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National Security and International Affairs Division

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March 11, 1999

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Subject: NATO's Operations and Contingency Plans for Stabilizing the Balkans

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter provides extracts from our recent report on NATO's operations and contingency plans for stabilizing the Balkans. For purposes of this letter, the Balkans region is defined as Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro, hereafter referred to as the FRY).¹ Figure 1 and attachment I provide maps of the Balkans region. The full report provides information on (1) current and projected security conditions in the Balkans region, particularly with regard to Bosnia and Serbia's province of Kosovo, and (2) the potential impact of these conditions on (a) prospects for a drawdown of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, (b) NATO's current operations around Kosovo, and (c) NATO and U.S. plans to deploy air and ground forces for resolving the ongoing conflict in Kosovo, in particular, ground operations planned for a "permissive environment"—one where all parties to the conflict agree to the presence and mission of NATO-led forces.

To address these issues, we relied extensively on NATO and U.S. documents concerning the situation in the region. We also conducted interviews with the Department of Defense (DOD), State, and NATO officials to clarify our understanding of information contained in these documents. The full report from which these extracts were derived provides summary information on the status of NATO and U.S. planning as of February 26, 1999, three days after the latest round of Kosovo peace negotiations had ended with the failure of the parties to agree to a proposed interim peace settlement. Recent reports indicate that as of today, the parties are still unwilling to sign this proposed peace agreement. As discussed in the full report, NATO and U.S. decisions on the force level, mission, and tasks of a peace enforcement operation for Kosovo will depend greatly on the provisions of any cease-fire or peace agreement that may be reached in the future and on the parties' willingness to implement them.

¹The former Yugoslavia consisted of six republics: (1) Bosnia and Herzegovina, (2) Croatia, (3) Macedonia, (4) Montenegro, (5) Serbia, and (6) Slovenia. Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the republics of Serbia and Montenegro asserted the formation of a joint independent state known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This entity has not been formally recognized as a state by the United States.

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Figure 1: Map of the Balkans Region



Overview of the Security Situation in the Balkans

The situation in the Balkans remains one of ethnic turmoil and conflict, with the potential for the recent fighting in Kosovo to escalate and engulf relatively peaceful areas of the region.

Bosnia

Substantial progress has been made in Bosnia since the signing of the 1995 Dayton Agreement,² but almost all of the results were achieved only with intense international involvement and pressure, both political and military. This pressure will continue to be necessary because the parties to the conflict--Bosnia's Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, as well as Croatia and the FRY³--largely retain their wartime goals. Despite the progress made to date, conditions in Bosnia have not improved to the point where SFOR can withdraw or substantially draw down. As we previously reported, these conditions will likely not be met for some time to come.⁴

Parties Largely Retain Wartime Goals

The actions taken by the international community beginning in mid-1997 accelerated the pace of progress toward reaching the Dayton Agreement's goals over the next year. With the military situation remaining stable, the international community used intensive political and military pressure to force advancements toward the goals of providing security for the people of Bosnia, creating a democratic environment, establishing multiethnic institutions at all levels of government, arresting those indicted for war crimes, returning people to their prewar homes across ethnic lines, and rebuilding the infrastructure and revitalizing the economy.⁵ Though the pace slowed somewhat during the second half of 1998, the international community has continued to exert intensive pressure to force the parties to comply with the Dayton Agreement's provisions.

The intensive international pressure on the political leaders of the Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs was necessary because their strategic goals remain largely unchanged and the underlying political differences have not been resolved. The delays in implementing the Dayton Agreement's civil provisions--including the slow pace of developing multiethnic institutions and the obstruction of people attempting to return to their pre-war homes across ethnic lines--is a continuing manifestation of the attitudes of Bosnian Serbs and Croats toward a unified Bosnia. The majority of these two groups, as well as their political leaders, continue to want to establish states separate from Bosnia. According to polling data of the U.S. Information Agency, only 19 percent of Bosnian Serbs and 45 percent of Bosnian Croats support the goal of Bosnia remaining a single state. In contrast, 99 percent of Bosniaks support this goal.

²For purposes of this report, the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its supporting annexes are referred to as the "Dayton Agreement."

³The war in Bosnia was fought among Bosnia's three major ethnic/religious groups--Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs (Eastern Orthodox Christians), and Croats (Roman Catholics), the latter two being supported by Serbia and Croatia, respectively. Before the war, Bosnia's population was 4.4 million people--44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serb, 17 percent Croat, and 8 percent other ethnic groups. The Dayton Agreement was signed in December 1995 by representatives of Bosnia's three major ethnic groups, Croatia, and the FRY.

