Report to the Honorable Tom DeLay, House of Representatives

July 1989

EL SALVADOR

Limited Use of U.S. Firms in Military Aid Construction



GAO	United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548		
	National Security and International Affairs Division		
	B-236752		
	July 12, 1989		
	The Honorable Thomas DeLay House of Representatives		
	Dear Mr. DeLay:		
	In response to your request, we (1) reviewed the Army Corps of Engi- neers' decisions on four Salvadoran construction contracts funded by the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and (2) reviewed the circum- stances surrounding the legality and propriety of the offshore procure- ment waivers ¹ approved for these four and similar contracts, particularly those that could have affected firms from labor surplus areas. ² A key concern was whether the waivers, which opened competi- tion to Salvadoran firms, unfairly affected U.S. firms' ability to compete for the contracts.		
Background	 U.S. security assistance dollars are primarily intended for expenditure within the United States and can be used to purchase foreign goods and services only on an exception basis. However, since 1986, offshore procurement waivers have been approved for MAP-funded construction in El Salvador, including the four construction contracts we reviewed. Although MAP funds are provided under the Foreign Assistance Act, these funds have been merged since fiscal year 1982 with another component of the security assistance program called Foreign Military Sales, which is governed by the Arms Export Control Act. Thus, under Defense Department regulations, "merged MAP funds" are subject to the security assistance procedures specified in the Arms Export Control Act. Under section 42(c) of the act, these funds may be used for procurement outside the United States only if the President determines that such procurement will not result in adverse effects upon the U.S. economy, with special reference to areas of labor surplus, that outweigh the economic or other advantages of less costly procurement outside the United 		
	States. ¹ These waivers allow the procurement of goods and services outside the United States only if such procurement will not result in adverse effects on the U.S. economy that outweigh the economic or other advantages of less costly procurement outside the United States.		

²The U.S. Department of Labor classifies an area in the United States as labor surplus if the unemployment rate is at least 20 percent higher than the average unemployment rate for all states during the previous 2 years. As of April 1988, 1,678 areas in 46 states and Puerto Rico were classified as labor surplus areas.

	The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) has been delegated the authority to make offshore procurement determinations, with the concurrence of the Departments of State and the Treasury. In addition to DSAA's review of offshore procurement requests, which are submitted by the Army Corps of Engineers, these Departments generally analyze the economic impact and policy implications of these procurements before the waivers are approved.
Results in Brief	Since 1986, ³ no U.S. firms have been awarded contracts for construction projects in El Salvador under the U.S. security assistance program. However, 13 construction contracts, valued at \$19 million, were awarded to Salvadoran or joint venture firms that had generally submitted lower prices.
	Some of the U.S. firms that submitted proposals on these projects are located in labor surplus areas. However, it is most likely that their labor forces would largely be comprised of Salvadorans plus a few Americans to provide technical supervision.
	DSAA does not have any written procedures for reviewing or approving offshore procurement determination decisions or for considering labor surplus areas in these decisions. We could find no evidence that DSAA took specific action to consider the impact on labor surplus areas. DSAA said it does consider various general factors in awarding offshore pro- curement waivers and pointed out that the law does not require that an assessment of the impact on labor surplus areas be documented. Although significant changes can occur in scope or costs after the Trea- sury and State Departments concur in an offshore procurement waiver, the Department of Defense has no mechanism to inform these Depart- ments of modifications.
	The Army Corps of Engineers awarded the construction contracts in accordance with the solicitation requirements and the Federal Acquisi- tion Regulation. However, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) has had difficulty in obtaining relevant documentation for Salvadoran contractors and has not conducted any in-country audits of these contracts.

³This report covers construction contracts awarded for work in El Salvador between 1985 and August 1988.

Construction Performed by Salvadoran or Joint Venture Firms

Since Salvadoran and/or joint venture (U.S.-Salvadoran) firms generally provide the same services as U.S. firms at lower cost, they have consistently been awarded construction contracts since July 1986. Between fiscal year 1985 and May 1988, \$37 million of security assistance funds was authorized for 18 current and completed construction contracts for El Salvador. Of these projects, 5 were awarded to U.S. firms before off-shore procurement was authorized in 1986. Since then, the other 13 contracts, including the 4 construction contracts we reviewed, have been awarded to Salvadoran or joint venture firms that had generally submitted lower prices than U.S. firms.

Seventeen U.S. firms submitted 27 proposals, 14 Salvadoran firms submitted 45 proposals, and 1 joint venture firm submitted 2 proposals on the 18 construction contracts funded by MAP since fiscal year 1985. It appears that many U.S. firms bid only once and did not pursue other contracts after an unsuccessful try, whereas many of the same Salvadoran firms repeatedly bid for the contracts.

Of the 17 U.S. firms that submitted proposals, 7 were located in labor surplus areas, as classified by the U.S. Department of Labor's <u>Areas in</u> <u>Employment and Unemployment</u>, October 1987 and April 1988. However, most of the U.S. firms we contacted stated that the labor force for construction work in El Salvador would largely be comprised of Salvadorans plus a few Americans to provide technical supervision. Thus, whether or not a waiver is approved to permit local competition, most of the construction work is performed by the local labor force.

U.S. firms have offered reasonably competitive prices. For example, on 6 of the 18 contracts, 9 U.S. firms⁴ submitted offers that were less than the U.S. government estimate⁵ (7 firms) or exceeded the government estimate (2 firms) by only 3 and 6 percent. Even so, Salvadoran firms often bid lower than the government estimate, and as a result, the awards on the 13 construction contracts to Salvadoran or joint venture firms were \$2 million less than the total U.S. government estimate of \$20 million. Thus, the use of Salvadoran firms has resulted in lower construction costs and has saved security assistance funds.

⁴Offers from five of the nine U.S. firms were deemed unacceptable for failure to submit technical proposals or required bid bonds with their proposals.

 $^{^5\}mathrm{The}$ government estimate provides a basis for comparison to determine the reasonableness of proposed prices.

	Since military aid funding for El Salvador declined from \$121 million in fiscal year 1986 to \$85 million in fiscal year 1988, it has become increas- ingly important that these funds be used as effectively as possible. Awarding contracts to Salvadoran firms in lieu of direct funding may be viewed as an additional form of aid to a war-torn country.
Limitations on U.S. Firms	U.S. firms encounter difficulty in competing for projects because they generally incur more costs than their Salvadoran counterparts for such items as overhead and mobilization. These higher costs result in higher-priced offers that are not competitive. It is also difficult for U.S. firms to secure performance and payment bonds. ⁶ We were told that some U.S. firms could not secure the required bonding because the U.S. insurance companies generally will not provide bonding for work in countries where there is civil unrest.
	The Army Corps of Engineers, however, has waived certain bond requirements for all firms because the Corps contracting officer deter- mined that it would be impracticable for Salvadoran and joint venture firms to use Treasury-listed sureties for bonding purposes. Waiving this requirement made it possible for these firms to perform Corps construc- tion contracts using Salvadoran bonding. However, the Department of Defense (DOD) noted that both U.S. and Salvadoran firms had the option of using Salvadoran banks to execute the performance and payment bonds. Thus, Salvadoran firms would have had no advantage over U.S. firms if U.S. firms had chosen this option.
	Even though some U.S. officials said that it was somewhat questionable whether the U.S. government would be reimbursed if an Salvadoran contractor defaulted using Salvadoran bonds, permitting these bonds was the practice on 10 of 13 contracts awarded to Salvadoran and joint venture firms. On the other three contracts, other non-Treasury listed sureties were permitted by the Corps.
	The Corps has followed its procedures and regulations in awarding con- tracts to Salvadoran and joint venture firms. However, on one contract awarded to a Salvadoran firm, two U.S. firms were excluded from evalu- ation in the contract selection process solely because of price and not on

⁶Performance and payment bonds can be executed by corporations, but only by those on the Treasury Department's list of approved sureties. The list contains U.S. insurance companies that are acceptable sureties for federal bonds.

	technical merit. As a result, a U.S. firm was excluded from further consideration.
	DSAA approved offshore procurement waivers because U.S. participation was limited and greater competition was needed to ensure competent engineering services at fair and reasonable prices in the contractor selec- tion process. We agree that it may be more expensive for U.S. firms than local firms to perform the construction in El Salvador. However, U.S. firms, including some from labor surplus areas, are both willing and technically capable to perform the work and have submitted reasonably competitive prices. Since U.S. firms are competitive, the question is whether priority should be given to reducing program costs and con- serving assistance funds over the possibility that the U.S. economy may be adversely affected by an offshore procurement.
Procedural Guidance and Criteria Lacking	Although the purpose of security assistance funds is to support U.S. commitments to our allies, these funds are intended to be spent in the United States. Section 42(c) of the Arms Export Control Act permits exceptions to this policy when DSAA determines, with concurrences from the Departments of State and the Treasury, that there will not be adverse affects upon the U.S. economy, with special reference to labor surplus areas, that outweigh the economic or other advantages of less costly procurement outside the United States. However, DSAA has not documented any specific action to consider labor surplus areas in these decisions. In addition, it has not established any guidance or criteria for reviewing or approving offshore procurement determination decisions (waivers) or procedures for considering labor surplus areas.
	As justification for continuing its approvals of offshore procurement waivers for construction in El Salvador, DSAA stated that Salvadorans comprise most of the on-site labor force on the contracts. Thus, DSAA determined, after waivers had been approved, that the impact on U.S. labor would not be significant. DSAA's General Counsel concurred that DSAA must consider labor surpluses in various U.S. locales but stated that section 42(c) does not specifically require that an assessment be documented. In addition, DSAA's General Counsel stated that it is diffi- cult to define the adverse impact in any quantifiable sense, since one cannot anticipate months in advance whether firms from a labor surplus area will submit offers on construction contracts.
	We recognize that implementation of the act does not require documen- tation and that the adverse impact need not be defined. Although we

