



March 2023

# HAITI

## USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities

# GAO Highlights

Highlights of [GAO-23-105211](#), a report to congressional requesters

## Why GAO Did This Study

In January 2010, a catastrophic earthquake in Haiti caused physical, social, and economic devastation. More than a decade later, Haiti continues to experience political and social unrest and natural disasters, including another large earthquake that struck the country in August 2021.

USAID provided nearly \$2.3 billion to support reconstruction and development activities in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020. State funded activities to develop the Haitian National Police.

GAO was asked to examine U.S. reconstruction activities in Haiti since 2010. GAO examined the extent to which: (1) USAID infrastructure and development activities achieved intended results; (2) State met its goals to develop the police; and (3) USAID undertook efforts to help build the capacity of Haitian entities to implement reconstruction activities.

GAO reviewed results from evaluations, agency documents, and implementer reports for a nongeneralizable sample of activities selected based on funding. GAO interviewed officials, implementers, and beneficiaries.

## What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that USAID improve its infrastructure planning, tracking, and assessment of results; and better track data on its local partnerships in Haiti and activities to strengthen local organizational capacity. GAO also recommends that State evaluate the effectiveness of its activities to develop the Haitian National Police. USAID and State concurred with the recommendations.

View [GAO-23-105211](#). For more information, contact Latesha Love-Grayer at (202) 512-4409 or [lovegrayerl@gao.gov](mailto:lovegrayerl@gao.gov).

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## What GAO Found

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) completed four of the eight major post-earthquake infrastructure activities that GAO reviewed. Key results included constructing a power plant, building 906 homes, and improving 24 health and public facilities. Two activities are ongoing, including upgrading a port and two health facilities. Two other activities were canceled because costs were higher than initially anticipated. USAID's completed infrastructure activities supported Haiti's recovery—providing shelter, reliable electricity, and improved access to health services. However, due in part to unrealistic initial plans, most infrastructure activities experienced delays, budget increases, and scope reductions. GAO also found gaps in strategic planning and tracking and assessing the results of these activities, affecting management and oversight.

### Progress in Constructing the State University Hospital from June 2014 and May 2021

June 2014

May 2021



Source: GAO (left) and U.S. Agency for International Development (right). | GAO-23-105211

GAO reviewed 29 evaluations, each of which discussed multiple results for USAID development activities. GAO found that across key sectors—economic and food security, governance, and health—at least half of the results were successful and at least one-third were unsuccessful. For example, under governance, evaluations indicated that an activity improved property tax systems and another activity fell short in strengthening judicial oversight.

The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs activities to develop the Haitian National Police achieved mixed results. The results that implementers reported for these activities usually focused on outputs, such as the number of trainings provided. However, State has not evaluated the outcomes of these activities, such as improvements to investigative capacity, limiting information about their overall effectiveness.

USAID has taken steps to strengthen the organizational capacity of local organizations in Haiti so that they can manage USAID awards. However, local entities secure limited USAID funding, due in part to capacity limitations, according to officials. The USAID mission in Haiti does not fully track data on its local partnerships, or its activities to strengthen local organizational capacity, which limits institutional knowledge about these efforts and understanding of results and lessons learned to inform future activities.

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## Abbreviations

HNP	Haitian National Police
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HHIP	Haiti Health Infrastructure Program
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
PPR	Performance Plan and Report
SSQH	Services de Santé de Qualité pour Haïti
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID/Haiti	U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Haiti
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

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March 16, 2023

The Honorable Hakeem Jeffries  
Minority Leader  
House of Representatives

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
House of Representatives

On January 12, 2010, a catastrophic earthquake struck near Haiti’s capital, causing physical, social, and economic devastation to the country. The earthquake is estimated to have killed more than 220,000 people, injured more than 300,000, and displaced about 2 million from their homes, according to the World Bank Group.<sup>1</sup> More than a decade later, Haiti is struggling to recover. The country has continued to experience additional challenges since the earthquake, including political unrest, gang violence, and natural disasters, including a magnitude 7.2 earthquake that struck the southwestern part of the country in August 2021. These challenges have further weakened the country’s already fragile economic, social, and political institutions.

