



Statement before the Subcommittee
on Government Operations,
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform,
House of Representatives

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PERSONNEL VETTING

Sustained Leadership Is Critical to DOD's New Approach to Its Background Investigation System

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Sustained Leadership Is Critical to DOD's New Approach to Its Background Investigation System

GAO-25-108721

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A testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Operations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives
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What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS)—an IT system for conducting background investigations for most federal agencies and over 13,000 industry organizations that work with the government. However, delays have hindered NBIS deployment. DOD initially planned for NBIS to be fully operational in 2019 and changed its deadline several times. It now projects major development to be complete by the end of fiscal year 2027.

DOD's Missed Deployment Targets for the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS) Program, as of August 2025



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) information. | GAO-25-108721

DOD paused the NBIS program in 2024 and has since taken a new approach to its management and oversight of the program. In March 2024, DOD appointed a new Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) director and NBIS program manager and subsequently revised its previous plans to develop an entirely new IT system. As of September 2025, DOD plans to migrate personnel vetting data to the cloud and modernize legacy systems. DOD also transferred some authority over the NBIS program to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment in early 2024 as part of its efforts to address NBIS delays, cost overruns, and technical issues; and it created the NBIS Requirements Governance Board to regularly review the program.

GAO is currently reviewing DOD's new schedule and cost estimate for NBIS following recent reforms. In contrast to its past approach, DCSA has stated that it intends to meet all of GAO's scheduling best practices with the use of a software tool instead of an integrated master schedule for NBIS. DCSA has also taken some action consistent with GAO's best practices for cost estimating, including completing an independent cost estimate. DCSA now projects spending an additional \$2.2 billion on NBIS development, in addition to costs of \$2.4 billion it spent on NBIS and legacy systems since fiscal year 2017.

Leadership is critical to the development of the NBIS system and the successful implementation of Trusted Workforce 2.0. Setbacks in NBIS development have led to delays in achieving Trusted Workforce 2.0 milestones. New DCSA leadership in 2024 set the program on a path that is intended to show marked improvements. However, sustained leadership by DOD will be critical to achieving personnel vetting reform.

Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. government personnel vetting processes, such as background investigations, rely on IT systems to process data on millions of federal employees and contractor personnel. Since 2018, the government has undertaken a major reform of personnel vetting called Trusted Workforce 2.0. DOD has been developing NBIS as the new IT system for personnel vetting.

This statement summarizes information on (1) DOD efforts to revise its approach to NBIS development, (2) GAO's ongoing work on the most recent NBIS schedule and cost estimate, and (3) the importance of sustained leadership for NBIS to achieve personnel vetting reforms under Trusted Workforce 2.0.

This statement is based on GAO's prior reports on NBIS from December 2021 through June 2024 as well as ongoing work. To perform prior and ongoing work, GAO analyzed information on NBIS from DCSA and the Office of Personnel Management, and interviewed knowledgeable officials.

What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO made one matter for congressional consideration to require DCSA to develop a reliable schedule and cost estimate for NBIS and 15 recommendations to DOD to improve NBIS program management and cybersecurity. One recommendation related to program management remains open. GAO will continue to monitor this high-risk area.

Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Mfume, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) development of the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS). NBIS is an information technology (IT) system intended for use in conducting background investigations for most federal agencies and over 13,000 industry organizations that work with the government.

Personnel vetting processes—including background investigations—and the IT systems that support them are vital to determining the trustworthiness of the federal government's workforce and minimizing risks to U.S. national security. In 2015, two cybersecurity incidents compromised sensitive information in Office of Personnel Management (OPM) systems, including personnel vetting files, on over 22 million federal employees and contractor personnel. A year later, the President assigned DOD the responsibility for developing and operating IT systems for personnel vetting processes.¹

Today, DOD's Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) is responsible for developing and securing the NBIS system for personnel vetting while also maintaining legacy IT systems.² Additionally, DCSA provides personnel vetting services for most of the government, including

