B-401865; B-401865.2; B-401865.3; B-401865.4; B-401865.5; B-401865.6; B-401865.7, Navistar Defense, LLC; BAE Systems, Tactical Vehicle Systems LP, December 14, 2009
DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Decision
Matter of: Navistar Defense, LLC; BAE Systems, Tactical Vehicle Systems LP
File: B-401865; B-401865.2; B-401865.3; B-401865.4; B-401865.5; B-401865.6;B-401865.7
David
R. Hazelton, Esq., Donald M. Remy, Esq., Mark M. Noel, Esq., Benjamin N.
Ratner, Esq., Benjamin S. Wei, Esq., Kyle R. Jefcoat, Esq., Edward J. Shaprio,
Esq., Thomas H. Moore, Esq., and Derrick B. Farrell, Esq., Latham & Watkins
LLP; and Laurence H. Levine, Esq., Law Offices of Laurence H. Levine, for
Navistar Defense, LLC; and Rand L. Allen, Esq., Philip J. Davis, Esq., Paul F.
Khoury, Esq., Nicole P. Wishart, Esq., John R. Prairie, Esq., and Julie A.
Dunne, Esq., Wiley Rein LLP, for BAE Systems, Tactical Vehicle Systems LP, the
protesters.
Harvey
G. Sherzer, Esq., Scott Arnold, Esq., Tina D. Reynolds, Esq., Pablo Nichols,
Esq., Robert J. Moss, Esq., Ubong E. Akpan, Esq., and Shaunna E. Bailey, Esq.,
Dickstein Shapiro LLP, for Oshkosh Corporation, an intervenor.
Vera
Meza, Esq., and John Klecha, Esq., Department of the Army, for the agency.
Jonathan L. Kang, Esq., and Ralph O. White, Esq., Office of
the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
1.
Protest challenging evaluation of awardee's technical proposal is sustained
where agency did not reasonably apply a solicitation criterion which stated
that existing production capabilities will be viewed as having less risk than those
that do not currently exist.
2. Protest
challenging evaluation of protester's past performance is sustained where the
agency cannot produce a record that demonstrates the basis for the evaluation.
3. Protest
challenging evaluation of awardee's proposed price is denied where the depth
and detail of the agency's price realism analysis was a matter within its
discretion, and the record shows that the evaluation was reasonable.
DECISION
Navistar Defense, LLC, of Warrenville,
Illinois, and BAE Systems, Tactical Vehicle Systems LP, of Sealy, Texas,
protests the award of a contract to Oshkosh Corporation, of Oshkosh, Wisconsin,
under request for proposals (RFP) No. W56HZV-09-R-0083, issued by the Department of the Army, U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, for production of the family of medium
tactical vehicles (FMTV). Navistar and
BAE challenge the Army's evaluation of the offerors' technical and price
proposals, and contend that the selection decision was flawed.
BACKGROUND
The FMTV is a group of diesel engine, all-wheel drive
trucks and companion trailers. The FMTV program
began in 1991 and replaced a number of different vehicles with a "family" of trucks
and trailers based on a common cab and chassis, using a set of common parts. The commonality of designs and parts is
intended to simplify production and maintenance, and to reduce costs. The FMTV consists of 14 truck and 3 trailer
variants which vary by load capacity and mission requirements. As part of the Army's long-term armor
strategy (LTAS), an armored version of the FMTV cab was developed with the
capability of being fitted with additional armor, known as a "B-Kit." BAE is the incumbent contractor for
production of the FMTV.
The solicitation was issued on February 27, 2009, and
sought proposals to provide the follow-on production for the FMTV program. The RFP anticipated award of a
5-year requirements contract with fixed unit prices for the trucks and trailers,
certain fixed-price options such as B-Kit armor and alternate paint, and a
cost-plus-fixed-fee option for system technical support. The estimated quantities for the Army's requirements
are 12,415 trucks and 10,926 trailers. The
trucks and trailers are to be built in accordance with a technical data package
(TDP) which is owned by the government, and which was provided to offerors. The design for the cab portion of the trucks
is a proprietary design owned by BAE; certain drawings for this cab were provided
to offerors.
The
RFP identified three evaluation factors:
(1) capability, (2) past performance and small business participation,
and (3) price.[1] RFP sect. M.6.2.
The capability and price factors were of equal weight, and were each more
important than the past performance and small business participation
factor.
The
capability factor had two subfactors, production capability, and technical; the
production capability subfactor was "significantly more important" than the
technical subfactor. Id. Within the production capability subfactor,
the RFP identified seven elements of different weights. Specifically, the RFP stated that "the
Manufacturing Facilities, Time Phased Critical Path, and Key Tooling/Equipment
Elements are equal and individually more important than the Quality System and
Subcontractor Letters of Commitment Elements which are equal and individually
more important than Production Approach and Workforce/Manpower Planning
Elements which are equal in importance."
Id. In addition, the RFP
advised that a production capability that "currently exists" would be evaluated
as having a lower risk than a production capability "that does not currently
exist." RFP sect. M.9.1.
Within
the significantly less important technical subfactor, the RFP identified two
subfactors and advised that "the Proposed Cab Design Element is more important
than the Innovation Experience Element."
Id. Within the past
performance and small business participation factor, past performance was "significantly
more important" than small business participation. Id.
Under the price factor, the solicitation stated that the
agency would evaluate the reasonableness and realism of the Offeror's total
evaluated price. RFP sect. M.8.1. The RFP instructed offerors to provide a cost
buildup for their fixed prices, with data regarding profit and costs such as material,
labor, overhead, testing, engineering, other direct, and general and
administrative. RFP sect. L.2.4. As relevant here, the RFP also required
offerors to submit a bill of materials for direct cost items, as follows:
Material Cost. Offeror will provide the total direct material per vehicle. Provide a link to a separate bill of material spreadsheet for items with a unit price greater than $500 per vehicle. On this bill of material include description, vendor name, part number, quantity and unit of measure (per vehicle), price per item and extended [price] per vehicle, basis of price (quote, purchase order, estimate, etc.)
RFP sect. L.2.4.1.
The RFP identified an estimated vehicle and trailer
delivery schedule for the 5-year contract period for proposal planning and
evaluation purposes. RFP sections L.3.1.1,
L.3.1.2. The schedule set forth initial
delivery requirements of 24 trucks and 6 trailers in May and June 2010 for first article testing (FAT). Id.
No deliveries were due from June to September, and full production
deliveries were to begin in October 2010. Id.
The Army received initial proposals from three offerors by
the closing date of May 27: Navistar, BAE, and Oshkosh. As relevant here, Oshkosh stated in its
proposal for the facilities element of the production capability subfactor that
the company did not currently have one of the required facilities, an e-coat
facility.[2] Navistar Agency Report (AR) [3],
Supp. Documents, Oshkosh Initial Proposal, Vol. 2, at 1-109. Instead, Oshkosh stated that it would utilize subcontractors to perform the required e-coating for the early production requirements in May and June 2010, and would complete its own e-coat
facility by July 2010. As also relevant
here, Oshkosh stated that it would develop its own designs and production
approach for the cab based on the proprietary BAE data in the TDP. Navistar AR, Supp. Documents, Oshkosh Initial
Proposal, Vol. 2, at 2-9. As part of its
approach to the cab design element, Oshkosh proposed to build a prototype cab
in order to "eliminate[] production schedule risks associated with the cab TDP
and tooling." Id.