The United States has provided assistance in Haiti to help with reconstruction and development after the 2010 earthquake. Congress appropriated \$1.2 billion in supplemental funding for Haiti reconstruction, \$918 million of which it appropriated to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State.<sup>2</sup> In addition, USAID and State have allocated funding from their annual appropriations since

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<sup>1</sup>World Bank Group, *Haiti Earthquake PDNA (Post-Disaster Needs Assessment): Assessment of Damage, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs* (Washington, D.C.: 2010).

<sup>2</sup>Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, 124 Stat. 2302, 2323 (2010). The Act also appropriated \$219.8 million to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) for bilateral reconstruction activities and for debt relief. As authorized by the Act, Treasury provided an additional \$33.4 million for debt relief to Haiti in February 2012. In the Act, Congress also made funds available to GAO to monitor U.S. post-earthquake assistance to Haiti.

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the earthquake for reconstruction and development activities in Haiti.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, from fiscal years 2010 through 2020, USAID has provided nearly \$2.3 billion to support infrastructure activities focused on constructing, rehabilitating, operating, or maintaining buildings or physical systems as well as for noninfrastructure development activities focused on achieving economic growth and long-term stability.<sup>4</sup> State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has funded activities to support the development of the Haitian National Police (HNP).

As in other countries, USAID and State award funding to implementing partners to carry out activities and perform various functions in Haiti.<sup>5</sup> These entities may have headquarters based in the United States, in Haiti, in other countries, or in multiple countries (that is, multilateral organizations), and play an important role in the execution of humanitarian, development, and security activities. In particular, we have reported on the important role that local Haitian organizations can play in supporting, maintaining, and managing USAID activities in Haiti to ensure their sustainability.<sup>6</sup>

We have issued multiple reports on U.S. assistance in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake, examining oversight of U.S. reconstruction assistance,

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<sup>3</sup>We define an activity as an individual award with an implementing partner, with another U.S. government department or agency, another donor, or with a partner-country government, except when we grouped infrastructure awards that contributed to a common goal, such as the construction, rehabilitation, operation, or maintenance of infrastructure, such as a building or physical system at one or more sites. In general, our groupings of infrastructure activities were consistent with the sampling strategy used for our prior work on Haiti reconstruction. See appendix I for further details on our methodology for grouping awards into activities.

<sup>4</sup>We define development activities as activities that were not focused solely on constructing or rehabilitating physical systems or buildings.

<sup>5</sup>For this report, we focus on primary implementing partners that receive funding directly from USAID and State to implement reconstruction activities in Haiti. According to USAID guidance, a primary implementing partner may enter into a subaward that provides funds to another organization, including an organization based outside the United States, a government entity in a partner country, or a multilateral organization, if certain conditions are met. According to INL officials, INL has not funded local Haitian entities as primary implementing partners and has not provided assistance to help build the capacity of local entities to support the development of the HNP, although INL's prime implementing partners have relied on local organizations for supplies and services.

<sup>6</sup>See GAO, *Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed Results and Face Sustainability Challenges*, [GAO-13-558](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2013); and *Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Has Achieved Mixed Results and Should Enhance Sustainability Planning*, [GAO-15-517](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2015).

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USAID's progress in implementing activities, and efforts to ensure the sustainability of USAID projects in Haiti. You asked us to update our prior work on the status of select USAID reconstruction activities in Haiti, including a review of the nature and results of U.S. foreign assistance in Haiti from 2010 through 2020.

In this report, we examine the extent to which (1) selected USAID infrastructure activities in Haiti achieved intended results from fiscal years 2010 through 2020, and what is known about the effects of the 2021 earthquake on those activities; (2) selected USAID development activities in Haiti achieved intended results during the period, and what is known about the effects of the 2021 earthquake on those activities; (3) State met its goals to develop the HNP; and (4) USAID undertook efforts to help build the capacity of Haitian entities to implement reconstruction activities in Haiti.