¹Specifically, in 2016, Executive Order No. 13,467, as amended by Executive Order No. 13,741, assigned DOD the role of designing, developing, deploying, operating, securing, defending, and continuously updating and modernizing personnel vetting IT systems that support all background investigation processes that had been conducted by the National Background Investigations Bureau within the Office of Personnel Management. Exec. Order No. 13,467, *Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information*, § 2.4(b) (June 30, 2008), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,741, *Amending Executive Order 13467 To Establish the Roles and Responsibilities of the National Background Investigations Bureau and Related Matters*, § 1(f), 81 Fed. Reg. 68,289, 68,290 (Sept. 29, 2016).

²In this statement, we use the term "NBIS system" to refer to the set of subsystems and associated capabilities that is the focus of the software development effort. We use the term "NBIS program" to refer to the NBIS Program Management Office and its management of the program as a whole, including related subprojects such as acquisition, engineering, training, and cybersecurity.

conducting around 2 million background investigations each year.³ In early 2024, DCSA paused the NBIS program after it missed multiple milestones for Trusted Workforce 2.0—the government’s major reform of personnel vetting. During the pause, DCSA revised its approach to NBIS, including developing a new schedule to meet future milestones and a new cost estimate.

This statement provides information on (1) DOD efforts to revise its approach for the NBIS program since it paused development in 2024, (2) our ongoing work on the new NBIS schedule and cost estimate, and (3) the importance of sustained leadership for NBIS to achieve personnel vetting reforms under Trusted Workforce 2.0.

This statement is based on our prior reports and testimonies reviewing NBIS from December 2021 through June 2024, which was when I last testified before this subcommittee.⁴ This work also informed our 2025 update on the government-wide personnel security clearance process—an issue on our High-Risk List.⁵ This statement also includes preliminary observations from our ongoing work examining DCSA’s new NBIS schedule and cost estimate. To perform our prior and ongoing work, we analyzed information on NBIS from DCSA and OPM and interviewed officials with knowledge of the NBIS program and NBIS and legacy systems.

More detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology for our prior work can be found in the issued reports listed in the Related

³While DCSA conducts 95 percent of the government’s background investigations, some executive branch agencies have the authority to conduct all or some of their own investigations, according to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Such agencies include the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the State Department, as well as some DOD components such as the National Security Agency.

⁴GAO, *DOD Needs to Improve Management of the National Background Investigation Services Program*, [GAO-24-107616](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2024); see the Related GAO Products section at the end of this statement for additional GAO reports on this topic.

⁵In 2018, we placed the government-wide security clearance process on our High-Risk List due in part to challenges with IT systems. In our latest High-Risk update, we found that the government-wide personnel security clearance process continued to face challenges regarding the timely processing of clearances and development of the NBIS system. We have made numerous recommendations to address these challenges. For more information on our previous recommendations, see GAO, *High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness*, [GAO-25-107743](#) (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).

GAO Products section at the end of this statement. We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background

The Personnel Vetting Process and Trusted Workforce 2.0

Personnel vetting processes help ensure the trustworthiness of the federal government's workforce and those who support it. Specifically, federal departments and agencies vet personnel to determine whether they are, and remain over time, (1) eligible to access classified information or to hold a sensitive position; (2) suitable for government employment or fit to perform work for, or on behalf of, the government as contractor employees or certain categories of federal employees; and (3) eligible for access to agency systems or facilities.

The Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council (PAC) is responsible for the government-wide implementation of personnel vetting reforms and is involved in setting requirements for NBIS.⁶ The PAC has four principal members: the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); the Director of National Intelligence (DNI); the Director of OPM; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.

