GAO

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Report to Congressional Addressees

November 2026

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

AI and Cybersecurity

Technologies Can Magnify Cyberattacks and Enhance Cyber Defense



GAO-27-108458

The cover image displays the dual-use nature of AI in cybersecurity. The layout captures perspectives of threat actors and cyber defenders at the intersection of AI and cybersecurity. An AI processor is located at the center of this intersection to emphasize the interconnectedness between conflicting motives—one side attempts to shield and adapt while the other side aims to compromise and evade detection. The blue credential labeled “FAKE” represents a stolen credential of a cyber defender, allowing threat actors to perform malicious actions under a fake identity and evade detection.

Cover source: GAO | GAO-27-108458

Highlights of GAO-27-108458, a report to congressional addressees

November 2026

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Why GAO did this study

AI is a rapidly growing, transformative technology with applications in every aspect of modern life. The government is still not operating at a pace commensurate with evolving cybersecurity threats to the nation's security, economy, and well-being. State and non-state actors attack government and private-sector systems thousands of times each day, threatening national security and essential services such as water, energy, telecommunications, and financial systems.

This report examines: (1) how AI has enhanced the cyberattack capabilities of threat actors; (2) how AI is used for cybersecurity and its benefits to cyber defenders; (3) challenges cyber defenders face when using AI to safeguard information systems; and (4) policy options that could help support various policy goals in this area.

For all four objectives, GAO reviewed literature and agency documents; interviewed agency, academic, and industry stakeholders; and convened a multi-day expert meeting with experts from government, industry, and academia. For the fourth objective, GAO also identified policy goals from executive orders, national strategies, the GAO High Risk List, federal laws, and other sources. GAO is identifying policy options in this report.

View GAO-27-108458. For more information, contact Kevin Walsh at WalshK@gao.gov, or Karen L. Howard, PhD at HowardK@gao.gov, or Jennifer R. Franks at FranksJ@gao.gov.

What GAO found

Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies have provided threat actors with the ability to magnify the reach and impact of traditional cyberattacks. For example, AI makes it possible to create high-quality content for phishing and deepfakes and to improve the precision and accuracy of cyberattacks, accelerating the speed and scale of malicious cyber activity. Among emerging trends in AI-leveraged cyberattacks is the use of agentic AI to autonomously carry out multiple stages of an attack with minimal human input.

Examples of artificial intelligence (AI)-leveraged cyberattacks

Incident	Summary of attack
June 2026: AI-powered malware lab built for evading detection	A threat actor used AI to build a testing framework to refine techniques for malware to evade detection. An investigation revealed that threat actors used multiple AI agents to test malicious code against different security products.[a] The agents were tasked with finding new attack techniques from security research, mapping them to known cybersecurity frameworks, conducting the attacks in test environments, and reporting the results.
Feb. 2026: Exploitation of stolen passwords	A low-skill level threat actor used multiple commercial generative AI services to launch a widespread attack exploiting gaps in foundational cybersecurity. Reportedly, the threat actor compromised several devices by using stolen credentials from past incidents on devices that had weak passwords and no multi-factor authentication enabled.

Source: GAO analysis of industry reporting | GAO-27-108458

[a]Agentic AI is an AI system that operates with a level of autonomy, enabling independent decision-making and adaptive behaviors. AI agents are AI systems that can not only create content but also operate autonomously to accomplish complex tasks and make decisions in response to changing conditions.

While different types of AI have been used to improve cybersecurity applications for decades, recent advancements in generative AI have expanded cyber defense capabilities. Cyber defenders use AI technologies, such as machine learning and generative AI applications, to safeguard information systems. Specifically, they use AI to improve the efficiency of their security tools, teams, and operations. For example, cyber defenders use tools to analyze network traffic. Integrating generative AI into tools allows for dynamic scanning capabilities while factoring in new known vulnerabilities and environment activities. Additionally, cyber defenders can use generative AI to detect vulnerabilities in source code and parse through large amounts of network information quickly. These improvements allow defenders to expand their cyber defense capabilities and better equip them to address the rising threats of malicious cyber activities.

However, cyber defenders also face challenges when using AI-enabled cybersecurity tools. Most of the risks and challenges identified by experts pertain to the use of generative AI. For example, there are no widely accepted evaluation criteria for assessing offensive or defensive capabilities of generative AI. In addition, generative AI introduces new risks that can expand the attack surface. Experts identified data privacy and quality challenges; technical challenges involving the underlying architecture of generative AI; governance and trust obstacles due to the rapid pace of AI evolution and outdated frameworks; and organizational obstacles, such as cost, the AI skills gap, and complications with integration, among others. Multiple experts identified fragmented regulatory approaches and insufficient data sharing as key challenges.

GAO identified four potential policy goals with respect to the use of AI in cybersecurity through discussions with experts and research. These goals are to: address gaps in cybersecurity guidance and practices, address AI-related research gaps, govern AI tools throughout their cybersecurity lifecycle, or enhance the cybersecurity workforce. GAO also identified 16 policy options that represent a menu of alternatives that policymakers could consider to help support these policy goals. For the purposes of this report, policymakers include legislative bodies, agencies, standards organizations, industry, and other groups. The policy goals, options, and related details are not intended to be exhaustive. See the tables linked below for additional details on each policy option, including opportunities and considerations.

Policy Goals and Policy Options for AI Cybersecurity Applications

Policy goal: Address gaps in cybersecurity guidance and practices

Policy options (report page 41)

- Harmonize cybersecurity requirements
- Improve cyber threat information sharing
- Close gaps in artificial intelligence (AI)-related privacy risks
- Improve application of fundamental cybersecurity practices

Policy Goal: Address AI-related research gaps in cybersecurity

Policy options (report page 43)

- Expand research to enable the safe adoption of AI for cybersecurity
- Enhance innovation and research in agentic AI identity management
- Expand AI testing environments

Policy Goal: Govern AI tools throughout their cybersecurity lifecycle

Policy options (report page 45)

- Establish a deterministic AI fallback capability for critical cybersecurity functions [a,b]
- Require human authorization for consequential AI-initiated cybersecurity actions
- Establish a risk-based approach to acquiring AI products
- Validate the output of AI cybersecurity tools before and during deployment
- Evaluate AI cybersecurity solutions for value gain
- Establish a senior role that can manage privacy risks when using AI
- Restrict autonomous and nondeterministic AI in consequential functions pending certification [a]

Policy Goal: Enhance the cybersecurity workforce

Policy options (report page 49)

- Sustain workforce skills in current cybersecurity practices
- Strengthen AI expertise for the cybersecurity workforce

Source: GAO. | GAO-27-108458

[a]Deterministic AI refers to models that are designed to operate under strict rules with predictable outputs. In contrast, nondeterministic AI, such as generative AI models, incorporates probabilities, randomness, or choice and identical inputs may produce different outputs. Nondeterministic AI may exhibit a range of behaviors under the same input conditions resulting in outputs that are less predictable.
[b]For the purposes of this report, we use the term "fallback" to refer to a predefined alternative capability, such as rule-based tools or manual procedures that an organization can use to continue performing a critical cybersecurity function if an AI system becomes unavailable, fails, or demonstrates outcomes inconsistent with its intended use.

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Abbreviations

AI	artificial intelligence
API	application programming interface
CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
DDoS	distributed denial of service
FedRAMP	Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
IC3	Internet Crime Complaint Center
IT	information technology
LLM	large language model

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November 20, 2026

The Honorable Margaret Wood Hassan
Ranking Member
Joint Economic Committee
United States Senate

The Honorable Robert Garcia
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) has created growing excitement and debate about its potential to revolutionize entire industries, particularly with recent developments in generative AI. In the near term, it may increase productivity and transform daily tasks in many areas. For example, AI tools may enable cyber defenders to develop more robust defenses against cyberattacks. However, the development and use of AI may introduce novel cybersecurity threats while providing cyber threat actors with the ability to magnify the reach and impact of traditional cyberattacks.[1] We have previously reported that threat actors have increasingly used AI to accelerate attacks against critical infrastructure systems.[2]

Due to the cyber-based threats to federal systems and critical infrastructure, and the persistent nature of information security vulnerabilities, we first designated federal information security as a government-wide High Risk area in our biennial report to Congress in 1997.[3] In 2003, we

[1]Threat actors refer to a broad range of malicious cyber actors including hackers, state and non-state actors, and transnational criminal groups, as well as individuals or AI with authorized access who cause harm, wittingly or unwittingly.

[2]GAO, *Artificial Intelligence: DHS Needs to Improve Risk Assessment Guidance for Critical Infrastructure Sectors*, GAO-25-107435 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2024). The term "critical infrastructure" refers to systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of these matters. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e). Federal policy identifies 16 critical infrastructures: chemical; commercial facilities; communications; critical manufacturing; dams; defense industrial base; emergency services; energy; financial services; food and agriculture; government facilities; health care and public health; information technology; nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; transportation systems; and water and wastewater systems. National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), 89 Fed. Reg. 37,055 (May 3, 2024).

[3]GAO, *High-Risk Series: An Overview*, HR-97-1 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 1997).

expanded this High Risk area to include the protection of critical cyber infrastructure.[4] In 2015, we expanded it again to include protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information.[5]

This report examines the use of AI by both threat actors and cyber defenders, as well as its potential benefits and challenges in cybersecurity applications.

We prepared this report at the initiative of the Comptroller General. We examined: (1) how the use of AI has affected cyberattack capabilities of threat actors; (2) how AI is being used for cybersecurity and the benefits presented to cyber defenders when using AI to safeguard information systems; (3) challenges that are presented to cyber defenders when using AI technology to safeguard information systems; and (4) policy options to support various policy goals in this area.

To address these objectives, we conducted a literature search; interviewed officials and representatives from government, industry, academia, and associations; and convened a multi-day expert meeting in April 2026. We also identified policy goals and options from federal laws and regulations, executive orders, and expert perspectives. See appendix I for the full objectives, scope, and methodology used in this report, and appendix II for the list of expert meeting participants.

We conducted our work from April 2025 through November 2026 in accordance with all sections of GAO's Quality Assurance Framework that are relevant to technology assessments. The framework requires that we plan and perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations to our work. We believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis conducted, provide a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions in this product.

[4]GAO, *High-Risk Series: An Update*, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003).


[5]In general, personally identifiable information is any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, date or place of birth, and Social Security number; or that otherwise can be linked to an individual. Also, see GAO, *High-Risk Series: An Update,* GAO-15-290 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2015).

1 Background

1.1 Artificial intelligence

The term AI applies to a broad array of algorithms and techniques that enable computer systems to make predictions, learn concepts or tasks, and solve complex problems in a manner that mimics human intelligence. For the purposes of this report, we use "model" to refer to the result of an algorithm "trained" on a set of data. Training is the iterative process of feeding data (called training data) through an optimization process to improve model performance. Training data is used to teach an AI model how to make predictions, recognize patterns, or generate content. Technological advancements, combined with the availability of generative AI tools to the public starting in late 2022, have led to widespread use of AI tools. The technology is continuously evolving, with rapidly emerging capabilities and applications in every aspect of modern life. Figure 1 provides examples of the different types of AI.

Figure 1: Types of artificial intelligence



Source: GAO analysis of Congressional Research Service documentation; iiierlok_xolms/stock.adobe.com. (icons). | GAO-27-108458

Agentic AI

Agentic AI is an AI system that operates with a level of autonomy, enabling independent decision-making and adaptive behaviors. AI agents are AI systems that can not only create content but also operate autonomously to accomplish complex tasks and make instantaneous decisions in response to changing conditions.

Natural language processing

Natural language processing relates to how computers understand, process, and manipulate human languages. Natural language processing incorporates rule-based and data-based learning systems, and many of the internal components of these systems are themselves machine learning algorithms with predefined inputs and outputs, sometimes operating under additional constraints.


Frontier models

A frontier model is a category of foundation model—which is a type of generative AI model that is trained on large amounts of data. Frontier AI encompasses the applications and capabilities those models enable. These models are known for their unprecedented scale and capabilities, such as advanced logical reasoning or coding proficiency that appeared as a result of extensive training. Frontier AI refers to AI systems powered by frontier models.

Additionally, these models can be fine-tuned for specific tasks. Fine-tuning is the process of revising a pretrained foundation model for specific tasks. Further, fine-tuning is a type of transfer learning—when a model's preexisting learning is adapted to new tasks, such as vulnerability analysis or coding. With fine-tuning, a pretrained model is again trained on a smaller, more specialized dataset that is relevant to the model's intended use case.[6] Figure 2 is an illustrative example of the fine-tuning process.

[6]An AI use case is a specific challenge or opportunity that AI may solve.

Figure 2: Illustrative example of fine-tuning a foundation model for specific tasks



Source: GAO (analysis and illustration). | GAO-27-108458

Open-source systems

Open-source systems, unlike proprietary commercial systems, are software systems made available under terms that grant consumers the freedom to use the system for any purpose, study how it works, modify it for any purpose, and share the system for others to use. Many modern software systems rely heavily on open-source system components. All components are typically made available in open-source software.

Open-source systems, such as open-source AI systems, have many advantages, including visibility into the code base, flexibility that enables customization, lower cost driven by the absence of licensing fees, and dynamic communities of developers that collaborate on improvements. However, this direct access to the software means that consumers are responsible for managing the system's security throughout the software's lifecycle.

AI models can be released with different levels of openness. Although often referred to as 'open-source,' most publicly released models can be more accurately described as 'open-weight.' Weights represent the strength of various connections that a deep learning algorithm revises through training on large quantities of data. While developers may provide model weights, they may withhold the underlying training code or datasets. Some levels of openness, as described in Stanford's 2025 AI Index Report include:[7]

[7] Maslej, Nestor, et al. "The AI Index 2025 Annual Report." AI Index Steering Committee, Institute for Human-Centered AI, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, April 2025.

- Unrestricted open-weight models are fully open, allowing free use, modification, and redistribution.

- Restricted open-weight models provide access to their weights, but impose limitations, such as prohibiting commercial use or redistribution.

The performance gap between leading closed-weight frontier models and open-weight models has fluctuated over the past three years, with open-weight systems closing in and then falling behind as new proprietary models are released. Open-weight models offer significant benefits for research, innovation, and access. With open-weight models, more people can study and build on the model, evaluate its capabilities, test for vulnerabilities, and iterate on improvements.

AI governance

In June 2021, we developed an AI accountability framework to help managers ensure accountability and responsible use of AI.[8] This framework is organized around four principles, which address governance, data, performance, and monitoring. For each principle, the framework describes key practices for federal agencies and other entities that are considering, selecting, and implementing AI systems.