	agree that it may be difficult to anticipate that firms from labor surplus areas will bid on these construction contracts, the requirement to consider labor surplus areas in offshore procurement decisions is mandatory under section $42(c)$ of the Arms Export Control Act.
	We are also concerned about the content of DSAA's determinations. They contain little specificity, with no references to time frames or monetary ceilings, and have resulted in some confusion within DSAA and the Corps over the limitations of each determination. These vague determinations can give the impression, for example, that they are blanket offshore pro- curement waivers. Technically, a blanket offshore procurement waiver was not approved for construction in El Salvador. However, some Corps officials believed that a blanket offshore procurement waiver had been approved. In two cases, Corps officials even solicited requests for pro- posals on two separate contracts from Salvadoran and joint venture firms before a waiver was authorized. DSAA officials do not believe this procedure was improper, since the contract was not awarded until after an offshore procurement determination had been approved.
	DSAA believes that the determination language should be in general terms to provide flexibility in the process. This would avoid the need to constantly revise determinations. We were told that DSAA usually issues a new determination for a related program if the initial proposal is changed significantly. We do not believe, however, that DSAA's flexibility would be impeded by requiring determinations to contain limitations on scope and value. Only significant changes would require a separate determination.
Waiver Concurrences by the Departments of State and the Treasury	The State and the Treasury Departments provide initial concurrences on offshore procurement determinations on a particular project or a group of projects. When making these decisions, the Departments rely on DOD for information about the planned scope and nature of projects. DOD has no mechanism for reporting changes made to scope or costs during implementation.
	Significant changes can occur; for example, in our review of offshore procurement determinations for Salvadoran construction, we noted that one waiver was used to cover 10 contracts over a 16-month period for construction work in El Salvador. However, not all of these projects were included in the initial offshore procurement request that was pro- posed to the Departments of State and the Treasury, and the costs had exceeded the proposed estimate by about 22 percent as of May 1988. It

	is possible that the changes in scope from the initial proposal would have affected their decisions. The number of waivers approved by DSAA has increased in the last few years. We believe that DSAA should periodi- cally provide to the Departments of State and the Treasury information on the actual scope and costs of each project authorized by a determina- tion. This information could then be used to analyze subsequent off- shore procurement determination decisions.
Recent DSAA Actions	Subsequent to our review, DOD initiated action to provide more detailed guidance to the Corps and other implementing agencies on offshore pro- curement actions. We believe that DSAA can take further actions to improve its offshore procurement decisions, such as developing criteria and procedures for granting waivers in consultation with the other Departments involved and setting scope and dollar limitations to ensure that the limits of offshore procurement authority are understood and adhered to.
	During the course of our review, DSAA took actions to (1) limit its approvals for offshore procurement on two construction projects to the scope and estimated costs as initially requested and (2) limit the propos- als on a third construction project to U.S. firms by denying the request for an offshore procurement waiver. Subsequent to our review, DSAA stated that the decision to seek offshore procurement determinations for five of eight construction projects in El Salvador that are currently being considered will depend on whether the Corps identifies adequate interest by U.S. firms.
Contracts Not Fully Audited	DCAA, which is responsible for defense contract audits, has not con- ducted any in-country audits and has not been able to obtain relevant documentation from Salvadoran contractors when it has attempted to audit contracts. The Corps, in practice, has normally audited letter con- tracts, while certain other contracts, including those awarded for con- struction in El Salvador, are not generally audited.
	We are concerned that because of the lack of relevant documentation, Salvadoran subcontractors have not been fully audited. We believe that the Corps should work with DCAA to ensure that contracts awarded for construction in El Salvador are fully audited in accordance with the per- tinent DOD regulations.

Since military aid to El Salvador has been significantly reduced over the past 3 years, spending these limited resources in the most economical way has taken on even greater importance. Military aid funds used for construction in El Salvador can be stretched further by permitting local competition. In addition, construction contracts awarded to Salvadoran and joint venture firms may be viewed as an indirect form of military aid to a war-torn country.
However, because DSAA has not documented its assessment of the impact on U.S. labor surplus areas before granting waivers, it is not clear that the Arms Export Control Act is being implemented as required. We believe that DSAA cannot be certain that the benefits of offshore procure- ment outweigh possible adverse effects on the U.S. economy unless it makes it a practice to document assessments of the impact on U.S. areas of labor surplus.
DSAA has recently limited competition to U.S. firms on several proposed Salvadoran construction projects until the Army Corps of Engineers suf- ficiently determines that U.S. firms cannot provide the services and that an offshore procurement waiver should be granted. However, written procedures are needed to ensure that DSAA's decision to approve off- shore procurement has been made with due consideration of the impact on labor surplus areas.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, DSAA, to
 establish guidance and criteria for reviewing and approving offshore procurement determinations, including documenting its assessment of the impact on labor surplus areas before making offshore procurement determination decisions; provide more specificity in each offshore procurement determination, including, at a minimum, the scope of work, monetary ceilings, and approximate time frames to provide clear limitations on the extent that a determination can be used; and establish a mechanism to periodically inform the Departments of State and Treasury of significant changes in the scope of work and modifications to previously approved offshore procurement determinations.

	We recommend that the Commanding General of the Army Corps of Engineers work with DCAA to ensure that contracts awarded for con- struction in El Salvador are fully audited in accordance with pertinent DOD regulations.
Agency Comments	The Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense provided written com- ments on a draft of this report. (See app. V, VI, and VII.)
	Although DOD had several major concerns about our conclusions regard- ing the offshore procurement determination process, it agreed with our recommendation regarding the need for guidance. DOD stated that it will (1) develop internal guidance for reviewing offshore procurement requests and for considering the impact on labor surplus areas and (2) initiate action to provide detailed guidance to the implementing agencies to ensure that the limits of the offshore procurement authority are understood and adhered to. DOD also plans to coordinate with DCAA to ensure that negotiated contracts awarded to Salvadoran firms will be audited in accordance with DOD regulations.
	DOD did not agree to include more specificity in offshore procurement determinations. DOD contends that the offshore procurement determina- tion should be used to signify approved policy decisions and that esti- mated costs, time frames, and milestones need not be specifically addressed in the determination. The wording of the offshore procure- ment determination, according to DOD, permits reasonable delays or increases in cost to be authorized without the need to process an addi- tional determination.
	We recognize that the offshore procurement determination reflects a policy decision, but to ensure that the policy is applied as DSAA intended, the limitations should be clearly stated in the determination. We do not believe that requiring determinations to contain limitations on scope and value would severely limit the flexibility that DSAA desires. We agree that it could be counterproductive to include overly restrictive require- ments in the determinations and are not suggesting that new determina- tions be executed for minor changes. However, significant changes in scope and value should be consistently communicated to the cognizant departments. The current wording in the determinations is so vague that confusion within DSAA and one implementing agency (the Corps) has resulted.

The determination reflects the concurrence of the Departments of Treasury and State on the proposed use of military aid funds. In addition, the determination is recognized as the authorizing document for offshore procurement; the supporting documentation, such as the coordination document submitted to the Departments of Treasury and State, which provides specificity as to the determination's scope, would not carry similar weight. Therefore, we believe that stating the broad outlines of the projects to be included under each determination would ensure that the policy is not being misunderstood or misapplied.

The State and Treasury Departments concurred with our recommendation that they be informed when significant changes in scope are made to previously approved offshore procurement determinations. DOD did not agree with this recommendation because it believes that sufficient coordination already takes place. DOD added, however, that the new internal guidance it is preparing will address the development of a consistent mechanism to provide information to the Departments. In addition to being routinely informed by DSAA of significant changes, the State Department would want to have the right to object to a change in an offshore procurement determination should policy issues be created by an increase in scope.

The Department of the Treasury agreed that criteria and guidelines should be devised to regulate offshore procurement of construction services in El Salvador and other countries. Treasury believes that such guidance should encourage participation by U.S. firms yet not preclude the use of foreign firms if they can do the job at substantially lower cost or if U.S. firms are not interested in competing. The Treasury Department added that the guidance should give preference to U.S. firms who actively participate in the work rather than subcontracting it to a local firm. Also, the Treasury Department would like more specificity in the determinations as well as notification of significant changes in scope that occur during implementation.

We have made revisions to the report, where appropriate, to reflect the comments made by State, Treasury, and DOD. The revisions included (1) the deletion of a suggestion that the Congress require the Department of State to present the costs and details of the construction program in El Salvador in the Congressional Presentation Document because such information was included in the most recent submission to Congress during the course of the review and (2) the elimination of a proposal that public accounting firms could be used to audit construction contracts awarded to Salvadoran firms, which was replaced by a

recommendation that DSAA work with DCAA to ensure that the contracts are fully audited in accordance with Defense Department regulations.

In addition, the report was clarified to reflect (1) DSAA's consideration of labor surplus areas in its review of offshore procurement requests, (2) the Regional Military Training Center and yearly program costs, (3) the role of the Salvadoran military in the identification of desired projects, and (4) recent DSAA actions implemented subsequent to our review.

We performed our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Our objectives, scope, and methodology are discussed in appendix IV.

We are sending copies of this report to interested Committees and Members of Congress; the Defense, State, and Treasury Departments; and the Army Corps of Engineers. Copies will be sent to other interested parties on request.

The report was prepared under the direction of Joseph E. Kelley, Director, Security and International Relations Issues. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VIII.

Sincerely yours,

Frank C Conchan

Frank C. Conahan Assistant Comptroller General

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Abbreviations

CPD	Congressional Presentation Document
DCAA	Defense Contract Audit Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
LOA	Letter of Offer and Acceptance
MAP	Military Assistance Program

A Growing Construction Program in El Salvador

Between fiscal year 1985 and May 1988, \$37 million of the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) fund was approved for 18 construction projects in El Salvador. About \$13 million of that amount was originally allocated for the construction and operation of a Regional Military Training Center¹ but was reprogrammed in fiscal year 1985. The balance of the \$37 million was for various construction projects for military purposes throughout El Salvador. In August 1984, the Army Corps of Engineers headquarters tasked the Background Mobile District Office of the Corps of Engineers to handle all MAP-funded construction in El Salvador, beginning with a heliport complex at San Miguel. Other projects since then have included pier and range improvements; security upgrades; and construction of aircraft hangars, barracks complexes, an aircraft dispersal facility, and a country-wide unit training facility. The construction projects in El Salvador are not highly technical or sophisticated from an engineering perspective. Overall, the cost of each project is relatively low, ranging from \$300,000 to \$3.4 million per project. During fiscal year 1985, three projects totaled \$5.4 million; in fiscal year 1986, four projects totaled \$9 million; in fiscal year 1987, six projects totaled \$8 million; in fiscal year 1988, five projects totaled \$6.5 million; and another four planned projects were estimated to cost \$4.6 million as of May 1988.² After an October 1986 earthquake in San Salvador destroyed military infrastructure, the Corps assessed the costs of reconstructing damaged and destroyed buildings. In May 1988, the Corps completed construction of 84 of 89 temporary facilities, the first phase of the earthquake reconstruction program. ¹The Regional Military Training Center was to be located in Honduras for the purpose of training

¹The Regional Military Training Center was to be located in Honduras for the purpose of training military forces from El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. When negotiations with the government of Honduras failed to resolve outstanding issues, the funds were split among these three countries. The funds for El Salvador were to be used for training, training equipment and ammunition, and training infrastructure. The total reprogrammed fund for El Salvador for fiscal years 1984-85 was \$22 million, of which \$13 million was allocated for construction and \$9 million for other training support.

