While the United States has unquestionable monetary and political interests in the United Nations (U.N.) and other international organizations, in recent years many members of Congress and the public have questioned the effectiveness of such organizations. Findings/Conclusions: Studies of the management of U.S. participation in several international organizations reveal continuing problems: (1) inadequate staffing and constant rotation of personnel in the State Department's Bureau of International Organizations; (2) a need for policy objectives and priorities to support U.S. participation in international organizations; and (3) the United States, as a member government, does not receive timely and sufficient information on international organization activities. Management problems within the organizations also restrict U.S. participation. The U.N. system needs restructuring, with emphasis on centralized planning, programming, budgeting, and resource allocation. Improved evaluation is also needed in the U.N. system. Recommendations: The President should: reaffirm the importance and priority accorded to U.S. participation in the U.N. family of organizations; charge the Secretary of State with the responsibility for formulating and directing U.S. policy for participation in these agencies; and establish a cabinet-level advisory committee to assist the Secretary of State in carrying out these responsibilities. The State Department and U.S. missions to international organizations should establish an order of priority for all restructuring, programming, and budget issues and problem areas that have been identified. (RRS)
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

U.S. Participation In
International Organizations

Department of State and
Other Federal Agencies

GAO's recent reviews of U.S. involvement in international organizations show a continuing need for the executive branch to upgrade this aspect of U.S. foreign affairs.

The management of U.S. participation in these organizations should be strengthened and the process of recruiting qualified Americans to work in them should be improved.

These improvements on the part of the U.S. Government can make the U.S. more influential in working with other members toward improved management in the organizations themselves.
To the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report discusses how the United States can enhance its role in the international organizations which are increasingly important in this interdependent world.

In separate reports to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, we have discussed U.S. participation in the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Food Program as well as the employment of Americans in international organizations. This report summarizes our overall evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations on U.S. participation in international organizations.

Our review was made pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretaries of State, Labor, Commerce, Agriculture, and Health, Education, and Welfare; the Chairman, Civil Service Commission; other interested Government agencies; cognizant congressional committees; and various organizations and individuals active in this area.

Comptroller General of the United States
DIGEST

The U.S. has unquestionable interests, monetary and political, in the U.N. and other international organizations. In recent years, many Members of Congress and many among the public have doubted the effectiveness of these organizations.

Several prior GAO reports and this report point out possible reasons for this:

-- Problems in managing U.S. involvement in international organizations.

-- Management problems within the organizations themselves.

-- The need to improve the process of recruiting qualified Americans for jobs in the organizations.

The U.S. taxpayer, who pays for U.S. participation in international organizations, is looking to the U.S. Government to more effectively organize itself so it can influence and carry out a consistent, participative, and productive policy within these organizations.

CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN MANAGING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Secretary of State, primarily through the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, is responsible for managing U.S. participation in international organizations. This includes planning, formulating, and implementing U.S. policies and coordinating the Government's technical positions that relate to international organizations.
Other U.S. Government agencies involved include the Agency for International Development and the Departments of Agriculture; Health, Education, and Welfare; Labor; and the Treasury.

Since 1969, GAO has noted problems, such as having the State Department review and prepare U.S. positions on international organization "budgets" while the other agencies review and prepare U.S. positions on the organizations' "programs" or "substantive matters." This caused both processes to be incomplete and inadequate, and important functions were going unattended. GAO recommended ways to help alleviate the problems.

Notwithstanding past criticism, the State Department and other executive branch agencies have not greatly changed the way they manage U.S. participation in international organizations. Organizational problems still cause inadequate direction and guidance, and the U.S. review and evaluation processes have continuing problems.

The President needs to emphasize the importance and high priority he accords to U.S. participation in the U.N. family of organizations and to clearly state that the Secretary of State is charged with the responsibility for formulating and directing U.S. policy for participating in these organizations.

The Bureau of International Organization Affairs

Inadequate staff and constant rotation of personnel continue to limit the Bureau's ability to manage U.S. participation in international organizations. Too frequent rotation of Foreign Service officers and personnel makes it difficult to build the continuity of experience needed.
Little has been done to establish interagency advisory committees under the active working leadership of the State Department representatives, as GAO recommended to the President in 1970. GAO believes that the Secretary of State should fully utilize interagency advisory committees. (See p. 8.)

Need for U.S. policy objectives and priorities

In several prior reports, GAO said the executive branch needed to establish definitive policy objectives and priorities to support U.S. participation in international organizations. Although some attempts have been made to do this, a unified policy, clearly stating U.S. priorities and measuring U.S. interests related to programs the organizations are or should be carrying out, is lacking.

Consistent with applicable legislative restrictions, GAO recommends that the President by Executive order (1) reaffirm the importance and high priority that he accords to U.S. participation in the U.N. family of organizations, (2) charge the Secretary of State with the responsibility for formulating and directing U.S. policy for participating in these organizations, and (3) direct the establishment of a Cabinet-level advisory committee to assist the Secretary of State in carrying out his responsibilities. (See p. 12.)

Limited U.S. review and evaluation of programs and budgets

Some improvements have been made in U.S. review of international organization programs since 1970. However, the U.S. as a member government still does not receive soon enough sufficient information on international organization activities. Without this the U.S. cannot make informed judgments about their feasibility and effectiveness.
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State more fully utilize interagency advisory committees in coordinating the actions required by executive branch agencies to manage U.S. participation in the various organizations. (See p. 13.)

IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.N. FAMILY OF ORGANIZATIONS

Management problems within the international organizations themselves keep the U.S. from participating more. Although the U.S., as one member, cannot unilaterally make the improvements, it can work with member governments to make improvements which will benefit all members.

These include improvements in the organizations' structure, budgeting and programming, and review and evaluation. The need to strengthen these areas has long been recognized.

The U.N. System urgently needs to be restructured, and this requires more positive and aggressive State Department action. An expression of congressional concern to the Secretary of State would help emphasize the importance of this restructuring.

What is being done to improve overall budgeting and programming

Many proposals for restructuring suggest centralized planning, programming, and resource allocation within the U.N. Some improvements have been made, but progress has been slow and much remains to be done.

The U.S. Government continues to support the concept of funding activities for developing countries through voluntary contributions, using the U.N. Development Program as a central funding channel for development planning and programming. U.S. work in this area should be increased, and the resident representatives of the Development Program should be given more responsibility.
The State Department, the U.S. missions to the U.N., and other international organizations should list, in order of priority, all program budget issues and problem areas which have been identified and have not been resolved. When doing this, such factors as importance to the U.S., complexity of the issue, and the probability of obtaining action satisfactory to the U.S. in a reasonable time should be considered.

Using such a list, the U.S. missions—through their membership on committees, working groups, and other U.N. organs and through their contacts in U.N. agencies—could do the most possible to convince the U.N. bodies and member nations of the urgent need to act on the many recommendations and proposals and, in so doing, to improve the U.N. program and budget processes. The State Department should monitor this closely and have the U.S. missions report regularly on their progress. (See p. 20.)

EVALUATIONS

In past reviews, GAO has maintained that audits by the U.N. Board of Auditors and reviews by the U.N. Joint Inspection Unit did not provide member governments with information on how well resources were being used by the organizations and whether approved objectives were being accomplished.

GAO continues to urge the establishment of a U.N.-wide independent review body. This concept has not yet been accepted in the U.N., but some steps have been taken to improve existing review bodies. GAO supports the steps taken to strengthen and expand the roles of the Joint Inspection Unit and the Board of Auditors.

The Secretary of State should clearly and strongly state that immediate steps must be taken to strengthen and improve financial management, including evaluation and external audit. (See p. 23.)
IMPROVED RECRUITING OF QUALIFIED CANDIDATES FOR U.N. ORGANIZATIONS

The success of the U.N. and its specialized agencies in achieving efficiency and effectiveness depends to a great extent upon the quality of their professional staffs. The U.S., because it is the largest financial backer of the U.N. System and relies on the international agencies to execute multilateral development projects throughout the world, has a major stake in the quality of these employees.