To examine the extent to which selected USAID infrastructure activities in Haiti achieved intended results from fiscal years 2010 through 2020, and the effects of the 2021 earthquake on those activities, we reviewed information about progress for eight major infrastructure activities included in a nongeneralizable sample of USAID-funded reconstruction activities in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020.<sup>7</sup> We compared documentation of progress with USAID plans and interviewed USAID officials and implementing partners to learn about progress for each selected activity.<sup>8</sup> We did not travel to Haiti and conducted all meetings by video or teleconference due to the COVID-19 pandemic and travel restrictions because of security concerns in the country.

To examine the extent that selected USAID development activities in Haiti achieved their intended results, we reviewed evaluations of development activities in Haiti for fiscal years 2010 through 2020. To learn about the factors that affected development results, including the effects of the 2021 earthquake on those activities, we reviewed implementing partner progress reports for 42 development activities included in our sample of reconstruction activities in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020. We also interviewed USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and in Haiti, and

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<sup>7</sup>These selected reconstruction activities included eight infrastructure and 42 development activities in Haiti for which USAID obligated at least \$10 million as of September 30, 2020, or which we selected for our prior work on Haiti reconstruction.

<sup>8</sup>These selected reconstruction activities included completed and ongoing activities as of September 30, 2020. As a result, our review of ongoing reconstruction activities included information about the progress and results of these activities as of 2022.

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implementing partners and available beneficiaries of seven of the 42 selected development activities that were ongoing at the time about activity results and factors affecting the achievement of results.

To examine the extent to which State met its goals to develop the HNP, we reviewed progress reports and other documents from implementing partners. We also interviewed INL officials, implementing partners, and HNP officers to examine results and the factors that affected the achievement of results for activities that focused on the development of the HNP.<sup>9</sup> In addition, we reviewed INL bureau evaluation plans and interviewed INL officials in Washington, D.C., and in Haiti to determine the extent to which INL evaluated its activities supporting the development of the HNP and its evaluation plans for these activities. We also reviewed State's evaluation policy and INL implementation guidance for the policy, and interviewed INL officials to determine evaluation requirements applicable to these activities.<sup>10</sup>

To examine the extent of USAID's efforts to help build the organizational capacity of Haitian entities to implement reconstruction activities in Haiti, we reviewed documentation and interviewed USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and in Haiti about such efforts.<sup>11</sup> In addition, we analyzed USAID data and reviewed documents of USAID-funded activities in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020 to identify activities that provided organizational capacity-building assistance to local Haitian

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<sup>9</sup>Because our review focused on INL activities to develop the HNP workforce, we excluded from our analysis other activities that INL funded in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020 that focused on the construction and rehabilitation of HNP infrastructure, including police stations, HNP academy buildings, and corrections infrastructure. In addition, we excluded from our analysis INL activities focused on peacekeeping support to the United Nations mission in Haiti and justice sector support to the Haitian judicial system and civil society organizations.

<sup>10</sup>See Department of State, 18 Foreign Affairs Manual 301.4, *Department of State Program and Project Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation*; Department of State, *Guidance for the Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy at the Department of State* (January 2019); and Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *INL Implementation Guidance for the Department's Evaluation Policy* (June 2021).

<sup>11</sup>For this report, we define organizational capacity building as activities intended to develop skills within the organization itself, including skills necessary to independently and appropriately manage USAID or other donor funding and programs. Organizational capacity building activities may include strengthening an organization's governance, administration, human resources, financial management, organizational management, program management, and project performance management. Organizational capacity building differs from technical capacity building, which focuses on improving skills related to a specialized field, such as agriculture, education, or health.