The agency convened separate evaluation teams to assess
proposals under the capability, past performance/small business participation,
and price factors. The agency also
convened a source selection evaluation board (SSEB) to review the evaluation
findings, and brief the source selection authority (SSA). The Army concluded that all offerors'
proposals were within the competitive range.
Navistar AR, Tab 11, Quality of Proposals Briefing, at 25. The agency conducted discussions with each
offeror through a series of written items for discussions (IFDs) which
requested written responses. All three
offerors submitted timely final proposals.
The Army's final evaluation ratings, as developed by the
SSEB, were as follows:[4]
|
NAVISTAR |
BAE |
OSHKOSH |
|
|
CAPABILITY FACTOR |
EXCELLENT/ |
EXCELLENT/ |
EXCELLENT/ |
|
PRODUCTION
CAPABILITY SUBFACTOR |
EXCELLENT/ |
EXCELLENT/ |
EXCELLENT/ |
|
Manufacturing
Facilities |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
|
Time
Phased Critical Path |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
|
Key
Tooling & Equipment |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
|
Quality
System |
Good/ |
Adequate/ |
Good/ |
|
Subcontractor
Letters of Commitment |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
Production
Approach |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
|
Workforce/Manpower |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
|
TECHNICAL
SUBFACTOR |
GOOD/ |
EXCELLENT/ |
EXCELLENT/ |
|
Cab
Design |
Good/Low Risk |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
|
Innovative
Engineering Change Experience |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
Excellent/ |
|
PAST PERFORMANCE AND
SMALL BUSINESS PARTICIPATION FACTOR |
GOOD/ |
GOOD/ |
GOOD/ |
|
PAST
PERFORMANCE SUBFACTOR |
GOOD/ |
GOOD/ LOW RISK |
GOOD/ LOW RISK |
|
SMALL
BUSINESS PARTICIPATION SUBFACTOR |
GOOD/ |
EXCELLENT/ |
GOOD/ |
|
TOTAL
PRICE |
[deleted] |
$3,462,891,786 |
$3,023,192,525 |
Navistar AR, Tab 14, SSD, at 3.
In the selection decision, the SSA found no basis to
distinguish between the proposals under any of the evaluation factors,
subfactors, or elements where the proposals received equal ratings. Navistar AR, Tab 14, SSD at 3-6. The SSA noted that the offerors had different
ratings in three areas: the quality
systems element of the production capability subfactor, the technical subfactor
(based on a difference in ratings for the cab design element of the technical
subfactor), and the small business participation subfactor. Id. at 3-5. Despite these differences, the SSA concluded
that "I find all three offerors' ratings in both the Capability Factor and the
Past Performance/Small Business Participation Factor" equal, and based her
selection decision on the Total Evaluated Price. Id. at 6. After concluding that each offeror's proposed
price was reasonable and realistic, the SSA selected Oshkosh's proposal for
award because its price was approximately $439.7 million less than BAE's price,
and $[deleted] less than Navistar's price.
Id.
The Army awarded the contract to Oshkosh on August 26, and
provided debriefings to Navistar and BAE on September 2 and 3,
respectively. These protests followed.
DISCUSSION
Navistar and BAE each challenge the Army's evaluation under
the capability and price factors, and Navistar challenges the agency's
evaluation of its own past performance. First,
we conclude that the agency's evaluation was unreasonable under the key tooling
and equipment element of the production capability subfactor. In this regard, the RFP set forth very clear
and specific groundrules about how the agency would evaluate risk under the
production capability subfactor, and the selection decision was inconsistent
with those groundrules. Second, because
the Army was unable to produce critical relevant documents supporting its evaluation
of Navistar's past performance, our Office has no basis on this record to conclude
that the evaluation was reasonable.
As a preliminary matter, this decision relies, in part,
upon the testimony of Army witnesses provided during a hearing conducted by our
Office on November 9 and 10, 2009. We heard
testimony from the SSA, the CO, the SSEB chair, the price evaluation team
leader, the capability factor team leader, the production capability subfactor
team leader, and the cab design evaluator.
In reviewing an agency's evaluation of offerors' proposals, we do not
limit our consideration to contemporaneously-documented evidence, but instead consider
all the information provided, including the parties' arguments, explanations,
and any hearing testimony. Remington
Arms Co., Inc., B-297374, B-297374.2, Jan. 12, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 32 at
10. While we generally give little or no
weight to reevaluations and judgments prepared in the heat of the adversarial
process, Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support, B-277263.2, B-277263.3, Sept.
29, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 91 at 15, post-protest explanations that provide a
detailed rationale for contemporaneous conclusions, and simply fill in
previously unrecorded details, will generally be considered in our review of
the rationality of selection decisions--so long as those explanations are
credible and consistent with the contemporaneous record. NWT, Inc.; PharmChem Labs., Inc., B-280988, B-280988.2, Dec. 17, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 158 at 16.
Key Tooling and Equipment Element Evaluation
Navistar and BAE first argue that the Army unreasonably
evaluated Oshkosh's proposal as excellent/low risk under the key tooling and
equipment element of the production capability subfactor. The protesters contend that the Army's
selection decision unreasonably concluded that, contrary to the record, Oshkosh
had demonstrated that all of the required key tooling and equipment currently
existed, and that there was no basis to distinguish between the competing
proposals in this area.
During the hearing, the SSA conceded that that selection
decision incorrectly stated that Oshkosh possessed all of the required key
tooling and equipment. Hearing Transcript
(Tr.) at 701:19-703:12. Nonetheless, the
Army contends that the solicitation did not require the agency to assess risk based
on whether an offeror currently had all key tooling and equipment. Instead, the agency argues that the RFP only required
the agency to evaluate an offeror's proposed approach to acquire the required
items. In our view, the agency's evaluation
of Oshkosh's proposal under the key tooling and equipment element was
inconsistent with the plain language of the solicitation.
The evaluation of an offeror's proposal is a matter within
the agency's discretion. IPlus, Inc.,
B-298020, B-298020.2, June 5, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 90 at 7, 13. In reviewing a protest against an agency's
evaluation of proposals, our Office will not reevaluate proposals but instead
will examine the record to determine whether the agency's judgment was
reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria and applicable
procurement statutes and regulations. See
Shumaker Trucking & Excavating Contractors, Inc., B-290732, Sept.
25, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 169 at 3. A
protester's mere disagreement with the agency's judgment in its determination
of the relative merit of competing proposals does not establish that the
evaluation was unreasonable. VT Griffin Servs., Inc., B-299869.2, Nov. 10, 2008,
2008 CPD para. 219 at 4. While we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the agency, we will question the agency's
conclusions where they are inconsistent with the solicitation criteria,
undocumented, or not reasonably based. Sonetronics,
Inc., B-289459.2, Mar. 18, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 48 at 3.