The employment of Americans in professional positions is relatively low in most of the U.N. organizations in our review. This situation has long been recognized, but the State Department and other U.S. recruiters need to take more vigorous action to improve it. (See ch. 5.)

AGENCY COMMENT

GAO did not obtain written agency comments on this report, but did discuss it with key officials of the Department of State. They did not indicate any major disagreement with the report and were generally receptive to the suggestions, conclusions, and recommendations. Their comments were helpful and have been incorporated in the report where appropriate.
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**ABBREVIATIONS**

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<tr>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The future of U.S. membership in the United Nations has in recent years been a subject of national debate. Yet the new and continuing interdependence among world nations is well recognized, and the ever-increasing importance of multilateral organizations is gaining acceptance.

It is generally recognized that there is room for improvement in the activities of these organizations. This report's findings and conclusions are intended to focus on ways to increase the organizations' efficiency and effectiveness by strengthening and improving the management of U.S. participation. We hope that strengthening our own efforts toward this end will encourage other member governments to do likewise.

In numerous reports since 1969, we have made recommendations for improved management of U.S. participation. Time and time again we found that our recommendations were not being fully carried out. As a result the United States was not participating as actively as it should in these organizations.

In early 1976 we began yet another effort to review U.S. participation in international organizations and to determine how well our recommendations were being implemented. In about mid-1976, at the request of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, we broadened our review to include updates of our previous work concerning certain international organizations. (We issued five reports to the Committee to fulfill that request. See app. II.)

Our latest reviews have again shown a need for improvements in the way the United States manages its participation. We also see, as we have before, a need for improved management of the organizations themselves. Realizing that we cannot unilaterally make those improvements, we nonetheless discuss them and suggest ways for the United States to work toward them. Basically, our recommendations are ways the United States can strengthen its participation and thus become a more important force in the organizations.

BACKGROUND

Since the United Nations was established about 30 years ago, the nations and people of the world have been approaching the reality of global interdependency. Major issues
concerning food, population, peace, energy, trade, environment, humanitarian development, and other subjects involve virtually all countries. The number and complexity of these issues and of international activities demand that national governments give more of their time, attention, and resources to the growing interrelationships of the world community.

The increasing interdependence of all nations has fostered tremendous increases in the activities of the U.N. System and other international organizations. This expansion of programs during a period of rising costs has resulted in dramatically increased budgets in recent years. As a consequence, the voluntary and assessed contributions of the United States and other major contributors to the organizations have risen sharply.

The U.S. assessed contribution to the U.N.'s regular budget, except for a slight drop in fiscal year 1975, has risen steadily from $29 million in fiscal year 1965 to an estimated $87 million in fiscal year 1977, an increase of 200 percent.

The Congress' concern with the escalating costs of U.S. participation in the international organizations led it in 1972 to place a limit on U.S. contributions of no more than 25 percent of the total annual assessment of the United Nations or any affiliated agency. The United States and other major contributors are also involved in efforts within the international organizations to have percentage limits imposed on future budget increases.

In recent years, more and more of the U.S. resources allocated to overseas development assistance have been channeled multilaterally, through the international organizations and development banks.

For example, over the 25-year period through fiscal year 1970, total U.S. contributions to international organizations stood at $4.7 billion. In the ensuing 7-year period, by current projections, $4 billion, or 85 percent, will have been added, making the total $8.7 billion. In addition, U.S. contributions and commitments to the multilateral development banks through December 31, 1976, total about $17.5 billion. U.S. bilateral development assistance funds, on the other hand, have remained fairly constant over the past decade, at about $1.4 billion per year.

The operating premise for channeling most of these resources multilaterally seems to be that international
organizations can better use these resources in addressing worldwide problems. In recent years, however, many in the Congress and among the American public have expressed serious concern with the effectiveness of international organizations. Our Government, which is called upon for increasing levels of support, should expect international organizations to demonstrate the competence and ability necessary to meet the challenges of global concerns. The U.S. taxpayer, who pays for U.S. participation in these organizations, is looking to the U.S. Government to more effectively organize itself so as to influence and carry out a consistent, participative, and productive policy within the organizations.

The complex array of international organizations in which the U.S. Government participates is not easy to categorize or describe. One way to illustrate the diversity of such organizations is to divide the principal multilateral organizations and agencies into the following five categories.

First, there is the United Nations and its main organs, which include the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, the World Court, and the Trusteeship Council. Second, there are agencies created under immediate U.N. auspices, including the Children's Fund and the Development Program.

In a third category are the specialized agencies, associated with but administratively independent of the United Nations. These include the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the International Labor Organization, and the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Also independent of the United Nations are two remaining categories—the regional political and military organizations, such as the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the multilateral economic agencies, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

This growing complexity of multilateral organizations presents the U.S. Government with the difficult problem of effective coordination and participation.

In the United Nations itself, the General Assembly serves as a forum where each member nation may express its opinion and vote on resolutions or recommendations. The Security Council is primarily responsible for maintaining peace and security, and the Secretariat serves as the
administrative agency. The Economic and Social Council is responsible for coordinating the economic and social work of both the immediate U.N. agencies and the specialized agencies.

Most of the specialized agencies have a similar organizational structure, consisting of (1) a general membership body, which meets annually or biennially to set policy and approve the budget, (2) a governing body made up of an elected portion of the membership, which meets more often to implement the policies and programs approved by the overall membership body, and (3) a secretariat, consisting of the chief executive of the organization and his staff of international civil servants, which carries out the day-to-day activities of the organization.

U.S. participation in the United Nations and its specialized agencies is the responsibility of the Secretary of State. This responsibility includes planning, formulating, and implementing U.S. policies and coordinating technical positions throughout the Government concerning international organizations. The Secretary also approves U.S. contributions to the organizations and appoints U.S. delegations to their governing bodies. He is charged with determining how participation in the organizations can best serve U.S. interests. These responsibilities are carried out primarily through the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

Other U.S. Government agencies have major interests and actively participate in international organizations. Examples include the Department of Agriculture in the Food and Agriculture Organization; the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in the World Health Organization; the Department of Labor in the International Labor Organization; and the Department of the Treasury and the Agency for International Development in multilateral development programs.

SCOPE

Our reviews of the management of U.S. participation in international organizations have focused on selected U.N. specialized agencies whose activities and performance are extremely important to the Congress and the American people. We have reviewed U.S. participation in (1) the World Health Organization, which deals with health problems affecting all nations and which is now emphasizing the provision of basic health services to the people of less developed countries, (2) the International Labor Organization, which works to better the lot of individual workers and to improve employment
opportunities around the world, and (3) UNESCO, which has fostered the exchange of educational, scientific, and cultural knowledge among countries.

In the food area we reviewed U.S. participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Program. The Food and Agriculture Organization, a U.N. specialized agency, promotes international cooperation in research, standards setting, and policies concerning food. The World Food Program, created and administered jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the United Nations, seeks to promote economic and social development through food aid programs, such as food for work. We were mindful also of the relationships of these two organizations to two others created as a result of resolutions at the 1974 World Food Conference in Rome. These are the World Food Council, established to coordinate the food activities of all U.N. agencies, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development, being established to stimulate increased investment in the agricultural sector in the less developed countries.

We also did extensive review work in Washington, New York, and Geneva to obtain information on broader issues relating to U.S. participation in international organizations. Some of the issue areas covered in this phase of our work were the moves in the United Nations toward restructuring and improved budgeting, programing, and evaluation; the current status of U.S. participation in UNESCO; the changes in the State Department's organization for managing U.S. participation; the employment of Americans in international organizations; and the current feeling about the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) concept of centralized programing of all U.N. development assistance.