⁴Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton Accelerated as International Involvement Increased (GAO/NSIAD-98-138, June 5, 1998) and Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force, (GAO/NSIAD-99-19, Oct. 8, 1998).

⁵See Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton Accelerated as International Involvement Increased for a full description of progress toward these goals and Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force for information on SFOR's contribution to implementing the military and civilian provisions of the Dayton Agreement.

At the same time, Croatia and Serbia--the dominant republic in the FRY--continue to use their influence to obstruct Dayton implementation as they pursue their strategic goals of a "Greater Croatia" and "Greater Serbia" respectively.

The international community will attempt to achieve a breakthrough in minority returns during 1999, with the Office of the High Representative⁶ hoping that as many as 120,000 people will return home across ethnic lines this year. However, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated that about 50,000 of these "minority returns" will take place in 1999, a number more in keeping with the incremental progress achieved thus far.⁷ In developing this estimate, UNHCR assumed, among other things, that (1) the international community will maintain a concerted, forceful, and long-term commitment to Dayton implementation; and (2) SFOR will maintain a credible security umbrella in Bosnia and will actively support the implementation of the civil aspects of Dayton.⁸

Potential for an SFOR Drawdown

As long as a credible SFOR remains in theater ready and able to intervene actively should circumstances warrant, according to international officials in Bosnia, the probability that the respective ethnic groups will resort to military action is low. These officials said, however, that SFOR needs to continue to deter hostilities through constant monitoring and maintaining a deterrent presence. SFOR also needs to actively maintain a safe and secure environment, particularly with regard to returns of people to their pre-war homes across ethnic lines. SFOR officials told us that the increased emphasis of the international community on minority returns will in turn increase the number of "hotspots" of potential violence. In November 1998, international officials in Bosnia estimated that without an SFOR presence at or about its current force levels, the war would break out again within a short period of time.

In mid-December 1998, NATO concluded that political and security conditions in Bosnia would not allow a change in SFOR's mission or a substantial drawdown in SFOR force levels.⁹ Instead, NATO decided to make administrative adjustments of up to 10 percent in SFOR force levels by April 1999. This could lower the number of SFOR troops to about 30,000. As currently envisioned, NATO will reduce the number of SFOR's combat support and combat service support personnel but will not reduce the number of combat battalions located in Bosnia. As part of this efficiency reduction, DOD plans to decrease the U.S. contribution to SFOR by 10 percent to about 6,200 troops. According to information from the Joint

⁶The Dayton Agreement created the position of the High Representative. It gave the High Representative, an international official, many responsibilities, including monitoring the implementation of the agreement, coordinating civilian organizations, maintaining close contact with the parties, and giving the final interpretation in theater on civilian implementation of the agreement.

⁷According to UNHCR data, the number of people returning home across ethnic lines has been increasing each year since the signing of the Dayton Agreement. The number went from an estimated 9,500 in 1996, to 39,000 in 1997, to over 41,000 in 1998, for a total of 89,500. Despite this trend, UNHCR estimated that as of the end of 1998, about 370,000 refugees and 860,000 displaced persons (about 1.23 million people total) had not yet found a "durable solution" to their displacement, defined as humanitarian/refugee status, other resident status, resettlement, and repatriation. If these people returned to their pre-war homes, most of them would be returning to areas now controlled by another ethnic group.

⁸According to a senior State Department official, as part of this increased emphasis, the international community will begin to pressure the Republika Srpska government to accept the returns of non-Serbs to Republika Srpska, something that did not occur in 1998 despite the pledges of the moderate Republika Srpska Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik. In February 1998, the Prime Minister set a goal of returning 70,000 non-Serbs to their pre-war homes in Republika Srpska. Organized visits of Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks to their pre-war communities, however, sparked violent incidents in western Republika Srpska during the spring of 1998. According to UNHCR data, only 6,000 non-Serbs returned to Republika Srpska, excluding the Brcko area, during the year. In comparison, about 32,700 minority returns occurred in the Federation, including about 10,370 Serbs, and about 2,600 non-Serbs returned to the Brcko area.

⁹SFOR consists of about 33,200 troops located in Bosnia and Croatia (as of November 1998). The United States remains the largest force provider to SFOR, and Americans continue to hold the key NATO military positions that control the operation. As of January 1999, the United States was providing about 6,830 troops to SFOR--6,730 in Bosnia and 100 troops in Croatia. An additional 2,200 U.S. military personnel in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy were directly supporting SFOR operations but were not a part of SFOR. Attachment III provides more information on current peace operations of NATO and the United Nations in the Balkans.