We identified key governance practices at the organizational and system level. At the organizational level, we reported that entities should define clear goals, roles and responsibilities, and demonstrate values and principles to foster trust. We also noted that entities should develop a competent workforce, engage stakeholders with diverse perspectives to mitigate risks, and implement an AI-specific risk management plan.

At the system level, we reported that entities should establish technical specifications to ensure the AI system meets its intended purpose and complies with relevant laws, regulations, standards, and guidance. We also noted that entities should promote transparency by enabling external stakeholders to access information on the AI system.

Further, we reported that AI systems pose unique challenges for independent assessments and audits because their inputs and operations are not visible to the user. Such a system can be an opaque "black box," either because the inner workings of the software are inherently very difficult to understand, or because vendors do not reveal them for proprietary reasons.

1.2 Cybersecurity

The term cybersecurity refers to a broad array of practices or methods that enable organizations to defend against cyberattacks targeting applications, data, programs, networks, and information systems. These principles apply regardless of whether AI is involved in the attack or the defense of

[8]GAO, *Artificial Intelligence: An Accountability Framework for Federal Agencies and Other Entities*, GAO-21-519SP (Washington, D.C.: June 2021).

information systems. The three pillars of information security include:

- **Confidentiality**: preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including the protection of personal and proprietary information
- **Integrity**: guarding against improper information modification or destruction and ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity
- **Availability**: ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information

There are various cybersecurity technologies that can be used to better protect organizations from cyberattacks. These include tools for controlling access to and from computer networks, detecting or preventing network intrusions, and monitoring network traffic for malicious activity, among others. See table 4 in chapter 3 for more examples.

In February 2025, we reported that state and non-state actors are attacking our government and private-sector systems thousands of times each day.[9] In addition to risks to national security and intellectual property, systems supporting daily life of the American people are at risk, including those used in ensuring safe water, ample supply of energy, reliable and secure telecommunications, and our financial services.

In addition, we reported that federal efforts are needed to better understand the status of private sector technological developments with cybersecurity implications—such as AI—and to continue to enhance public and private sector coordination.[10] Further, we found that the federal government needs to ensure the responsible use of AI and other emerging technologies for cybersecurity.

Cyberattack techniques

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), threat actors are becoming savvier and increasingly callous each year—attacking power grids, shutting down hospitals, and stoking geopolitical tensions.[11] Over $20 billion in financial losses were reported to IC3 in 2025, spanning over 1 million complaints. IC3 attributed over $893 million of these financial losses to AI-related cybercrime. Listed below are some techniques that threat actors have traditionally used to carry out cyberattacks; some of these attacks may be leveraged by AI, while others may not.

Social engineering involves manipulating human behavior. This may include associating with an individual to gain confidence and trust, tricking a victim into revealing sensitive information, or obtaining unauthorized access to accounts or passwords. An example of this

[9]GAO, *High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness*, GAO-25-107743 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).

[10]GAO-25-107743.

[11]Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Internet Crime Report 2025*, accessed July 13, 2026, https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2025_IC3Report.pdf.

attack is a business email compromise, which is a scam that is carried out through social engineering techniques to conduct the unauthorized transfer of funds by compromising email accounts and other forms of communication, such as phone numbers and virtual meeting applications.


- Phishing is a type of social engineering technique where a fraudulent solicitation is communicated by email or on a web site that the perpetrator masquerades as a legitimate business or reputable person. This technique is often used to acquire sensitive data, such as bank account numbers.
- A deepfake is another type of social engineering technique in which a video, photo, or audio output is synthesized by AI. Deepfakes can depict someone appearing to say or do something that they never said or did. It is often used as a social engineering technique.

Malware—also called malicious software—is an unauthorized process that will have an adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system. Ransomware is a type of malware in which a threat actor enters the target system and renders it unusable through techniques such as encrypting important files, essentially holding the system hostage unless the victim pays the ransom.

The Cyber Kill Chain® framework, developed by Lockheed Martin, identifies seven stages of an attack.[12] Figure 3 illustrates and defines each of these seven stages.

[12]The Cyber Kill Chain framework, developed by Lockheed Martin, is part of the intelligence driven defense model for identification and prevention of cyber intrusion activity. Available at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/intelligence-driven-defense.html.

Figure 3: Stages of a cyberattack



Source: Cyber Kill Chain®, Lockheed Martin; GAO illustrations. | GAO-27-108458

Cyber threats to critical infrastructure

Attacks on critical infrastructure sector assets, systems, and networks could have an impact on national security, economic security, or public health and safety.

Critical infrastructure sectors face threats from nation-state and criminal actors. The Department of Homeland Security reported in October 2024 that domestic and foreign adversaries are likely to continue targeting critical infrastructure with disruptive and destructive cyber and physical attacks.[13] The resulting impact on these sectors can affect other industries and standards of living. For example, we reported in May 2026 that water and wastewater systems are facing new and more destructive cyberattacks, ranging from insider threats from witting or unwitting employees, to attacks from around the globe.[14] Additionally, in August 2026, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced their efforts to disrupt a global hacking platform used by the People's Republic of China state-sponsored hacker group, known as QTFY, to target United States critical

[13]Office of Intelligence and Analysis, *2025 Homeland Threat Assessment* (Oct. 2024).

[14]GAO, *Critical Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Cybersecurity Threats to the Water and Wastewater Sector*, GAO-26-109159 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2026).

infrastructure and other sensitive networks.[15] Chinese threat actors obtained computer hacking services through this global platform to hide the origin of their attacks and target the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Federal Reserve, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services, the National Institutes of Health, and the United States Senate.

[15]Department of Justice, *Justice Department and FBI Seize Platforms Operated and Used by China State-Sponsored Hackers to Target U.S. Critical Infrastructure* (Washington, D.C: Aug. 26, 2026).

2 Threat Actors Use AI to Advance Cyberattack Capabilities

Recent developments in generative AI have enabled threat actors to improve the precision and accuracy of existing techniques used to carry out cyberattacks. Additionally, threat actors are accelerating the pace of cybercrime operations and using AI to automate all stages of attack. Emerging trends in AI-leveraged cyberattacks include increased automation of malicious cyber activity and expedited exploitation of new unknown vulnerabilities, commonly referred to as a zero-day vulnerability.[16]

2.1 Threat actors use AI to augment the effectiveness of existing cyberattack techniques

Threat actors utilize AI to improve the precision and accuracy of existing cyberattack techniques. Many experts reported an influx in social engineering techniques, such as phishing and deepfakes, to carry out cyberattacks. AI technology has enabled the creation of convincing synthetic content in mass quantities, such as social media profiles and highly personalized conversations, that can be used to gain trust for various goals like gaining access to money or data. Although people have manipulated video and audio similarly for decades, the widespread availability of AI makes it possible to create high-quality content with greater precision and accuracy. In addition, threat actors can use AI to quickly generate many variations of code for the same exploit, making it harder for defenders to rely on detection techniques, such as matching signatures. Table 1 includes examples of incidents where the threat actors augmented existing cyberattack techniques with AI.

Table 1: Examples of artificial intelligence (AI)-leveraged cyberattacks

Date	Incident	Summary of attack
June 2026	AI-powered malware lab built for evading detection	In an incident linked to ransomware and data theft, a threat actor used AI to build a testing framework to refine techniques for malware to evade detection. An investigation began after a test file containing malicious code triggered an alert. The investigation revealed that threat actors used multiple AI agents to test malicious code against different security products. Specifically, the agents were tasked with finding new attack techniques from security research, mapping them to known cybersecurity frameworks, conducting the attacks in test environments, and reporting the results.

[16]A zero-day vulnerability is a flaw in software that has no associated fix because it is unknown to its developers.

Date	Incident	Summary of attack
Feb. 2026	Exploitation of stolen passwords	A low-skill level threat actor used multiple commercial generative AI services to launch a widespread attack exploiting gaps in foundational cybersecurity. Reportedly, the financially motivated threat actor compromised several devices by using stolen credentials from past incidents and using a brute force method on devices that had weak passwords and no multi-factor authentication enabled.[a]
Jan. 2024	Arup deepfake financial fraud	Threat actors stole $25 million in fraudulent wire transfers. The attacker used generative AI to create real time audio and video deepfakes of multiple Arup executives on a live video call, successfully convincing a financial employee to authorize fraudulent wire transfers.
2020-ongoing	Deepfake employment fraud	Remote worker fraud has been on the rise since at least 2020, according to various industry reports. Specifically, North Korean information technology workers increasingly use stolen or fraudulent identities, sometimes combined with AI-leveraged techniques, such as deepfakes, to impersonate legitimate job applicants and fraudulently obtain remote employment in America.

Source: GAO analysis of industry reporting. | GAO-27-108458

[a]Brute force is an attack method for accessing a device by attempting multiple passwords.

2.2 Threat actors can use AI to accelerate all stages of a cyberattack

Threat actors can use AI to augment and automate activities across multiple stages of an attack. AI can enable threat actors to operate faster, scale certain activities, iterate more rapidly, and reduce the human effort required for some attack activities. Additionally, AI improves the success rate of each stage of attack. A 2024 industry white paper describes how generative AI and other AI techniques can be used to augment malicious activities across every stage of attack.[17] This would allow threat actors to achieve their tactical goals faster compared to traditional methods. Table 2 describes how AI can be used to accelerate the stages as defined by the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain® framework.

Table 2: How artificial intelligence (AI) can accelerate each stage of attack

Stage	AI-enabled method
Reconnaissance 	Attackers can use AI tools to gather information on the attack surface of a target, perform open-source intelligence collection on human targets, and use supervised machine learning to identify vulnerabilities to exploit. This process has been shortened from weeks to hours or less.

[17]"Navigating a New Threat Landscape: Breaking Down the AI Kill Chain," Resources, Darktrace, accessed June 2, 2026, https://www.darktrace.com/resources/navigating-a-new-threat-landscape.

Stage	AI-enabled method
Weaponization 	Attackers can use AI to generate new multi-stage attacks that obscure the exploit more thoroughly than passing as a benign file, increasing the likelihood that it will not be flagged by threat intelligence-based security tools.
Delivery 	Attackers can use generative AI to target users, for example, by writing a highly personalized email containing a link to the exploit, increasing the chances that a user interacts with the link and delivers malware.
Exploitation 	Attackers can use AI to automate the exploitation of vulnerabilities, carry out network scans, and collect intelligence.
Installation 	Attackers can use AI to evaluate the optimal time to install the exploit based on environmental factors, generate scripts to evade threat intelligence-based security tools, and otherwise respond to the system environment to maintain access to the target.
Command and control 	Attackers can use generative AI to scan the web for new covert channels that are used to maintain contact with compromised systems, then disguise remote communication within AI-learned regular network operations.
Actions on objectives 	Attackers can use AI to automate the harvesting of account credentials to allow access. Attackers can also use AI to summarize content so that only relevant data gets encrypted, increasing their efficiency by saving time and compute power.

Source: GAO analysis of industry reporting and the Cyber Kill Chain® developed by Lockheed Martin; GAO (icons). | GAO-27-108458

Experts note that a major challenge is the inconsistent implementation of different cybersecurity key practices, including misconfigured settings, out-of-date software, and relying on insecure passwords. The prevalence of AI now makes it much easier and faster for threat actors to discover and exploit these weaknesses. Applying foundational cybersecurity practices could reduce the impact or lower the likelihood of AI-leveraged attacks and authentications.

2.3 Emerging trends in AI-leveraged cyberattacks

The prevalence of AI-leveraged cyberattacks is difficult to quantify because determining the extent to which a threat actor used AI remains a challenge. According to experts, there are some common characteristics that can point to an AI-leveraged attack, such as the time between the identification of a vulnerability and the time of exploitation, or observations of extraneous text in the code. However, there are no technical indicators that can differentiate between a traditional

attack versus an attack leveraging AI. The lack of definitive technical indicators of AI means the reported amount of AI leveraged cyberattacks could be inaccurate. Some AI model providers report on the malicious misuse of their products. However, according to an expert, this reporting is not always feasible without a user agreement. Cyberattack capabilities are expected to evolve alongside technological advancements in AI. Examples of emerging trends in AI-leveraged attacks include agentic AI, identity-based attacks, and zero-day vulnerability exploitation.

Agentic AI

Threat actors have used agentic AI to launch autonomous cyber campaigns that carry out multiple stages of the attack with minimal human input. Threat actors can have these AI agents persist over longer periods of time, making it more difficult to identify them. Table 3 includes examples of recent cyberattacks involving agentic AI.

Table 3: Examples of autonomous cyberattacks involving agentic artificial intelligence (AI)

Date	Incident	Summary of attack
July 2026	Autonomous AI agent attack on Hugging Face[a]	An AI model broke out of an isolated testing environment after its developers removed guardrails to test its cybersecurity capabilities. Rather than completing the test in the controlled environment, the AI model orchestrated a complex series of tasks in pursuit of the test solution and hacked into the database that it suspected to be hosting the solutions by obtaining access to the internet, exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities, and elevating its privileges. Roughly 1,200 agents meant to be isolated from one another found a way to communicate on an unsanctioned message board, sending over 70,000 messages and files between July 7th and July 13th. Of these agents, 700 went on to participate in the attack on Hugging Face.
July 2026	Fully autonomous agentic AI driven ransomware operation	Without human intervention, an extortion operation conducted by a large language model was able to create demands, adjust for failed actions, interpret results and continue its activities. This incident highlights the rapid discovery and exploitation of platforms that are not up to date on fundamental cyber hygiene, such as outdated passwords and unpatched software.
Nov. 2025	Anthropic cyber espionage campaign	A nation-state threat actor conducting a cyber espionage campaign used commercially available agentic AI capabilities to automate an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the campaign. The actor was able to bypass guardrails and took advantage of the AI's ability to follow complex instructions, chain tasks, and utilize software tools available on the web.

Source: GAO analysis of industry reporting and independent research. | GAO-27-108458

[a]Hugging Face, Inc. is an American company that develops computation tools for building applications using machine learning.

AI-leveraged distributed denial of service attacks

Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks prevent authorized access to resources or cause a delay of time-critical operations by using multiple machines to attack a target, often flooding the target network with traffic. Although these types of attacks have been around for decades, recent AI advancements have made them more efficient and harder to defend against. Specifically, threat actors can now analyze traffic, adjust attack tactics in real time, and evade detection by mimicking legitimate network traffic. These attacks have evolved from high-volume, brute force type disruptions into intelligent adaptive cyber weapons powered by AI.