The RFP required offerors to provide the following
information regarding key tooling and equipment in their proposals:
Identify the extent to which the Key Tooling and Equipment currently exists and are configured to produce the FMTV. For any new Key Tooling and Equipment proposed, provide a milestone schedule to obtain any new Key Tooling and Equipment. Identify any impact that acquiring of the new Key Tooling and Equipment may have on the Government's required delivery date or to meet surge and other vehicle or major component production requirements.
RFP sect. L.3.1.3.5.3.
The RFP expressly anticipated making use of the requested
information about whether key tooling and equipment currently existed. For example, it stated that the seven
elements within the production capability subfactor, including the element of key
tooling and equipment, would be evaluated based on the following understanding
of risk for each element:
A production capability that (a) currently exists, (b) is producing items which are the same or similar in complexity to the FMTV, and (c) has excess production capacity sufficient to support the anticipated FMTV delivery schedule reflected in paragraphs L.3.1.1 & L.3.1.2, will be considered a lower risk than a proposed production capability that does not currently exist, is not producing items that are the same or similar to the FMTV, or currently has no excess production capacity . . . .
RFP sect. M.9.1.
Within the production capability subfactor, the RFP also
provided more detailed information applicable to each of the seven
elements. Specifically, the RFP stated
that the agency would evaluate offerors' proposals under the key tooling and
equipment element of the production capability subfactor as follows:
Key Tooling and Equipment Element. (See L.3.1.3.5 through L.3.1.3.5.3) The SSEB will assess the risk of the offerors plan to acquire Key Tooling and Equipment needed to support production of FMTV trucks and trailers as specified in the delivery schedules in L.3.1.1 & L.3.1.2). The Government will also assess the risk that the milestone schedule for acquiring Key Tooling and Equipment provided by the offeror will reduce or increase the risk of complying with the timely production of key components, FMTV trucks and FMTV trailers.
RFP sect. M.9.1.b.
In answering the RFP, Oshkosh's proposal set forth
numerous charts detailing whether the required key tooling and equipment was "on
hand" or whether it would be obtained later.
Navistar AR, Oshkosh Final Proposal, Vol. 2, at 1-142-1-147,
1-150-1-151, 1-156-1-197. For equipment not
yet "on hand," the proposal included a schedule for when the items would be procured,
installed, and finally "proved out" for production. Id.
As relevant here, Oshkosh's proposal listed over 100 items of key
tooling and equipment to be obtained; these items included welding fixtures for
the chassis (which were due to be ready by November 2009), welding robots for
the cab (which were due to be ready by February 2009), and all of the required items
for its proposed e-coat facility (which was due to be completed by July 2010). Id. at 1-146, 1-166, 1-169.
With respect to the cab design element, Oshkosh stated
that it had developed a prototype cab "to determine what tooling is necessary,
and identify the best way to configure such tooling." Id. at 2-9c. In its final proposal, the awardee explained
that due to difficulties encountered in the development of its prototype cab, "[a]dditional
tooling will be created to facilitate the production welding process." Id. at 2-9d. The awardee also stated that it had entered
into contracts with a vendor to "produce the stampings required for the FMTV
LTAS cab."
Id. at 2-9.
In assessing Oshkosh's proposal, the Army's evaluators
concluded that the proposal "reflects an excellent approach which will clearly
support the attainment of contract requirements." Navistar AR, Tab 20, Oshkosh Interim Key
Tooling Evaluation, at 3. Moreover, the
agency evaluated the awardee's key tooling and equipment under each of six
areas identified in section L of the RFP, and concluded that the items existed,
had been procured, or were on schedule to be obtained. Id. at 4. In summary, the agency evaluators rated Oshkosh
excellent/very low risk overall under the key tooling and equipment element of
the production subfactor based on their conclusion that the proposal presented
no weaknesses and had one strength, i.e., "Offeror has procured LTAS cab
stamping dies in advance." Id. The SSEB final report repeated the same
conclusions. Navistar AR, Tab 13, SSEB Final
Report, at 38.
In the selection decision, the SSA stated that the
offerors each merited excellent/very low risk ratings under the key tooling and
equipment element based on her conclusion that all offerors had the needed
items as follows:
In evaluating Key Tooling & Equipment, I find that BAE has all necessary tooling and equipment on hand and in good condition. I find that Navistar has all necessary tooling and equipment on hand and in good condition at the Springfield Assembly Plant line that will be specific to the FMTV and that their trailer manufacturer has all the necessary tooling and equipment from their commercial trailer operation. I find that Oshkosh has all the necessary key tooling and equipment, including procurement of stamping dies for their LTAS cab in advance of award to mitigate risk.
Navistar AR, Tab 14, SSD at 4.
During the hearing, however, the SSA testified that the above
quote (from the SSD) was inaccurate, and did not reflect her understanding about
whether Oshkosh and Navistar had all of the necessary key tooling and
equipment. Tr. at 701:19-703:12. Instead, the SSA testified that she
understood that neither Oshkosh nor Navistar had all of the required key
tooling and equipment at the time of the selection decision, even though this
understanding is not reflected in the decision document. Id.
The agency argues that the SSA's judgment here was
reasonable because the solicitation required only that offerors demonstrate
their plans to acquire key tooling and equipment. The agency argues that its intent in drafting
the "currently exists" clause was merely to limit competition to a company that
has the ability to manufacture trucks and trailers similar to the FMTV, as
opposed to, for example, a smaller company without such abilities. See Agency Post-Hearing Comments at
7-8. In this regard, the SSA testified
that she understood the RFP as merely requiring offerors to demonstrate a "credible
plan" for obtaining the required key tooling and equipment. Id. at 703:4-7.
While the solicitation anticipated that the agency would
evaluate an offeror's "plan to acquire Key Tooling and Equipment," it also
states that an offeror whose key tooling and equipment does not exist will be
viewed as presenting more risk than an offeror that has such items on
hand. We see no contradiction in the
language of the two provisions, and we think they must be read together in a
way that gives meaning to both provisions.
As discussed above, Section L of the RFP instructed
offerors to [i]dentify the extent to which the Key Tooling and Equipment
currently exists and are configured to produce the FMTV." RFP para. L.3.1.3.5.3. The "currently exists" clause stated that an
offeror will be evaluated as presenting lower risk if its production capability
has all three of the following characteristics:
(1) it exists, (2) it is producing similar items, and (3) it has excess
capacity. Conversely, an offeror could
expect a higher risk rating if its production capacity: (1) did not exist, (2) was not producing
similar items, or (3) did not have excess capacity. RFP sect. M.9.1.
We think that the solicitation's ground rules for
evaluating the key tooling element clearly intended to differentiate between
existing and non-existing production capabilities. Navistar AR, Tab 20, Oshkosh Interim Key
Tooling Evaluation, at 4. The SSEB chair
and the SSA each stated that they understood the clause to refer to an offeror's
factory or facility, rather than the whole of the production capability
subfactor. See Tr. at 606:5-606:9
(testimony of the SSEB chair); 705:19-706:16 (testimony of the SSA). The RFP, however, states that the agency will
consider the risk associated with an offeror's "production capability"--under
which the RFP identified seven elements--and not just the element that
considered an offeror's manufacturing facilities. We think the agency's interpretation of the
solicitation's "currently exists" language, as related by agency witnesses is
inconsistent with the plain language of the RFP.