²The amounts represent the actual costs of current and completed construction projects as of May 1988; the actual costs are less than the amount authorized in the Letters of Offer and Acceptance for this construction. The amounts reflect the year in which contracts were awarded and not the year in which the Letter of Offer and Acceptance was funded.

Construction Program to Continue	The Military Group Commander in El Salvador identified a requirement for a sustained level of funding at \$8 million a year to continue the con- struction program. Proposed projects in fiscal years 1988 and 1989 include the construction of a medical warehouse and utility upgrades at various locations. Construction of other permanent facilities to replace those damaged or destroyed in the earthquake is estimated to cost \$60.4 million but is not currently budgeted. According to a Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) official, when possible, funding for future construction projects will be obtained by reviewing every open Salvadoran MAP case and determining how much can be deobligated from these cases to make funds available for other construction projects.
No Congressional Reporting Requirement	DSAA is not specifically required to report the construction of military facilities in El Salvador in the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD), which explains and supports annual security assistance budget requests to Congress. According to the CPD program objectives for fiscal years 1985 to 1988, the procurement and repair of equipment are described as the purposes for MAP funding in El Salvador. During these fiscal years, construction projects were not mentioned because they were considered a minor element of the security assistance program, according to a DSAA official, and only major programs were discussed in the CPD.
	According to the Military Group Commander, emphasis has recently been placed on MAP-funded construction in El Salvador. In addition, the fiscal year 1989 CPD includes a requirement to reconstruct military facil- ities that were destroyed or damaged in the 1986 earthquake. He added that this reconstruction will provide a lasting improvement to the mili- tary infrastructure, thereby helping to sustain a viable military force in El Salvador. Although additional funding will be required to reconstruct these facilities, these costs were not included in the fiscal year 1989 CPD. However, this information is now included in a classified annex to the fiscal year 1990 CPD.
	Although DOD is not specifically required to include information about the construction program in El Salvador in the CPD, the total construc- tion activity could, over time, represent a significant buildup of the Sal- vadoran infrastructure.

Appendix I A Growing Construction Program in El Salvador

Initiation of Salvadoran Construction Projects	The Military Group at the U.S. Embassy, El Salvador, receives from the Salvadoran military the construction requirements of their country and identifies those that can be met with the use of security assistance funding. The Military Group translates these requirements into requests to the Army Corps of Engineers to prepare the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) casework for design and construction of these projects. At that time, the Corps decides whether the project deviates from the normal FMS procedures and will require special authorization. For example, due to the anticipated limited interest of U.S. firms for work in El Salvador, the Corps has requested offshore procurement authorization from DSAA to broaden the FMS vendor participation to include Salvadoran firms. These requests, together with the case information regarding price and project description, are submitted to DSAA. Upon receipt of offshore procurement authorization, the FMS case is submitted to the Salvadoran government for approval. If accepted, the work is contracted to independent or joint venture firms through the Corps, as was the case for construction work in El Salvador. Once the contracts are awarded, the Corps Area Office in El Salvador is responsible for contract administration and quality assurance.
The Contract Process	The Corps follows the Federal Acquisition Regulation, plus implement- ing regulations and supplements, in selecting contractors whose offers are most advantageous to the U.S. government. This regulation contains the policies and procedures relating to acquisition of supplies and services.
	Overseas construction projects customarily involve solicitations and competitive negotiations that result in negotiated procurement contracts. When construction work needs to start immediately, a letter contract is negotiated (see p. 18).
	Before a request for proposals is issued to solicit offers, a formal Source Selection Plan is prepared. The plan describes evaluation criteria and the relative importance of the criteria. The proposals are first evaluated for responsiveness ³ in the Corps Contracting Division. A responsive pro- posal for a construction contract often includes, among other things, an

 $^{^{3}}$ The concept of responsiveness applies only when sealed bidding procedures are used and does not apply in negotiated procurements. However, the Corps uses the term "responsive" to mean that proposals comply with all of the requirements of the request for proposals.

Appendix I A Growing Construction Program in El Salvador

adequate bid bond; a bidding schedule; and a complete technical proposal, which typically includes appropriate material describing the contractor's prior and current experience, financial capability, and management structure. The Division rejects a proposal as being nonresponsive if it does not conform to a material provision of a request for proposals.

The proposals that are determined to be responsive are then evaluated by the Source Selection Evaluation Board members. The Board is normally composed of members of Engineering, Construction, and Resource Management Divisions. Each Board member ranks each proposal based on the criteria in the Source Selection Plan and the request for proposals. The criteria and weight applied to each factor in the plan depend on the circumstances of the particular work to be done. Standard evaluation factors include specialized experience, scheduling, quality control management, previous experience, and experience of supervisory personnel. Technical competence is usually given more weight than management/administrative factors, and price is normally considered after the technical evaluation.

After each technical evaluator independently evaluates each responsive proposal, a price analysis is performed by comparing the submitted prices with each other and with independent government estimates, using a rough mathematical pricing formula. The pricing formula consists of dividing the total proposed price by the number of technical evaluation points. According to Corps officials, the highest ranking proposal based on the price-per-point analysis is always considered the most favorable proposal.⁴

Generally, the competitive range is determined by the contracting officer and discussions are conducted with all offerors within the range. However, awards may be made on the basis of initial offers without discussions if the contracting officer determines that the most favorable proposal would result in the lowest overall cost.

The successful contractors are selected based on technical and management evaluation factors as well as price. If the contracting officer determines that a proposed price is significantly lower than the government estimate, he must make sure that both the offeror and the government

 $^{^4}$ In April 1988, the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement was amended to discontinue the price-per-point analysis, according to Corps officials.

	estimator completely understand the scope of work. This has been done by requesting a price verification from the offeror.
	Prior to making an award, the contracting officer must determine that the proposed awardee is financially and technically responsible, can manage the contract properly during performance, and can complete the work on time. This process results in a determination of the contractor's ability to meet contractual obligations. The contracting officer may determine that a pre-award survey will be used in determining contrac- tor responsibility, if appropriate to the circumstances.
Letter Contracts Expedite the Award Process	The letter contract is a quick means of negotiating and awarding con- tracts when the Corps determines that (1) the government's interests demand that the contractor be given a binding commitment to start work immediately and (2) it is not possible to negotiate a definitive con- tract in sufficient time to meet the requirement. The ongoing insurgency in El Salvador required that some projects be completed as expeditiously as possible. In this regard, two projects were requested immediately fol- lowing a 1985 guerilla attack on an unprotected base, which resulted in damage to the base and the deaths of about 60 Salvadoran soldiers.
	In awarding letter contracts, Corps officials told us that, because of the unusual and compelling urgency, they generally limit competition to sev- eral firms that they believe can satisfy the requirement. Corps officials generally request the firms to develop proposals and present them orally to Corps officials. The price, Corps officials told us, is negotiated and is not a major factor affecting the award decision. Later, the con- tract is modified to include a firm fixed price.
Rationale for Approving Offshore Procurement Authority	According to DSAA, some of the general considerations that are applied but not documented when considering whether to approve an offshore procurement are as follows:
	 Does the procurement fit within the context of the country program and mutual U.S. and host country interests? Can the item or service, as required for the program, be obtained from U.S. sources or would it be cost prohibitive? Must the item or service be obtained from an offshore source in order to meet specific requirements of the program?

- Is the U.S. mobilization base or U.S. industry, with reference to areas of surplus labor, affected by offshore procurement of this particular item or service?
- Are U.S. trade patterns or trends affected?

Although these factors are provided by DSAA as considerations in the offshore procurement decision process, as stated previously, there is no documentary evidence that such factors are considered. The Defense Department added that none of these considerations is decisive in every case in granting offshore procurement determinations, but they do establish the basis for the request for such action.

In the case of construction in El Salvador, the Corps requested and used offshore procurement authority three times as of May 1988: in July 1986 and in May and July 1987. Although the authority involves construction services in El Salvador, the number of projects covered varies considerably. For example, the July 1986 authority covered 10 projects, the May 1987 authority covered 2 projects, and the July 1987 authority covered 1 project. As a result, 13 solicitations between July 1986 and May 1988 authorized U.S. firms, Salvadoran firms, or joint (U.S.-Salvadoran) firms to submit offers on projects as prime contractors.

According to DSAA, its decision to approve the requests for offshore procurement was based on the fact that U.S. participation was limited in the past and greater competition was needed to ensure competent engineering services at fair and reasonable prices. U.S. government officials who provided input in the initial decision to authorize offshore procurement included the U.S. Ambassador and Military Group Commander in El Salvador, the Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Southern Command.

In April 1986, the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador requested offshore procurement authorization for construction of military facilities and infrastructure, citing the high initial cost of construction and significant cost overruns experienced with U.S. firms. The Corps informally reported to DSAA that few U.S. companies submitted proposals and that offers solicited from U.S. firms for contracts frequently exceeded the Corps' estimated costs for the planned projects.

The Military Group Commander recommended that this authority be obtained to ensure the maximum use of security assistance funds through savings that would result from greater competition. He stated that one of the frustrations with the existing competitive system was that the U.S. firms were winning the contracts, taking administrative fees and profits, and then subcontracting the actual work to Salvadoran firms. This practice, he said, did not result in the best price for the U.S. government with respect to construction projects.

Furthermore, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, stated in a message to the Chief of Station, U.S. Embassy, El Salvador, that he supported offshore procurement on the basis that

"there are a number of highly qualified, underemployed [Salvadoran] firms available which could complete designs faster than U.S. counterparts and which are better able to specify local construction standards, materials, and methods."

He also stated that

"we recently overcame the 'Buy U.S.' prime contractor restriction in 'Costa Rica' and would work with the staff to 'get this same relief on future projects in El Salvador.' "

Corps officials and the Military Group Commander pointed out that the Corps Area Office in El Salvador also fulfills a training or educational mission. The Office (1) assists the Salvadoran contractors and subcontractors who are awarded construction contracts in constructing to U.S. specifications and (2) trains local engineers, who are employed by the Corps Area Office, how to supervise the contractors.

Not all of the negative conditions that were cited by these officials as resulting from the use of U.S. firms were fully substantiated by our analysis. Before offshore procurement authority was first granted in July 1986, five construction contracts were awarded to U.S. firms, and a number of U.S. firms submitted offers or expressed interest in performing the work on these contracts. Three of the five contracts awarded to U.S. firms were negotiated using a letter contract in which price was not the major factor affecting the award decision.⁵ We noted that the prices submitted on the other two contracts by some U.S. firms appeared reasonably competitive, since they did not exceed the government estimate or exceeded it by a small percent.

Regarding the statements on cost overruns, we noted that the Corps repeatedly added to or deleted from the scope of construction work in El Salvador, often at the request of the Salvadoran government. These

⁵On these three contracts, no formal proposals were submitted to the Corps prior to the time the contract was awarded, as stated previously. The contracts were "definitized" during construction.