Example of AI-Leveraged Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks

DDoS attacks have become more automated and adaptive. According to a 2025 industry threat intelligence report, attackers used AI-driven tools to launch attacks, monitor defender responses in real time, and rapidly switch tactics. For example, investigations revealed that four distinct DDoS attacks were executed within three minutes. Each attack adjusted in response to the observed mitigation techniques taken by the target. This approach allowed the attackers to test and adjust their methods in real time.

Source: Nokia Corporation, *Nokia Threat Intelligence Report* (Finland: 2025) | GAO-27-108458

Cybercrime as a service

Cybercrime as a service is a business model for cybercrime in which specialized vendors sell packaged tools and services for a variety of cyberattacks, such as phishing, ransomware, malware, and DDoS, among others. Increased availability of these services can make it easier for threat actors with less skill and resources to launch effective cyberattacks. According to an expert, although generative AI makes it easier for non-skilled actors to create convincing lures, the malicious code used to implement attacks are often created by skilled actors and sold to actors with less skills. This includes jailbroken commercial large language models (LLM), malicious LLMs with no guardrails to limit discussion of illegal activity, AI-augmented malware that can modify its behavior in new environments, and malware that can change its signature to evade detection.[18]

Threats to Critical Infrastructure

Experts warned that the ability to fine-tune large language models on specific topics like engineering or physics may allow threat actors to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of how systems in critical infrastructure work. This could help threat actors identify weak points in high-impact systems, potentially leading to increased cyber risk. For example, a low-skilled hacker could accelerate their capabilities by training a large language model on how power plants work to improve vulnerability detection and exploitation.

Source: GAO analysis of expert interviews. | GAO-27-108458

Identity-based attacks

Threat actors are increasingly turning to stolen credentials as a source of data. Rather than targeting weaknesses in a system's configuration, AI tools help threat actors automate multiple attempts to obtain authenticated access to privileges and system information. This authenticated access changes the dynamics of an intrusion, as threat actors can now use AI to move faster,

[18]The term jailbreaking related to AI refers to the act of bypassing the guardrails of an AI model by exploiting loopholes. See ch 4.2 for details on jailbreaking.

blend into normal activities within the system, and expand their areas of impact with fewer obstacles. While these are not new attack techniques, AI-leveraged identity-based attacks offer an easier, more reliable attack vector compared to vulnerability exploitation.

Zero-day vulnerability exploitation

AI tools have accelerated the rate at which zero-day vulnerabilities are being discovered. In 2025, CrowdStrike observed a 42 percent year-over-year increase in the number of zero-day vulnerabilities exploited before they were disclosed to the public, continuing the upward trend observed over the past few years.[19] Whether the vulnerability is exploited by a threat actor or patched by a developer depends on who finds it.

See appendix III for information on mitigating AI-leveraged attacks.

[19]"2026 Global Threat Report: Year of the Evasive Adversary," CrowdStrike, accessed April 28, 2026, https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/global-threat-report/.

3 Cyber Defenders Use AI to Improve Tools and Enhance Cybersecurity

Many of the same AI applications that enhance cyberattacks can also be used to defend against them. Cyber defenders use a variety of machine learning and generative AI applications to safeguard information systems. Specifically, they use AI applications to improve the efficiency of their security tools, teams, and operations. These improvements allow defenders to expand their cyber defense capabilities and better equip them to address the rising threats of AI-leveraged cyberattacks.

3.1 There are various AI applications to enhance cybersecurity

While AI has been used for cybersecurity for many years, recent advancements in generative AI have expanded cyber defense capabilities. Developers are applying LLMs and generative AI to cybersecurity tools, allowing cyber defenders to ingest and analyze large amounts of data more quickly. In addition, cyber defenders are utilizing machine learning to reduce false positives and obtain a better understanding of network activities to improve security posture.[20]

Dual-use nature of AI in cybersecurity

Cybersecurity tools can be used for cyber defense and offense. Therefore, AI advancements in cybersecurity inherently can benefit both threat actors and cyber defenders. Many of the steps required to perform a successful cyberattack or a defensive penetration test are similar, such as reconnaissance and initial access. These offensive benefits create a disadvantage for cyber defenders due to the volume of exposure and speed of response necessary to protect their systems from cyberattacks. Cybersecurity teams and researchers have proven that LLMs are effective at automating these steps with little human oversight. Similarly, cyber defenders can use the same workflow to defend their network and use AI to identify or remediate vulnerabilities. AI enables cyber defenders to conduct penetration testing, code review, and vulnerability assessment at a scale that is difficult for most cyber defenders to achieve independently.

AI-leveraged cybersecurity tools

AI can be leveraged in various ways to bolster cybersecurity. Table 4 describes some examples of how AI is integrated into common cybersecurity tools.

[20]The term “false positives” refers to an alert indicating a vulnerability exists when there is not one present.

Table 4: Artificial intelligence (AI) use in cybersecurity tools

Technology	Tool description	How AI is integrated
Content management	Monitors web and messaging applications for inappropriate content, including spam, banned file types, and proprietary information.	Content management tools use natural language processing and machine learning techniques to identify high risk information, such as personally identifiable information, to prevent data loss, as well as monitor incoming traffic for phishing or spam.
Firewalls	Control access to and from a network or computer.	Next generation firewalls use machine learning to dynamically make changes to mitigate network intrusions, while also using behavioral analytics to detect deviations in baseline operations that could indicate cyberattacks
Intrusion detection systems	Detect inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activity on a network or computer system.	Intrusion detection systems use machine learning to develop network behavior baselines to detect deviations, reduce false positives, and identify threats based on network activity.
Intrusion prevention systems	Builds on intrusion detection systems to detect attacks on a network and take action to prevent them from being successful.	Intrusion prevention builds on intrusion detection systems by using machine learning to develop network behavior baselines to detect deviations, false positives, and identify threats based on network activity, as well as performing or recommending remediation actions.
Network detection and response	Continuously monitor network traffic and activity to detect malicious activity and respond in near real time.	Machine learning is used to detect and analyze malicious activity by comparing it to predetermined normal behavior baselines for users and equipment. Additionally, generative AI provides the ability to perform remediation actions with various levels of human interaction.
Scanners	Analyze computers or networks for security vulnerabilities.	Scanners use machine learning and generative AI to allow for dynamic scans of computers or networks looking for vulnerabilities while factoring in new known vulnerabilities and environmental activities.
Security event correlation tools	Monitor and document actions on network devices and analyze them to determine if an attack is ongoing or has occurred. Enables an organization to determine if ongoing system activities are operating according to its security policy.	Tools such as Security Information and Event Management and Security Orchestration Automation and Response platforms can use machine learning and user behavior analytics to correlate security events to assets across large volumes of log data. Generative AI also provides the ability for automated workflows with little human intervention.

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense Data. | GAO-27-108458

3.2 Reported uses and benefits of AI in cybersecurity

One expert described cybersecurity as a data problem, with extremely large amounts of data being gathered and understood to detect malicious activity. This expert noted that AI could make the problem solvable. Cyber defenders can accomplish tasks more quickly and at scale when using AI for cybersecurity. According to a survey of 2,286 chief information officers and chief information security officers from companies with global revenues greater than $1 billion, over 70 percent of security analyst tasks can be automated with generative AI.[21] This leads to fewer manual processes and more time improving threat detections.

Responding to security incidents

According to industry research, the amount of time required to resolve a cybersecurity incident was reduced by 30 percent for companies with generative AI integrated as part of their cybersecurity posture.[22] The use of AI allows defenders to focus on more complex responsibilities, including proactive threat hunting, operational efficiency, and resource allocation, by offloading repetitive activities to AI-driven tools. Additionally, cyber defenders use AI to automate security operations and anomaly detection. In some instances, cyber defenders can use AI to automate incident response, reducing human involvement and allowing the network to self-heal. Further, AI is used by cyber defenders to perform tasks that historically required a specific skillset, such as specialized queries or interpreting logs from a variety of devices, such as servers, workstations, or firewalls. One agency reported that using AI can provide an increase in forensic efficiency.[23] For example, cyber defenders can use AI to assist with enhanced digital forensics by improving the process for extracting and analyzing data from devices containing digital evidence. Cyber defenders also use AI-leveraged tools to provide context-based security vulnerability scoring by assessing the severity and confidence of security incidents, reducing false positives, and prioritizing alerts based on applicability to the network.

AI-Leveraged Incident Response in the Electricity Grid

Cyber defenders in the energy sector use AI to detect and automatically respond to vulnerabilities on the electricity grid. In addition, energy companies embed AI into their cybersecurity solutions to detect malicious activity and improve incident response. For example, AI is used in the United Kingdom to protect energy assets from cyber security threats. Additionally, Sandia National Laboratories reported on its efforts testing how embedded AI systems can monitor new and existing power grid systems for disruptions from cyberattacks.[a]

[a]Mollie Rappe, "Protecting the Grid with Artificial Intelligence," *Sandia Lab News*, Vol. 17, No. 16 (2025): 1,4,5

Source: GAO analysis of literature and government reports. | GAO-27-108458

Monitoring network security

Cybersecurity teams use AI to parse through larger amounts of network information

[21]"State of Cybersecurity Resilience 2025," Accenture, accessed July 2, 2025, https://www.accenture.com/en/insights/security/state-cybersecurity-2025.

[22]Microsoft Corporation, *Generative AI and Security Operations Center Productivity: Evidence from Live Operations* (Nov. 2024).

[23]Office of Management and Budget, *2024 Federal Agency AI Use Case Inventory* (Jan 23, 2025), https://github.com/ombegov/2024-Federal-AI-Use-Case-Inventory.

quickly, reducing the time to find anomalies and vulnerabilities that may have otherwise gone undiscovered. For example, cyber defenders use AI to maintain an inventory of all systems across a network and their operating status to have a better understanding of their attack surface. Cyber defenders also use AI to gain a better understanding of network activities by using machine learning with advanced analytics to enhance the detection of network vulnerabilities and risk-based alerting.

Cybersecurity teams use machine learning to build network activity baselines, or representations of normal activity, and compare those baselines with live activity to identify any potentially malicious activities or insider threats. Cyber defenders can use the baselines along with predictive AI, an application of machine learning which identifies patterns, to predict risk exposure and future behaviors. Cyber defenders also use AI to improve productivity by using it as a knowledgeable assistant to help with security operations. For example, cyber defenders use AI to assist by automating tasks, such as patching, vulnerability triage, and managing configurations. This boost in cybersecurity capabilities has lowered the barrier for entry to many cyber defenders.

AI-Leveraged Network Monitoring in the Financial Sector

Financial institutions are using AI to monitor networks and improve the detection of phishing emails, ransomware, and unauthorized access to data. For example, one financial institution used machine learning algorithms and natural language processing techniques to determine the likelihood of phishing emails. This financial institution reported a reduction in successful phishing attempts targeting their customers after implementing the AI powered system. Another financial institution used an AI solution to identify an active ransomware attack, which enabled them to isolate the infected systems and prevent the ransomware from spreading. The AI system developed normal user activity baselines and used them to identify abnormal activity, which led to the discovery of the cyberattack.

Source: GAO analysis of literature. | GAO-27-108458

Discovering and remediating vulnerabilities

Cyber defenders can use AI to assess source code and identify vulnerabilities which were previously unknown. In some cases, the AI tools can recommend remediations to the developers of the source code. Cyber defenders can also use AI to detect and remediate source code vulnerabilities at a scale that is hard to match without AI automation. These defenders are also able to locate both “logic bugs”—where the software workflows may act in unintended ways—and classic coding vulnerabilities (e.g. buffer overflows, where attackers can corrupt memory by entering input larger than the program can handle). Additionally, cyber defenders from Firefox used AI during initial evaluation activities to identify and fix 271 vulnerabilities and reported that the AI model was as capable as the human researchers they have previously worked with.[24] The

[24]“The Zero-Days are Numbered,” Mozilla Blog, Apr. 21. 2026, https://blog.mozilla.org/en/firefox/privacy-security/ai-seurity-zero-day-vulnerabilities/. Firefox is a free, open-source web browser developed by the Mozilla Corporation.

paradigm shift was likened by one expert as similar to moving from a bicycle to an electric car with the same foundation but with vastly more capabilities. An expert described the autonomous detection of zero-day vulnerabilities as the current golden ticket everyone is aiming for.[25] LLMs have been successful at detecting zero-day vulnerabilities in source code, and AI developers are expanding on this capability with every release.

AI-Leveraged Vulnerability Detection in the Electricity Grid



Researchers are testing the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in electricity grid systems to detect vulnerabilities, such as false data injection, where malicious data is injected into sensor readings to deceive security teams. Experts explained that the power grid has both a physical layer and communication layer that connects to sensor data. A sensor with a zero-day vulnerability can be susceptible to false data injection attacks. The sensor data is collected for managing equipment, and control commands can be sent to specific equipment components based on variations detected in the sensor data. If an attacker can forge and inject a fake control command into a particular component, the consequence could be significant. Specifically, an attacker could inject false sensor data into the communication layer and potentially trigger the operation center to make the wrong operational decision based on false data.

Source: GAO analysis of expert interviews; TarikVision/adobe.stock.com (icon). | GAO-27-108458

[25]A zero-day vulnerability can lead to a threat actor exploiting a previously unknown hardware, firmware, or software vulnerability.

Analyzing and sharing cyber threat intelligence

Cyber defenders use AI to determine likely targets and predict potential threats based on published threat reports. AI is used to gather data from multiple disparate sources to create short, precise, and actionable summaries. For example, according to an expert we spoke with, cyber defenders use AI to ensure that relevant threat intelligence is supplied to interested parties by assessing the contents of the reports and comparing it to customer profiles. In addition, LLMs are used for collecting data from sources, such as logs, cyber threat reports, and even social media chatter for early threat signals. Further, cyber threat intelligence professionals use LLMs as assistants, performing tasks such as reviewing an analyst's work for errors and helping humans work through problems.

To expand cyber threat intelligence capabilities, relevant professionals are investigating how AI can increase threat intelligence sharing, allowing for cybersecurity tools to adapt to emerging threats in near real time. While AI is currently used for some cyber threat intelligence purposes, researchers and experts are working to expand capabilities and use cases. One expert we spoke with explained how cyber defenders compile data from multiple information sources to create a complete understanding of the cyber threat, and that this process can be complicated and time consuming. The expert described efforts toward developing a single source that would leverage generative AI to compile this data centrally, which could save cyber defenders time while also increasing efficiency.