Staff, the U.S. military will reduce its contribution to SFOR's operational reserve—a U.S. aviation task force that also supports the U.S. military sector—as well as in headquarters and support units.

NATO is currently studying various options for more substantially reducing SFOR's presence in Bosnia. The United States proposed two options for consideration: (1) a gradual reduction option in which the size of SFOR would decrease in light of progress in Dayton implementation, and (2) a substantial reduction option in which the post-1999 force would be structured based upon SFOR's key military tasks. This study is to be submitted by NATO military headquarters to NATO's international military staff during March 1999.

U.S. SFOR officials told us in November 1998 that the U.S. military employs 55 percent of its ground combat forces in Bosnia on "presence patrols" and 40 percent on duties associated with force protection. SFOR's presence patrols, according to U.S. and other SFOR officials, serve both military and civilian purposes. SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo is in the process of collecting data on how SFOR overall is using its ground combat forces. SFOR intends to use the data as the basis of (1) SFOR's next 6-month assessment due in May 1999 and (2) future decisions on removing SFOR combat battalions from Bosnia. These data are expected to be available by the end of March 1999.

Kosovo

In mid-October 1998, FRY President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to a cease-fire under pressure from NATO, and Kosovar Albanian insurgents agreed to exercise self-restraint. The cease-fire, however, constituted only a pause in the military struggle over the future of Kosovo. The Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians retain mutually exclusive goals and are prepared and willing to renew the conflict in order to attain their objectives. These and other aspects of the security environment in and around Kosovo will affect the mission, composition, and required force levels of any NATO-led force that may be deployed in an effort to resolve the conflict. The relationship between the security environment and proposed NATO-led operations is discussed in detail in our full report on NATO's operation and contingency plans for stabilizing the Balkans.

Security Situation and Status of Peace Negotiations

Since the October agreement, there has been a continuous deterioration of the cease-fire. Numerous violent incidents occurred during late December 1998 and January 1999 as the Kosovar Albanian insurgents took advantage of the cease-fire and initial reductions in Serb security forces and as Serb special forces were reintroduced into the province. The on-the-ground presence of the unarmed Kosovo Verification Mission, led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has not and likely will not be able to deter Serb forces or the insurgents from using violence to gain advantage.

According to a recent statement of the Director of Central Intelligence, the year-long conflict between Kosovar Albanian insurgents and Serb forces will likely continue to escalate without the presence of an external force, such as a NATO-led peace enforcement operation. An escalation of the conflict would likely further destabilize or harm international efforts to stabilize the region, particularly the neighboring countries of Bosnia; Macedonia, a country with a large minority population of ethnic Albanians; and Albania, where the government does not control the country's northern areas that support Kosovar Albanian insurgents. According to reports of the United Nations Secretary General, Kosovar Albanian insurgents are militarily active on both sides of the Kosovo-Albania border. Attachment I provides a map showing the distribution of the ethnic Albanian population in and around Kosovo.

NATO's current operations around Kosovo are part of a larger international effort to verify whether Serb and Kosovar Albanian forces are complying with the cease-fire and other measures called for by the U.N. Security Council in late September 1998.¹⁰ By late January 1999, it appeared that cease-fire violations committed by both parties during late December 1998 and January 1999 would escalate into a full-scale resumption of the conflict before a peace settlement could be reached. In response to this situation, as well as to recent Serb atrocities against Kosovar Albanians, the international community attempted to mediate an interim peace settlement between both parties during early February 1999 under the renewed threat of NATO airstrikes against the Serbs. This round of negotiations ended with no peace agreement being reached but with the expectation that negotiations would continue on March 15, 1999. As of March 11, however, reports indicated that the parties were unwilling to sign the proposed interim peace agreement.

NATO Contingency Plans for Resolving the Conflict

NATO and the United States have considered a number of air and ground options for resolving the Kosovo conflict. The United States and NATO have publicly threatened to launch airstrikes against the Serbs as a means of forcing them to agree to an interim peace settlement. It is unclear, however, what the current intent is with regards to NATO's planned use of airstrikes, as executive branch officials have recently made conflicting statements on this issue. On February 19, 1999, the President said that NATO allies stand united in their determination to use force if Serbia failed to accept the interim peace agreement. Shortly after recent negotiations in France ended with neither party agreeing to the proposed settlement, DOD said in comments to our full report that there is no longer a willingness to use air and/or ground forces in Kosovo to get an agreement.