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entities. We interviewed officials at the USAID mission in Haiti (USAID/Haiti) about these activities and their processes for tracking and analyzing data on local partnerships and organizational capacity-building activities. We then reviewed progress reports and the one evaluation conducted to date that examined USAID/Haiti's organizational capacity-building assistance and interviewed USAID officials, implementing partners, and representatives of Haitian organizations that received capacity-building assistance to determine the results of the assistance and factors affecting the results. Finally, we reviewed USAID and USAID/Haiti strategies and policies related to local partnership and organizational capacity building and analyzed performance data to determine the success of USAID/Haiti's efforts to strengthen the organizational capacity of Haitian entities and increase local partnership.

For each objective, we reviewed documentation and conducted interviews with knowledgeable officials to assess the reliability of the data. We determined that the information and data we used from activity documentation were sufficiently reliable for reporting on the results and factors affecting the results of selected USAID reconstruction activities and INL activities to develop the HNP, and for describing the USAID/Haiti-funded activities in local organizational capacity building that we identified and examples of their reported results. We found limitations to the completeness and consistency of the data USAID/Haiti collects on its local partnerships and organizational capacity-building activities, as discussed later in the report. For more information about our scope and methodology, see appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2021 to March 2023 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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## Background

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### Development Challenges in Haiti

Haiti is still recovering from the January 2010 earthquake, and subsequent disasters have devastated regions of the country. Following the earthquake, Haiti suffered from one of the largest cholera outbreaks in history, which lasted from 2010 to 2019 and caused nearly 10,000

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deaths, according to the World Health Organization.<sup>12</sup> In October 2016, Hurricane Matthew caused damage estimated at almost one-third of Haiti's gross domestic product (GDP) at the time, and caused approximately \$600 million in losses to the country's agricultural, livestock, and fishing sectors.<sup>13</sup> A 2-year drought, compounded by the hurricane, largely destroyed Haiti's food supply. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the provision of medical services in Haiti's health care institutions, constraining access to infant and child health care services and routine immunizations.<sup>14</sup> In August 2021, a magnitude 7.2 earthquake struck southwestern Haiti. The earthquake is estimated to have caused more than 2,200 deaths and 12,200 injuries, and damaged or destroyed approximately 130,000 homes.<sup>15</sup> The effects of the earthquake exacerbated Haiti's humanitarian needs resulting from an ongoing food security crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Weak governance has posed further challenges in Haiti. USAID has noted that government institutions in Haiti have been under-resourced and provided limited services to a small percentage of the population. From 2012 through 2022, Transparency International also ranked Haiti among countries with the highest perceived levels of corruption.<sup>16</sup>

Haiti has also experienced periods of political instability and social unrest since the earthquake. In February 2017, Haiti inaugurated President Jovenel Moïse, after the country had been without an elected president during the prior year because of delayed elections and political gridlock.

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<sup>12</sup>For more information about efforts to respond to the 2010-2019 cholera outbreak in Haiti, see: "World Health Organization—towards cholera elimination in Haiti," accessed Feb. 21, 2023, <http://open.who.int/2018-19/country/HTI>.

<sup>13</sup>Congressional Research Service, *Haiti's Political and Economic Conditions* (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2020).

<sup>14</sup>U.S. Agency for International Development, *Haiti—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year 2020* (Sept. 30, 2020).

<sup>15</sup>U.S. Agency for International Development, *Haiti—Earthquake Fact Sheet #11, Fiscal Year 2021* (Sept. 7, 2021).

<sup>16</sup>Transparency International's annual Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and business people. The index uses a scale of zero to 100, where zero indicates a high perceived level of corruption. From 2012 through 2022, Haiti ranked among the 25 most corrupt countries and its perceived corruption scores ranged from 17 to 22. For more information about the Corruption Perceptions Index, see Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index 2022* (Berlin, Germany: January 2023).