Similarly, a related tool was released and is available for licensing by cybersecurity professionals that links threat intelligence databases.[26] Cyber defenders can use the AI leveraged tool to analyze the information found in multiple threat intelligence databases, as well as reports on emerging risks and breaches. It compares the compiled threat intelligence while also creating a profile representing network characteristics to create actionable data for cyber defenders to use to secure their system.

Reverse engineering malware

Reverse-engineering in cybersecurity refers to the act of analyzing malware to understand its underlying code or operational behavior. When defenders reverse-engineer malware, AI-leveraged tools can automatically extract functions, identify known code patterns, and discover potential backdoors. In the absence of AI, this process can be slow and requires a specific set of expertise. AI is used to automate tasks, such as behavioral profiling, malware classification, and code de-obfuscation (the act of reversing obscured computer code to restore its readability and reveal its true logic). Additionally, cyber defenders use machine learning algorithms and LLMs to quickly identify suspicious code sections, uncover attack techniques/surfaces, and link samples to known malware families.

[26]"AI Effort Moves from Novelty to Front Lines of National Lab's Cyber Protection," Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, accessed July 6, 2026, https://www.pnnl.gov/news-media/ai-effort-moves-novelty-front-lines-national-labs-cyber-protection.

Testing cyber defenses

Cyber defenders working on penetration tests use AI to help predict attack paths and recommend actions, integrating human expertise and machine capability. AI is used by the authorized attackers (i.e. penetration testers) in authorized, simulated cyberattacks on a computer system, network, or application to uncover weaknesses before they can be exploited by threat actors. For example, organizations are using AI to mimic attacks on their systems and identify security vulnerabilities. Cyber defenders also use AI to automate time-intensive tasks, such as network reconnaissance and generating exploit scripts to test system defenses. In addition, cybersecurity teams are using LLMs to manage other LLMs with little human interaction to perform penetration testing against networks, essentially acting as a team of experts. These methods have successfully performed penetration tests of web pages and networks, with LLMs identifying bugs and security vulnerabilities.

In addition, cyber researchers are investigating ways to use LLMs to interpret network data from internet-wide scans, which can help automate the process of identifying visible devices and improve vulnerability discovery. Current advancements imply a potential for agent-based systems that autonomously share and act upon threat intelligence across networks, protecting organizations at scale without prior manual or human interventions.

Meeting compliance obligations

According to industry reporting, cybersecurity teams can use generative AI to create templates for documentation required by governance bodies.[27] Organizations also use AI for tasks such as preventing unauthorized disclosure of personally identifiable information, patient information, or intellectual property.[28] In addition, cyber defenders in the federal government report using AI to improve cybersecurity compliance activities. For example, in the federal agency AI use case inventory, the Department of Commerce reported using AI to analyze cybersecurity documentation and architectural risk assessments.[29]

[27]Mandiant, *The Defender's Advantage: Artificial Intelligence*, https://cloud.google.com/security/resources/defenders-advantage-artificial-intelligence.

[28]Personally identifiable information is any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, date or place of birth, and Social Security number; or that otherwise can be linked to an individual.

[29]Office of Management and Budget, https://github.com/ombegov/2024-Federal-AI-Use-Case-Inventory.

4 Challenges When Using AI to Safeguard Information Systems

Cyber defenders face challenges when using AI-enabled cybersecurity tools. Experts identified a variety of challenges involving data, risks and technical challenges, governance and trust, and organizational obstacles. While different types of AI have been used to improve cybersecurity applications for decades, most of the risks and challenges identified by experts pertain to the use of generative AI. See appendix III for information on mitigating new risks associated with the use of AI for cybersecurity.

4.1 Data challenges

Challenges faced by cyber defenders when using AI for cybersecurity include data privacy, such as difficulties in mitigating privacy-related risk, access to quality data needed to properly train models, as well as transparency issues regarding training data quality.

Data privacy

Data privacy was a common concern raised by multiple experts regarding AI use for cybersecurity. Specifically, experts expressed the need to ensure the AI tools both work correctly and do not leak sensitive data. Further, experts warned that AI tools are increasingly ingesting large volumes of data and the ability to identify or protect sensitive or personal data needs to exist. As previously reported, information about how and when some models retain and use information entered into them is sparse or unavailable to many users, which poses risks for using these tools.[30] In addition, as we reported, commercial developers are taking measures to safeguard sensitive information by undergoing privacy evaluations at various stages of AI training and development.[31] Before training a model, developers can filter and curate training data to reduce the use of harmful content, such as sites that collect personal information.

As previously reported, there is varied understanding among the public about AI, leading to a lack of understanding of what people are consenting to. Further, we have reported that federal agencies struggle to hire new staff or train existing staff to ensure they have sufficient knowledge of AI and privacy to implement AI while mitigating privacy-related risks.[32] In 2024, the Bipartisan House Task Force on Artificial Intelligence was created to investigate and report on a range of different expert insights and perspectives on numerous AI issues, including data privacy. According to the report, AI is inherently linked to issues of data, including how to obtain large amounts of data, analyze data for patterns, and use those patterns to make predictions.[33]

[30]GAO, Science & Tech Spotlight: *Generative AI*, GAO-23-106782 (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2023).

[31]GAO, *Artificial Intelligence: Generative AI Training, Development, and Deployment Considerations*, GAO-25-107651 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 22, 2024).

[32]GAO, *Artificial Intelligence: OMB Action Needed to Address Privacy-Related Gaps in Federal Guidance,* GAO-26-107681 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2026).

[33]Bipartisan House Task Force on Artificial Intelligence, *Bipartisan House Task Force Report on Artificial Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2024).

Developers and users of AI can intentionally or unintentionally cause or exacerbate data privacy harms related to each of these facets.

In 2019, we reported that Congress should consider developing comprehensive legislation on internet privacy that would enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving internet environment.[34] Currently, there is no comprehensive federal data privacy and security law. However, there are several federal privacy laws focused on specific sectors or use cases, such as protecting child privacy and personal health information. Some states have enacted their own state privacy laws with varying requirements. Beyond these examples, many businesses are generally unrestricted in the types of sensitive information they can collect, how they can use that information, who they can transfer or sell it to, and how long they can retain it. At the same time, agencies do not always have the privacy-enhancing technologies and resources to ensure privacy protection while using AI.[35] Further, according to experts who contributed to our report on privacy risks associated with AI, the ability of AI to make this information more accessible to a wider audience than originally intended (e.g., data brokers, foreign adversaries, and other entities) puts individuals' privacy and sensitive information at increased risk.[36] In addition, inadequate data requirements and storage practices for AI create the risk of data breaches and improper access. While state laws have started to address these concerns, many Americans have limited rights or recourse when faced with encroachments on their privacy.

Training data

The accuracy and output of AI systems are affected by quality and quantity of training data. Multiple experts stated that there is a lack of transparency regarding what kind of training and datasets models use. According to one expert, the transparency of training data for generative AI models has worsened over time and information contained in model cards on training data does not meet guidelines proposed by researchers.[37] Experts expressed difficulties in the ability to obtain the quality data needed to adequately train models.

[34]GAO, *Internet Privacy: Additional Federal Authority Could Enhance Consumer Protection and Provide Flexibility*, GAO-19-52 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2019).

[35]Privacy-enhancing technologies are a collection of tools, techniques, and methods designed to protect individuals' personal information and ensure their privacy in digital environments.

[36]GAO-26-107681.

[37]A model card is a document that provides essential information about a machine learning model. It aims to increase transparency and facilitate responsible deployment of AI models by clearly outlining the model's purpose, intended use, performance characteristics, and limitations.

Data Constraints That Can Hinder Research for Securing the Electricity Grid



Experts stated that managing today's power grid is becoming harder due to dynamic loads of power voltage, such as data centers and disparate types of appliances. Specifically, the voltage and current exhibit more variable behavior and are not very predictable. Experts stated that there may not be enough data of sufficient quality necessary to properly train AI to successfully identify patterns and determine if something is wrong in this dynamic environment. For example, grid researchers need data down to the nanosecond to sufficiently train machine learning models. However, this requires a lot of data storage and creates a tradeoff between data storage requirements and data needs.

Source: GAO analysis of expert interviews; TarikVision/adobe.stock.com (icon). | GAO-27-108458

In July 2026, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published security principles and practices for open-source software.[38] According to the guidance, agencies need full access to AI software system training data to find and fix vulnerabilities. Threat actors can embed a backdoor into a model by manipulating the training data and these backdoors are impossible to find without access to the training data. In addition, models that are trained on corrupted or poisoned data can misperceive reality, which can degrade performance and result in model collapse—a deteriorating process affecting generations of learned generative models. Furthermore, according to experts, training data could include biases unknown to the user, which can affect the accuracy of the model's output.

4.2 Risks and technical challenges

Generative AI introduces new cybersecurity risks that cyber defenders must consider when introducing the technology into their environment. As we previously reported, generative AI could offer agencies benefits in summarizing information, enabling automation, and improving productivity.[39] However, we also reported that despite continued growth in capabilities, generative AI systems are not cognitive, lack human judgment, and may pose numerous risks. Specifically, generative AI models can be vulnerable to a wide range of threats that target their training data, end points, and underlying infrastructure.[40] Although some AI systems have security safeguards designed to prevent harmful misuse or unauthorized actions, bad actors can sometimes circumvent these safeguards.

Adversarial attacks

Adversarial attacks are malicious techniques that manipulate AI models by exploiting vulnerabilities in the model's underlying logic.

[38]Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, *Open Source Software: Security Principles and Practices* (July 30, 2026).

[39]GAO-23-106782.

[40]Training data is used to teach an AI model how to make predictions, recognize patterns or generate content.

Threat actors generally try to exploit these vulnerabilities using methods that focus on:

- compromising the model's availability, such as the user's ability to access outputs;
- integrity, such as the model's ability to perform as intended; or
- confidentiality, such as the user's ability to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive information.

Federal research efforts are underway to characterize and mitigate these threats. For example, in 2023, the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory established the Center for Artificial Intelligence Security Research to study, evaluate, and harden AI systems against adversarial threats.

Additionally, in March of 2025, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published its Trustworthy and Responsible AI report that provides a taxonomy of concepts and defines terminology in the field of adversarial machine learning.[41] This report includes information on predictive and generative AI taxonomy, attack classifications, and benchmarks for adversarial machine learning vulnerabilities. It also identifies current challenges in the life cycle of AI systems, and corresponding methods for mitigating the consequences of attacks, among other things.

Table 5 describes different types of adversarial attacks and the resulting risks when exploited.

Table 5: Adversarial attacks and examples of exploitation

Adversarial attack	Description	Example of exploitation
Data poisoning	Involves threat actors manipulating or corrupting the training data used to develop artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning models by injecting malicious data into the model's training data to manipulate model outputs in a specific way or to degrade the general robustness of a model.	Threat actors could cause the model to misclassify malicious emails or malicious code as benign, resulting in false positives or false negatives.[a]
Jailbreaking	The act of bypassing the guardrails of an AI model by exploiting loopholes and causing AI to act in an unintended manner (which may or may not be with malicious intent).	Threat actors could exploit vulnerabilities in AI assistants, tricking them into revealing sensitive information, such as a cyber defense playbook.
Model evasion	Involves threat actors modifying inputs into the AI model in a way that causes it to misclassify or misinterpret them, changing its intended behavior.	Threat actors could change individual pixels of an image by adding noise that tricks the model into misclassifying a malicious object as benign.

[41] Apostol Vassilev, Alina Oprea, Alie Fordyce, Hyrum Anderson, Xander Davies, and Maia Hamin, "Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations," *NIST Trustworthy and Responsible AI,* NIST AI 100-2e2025 (Gaithersburg, MD), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-2e2025.

Adversarial attack	Description	Example of exploitation
Prompt injection	Involves threat actors crafting specific prompts or input data to trick an AI model into producing a harmful or unintended outcome. This technique has evolved significantly, with new types of prompt injection continuously emerging from both malicious actors and security researchers.	Threat actors could compromise an information technology (IT) helpdesk chatbot, which could result in unauthorized access to systems and data.
Supply chain	Involves threat actors targeting vulnerabilities in connected services to compromise the behavior or functionality of the models.	Threat actors could exploit prompt injection vulnerabilities of an AI agent to push a malicious update, affecting any developer who installs the update.


Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-27-108458

[a]The term "false positives" refers to an alert indicating a vulnerability exists when there is not one present. The term "false negatives" refers to an instance in which a security tool intended to detect a particular threat fails to do so and incorrectly classifies malicious activity as benign.

In addition, the architecture of current LLM-based agents generally requires combining trusted developer instructions with other task-relevant data into a unified input. This results in a system that lacks a clear separation between trusted internal instructions and untrusted external data. Therefore, the system is vulnerable to attacks in which threat actors provide data that contain malicious instructions designed to trick the system.

In AI agent hijacking, attackers exploit this lack of separation by creating a resource that looks like typical data an agent might interact with when completing a task, such as an email, a file, or a website — but those data actually contain malicious instructions intended to "hijack" the agent to complete a different and potentially harmful task. Figure 4 shows how this attack can occur when a user provides a simple instruction to their agent, such as "Who am I meeting with today?"

Figure 4: Example of an agent hijacking attack



Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); GAO (illustration). | GAO-27-108458

Data and model drift

Data drift refers to the changes in the statistical properties of the input data in an operational environment, as compared to the training data. Model drift refers to the degradation of model performance due to changes in data or in the relationships between input and output variables. Data and model drift can degrade the performance of AI tools used for cybersecurity. According to an agency official, using commercial AI tools that are trained on massive datasets can increase the risk of data drift.

Explainability


Experts stated that explainability and transparency present challenges when using AI for cybersecurity. AI is being incorporated into commercial products used in cybersecurity operations. In some cases, these integrations are added to tools that are actively in use, with no notice or details provided on how these capabilities are built or the work they are performing on the backend. Furthermore, agency officials reported that vendors struggle with the ability to articulate what their product can and cannot do. Assessing limitations and when a tool might fail is an important step in assessing what tools to acquire. However, officials explained that their questions about limitations are typically handled by a sales representative who cannot speak to the inner workings of the technology, rather than the engineers who developed the capability.

Technical challenges

Users can solicit outputs from a generative AI system by using inputs called "prompts"—questions or descriptions entered by a user to generate and refine the results. Many of the

available generative AI systems allow users to prompt the system in natural language, such as a text query typed into a chat box. The ability to create, or generate, novel content separates generative AI from other types of AI. Experts emphasized a fundamental problem with how generative AI works. Specifically, there are no differential levels of trust within LLMs, which creates a structural problem. The experts noted that, although this is problematic, the tool is performing the way it was intended. However, there is currently no good systemic way to address this problem. In addition, the nondeterministic nature of generative AI creates a predictability problem. Figure 5 highlights the differences between deterministic and nondeterministic characteristics in AI.