In March 2018, the PAC's principal members initiated Trusted Workforce 2.0 to reform the personnel vetting processes. In April 2022, the PAC issued the first iteration of its Trusted Workforce 2.0 Implementation Strategy, which states that the reform aims to better support agencies' missions by reducing the time required to bring new hires onboard, enabling mobility of the federal workforce, and improving insight into workforce behaviors. We have since recognized the PAC's continued commitment to reforming the personnel security clearance process in our High-Risk reports. The PAC initially planned to fully implement Trusted

⁶The PAC was established in June 2008 by Executive Order No. 13,467. See Exec. Order No. 13,467, § 2.2, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,103, 38,105 (June 30, 2008).


Workforce 2.0 by fiscal year 2026, but now plans to complete all milestones by fiscal year 2028.

NBIS Development and Costs

Following the 2015 OPM cybersecurity incidents, DOD directed the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to lead the acquisition of a new IT system to replace all OPM legacy IT systems supporting background investigation processes. DOD initially planned for NBIS to be fully operational in 2019, but it did not meet this target. The department then transferred the NBIS Program Management Office from DISA to DCSA on October 1, 2020, as DCSA had assumed responsibility for conducting background investigations for most federal agencies. DCSA also took over the ownership and maintenance of OPM legacy systems and DOD legacy systems that support personnel vetting.

DCSA projected that it would deliver all initial capabilities by the end of fiscal year 2023 and decommission all legacy IT systems by the end of fiscal year 2024. However, DOD missed those targets and notified stakeholders in December 2023 that the delay would impose additional costs. In early 2024, DCSA paused the NBIS program and undertook a replanning effort to change its approach to develop and manage the NBIS system. Figure 1 shows a timeline of NBIS delays in development since 2015.

Figure 1: Delays in DOD Development of the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS), Fiscal Years 2015 through 2024



Source: GAO analysis of Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-25-108721

From fiscal years 2017 through 2024, DOD spent \$2.4 billion on developing NBIS and sustaining legacy personnel vetting systems.⁷ This total includes around \$1.1 billion that DOD initially spent to develop the NBIS system. In addition, DOD spent around \$1.3 billion to maintain legacy systems.⁸

DOD Has Revised Its Approach to the NBIS Program


DOD Revised NBIS Program Plans, Oversight, and Engagement with Stakeholders and Users

Since it paused development in early 2024, DOD has revised multiple aspects of its approach for the NBIS program. The new DCSA leadership revised the concept of the NBIS system. DCSA had previously planned to develop an entirely new IT system. As of September 2025, it plans to migrate personnel vetting data to the cloud and modernize the programming code of legacy systems. As of August 2025, DCSA projects that it will modernize legacy systems and decommission legacy data centers by the end of fiscal year 2027. Figure 2 outlines changes to NBIS program management since early 2024.

⁷This total is based on actual amounts in DOD budget justification documents for research, testing, development, and evaluation (RDT&E) and operation and maintenance (O&M). DOD pays for legacy systems by using two funding sources that originated from the transition in 2019 of background investigation functions from OPM to DOD. First, DCSA established a working capital fund in June 2019 to finance personnel vetting activities, such as background investigations. Working capital funds recover costs by charging customers a standard price for a product or service. Second, OPM transferred ownership of legacy IT systems to DCSA in October 2020, but they continue to reside on OPM's network. Under a series of interagency agreements, DCSA will continue to pay OPM for services associated with the legacy systems until they are no longer needed.

⁸DOD is responsible for OPM legacy systems that reside on OPM's network but are maintained by DOD personnel until those legacy systems are replaced by the NBIS system. OPM legacy systems include the Personnel Investigation Processing System (PIPS). DOD also maintains its own legacy systems including the Defense Information System for Security (DISS) and Mirador, which is the DOD system of record for continuous vetting.

Figure 2: DOD Actions to Revise its Approach to the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS) Program Since March 2024



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-25-108721


DOD also revised its approach to overseeing the NBIS program. DOD transferred some authority over the NBIS program to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment in early 2024 as part of its efforts to address NBIS delays, cost overruns, and technical issues.⁹ In addition, DOD established the NBIS Requirements Governance Board (NRGB) in October 2024 to oversee requirements prioritization, assess capabilities, and inform decision-maker review for NBIS. For example, mission owners' representatives gather requirements from users of the NBIS system and communicate these to the NRGB.¹⁰ The DCSA director is a voting member of the NRGB and the NBIS program manager is a non-voting member.