The record shows that the Army failed to reasonably
consider the comparative risk in Oshkosh's ability to procure, install, and "prove
out" the required key tooling and equipment.[5]
As discussed above, Oshkosh's proposal
identified more than 100 items of key tooling and equipment that were not on
hand--including items in categories where the agency incorrectly concluded that
all necessary items already existed. See
Navistar AR, Tab 20, Oshkosh Interim Key Tooling Evaluation, at 3. On this record, we think that the agency's
evaluation was inconsistent with the terms of the solicitation, and we sustain
the protest on this basis.[6]
Past Performance Subfactor Evaluation
Navistar next argues that the Army unreasonably evaluated
its past performance as good/low risk, as opposed to excellent/very low risk. It also contends that the record here does
not contain the documents relied upon by the agency for its evaluation, and
therefore does not support the rating.
We agree with Navistar. Since
this record provides no basis for our Office to determine whether the
evaluation was reasonable in this area, we sustain this challenge.
The
RFP required offerors to submit references for up to five recent and relevant
commercial or government contracts. RFP
sect. L.4.1. The RFP advised that the agency
would evaluate offerors' past performance based on three primary areas: technical performance, delivery, and business
relations. RFP sect. M.10.1.1. The RFP provided a questionnaire for past
performance references which listed 20 questions addressing technical,
delivery, and customer satisfaction performance. Offerors were required to "send a copy of the
past performance questionnaire directly to the appropriate Contracting Officer
Representative (COR), PCO and relevant customers." RFP sect. L.4.1.4.
Navistar identified two prior contracts for past
performance references: a Marine Corps
contract for production of mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles, and
an Army contract for manufacture, test and support of medium tactical vehicles
(MTVs) under a Foreign Military Sales contract.[7] Navistar AR, Final Proposal, Vol. 3, at
8-15. The agency received questionnaire
responses from four officials familiar with Navistar's performance on the MRAP
contract: the acquisition CO, the
program manager, a contracting specialist, and a representative of the Defense
Contract Management Agency (DCMA). Navistar
AR, Tab 30, Navistar Interim Past Performance Evaluation[8];
Supp. Documents, Deleted SSEB Interim Report Slides, at 4.[9]
These responses were summarized in the Army's interim past
performance evaluation rating, and the numerical scores were tallied in a chart
in the SSEB interim report. Id. For the MTV Troop/Cargo contract, Navistar
received an overall "excellent" rating.
Navistar AR, Tab 30, Navistar Interim Past Performance Evaluation, at
6. For the MRAP contract, Navistar
received an overall "adequate" rating, based on the following element ratings: adequate for technical performance, adequate
for delivery, and good for customer relations.
Id.
In its report on the protest, the Army provided only two
questionnaires concerning Navistar, one for its MTV contract, and one from the
acquisition CO (ACO) for its MRAP contract.
The MRAP ACO's questionnaire response contained three positive, and no
negative ratings and comments. The deleted
SSEB briefing slides show, however, that the agency received questionnaire
responses for Navistar's MRAP contract from four individuals, providing 32 responses. Navistar AR, Supp. Documents, Deleted SSEB
Interim Report Slides, at 4. The agency explains
its inability to produce the missing evaluation documents as follows:
The Army admits that it cannot produce the Past Performance Questionnaire (PPQ) response containing the adverse comments/ ratings from the USMC Program Manager . . . for the MRAP . . . vehicles. Unfortunately the response to the questionnaire was not saved electronically (i.e. scanned) and the paper copy, along with copies of all of the PPQ responses were shredded at the conclusion of the SSEB. This was an inadvertent error and unintentional.
Navistar SAR at 3.
Thus, of the 32 questionnaire answers received from the four individuals
identified above, the documents produced by the agency--the MRAP ACO's
questionnaire response and the agency's IFDs and interim past performance
evaluation--support only three of the positive ratings, and the agency's
summary of seven of the negative ratings.
There is no record of the narrative comments for the 22 other ratings
received--almost all of which appear, based on the numerical summaries, to be
positive--or the agency's evaluation of these ratings.
Navistar challenges its "adequate" rating for the MRAP
contract, arguing that the agency did not reasonably evaluate its responses to
discussions questions. Additionally, the
protester also contends that the agency's evaluation cannot support its rating
of adequate for the MRAP contract, and hence its past performance rating
overall, because the agency cannot provide the documentation for the
evaluation.
Notwithstanding its inability to produce the relevant
questionnaires concerning the MRAP contract, the Army argues that the record is
adequate for our review because the agency allowed Navistar to address negative
ratings and comments provided by the MRAP PM during discussions. Although Navistar responded to each negative
rating and comment, the Army's evaluation states that the questionnaire
respondent found no basis to change the negative rating. AR, Tab 30, Navistar Interim Past Performance
Evaluation, at 6-7.
While, as a general matter, the evaluation of an offeror's
past performance is a matter within the discretion of the contracting agency,
we will question an agency's evaluation of past performance where it is
unreasonable or undocumented. Clean
Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc., B-296176.2, Dec. 9, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 222 at
3. Although an agency is not required to
retain every document generated during its evaluation of proposals, the agency's
evaluation must be sufficiently documented to allow our Office to review the
merits of a protest. Apptis, Inc.,
B-299457 et al., May 23, 2007, 2008 CPD para. 49 at 10. Where an agency fails to document or retain
evaluation materials, it bears the risk that there may not be adequate
supporting rationale in the record for us to conclude that the agency had a
reasonable basis for its source selection decision. Id.
In sum, we think that the record here is inadequate for
our Office to determine whether the agency's evaluation of Navistar's past
performance was reasonable. The agency's
evaluation cited the existence of positive and negative comments; however, only
certain of the negative comments were described, leaving our Office with no
insight as to the nature of almost all of the positive comments, and no insight
as to how the agency viewed any of them.[10] Because we cannot review the documents upon
which the agency relied, we cannot determine whether the conclusions that the
agency drew from them with regard to both the positive and negative comments
were supported by these documents. We
sustain the protest.
Remaining Issues
The issues
discussed above reflect the areas where we agreed with the protesters, and
concluded that they were prejudiced by the errors in the agency's
evaluation. The remainder of this
decision discusses issues where we disagree with the protesters. These areas involve: (1) BAE's argument that the agency should
have found Oshkosh's cab design unacceptable due to its use of materials
different from those specified in the TDP (or alternatively, that the agency
should have assessed greater risk in the proposal's approach to cab design);
(2) the agency's evaluation of price; and (3) Navistar's argument that the
agency's affirmative determination of responsibility with respect to Oshkosh is
flawed.[11]
Cab Design Element Evaluation
BAE argues that the
Army unreasonably evaluated Oshkosh's proposal as excellent/low risk under the
cab design element of the technical subfactor.
BAE raises two primary arguments:
(1) Oshkosh's proposed use of materials that are different from those
specified in the TDP rendered its proposal technically unacceptable, and (2)
the agency failed to reasonably evaluate the risk raised by Oshkosh's problems
developing a prototype version of the cab.
For the reasons discussed below, we disagree with BAE.