Figure 5: Deterministic versus nondeterministic characteristics in artificial intelligence



Source: GAO (analysis); ssas, dzm1try/stock.adobe.com. | GAO-27-108458

Machine learning determines outputs from its inputs via a set of predefined rules. For example, in deterministic AI models, entering the same input prompt or question will always yield the same predetermined output, based on how the model algorithm is coded. In contrast, in nondeterministic AI models, entering an identical input or question multiple times will result in outputs that are different from each other. For instance, in generative AI models, there is a randomness factor coded into the model, making those outputs unpredictable.

In deterministic AI, the output decisions are traceable. Specifically, every intermediate step can be logged, creating audit trails needed for sectors, such as critical infrastructure. Whereas in nondeterministic AI models, this introduction of randomness creates an inability to trace why these decisions are made. This makes it challenging to validate desired outcomes for certain use cases. Nondeterministic AI models can introduce responses that provide false information, recommend malicious code, or expose sensitive data through unexpected

behaviors. According to experts, nondeterministic AI introduces new uncertainties, requiring updated risk assessment methodologies that account for unpredictability, potential bias, and the need for human oversight.

AI constraints

Experts stated that before AI was widely applied in cybersecurity, security operations relied heavily on the experience and expertise of security professionals. From a cybersecurity perspective, the main motivation for AI is to complement the expertise of security professionals. Experts emphasized that the underlying theme of the evolution in cybersecurity tools is that it complements the expertise or domain knowledge of cybersecurity professionals.

Despite the benefits AI can bring to common tools used for cybersecurity, there are still some constraints that limit what AI can do when compared to the human role. For example, without providing the appropriate context, the AI tool cannot correctly determine priorities for an organization. Although AI can process vast amounts of data and identify anomalies, it lacks unique business context of an organization, such as risk tolerance or what assets are considered critical. It does not instinctively grasp the impact of a potential breach on reputation, intellectual property, or regulatory compliance without being fed the appropriate context. In contrast, a human analyst is better positioned to prioritize alerts and will know whether an alert might require immediate high-priority attention. In addition, AI operates on data and algorithms on which it has been trained. Therefore, for example, if new policies are implemented, AI will not inherently know unless they are trained on those new policies. Notably, AI has been known to incorrectly extrapolate beyond its programmed knowledge base, resulting in false outputs.

See appendix III for information on mitigating new risks associated with the use of AI for cybersecurity.

4.3 Governance and trust challenges

A key concern identified by experts is managing the risk of misuse while enabling beneficial applications for the use of AI in cybersecurity. An expert emphasized that organizations at all levels need policies governing AI tool use, including whether employees may use public browser-based models for work purposes and how to monitor and enforce compliance of established policies. For example, experts stated that organizations should have policies in place to manage which data employee users may enter into an AI model. In addition, experts emphasized that organizations could establish standard operating procedures like requiring the use of certain verification methods, such as using a verbal safe word when making certain requests to the information technology (IT) helpdesk.

Determining accountability

Experts emphasized the importance of identifying where accountability lies when implementing LLM-based agentic AI systems. Specifically, one expert argued that software companies are not currently liable when their infrastructure or devices are used for cyberattacks. Therefore, there is debate on whether model providers should be held accountable when AI is used for cyberattacks

or when AI makes a decision that may not be in line with the organization's mission. Further, experts explained that models should be assessed before used in any high-risk decisions, such as those regarding war, finance, or education. Lastly, when organizations prioritize ensuring that humans are in the loop, this provides an opportunity for human accountability for decision-making and mitigating risks.

Compliance obstacles

According to experts, the rapid pace of AI evolution is outpacing the governance, procurement, and compliance frameworks designed for traditional technology. Experts identified specific hurdles, including obstacles with meeting requirements for testing, identity management, and authorization processes. A few examples are listed below.

Multiple experts expressed that the speed of the current procurement process in the federal government is not always compatible with AI due to its rapid evolution. Specifically, AI capabilities evolve on timescales measured in months. Meanwhile, some procurement and acquisition processes across government and industry were designed for technologies that change over years. Therefore, by the time acquisition processes conclude, the tools being acquired may no longer represent current capabilities.

The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 requires federal agencies to develop, document, and implement information security programs to protect the information and systems that support the agencies' operations and assets.[42] However, the act pre-dates the nondeterministic nature of generative AI. Specifically, that the technology being used for cybersecurity, including technology with nondeterministic properties, could be tested and validated for a specific solution in the same way that is used when deterministic. However, the nondeterministic nature of generative AI's underlying logic introduces randomness, rather than operating within a set of strict rules, making outputs harder to predict. Therefore, generative AI was said to disrupt assumptions of determinism, testability, and control effectiveness.

Zero trust architecture is a set of cybersecurity principles stating that organizations must verify everything that attempts to access their systems and services. In January 2022, the Office of Management and Budget issued a memorandum requiring agencies to achieve specific zero trust security goals by the end of fiscal year 2024.[43] This includes identity management goals governing the authorization of access to resources. Agency officials described potential conflicts between managing AI identities and zero trust architecture. Specifically, managing digital identities and access authorization for AI agents was cited

[42]The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA 2014) (Pub. L. No. 113-283, Dec. 18, 2014) largely superseded the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA 2002), enacted as Title III, E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 2946 (Dec. 17, 2002).

[43]Office of Management and Budget, *Moving the U.S. Government Toward Zero Trust Cybersecurity Principles*, M-22-09 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2022).

as a challenge. Officials stated that, when implementing zero trust, the technology's emphasis on identity and just-in-time access becomes more difficult to implement when actions are performed by automated agents. One expert meeting participant expressed a need for further research into identity and access management for AI agents.

According to multiple experts, rigorous authorization requirements in the federal government can prevent agencies from adopting AI tools at the speed necessary to stay ahead of the evolving threat landscape. For example, the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) establishes security requirements and guidelines that are intended to help secure cloud computing environments used by agencies. However, experts stated that the lack of mature, AI-specific evaluation criteria within programs like FedRAMP creates authorization uncertainty and inconsistency. In addition, the program's authorization process can create delays in onboarding new AI technology for cybersecurity. Specifically, as vendors integrate new AI capabilities in their commercial solutions, the availability of the new capability is delayed in FedRAMP authorized versions. Further, experts stated that the process to obtain an "authority to operate" is slow and not well-adapted for AI systems, causing delays that hinder adoption, innovation, and the deployment of best-in-class tools.

Conflicting cybersecurity regulations

Multiple experts reiterated the need to harmonize cybersecurity regulations, especially when considering a potential influx of compliance obligations that will come with the use of AI. In 2020, we reported on the need for federal agencies to coordinate on requirements and assessments of states.[44] Specifically, we found that between 49 and 79 percent of federal cybersecurity requirements had conflicting parameters for states when using federal data. Further, we reported that state information security officials noted that these conflicting requirements cost states additional time and money and could ultimately detract from security efforts. In March 2026, we reported on the impact, progress, challenges, and opportunities of harmonization from industry perspectives through a panel discussion.[45] Participants identified negative impacts that their industries experience with multiple, overlapping cybersecurity regulations and how these can result in redundant work.

In July 2026, we reported on the extent to which federal cybersecurity regulations and requirements are potentially duplicative or conflicting for regulated private sector entities.[46] As of June 2026, we identified cybersecurity regulations established by 37 federal agencies for private entities within nine critical infrastructure sectors. Specifically, 80 of the 117 cybersecurity regulations we identified (about 70 percent)

[44]GAO, *Cybersecurity: Selected Federal Agencies Need to Coordinate on Requirements and Assessments of States*, GAO-20-123 (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2020).

[45]GAO, *Cybersecurity Regulations: Additional Industry Perspectives on the Impact, Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities of Harmonization,* GAO-26-108685 (Washington, D.C.: March 05, 2026).

[46]GAO, *Cybersecurity Regulations: Multiple Sectors Are Subject to Potentially Duplicative Reporting Requirements*, GAO-26-108606 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2026).

had at least one or more of the following three types of reporting requirements for private entities to proactively report:

- cybersecurity incidents;
- cybersecurity plans or other technical information; or
- reviews, audits, or assessments

We reported that combined, these 80 regulations had at least 125 requirements for private entities to report. Many regulations required multiple types of reporting. We further reported that when multiple regulations have the same types of reporting requirements, particularly when the requirements affect entities within the same sector or across multiple sectors, those regulations have the potential to be duplicative or conflicting.

When discussing possible solutions to address the need for harmonization, an expert suggested a comprehensive crosswalk between federal regulations and sector-specific guidance to reduce duplication and conflicts. Further, experts emphasized that the crosswalk could identify conflicting requirements and define an acceptable substitution. For example, experts proposed establishing addendums to recognize equivalency among conflicting security controls. Notably, experts emphasized that this would require establishing a consistent definition of AI across state and federal frameworks. Specifically, experts stated that no such agreed-upon definition currently exists, and any resulting definition would need to distinguish AI types, such as generative, agentic, and traditional machine learning, since a single definition may not fully capture their unique risks.

Lack of cybersecurity information sharing

According to the 2026 International AI Safety Report, the lack of incident reporting and monitoring makes it difficult to assess how well current practices reduce risks or how consistently they are implemented.[47] Most frameworks remain voluntary, which makes adherence and enforcement more difficult to verify. Policymakers have limited visibility into how risks are identified, evaluated, and managed in practice, and information sharing between developers, deployers, and infrastructure providers remains fragmented.

In addition, experts elaborated on the scale of vulnerability exploitation and management problems due to the increased speed and scale of AI-leveraged threat actors. Experts claimed that many of the vulnerabilities being disclosed do not make it into CISA's *Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog*.[48] Experts also expressed concerns with the information entered into the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database.[49] They noted that a majority of the patches do not address the root cause of the underlying vulnerability. At the same time, the window of time from a

[47]Y. Bengio et al., *International AI Safety Report 2026* (DSIT 2026/001, Feb. 2026). https://internationalaisafetyreport.org/.

[48]CISA's *Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog* maintains the authoritative source of vulnerabilities that have been exploited in the wild to help organizations better manage vulnerabilities and keep pace with threat activity.

[49]The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE™) Program is a voluntary, international, community-driven effort to identify, define, catalog, and share information about publicly disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

disclosed vulnerability to an automated exploit is getting exponentially smaller.

Furthermore, the need to receive, provide, and share threat information across sectors without fear of repercussion was consistently identified in interviews we held with end users. Many experts expressed a desire for a long-term reauthorization of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.[50] The act created a framework to facilitate and promote the voluntary sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures among and between federal and non-federal entities. Experts also expressed concern about liability for AI model actions. An expert noted that uncertainty about liability is one of the key drivers of the reluctance for a lot of voluntary information sharing on AI tools. Additionally, the act was established before advancements in generative AI, therefore making it difficult to report AI-specific information involving threats. While multiple experts believe that information sharing under this act should remain voluntary, others felt that it would not be as effective without incentives or legal obligations for non-federal entities.

Overreliance on automated decision-making

Cyber defenders rely on automated decision-making for some tasks. Recent advancements in generative AI have introduced new capabilities for agentic systems. Specifically, agentic systems can now learn and evolve from dynamic, unstructured data in real time. Previously, this required the system to be recoded to adapt to new variables. While this new capability can be useful in rapidly changing domains, there is a tradeoff when considering traceability, reproducibility, and potential safety implications if the system were to fail.

Experts explained that the repetitive tasks that AI tools now automate, such as log reviews, alert triage, and pattern analysis, are tasks that have contributed to human pattern recognition skills. As these tasks are offloaded to automated systems, defenders are increasingly functioning as managers and orchestrators of the AI agents rather than as technical practitioners with deep subject-matter expertise. Additionally, cyber defenders may find themselves unable to take manual control effectively if AI systems fail, are compromised, or produce untrustworthy outputs. According to experts, the primary method of validation for AI generated outputs is human review of decisions, commonly known as “human-in-the-loop.” Specifically, automated decisions are validated by qualified subject matter experts.

Furthermore, experts stated that AI applications involving dynamic decision-making that affect system operation are more challenging than detection applications. While detection and pattern recognition applications are more popular and mature, applications where AI makes decisions that dynamically impact the system have not demonstrated high effectiveness. The results for these dynamic applications vary significantly on a case-by-case basis, with successes sometimes occurring but without consistency or predictability.

[50]Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. N (Cybersecurity Act of 2015), Title I (Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015), 129 Stat. 2242, 2936-56 (2015) (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501-10).

Cyber defenders are expected to assess the tools they use for reliability, effectiveness, and security, among other things. Due to the severity of impact of an incorrect decision or a system failure in safety-critical domains, reproducibility in automated decision-making is not optional. Further, overreliance on automation can lead to a decline in maintaining manual skills, which become critical when systems fail.

Automated System Failure in Aviation

In September 2025, airports in Europe, including London's Heathrow, Berlin, and Brussels were hit by a ransomware cyberattack that targeted its check-in technology. The failure, while not safety critical, forced several airports to revert to manual processes that led to significant delays and flight cancellations and left thousands of passengers stranded. According to the World Economic Forum, this incident highlighted how tightly interconnected digital systems, third-party dependencies, and legacy infrastructure can create single points of failure that have continent-wide operational impacts.

Source: World Economic Forum, *Global Aviation Sustainability Outlook 2026*, (World Economic Forum White Paper, March 2026). | GAO-27-108458

Evaluation gaps

Experts and industry officials reported growing concerns in evaluating AI model performance. Specifically, they noted concerns with the reliability of standardized AI testing frameworks (called benchmarks) and difficulties with evaluating the effectiveness of AI systems. Experts also noted that there is no consistent basis for evaluating vendor claims about generative AI tool capabilities.

Reliability of AI benchmarks in cybersecurity

AI benchmarks are intended to track the technical progress of LLM and AI agent capabilities for different categories, such as safety, language, coding, math, and reasoning. Experts explained that cyber defenders need to know whether a particular benchmark is appropriate for each use case, and whether what is deployed has been trained and tested on the same use case. However, some experts stated that the current benchmarks used to measure model capabilities become useless almost immediately. In addition, according to the Berryville Institute of Machine Learning, an AI system that performs well on a security benchmark may itself not be secure because these benchmarks are not meaningfully correlated with system properties.[51] There is a difference between building machine learning systems that are secure and using machine learning for security. Furthermore, the benchmarks used to measure AI performance face growing reliability concerns due to high error rates and the ability for AI to exploit benchmark testing to achieve near-perfect scores without solving a single task.