The overall conclusions and recommendations herein are based largely on the conclusions and recommendations made in the five reports previously mentioned. We discussed each of those reports with key officials of the agencies concerned, and included their comments in the reports as appropriate. Most of the officials were in general agreement with our conclusions and recommendations.

In order to provide this overall report promptly to the Congress, we again did not obtain formal written agency comments, but we did discuss the report with key officials of the Department of State. These officials did not indicate any major disagreement with the report and were generally receptive to the suggestions, conclusions, and recommendations. Their comments were helpful and have been incorporated in the report where appropriate.
CHAPTER 2
CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN
MANAGING U.S. PARTICIPATION
IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

We have made many reviews and proposals aimed at strengthening the management of U.S. participation in international organizations. In 1970 we noted a widespread feeling that the State Department accorded a low priority to the review and evaluation of the programs and accompanying budgets of these organizations. We also expressed concern over the disparity between the management level of the action officers in State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the near-Cabinet-level officers with whom they must deal in other departments and agencies.

We also noted in 1970 that a fairly general practice had developed whereby the Department of State reviewed and prepared U.S. positions on international organization "budgets," while the other agencies reviewed and prepared U.S. positions on the organizations' "programs" or "substantive matters." As a result, both processes were incomplete and inadequate. Under these management conditions, important functions were going unattended.

We believed that at least three steps were necessary to enable State to effectively direct and coordinate the activities of all departments and agencies concerning U.S. participation in international organizations. We recommended that:

1. The Department of State give a higher priority to U.S. financial participation in international organizations than it had in the past and that the office responsible for the overall direction of international organization affairs be upgraded.

2. The Department of State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs be realigned and strengthened.

3. The President through Executive order establish a working mechanism to include necessary interdepartmental advisory committees with specific responsibilities and duties, each under the active leadership of a designated State Department representative as chairman.
We also made a series of specific proposals aimed at improving the review and coordination of U.S. interests in international organizations.

In 1974 we found that progress toward implementing our recommendations had been slow and that no single recommendation had been put fully into effect. Although State was drawing heavily on other agencies for technical support and expert assistance, it had not yet established the policy objectives and priorities necessary to effectively coordinate the total U.S. effort.

State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs had been reorganized in 1971 along the lines we recommended in 1970, but failure to adequately staff the Bureau and constant rotation of personnel tended to defeat its reorganization efforts. Therefore, to improve State's capability to manage U.S. participation in international organizations, we recommended in 1974 that the Secretary of State strengthen the Bureau by acquiring adequate staff and providing for greater continuity of tenure and that he establish a deadline for developing and promulgating U.S. policy objectives and priorities for each organization to guide personnel managing U.S. interests. The Bureau underwent another reorganization in August 1976, geared to permit a better balance among its different elements. It is too early to assess the impact of this latest reorganization.

In 1975 the Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy agreed with our 1974 conclusion that staffing was a problem in the Bureau. The Commission reported that the Bureau was hampered by inadequate staffing, limited influence, largely mechanical responsibilities, and a relatively small policy role. Citing these weaknesses and the increasing multilateral importance of issues under the responsibility of State's functional bureaus, the Commission recommended that the Bureau be reconstituted to concentrate on international organization budgetary contributions and international conference support, with the policymaking functions being allocated to the functional bureaus for the relevant issue areas.

Despite the many suggestions for improvements, the manner by which the State Department and the other executive branch agencies manage U.S. participation in international organizations has not changed much. There are still organizational problems in direction and guidance, as illustrated by the continued inability of the executive branch to develop adequate statements of U.S. policies and objectives and continuing problems with the review and evaluation processes.
WEAKNESSES IN THE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Inadequate staffing and constant rotation of personnel continue to limit the Bureau's ability to manage U.S. participation in international organizations. Although staff allotments have been increasing slowly, an effective mechanism has not evolved which would bring together the experts who have the needed technical background and experience with the experts skilled in multilateral diplomacy.

The Bureau's rotational policies appear unchanged from 1974. Most officials occupying the top policymaking positions are foreign service officers subject to rotation every few years. Some of the other key positions are occupied by foreign service personnel, who, according to the Foreign Service Manual, "are available for assignment to any post in the world."

In our view, too frequent rotation of officers makes it difficult to build the continuity of experience needed to effectively manage U.S. participation in international organizations. By the time individuals become familiar with the activities of the organizations and are capable of making their most important contributions toward improving U.S. management, they are rotated and new individuals must learn the system.

We also found little progress in implementing our 1970 recommendation that the President establish interdepartmental advisory committees under the working leadership of State Department representatives.

The two committees set up since then to deal with International Labor Organization affairs were both organized to deal with the circumstances leading to the U.S. letter of intent to withdraw from the Organization. The Cabinet-level committee meets on an ad hoc basis about every other month. The International Labor Organization Working Group, after a rather busy beginning with meetings about every other week, now meets infrequently. Most contact between Working Group members is now done by telephone. Their only major activity comes just before the three conferences the Organization sponsors each year. At this time the Group members discuss U.S. position papers and related topics.

There is one longstanding committee, the Food and Agriculture Organization Interagency Committee, formed in 1946. Although the Committee has existed for 30 years,
there has not been any further delineation or definition of its specific responsibilities and functions or the specific responsibilities and roles of the individual agencies represented on it.

As a result, the Committee continues to operate as an unstructured, largely ad hoc organization. It does not meet regularly. Meetings are usually held to prepare for an upcoming Food and Agriculture Organization governing body meeting or special session, and then primarily to select ad hoc working groups who actually develop the U.S. position.

Abortive attempts have been made to establish inter-agency mechanisms for dealing with international health concerns. In 1974 the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare suggested that his agency would be pleased to cooperate with State in developing "mechanisms which will provide a continuing means for joint consideration of international health policy." However, to date no interagency committee on the World Health Organization has been developed.

In the absence of a committee to determine what the U.S. position will be on international health programs and activities, the agencies involved meet only on an ad hoc basis before meetings of major forums.

NEED FOR U.S. POLICY
OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

Since 1969 we have reported that the executive branch needs to establish definitive policy objectives and priorities in support of U.S. participation in international organizations. Although some attempts have been made to do this, our recent studies of selected organizations indicate a continuing lack of unified policy, direction, and coordination with respect to U.S. participation.

For example, the principal U.S. agencies involved in International Labor Organization affairs—the Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor—have yet to develop an overall statement of objectives of U.S. participation. Instead, these departments, each with its own interest, have been independently developing separate objectives and priorities. Although each department apparently circulates its statements of objectives to the other departments for review and clearance, there is no formal, systematic coordination leading to a unified position.
In the Food and Agriculture Organization, the principal agencies involved—the Departments of State and Agriculture and the Agency for International Development—had attempted to develop goals, objectives, and priorities for over a decade. Finally in 1976, after urging by the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, a statement of objectives was developed. The 1976 statement, however, is essentially a broad statement of U.S. interests in the Food and Agriculture Organization. It does not clearly state U.S. priorities or quantify U.S. interests relative to the programs the Organization is or should be carrying out.

Regarding the World Health Organization, there continues to be an absence of clear guidance for managers of U.S. interests. Broad pronouncements of international health goals do not provide the specific policy direction needed by the many U.S. agencies and offices with responsibilities in this area. We believe this reflects the lack of success in establishing a focal point or mechanism for formulating, coordinating, and implementing U.S. positions and programs in international health.

LIMITED U.S. REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS AND BUDGETS

A 1972 State Department policy document, citing a 1970 White House directive, stated that the United States should give proposed international organization budgets and programs the same close scrutiny given to Federal programs. One aspect of our latest study was to assess progress in this area. Some improvements in U.S. review of international organization programs had been made since 1970, and the way these came about suggests that continued improvements can be made.

However, U.S. efforts continue to be frustrated by the same major constraint we noted in 1970—namely, that the United States as a member government does not receive sufficient and timely enough information on international organization activities to make informed judgments about their feasibility and effectiveness.