The cab design element under the technical
subfactor considered the proposed designs for building the cab to be used on
all variants of these trucks. As
discussed above, the government owns the TDP for the FMTV overall, while BAE
owns the proprietary designs for the cab portion of the trucks. The RFP provided BAE's drawings of the cab,
but not the detailed design and production specifications.
In its initial proposal, Oshkosh stated that it would create drawings and manufacturing processes for the cab based on the proprietary BAE designs provided in the RFP. Navistar AR, Supp. Documents, Oshkosh Initial Proposal, Vol. 2, at 2-9. Oshkosh also stated that it was building a prototype cab prior to award to "eliminate[] production schedule risks associated with the cab TDP and tooling." Id.
In its final
proposal, Oshkosh stated that it would use non-galvanized steel on the parts of
the cab that support the armor welding because, during the development of its
prototype cab, the company had experienced difficulties with "off-gassing," a
problem that can occur when zinc coating on galvanized steel is welded. Navistar AR, Tab 00H, Oshkosh Final Proposal,
Vol. 2, at 2-11o. While Oshkosh acknowledged
that non-galvanized steel does not have the same corrosion resistance as
galvanized steel, it anticipated that by e-coating all components of the cab it
could meet the RFP's corrosion-resistance requirements. The proposal also stated that the company
would conduct additional tests to address risks concerning this issue. Id.
Moreover, the proposal also acknowledged that its first prototype cab
demonstrated that the "available tooling did not support the roof structure
adequately which resulted in unacceptable dimensional variations in a few
areas." Id. at 2-9c. Oshkosh stated that it would build a second
prototype cab to address these issues. Id.
The Army's evaluation
of Oshkosh's final proposal noted the change to non-galvanized steel, and
stated that the "Government has reviewed these materials and does not foresee
any potentially negative impacts," and that "these materials are deemed to be
acceptable in the construction of the cab spaceframe." Navistar AR, Tab 00P, Navistar Final Cab
Evaluation, at 1.
BAE first argues that Oshkosh's cab design was unacceptable because it did not comply with the TDP, which includes drawings that specify the use of galvanized steel. The Army acknowledges that galvanized steel is a requirement for one of the cab drawings, but argues the RFP permitted offerors to propose alternate designs for the cab.
We think that the RFP permitted offerors to submit an alternative cab design that took exception to the TDP. See RFP sect. C.1.2. The RFP states--albeit in a somewhat circular manner--that contractors are "required to build the vehicles as described on the drawings in the TDP with the exception that the Government will consider alternate designs to the base LTAS cab w/door assembly P/N 12505151." Id. (emphasis added). The provision continued: "Alternate cab designs shall comply with the base LTAS cab as described on drawing 12505151." Id. (emphasis added). Section M of the solicitation states that the agency will evaluate offerors' proposed "designs to the base LTAS cab w/door assembly P/N 12505151," and that the design information would be "evaluated against the cab interface control drawing (ICD), the vehicle TDP, and performance specification requirements." RFP sect. M.9.2.1.
At best, the RFP contained a patent ambiguity concerning whether alternate proposals had to comply with the TDP; given this ambiguity, we think both BAE's and the Army's interpretations of the solicitation are reasonable. Thus, BAE's argument that only its interpretation of the cab design requirement is reasonable is untimely as it was not raised prior to the solicitation's closing time. Bid Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.2(a)(1) (2009); See Poly-Pacific Techs., Inc., B-293925.3, May 16, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 100 at 3. Moreover, as discussed below, we think the agency reasonably evaluated Oshkosh's proposed use of an alternative metal.
Despite BAE's arguments to the contrary, we also think that the agency reasonably viewed as a strength Oshkosh's proposal to develop a prototype cab.[12] The RFP did not require offerors to produce prototypes; instead, Oshkosh voluntarily undertook this effort to identify and address risks in advance of contract award. While BAE argues that the agency should have been concerned that Oshkosh needed to build a second prototype to resolve difficulties experienced with its first, the agency viewed the approach of building a prototype as a strength because it allowed Oshkosh to identify risks prior to performance. On this record, we think the agency was within its discretion to view Oshkosh's work on its prototype as a strength, rather than a risk.
Finally, we note that during the hearing, the Army cab design evaluator testified that he was aware of and understood the risks posed by Oshkosh's attempt to address the difficulties arising from welding galvanized steel. See Tr. at 36:20-37:11, 112:9-14, 117:12-118:2, 118:10-14, 120:11-14; see also Navistar AR, Tab 00P, Navistar Final Cab Evaluation, at 1. The evaluator also testified that he was aware of and understood the difficulties identified in Oshkosh's proposal concerning "unacceptable dimensional variations" in the first prototype. Id. at 133:11-134:9. Despite these risks, the evaluator testified that he viewed these problems as relatively minor, that problems like these could be expected when a new contractor was developing designs from BAE's drawings, and that Oshkosh's identification of potential problems through its use of prototypes gave him confidence that Oshkosh would solve these problems. See id. at 118:10-119:5. With regard to the selection decision, the SSA testified that she was generally aware of these issues, but relied on the judgments of the technical evaluators that Oshkosh's proposal merited a low risk rating. See Tr. at 696:6-697:2, 697:12-698:5.
In conclusion, we think the record shows that the agency was aware of the potential risks raised by Oshkosh's proposal in the area of cab design, and reasonably determined that these risks did not pose a significant risk of unsuccessful contract performance. In this regard, we think the agency acted within its discretion when it concluded that the risks were relatively minor, and that Oshkosh's proposed approach reasonably mitigated those risks. We also think the SSA reasonably concluded that there was no meaningful difference under this evaluation element between BAE's proposal, which relied on its current production of the cab, and Oshkosh's proposal, because the agency had confidence that Oshkosh's pre-award efforts served to mitigate the risk that Oshkosh would be unable to perform the contract requirements. We think these judgments were well within the discretion afforded evaluators and the SSA, and on this record, we find no basis to sustain the protest.
Price Realism EvaluationNavistar and BAE next argue that the Army failed to
reasonably evaluate the realism of Oshkosh's proposed price.[13] As discussed above, the RFP stated that the
Army would evaluate offeror's proposed prices for realism and
reasonableness. RFP sect. M.8.1. The protesters primarily contend that the agency failed to reasonably evaluate the profit, material, and general and administrative (G&A) portions of Oshkosh's fixed price. We disagree.
Agencies are only required to perform a cost realism
analysis when the solicitation anticipates the award of a cost-reimbursement
contract. In contrast, where an RFP
contemplates the award of a fixed-price contract, or a fixed-price portion of a
contract, an agency may, as here, provide in the solicitation for the use of a
price realism analysis for the limited purpose of measuring an offeror's
understanding of the requirements or to assess the risk inherent in an offeror's
proposal. Puglia Eng'g of California,
Inc., B-297413 et al., Jan. 20, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 33 at 6. Although the FAR does not use the term "price
realism," it states that cost realism analysis may be used to evaluate
fixed-price proposals for purposes of assessing proposal risk, but not for the
purpose of adjusting an offeror's evaluated price. FAR sect. 15.404-1(d)(3).