Appendix I A Growing Construction Program in El Salvador

changes in scope resulted in price changes on the two negotiated contracts. On these contracts, the actual cost exceeded the initial award by 16 and 45 percent. On the three letter contracts awarded to U.S. firms, the actual costs of each contract did not exceed the "definitized" cost by more than one percent. Changes in scope also resulted in increases to some Salvadoran firms' costs on other Corps contracts. Overall, however, permitting competition from Salvadoran firms has resulted in lower construction costs.

We were also informed by Corps officials that U.S. firms might not be interested in working in El Salvador partly due to the relatively small size of the construction projects. According to Corps officials, larger projects are more attractive to U.S. firms because they are more likely to achieve economies of scale by spreading overhead and mobilization costs over a larger base. Thus, U.S. firms can bid more competitively on larger projects, whereas we were told by Corps officials that local firms, which often have cash flow difficulties, can more easily finance projects that are broken down into smaller ones.

In one instance, however, the Corps separated construction work of the same type into a number of small contracts. The project, estimated to cost \$4.8 million for the construction of obstacle courses and open-air classrooms throughout El Salvador, was broken down into three different contract proposals by regional area. A Corps official stated that the projects were not solicited under one proposal because of an urgent need to initiate and complete work simultaneously at several locations. Even so, two of the three contracts were awarded to the same Salvadoran firm, and the third was awarded to another Salvadoran firm. One U.S. firm, which bid on the three proposals separately, said that it could have submitted a more competitive offer and achieved economies of scale if the work had been covered under one proposal.

U.S. Contractors' Ability to Compete Against Salvadoran and Joint Venture Firms for Construction in El Salvador Is Limited

	We contacted 10 U.S. firms and a U.S. partner in a joint ven that submitted offers on 21 separate contracts, executed be and 1987, to gain an understanding of the factors that migh affected their competitiveness for construction in El Salvad them had encountered similar difficulties in attempting to v tion contracts after Salvadoran firms were authorized to co eral firms cited their inability to compete in bidding against and described the problems associated with obtaining perfor payment bonds. Some firms said that to compete effectively need to bid on solicitations restricted to U.S. firms or enter venture with a Salvadoran firm on solicitations permitting I tition. In a joint venture, U.S. firms could cut overhead cost Salvadoran bonds, which were perceived by several U.S. fir easier for Salvadoran firms to obtain.	tween 1985 it have for. Many of vin construc- mpete. Sev- c local firms ormance and v they would into a joint local compe- s and use
Analysis of Selected Construction Contracts	Three of the four construction contracts that we focused or review involve the construction and/or erection of pre-engi buildings. The fourth contract involves the construction of courses, ranges, and open-air classrooms at various location tracts were awarded to Salvadoran firms, except one that w to a joint venture firm. In each case, the offeror with the low posed price won the contract.	neered metal obstacle ns. The con- was awarded
	Offerors submitted 30 proposals for the 4 contracts: 17 from dor, 11 from the United States, and 2 from a joint venture f 30 proposals submitted, 12 were deemed nonresponsive or 1 tive by the Corps Contracting Division. All 11 of the U.S. fin and one Salvadoran firm's offer were deemed nonresponsive petitive. Table II.1 shows the reasons that the U.S. firms we sidered for award on the contracts.	"irm. Of the not competi- rms' offers ve or not com-
Table II.1 Offers From U.S. Firms		
Regarded as Nonresponsive or Not Competitive	Reason	Frequency
•	Failed to submit a technical proposal	4
	Not priced within competitive range or excessively priced Failed to submit a bid bond	3
	Failed to submit a financial statement	2
	Submitted a bidding schedule via facsimile telegraph	1

	Appendix II U.S. Contractors' Ability to Compete Against Salvadoran and Joint Venture Firms for Construction in El Salvador Is Limited
	The Salvadoran firm was nonresponsive for failure to submit a bid bond and a technical proposal. The offerors that were considered nonrespon- sive had not conformed to a material provision of the request for proposals.
U.S. Firms Incur More Costs to Perform the Same Work	U.S. firms often cannot compete with the prices of local competitors. Officials of several U.S. firms told us that they generally incur more costs than Salvadoran firms because of the extra costs associated with start-up, mobilization in-country, and use of American supervisors. Rep- resentatives of a majority of the firms we contacted said that they planned to subcontract much of the work to Salvadorans and use Ameri- can employees to supervise. In addition, one U.S. firm noted that the Salvadoran firm it planned to use as a subcontractor also submitted a proposal as prime contractor for the construction work.
	A U.S. contractor, who had performed work in El Salvador before off- shore procurement was authorized, explained the difference between working in El Salvador and Panama. He said that in Panama, where he has successfully competed against local firms for Corps construction contracts, he was able to hire his own work force at a reasonable cost. However, Americans will not work in El Salvador unless they are well compensated. This contractor explained that Americans expect a base pay plus a premium, or "danger," pay. Thus, the U.S. firms hire only a few Americans and then subcontract to local nationals, who comprise virtually all of the on-site labor force. However, several U.S. firms said that Salvadoran subcontractor prices for doing the site work may be high for the amount of work required. Thus, the prices submitted by U.S. firms would also be high.
Difficulties in Obtaining Performance and Payment Bonds	Performance and payment bonds are generally required from the con- tractor that is selected as the successful offeror for any construction contract exceeding \$25,000. These bonds basically guarantee that the contractor will complete the work (performance) and pay the laborers, material suppliers, and subcontractors (payment). Performance and payment bonds may be secured through a corporate surety that is approved by the U.S. Treasury or by two or more individual sureties. However, the contracting officer may determine that, for work per- formed in a foreign country, it is impracticable for the contractor to fur- nish such bonds or use Treasury-listed sureties. Thus, the contracting officer may waive either requirement.

Salvadoran and Joint Venture Firms Obtain Bonding	According to the contracting officer for the construction contracts, when the Corps began soliciting proposals for construction in Central America, it found that local firms had difficulty obtaining the performance and payment bonds as required by the solicitation. Therefore, the Corps allowed the successful offeror the option of using a letter of credit from a local bank to secure the performance and payment bonds. As a result, on the 13 construction contracts awarded to Salvadoran and joint ven- ture firms between fiscal year 1986 and May 1988, all were permitted to use non-Treasury listed sureties, 10 of which used local Salvadoran financial institutions.
U.S. Firms Have Difficulties Obtaining Performance and Payment Bonds	Several U.S. firms we talked to cited difficulties in obtaining perform- ance and payment bonds due to the civil unrest in El Salvador. They said that U.S. insurance companies considered the venture too risky and would not issue a bond. A bond specialist of a U.S. insurance company agreed that it would be difficult for U.S. companies to obtain bonds for work in El Salvador.
	In one case involving a U.S. firm that submitted a proposal on a Salvado- ran construction project, a U.S. insurance company verbally approved the performance and payment bond but withdrew its commitment a few days before bid submission in 1987 due to a news report of a bombing incident in El Salvador.
	Several U.S. firms believe that bonds are easier to obtain from a Salva- doran bank but may be worthless if they are not backed by hard cur- rency. According to an official of a U.S. firm, one reason his firm agreed to submit an offer on a project as a joint venture was that he could use a Salvadoran bank to obtain bonding. Otherwise, he said, his firm would not have been able to obtain bonding for the contract. However, DSAA noted that U.S. and Salvadoran firms had the option of using Salvado- ran banks to execute the performance and payment bonds. Thus, Salva- doran firms would have had no advantage over U.S. firms, if U.S. firms had chosen this option.
	According to a Corps official and a bond specialist of a U.S. insurance company that specializes in international bonds, if a Salvadoran contrac- tor defaulted, it would be questionable whether the U.S. government could be reimbursed. They also noted that the government of El Salva- dor imposes severe restrictions on foreign exchange.

Appendix II U.S. Contractors' Ability to Compete Against Salvadoran and Joint Venture Firms for Construction in El Salvador Is Limited

Price Criteria Used for Determining the Competitive Range	Corps officials have broad discretion in determining the competitive range. Competitive range encompasses both price and technical considerations.
	We noted that proposals from two U.S. firms were determined not to be in the competitive range by Corps officials. This determination was based solely on price and not on technical merit. The offers from these two U.S. firms were \$3.7 million and \$2.35 million. Of the remaining four proposals, all from Salvadoran firms, the offers ranged from \$1.7 million to \$2.1 million. Since one U.S. firm's offer was only \$250,000 from the next higher-priced proposal that was evaluated, the breakpoint could easily have been between \$3.7 million and \$2.35 million rather than between \$2.35 million and \$2.1 million. Thus, at least one U.S. firm could have been given consideration. The Contracting Officer of the Mobile District Office stated that, in retrospect, this U.S. firm should not have been eliminated from consideration.
Two Salvadoran Firms Were Not Fully Audited Due to Civil Unrest	The Corps has normally audited letter contracts, while certain other contracts, including those awarded for construction in El Salvador are generally not audited.
	In 1986, the Corps requested the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to audit two letter contracts that involved a U.S. prime contractor and a Salvadoran subcontractor. DCAA is responsible for performing contract audits of Defense Department contractors and subcontractors.
	In both instances, DCAA decided not to send an auditor to El Salvador due to the political and civil violence occurring there. DCAA stated that the risks associated with travel in El Salvador were too high and the per- sonal safety of the auditor could not be ensured. DCAA requested that two Salvadoran subcontractors submit relevant documentation to be audited at its stateside office, but the firms did not fully cooperate with this request. Thus, DCAA could not reach definitive conclusions on the subcontractors' costs. On one case, involving the audit of a million-dollar Salvadoran subcontract, DCAA requested information, orally and in writ- ing, from the Salvadoran firm. Although DCAA made repeated attempts to obtain the necessary information, its requests were ignored. Thus, DCAA could not reach a definitive conclusion on its evaluation of the sub- contractor's costs and treated the entire \$1 million Salvadoran subcon- tract as unresolved. On the second contract, DCAA validated roughly 80 percent of the proposed price based on relevant documentation. The

Appendix II U.S. Contractors' Ability to Compete Against Salvadoran and Joint Venture Firms for Construction in El Salvador Is Limited

contracting officer in both cases believed that sufficient data were available to negotiate a price.

MAP provides grant funds to friendly and allied countries to finance procurement of defense articles and services that help strengthen their defense capabilities. All of the Salvadoran construction was funded with "merged MAP funds," that is, MAP funds transferred to the Salvadoran FMS program under section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Although MAP funds are provided under the Foreign Assistance Act, under Defense Department regulations, merged MAP funds are subject to FMS procedures under the Arms Export Control Act once they are transferred to an FMS account.