A State Department program to obtain supplemental information on U.N. activities in-country through reports by U.S. overseas missions has made some contribution to the base of information for reviewing programs and budgets. The reports, however, do not systematically comment on all U.N. activities in a country and are often not detailed enough to permit followup action. Another problem seems to be that State Department officials in Washington do not systematically follow up on information in the reports when action is indicated. State Department officials told us that,
in cooperation with the Agency for International Development, they are taking steps to improve this evaluation effort.

The problem of inadequate information is compounded when a large part of a specialized agency's activity is funded from sources outside of its regular budget. For example, specialized agencies carry out many projects designed and funded by UNDP and others funded by trust funds. In the past, the program and budget proposals made available to member governments have often not included information on such extrabudgetary activities, which, in the cases of the International Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization, for example, comprise over three-fourths of the organizations' total activities.

We realize that member governments have an opportunity to review UNDP-funded activities in the process of approving the UNDP 5-year country programs. However, we believe that more current information on all extrabudgetary activities being carried out by each specialized agency is necessary for member governments to judge the organization's regular budget proposals in the proper perspective. We are pleased to report that both the International Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization plan to include fuller information on extrabudgetary activities in their future budget and program proposals.

More complete and timely data of this kind from the organizations is not, in our view, the only avenue for improved U.S. review of programs and budgets. In general, the best time for member countries to influence an international organization's budget is during the drafting stage, and not when the legislative body votes on the budget. U.S. agencies, led by State, could improve international organizations' programming and budgeting decisions by taking more initiative before the proposals are finalized for presentation to the legislative bodies. This could be achieved by working with secretariat officials during the drafting stage and by channeling U.S. input through resolutions at regional and interim meetings of the organizations.

It has also been suggested that the United States improve its input by selecting areas of interest, developing positions, and seeking the support of other members in advocating its positions. The United States has been doing this to some extent through the Geneva Group, composed of major donors, which has attempted to hold down the organizations' budgets.

In our view, the kind of action being taken by the Geneva Group can greatly affect the activities of the specialized
agencies. Placing percentage limits on future budgetary increases would involve the United States and the Group in long-range planning and lead to the setting of priorities. We see this as a positive step.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study of the management of U.S. participation in the international organizations leads us to continue to urge that the executive branch improve its management and coordination of these activities. We see a need for the President to emphasize the importance and high priority he accords to U.S. participation in the U.N. family of organizations and to clearly state that the Secretary of State is charged with the responsibility for formulating and directing U.S. policy for participating in these organizations.

The key to more effective participation in international organizations lies in the development of procedures which impose on all interested Government agencies the requirement to cooperate with the Department of State in defining objectives and priorities, relating them to available resources, and presenting them as a coherent program. This needs to be accomplished far enough in advance of budget deadlines so that the United States can have a reasonable prospect of influencing the growth and force of the U.N. agencies.

We believe that the Secretary should spell out the specific responsibilities for each agency involved, and that each concerned agency should be encouraged to help develop unified, consistent, and workable policy statements, objectives, and goals, along with a plan for achieving them.

In the interest of improving the oversight function of the congressional committees, the Congress could require that the Department of State and other agencies seeking funds for international organizations include, as part of their yearly congressional budget presentation, specific statements listing what the Government hopes to accomplish through participation in each organization. This would help provide the Congress with a more systematic method of annually evaluating the progress made toward achieving objectives and goals in these organizations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the President by Executive order (1) reaffirm the importance and high priority that he accords to U.S. participation in the U.N. family of organizations,
charge the Secretary of State with the responsibility for formulating and directing U.S. policy for participating in these organizations, and (3) direct the establishment of a Cabinet-level advisory committee to assist the Secretary of State in carrying out his responsibilities.

The advisory committee should be chaired by the Secretary of State and include the Ambassador to the United Nations and the head of each executive branch agency having a major role in international organization affairs. Such top-level attention, in our view, would provide the type of policy guidance and direction needed to enjoy broad support and take into account the increasingly important relationship of foreign and domestic policy. The Cabinet committee would provide overall policy guidance to the Secretary of State in the development of procedures and their implementation. Without it, major decisions regarding priorities and resource allocation would not reflect an integrated executive branch position which is so essential for effective U.S. policy.

We also recommend that the Secretary of State more fully utilize interagency advisory committees in coordinating the actions required by executive branch agencies to manage U.S. participation in the various organizations. Such committees should be chaired by the Secretary of State or his designee and include representatives from appropriate agencies. The Secretary should spell out the specific responsibilities for each agency involved and encourage them to help develop unified, consistent, and workable policy statements, objectives, and goals, along with a plan for achieving them.

The establishment of any such committees should of course be consistent with applicable legislative requirements and restrictions.

We believe that earnest, vigorous action in this area can contribute to stronger U.S. positions in international forums and result in the kind of positive, persuasive influence that will lead to better management and effectiveness within the international organizations.
CHAPTER 3

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.N. FAMILY OF ORGANIZATIONS

Our reviews were focused primarily on how the U.S. Government can improve the impact of its participation in the international organizations. The underlying goal is, of course, to improve the organizational performance and effectiveness in order to better accomplish stated objectives.

Clearly, some weaknesses in this effort are due to management problems within the organizations themselves. Although the United States, as one member, cannot unilaterally make the improvements, it can work with other member governments toward achieving improvements that will benefit all members. Major areas of potential improvement include the organizations' structure, budgeting and programming, and review and evaluation. The need to strengthen these areas has long been recognized.

We recognize the complexities of many of the problems involved in reorganizing the structure, budgeting, and programming of the U.N. System. In view of the many issues requiring attention, the difficulties of effecting needed changes are indeed formidable. Nevertheless, we believe that more effective means must be found to accelerate the consideration and successful resolution of problems, so that the United States and other member nations may participate more effectively and contribute more fully.

RESTRUCTURING

In December 1974 the U.N. General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to appoint a small group of high-level experts to submit a study containing proposals on structural changes within the U.N. System. A group of 25 experts, representing 25 different countries, nominated by the governments and appointed by the Secretary General, was later formed. It submitted its report, "A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Cooperation," to the Secretary-General in May 1975.

This wide-ranging report proposed major changes in the U.N. central structure, as well as reform or improvement of budget and program policies and procedures. The group of experts which prepared the report pointed out that the recommendations for restructuring would require action by the
General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, other U.N. intergovernmental bodies, and the Secretary-General and recommended that they be set in motion by the General Assembly in 1975.

In September 1975 the General Assembly created an Ad Hoc Committee to initiate the restructuring and to make the U.N. System more capable of dealing with problems of international economic cooperation and development. The Ad Hoc Committee was to consider relevant proposals and documentation, including the report of the group of experts on the System's structure.

The Ad Hoc Committee and a working group established by it have held numerous sessions in 1975 and 1976. In February 1976 the European Economic Community member countries and the United States each presented informal suggestions to the working group. The U.S. proposal identified major problem areas to be discussed. In April 1976 the United States presented to the working group a paper outlining preliminary U.S. delegation views on the problem areas under consideration by the working group.

The problem areas identified by the United States, the European Economic Community, and the Group of 77 were similar to those discussed in the report of the group of experts. These included such matters as (1) overall coordination of the activities of the organizations of the U.N. System and the establishment of priorities for the System as a whole, (2) management of funds for operational activities under a single administrative structure, (3) creation of a mechanism for evaluating operational activities, (4) enhancement of the effectiveness of the planning, programing, budgeting, and evaluation functions of the System by adopting areas of activity and approaches to priority selection, and (5) improvements in both internal and external evaluations of program implementation.

On November 29, 1976, the Ad Hoc Committee reported to the General Assembly that it had not been able to reach its objective of working out a comprehensive package of agreed guidelines and recommendations and that it was therefore reporting only on its work through October 1976. The report recommended that the General Assembly extend the Committee's mandate with a view toward enabling it to submit its final recommendations to the General Assembly's 32d Session (Fall 1977) through the Economic and Social Council.