⁹The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment has decision authority for NBIS program milestones. The milestone decision authority is the program decision authority and specifies the decision points and procedures for assigned programs. DOD Instruction 5000.02, *Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework* (Jan. 23, 2020) (incorporating change 1, effective June 8, 2022). The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security serves as the NBIS program sponsor, which approves the Capability Needs Statement, interfaces with the user community, establishes and leads a requirements governance process, and ensures the oversight board conducts value assessments of NBIS capabilities.

¹⁰Mission owners' representatives represent the end-users of the NBIS software system and are responsible for facilitating engagements between their respective mission owner communities.

The NBIS program also revised its approach to engaging with external users of the NBIS system. This includes personnel security managers at 115 federal departments and agencies and around 13,000 organizations across the United States that work with the federal government. For example, beginning in 2025, DCSA has been testing a Personnel Vetting Questionnaire product that will support Trusted Workforce 2.0. Figure 3 depicts the oversight and external stakeholders involved with the NBIS program.

Figure 3: National Background Investigation Services (NBIS) Program Oversight, Program Management, and Stakeholder Organizations



Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. | GAO-25-108721

^aMission owners' representatives represent the end-users of the NBIS software system and are responsible for facilitating engagements between their respective mission owner communities.

DCSA Has Made Progress Implementing GAO's Recommendations

DCSA has made progress addressing recommendations we have made to improve NBIS program stakeholder involvement and cybersecurity. We reported in 2023 that DCSA was engaging its stakeholders, but respondents to our survey of NBIS users at federal agencies and industry organizations reported concerns with transitioning to the new system.¹¹ We recommended that DOD assess and use our survey results to inform its efforts to improve engagement with NBIS stakeholders.

DOD agreed with our recommendation and, in October 2024, DCSA implemented it by incorporating the results of our survey in its NBIS communications plan. Specifically, the plan includes several issues we identified in our survey to improve existing NBIS stakeholder engagement efforts. For example, DCSA discussed efforts to improve transparency, train individuals to use NBIS, acknowledge and incorporate stakeholder

¹¹GAO, *Personnel Vetting: DOD Needs a Reliable Schedule and Cost Estimate for the National Background Investigation Services Program*, [GAO-23-105670](#) (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2023.)

feedback, develop key performance indicators, and conduct quarterly stakeholder updates on NBIS progress.

DOD also has implemented recommendations we made to address NBIS cybersecurity issues. In June 2024, we found that DOD had not fully planned for the cybersecurity of NBIS and legacy background investigations systems and did not fully implement privacy controls. We made 13 recommendations to address these issues and DOD has since implemented them.¹²

We are currently reviewing the extent to which DCSA has implemented cybersecurity controls for selected NBIS systems and legacy background investigation systems. We plan to publish our report later in calendar year 2025 with limited distribution due to the sensitivity of the material covered.

GAO Is Reviewing the Reliability of the NBIS Schedule and Cost Estimate


Separately, we are also reviewing the new NBIS schedule and cost estimate that DOD created in fiscal year 2025. In our prior reviews, we found that DCSA's NBIS schedule and cost estimate minimally met or did not meet our best practices for managing Agile programs and cost estimating (see fig. 4).¹³ While DOD concurred with our recommendation to align the NBIS program to meet our best practices for managing Agile programs and cost estimating, because of prior inaction, we recommended that Congress consider requiring DOD to develop a reliable program schedule and cost estimate for NBIS.¹⁴

¹²GAO, *Personnel Vetting: DOD Needs to Enhance Cybersecurity of Background Investigation Systems*, [GAO-24-106179](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2024).