In October 2024, researchers at the Rochester Institute of Technology introduced a benchmark—Security Extraction, Understanding & Reasoning Evaluation—intended to address specific tasks that general evaluations in existing benchmarks did not sufficiently address, such as practical and applied aspects of LLM performance in cybersecurity.[52] This benchmark was designed

[51]Gary McGraw, Ph.D., Harold Figueroa, Katie McMahon, and Richie Bonett, "No Security Meter for AI," *Berryville Institute of Machine Learning*, version 1.0 (Berryville, Virginia: May 2026), https://berryvilleiml.com/docs/no-security-meter-ai.pdf.

[52]Dipkamal Bhusal et al, "SECURE: Benchmarking Large Language Models for Cybersecurity," *arXiv* (Oct. 2024), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.20441v4.

to assess performance in realistic cybersecurity scenarios. Additional cybersecurity benchmarks have since been introduced. For example, in 2025, the Cybersecurity AI Benchmark was designed for evaluating cybersecurity AI agents to address the gap between pre-trained knowledge of cybersecurity in LLMs and attack and defense capabilities.[53] Further, a benchmark was developed to evaluate an LLM agent on conducting cyber threat investigations in real-word scenarios.[54]

According to the Berryville Institute of Machine Learning, these cybersecurity benchmarks are static fixed tests that probe models in specific, simulated scenarios. Once these tests are published, they are pulled into training datasets which pollutes benchmark results. For example, researchers at the University of California Berkeley demonstrated that eight of the most prominent AI agent benchmarks can be tricked into giving a near-perfect score by simply exploiting how the score is computed without solving a single problem.[55] This was observed in the autonomous attack on Hugging Face (introduced in table 3). According to an independent investigation of the incident conducted by METR and Redwood Research, agents did extensive research on how they could spoof, edit, or delete their own transcripts because they believed that the automated scorer would check to see if they had completed the task in the intended way.[56] Agents used the unsanctioned message board to coordinate several large-scale collective projects to find a general-purpose way to fool or tamper with the automated scorer for a benchmark.

Difficulties with evaluating effectiveness of AI systems for cybersecurity

According to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, generative AI systems lack clear behavioral guarantees, and their outputs must be understood probabilistically rather than deterministically.[57] Experts stated that evaluating AI for cybersecurity is difficult because it is context dependent. Specifically, designing a test and selecting metrics would be different for various aspects of cybersecurity. For example, a test for automated defense mechanisms would be different from how an organization would test phishing attack defenses.

[53]María Sanz-Gómez, Victor Mayoral-Vilches, Francesco Balassone, Luis Javier Navarrete-Lozano, Cristóbal R. J. Veas Chavez, and Maite del Mundo de Torres, "Cybersecurity AI Benchmark (CAIBench): A Meta-Benchmark for Evaluating Cybersecurity AI Agents," *arXiv* (Oct. 2025), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.24317.

[54]Yiran Wu et al, "ExCyTIn-Bench: Evaluating LLM Agents on Cyber Threat Investigation," *arXiv* (May 2026), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.14201

[55]Hao Wang, Hanchen Li, Qiuyang Mang, Alvin Cheung, Koushik Sen, and Dawn Song, "Do Androids Dream of Breaking the Game? Systematically Auditing AI Agent Benchmarks with BenchJack," *arXiv,* (May 2026), https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.12673.

[56]Ryan Greenblatt, Ajeya Cotra, and Hjalmar Wikj, "Brief Independent Investigation of Agents' Behavior, Reasoning and Collaboration in the OpenAI / Hugging Face Hacking Incident," *METR*, (Aug. 2026), https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-incident-investigation/#core-takeaways-about-this-incident

[57]Nadya Bliss, Paul England, and Giovanni Vigna, "Implications of AI for Cybersecurity: A Rapid Expert Consultation," *National Academies Press*, (June 2026), https://www.nationalacademies.org/projects/CAST-CRTS-25-02/publication/29493

Inability to validate vendor claims

Experts expressed that there is no consistent basis for evaluating vendor claims about generative AI tool capabilities. Specifically, cyber defenders expressed that they have to rely on vendor claims about generative AI model and tool capabilities and performance rather than independently evaluating the technology. Furthermore, one expert stated that end users are defaulting to the honor system, rather than relying on traditional auditing and evaluative standards for generative AI. Although independent evaluation efforts exist, experts noted there is no accepted framework or evaluation criteria for applying them consistently. Further, they emphasized that large AI vendors will often claim to be doing things a certain way then suddenly stop without informing their customers.

4.4 Organizational challenges

Experts identified organizational challenges, such as cost, the skillset needed to use AI for cybersecurity, training, recruiting, and retaining talent, as well as difficulties with integrating AI into daily workflows.

Cost unpredictability

According to experts, the consumption-based cost structure of AI presents a challenge for adoption and can influence implementation. Traditionally, software has been priced on a fixed or predictable metric, such as a predetermined quantity of licenses for users or end points. However, AI model usage is priced by billing fractions of a cent for every word the model reads and every word the model writes, commonly referred to as input or output tokens. For example, as of October 2026, Anthropic's Claude Fable 5 reportedly costs 10 dollars per 1 million input tokens and 50 dollars per 1 million output tokens.[58] According to experts, the pricing framework for AI use in cybersecurity is variable, and end users struggle to determine whether it is worth the cost. Furthermore, state and local governments and smaller critical infrastructure operators that are resource-constrained could be disproportionately affected.

AI skills gap

Experts raised concerns about the AI skills gap in the cybersecurity workforce, as well as the general workforce—both of which can have implications for cybersecurity. Many experts agreed that there is a critical need for more cybersecurity professionals who are knowledgeable on how to use and secure AI. Specifically, according to experts, it is important that cybersecurity teams have qualified people who can continuously monitor what the technology is doing and what the outcomes are. Further, experts emphasized that cybersecurity professionals need to improve their AI competences and capabilities. However, one expert highlighted the importance in prioritizing the teaching of cybersecurity fundamentals first, so that organizations can maintain a workforce that understands what AI-leveraged cybersecurity tools are doing, what processes they are

[58]"Pricing," Claude Platform Docs, Anthropic, accessed October 20, 2026, https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/about-claude/pricing.

automating, and how they come to certain conclusions. According to experts, there are various areas of AI that need further training in the workforce pertaining to cybersecurity; these include:

Training the general workforce on

- AI adoption, which could focus on frameworks, assessing risk based organizational needs, implementation, and workflows.
- How to use AI in ways that do not compromise cybersecurity.

Training the cybersecurity workforce on

- How to use AI for cybersecurity effectively.
- Key practices for a human-AI hybrid environment.

Training and talent retention

Multiple experts identified high costs as the most significant limiting factor in AI education and training in the United States. Specifically, one expert expressed a need for access to free resources so that professionals do not have to provide funding to be adequately trained. At the same time, an expert said that the cost to use AI in the lab at their university is an expense limiting the scope of their AI curricula. For example, they explained that one of their exercises would cost 30 percent of their monthly token budget to run.

In addition, multiple experts raised concerns with the ability of the United States to compete globally in recruiting talented students. For example, one expert shared that top-candidate students are choosing universities overseas because they invest in the necessary AI components needed to educate their students. Furthermore, experts identified a need to ensure successful pathways to employment, or workforce pipelines, for cybersecurity careers. For example, recent graduates find it difficult to get hired despite the demand for more cybersecurity and computer science workers. Experts emphasized the importance of maintaining entry level positions and the development of roles from junior to senior level. Multiple experts referred to other countries offering pathways for people coming out of the military into the vendor community and into industry—enabling immediate employment for people who are already well-versed in cyber defense.

To that end, many experts agreed that access to free training and education resources related to AI and cybersecurity, along with an established workforce pathway, could address the AI skills gap and advance competitiveness in the United States. For example, according to experts, programs that are free to use could help grow the AI and cybersecurity workforce by making it easier for more people to get involved in the industry, rather than limiting it to students who can afford higher education.

Integration complications

In addition to the challenges covered above, integration and workflow complications can also hinder the ability for organizations to successfully adopt an AI-based solution. According to experts, environmental changes can cause an AI system to fail. Specifically, a change in protocols will change the overall distribution of data and the AI system that was previously trained, tested, and reliable on one protocol may fail when presented with new data to accommodate a different protocol. Additionally, one expert discovered

that an organization that purchased an AI-based solution had low usage of the product. After learning about how the customer was using the tool, they found that adoption was hindered by how users moved from existing tools to the new solution. Specifically, there were issues with how the solution fit into the customer's daily work and the learning curve associated with using the new solution. Further, agency officials expressed difficulties integrating AI into legacy environments.

5 Policy Options Could Help Support Various Policy Goals Regarding AI Cybersecurity Applications

Policymakers may include legislative bodies, government agencies, standards-setting organizations, industry, and other groups. Policy options are presented below as a broad set of alternatives or menu of options policymakers may wish to consider as they seek to advance various policy goals and to enhance benefits or mitigate challenges with respect to AI in cybersecurity. The policy goals, options, and discussions presented below are not intended to be exhaustive, nor do they necessarily align with the views of all experts and stakeholders we engaged with as part of our work. We did not seek consensus and are making no statements about what should be done; these are presented as options for what could be done, depending on which goal(s) an individual or entity might want to advance.

Policy goal: Address gaps in cybersecurity guidance and practices

Cybersecurity regulations and guidance in the United States remain fragmented, with duplication and overlap between federal and state frameworks that experts across sectors identified as a persistent barrier. Even where guidance exists, checklist-based compliance does not necessarily translate into meaningful risk reduction. AI introduces additional complexity, including privacy risks, that existing guidance does not fully address. Policymakers could address these gaps by harmonizing cybersecurity requirements, improving cyber threat information sharing, closing AI-related privacy risk gaps in guidance, and reinforcing application of fundamental cybersecurity practices. Table 6 includes options that policymakers could consider to help address gaps in cybersecurity guidance and practices.

Table 6: Policy options to help address gaps in cybersecurity guidance and practices

Policy option	Opportunities and considerations
Harmonize cybersecurity requirements Potential implementation approaches • Create a crosswalk between overlapping cybersecurity regulatory frameworks to identify conflicts and duplication across compliance obligations. • Consolidate federal incident reporting, definitions, and intake mechanisms into a unified portal that securely routes relevant data to appropriate sector-specific regulators. • Establish a coordinating body to implement cross-agency baseline standards for cybersecurity and enforce mutual recognition among sectors.	**Opportunities** • Could reduce the number of conflicts that public and private sector entities face when complying with multiple overlapping cybersecurity regulatory frameworks. • Could allow entities experiencing an active cyberattack to report once rather than having to manage multiple conflicting reporting deadlines. • Could save time and money for many private and public sector entities by reducing duplicative efforts and redundant work. • Could provide a trusted regulatory crosswalk, or baseline, that state and federal agencies can align to.

Policy option	Opportunities and considerations
• Ensure artificial intelligence (AI) definitions across state and federal frameworks encompass current capabilities. • Ensure that existing policies, rules, and laws that govern the use and misuse of information systems apply to, and are appropriate for, AI systems.	• Could improve compliance and the nation's cybersecurity by providing reciprocity for entities that meet an approved baseline standard. • A mandate could alleviate jurisdictional friction between independent and executive branch agencies. **Considerations** • May face significant institutional and political resistance. • Would require collaboration and consensus across various policymakers, which can be difficult and time-consuming. • May compound existing complexity if multiple entities establish their own AI-specific requirements. • May require a consistent definition of AI across state and federal frameworks. • Would require extensive testing and validation by appropriate personnel to ensure a unified reporting portal is secure before deployment. • Standardized baselines may dilute unique requirements for varying needs. • Regulatory agencies apply differing requirements across sectors.
Improve cyber threat information sharing Potential implementation approaches • Offer incentives to organizations that participate in voluntary information sharing frameworks. • Offer long-term liability protections and omnidirectional information sharing between private and public sector entities. • Government policymakers could require entities to share cyber threat information. • Encourage AI-specific communication channels for sharing information about threat vectors and defense capabilities.	**Opportunities** • Could amplify the collective understanding of cybersecurity threats and how to respond to them. • Could better equip the nation to defend against the influx of cyberattacks brought on by AI. **Considerations** • May require establishing a review process for vetting private entities seeking inclusion and benefiting from any information sharing programs. • Would require definitions to be expansive and clear. • Would require strong protections for the privacy rights of citizens to ensure that any personal information is handled in accordance with federal privacy laws. • Would require clearly defined liability protection for adequate participation to realize benefits. • May require additional resources, time, and personnel for participating organizations. • Multiple pathways for sharing information may create duplication, potentially causing users to default to one sharing platform or to not report at all.

Policy option	Opportunities and considerations
Close gaps in AI-related privacy risks Potential implementation approaches • Share information on privacy-related risks associated with introducing generative AI into entities and their systems. • Determine and specify examples of known privacy-related risks, and mitigations, that entities should consider when updating their policies as they pertain to AI.	**Opportunities** • Provide informed decision-making opportunities for entities considering adoption of AI for cybersecurity. • Help protect the privacy of sensitive data when using AI. **Considerations** • Would require coordination between government, industry, and academia. • May require assessing how the risk varies by use case. • May require assessing how the risk varies by organization and sector. • May require assessing level of impact based on the sector and use case.
Improve application of fundamental cybersecurity practices Potential implementation approaches • Promote the implementation of fundamental cybersecurity practices. • Implement a zero trust security model. • Prioritize timely patching of vulnerabilities. • Require the use of multi-factor authentication and the use of verbal safe words for financial transactions. • Establish protocols to frequently verify that firewalls are configured correctly.	**Opportunities** • Reduce the likelihood or minimize the impact of AI-leveraged attacks. • Limit the actions threat actors can take thus preventing unauthorized access. • Reduce the impact of misconfigurations. • Reduce the impact of user errors. • Prevent or minimize the likelihood of data breaches. • Prevent or minimize operational disruptions. • Protect resources from AI-leveraged brute force and denial of service attacks. • Prevent exploitation by deepfake technology. **Considerations** • May require modernizing legacy systems. • May require additional funding and resources.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-27-108458

Policy goal: Address AI-related research gaps

Stakeholders described research gaps that limit informed decisions about AI use in cybersecurity, including the lack of reliable methods for assessing risk across use cases, unresolved identity management challenges for agentic AI, and the absence of shared testing environments for many sectors. Policymakers could address these gaps by investing in research on safe AI adoption, advancing AI identity management, and establishing controlled testing environments. Table 7 describes policy options that could help address this goal.