As our Office has repeatedly held, the depth of an agency's
price realism is a matter within the sound exercise of the agency's
discretion. Citywide Managing Servs.
of Port Washington, Inc., B-281287.12, B-281287.13, Nov. 15, 2000, 2001 CPD
para. 6 at 4-5. In reviewing protests
challenging price realism evaluations, our focus is whether the agency's review
was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation. Grove Resource Solutions, Inc.,
B-296228, B-296228.2, July 1, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 133 at 4-5. As a general matter, it is unobjectionable
for an offeror to submit a below-cost proposal for a fixed-price contract, since fixed-price contracts generally are
not subject to adjustment during performance and the contractor, not the
agency, bears the financial risk of cost overruns. Crown Title Corp., B-298426, Sept. 21,
2006, 2006 CPD para. 145 at 5-6.
With regard to Navistar's and BAE's specific challenges, the
protesters first argue that the agency did not reasonably evaluate Oshkosh's
proposed material costs, in part because Oshkosh's material costs were lower
than theirs.
The Army concluded that Oshkosh's material costs were
realistic, even though its proposal only provided details regarding
approximately 66 percent of its material costs; these costs were supported by
vendor quotes, or estimates based on similar parts or historical prices. Navistar AR, Tab 16, Interim Oshkosh Price
Evaluation, at 14. The record shows, however, that
the price evaluator understood that the limited amount of information was a
result of the RFP's requirement, discussed above, that offerors identify in
their bill of materials only those direct costs with a unit price in excess of
$500 per vehicle; the agency assumed that the remaining material costs were
excluded because Oshkosh planned to produce many of its vehicle components
in-house. See Tr. at
569:22-570:12; Navistar AR, Supp. Documents, Retrospective Price Realism
Report, at 4. Further, the agency assumed
that Oshkosh's proposed material costs were lower than those proposed by BAE
and Navistar because Oshkosh planned to produce more of its components in‑house,
and rely less on subcontractors. Id. We see nothing unreasonable about the agency's
evaluation.
Next, BAE argues that Oshkosh's proposal did not provide a
breakdown of the material and labor resources required to produce the cab. This level of detail, however, was not
required under the solicitation, and the price evaluator testified that the
agency understood the cab costs to be included within the general material and
labor cost categories in Oshkosh's price proposal. Tr. at 564:9-19, 569:22-570:12; 573:1-17. Again, we see nothing unreasonable about this
conclusion.
Finally, the protesters contend that the agency failed to
reasonably consider the risks posed by Oshkosh's decision to offer a [deleted]
percent G&A rate, particularly in light of the fact that it offered a [deleted]
profit rate of [deleted] percent.
The record here shows that the agency addressed this issue
during discussions, and asked Oshkosh to explain its decision to [deleted]. Navistar AR, Tab 001, IFD_OCP_001 at 1. In its response, Oshkosh both explained its
rationale, and confirmed its pricing. Id.
at 2. In addition, Oshkosh and the Army agreed
on a modified contract clause [deleted].
Navistar AR, Tab 00L, Oshkosh IFD_OCP_020; Tr. at 533:9-534:6. The agency explained that it relied on these
exchanges, as well as its understanding of Oshkosh's current and anticipated
business volumes, to conclude that [deleted] G&A costs for the FMTV
contract did not render Oshkosh's proposal unrealistic. As discussed above, since the contractor, and
not the government, bears the financial risk of any cost overrun, it is unobjectionable
for an offeror to submit a below-cost proposal for a fixed-price contract, Crown Title Corp., supra. Accordingly, we find no basis in this record
to conclude that the agency's evaluation of this issue was unreasonable.
The protesters argue, and we agree, that the Army's interim
and final price evaluation provided limited detail concerning its price realism
evaluation. Nonetheless, the agency
prepared what it called a "Retrospective Report" concerning the realism of
Oshkosh's price proposal during the course of this protest. The agency explained that the retrospective
report was intended to summarize and provide additional detail concerning
conclusions that were reached during the procurement, and to provide more
detail concerning the summary conclusions that Oshkosh's proposed price and the
constituent cost elements were realistic.
Navistar SAR at 4. We think that
the agency's retrospective report and the testimony by the price evaluator are consistent
with the contemporaneous record, and that they show that the agency conducted a
reasonable price realism analysis. See
NWT, Inc.; PharmChem Labs., Inc., supra.
The record here shows that the agency evaluated the
offerors' proposed profit and material, subcontracting, warranty, indirect,
G&A, labor, and federal tax costs. See,
e.g., Navistar AR, Tab 16, Interim Oshkosh Price Evaluation, at 14-15; see
also Supp. Documents, Retrospective Price Realism Report, at 2-9. During the hearing, the price evaluator
testified that he consulted with the technical evaluators as to whether they
considered offerors' proposed costs realistic for the work to performed, and
that no concerns were identified. See,
e.g., Tr. at 508:4-509:4, 544:20-545:6, 571:17-572:7, 577:17-578:8,
581:15-19.
The SSEB final report noted the differences between the
offerors' proposed price for each FMTV vehicle and trailer variant, as compared
with the historical cost for those items.
Navistar AR, Tab 13, SSEB Final Report, at 142. The agency concluded that there were three "Major
Reasons for Price Differences" between the offerors' proposals: (1) Oshkosh's lower costs for its in-house
production, and its use of "little subcontracting," compared with the other
offerors; (2) Oshkosh's lower profit rate of [deleted] percent, as compared to
Navistar's and BAE's higher profit rates of [deleted] percent and [deleted] percent,
respectively; and (3) Oshkosh's [deleted] lower G&A rate of [deleted] percent,
as compared with Navistar's and BAE's higher G&A of [deleted] to [deleted] percent,
and [deleted] percent, respectively. Id.
at 92. The SSA concluded that, based on
the information she reviewed, the offerors' proposed prices were reasonable and
realistic. Navistar AR, Tab 14, SSD, at
6. Based on our review of the
contemporaneous record, the retrospective document, and the testimony provided
by the Army price evaluator, we think that the agency conducted a reasonable,
and properly documented, price evaluation.
Oshkosh's Financial Capability
Finally, Navistar argues that the Army failed to reasonably
evaluate Oshkosh's financial capability, as required by the solicitation. In this regard, Navistar argues that the CO's
affirmative determination of responsibility for Oshkosh was flawed for two
reasons: (1) the CO did not consider two
reports prepared by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) concerning
Oshkosh, and (2) the CO improperly relied on a pre-award survey prepared by the
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and did not adequately scrutinize or
question the survey's conclusions. We
disagree.
Contracts may only be awarded to responsible prospective
contractors. FAR sect. 9.103(a). In making a responsibility determination, the CO must determine, among other things, that the contractor has "adequate financial resources to perform the contract, or the ability to
obtain them." FAR sect. 9.104-1(a). We will
consider a challenge to a CO's affirmative determination of responsibility only
where it is alleged that definitive responsibility criteria in the solicitation
were not met, or where the protester identifies evidence raising serious
concerns that, in reaching the responsibility determination, the CO
unreasonably failed to consider available relevant information or otherwise
violated statute or regulation. 4 C.F.R.
sect. 21.5(c); T.F. Boyle Transp., Inc., B-310708, B-310708.2, Jan. 29,
2008, 2008 CPD para. 52 at 5.