DOD and U.S. European Command officials told us in late 1998 that the United States did not intend to deploy U.S. ground troops to Kosovo. The executive branch at that time, however, had not ruled out the possibility of sending U.S. troops there as part of a NATO-led force to enforce a cease-fire or a peace agreement with the parties' consent, that is, within a permissive environment. As the security situation deteriorated during late 1998 and early 1999, NATO allies responded to the changed situation by deciding to execute, under certain conditions, an option for a ground force that would enforce a peace agreement.

During February 1999, the President said that the United States has an important interest¹¹ in resolving the Kosovo conflict that warrants the deployment of U.S. ground troops to help bring peace to Kosovo, but U.S. forces would be deployed only if a permissive environment existed. At that time, the United States would have provided about 4,000 troops to a NATO-led force of 28,000 (about 14 percent of the total) if the parties reached a strong peace agreement, defined by the President as an agreement that provides for (1) an immediate cease-fire, (2) a rapid withdrawal of most Serb security forces, and (3) the demilitarization of the Kosovar Albanian insurgents. The executive branch did not rule out the possibility of providing U.S. ground troops to a NATO-led force that would enforce a cease-fire agreement in a permissive environment.

¹⁰U.N. Security Council Resolution 1199 (Sept. 23, 1998). While the FRY agreed to a cease-fire in October 1998, the Kosovar Albanian insurgents agreed only to exercise "self-restraint."


¹¹The national security strategy defines three types of U.S. interests--vital, important, and humanitarian--that guide decisions about whether and when to use U.S. military forces. Important interests do not affect the nation's survival as do vital interests, but they do significantly affect the national well-being and the character of the world in which Americans live. Where important interests are at stake, according to the strategy, military forces should be used only if they advance U.S. interests, are likely to accomplish their objectives, and if other means are inadequate to accomplish U.S. goals.

As of February 26, 1999, based on the expectation that an interim peace agreement would be reached in the near term, NATO and U.S. planning efforts were concentrated on deploying this force that would monitor, ensure, and, if necessary, enforce a peace agreement in Kosovo only. If this force were to deploy by mid-1999, the number of NATO-led troops in the Balkans would grow to about 63,000 and U.S. commitments in the region would increase to about 11,400 troops, most of which would come from the U.S. Army. (See attachment II for information on how U.S. Army resources are currently engaged worldwide.)

However, the conflict will likely escalate over the next few months in the absence of a viable peace agreement backed by an external force, such as a NATO-led peace enforcement operation. If the security situation significantly deteriorates before the FRY and Kosovar Albanian insurgents reach such an agreement, then NATO allies could decide to plan for and deploy a different force that is better suited for the changed security environment and the status of peace negotiations. Specifically, NATO could choose to deploy a force that would enforce a cease-fire in Kosovo only or in Kosovo and Albania. This force would provide a secure environment in Kosovo while the parties continue to negotiate a viable peace agreement. The expected security environment and the associated mission and tasks of such a force would likely require a much larger number of troops than the force of 28,000 currently under consideration. Further, security conditions around Kosovo may require the deployment of NATO-led troops to help stabilize Albania and Macedonia.

This letter was prepared under the direction of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, who may be contacted on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions about this letter or our full report on these matters. Other major contributors to the report include B. Patrick Hickey, Judith McCloskey, E. Jeanette Velis, and Jody Woods .

Sincerely yours,


Benjamin F. Nelson, Director
International Relations and Trade Issues

Attachments (3)

MAPS OF BOSNIA AND THE KOSOVO AREA

This attachment provides maps showing the distribution of Bosnia's three major ethnic groups (see fig. I.1) and the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo and Macedonia (see fig. I.2), as well as the areas of operation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (see fig. I.3).

Figure I.1: Map of Bosnia




Figure L2: Distribution of Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia





Figure L3: Kosovo Liberation Army Areas of Operation (as of October 1998)



EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY RESOURCES

The U.S. Army has 10 active divisions, sized to meet the requirements of the National Military Strategy. All 10 divisions would be needed in the event of two major theater wars occurring at about the same time. While not engaged in major theater wars, these divisions can be used in smaller-scale operations like the one in Bosnia. A number of the divisions are actively engaged in various parts of the world today, as shown in table II.1.