1/A group of developing nations in the United Nations now numbering over 100.
With its mandate extended, the Committee is continuing its work. Meetings were held in early 1977. U.S. officials at the United Nations reported that the Committee has reached general agreement on some issues, such as the integration of U.N. field activities under a single team leader, the use of the UNDP country programming system as a basis for operational programming, the unification of some administrative servicing, and increased coordination at the executive level.

BUDGETING AND PROGRAMING

In addition to the reports of the group of experts and the Ad Hoc Committee, other reports also identified budget and programming problems and made proposals and recommendations to resolve them. Two of these reports were:

1. "Review of the Intergovernmental and Expert Machinery Dealing with the Formulation, Review and Approval of Programs and Budgets." This was a report of the Working Group on United Nations Programme and Budget Machinery, issued in June 1975.

In November 1975 the General Assembly referred the report to the Economic and Social Council, requesting that it report back at the 31st (1976) General Assembly Session. Later, in September 1976, the General Assembly included this report in the agenda for the 31st Session and assigned it to the Fifth Committee. In December 1976 the Fifth Committee recommended to the General Assembly that the report be included in the provisional agenda of the 32d (1977) Session, and the General Assembly agreed.

2. "Administrative and Budgetary Coordination of the United Nations with the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency." This was a report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, issued in November 1975.

In December 1975 the General Assembly took note of the report and its observations and referred it to the concerned U.N. organizations.

Improvements have been made in the budgeting and programming areas, but progress has been slow, as shown by the actions taken on the above reports, and much remains to be done. These reports identify numerous problems and propose corrections to resolve them. The recommendations range from
relatively simple proposals concerning the form and comparability of the budget documents to drastic proposals for changes in the organizational structure and in the areas of responsibility in the existing system. Discussed in the reports are the need for:

--Continuing efforts toward greater harmonization of various processes, such as program and budget presentations; program narratives and classifications; the presentation of statistical and tabular material; and synchronization of timetables of various U.N. organizations for budget presentation, review, and approval.

--Improved guidance by the General Assembly to achieve greater uniformity in reflecting in the various budgets such factors as inflationary trends, foreign exchange rates, growth rates, and full or semifull budgeting.

--Continuing efforts toward greater coordination among the various U.N. agencies and reviewing groups with respect to budget and program matters, including the establishment of priorities among programs.

--All budgets to show the sources and the use of all extrabudgetary funds.

--Consolidating in a single U.N. fund all funds for technical assistance and preinvestment activities.

--The establishment of a single body with responsibility for reviewing the operational activities of the U.N. System in its entirety and for providing overall policy guidance.

--Improved central guidance on budget issues of broad applicability and centralized policy direction with respect to programing and budgeting.

--Improved integration and cooperation among the U.N. institutions concerned with planning and those concerned with operations.

**UNDP CONCEPT OF COORDINATION**

Many of the restructuring proposals embody centralized planning, programing, and resource allocation within the United Nations. This idea in some respects is similar to
the U.N. Development Program country programming concept wherein technical assistance is coordinated and funded primarily through a single channel. The UNDP system of country programming is based largely on the needs and priorities of a developing country as agreed to by the country. These needs are assessed in terms of UNDP resources, and a 5-year plan or country program is established by the recipient country and UNDP. Approved UNDP assistance projects, funded through voluntary contributions, are then carried out primarily by the specialized agencies under the team leadership of the UNDP resident representative.

Our report, "Actions Required to Improve Management of United Nations Development Assistance Activities" (July 3, 1975, ID-75-73), supported this concept and urged that it be extended to cover coordinated planning by all U.N. System components. The System has made some progress in the programming and resource allocation process in the United Nations. Yet, specialized agencies still tend to favor their autonomy, and few are willing to accept a central mechanism to coordinate planning and programming.

We continue to support coordinated planning and the channeling of U.N. development assistance through one focal point in each country, as opposed to direct programming by specialized agencies. Recently, the Food and Agriculture Organization diverted $18.5 million of its regular budget to direct field programs and the World Health Organization decided that 60 percent of its regular budget would be spent on technical assistance by 1980. Such actions serve to undermine the centralized development concept of UNDP.

More fundamentally, the consistently held view of the United States and other major contributors—that U.N. development assistance should be funded mainly through voluntary contributions and not through the assessed contributions of member states—is being challenged. The Food and Agriculture Organization and World Health Organization precedents, in our view, could lead to actions in other agencies for increased assessments and for the direct application of funds to development programs outside UNDP's coordinative mechanism.

The dangers of such a movement away from centralized coordination, particularly in specialized agencies wherein the large contributors no longer have the majority vote, are very real. For example, the loss of large-contributor discretion in levels of contributions and application of resources could prompt some to drop out, and this would in turn lessen the organizations' effectiveness.
Our Government continues to support and follow the concept of funding development activities through voluntary contributions and using UNDP as a central funding channel and focal point for development planning and programming. We urge that U.S. efforts in this area be increased, and we encourage strengthening the leadership role of the UNDP resident representative. We should point out, however, that the activities of the multilateral development banks must be considered in any successful development strategy.

In many countries these lending institutions have greatly influenced development strategies through overall economic surveys and analyses that have led to large investments. Therefore, the development banks with major stakes in developing countries also served by the U.N. System must be included in any successful country programming strategy.

In the final analysis, we are convinced that the ultimate goal of any programming strategy should be to develop a country's internal capacity to form its own development plans and effectively carry them out.

CONCLUSIONS

We believe that improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of any international organization can best be brought about, not by a single member, but by the concerted efforts of all member governments. To this end the Congress can continue to motivate the executive branch to make a more constructive and coordinated participative effort. More importantly, continued congressional concern should help assure that U.S. representatives to international organizations understand and are guided by a policy that includes the encouragement of other country representatives to become more involved and to join in actions aimed at improving international organization performance.

We agree that there is an urgent need for restructuring the U.N. System and believe that the proposals made by the group of experts merit more positive and aggressive State Department action than they have received. We believe that this study offers an excellent opportunity for the United States to press for those changes it supports, and we suggest that an expression of congressional concern to the Secretary of State would help emphasize the importance of this matter.

Some of the problem areas and the proposed changes and corrections are relatively minor. Consensus on how to resolve them should be easier to obtain than on the more complex and controversial matters.
RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the State Department and the U.S. missions to the United Nations and other international organizations establish an order of priority for all restructuring, programming, and budget issues and problem areas which have been identified but not resolved. They should consider such factors as importance to the United States, complexity of the issue, and the probability of obtaining action satisfactory to the United States in a reasonable time.

We recommend that, using such a list, the U.S. missions, through their membership on committees, working groups, and other U.N. activities and through their contacts in U.N. agencies, do all they can to convince the U.N. bodies and other member nations of the urgent need to act on the many recommendations and proposals and in doing so to improve the U.N. program and budget processes.

We also recommend that the State Department monitor this effort closely and have the U.S. missions report regularly on the progress made.
CHAPTER 4

THE NEED FOR IMPROVED EVALUATION
IN THE U.N. SYSTEM

U.N. studies have recognized the need for improved evaluation of the operational activities of the U.N. System. At present, evaluation efforts within the U.N. System include internal evaluations, external audits of financial statements, audits by the U.N. Board of Auditors, and reviews by the U.N. Joint Inspection Unit. In our reviews, both past and current, we have maintained that these evaluations were not effectively meeting member governments' needs for information on how well the organizations use their resources and whether they were achieving approved objectives.

We have recommended many times that an independent U.N.-wide review and evaluation body of appropriate size and competence be established to evaluate U.N. programs and activities.

The Congress, in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, emphasized this need in calling for the President to seek the establishment of a single professionally qualified group to independently evaluate the activities of the United Nations, its affiliated organizations, and the international financial institutions.