Section 42(c) of the Arms Export Control Act states that

"funds made available under this Act may be used for procurement outside the United States only if the President determines that such procurement will not result in adverse effects upon the economy of the United States or the industrial mobilization base, with special reference to any areas of labor surplus or to the net position of the United States in its balance of payments with the rest of the world, which outweigh the economic or other advantages to the United States of less costly procurement outside the United States."

The President delegated to DSAA the responsibility for making offshore procurement determinations, with concurrences from the Departments of State and Treasury for each proposal. Since 1976, DSAA has approved 64 offshore procurement determinations valued at \$4.7 billion. The value of most of these determinations is related to programs in Israel. About two-thirds, or 41, of the determinations, valued at about \$950 million, were made in the last 3 years (from 1986 to July 1988); of those, 20, valued at \$31 million, involved construction in Central America, Africa, Grenada, and the Philippines.

In recent years, the number of waivers for the purpose of overseas construction has increased, partly to stretch limited security assistance funds, according to a DSAA official. Another reason for the increase is a recently created civic action program for several African countries. This program and others authorized for offshore procurement encompass a number of small-scope construction projects, most of which are less than \$400,000 per project. Separate determinations were approved for each project.

Regarding construction in El Salvador, limited security assistance funds can go further with this authority because, typically, it will be less expensive for local national firms to do the work.

No Evidence That Labor Surplus Areas Were Considered	Section $42(c)$ does not indicate what procedures should be followed with special reference to areas of labor surplus when deciding whether to procure foreign goods and services under the FMS/MAP program. However, the legislative history of section $42(c)$ does make clear that responsible officials are to give careful consideration to the possibility and desirability of placing orders in areas of labor surplus in the United States before placing them in foreign countries.
	In justification for continuing its approvals of offshore procurement waivers for construction in El Salvador, DSAA stated that Salvadorans were comprising most of the on-site labor force. Thus, DSAA determined, after the waivers had been approved, that U.S. labor would not have been significantly affected.
	We found no documentary evidence, however, that DSAA took specific action to consider labor surplus areas before making offshore procure- ment decisions. DSAA's General Counsel concurred that DSAA must con- sider labor surpluses in various U.S. locales but pointed out that section 42(c) does not specifically require that an assessment be documented. In addition, DSAA's General Counsel stated that it is difficult to define the adverse impact in any quantifiable sense, since one cannot precisely anticipate months in advance whether firms from a labor surplus area will submit offers on construction contracts.
	We recognize that implementation of the act does not require documen- tation and that the adverse impact need not be defined. Although we agree that it may be difficult to anticipate with precision that firms from labor surplus areas will submit offers on these construction con- tracts, the requirement to consider labor surplus areas in offshore pro- curement decisions is mandatory under section 42(c) of the Arms Export Control Act. Without documentation, we believe that it would be diffi- cult for DSAA to ensure that a decision to approve offshore procurement has been made with due consideration of the impact on areas of labor surplus.

Determination Decisions Lack Implementing Guidance and Procedures Section 42(c) describes the factors that should be considered in approving offshore procurement determinations, but the act does not specify how this authority will be implemented or what weight these factors should be given. DSAA has no written guidance for approving or reviewing these determination decisions.

Early in 1988, both the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs and the Director, DSAA, stated in correspondence to several congressmen that offshore procurement waivers for Salvadoran construction could be authorized only on a case-by-case basis. However, in some cases, the offshore procurement determination did not specify all projects ultimately covered.

The act does not specifically require DSAA to issue separate determinations by country or project, but as a matter of practice, DSAA has made the determinations by country with a generalized scope so that minor extensions in time or scope could be permitted. Each approved offshore procurement determination is normally identified by separate Letters of Offer and Acceptance (IOA). Also, the wording in the offshore procurement determination states that the construction will be authorized "under a IOA." A May 1987 waiver approved for earthquake construction in El Salvador involves two contracts to date; both were covered under one IOA. However, a July 1986 waiver involved 10 contracts for construction throughout El Salvador for pier and base improvements, a joint operations center, unit training facilities, a barracks complex, and aircraft hangers. The construction under this waiver was covered by seven IOAS.

A DSAA official stated that too many projects were included under the authorization of one waiver and that the projects could not be clearly identified as one program. We believe that DSAA should take action to establish written procedures or guidance to ensure that each waiver clearly states limitations in scope and costs.

In addition, a greater number of U.S. firms submitted proposals on certain types of construction projects. For example, a project to erect metal buildings in El Salvador generated 8 proposals, 4 of which were from U.S. firms, and at least one U.S. firm submitted a proposal on 15 of the 18 construction contracts. When making offshore procurement determination decisions, DSAA should take into consideration that a greater number of U.S. firms may submit proposals on certain types of construction projects.

	Appendix III Defense Department Needs to Revise Its Process for Approving Offshore Procurement Determinations
	DSAA argues that offshore procurement determinations are policy docu- ments and should not be used for implementation purposes. We recog- nize that the offshore procurement determination reflects a policy decision, but we believe that to ensure the policy is applied as DSAA intended, the limitations should be clearly stated in the determination. We believe that stating the broad outlines of the projects to be included under each determination would ensure that the policy is not misunder- stood or misapplied.
Determinations Do Not Adequately Reflect Scope and Costs	The determinations generally authorize offshore procurement of materi- als, equipment, and services on a country-by-country basis and contain varying degrees of specificity. Determinations that approve offshore procurement of equipment usually specify the type of equipment and quantity but not the cost of the procurement or the time frames for accomplishment. Determinations involving construction are even less specific and contain no references to time limitations or monetary ceil- ings. Most determinations involving construction projects cite a broad, generalized scope and state that the procurement is for construction materials, equipment, and/or services. As a result, the determinations have been misinterpreted as blanket waivers.
	The three determinations for offshore procurement for construction in El Salvador, for example, are worded basically the same, as follows: "I [Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency] hereby determine that procure- ment for the Government of the Republic of El Salvador under a Letter of Offer and Acceptance of construction material and services of Salvadoran contractors will not result in adverse effects upon the economy of the United States or on the industrial mobilization base, and I therefore authorize the use of MAP funds made available for the Government of the Republic of El Salvador for such procurement."
	Only a cover memorandum, or a coordination document, which is attached to the proposed determination and reviewed by the Depart- ments of State and the Treasury, provides specificity as to the scope of a determination. But the program is not necessarily implemented as stated in this memorandum because changes can be made in the scope to meet program requirements without further justification or concurrence from the Departments of State and the Treasury. In addition, the Depart- ments do not receive information on the final scope and costs of each determination. Complete information might affect their decisions to con- cur or nonconcur on subsequent determination reviews.

	DSAA officials stated that they require flexibility in the determination language so that they can make changes without submitting a new determination for every minor change. However, (1) there are no crite- ria defining minor and significant changes and (2) if DSAA does not notify the State and Treasury Departments of proposed changes to a determination, the value of their concurrences is lessened. In addition, the waiver can be misconstrued as a blanket waiver. For example, Corps officials believed that a blanket offshore procurement waiver had been issued for construction in El Salvador. In fact, in two cases, Corps offi- cials solicited requests for proposals before a waiver was authorized. We do not believe that DSAA's flexibility would be seriously impaired by requiring determinations to contain limitations on scope and value. We agree that it could be counterproductive to include overly restrictive requirements in the determinations and are not suggesting that new determinations be executed for minor changes.
DSAA Changes Projects' Scope and Costs Without State and the Treasury Departments' Concurrence	Officials in the Treasury and State Departments recommend concur- rence or nonconcurrence of waivers based on a review of the documents provided to them by DSAA. The process is totally self-determined by these officials because there are no established procedures or guidance for this review. The review process is strongly dependent on the facts given to them by DSAA. Generally, officials in the Treasury Department consider financial and economic factors. Although the State Department considers the same factors as the Treasury Department, it also evaluates the proposal to ensure consistency with U.S. policy. Treasury routinely contacts the Defense Department for information about the planned scope and nature of the project. In some cases, the Treasury Department information about the changes. There is no mechanism for reporting to the Treasury and State Departments any changes in scope or costs that emerge during implementation.
	DSAA provides State and Treasury information regarding each proposed determination that reflects the scope of a program only as known at the time it is initiated. The justification for the July 1986 waiver for construction in El Salvador, for example, estimated that four projects would cost \$11.6 million, and the State and Treasury Departments concurred. However, as of May 1988, this waiver covered 10 separate projects and contract awards of \$14.1 million. The July 1986 waiver was also used for solicitations that had closing dates as late as September 1987. The

award amounts exceeded the waiver estimate by \$2.5 million (22 percent), and the number of projects was increased.

Treasury and State Department officials used the original estimates in scope and costs as the basis for their approval, but as of May 1988, they had no knowledge of the total scope of the program or its costs. DSAA could continue to increase the value of this waiver, since it has no finite dollar ceilings or time limitations. In effect, 10 projects were contracted for under one waiver without explicit DSAA approval to extend the waiver authority beyond the Corps' initial request.

DSAA justified this situation as an example of the flexibility that it needs to exercise waiver authority. However, DSAA's flexibility diminishes the function of the State and Treasury Departments. State and Treasury officials who work on these issues believe that the determination language is more vague than necessary for flexibility and that criteria should be devised for deciding when changes in project scope are substantial enough to require a new determination. As stated previously, we believe the limitations should be clearly stated in the determination to ensure that the policy is applied as DSAA intended. The current wording in the determinations is so vague that confusion within DSAA and one implementing agency (the Corps) has resulted. Stating the broad outlines of the projects to be included under each determination would ensure that the policy is not misunderstood or misapplied.

Since the determination is signed by the Departments of the Treasury and State and reflects concurrence with the proposed use of military aid funds, we believe that the determination is the document that should reflect the limitations of its use. Furthermore, the determination is recognized as the authorizing document for offshore procurement; the supporting documentation, such as the coordination document submitted to the Departments of Treasury and State, which provides specificity as to the determination's scope, would not carry similar weight.

Recent DSAA Actions

After our review was completed, the Defense Department initiated action to provide more detailed guidance to the Corps and other implementing agencies on offshore procurement actions, including specific dollar limitations and a clear statement that the offshore procurement authorization is not a blanket authorization.

During the course of our review, DSAA also took action to limit its approval of the Corps' requests for offshore procurement. In an August

1988 message to the Corps, DSAA stated that its approval of offshore procurement under one waiver was specifically limited to the scope of construction as initially requested for two construction projects and to the projects' estimated costs. Any additional offshore procurement, whether part of the cited cases or other existing FMS cases, was to be coordinated with DSAA on a project-by-project basis.

Furthermore, DSAA recently directed the Corps not to consider requesting offshore procurement on a third project until it was absolutely certain that no American contractors were interested in it, thereby limiting bidding on the construction proposal to U.S. firms only. After our review, DSAA stated that the decision to seek offshore procurement determinations for 5 of 8 projects currently being considered will depend on whether the Corps identifies adequate interest by U.S. firms.