Table 7: Policy options to help address artificial intelligence (AI)-related research gaps in cybersecurity.

Policy option	Opportunities and considerations
Support research to enable the safe adoption of AI for cybersecurity Potential implementation approaches • Invest in determining a risk level associated with different cybersecurity use-cases. • Invest in researching how to objectively determine the measurable benefits of using AI. • Invest in research on technical indicators of an AI-leveraged activities. • Invest in research on defenses to mitigate data poisoning. • Invest in research on mechanisms of interpretability, explainability, and how to control decision making. • Invest in research of the relationship between training data, learning, and model output. • Advance AI benchmark developments. • Invest in research of alternate forms of AI that are not language model architectures.	**Opportunities** • Could advance AI capabilities for cybersecurity in a safe manner. • Could establish characteristics of adopting AI safely. • Could enable AI use in more cybersecurity use cases. • Could reduce anxiety about adopting AI tools for cybersecurity. • Could help better understand the new threat landscape and prevalence of AI-leveraged attacks. **Considerations** • Would require collaboration between government, industry, and academia, which can take time and resources.
Enhance innovation and research in agentic AI identity management Potential implementation approaches • Support research to identify and manage AI agent identities. • Develop frameworks for non-human identity management compatible with zero trust architecture. • Develop standards for agentic AI identity and authentication.	**Opportunities** • Improve agentic AI oversight capabilities, such as the ability for a human to approve or override an AI agent's actions. • Make agentic AI applications more compatible with zero trust architecture. **Considerations** • May require additional time, personnel, cost, and communication among policymakers. • Achieving the levels of access required for zero trust relies on implementing specific identity, policy, and monitoring tools.
Expand AI testing environments Potential implementation approaches • Government agencies and industry could expand AI test beds, shared and controlled environments for testing sector-specific AI applications, available to organizations that lack the resources to build independent testing capacity. • Academic institutions could partner with government and industry to provide shared testing infrastructure.	**Opportunities** • Provide clarity on sector-specific and application-specific risks. • Advance development of new sector-specific applications in controlled environments. • Clarify AI capabilities needed to prevent premature regulations that could stifle AI innovation. • Help organizations understand what AI solutions are best fit for their environment.

• Federal agencies could make testing environments available to under-resourced organizations that cannot build independent testing capacity.	**Considerations** • Would require collaboration between public and private sector. • May be resource intensive.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-27-108458

Policy goal: Govern AI tools throughout their cybersecurity lifecycle

AI tools deployed in cybersecurity do not remain static. According to experts, AI performance can degrade when deployment conditions change. The experts also noted that organizations can become dependent on AI tools without the means to verify whether those tools continue to meet operational needs. Policymakers could address these governance gaps through measures, such as periodic revalidation requirements, non-AI fallback capabilities, risk-based acquisition frameworks, human authorization requirements, and designated senior officials with authority over AI deployment decisions. These measures govern the use of AI tools that have already been adopted, complementing policy options that address whether AI should be used in certain cybersecurity functions at all. Table 8 describes policy options that could help support this goal.

Table 8: Policy options to help govern artificial intelligence (AI) tools throughout their cybersecurity lifecycle

Policy option	Opportunities and considerations
Establish a deterministic AI fallback capability for critical cybersecurity functions[a] <u>Potential implementation approaches</u> • Sector regulators could require that critical infrastructure operators maintain a tested, risk-informed, non-AI fallback for cybersecurity functions that depend on AI based on the consequences of a system failure. • Federal agencies could require that in-house AI-dependent functions have a documented manual or rule-based alternative that staff can operate. • Standards organizations could define what an adequate fallback looks like for different functions. • Operators could run periodic exercises that validate critical functions without AI to confirm the fallback works.	**Opportunities** • Keep critical cybersecurity functions running if an AI tool fails, is compromised, or drifts out of date. • Limit the damage from a single AI failure spreading across systems. • Give organizations a fallback they have actually tested. • Address the degradation problem, where a reliable model fails when conditions change. **Considerations** • Maintaining a parallel non-AI capability is expensive and may duplicate effort. • Would need to understand when and how a deterministic AI fallback should be enabled as part of continuity of operations plan. • A fallback that is rarely used may not work when it is finally needed, though a requirement to periodically validate its operation may mitigate this risk. • Some AI-enabled functions may have no practical manual equivalent at the scale of modern networks.

Policy option	Opportunities and considerations
	• The requirement could slow or discourage adoption of AI tools that would provide a clear benefit.
Require human authorization for consequential AI-initiated cybersecurity actions Potential implementation approaches • Require human approval before any AI-initiated consequential actions beyond identification or analysis, such as a change to network configurations, access controls, or incident response actions. • Require that AI cybersecurity tools deployed in critical infrastructure operate in advisory mode only, with human operators retaining execution authority. • Require agentic AI products to include configurable human-in-the-loop controls as a default setting. • Define tiers of AI autonomy for cybersecurity, specifying which tiers require human authorization.	**Opportunities** • Prevent AI systems from taking actions that could produce unintended consequences in operational environments. • Maintain human accountability for cybersecurity decisions by ensuring that a person approves every consequential action. • Address the gap identified by experts who reported that AI agents act outside their initial parameters. • Preserve the analytical and detection capabilities of AI while limiting its ability to take autonomous action. **Considerations** • Human-in-the-loop requirements could slow response times in situations where speed is critical, such as active intrusions or distributed denial of service attacks where automated response is measured in milliseconds. • The volume of alerts in large cybersecurity environments may exceed human capacity to review and approve each one, leading to either approval fatigue or backlogs that delay necessary actions. • Organizations with limited cybersecurity staff may find that mandatory human authorization creates a bottleneck that reduces the net defensive value of AI tools. • The definition of “AI-initiated action” may be difficult to scope precisely, as many cybersecurity tools already automate responses at multiple levels.
Establish a risk-based approach to acquiring AI products Potential implementation approaches • Develop minimum acceptance criteria for AI procurement. • Require agentic AI products to include strong identity management and oversight mechanisms. • Establish a certification authority for assessing the security of AI cybersecurity solutions/products. • Ensure that internal policies on AI acquisition are informed by cybersecurity risks.	**Opportunities** • Help organizations maintain control of agentic AI during implementation and operation. • Reduce cybersecurity risk when using AI for cybersecurity. • Improve the safe adoption of AI for cybersecurity. • Reduce the risk of deploying less-proven AI in safety-critical functions. **Considerations** • Could limit the number of AI solutions federal agencies or highly regulated sectors can choose from.

Policy option	Opportunities and considerations
• Promote risk tiering, reserving proven AI approaches for safety-critical functions and allowing newer AI in lower-consequence functions first.	• Could require frequently reassessing risk. • Could be difficult to quantify risks. • Risk tiers may need frequent updates as AI capabilities mature.
Validate the output of AI cybersecurity tools before and during deployment Potential implementation approaches • Develop standardized pre-deployment validation protocols for AI cybersecurity tools, including defined success metrics, minimum performance thresholds, and structured pilot methodologies. • Complete validation pilots with documented outcomes before deploying AI tools in production environments for high-consequence cybersecurity functions. • Establish shared testing environments and benchmark datasets that enable organizations to evaluate AI cybersecurity tools against realistic threat scenarios. • Implement data quality controls, such as testing and validating training datasets, and evaluating the accuracy, quality, and authenticity of generative AI outputs. (see appendix III for more examples)	**Opportunities** • Prevent deployment of tools that do not meet operational requirements. • Standardized validation protocols could reduce duplicated evaluation effort across organizations adopting the same tools for similar use cases. • Documented pilot outcomes, if shared, could build an evidence base that informs future adoption decisions across sectors. • Could help address data quality, reliability, and integrity concerns. • Give under-resourced operators access to validation capacity they could not build alone. **Considerations** • Validation requirements could delay deployment of tools that would provide immediate defensive value, particularly during active threat campaigns. • Defining meaningful success metrics for AI cybersecurity tools is a technical challenge, as performance may depend on threat conditions that cannot be fully replicated in pilot environments. • May require shared testing infrastructure that does not currently exist for many sectors.
Evaluate AI cybersecurity solutions for value gain Potential implementation approaches • Entities could establish baseline thresholds for determining whether an AI solution produces measurable gains that clearly outweigh its total cost, operational risk, and human overhead when compared to existing or alternative solutions, prior to acquiring the solution. • Entities could implement processes to frequently evaluate AI cybersecurity solutions that are already in use and discontinue those that do not produce a value gain compared to existing or alternate solutions. • Sector risk management agencies could ask critical infrastructure operators to document value gain determinations for AI cybersecurity solutions. • Standards organizations could publish guidance on how to establish appropriate criteria and metrics for determining whether an AI solution is worth acquiring or keeping.	**Opportunities** • Could prevent the use of AI solutions that add risk without adding value. • Could free resources spent maintaining low-value AI solutions. • Could normalize the dismissal of risky or low-value AI solutions and signal markets to produce more valuable, secure solutions. **Considerations** • Measuring the value of an AI solution against a non-AI baseline is highly contextual and often specific to organizational needs and risk tolerances. • May cause unintended consequences if dependencies are not known. • May be difficult to evaluate due to the rapid pace of advancements and capabilities in AI models.

Policy option	Opportunities and considerations
Establish a senior role that can manage privacy risks when using AI Potential implementation approaches • Designate a senior privacy official with the expertise and authority necessary to manage data privacy risks when using AI. • Ensure senior privacy roles are trained and equipped to manage AI-related privacy risks.	**Opportunities** • Better manage privacy risks when using AI for cybersecurity. • Help decision makers navigate privacy considerations when adopting new AI-leveraged cybersecurity tools. • Provide protections needed for any advancing technology that outpaces the development of formal security guidelines. • Aid in prioritizing privacy impact assessment requirements for systems containing personally identifiable information when using AI. **Considerations** • Would require the appropriate level of authority to ensure that privacy concerns are elevated to the head of the organization. • Would require a significant level of AI literacy.
Restrict autonomous and nondeterministic AI in consequential functions pending certification Potential implementation approaches • Use a risk-based approach to limit AI systems from carrying out consequential cybersecurity actions, such as changing network configurations, changing access controls, or initiating incident response measures until a certification framework for such systems exists. • Use a risk-based approach to limit AI used for consequential functions to an advisory mode only, or produce deterministic, auditable outputs, until certification frameworks exist. • Prohibit autonomous or nondeterministic AI action in cybersecurity functions that affect critical infrastructure. • Encourage industry to build AI cybersecurity products that separate analysis from action by design.	**Opportunities** • Could prevent AI from taking actions that cannot be undone. • Keep humans involved in high-consequence decisions. • Ensure AI involved in these functions produces consistent, auditable outputs. • Address the documented problem of AI agents acting outside their initial parameters. • Provide regulatory clarity for operators in safety-critical sectors. **Considerations** • Threat actors are not bound by these restrictions and could gain an advantage in capabilities. • Requiring human execution or deterministic outputs for every consequential action could slow response during fast-moving attacks. • The distinction between a "consequential action" and an "audit-trail-dependent function" is not always clear, particularly as hybrid architectures emerge. • Some defensive uses of generative AI, such as automated playbook generation, could provide value even in regulated sectors, and a blanket restriction would foreclose them. • All of these potential approaches depend on first defining “consequential cyber actions” and publishing criteria for when deterministic outputs are required.

Policy option	Opportunities and considerations
	• Would require designating an appropriate certifying authority.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-27-108458

[a]For the purposes of this report, we use the term "fallback" to refer to a predefined alternative capability, such as rule-based tools or manual procedures that an organization can use to continue performing a critical cybersecurity function if an AI system becomes unavailable, fails, or demonstrates outcomes inconsistent with its intended use. Deterministic AI refers to models that are designed to operate under strict rules with predictable outputs.

Policy goal: Enhance the cybersecurity workforce

Experts reported that AI is displacing entry-level cybersecurity positions, narrowing the pipeline through which analysts gain experience. At the same time, AI has been identified as the most pressing skills gap in the cybersecurity workforce, and emerging capabilities, such as agentic AI, are not yet well understood by practitioners. Policymakers could address both sides of this challenge by strengthening AI expertise across the workforce and preserving the human skills and entry-level pathways that sustain long-term capacity. Table 9 includes the policy options that could be considered by policymakers to help enhance the cybersecurity workforce.

Table 9: Policy options to help enhance the cybersecurity workforce

Policy option	Opportunities and considerations
Sustain workforce skills in current cybersecurity practices Potential implementation approaches • Include manual alternatives in training programs so that the workforce does not lose the underlying skill. • Identify the cybersecurity functions where human judgment should be retained. • Retain essential human skills and judgement while applying automation based on mission impact and operational conditions. • Establish periodic exercises that assess the ability of cybersecurity personnel to manually perform certain automated workflows in the event of a failure.	**Opportunities** • Could enable analysts to check the accuracy of artificial intelligence (AI) output instead of blindly trusting it. • Could prevent the loss of foundational skills needed for continuity in the event of a system failure. • Could preserve the human role and help to maintain skills necessary to conduct critical cybersecurity functions without AI assistance. **Considerations** • Including manual capability adds training cost and may slow operations. • In environments with severe staff shortages, time spent maintaining manual skills competes with other work. • The volume of modern cybersecurity work may make full manual operation impractical regardless of skill. • Deciding which skills to preserve is a judgment call that could become outdated.

Strengthen AI expertise for the cybersecurity workforce Potential implementation approaches • Provide resources, educational programs, and career pathways for advancing AI expertise in cybersecurity. • Advance career pathways for recent graduates in AI or cybersecurity fields. • Offer incentives to AI developers for providing free resources to universities and open-source education programs that focus on the use of AI for cybersecurity. • Establish specialized training courses informed by experts in the field that are free to the public.	**Opportunities** • Improve United States' ability to recruit top talent. • Improve ability for recent graduates to gain necessary experience and secure an entry level job in AI or cybersecurity. • Advance United States' competitiveness. • Improve AI adoption rates. • Help lower the barrier of entry for cyber defenders. **Considerations** • Would require collaboration between government, industry, and academia. • May require continuous updating to keep pace with the latest technological advancements in AI.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-27-108458

6 Agency and Expert Comments

We provided a draft of this report to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, and the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and Agriculture with a request for technical comments. We incorporated agency comments into this report as appropriate.