We have assisted the Departments of State and the Treasury in this effort by giving them a set of auditing and reporting standards to guide them in establishing these new groups or organizations.

The World Bank Group and the Asian Development Bank have recently created independent review systems. The Inter-American Development Bank has had such a system for some time.

In the United Nations, the Department of State submitted the Comptroller General's "Statement on Auditing and Reporting Standards" to the Working Group on the United Nations Program and Budget Machinery in May 1975.

Rather than trying to establish a new U.N. body to meet evaluation needs, State has decided to push for the strengthening of the Joint Inspection Unit as the vehicle for implementing our past recommendations and the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973.
In past reports we have expressed reservations about the Unit's ability to perform this task, because of its small size; its lack of professional diversification, permanence, and centralized direction and control; and its financial dependence on the U.N. organizations it reviews.

In 1975 and 1976 various proposals to improve external evaluation procedures and machinery have been discussed by U.N. working groups and committees. Acting on recommendations by one such group, the General Assembly in December 1976 established the Unit on a permanent basis and made it a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly and the legislative bodies of the international organizations that accept the statute concerning the Unit. The General Assembly also endorsed the principle of using part of the Unit's resources exclusively for evaluation functions.

During 1976 the U.N. Board of Auditors also took steps to more effectively carry out its responsibilities to the General Assembly. A major change was the introduction of an indepth evaluation of the adequacy of the systems of financial management and control in the United Nations and its principal organs. This is intended to be the initial step in the adoption of a systems-oriented audit approach over the next few years. Other changes merged the staffs of the three member countries into one integrated unit under the direction of a Director-General and three Directors of Audit Operations.

**CONCLUSIONS**

While we continue to urge the establishment of a single independent review body, we support the steps taken in 1976 to strengthen and expand the roles of the Joint Inspection Unit and the Board of Auditors. Improving the efficiency and economy of U.N. operations at all levels will permit a greater portion of the available funds to be applied directly to program objectives and, consequently, will enhance the attainment of those objectives.

Needed improvements in financial management can be accomplished only with the active and continuing support of the United States, other member governments, and U.N. officials at the highest levels. We believe that the Secretary of State must clearly express a strong U.S. conviction that immediate steps must be taken to strengthen and improve financial management, including evaluation and external audit.
RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the U.S. missions to the United Nations, take positive, continuing action to convince top-level officials of U.N. organizations of the urgent necessity to improve financial management and evaluation.
CHAPTER 5

THE NEED TO IMPROVE RECRUITING OF QUALIFIED CANIDATES FOR U.N. ORGANIZATIONS

The success of the United Nations and its specialized agencies in operating efficiently and effectively depends to a great extent on the quality of their professional staffs. The United States, because it is the largest financial backer of the U.N. System and relies on the international agencies to execute multilateral development projects throughout the world, has a major stake in the quality of their employees. The United States can and should assist the U.N. operations by providing highly qualified American candidates to fill vacancies.

The United Nations and its specialized agencies employ about 14,500 professionals, of which about 1,800 (less than 13 percent) were Americans at the end of 1975. To achieve geographic diversity in their headquarters, some of the U.N. agencies establish criteria for a desirable range of employment for each member country. The criteria are based primarily on the percentage of contributions, with a minimum allocation for small contributors and special allocations for countries with large populations. Based on these criteria, the employment of Americans in professional positions is relatively low in most of the U.N. organizations in our review. This situation has been recognized for years, but the State Department and other U.S. recruiters have done little to increase U.S. participation.

The State Department and other Federal agencies engaged in recruiting said that their primary emphasis is on placing Americans in "key positions" and that increasing total employment is a secondary objective. For example, recruiting officials devote few resources to field positions, since they are not considered key policymaking positions. Nevertheless, we found that the agencies have not defined or adequately identified key posts and have not effectively managed the filling of the posts. This matter is of serious concern, in our opinion, because American participation at the senior management levels and in the field expert positions is even lower than overall U.S. representation.

Both State Department and international organization officials cited a number of factors contributing to low American employment in the organizations. One is the
decreasing number of positions available to Americans as new member countries are admitted and each is allocated a minimum number of positions. Also, financial constraints have forced organizations to stop hiring or cut back on personnel. In addition, certain factors, such as the long selection process and the lack of career development systems, make international organization employment unattractive to many Americans. Finally, the organizations cite the limited language capabilities and international experience of many American applicants.

We believe that some of these problems could be overcome through improved U.S. recruiting by the Department of State, with the participation of the Civil Service Commission and other Federal agencies. Intensifying the U.S. recruiting efforts would entail a major revamping of the current approach, changing the emphasis from placing people to active recruiting for specific vacancies. Such an effort would incorporate many suggestions of international organization officials on ways the United States could improve its recruiting. The chief advantage of this approach would be that of assuring more and better qualified American candidates for U.N. positions; the major disadvantage would be the higher cost.

Success in this recruiting effort would require close cooperation between the U.S. missions to the various organizations and their headquarters recruiters. More importantly, it would require defining U.S. objectives, identifying potential vacancies long before they become available, attracting top quality candidates for positions most likely to improve the management and effectiveness of the organizations, and fully supporting U.S. candidates recommended for the positions.

We have prepared a separate report on the need for greater U.S. Government efforts to recruit qualified candidates for employment by U.N. organizations. (See app. II.) In that report we recommended that the Secretary of State press for needed reforms in the personnel systems of the U.N. organizations, in order to streamline the long selection process and develop a better career system. We also recommended that the Secretary of State, in consultation with other concerned agencies, develop realistic long-range targets for attaining optimum U.S. participation in the international organizations, and that he prepare an annual positive action plan detailing specific targets for improving participation and specific measures to be taken during the year to achieve those goals. We also recommended that the Congress require the Secretary of State to report annually on his implementation of the positive action plan for improving participation.
OBSERVATIONS ON CURRENT ISSUES
IN SELECTED ORGANIZATIONS

UNESCO

In 1974 the Congress directed that no U.S. funds could be used to support UNESCO until the President certified that UNESCO had adopted policies fully consistent with its educational, scientific, and cultural objectives and had taken steps to correct its primarily political actions, particularly regarding Israel. At its 1974 General Conference, UNESCO had voted to (1) deny Israel's application to join the European Region, (2) condemn Israel for archaeological excavations in Jerusalem, and (3) condemn Israel's educational and cultural policies in occupied Arab territories.

At the 1976 General Conference in Nairobi, the same issues surfaced again. This time the United States was partially successful in preventing anti-Israeli actions. The condemnations of Israel for its archaeological excavations in Jerusalem and for its educational and cultural policies in occupied Arab territories were reaffirmed, but the denial of Israel's application to join the European Region was reversed. Furthermore, additional actions that some delegations had feared would be taken against Israel—such as a reaffirmation of the General Assembly resolution equating Zionism and racism—never materialized. In addition, the language of at least one resolution was toned down considerably before passage.

The 1976 reappearance of a Soviet-sponsored draft declaration on the mass media first introduced in 1972 stirred up as much controversy as the issues involving Israel. Although the two-page declaration generally affirms a commitment to use the mass media to develop friendship and mutual respect between nations, one controversial clause would make governments responsible for the mass media under their jurisdiction. The proposed declaration would not be binding, but there was apprehension that its approval by the 1976 Conference would appear to demonstrate UNESCO support of press censorship. The declaration was strongly opposed by Western journalists, who feared that its adoption would lead some countries to impose tight controls over foreign reporters.

Third-world countries who support the declaration point out that Western media supply most of the international news to and about them. They believe that Western journalists too often focus on negative developments,
ignoring positive social and economic achievements in their countries. To attempt to balance what they consider to be Western-slanted news from U.S., British, and French news services, third-world countries have asked UNESCO to help link their national news services into a worldwide pool. Some Western journalists believe that this too could lead to expelling foreign correspondents or curtailing their activities and that much of the content of such a pool would be self-serving propaganda.