The RFP stated that, as part of the CO's determination of
responsibility, "the Government may assess the offerors financial and
management capabilities to meet the solicitation requirements." RFP sect. M.5.
The Army states that the CO determined that Oshkosh was a responsible
offeror, and as part of that determination concluded that the awardee had the
financial capability to perform the contract.
Navistar AR at 19; Navistar SAR at 9. The CO states
that he relied on a pre-award survey that was prepared at the Army's request by
the DCMA, which concluded that, based on its financial condition, Oshkosh was a
"MODERATE RISK contractor," but that contract award was nonetheless recommended. Navistar AR at 19; Navistar AR, Tab 43, DCMA
Pre-Award Survey, at 5 of 11. The CO did
not separately document his determination, but instead, consistent with the
FAR, indicated that he viewed Oshkosh as a responsible offeror by signing the
contract. See FAR sect. 9.105-2(a)(1)
("The contracting officer's signing
of a contract constitutes a determination that the prospective contractor is
responsible with respect to that contract.")
Navistar first argues that the CO should have also considered
two DCAA reports concerning Oshkosh that were prepared in connection with other
procurements. The record shows that
these audit reports were provided to the SSEB chair, but were not provided to
the CO, and were not considered by him in his responsibility
determination.
We note first that neither of these DCAA reports identified
any specific concerns with Oshkosh's financial capability. Instead, in both reports DCAA specifically
declined to take a position on Oshkosh's financial capability, and recommended a
future review. See Navistar AR,
Supp. Documents, DCAA Report, June 6, 2008, at 2; DCAA Report, February 5, 2009,
at 1. The Army elected to request a
review of Oshkosh's financial capability by DMCA, and the record shows that the
resulting DCMA report was reviewed and relied upon by the CO in his affirmative
determination of responsibility.
Navistar AR at 19; Navistar SAR at 9; Tr. at 646:18-647:4. On this record, we find no basis to conclude
that the CO unreasonably failed to consider available relevant
information.
Navistar also argues that the CO did not adequately
scrutinize the DMCA audit report. During
the hearing, the CO acknowledged that he did not understand certain conclusions
in the DCMA report, and thus did not make a completely independent judgment as
to whether DCMA's conclusions about Oshkosh's financial status were accurate. See, e.g., Tr. at 674:3-14. Despite this testimony, we think the CO did
not abuse his discretion by accepting the conclusions of the pre-award survey
that recommended award, notwithstanding Oshkosh's moderate risk rating, given
the DCMA's detailed analysis and specific conclusions. We find no basis here to conclude that any of
the exceptions to our jurisdictional bar concerning challenges to a CO's
affirmative determination of responsibility applies, and therefore dismiss this
aspect of Navistar's argument. [14]
Conclusion and Prejudice
As discussed above, the protesters raised multiple
challenges to the Army's evaluation of offerors' proposals under all of the
evaluation factors. With the exception
of two areas, we find that the agency's evaluation was reasonable. We conclude, however, that the agency's
errors with regard to the key tooling and equipment element of the production
capability subfactor and the past performance subfactor warrant sustaining the
protest because we think, as described below, that the outcome of the
competition could have been affected and that the protesters were thereby
prejudiced by those errors. See McDonald-Bradley,
B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 54 at 3; see also, Statistica,
Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1681 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
In essence, the record in this procurement shows that the
agency did not conduct a tradeoff analysis because the SSA viewed the proposals
as equal with regard to the non-price evaluation factors. Specifically, the SSA found no differences
between the offerors' proposals under the capability or the past
performance/small business evaluator factors, and concluded that she "must
therefore rely on the Total Evaluated Price as the determining Factor in my
decision." Navistar AR, Tab 14, SSD, at
6. With regard to the elements of the
production capability subfactor, the SSA stated as follows: "While all three offerors have subtle
differences in specific details regarding these seven elements, they are all
rated Excellent with a Very Low Risk, and therefore, I find no meaningful
differences between them as evaluated." Id.
at 4.
With regard to the key tooling and equipment element, we
think that the solicitation explicitly identified the manner in which the Army
would evaluate risk. It is a fundamental
principle of government procurement that competitions must be conducted on an
equal basis, that is, offerors must be treated equally and be provided with a
common basis for the preparation of their proposals. Continental RPVs, B-292768.2,
B-292768.3, Dec. 11, 2003, 2004 CPD para. 56 at 8.
Contracting officials may not announce in the solicitation that they
will use one evaluation scheme and then follow another without informing
offerors of the changed plan and providing them an opportunity to submit
proposals on that basis. The S.M.
Stoller Corp., B-400937 et al., Mar. 25, 2009, 2009 CPD para. 193 at
5-6. Our Office will sustain a protest
that an agency improperly waived or relaxed its requirements for the awardee
where the protester establishes a reasonable possibility that it was prejudiced
by the agency's actions. Datastream
Sys., Inc., B-291653, Jan. 24, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 30 at 6.
Key tooling and equipment was one of the three most
important elements under production capability, which was the most important
subfactor under the capability evaluation factor. Thus, if the agency had properly evaluated
Oshkosh's proposal under this element, following the evaluation scheme set
forth in the solicitation, the awardee's proposal could have received a lower rating--or,
to be more specific, a higher risk rating--and the agency would have been
required to conduct a tradeoff between the price and non-price evaluation
factors. We therefore conclude that both
protesters, Navistar and BAE, were prejudiced by the Army's evaluation.[15]
With regard to the evaluation of Navistar's past
performance, we conclude, as discussed above, that there is not enough
documentation in the record for our Office to assess the reasonableness of the Army's
evaluation. Navistar received one
excellent and one adequate rating for its past performance references. Because the record does not provide support for
the "adequate" rating for one of the two past performance references, there is
a possibility that Navistar's past performance rating could improve from good
to excellent. Moreover, because the past
performance subfactor was "significantly more important" than the small
business subfactor, there is a possibility that Navistar's past performance
rating could improve in a way that would increase its rating above the "good"
rating received by all three offerors under the past performance/small business
participation evaluation factor. Such an
improvement, would, again, require the agency to conduct a tradeoff between the
price and non-price evaluation factors. We
therefore conclude that Navistar was independently prejudiced by the agency's
past performance evaluation.
RECOMMENDATION
We recommend that the Army reevaluate these proposals under
the key tooling and equipment element in a manner consistent with the terms of
the solicitation. The agency should also
consider whether its evaluation under the time phased critical path element was
affected by its conclusions regarding the key tooling and equipment evaluation.[16] We also recommend that the agency conduct a
new evaluation of Navistar's past performance that adequately documents the
agency's judgments. Following its reevaluation
of offerors' proposals, the agency should make a new selection decision. If Oshkosh is not found to offer the best
value to the government, the agency should terminate Oshkosh's contract for the
convenience of the government.
Finally, we recommend that Navistar and BAE be reimbursed
the costs of filing and pursuing the successful grounds of their protests
related to their challenge of technical and past performance evaluation issues,
including reasonable attorney fees. 4
C.F.R. sect. 21.8(d)(1). Navistar and BAE
should submit their certified claims for costs, detailing the time expended and
cost incurred, directly to the contracting agency within 60 days after receipt
of this decision. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(f)(1).