We also offered our expert meeting participants the opportunity to review and comment on the draft of this report, consistent with previous technology assessment methodologies. We sent the report to 17 of those experts who volunteered to review our report and incorporated expert comments as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the relevant federal agencies, and other interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact Kevin Walsh at WalshK@gao.gov; Karen Howard at HowardK@gao.gov; or Jennifer R. Franks at FranksJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Media Relations may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Objectives

We prepared this report at the initiative of the Comptroller General to assist Congress with its oversight responsibilities, considering the evolving artificial intelligence (AI) and policy environment. Specifically, we focused on AI as it pertains to cybersecurity. For this report, we described how AI impacts cyberattacks, the potential benefits and status of AI from the perspective of cyber defenders, described the challenges and risks of implementing these technologies, and identified policy goals that policymakers could pursue through various policy options that could help realize benefits or address challenges. Specific objectives for this report were:

1. How has the use of AI affected cyberattack capabilities of threat actors?
2. How is AI being used for cybersecurity and what benefits are presented to cyber defenders when using AI to safeguard information systems?
3. What challenges are presented to cyber defenders when using AI technology to safeguard information systems?
4. What policy options, if any, could help support various policy goals in this area?

Scope

For this report, we defined "AI" as computer systems that "learn" how to improve their performance. We define cybersecurity as the ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyberattacks. We focused on the use of AI as it specifically pertains to cybersecurity, attacks that have been confirmed to have used AI, reported benefits of the use of AI by organizations or security teams, and risks and challenges to implementing AI in cyber defense as reported by experts and cybersecurity practitioners.

Methodology

For all objectives, we reviewed literature and agency documents; interviewed a variety of agency officials, industry representatives, and other stakeholders; and convened a multi-day expert meeting. Considerations for government included representatives for initiatives, implementations, and research in using AI for cybersecurity. To determine which federal agencies were using AI for cybersecurity, we analyzed the Office of Management and Budget's 2024 Federal Agency AI Use Case repository and filtered these entries for cybersecurity use cases and different stages of development. Additionally, we identified a number of initiatives related to AI use for cybersecurity through research.

For our first objective, we reviewed documentary and testimonial evidence to describe how AI has affected cyberattack capabilities of threat actors. Specifically, we used documentary and testimonial evidence to analyze existing tactics and techniques used by threat actors to determine how AI is being incorporated into existing techniques. We also conducted analysis to determine the characteristics of AI-leveraged attacks and how the use of AI has changed the cyber threat landscape. Further, we conducted an analysis to identify emerging trends in AI-leveraged malicious activity. We then summarized the results of our analysis.

For our second objective, we reviewed documentary and testimonial evidence to summarize how AI is used by cyber defenders to safeguard information systems. To do this, we analyzed the different types of AI that are being incorporated into cybersecurity tools and processes. In addition, we analyzed recent advancements in AI and summarized examples where AI has benefited traditional methods in cybersecurity. We also summarized ongoing work to further advance capabilities in cybersecurity.

For our third objective, we used documentary and testimonial evidence to summarize challenges faced by cyber defenders when using AI to safeguard information systems. We analyzed the use of AI for cybersecurity to identify challenges pertaining to data, new risks, and technical challenges associated with advancements in generative AI. We assessed actions that can be taken to reduce the impact and likelihood of identified risks. We also identified challenges associated with AI governance and trust, including obstacles regarding compliance with legislation and regulations; conflicting regulations; and gaps in information sharing and evaluation standards. Further, we identified organizational challenges, such as cost, skills gap, and training.

For the fourth objective (in addition to the steps above), we identified policy goals and options from executive orders, national strategies, the GAO High Risk List, federal laws and regulations, state legislation, and evidence gathered from our prior objectives and a broad range of expert perspectives.

Review of literature and documents

For all objectives, we reviewed relevant literature and documents identified by agency officials, stakeholders, and a background literature search conducted by a GAO librarian to find information on the use of AI in cybersecurity. We selected articles most relevant to our objectives for further review. The literature and documents provided information and knowledge for our understanding of the state of AI as it pertains to cybersecurity, helped us identify experts or groups to consider for the meeting of experts, and provided corroborating evidence for interviews. In addition to our search, we received additional literature and documents from agency officials and other stakeholders we interviewed.

Interviews

We conducted interviews with representatives spanning government, academia, industry, and independent organizations. We tailored interview questions based on the interviewees' roles, responsibilities, and expertise. We used information gathered from prior GAO reports, a literature search, agency documents, interviews, and GAO subject matter expertise to identify a list of interviewees. We selected our interviewees to complement the other parts of our methodology, such as verifying key information from literature and documents and supplementing the views provided by our expert participants. In our report, we refer to individuals representing an agency as "agency officials," individuals who participated in our expert meeting and those we interviewed as "experts." When statements include a mix of these individuals, we attribute them to "experts." We

interviewed agency officials from federal and state governments where applicable, including alliances with multi-state representation. We also interviewed industry representatives from organizations that could give insight on how AI is being used or developed for cybersecurity by researchers, end users, and critical infrastructure. We interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of stakeholders. The results of our interviews are illustrative and represent important perspectives but are not generalizable.

Meeting of experts

We convened a multi-day virtual expert meeting that included a nongeneralizable group of 20 experts from state and federal government, industry, academia and independent organizations. To obtain a broad range of perspectives, expert selection criteria included: roles and professional affiliation, previous experience, technical expertise, and nontechnical expertise. Prior to the meeting, we asked the experts to identify any potential conflicts of interest, which we considered to be any current financial or other interest that might conflict with the service of an individual because it could (1) impair objectivity or (2) create an unfair advantage for any person or organization. We determined the experts to be free of reported conflicts of interest, except those that were outside the scope of the meeting or where the overall design of our meeting and methodology were sufficient to address them for our purpose. We also determined the group to have no inappropriate biases for our purpose. The comments of these experts generally represented their individual views and not the organizations with which they were affiliated and are not generalizable to the views of others in the field. The meeting was professionally moderated and transcribed to ensure that we accurately captured the experts' statements. Following the meeting, we continued to draw on the expertise of those individuals who agreed to work with us during the remainder of our study. We provided the experts with an opportunity to provide feedback on potential policy options and implementation approaches. We also provided the experts with an opportunity to review a draft of our report and provide technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The experts and their titles and affiliations are listed in appendix II.

We conducted our work from April 2025 through November 2026 in accordance with all sections of GAO's Quality Assurance Framework that are relevant to technology assessments. The framework requires that we plan and perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations to our work. We believe that the information and data obtained, and the analyses conducted, provide a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions in this product.

Appendix II: Expert Participation

We convened a multi-day expert meeting to discuss the opportunities and challenges of the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for cybersecurity and inform the development of policy goals, options, and implementation approaches. All final decisions regarding meeting substance and expert participation were made by GAO. The meeting was held virtually, in three separate sessions, in April 2026.

Experts who participated in this meeting are listed below, along with their titles at the time of the meeting. We sent the report to 17 of those experts who volunteered to review it, and we incorporated their comments as appropriate.

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Mustaque Ahamad

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Association of American Railroads

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Professor
University of California in Santa Barbara

Director
NSF AI Institute for Agent-based Cyber Threat Intelligence and Operation

Heather West

Senior Director of Cybersecurity and Privacy
Venable LLP

Appendix III: Mitigations

Although the cyber landscape has changed with the introduction of new artificial intelligence (AI) tools, cybersecurity fundamentals remain essential to defending against cyberattacks. However, one challenge as noted by experts is the inconsistent implementation of different cybersecurity best practices, including misconfigured settings, unpatched software, and relying on insecure passwords. Taking proactive steps—such as applying some basic cybersecurity techniques and ensuring that adequate verification processes are in place—could reduce the impact and/or lower the likelihood of AI-leveraged attacks.

Mitigating AI-leveraged attacks

Fundamental practices, such as those covered below offer protection against AI-leveraged cyber threats. However, beyond the fundamentals, some additional techniques may be necessary to manage AI cybersecurity risk effectively.

Application programming interface (API) security

Rate limiting can protect resources against brute force and denial of service attacks by restricting the number of requests a user can make in a certain amount of time. Rate limits ensure that no user can overwhelm the system with harmful requests.

Similar to rate limiting, throttling restricts the number of requests a system can receive. However, instead of operating at the user or client level, throttling works at the server/network level. Throttling limits and quotas protect the API's backend system bandwidth.

Firewall settings

Firewalls provide protection by shielding a computer or network from malicious network traffic. Firewalls can be configured to block data from certain locations, applications, or ports while allowing relevant and necessary data through. According to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), open ports and misconfigured services, such as cloud services, are among the most commonly exploited vulnerabilities. Threat actors can detect open ports using scanning tools and often use them as initial attack vectors.

Multifactor authentication

Multifactor authentication requires more than one factor to verify a user's identity. These factors typically include a security key, a code generator application, or codes sent by text or phone call to verify a user's identity. Multifactor authentication can help prevent account takeovers, especially for remote desktop access.

Old school methods

"Old school" verification methods, such as verbal safe words or phrases can prevent exploitation by deepfake technology. For example, in the case of password reset requests made to the information technology (IT) helpdesk via phone or video, a verbal safe word or verbal authentication phrase could help prevent unauthorized

access to accounts. Further, for smaller teams, personal questions that are not easily found online would provide an additional layer of protection.

Software patching

Unpatched software may allow an attacker to exploit publicly known vulnerabilities to gain access to sensitive information. Patch management helps prevent compromises, data breaches, operational disruptions, and other adverse events.

Zero trust implementation

The concept of zero trust is more important than ever with the introduction of autonomous AI agents. Zero trust architecture enables granular privilege access management and can allow users to be assigned only the rights required to perform their assigned tasks. In case an agent is compromised, zero trust implementation can help limit the actions threat actors can take and reduce the impact of misconfigurations and user errors.

Mitigating new risks associated with the use of AI for cybersecurity

Experts stated that the implementation of foundational cybersecurity key practices may mitigate some of the risks posed by using AI for cybersecurity. Table 10 includes some examples of actions that can be taken to lower the likelihood or reduce the potential impact of these risks and challenges.

Table 10: Mitigation techniques to address challenges and risks associated with the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-leveraged cybersecurity tools

Mitigation technique	Description of the mitigation technique	Risks and challenges it addresses
Decouple sensitive data from source	Decoupling sensitive data ensures that production data is not connected to a test environment for a new integration, software, or tool. Testing should use synthetic or sample datasets that mimic real-world conditions without exposing sensitive information. To mitigate risks, organizations can ensure that sensitive data is decoupled from the source.	Exposure of proprietary or sensitive data: Inadvertent exposure of corporate secrets or sensitive customer information could lead to regulatory, reputational, and operational consequences.
Monitor proprietary or sensitive data	AI has the potential to leak sensitive data if it has access to it. Minimizing the use of sensitive data in AI prompts and features as well as implementing the use of redaction and guardrails may prevent data leakage. Data leakage may be prevented by implementing output filtering, pattern detection, and access controls.	Confidentiality of sensitive data.
Test and validate training datasets	Validating training data ensures that no unintended content introduces biases into the model and establishes a secure data supply chain to guarantee data quality.	Degraded model performance and accuracy issues.
Implement data quality controls	Evaluate the quality and integrity of data used in training and the provenance of AI-generated content, for example by employing techniques like chaos engineering and seeking stakeholder feedback.	Data integrity, data poisoning.

Mitigation technique	Description of the mitigation technique	Risks and challenges it addresses
	Use real time auditing tools where they can be demonstrated to aid in the tracking and validation of the lineage and authenticity of AI-generated data.	
Evaluate outputs	Assess the accuracy, quality, reliability, and authenticity of generative AI output by comparing it to a set of known ground truth data and by using a variety of evaluation methods (e.g., human oversight and automated evaluation, proven cryptographic techniques, review of content inputs).	Information integrity
Implement governance mechanisms	Establish transparency policies and processes for documenting the origin and history of training data and generated data for generative AI applications to advance digital content transparency, while balancing the proprietary nature of training approaches.	Data privacy, information integrity, intellectual property
	Establish policies to evaluate risk-relevant capabilities of generative AI and robustness of safety measures, both prior to deployment and on an ongoing basis, through internal and external evaluations.	Information security and measuring performance and capabilities.
	Establish minimum thresholds for performance or assurance criteria and review as part of deployment approval (“go/no-go”) policies, procedures, and processes, with reviewed processes and approval thresholds reflecting measurement of AI capabilities and risks.	Information security and measuring performance and capabilities.
Anomaly detection	Integrate tools designed to verify the authenticity of digital signatures, and identify patterns associated with misinformation or manipulation.	Data poisoning, data integrity
Input validation and sanitation	Strong input management controls can partially mitigate many common risks to large language model-based applications, including AI agents. Input validation is performed to ensure only properly formed data is entering the workflow in an information system, preventing malformed data from persisting in the database and triggering malfunction of various downstream components. Input validation should happen as early as possible in the data flow, preferably as soon as the data is received from the external party.	Prompt injection
Red teaming	A structured testing exercise used to probe an AI system to find flaws and vulnerabilities, often in a controlled environment.	Prompt injection, jailbreaking
Endpoint security	Endpoint security is the practice of securing endpoints or entry points of end-user devices such as servers, desktops, laptops, and mobile and supported Internet of Things devices from being exploited by malicious actors and campaigns. It includes threat investigation, remediation, and uses multiple detection techniques ranging from static to behavioral analysis.	application programming interfaces (API) misuse, unauthorized access, data exfiltration, model manipulation

Mitigation technique	Description of the mitigation technique	Risks and challenges it addresses
Implement authentication and establish authorization protocols	Endpoints become vulnerable to various security threats, including unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and model manipulation when AI functionality is exposed through APIs. Implementing practices such as rate limiting, authentication, and authorization protocols, is critical to safeguard model endpoints. Additionally, monitoring API activity for aberrant usage patterns can help with detecting and responding to potential attacks.	Insider threat: Insider threats pose a significant risk to generative AI models and their underlying data.
AI-specific incident response plan	Develop and update AI system incident response and recovery plans and procedures to address the following: • Review and maintenance of policies and procedures to account for newly encountered uses; detection of unanticipated uses; • Verify response and recovery plans account for the entire AI ecosystem; • Verify response and recovery plans are updated for and include necessary details to communicate with downstream AI system Actors: Points-of-Contact, Contact information, notification format.	Since AI models may have unique vulnerabilities that are challenging to detect, establishing a dedicated AI security testing process can help identify and address these vulnerabilities.

Source: GAO analysis of industry reporting. | GAO-27-108458

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

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