After considerable debate, UNESCO voted by a large majority to shelve the media declaration until the 1978 General Conference. During the next 2 years, a 25-member special drafting and negotiating committee will attempt to reconcile the differences that emerged during the 1976 debate. To quote one of the U.S. delegates to the Conference: "The fight has just begun. The people who want to control the press are coming back and we will hear much more from them."

Perhaps because many third-world countries supported deferring the mass media declaration, the United States and other Western countries voted for a resolution calling on UNESCO to reinforce its work in the field of the free flow of information and communications policies. The resolution provides $130,000 to study and identify the communications needs of the developing countries. Third-world delegates to the 1976 Conference reportedly anticipate that these funds will be a wedge and that additional UNESCO and bilateral assistance in the communications field will be forthcoming.

On December 29, 1976, President Ford issued a certification that the progress made by UNESCO in the past 2 years met the conditions specified by the Congress for resuming contributions to UNESCO. The President requested the authorization and appropriation of funds to pay arrearages and other assessments owed by the United States as well as the assessments to become due in fiscal years 1977 and 1978. Arrearages and assessments covering the period 1975-78 total $97.4 million.

State Department officials have indicated that the United States can derive many benefits from participation in UNESCO and that the United States is therefore anxious to see the organization continue its legitimate activities. State has also testified that before 1974, U.S. problems with UNESCO had never been serious, being limited to administrative, program, and budgetary matters.

In fact, we observed in our recent visits that in several management areas UNESCO appears to be ahead of other
specialized agencies we visited. Only UNESCO includes financial projections in its planning document—the 6-year mid-term program. The juxtaposition of planning and financial data permits member governments to judge future programs not only on their merits but also on their cost. Another promising development in UNESCO is the Secretariat's continued effort to establish a dialogue with member governments on program preparation. Finally, the Director General of UNESCO, with the strong urging of the United States, France, and several other members, has begun to prepare statements on the impact, achievements, difficulties, and shortfalls of each continuing program activity of UNESCO. These management improvements are increasingly important, given the desire by the United States and other governments to control the rapid growth of the budgets of specialized agencies, while making the organizations more effective.

U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM—FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

A severe cash shortage in the U.N. Development Program, since referred to as the liquidity crisis, began to affect the Program in late 1975. It affected UNDP's 1976 operations and is expected to cause disruptions for years to come. A consultant hired by UNDP cautioned that unless the Program can solve some very difficult, basic problems, it may not be able to survive in its present form. The consultant cited serious weaknesses in UNDP's financial management, information, and control systems.

UNDP's apparent inability to forecast its financial needs made it impossible for Program officials to foresee the events that caused the liquidity crisis. The problem was exacerbated by UNDP's inability to take preventive action before the full effects of the crisis were felt.

Specific factors leading to the cash shortage included:

--Increased program and project implementation—by 13 percent—over 1974. The United States and others had been urging UNDP to increase its rate of implementation for several years; when it finally complied, problems resulted.

--Inflation.

--The contribution of a major donor country (the United States) dropped by $42 million from what UNDP had anticipated for 1974 and 1975.
---Unpaid amounts due UNDP totaled a dangerously high $72 million; another $30 million could not be used for general bills because it was in nonconvertible currencies.

---UNDP had no adequate contingency funds—the operational reserve was neither large nor fluid enough and the administrator did not have short-term borrowing authority.

The deficit of about $40 million in early 1976 was covered by November, largely through additional pledges and deferred payment agreements.

The full impact of the liquidity crisis on the specialized agencies that execute most U.N. development programs is not now known. However, the funding shortage has resulted in substantial reductions in country programs and the premature termination of many UNDP-funded field programs. In addition, at least one specialized agency has had to borrow funds to offset funding shortages.

A U.S. official at the U.N. mission said that the liquidity crisis and the resultant unreliability of program funding is one reason that the Food and Agriculture Organization is appointing its own country representatives. The Director-General of the World Health Organization was authorized to safeguard U.N. health projects of special importance by including the possibility of their being financed through the Organization's regular budget.

The U.N. Development Program reported in June 1976 that, although 85 percent of its planned activity for 1976 is continuing, some technical assistance projects have been postponed or canceled. For example:

---In Colombia, a project to develop low-cost farming technology has been drastically cut back.

---In Somalia, a program to help the Government set up health centers and satellite dispensaries in rural areas has been shelved.

The State Department, in its instructions to the field for preparing evaluative reports on international organizations' programs, attempted to assess the overall consequences of the liquidity crisis. Many posts reported expenditure cutbacks in UNDP-funded activities that resulted in project delay or termination.

In November 1976 the above-mentioned consultant issued a draft proposal for improving the Program's management
information and control systems. He identified several key needs—timely and accurate reporting and projections of revenues, expenditures, and cash flows. An action plan was developed involving the Program and one executing agency. The consultant said that implementing the plan could cost several million dollars.

An Agency for International Development official said that UNDP has done much to correct the effects of the liquidity crisis and to prevent future crises. For example, the Program has begun installing annual expenditure ceilings, requiring uniform monthly reports from the executing agencies, consolidating bank accounts, curtailing travel, and moving oil producers into net contributor status. It has also considered decreasing the number of country programs.

In addition, the UNDP administrator has begun to implement the action plan developed by the consultant. Thus far, the Program has asked the Nordic countries and the Agency for International Development for assistance. The Agency has offered to provide the Program with some staff assistance. However, as noted by the consultant, a lot more money would be needed to carry out the action plan recommended.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

The International Labor Organization, with tripartite representation of government, employer, and worker groups from each member country, endeavors to improve working conditions, create jobs, and promote human rights. In recent years, the Organization has also undertaken a large program of technical assistance to developing countries.

In November 1975 the United States submitted a letter of intent to withdraw from the International Labor Organization because of a growing dissatisfaction with the politicization of the Organization. The letter listed four matters of fundamental concern to the United States: the erosion of tripartite representation, selective concern for human rights, a disregard of due process, and the increasing politicization. In the notice of withdrawal, the United States promised to do everything possible to promote conditions in the Organization that would permit continued U.S. participation. The Organization's constitution provides that a withdrawing member must continue to pay its assessment for 2 years after the formal notice of intent to withdraw. Thus, the United States must decide by November 1977 whether to follow through on withdrawal.
Our latest review of U.S. participation in the International Labor Organization has shown that the agencies responsible for that participation, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor, have taken increased interest in the Organization's affairs since the notice was given. Each department has, to a varying degree, developed objectives for its own participation in the Organization, but no overall set of objectives for U.S. participation has been developed.

Development of overall objectives, as recommended in our separate report, would be helpful in making a decision on continued U.S. participation. Our report recommends further that the responsible departments coordinate a plan for achieving the objectives. This plan should include assurance that if the United States remains a member, high-level U.S. interest is maintained so that the recent initiatives by U.S. agencies are further developed and carried out.

Finally, one further matter concerning the International Labor Organization requires congressional, as well as executive branch, attention. The United States has ratified only 7 of the Organization's approximately 140 conventions governing labor standards. This poor record is reportedly related to the U.S. system of government, in which all powers not specifically delegated to the Federal Government are reserved to the States. Thus, U.S. agency officials pointed out that the seven conventions ratified by the United States are primarily in the maritime area—an area in which the Federal Government has clear jurisdiction.

Although U.S. labor standards equal or exceed most of the Organization's standards, the U.S. failure to ratify so many conventions makes it difficult for U.S. representatives to encourage ratification by others and to judge allegations of noncompliance.