Table II.1: U.S. Army Divisions and Their Current Commitments, as of February 11, 1999

Division	Home station	Status
1 st Cavalry Division	United States	Committed to Bosnia.
1 st Armored Division	Europe	Retraining following Bosnia mission to be completed by March 1999, followed by operational pause until 2000.
1 st Infantry Division	Europe	Retraining following Bosnia mission to be completed as of March 1999 followed by operational pause until 2000.
2 nd Infantry Division	Korea	Committed to Korea.
3 rd Infantry Division Mechanized	United States	Committed to Southwest Asia; quarterly rotates a battalion to Kuwait for training with Kuwaiti armed forces.
4 th Infantry Division	United States	Replaced 1 st Cavalry Division as one of earliest deploying divisions in the event of major theater war; being refitted as the lead division in the Army Advanced Warfighting Experiment.
10 th Mountain Division	United States	Scheduled to replace the 1 st Cavalry Division in Bosnia later this year.
25 th Infantry Division (Light)	United States	Normal home station training.
82 nd Airborne Division	United States	On call as rapid response force.
101 st Air assault Division	United States	Normal home station training.

As can be seen from the table, as of mid-February 1999, all but three of the Army's divisions are either committed to certain parts of the world or are preparing for or recovering from operations.

- One division is committed to Bosnia; another division is scheduled to deploy later this year.
- Two other divisions, the ones based in Europe, had been providing the bulk of the forces for Bosnia until last summer, when they were given an operational pause schedule to last until 2001. This reflected an Army decision to relieve U.S. Army Europe of the high operating and personnel tempo it has experienced since the Bosnia mission began and to allow it to focus on its wartime mission.
- A fifth division is based in Korea to guard against a North Korean invasion of South Korea.
- A sixth division is committed to Southwest Asia and has been deploying a battalion on a quarterly basis for the past several years to train with Kuwaiti armed forces. This division also has a brigade on alert to deploy to Kuwait in the event of any increased tensions with Iraq.
- A seventh division is on continuous alert to respond to any other crises that may occur anywhere in the world.

- The remaining three divisions are engaged in normal peacetime training to meet wartime requirements. One of these is also the test division in the Army's advanced warfighting experiment and is in the process of receiving new equipment. Any requirement to deploy all or a major part of another division would increase the risk of being able to respond to major theater war within established Joint Staff timelines should one occur during a Kosovo deployment because the pool of readily available divisions would shrink.

The Army also has 8 National Guard Divisions and 15 enhanced readiness brigades that could be called into service to provide forces for smaller-scale contingencies. One of these divisions is scheduled to lead the Bosnia mission in 2000. To avoid straining active divisions, the President could exercise his statutory authority to call-up reserve forces. He could utilize his Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up Authority, which allows him to involuntarily call to duty up to 200,000 reservists at any one time with no one reservist able to serve more than 270 days. If the time necessary to first train and then deploy a unit for a 6-month tour of duty exceeds the 270-day period, which has been the case for active units involved in Bosnia, the President could then use his statutory authority to order a partial mobilization of the armed forces. Under this authority he can call to involuntary duty up to 1 million reservists for up to 2 years. To use this authority, he must declare a national emergency.

CURRENT NATO AND U.N PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS REGION

The following attachment provides information on current military operations led by NATO and the United Nations intended to bring peace and stability to the Balkans. Table III.1 provides summary information on these operations. Table III.2 provides information on force contributors to SFOR. Table III.3 shows the mission of and force contributions to U.N. operations in Macedonia.

As shown in Table III.1, NATO commands almost all troops assigned to international peace operations in the Balkans. As of November 1998, at least 35,000 military personnel were deployed under NATO command or control in three operations in the region, while just over 1,000 military personnel were deployed in one U.N. operation. These operations both support and are dependent upon larger international civilian efforts to bring peace and stability to the region.

Table III.1: NATO and U.N.-led Peace Operations in the Balkans Region, as of November 1998

Name		Area of Operations	Force Levels	U.S. Contribution
NATO	SFOR	Bosnia Croatia	33,200 ^a	6,828
	SFOR direct support ^b	Croatia	N.A.	221 ^b
	Kosovo Extraction Force	Kosovo ^c	1,800	0
	Kosovo Air Verification Mission	Kosovo ^d		
Subtotal			>35,000^a	>7,049^b
United Nations ^f	U.N. Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) ^g	Macedonia	1,050	350
Total			>36,050^a	>7,399^b

N.A = Not available.