¹³In 2021 and 2023, we reviewed two versions of the NBIS program's integrated master schedule, and in 2023, we also reviewed the program's cost estimate. In our best practices, "minimally met" means the program provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. For more information, see [GAO-23-105670](#) and [GAO-22-104093](#).

¹⁴Agile methodology is an approach to software development in which software is developed incrementally and is continuously evaluated for functionality, quality, and customer satisfaction. For a discussion of scheduling and cost estimating best practices for Agile software development, see *Agile Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Agile Adoption and Implementation*, [GAO-24-105506](#) (Washington, D.C.: September 2020).

Figure 4: GAO’s Prior Assessment of How NBIS’s Schedule and Cost Estimate Have Met GAO Best Practices



Source: GAO analysis of information for the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS) program. | GAO-25-108721

Note: We assessed the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency’s (DCSA) schedule files as of February 2023 for the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS) program against industry best practices for developing a schedule published in the *GAO Schedule Assessment Guide*. See [GAO-23-105670](#). A high-quality, reliable schedule has four characteristics: it is comprehensive, controlled, credible, and well-constructed. We also assessed DCSA’s cost estimate from 2022 for the NBIS program against best practices for cost estimating published in the *GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide*. A high-quality cost estimate has four characteristics: it is accurate, comprehensive, credible, and well-documented. These best practices are also referenced in the *GAO Agile Assessment Guide* ([GAO-20-590G](#)).

We are currently assessing the reliability of the NBIS program’s 2025 schedule and cost estimate. In our preliminary work assessing the reliability of the program’s schedule, DCSA provided evidence that it is now working primarily with a software tool to track NBIS-related work instead of using an integrated master schedule for the program. DCSA officials believe the program’s current approach to Agile development through this tool meets our best practices. We will be assessing DCSA’s new approach to a program schedule to determine whether it meets our best practices.

Further, our preliminary analysis indicates that DOD has taken some action that is consistent with our best practices for cost estimating. DCSA’s new cost estimate is based on the revised approach for the NBIS program. DCSA estimates that NBIS costs will be \$2.2 billion over the next 7 fiscal years, through 2031. The estimate includes the cost of migrating personnel vetting data to the cloud, modernizing the code of legacy systems, and sustaining all personnel vetting systems. This projected \$2.2 billion in future NBIS costs are in addition to the \$2.4 billion DCSA has already spent on NBIS and the sustainment of legacy personnel vetting systems in the previous 8 fiscal years since 2017. In developing the new cost estimate, DOD conducted an independent cost estimate of the NBIS program, which we have previously noted is a best

Sustained Leadership Is Critical to the Success of NBIS and Trusted Workforce 2.0

practice to verify the accuracy and completeness of Agile software program estimates.

We are currently analyzing data to determine the extent to which DCSA's processes meet our best practices. We expect to report on the reliability of DCSA's NBIS schedule and cost estimate in Spring 2026.

DOD leadership has taken positive steps since 2024 to ensure that the NBIS system is developed to meet Trusted Workforce 2.0 milestones. As we have noted in our past High-Risk reports, the PAC started the reform effort in 2018, planned for it to be complete by fiscal year 2026, but now expects to complete all milestones by around 2028.¹⁵

DCSA leadership has been proactive in addressing challenges with the NBIS program. For example, DCSA paused the NBIS program to revise the approach to software development, program oversight, stakeholder engagement, and other aspects of the program. At the same time, DCSA continued to make progress implementing our recommendations.

However, with the impending departure of the current DCSA director, the agency faces the risk that this positive progress may be disrupted. To mitigate this risk, it will be important for DOD to swiftly appoint a new director with the appropriate qualifications and who is committed to sustaining this progress. DCSA leadership will be critical to the success of NBIS and to avoid further delays and cost overruns.