The protests are sustained.
Lynn H. Gibson
Acting General Counsel
[1]
The RFP termed the third evaluation factor "cost and price" because of the
inclusion of the cost-plus-fixed fee option for system technical support. As the costs associated with this option are
a very small part of the totals involved here--and their evaluation is not
challenged by the protesters--we will refer to this factor as "price."
[2]
E-coating is a process by which electrically charged metal components are
coated with a primer paint that has an opposite charge, thereby creating a bond
which improves corrosion resistance. See
BAE AR at 11 n.2.
[3]
The agency provided separate reports in response to Navistar's and BAE's
protests. Almost all of the documents in
the two agency reports are identical, but have different tab numbers within the
respective reports. For the sake of
brevity and convenience, citations to a document that is in both reports are to
the Navistar version of the AR.
[4]
For the capability factor and the small business participation subfactor, the
agency used an evaluation scheme of excellent/very low risk, good/low risk,
adequate/moderate risk, marginal/high risk, poor/very high risk; for the past
performance subfactor, the agency used an evaluation scheme of excellent/very
low risk, good/low risk, adequate/moderate risk, marginal/high risk,
unknown/unknown risk.
[5]
Additionally, with regard to the strength assigned for Oshkosh's acquisition of
stamping dies for the cab, the agency witnesses seemed unsure as to whether
Oshkosh had in fact obtained the dies that would be used for production, or had
merely reached an agreement with its supplier to provide them in the
future. On the one hand, the cab design
evaluator stated that he understood Oshkosh to have acquired dies for production
of the prototype, with the possibility that some of those items could be used
for final production, with others to be acquired after the design was
completed. Tr. 50:16-51:2,
53:20-54:6. The SSEB chair, on the other
hand, assumed that the dies for the production of the cab were in fact on
hand. Id. at 607:17-608:17.
[6] We
think that the agency should also determine whether its understanding of
Oshkosh's proposal concerning key tooling and equipment--which was not consistent
with the solicitation--affected its evaluation of Oshkosh under the time phased
critical path evaluation element. The
evaluation scheme for this element stated that the agency would evaluate "the
risk that [an offeror's] critical path considers all significant actions
required to meet the vehicle delivery requirements." RFP sect. M.9.1.f. As relevant here, the agency's evaluation of
Oshkosh's proposal identified strengths based on its schedule to "modify or
acquire" tooling and fixtures. Navistar
AR, Tab 19, Oshkosh Interim Time Phased Critical Path Evaluation, at 4.
[7]
These MTVs are not the same as the vehicles procured under the solicitation
here.
[8]
The final past performance evaluation report stated that there were no changes
to the interim evaluation conclusions or ratings. Navistar AR, Tab 00G, Navistar Final Past
Performance Evaluation, at 1.
[9] In
its initial report on the protest, the Army provided an edited version of the
SSEB interim report. In response to
Navistar's arguments that the record did not contain all of the past
performance questionnaires, the agency for the first time provided four slides
from the SSEB interim report which, the agency explains, had been provided to
the SSA but were subsequently removed from the interim report at her
request. Navistar SAR at 3. These slides summarize the numerical ratings
provided by the questionnaire respondents, but not the narrative bases for
those ratings. Navistar AR, Supp.
Documents, Deleted SSEB Interim Report Slides, at 4.
[10]
As discussed above, the MRAP ACO's questionnaire included three positive ratings
and comments; the Army's evaluation, however, did not cite these comments and
it is unclear how or whether the agency considered them.
[11]
The protesters raise numerous other collateral issues related to the issues
addressed above, as well as challenges to the evaluation of Oshkosh's proposal
under three additional elements of the production capability subfactor: manufacturing facilities, work
force/manpower, and quality systems. BAE
also challenges its rating under the quality systems element. We have reviewed all of the protesters'
challenges and find that none, other than those identified above, have merit. For example, the protesters challenge the
Army's evaluation of Oshkosh's proposal under the manufacturing facilities
element of the production capability subfactor as excellent/low risk, despite
the fact that Oshkosh proposed to build a new e-coat facility. We think the agency reasonably found that
although the facility would not be completed until July 2010--and therefore did
not yet "exist"--the awardee's proposal adequately mitigated the risk because
it relied on subcontractors to perform the contract requirements prior to July
2010, and also stated that these subcontractors would be available to continue
performance in the event the completion of the e-coat facility was delayed.
[12]
For the record, we note that the cab design element was part of the technical
subfactor, which did not have the same language as the production capability
subfactor regarding "existing" capabilities.
[13]
The parties do not challenge the Army's evaluation of the realism of the
cost-reimbursement element of Oshkosh's proposal.
[14]
Navistar also argues that the agency should have considered Oshkosh's financial
capability in its price realism analysis.
In essence, Navistar contends that an agency should consider not only
whether an offeror's proposed price is realistic for its proposed technical
approach, but also whether an offeror has the financial capability to perform
its technical approach at its proposed price.
For support, Navistar cites our decision in MCT JV, B-311245.2,
B-411245.4, May 16, 2008, 2008 CPD para.121, where we held that an agency's cost
realism evaluation was not reasonable because it did not consider the risk
posed by unrealistically low capped indirect rates, despite specific concerns
raised by DCAA regarding the awardee's financial condition. We think the MCT JV decision was based
on facts not present here. In MCT JV,
our Office stated that although an offeror's financial capability is not
normally part of cost realism, the agency failed to consider potential risks
arising from the awardee's ability to perform the contract, including its
financial condition. Id. at
13. In contrast, the solicitation here
is for a fixed-price contract, rather than a cost reimbursement contract. Thus, the depth and detail of the agency's
evaluation of the realism of offerors' prices is a matter largely within the
agency's discretion. Furthermore, unlike
in MCT JV, the agency here evaluated the risks stemming from the awardee's
proposed price, both in terms of price realism and as part of the agency's
affirmative determination of responsibility.
As discussed elsewhere in this decision, the record here shows that Army
considered the Oshkosh's financial capability as part of the CO's affirmative
determination of responsibility.
[15]
For the record, we recognize that BAE was more likely prejudiced than Navistar
under the key tooling and equipment element.
In this regard, the parties agree that BAE has all of the necessary key
tooling and equipment by virtue of its performance of the incumbent
contract. In contrast, the proposals of
both Oshkosh and Navistar stated that not all key tooling and equipment
currently existed, and both set forth schedules for acquiring them. In her testimony, the SSA acknowledged that
her conclusions regarding key tooling and equipment were in error with regard
to Oshkosh and Navistar. Tr. at
704:7-13. Because we think the agency's
evaluation was inconsistent with the RFP, we cannot make assumptions about how
the agency would have evaluated the relative merits of Oshkosh's and Navistar's
proposals, or what tradeoff decision the agency ultimately might have made.
[16] There is nothing in the record to suggest
that the solicitation's stated intent to assign a lower risk rating to offerors
with existing production capabilities does not reflect the agency's needs. Nonetheless, if the agency concludes that the
RFP does not reflect its requirements, it should amend the solicitation to
clarify its requirements, and obtain new proposals from the offerors.