^aThis number includes 2,268 SFOR personnel based in Croatia.

^bThis figure includes non-SFOR personnel assigned to the U.S. national support element in Croatia. About 1,980 U.S. troops were also directly supporting SFOR in Hungary (654) and Italy (1,324).

^cThis operation is based in Macedonia and is on-call for deployment to Kosovo to extract unarmed monitors of the Kosovo Verification Mission run by the OSCE.

^dThis operation includes forces based in Macedonia, specifically, ground forces assigned to the Kosovo Verification Coordination Center and some air assets.

^eThe number of NATO and non-NATO military personnel associated with this air operation is not available.

^fThe United Nations also has deployed a group of 28 military observers to monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula in southern Croatia. The FRY is disputing Croatia's claim to this peninsula because it controls the entrance to a sea inlet in Montenegro.

^gOn February 25, 1999, China vetoed the U.N. Security Council resolution that would have extended UNPREDEP's mandate beyond the February 28, 1999, end date.

Table III.2 provides information on troop contributions to SFOR by NATO and non-NATO participants.

Table III.2: SFOR Force Contributors, By Country (as of November 1998)

NATO Countries	Contribution
Belgium	561
Canada	1,040
France	3,167
Germany	2,535
Greece	294
Iceland	4
Italy	2,158
Luxembourg	24
Netherlands	1,211
Norway	750
Portugal	300
Spain	1,710
Turkey	1,554
United Kingdom	4,752
United States	6,828
Subtotal	27,550
Non-NATO	
Austria	208
Czech Republic	568
Egypt ^a	124
Estonia	43
Finland	377
Hungary	238
Latvia	41
Lithuania	41
Morocco	630
Poland	484
Romania	214
Russia	1,342
Sweden	449
Ukraine	395
Other countries ^b	147
Subtotal	5,301
Multinational Specialized Unit ^c	352
Total	33,203

^aThe withdrawal of Egyptian troops was completed by November 30, 1998.

^bNine other countries contributed troops to SFOR: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Ireland, Jordan, New Zealand, South Africa, and Slovakia.

^cData was not available to break out this number by country. Italy is the largest contributor to this unit, followed by Argentina. By February 1999, countries had contributed about 500 of the 800 troops required for this unit.

The United Nations had deployed one military observer force consisting of about 1,050 military personnel in Macedonia, as of January 1999 (see table III.3). On February 25, 1999, however, China vetoed the resolution calling for the extension of UNPREDEP's mandate past its February 28 end date, thereby ending the mission.

The mission of this force was to deter and report on possible developments that could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia or threaten its territory. UNPREDEP's tasks included deterring threats or clashes, monitoring events, and patrolling Macedonia's border areas and reporting to the Security Council any developments that could pose a threat to Macedonia.¹² In July 1998, UNPREDEP assumed the task of monitoring and reporting on (1) flows of illicit arms to the FRY, including Kosovo; (2) the arming and training of terrorists on Macedonian territory; or (3) any other activities prohibited since March 1998 by the U.N. Security Council.¹³ At the same time, at the request of the government of Macedonia, the U.N. Security Council extended UNPREDEP's mandate until February 28, 1999. It also authorized an increase in the operation's force level from 750 troops to 1,050 troops. The U.S. contribution to the operation increased from its previous level of 350 military personnel to 362.

Table III.3: U.N. Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (as of January 1999)

Mission	Tasks	Force Contributions
Provide a presence to deter possible developments that could undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or threaten its territory.	Under UNSCR 795:	Total Troops: 1,050
	Deter threats and prevent clashes.	Nordic Battalion: 650 (Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden)
	Monitor border areas.	
	Report any developments that could pose a threat to Macedonia.	Task Force Able Sentry: 350 (United States):
	Under UNSCR 1186:	Engineer platoon: 50 (Indonesia)
	Monitor and report on illicit arms flows to the FRY.	
	Monitor and report on arming and training of terrorists and other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1160.	35 military observers and 26 civilian police monitors to report on developments within Macedonia and provide training assistance.

Legend

FRY = Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
 UNPREDEP = United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
 UNSCR = United Nations Security Council Resolution

Source: United Nations.

(Code 711416)

¹²U.N. Security Council Resolution 795 (December 11, 1992).

¹³U.N. Security Council Resolution 1160 (March 31, 1998) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1186 (July 21, 1998).

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Postage & Fees Paid
GAO
Permit No. G100**

**Official Business
Penalty for Private Use \$300**

Address Correction Requested