Sustained leadership by DOD is also critical to addressing concerns raised by NBIS customers and users, especially federal agencies and contractors. For example, agencies that responded to our survey in May 2025 reported that a primary benefit of Trusted Workforce 2.0 is the ability to access real-time information on personnel through continuous vetting, but a third of the agencies stated that NBIS delays were disrupting

¹⁵In our High-Risk reports, we have noted the PAC's commitment to Trusted Workforce 2.0 and have highlighted key practices that agencies should adopt to demonstrate leadership commitment to sustain high-risk efforts. For example, see GAO, *High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness*, [GAO-25-107743](#) (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).

implementation overall.¹⁶ Contractors also reported that IT system inefficiencies—especially those related to NBIS—increased their workloads.

In summary, DOD has taken steps to revise its approach to oversight and management of NBIS. What will remain critical in determining the overall success of NBIS, and with it Trusted Workforce 2.0, will be sustained commitment from leadership. As DOD transitions from the current DCSA director to the appointment of a new one, DOD must continue to prioritize NBIS capabilities that meet customer needs and the success of Trusted Workforce 2.0 reforms to personnel vetting. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing the NBIS program in our ongoing reviews of the NBIS schedule and cost estimate, and related work.

Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Mfume, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Alissa H. Czyz, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, at czyza@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are James P. Klein and Kimberly Seay (Assistant Directors), Parke Nicholson (Analyst in Charge), Dustin Cohan, Victoria Coxon, Emile Ettedgui, Christopher Gezon, Catherine Kane, Kelly Liptan, Jason Lee, Susan Elizabeth Murphy, Alice Paszel, Terry Richardson, Carter Stevens, Daniel Swartz, Anne Thomas, Mary Weiland, Raymond Weyandt, and Erik Wilkins-McKee.

¹⁶We surveyed 45 federal agencies and 626 contractors about Trusted Workforce 2.0 implementation. GAO, *Federal Workforce: Observations on the Implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 Personnel Vetting Reform Initiative*, [GAO-25-107325](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2025). Some of these agencies receive continuous vetting services through a separate IT system owned by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. GAO also has two ongoing reviews of continuous vetting: one examining continuous vetting in the intelligence community and the other examining it across the executive branch.

Related GAO Products

High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness. [GAO-25-107743](#). Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2025.

Personnel Vetting: DOD Needs to Enhance Cybersecurity of Background Investigation Systems [GAO-24-106179](#). Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2024.

Federal Workforce: Actions Needed to Improve the Transfer of Personnel Security Clearances and Other Vetting Determinations [GAO-24-105669](#). Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2024.

Personnel Vetting: DOD Needs a Reliable Schedule and Cost Estimate for the National Background Investigation Services Program. [GAO-23-105670](#). Washington, D.C.: August 17, 2023.

Personnel Vetting: DOD Should Improve Management and Operation of Its Background Investigation Working Capital Fund. [GAO-23-105812](#). Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2023.

High-Risk Series: Efforts Made to Achieve Progress Need to Be Maintained and Expanded to Fully Address All Areas. [GAO-23-106203](#). Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2023.

Personnel Vetting: Actions Needed to Implement Reforms, Address Challenges, and Improve Planning. [GAO-22-104093](#). Washington, D.C.: December 9, 2021.

High Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas. [GAO-21-119SP](#). Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2021.

Federal Management: Selected Reforms Could Be Strengthened by Following Additional Planning, Communication, and Leadership Practices. [GAO-20-322](#). Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2020.

High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater Progress on High-Risk Areas. [GAO-19-157SP](#). Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2019.

Personnel Security Clearances: Additional Actions Needed to Implement Key Reforms and Improve Timely Processing of Investigations. [GAO-18-431T](#). Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2018.

Personnel Security Clearances Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Quality, Address Timeliness, and Reduce Investigation Backlog.

[GAO-18-29](#). Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2017.

Personnel Security Clearances: Plans Needed to Fully Implement and Oversee Continuous Evaluation of Clearance Holders. [GAO-18-117](#).

Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2017.

Information Security: OPM Has Improved Controls, but Further Efforts Are Needed. [GAO-17-614](#). Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2017.

Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Controls over Selected High-Impact Systems. [GAO-16-501](#). Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2016.

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