We believe that the poor U.S. ratification record is hampering U.S. participation, and we urge that cognizant congressional committees look into this issue further.
APPENDIX II

REPORTS ISSUED TO THE SENATE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

AS A RESULT OF THIS REVIEW

Need for U.S. Objectives in the
International Labor Organization
(ID-77-12)

Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce

This report (1) discusses the U.S. notice of intent to withdraw from the International Labor Organization, (2) questions the U.S. Government's commitment to effective participation, (3) analyzes the constraints to members influencing the Organization's budget, (4) points out the need to improve evaluation of its programs, and (5) recommends the development, coordination, and implementation of overall objectives for U.S. participation in the Organization.

U.S. Participation in the World
Health Organization Still Needs Improvement
(ID-77-15)

Department of State
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Agency for International Development

This report describes the activities of the World Health Organization, discusses current issues affecting the Organization, identifies the lack of clear U.S. policy objectives in the Organization, and makes recommendations to the Secretary of State to improve U.S. participation.

The United States Should Play A Greater Role
in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(ID-77-13)

Departments of State and Agriculture
and Other Federal Agencies

This report discusses the growth in U.S. financial support to the Food and Agriculture Organization and recommends specific U.S. actions to improve the Organization's programming, budgeting, and program evaluation systems.

To improve U.S. administration, GAO recommends that the President clarify the Secretary of State's responsibility for
directing executive branch efforts. The Secretary should define precise U.S. objectives in the Organization and delineate functions and responsibilities of each U.S. agency, particularly the Agency for International Development.

GAO recommends that the United States express concern over the Organization's recent inclusion of developmental activities in its assessed budget and reiterate U.S. policy that U.N. development activities should be financed by voluntary contributions and centrally programed through the U.N. Development Program.

The World Food Program—
How the U.S. Can Help Improve it
(ID-77-16)

Departments of State and Agriculture
and Agency for International Development

The World Food Program provides food aid to developing countries. The United States, its largest contributor, has a compelling interest in the success of the Program.

Although demand for World Food Program assistance is high, the Program doesn't have an adequate long-range planning system. Priorities are needed so that its aid reaches the poorest nations, as defined by the United Nations. Improvements are also needed in the Program's audit procedures.

GAO is making recommendations to help the World Food Program establish long-range planning procedures, develop a system of priorities, and expand its audit coverage.

Greater U.S. Government Efforts Needed
To Recruit Qualified Candidates
for Employment by U.N. Organizations
(ID-77-14)

Department of State and Other Federal Agencies

The success of U.N. organizations in achieving efficiency and effectiveness depends upon the quality of their professional staffs. The United States has a major stake in the quality of the employees hired and can assist U.N. operations by providing highly qualified American candidates.

GAO points out some of the problems encountered in locating and hiring Americans for U.N. organizations and makes recommendations for improving the U.S. recruiting system and increasing American professional participation in U.N. organizations.
# U.S. Contributions to International Organizations

## Fiscal Years 1970-75

(In thousands of dollars)

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.N., Specialized Agencies, and IAEA (assessed budgets)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping Forces</th>
<th>Inter-American Organizations (assessed budgets)</th>
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(In thousands of dollars)
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### United Nations Fund for Population Activities

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<td>456,671</td>
<td>260,878</td>
<td>279,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS</td>
<td>350,079</td>
<td>410,224</td>
<td>635,818</td>
<td>457,037</td>
<td>516,202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Amounts actually appropriated. The U.S. assessment exceeded the legislative “ceiling” of 25 percent on U.S. contributions to the U.N. and certain affiliated agencies. The differences between calculating the U.S. assessment at 25 percent and the higher percentages were paid from subsequent fiscal year funds. (IAEA, $366,756, 28.75%; UNESCO, $2,667,822, 29.47%; WHO, $4,926,758, 29.18%.)
2 Total calendar year 1970 assessment was $7,455,875. Amount shown represents sum actually appropriated. The remainder of $3,700,000 was paid from fiscal year 1972 funds. Amount shown represents sum actually appropriated. Of this amount, $3,906,156 was used to pay in full the calendar year 1971 assessment of $7,816,337. The remainder, amounting to $3,784,412, was used to complete payments of U.S. contributions for the calendar years 1969 and 1970.
3 Total amount appropriated. Of this amount, $3,906,156 was used to meet calendar year 1972 assessment and $3,906,156 to complete payment of U.S. contribution for calendar year 1971.
4 Formerly known as the International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property; the Organization became a specialized agency of the U.N. on December 17, 1974.
5 Does not include amounts totaling $54,433. These amounts, which could not be paid from fiscal year 1970 funds due to the Statutory requirement concerning utilization of “U.S. owned” excess currencies, were paid from fiscal year 1972 funds. (FAO, $366,756.10; IAEA, $2,667,822; UNESCO, $2,150,193; WHO, $4,926,758.)
6 Does not include amounts totaling $1,123,725. These amounts, which could not be paid from fiscal year 1970 funds due to Statutory requirement concerning utilization of “U.S. owned” excess currencies, were paid from fiscal year 1972 funds. (FAO, $3,906,156; IAEA, $2,667,822; UNESCO, $2,150,193; WHO, $4,926,758.)
7 Includes cash, commodities, and services.
8 The initial year’s contribution includes airlift services provided without charge to the United Nations of $1,000,000 in the case of UNRC; $10,000,000 in the case of UNOCI; $1,000,000 in the case of UNIFCYP; and $1,000,000 in the case of UNIFENDOF.
9 Includes $450,000 in payment of prior year’s arrearages. (July 1, 1964–June 30, 1964.)
10 Includes $26,581 to complete payment of calendar year 1971 assessment.
11 Includes amounts totaling $1,700,192 including $94,412 for the ILO—see footnote 2 to complete payment of calendar years 1969 and 1970 assessments. (See footnotes 9 and 6.)
12 The U.S. contributed $90 million in calendar year 1973; $19,419,000 was paid from fiscal year 1974 funds.
13 Of this amount, $70,5 million was used to meet the U.S. contribution for calendar year 1974; the remainder of $19,4 million was used to complete payment of the U.S. pledge for calendar year 1973.
14 Includes $1,000,000 for UNHCR Chilean refugee relief programs.
15 Special accounts for cholera emergency and malaria eradication programs.

Source: Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs.
OFFICIALS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SECRETARY OF STATE:
  Cyrus R. Vance  Jan. 1977
  Henry A. Kissinger  Sept. 1973
  William P. Rogers  June 1969

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS:
  Charles W. Maynes  Jan. 1977
  Samuel W. Lewis  Dec. 1975
  William B. Buffum  Feb. 1974
  David H. Popper  June 1973
  Samuel DePalma  Feb. 1969

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS:
  Andrew W. Young  Jan. 1977
  William Scranton  Mar 1976
  Daniel Patrick Moynihan  June 1975
  John A. Scali  Jan. 1973

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE EUROPEAN OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:
  Henry E. Catto, Jr.  Aug. 1976
  Francis L. Dale  Jan. 1974
  Jules Bassin (acting)  Apr. 1973

ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
  John J. Gilligan  Mar. 1977
  John E. Murphy (acting)  Jan. 1977
  Daniel Parker  Oct. 1973

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE:
  Robert Bergland  Jan. 1977
  John A. Knebel  Nov. 1976
  Earl L. Butz  Dec. 1971
SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE:
Joseph A. Califano, Jr. Jan. 1977
David Mathews Aug. 1975
Caspar W. Weinberger Feb. 1973

SECRETARY OF LABOR:
F. Ray Marshall Jan. 1977
William J. Usery Feb. 1976
John T. Dunlop Mar. 1975
Peter J. Brennan Nov. 1972

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY:
W. Michael Blumenthal Jan. 1977
William E. Simon Apr. 1974
George P. Shultz June 1972

SECRETARY OF COMMERCE:
Juanita Kreps Jan. 1977
Elliot L. Richardson Feb. 1976
Rogers C. B. Morton May 1975
John K. Tabor (acting) Mar. 1975
Frederick B. Dent Feb. 1973

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET:
Bert Lance Jan. 1977
James T. Lynn Feb. 1975
Roy Ash Feb. 1973