

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and International Affairs Division

B-258014

August 19, 1994

The Honorable William J. Perry The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

At the request of the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Subcommittees on Military Forces and Personnel and Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, we are reviewing joint training, including the use and management of computer simulation technology to enhance battle staff training; and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) oversight of that training.

In doing our work, we have identified an issue that we believe warrants your attention now to avoid the expenditure of unnecessary resources, the duplication of efforts, and operational inefficiencies. This issue relates to the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to establish two somewhat duplicative computer simulation training facilities at separate locations in the Tidewater area of Virginia: the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center (JTASC), under the control of the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), and the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), operating under the Joint Staff J-7.1

Briefings from representatives of the two centers, and mission statements and other documents indicate that both centers will (1) require significant computer capabilities to support training, (2) employ an opposing force concept, and (3) conduct joint doctrine assessment to some extent.

The development of two separate facilities stands in stark contrast with the results of a USACOM-sponsored study² by the Mitre Corporation, which cited

¹The JWFC is being created by expanding on the capabilities of the former Joint Warfare Center (JWC), located at Hurtburt Field, Florida, and absorbing the Joint Doctrine Center, located in Norfolk, Virginia. The new organization is being relocated to Fort Monroe, Virginia.

²Tidewater Joint Readiness Complex Definition Study, 30 September, 1993.

the benefits of a single, integrated facility serving both USACOM and the Joint Staff J-7. Under the integrated facility concept, the JWFC would have acquired, controlled, and provided the technical support for USACOM simulation training. The operating costs of the single facility to meet the needs of the Joint Staff and USACOM were estimated at about \$240 million over a 6-year period.

Under current plans, both facilities will develop similar capabilities to support training. Evolving operational concepts and incomplete data make full comparisons between single and dual facilities difficult. However, available data suggests that personnel requirements are increasing significantly under the two-facility arrangement. The same appears to be true in the case of facility acquisition and renovation costs. Available data suggests the potential for 6-year operating costs of the two facilities to be approximately 75 percent greater than Mitre's initial projection of \$240 million for a single, integrated facility.

USACOM and JWFC officials agreed that economies and efficiencies could be achieved with a single, integrated facility. Nevertheless, decisions were made within DOD calling for separate facilities. The JWFC is currently moving to Fort Monroe where, over the next year, several older buildings will be renovated to house its operations. USACOM plans to move within the next few months to Suffolk, into an almost new, state-of-the art, leased facility that is well designed for computer operations. Various officials have acknowledged, and existing data indicate, that this facility is large enough to house both JTASC and JWFC even if they continue to develop independent simulation capabilities.

Defense officials have cited various reasons to support the decision for two facilities. For example, the Joint Staff is concerned that JWFC could become large and unwieldy. Staffs of other Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) are concerned that JWFC support to USACOM would result in USACOM's domination over both the doctrine development and joint training support missions and resources of JWFC. Neither of these concerns justifies the establishment of duplicate facilities in light of the increased costs.

Some officials pointed out that the JTASC will primarily train forces stationed in the United States, while the JWFC will train forces stationed overseas. However, two major warfighting CINCs, the Pacific and European Commands, have received most of their simulation support from simulation centers in their theaters and some from the Army's National Simulation Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Some officials have questioned the need for the JWFC, preferring to see USACOM continue development of its own simulation facility. Others, independent of any consideration about a USACOM simulation facility, have seen the need for an organization operating under the JCS. They believe such an organization should provide a hub for improved Defense-wide coordination of simulation activities and help consolidate the joint operational modeling and simulation requirements of all CINCs. While we do not address the coordination of simulation activities in this letter, we will discuss the issue, along with JCS oversight of joint training in our upcoming report.

We have not seen any compelling justification for maintaining two centers so close together with such similar functions. While we are not in a position to support one facility over the other or recommend how to consolidate the two, we believe enough costs are involved that you should take a careful look at this issue before the organizations proceed with their separate plans. Otherwise, scarce resources could be used inefficiently.

We would be pleased to provide you with a more in-depth briefing on our work and results to date to underscore the importance of the issue raised in this letter. Please have a member of your staff contact me or Mr. Barry Holman on (202) 512-5140 should you desire additional information or wish to arrange for a more in-depth briefing on this issue. In addition, we would appreciate being apprised on any actions you plan to take on this matter.

Copies of this letter are being sent to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Subcommittees on Military Forces and Personnel and Readiness, House Armed Services Committee.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations and Capabilities Issues

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