Appendix IV Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to review the construction program in El Salvador, with emphasis on selected construction contracts and firms from labor surplus areas who had bid on these contracts, and to evaluate DSAA's process for authorizing offshore procurement waivers with respect to its legality and propriety for construction in El Salvador.

We conducted our review from January to August 1988 and obtained information from the Departments of Defense, Treasury, State, and Labor about the offshore procurement process. We interviewed officials of the Office of the Chief of Engineers and the Mobile District Office of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Area Engineer and the former and current Military Group Commanders, San Salvador, El Salvador, to determine how the contract process worked, the rationale for requesting offshore procurements, and the extent to which U.S. and Salvadoran firms have provided construction services in El Salvador.

Our review did not include an in-depth analysis of all of the construction contracts awarded to both U.S. and Salvadoran firms. However, we reviewed the files on four construction contracts that we were requested to review and obtained and analyzed information about all MAP-funded construction projects in El Salvador between 1985 and August 1988 to provide a basis for comparison and a context for evaluation. We also interviewed officials of 10 U.S. firms and the U.S. partner of a joint venture firm, representing a mix of successful and unsuccessful U.S. firms that had submitted offers on one or more construction contracts in El Salvador since 1985 to determine the factors that might have affected their competitiveness.

We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Comments From the Department of State

United States Department of State Comptroller Washington, D.C. 20520 February 2, 1989 Dear Mr. Conahan: I am replying to your letter of January 6, 1989 to the Secretary which forwarded copies of the draft report entitled "El Salvador: Limited Use of U.S. Firms in Military Aid Construction" (GAO Code 463766) for review and comment. The enclosed comments were coordinated within the Department and prepared by the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM). We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report. Sincerely, Kozer B. feldman Roger B. Feldman Enclosure: As stated. Mr. Frank C. Conahan Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.

	GAO DRAFT REPORT COMMENTS: EL SALVADOR: LIMITED USE OF U.S. FIRMS IN MILITARY AID CONSTRUCTION (GAO CODE 463766)
See p. 10.	PM would like to point out that basic information on foreign military sales construction agreements is already routinely included in the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD). For example, dollar figures for El Salvador appear on pages 44 and 138 of the FY 1990 CPD and in the classified annex to the CPD. Therefore, there is reason to believe that GAO's recommendation to include details of El Salvador construction projects in future CPD's may be duplicative.
	We concur that DSAA should advise State whenever a previously approved offshore procurement case has increased in scope. This could take the form of a simple notification, not a request for re-approval (although we would reserve the right to object if we believed policy issues were created by the increase in scope).
Now on p. 31.	For the sake of accuracy, we would like to make two textual comments. With regard to page 52 of the draft report, State Department officials do take economic and financial factors into account in evaluating proposed offshore procurement waivers. With regard to page 53, we do not recall specific statements in the last paragraph attributed to Department of State officers. Current limitations on security assistance funding are having a serious effect on America's ability to achieve its foreign policy goals. PM therefore strongly concurs with GAO that cost-saving alternatives, such as appropriate use of offshore procurement in foreign military sales construction projects, are a useful means of conserving scarce security assistance funds.
	Vladimir Lehovich Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Comments From the Department of the Treasury


DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY WASHINGTON
February 27, 1989
Dear Mr. Kelly:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft GAO report, "El Salvador: Limited Use of U.S. Firms in Military Aid Construction." We have no serious disagreements with the draft. We do, however, have several substantive observations which may be of interest to you.
In general, we agree that criteria and guidelines should be devised to regulate procurement of construction services in El Salvador and other countries. Such guidance should encour- age participation by U.S. firms yet not preclude use of foreign firms where they can do the job at substantially lower cost or where U.S. firms are not interested in bidding. The guidance should give preference to U.S. bidders who actively participate in the work rather than subcontracting it to a local firm.
The feasibility of procuring U.S. construction materials for offshore projects (see page 5) also is an issue that might be addressed in the guidelines. DSAA often takes the position that materials such as bulk commodities and fixtures made to non-U.S. standards can be procured abroad rather than in the United States. We agree, especially for smaller projects in remote locations. However, higher value-added manufactured items such as generators should continue to be procured in the United States where possible.
We would welcome more specificity in the Determinations as well as advice of significant changes in scope that occur during implementation of a project. Indeed, as a result of this GAO study DOD already has been in contact with us to discuss some of their thoughts on the latter issue.
In addition to these points, we suggest the following specific changes in your draft:
On page 11, change the last sentence to read, "When making these decisions, the Departments rely on DOD for information about the planned scope and nature of the project. There is no mechanism for notifying changes in scope or costs that emerge during implementation."
Top of page 13, add at the end of the sentence, " for granting waivers in consultation with the other Departments involved."
Middle paragraph on page 52, insert the following sentence just before the present last sentence: "Treasury routinely contacts DOD by telephone to obtain supplementary information on proposed projects and to request clarification on points

Now on p. 7.


Now on p. 31.

-2raised by the DSAA documentation." Now on p. 32. On page 53, the last sentence should read, "State and _ ----Treasury officials who work on these issues believe that the Determination language is more vague than necessary for flexibility, and that criteria should be devised for deciding when changes in project scope are so substantial as to require a new Determination." Finally, it probably would be useful to introduce early in the report the precise language of Section 42(c) that now Now on p. 27. appears only in Appendix III, page 44. Sincerely, William E. Barreda Deputy Assistant Secretary Trade and Investment Policy Mr. Joseph E. Kelly Senior Associate Director NSAID/SIR, Room 5148 General Accounting Office 441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548

Comments From the Department of Defense



2 A major DoD consideration in the review of the GAO report has been the role of the Offshore Procurement Determination. The Offshore Procurement Determination itself is a policy document. As a policy document, it should be supported by more specific implementation documents. Accordingly, the DoD disagrees with GAO findings that would convert the Offshore Procurement Determination into an implementing document. The DoD does, however, agree with the GAO that additional guidance is necessary to ensure that Offshore Procurement Determinations are supported by appropriate implementing instructions. This guidance will, however, be developed in such a manner so as not to encourage the use of offshore procurement. The DoD detailed comments on the report findings and recommendations are provided in the attachment. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Sincerely, CHARLES W. BROWN Attachment LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA As Stated DIRECTOR




Now on p. 15. See comment 2.	 Yearly Construction Summary. A review of Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) records indicates confirms that Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) construction were issued and implemented from fiscal years 1985 up to May 1988 in the amount of \$37.0 million. The GAO report indicates that a total of \$28.9 million for construction contracts was actually awarded during this period. It should be noted that the balance of construction projects under the indicated FMS cases were in process during this period and many are under contract or solicitation at this time. FINDING B: El Salvador Construction Program to Continue. The GAO reported that the Military Group Commander in El Salvador identified a requirement for a sustained level of funding of \$8 million a year to continue the construction program. The GAO observed that proposed projects in FY1988 and beyond indue the construction of a medical warehouse, utility upgrades at various locations and construction of other permanent facilities valued at \$60.4 million, to replace those damaged or destroyed in the earthquake. The GAO commented that, according to a Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSA) official, first year funding for the permanent military facilities will be obtained by scrutinizing open El Salvadoran MAP cases for unneeded funds, which will be made available for other construction projects. (p. 21/GAO Draft Report) DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The DoD agrees that the FMS construction will continue in the immediate future, but disagrees with the projected level of future construction. Additional Annual Level of Construction. Although the U. S. Military Group (USMILGP) Commander has indicated an estimated annual level of \$6-58 million, actual construction levels will be assessed yearly based on actual funds available. As with any MAP recipient, the assessment of valid military requirements for El Salvador for infrastructure improvements, support of current equip
	The FY1988 and FY1989 MAP allocations for El Salvador were \$80 million and \$85 million respectively. If funding levels remain at the current levels, an annual construction program of
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
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See comment 3.

- <u>FY1988, FY1989, FY1990 CPD Text.</u> In all three of the most recent CPDs, the following paragraph was included in the description of the El Salvador program:
"Approximately two thirds of past military assistance programs have been used for sustainment, including ammunition, spares, fuel, and logistical support. The remaining one-third has been used for the purchase of medical supplies, training, infrastructure improvements, mobility, fire support and command, control and communications."
- <u>Classified Annex to the CPD.</u> The FY1990 Classified Annex to the CPD contains a projected MAP expenditure plan which identifies, as an individual line item, the estimated value of the construction program for El Salvador.
The information provided in the CPD, as it is currently prepared, provides the Congress information on the Salvadoran construction program and its projected value.
<u>RMTC Reprogramming</u> . In FY 1984 and FY1985, special MAP allocations totaling \$38.5 million were made for the development of an RMTC in Honduras for the joint use of military forces from the Central American democracies. When this project was terminated due to political issues, the Congress was notified of its dissolution and planned reprogramming for the previously allocated funds under existing reprogramming rules. At that time; funds were reprogrammed to El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.
Detailed briefings were conducted at that time because of reprogramming rules and the sensitive regional political issues involved on the establishment of the original facility and its termination. While El Salvador was a focal point of discussion in terms of funds, the nature of the program was the central issue, not El Salvador.
FINDING D: Initiation of El Salvadoran Construction Projects. The GAO explained that the Military Group at the U.S.Embassy, El Salvador, discusses with the El Salvadoran military the construction requirements of their country and identifies those that can be met with the use of security assistance funding. According to the GAO, these requirements are then translated by the Military Group into requests to the Corps of Engineers to prepare the FMS case for design and construction of the projects. The GAO found, that at that time, the Corps decides whether the project deviates from the normal FMS procedure and will, therefore, require special authorization. The GAO noted that the request, together with the case information regarding price and project description is then forwarded to DSAA and, upon its
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



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Now on pp. 16-18.	technical evaluator independently evaluates each responsive proposal, a price analysis is performed by comparing the submitted prices and independent Government estimates, using a mathematical pricing formula that consists of dividing the total proposed price by the number of technical evaluation points. The GAO noted that, according to Corps officials, the highest ranking proposal based on price per point is always considered the most favorable proposal. The GAO reported that, when the contracting officer determines that a proposed price is significantly lower than the Government estimate, a Determination is made to make sure both the offerer and the Government estimator completely understand the scope of work to be done, including requesting price verification from the offerer. The GAO further explained that, prior to making an award, the contracting officer makes a pre-award survey to determine that the proposed awardee is responsible both financially and technically, has the capability to manage the contract properly during performance and the capability to complete the work on time. The GAO explained that the letter contract is a quick means to negotiate and award contracts when the Corps determines that (1) the Government's interests demand that the contractor be given a binding commitment so work can start immediately and (2) negotiation of a definitive contract is not possible in sufficient time to meet the requirement. The GAO observed the ongoing insurgency in El Salvador requires that some projects be completed as expeditiously as possible. The GAO found that, in awarding letter contracts, because of the unusual and compelling urgency, the Corps officials generally limit competition to several firms that can satisfy the requirement. (pp. 24-28/GAO Draft Report)
See comment 5	DOD RESPONSE. Partially concur.
	The award process described by the GAO does not indicate the degree of discussion and analysis that is involved in the evaluation of bids received or the dialogue between the Corps and the bidders. The highest ranking proposal under the price-per-point analysis is the lowest price to the Government, <u>price and other</u> factors considered, not the lowest price. The GAO emphasizes the role of price but not the role of other factors, such as management and experience, in the award process. In addition, the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS) was amended in April 1988 to stipulate that cost or price shall not be scored or otherwise combined with other aspects of the proposal evaluation. Accordingly, Price-per-Point analysis (as described in the GAO report) is no longer in use. The GAO also does not give adequate weight to the extensive discussion within the Corps Area Office on the technical merits, prices, bidder experience, etc., that are intimately involved in the ultimate award decision. At each stage of the process, there





Now on pp. 3-4, 18-21. See comment 6.	 attractive to U.S. firms and are more likely to result in economies of scale by spreading overhead and mobilization costs over a larger base. The GAO noted that U.S. firms generally bid more competitively on larger projects, whereas local firms (which often have cash flow difficulties) can more easily finance projects that are broken down into smaller units. The GAO found, however, that, in one instance, the Corps separated construction obstacle courses and open air classrooms throughout El Salvador, was broken down into three different contract proposal because of the urgent need to initiate and complete work simultaneously at several locations. The GAO found that two of the three contracts were awarded to the same Salvadoran firm and the third was awarded to another Salvadoran firm and the three constructs was awarded to another Salvadoran firm and the three constructs of scale if the work had been covered under one proposal. (pp. 4-6, pp. 28-3)/GAO Draft Report) DD RESPONSE. Nonconcur. The GAO implies that the primary criteria for a decision by the DSAA to support offshore procurement authority whas been granted for a specific program, the warding of the actual procurement contracts. Once offshore procurement authority has been granted for a specific program, the awarding of the actual procurement contract will, like all U.S. Government procurement, the following general considering whether any given procurement, the following general considering whether any given procurement, the following general considering whether any given procurement need has not been determined) . Can the item or service, as required for the program, bottained from U.S. and Most Country interest? (At this level, offshore procurement need has not been determined) . Can the item or service, as required for the program, bottained from U.S. and Most Country interest? (At this level, offshore procurement need has not been determined) . Can the item or service, as required for the program, bottai
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
-What percentage of the program cost would have to be purchased offshore to meet the program requirements?	
-Is it cost prohibitive to procure the item or service in the United States (e.g. special production run, shipping gravel to a foreign country)?	
-Is there any impact on the U.S. mobilization base or U.S. industry, with reference to areas of surplus labor, by offshore procurement of this item or service?	
-Is there any impact on U.S. trade patterns or trends?	
None of these considerations are decisive in every case in granting an Offshore Procurement Determination, but they establish the basis for the request for such action.	
Many organizations in the field may request offshore procurement for the perceived economic benefits to the host country (employment, etc) and program savings. However, DSAA reviews the request based on the availability of the service or item from U.S. sources, its impact on the U.S. industrial/ mobilization base, and reasonable cost availability.	
The bulk of Non-Israel offshore procurements have been for equipment, spare parts, and ammunition which are not produced in the United States such as aircraft parts, communications equipment/parts, 106mm ammunition/90mm ammunition. In such cases, the host country has generally already possessed non-U.S. origin equipment in its inventory. Such offshore procurements are approved because it is frequently more effective to assist the host country in maintaining equipment that it already has than to try to replace it with U.S. origin equipment at many times the cost of the equipment. This reflects the reality that neither the U.S. nor host country budgets can support wholesale replacement of otherwise operational equipment.	
In the area of construction, it not logical to ship some items like sand, gravel, and stone to foreign countries in support of construction projects even if the items <u>are</u> available from U.S. sources.	
Each country program is unique in many ways and the ultimate decision to support offshore procurement is a policy decision that considers the proposed purchase in the context of the general criteria above and the mutual benefit to the U.S. and host country program.	
The GAO indicates that the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command; the U.S. Embassy; and the USMILGP have all strongly supported offshore procurement since 1986. The U.S. Embassy and the USMILGP have most often cited local economic conditions and	
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










	FINDING I: Lack of Consideration of Labor Surplus Areas . The GAO reported that since, 1976, DSAA has approved 64 offshore procurement Determinations, wiled at \$4.7 billion, and two-thirds of the Determinations, with a value of about \$950 million, were made in the last 3 years (1986 to July 1988). The GAO found that, of these determinations, 20 contracts, valued at \$31 million, involved construction in Central America, Africa, Grenada, and the Phillipines. The GAO noted, that between 1976 and 1986, only four determinations were approved for construction in Israel, El Salvador, and Liberia. The GAO explained that the primary reason for the recent increase in the number of waivers is to stretch limited security assistance funds. (The GAO further explained that at least part of the increase resulted from a recently created civic action program for several African countries which authorized a number of small-scope construction projects for offshore procurement, most of which were less than \$400,000 per project.) The GAO found that DSAA did not give any consideration to labor surplus areas in making offshore procurement decisions, since DSAA contends that USA did not explained that, in addition, DSAA does not know, in advance, which firms plan to bid on specific construction projects. The GAO explained that the Adverse impact the defined, but does require that consideration be given to the impact on labor surplus areas. The GAO acconcluded that, in my be difficult to anticipate with precision if firms from labor surplus areas will bid on these construction contracts. The GAO explained that, hevertheless, the requirement to consider labor surplus areas in offshore procurement decisions is mandatory
Now on pp. 5-6, 28.	under Section 42(c) of the Arms Export Control Act. (pp. 9-10,
	pp. 45-47/GAO Draft Report)
See comment 9.	DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The DoD agrees that labor surplus areas should be considered in the approval of offshore procurement, but does not agree with the GAO conclusion that the DSAA does not consider labor surplus areas in its review of offshore procurement authorities or the discussion of the increase in Offshore Procurement Determinations presented by the GAO. Impact of Offshore Procurement on Labor Surplus. The DSAA does consider the impact on labor in the consideration of offshore procurement decisions and specifically reviewed this
	issue in the context of construction in El Salvador. The subject of labor surplus areas is a difficult area to address, but it must be considered in the review of offshore
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


FINDING J: Determination Decisions Lack Implementing Guidance and Procedures. The GAO reported the factors that should be considered for approving offshore procurement are provided in Section 42(c) of the Arms Export Control Act, but the legislation does not specify how this authority is implemented or what weight these factors should be given. The GAO reported, that in 1988,
both the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Inter- American Affairs and the Director, DSAA, stated (in correspondence to several congressman) offshore procurement waivers for El Salvadoran construction could only be authorized on a case-by-case basis. The GAO found, that in some cases, the offshore procurement Determination did not specify all projects ultimately covered. According to the GAO, the Act does not require DSAA to issue separate Determinations by country or project, but as a matter of DSAA practice, the Determinations have been made by country with a generalized scope so that
extensions in time or scope could be avoided. The GAO explained that each approved offshore procurement is normally identified by separate Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs). The GAO found that a May 1987 Offshore Procurement Determination approved for earthquake construction in El Salvador, for example, involved two contracts, and both were covered under one LOA. The GAO noted, however, that a July 1986 waiver for construction in El Salvador involved ten contracts for construction of various facilities throughout El Salvador, with construction under this waiver covered by seven LOAs. (pp. 9-10, pp. 48-49/GAO Draft Report)
DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The DoD agrees that Offshore Procurement Determinations do not currently contain specific implementing instructions, but the DoD does not, however, agree that Offshore Procurement Determinations should contain implementing instructions or be considered implementing documents. The DoD considers the Offshore Procurement Determination a policy document, not an implementing document.
Offshore Procurement as a Policy. An offshore procurement decision is a statement of policy based on appropriate review of relevant information. As such, it is not intended to provide implementing guidance any more than other Executive Orders or Findings. As a statement of a policy, it needs to be supported by specific implementing instructions or guidance. The DoD concurs that additional guidance is needed to ensure proper implementation of Offshore Procurement Determinations, but does not concur that it should be contained in the body of the Offshore Procurement Determination itself.
The DoD will, within this calendar year, develop additional internal guidance to ensure consistency of procedures and guidance in reviewing offshore procurement proposals and in providing implementing instructions to subordinate agencies. It is stressed, however, that the OSP Determination is a <u>Statement</u>
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



the proposed determination and reviewed by the Departments of State and Treasury, provides specificity as to the scope of the Determination. The GAO explained that this does not necessarily mean that the program will be implemented as stated, however, because changes in scope to meet program requirements can be made without further concurrence from the Departments of Treasury and State. The GAO stated that since these Departments do not receive information on the final scope and costs of each Determination, the lack of complete information could affect Determination reviews. The GAO observed that DSAA officials maintained that flexibility is required in the Determination language so that changes can be made without submitting a new Determination for every minor change. The GAO found, however, that (1) there are no criteria defining minor and significant changes and (2) if changes to existing Determinations are not communicated to the departments that are responsible for concurring in its use, then the value of obtaining concurrences from these Departments is lessened and the waiver can be misconstrued as a blanket waiver. The GAO concluded that DSAA requirements for flexibility diminishes the function provided by the State and Treasury Department. (pp. 50-54/GAO Draft Report)
DOD RESPONSE : Partially concur. The DoD agrees that the Offshore Procurement Determinations do not contain time or cost limitations. The DoD strongly non-concurs with the implication, that DSAA arbitrarily permits or encourages expansion of OSP authority obtained in coordination with the Departments of State and Treasury.
The actual Offshore Procurement Determinations are generally written without specific time or dollar limitation. This is due to both the policy nature of Offshore Procurement Determinations and the nature of FMS sales. Because of the mechanical aspects of LOA preparations and contracting; actual procurement and payment of FMS cases usually stretches over more than one year. Similarly, an LOA is the best estimate at a specific time of the final cost of an item or service. The wording of the Offshore Procurement Determination permits reasonable delays or increases in cost to be authorized without the need to process an additional Determination.
The DoD concurs, that this is an area for review and will include this in the guidelines which are under development for managing offshore procurement actions. However, the Offshore Procurement Determination itself is a statement of a policy decision by the administration. As such, it is not intended to be the implementing instruction. The DSAA is taking steps to ensure that implementing instructions provide more detailed guidance.
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	 (1) The DoD will, within this calendar year, develop additional internal offshore procurement guidelines which apply to a number of recommendations from the GAO. (2) The DoD has already initiated action which provides more detailed guidance to subordinate headquarters in
	the implementation of offshore procurement actions. The GAO has been provided message traffic indicating ten recent offshore procurement actions in which more specific implementation guidance has been given to the implementing agencies, providing specific dollar limitations and a clear statement that the OSP authorization was not a blanket authorization.
	(3) In El Salvador, the USMILGP has been advised that OSP approval will only be sought for three of eight projects currently under consideration. The five projects not currently being considered for offshore procurement approval have individual project values in excess of \$1.5 million. The ability of the Corps of Engineers to identify adequate U.S. firm interest for two of the five projects currently under solicitation will determine if an offshore procurement action will be considered for these five projects at a later date.
	RECOMMENDATIONS
ow on p. 8.	RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, DSAA(1) To establish guidance and criteria for reviewing and approving offshore procurement Determinations and (2) Establish procedures for considering labor surplus area firms before making offshore procurement decisions. (p. 15/GAO Draft Report)
ee comment 12.	DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The DoD agrees with the need to develop additional guidance and criteria for the review and implementation of OSP actions, but does not agree with establishing specific procedures for considering firms in a labor surplus before making an Offshore Procurement Determination.
	As expressed by section 42(c) of the AECA, offshore procurement is an exception to normal FMS policy. The development and publishing of specific criteria, procedures, and processes has been perceived as providing legitimization to a process that, for policy and legal considerations, the DoD does not want to encourage. This has led to a decided reluctance to issue any such guidance to subordinate headquarters.
	Prior to the increase in the FMS Credit program and the development of a MAP Merger program in the early 1980's, the bulk of military assistance was in the form of grant aid equipment and
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


Now on p. 8.	RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, DSAA, periodically to inform the Department of State and Treasury of significant changes in the scope of work and modifications to previously approved offshore procurement Determinations. (p. 16/GAO Draft Report)
	DOD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. The DoD does not concur with the recommendation that the Departments of State and the Treasury be informed on a periodic basis of significant changes in scope or value of offshore procurements. As worded, this recommendation implies the development of some form of formal report to the Departments of State and Treasury.
	Appropriate coordination is already being conducted at the staff officer level to permit appropriate State and Treasury offices to be informed of changes in the approved Offshore Procurement Determinations. This is the appropriate level at which such information should be addressed. The guidelines under preparation in response to Recommendation 1 will address this area to ensure a consistent mechanism to provide appropriate information to the Departments of Treasury and State.
Now on p. 9.	RECOMMENDATION 4 : That the Commanding General of the Army Corps of Engineers take immediate steps to develop that ability to audit fully construction contracts awarded to El Salvadoran firms or, if necessary, to use an independent public accounting firm to perform the audits in-country. (p. 16/GAO Draft Report)
	DOD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. TheDoD does not concur that the Corps of Engineers should develop an independent auditing capability to audit contracts in El Salvador or that public accounting firms might be used to perform this audit function. The DoD nonconcurrence is divided into the following three discussion points:
	1. <u>Corps of Engineers Audit Capability</u> . Existing DoD regulations establish that the Defense Contracting Audit Agency (DCAA) is the designated agency to audit DoD contracts. DoD Directive 5105.36 prohibits the establishment of an independent audit capability for the Corps of Engineers or other DoD elements.
	2. <u>Use of Public Accounting Firms</u> . If an audit is required of FMS contracts, the Truth in Negotiations Act (P.L. 87-653, as amended by P.L. 90-512) requires that contractor cost and pricing data be evaluated by an employee of the U.S. Government.
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The FAR, section 15.805-5(a)(1) states "When cost or pricin data are required, contracting officers shall request a field pricing report (which may include an audit review by the cognizant contract audit activity) before negotiating any contract or modification resulting in a proposal in excess of \$500,000, except as otherwise authorized under agency procedures unless information available to the contracting officer is
considered adequate to determine the reasonableness of the proposed price".
In practice, under this section, letter contracts are normally considered as potential candidates for pre-award audit as deemed necessary by the contracting officer, while contracts awarded under the competitive procedures are not generally pre- award audited.
In summary, out of 19 contracts (Corps Number, not GAO) valued at \$30.08 million awarded for El Salvador FMS in the period under discussion, only 5 letter contracts (valued at \$11.8M) were subject to pre-award audits. All U.S. firm bid information, valued \$7.1 million of this amount was pre-award audited by the DCAA. Of the remaining \$4.7 million in Salvadora subcontractor bids, only two bids in the value of \$2.066 million subject to pre-award audit were not, in fact, audited. Since the remaining 14 contracts were awarded by competitive process, they were not subject to pre-award audit. Thus, of 19 contracts valued at \$30.08, \$28.02 million in contracts was either audited as required or was not subject to audit.
As indicated above, the appropriate audit requirements of the FAR are, in fact, being met for FMS construction contracts awarded in El Salvador. The establishment on an independent Corps of Engineers audit capability is not only not authorized I DoD regulation, but also not necessary.
SUGGESTION: The GAO suggested that the Congress may want to consider requiring the Department of State to present the detail of the construction program in El Salvador in the CPD. (p. 16/G. Draft Report)
DOD RESPONSE:
DoD does not concur with this suggestion. DoD contends th the Congress is being informed on the construction program in E Salvador through the CPD. The CPD, as it is currently submitte

Now on pp. 10-11.

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	The following are GAO's comments on DSAA's letter dated March 22, 198
GAO Comments	1. Like other construction projects in El Salvador, the Regional Military Training Center construction was used to develop the Salvadoran infra- structure and training capability. We did not intend to imply that funds intended for the Center were used for general construction. We clarified the report to show that the amount of these funds used for military con- struction represented a part of the Training Center program.
	We limited our analysis to those contracts awarded from fiscal year 1985 to May 1988. We did not attempt to comment on construction projects in process or under solicitation at the time of our review.
	2. Although an \$8 million a year requirement for construction was iden- tified, we did not intend to imply that \$60 million had been approved for proposed construction projects. We clarified the report by stating that construction involving replacement of damaged structures was an esti- mated cost and has not yet been approved.
	3. As of January 25, 1989, the Defense Department began submitting cost and more detailed information on construction in El Salvador in the classified annex of the CPD. Therefore, we deleted our recommendation that the Defense Department include this information in the CPD.
	4. We did not intend to suggest that the United States initiates or imple- ments FMS procurements for the Salvadoran government and clarified the report in response to these comments.
	5. We agree that price was emphasized in the contract award process, but not to the exclusion of other factors involved in the process. As stated in the report, price is normally considered after managerial and technical factors. Also, technical competence is given more weight than other factors in these decisions. While extensive discussions normally take place between the Corps and the offerors during the contract award process, for most of the Salvadoran contracts we reviewed, awards were made on the basis of initial offers without discussions. Therefore, we did not highlight the aspect of discussions in awarding the contracts for work in El Salvador.
	6. We agree that the decision to request and approve offshore procure- ment authority was not based solely on price, and we did not intend to

suggest that in the report. In response to DSAA's comments, we added the

general factors it considers when deciding whether to approve an offshore procurement. However, without documentation, we could not verify that these factors were, in fact, used in its deliberations. While DSAA states that price is a minor consideration in the decision to procure an item or service offshore, we found no evidence to indicate what weight DSAA applies to the consideration of price.

We disagree with DSAA's analysis of contracts, especially those awarded to U.S. firms. DSAA states that two U.S. contracts were in excess of \$6 million. It appears that DSAA confuses the value of the LOA, which is normally higher than the cost, with the actual contract awards. The contracts awarded to U.S. firms for construction in El Salvador actually ranged from \$800,000 to \$3.3 million. The contracts to Salvadoran firms were awarded within a similar range, from \$300,000 to \$3.4 million. While we agree that larger projects would be more attractive to U.S. firms, we disagree with the implication that U.S. firms did not submit proposals on the smaller projects. Our analysis showed that some U.S. firms offered reasonably competitive prices and were awarded contracts of a size similar to those awarded to the Salvadoran contractors.

Data provided by the Corps indicated that until mid-1987, there had been minimum response from U.S. firms. Although the Corps reported a moderate increase in U.S. firms' interest in selected types of construction in 1987, we believe it is significant that DSAA continued to approve offshore procurement authority without obtaining assurances that U.S. firms were not interested in performing work in El Salvador and might offer competitive prices. In early 1989, after we completed our review, DSAA decreased its approval for offshore procurement in El Salvador, and we added this information to our report.

7. We changed our report to reflect that all firms were given the same advantages to compete for work in El Salvador.

8. We did not intend to imply that no audits were conducted, and we clarified this in our report. However, key source documents were not provided to DCAA by the Salvadoran subcontractors to provide a full accountability.

9. The report was clarified regarding DSAA's consideration of labor surplus areas in its review of offshore procurement requests and the position of DSAA's General Counsel. DSAA correctly states that we did not address nonconstruction offshore procurements and high-value offshore procurements. While we agree that the value of offshore procurements is not high relative to the total security assistance program, we believe the dollar value of \$90 million since 1986, excluding Israel, is significant. Although only a small portion of that involved constructionrelated offshore procurement, this type of offshore procurement authorizations is increasing. The issues addressed in this report involve DSAA's assessment of the impact of offshore procurements on U.S. labor surplus areas, which could affect its approvals for construction-related offshore procurements. As stated in the report, we could find no documentary evidence regarding DSAA's assessment of the impact on labor surplus areas.

10. While we recognize that offshore procurement determinations are policy documents, implementation of offshore procurement determinations varies and is unclear. Determinations can be implemented under one or more LOAS and construction contracts; it is difficult to identify which LOA and construction contract apply to which determination. Since the current process has created confusion with one implementing agency, we believe it is important for DSAA to assure itself that the agency is implementing determinations as mandated. We believe that this can be accomplished by describing the broad outlines of the projects to be included in each determination.

11. We agree that DSAA did not appear to arbitrarily permit or encourage expansion of offshore procurement authority, and we did not intend to imply that in the report. We identifed one case in which the offshore procurement determination exceeded its scope. We did not attempt to evaluate all of the offshore procurement determinations in this review. We limited our scope to the three determinations covering contracts awarded for construction in El Salvador between July 1986 and May 1988. We did not attempt to draw conclusions about the extent to which determinations could exceed their scope. However, we believe that the establishment of guidance and procedures to govern offshore procurement authority would clarify its use and would provide reasonable assurances to DSAA that it is being used in accordance with the governing legislation.

12. We do not believe that publishing specific criteria, procedures, and processes would encourage the use of offshore procurement. Such procedures would guard against abusing offshore procurement and provide assurances that exceptions to policy are justified.

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