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Haiti experienced growing instability during the Moïse administration with high rates of inflation, gang violence, and continuing social unrest due to poverty, lack of job opportunities, and growing public calls for an end to corruption.<sup>17</sup> As political gridlock continued, Haiti did not hold parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2019, and since January 2020, the country has had no functioning legislature.<sup>18</sup> Without an elected legislature, President Moïse ruled by decree, outside of constitutional norms, according to United Nations reports. Some opposition groups called for President Moïse's resignation and United Nations and U.S. officials encouraged Haiti to hold overdue legislative and municipal elections as soon as possible.<sup>19</sup>

Then on July 7, 2021, armed assailants assassinated President Moïse, leading to further political instability and gang conflict. According to the United Nations, following the assassination, gangs have challenged the Haitian government's authority under Prime Minister Ariel Henry who assumed office in July 2021. Gangs have also committed violence on the general population and engaged in kidnappings for ransom. In February 2022, the United Nations reported that kidnappings and homicides had increased by 180 percent and 17 percent, respectively, compared with 2020.<sup>20</sup>

Disasters, political instability, and insecurity have hindered Haiti's economic and social development. Past marginal gains in poverty reduction have been affected by this succession of crises. Although Haiti's economy was contracting and facing significant fiscal imbalances before the COVID-19 pandemic, the pandemic triggered an even greater economic downturn. In 2020, Haiti's GDP contracted by 3.3 percent and, in 2021, by an estimated 1.8 percent, according to the World Bank. The World Bank further reported that, in 2021, Haiti had a GDP per capita of

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<sup>17</sup>Congressional Research Service, *Haiti's Political and Economic Conditions* (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2020).

<sup>18</sup>Congressional Research Service, *Haiti's Political and Economic Conditions* (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2020).

<sup>19</sup>Congressional Research Service, *Haiti: Concerns after the Presidential Assassination* (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 19, 2021).

<sup>20</sup>United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Feb. 15 2022).

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\$1,815—the lowest in the Latin America and Caribbean region—and a poverty rate of about 52 percent.<sup>21</sup>

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## U.S. Assistance in Haiti

After the 2010 earthquake and subsequent disasters in Haiti, U.S. agencies, including USAID, have taken part in international humanitarian efforts such as providing food aid, medical assistance, and temporary shelter. USAID and State have led longer-term U.S. efforts to help Haiti reconstruct infrastructure damaged by the 2010 earthquake and to achieve economic growth and stability through development activities.

In January 2011, the U.S. government issued the *Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity* to guide U.S. reconstruction efforts. The U.S. strategy identified assistance in eight sectors: economic security, education, energy, food security, governance and rule of law, health and disabilities, ports, and shelter.<sup>22</sup> To support the 2011 strategy, USAID focused its reconstruction activities in each of the assistance sectors.

USAID's reconstruction activities in the assistance sectors have encompassed both infrastructure and noninfrastructure activities. USAID's infrastructure activities have supported the energy, economic and food security, health and disabilities, ports, and shelter sectors. These infrastructure activities focused on the construction, rehabilitation, operation, or maintenance of physical systems or buildings. USAID's noninfrastructure development activities have supported the economic and food security, health and disabilities, education, and governance and rule of law sectors. These development activities aim to achieve economic growth and long-term stability. INL activities have supported the governance and rule of law sector, focusing on the development of the HNP through trainings, advisory support, and the provision of equipment.

In 2018, State and USAID replaced the 2011 *Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy* with State's *Integrated Country Strategy* (ICS) for Haiti and the *USAID/Haiti Strategic Framework: 2018-2020* and the *USAID/Haiti*

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<sup>21</sup>For more data and information about Haiti's economic conditions, see "The World Bank in Haiti—Overview" (World Bank, accessed Sept. 27, 2022, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview>).

<sup>22</sup>For this review, we use these assistance sectors as a framework for our reporting on reconstruction activities, combining economic and food security into one sector because the *USAID/Haiti Strategic Framework: 2018-2020* that replaced the 2011 strategy presented them as a single development objective.

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*Strategic Framework: 2020-2024* to guide State and USAID’s assistance in Haiti.<sup>23</sup>

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## U.S. Efforts to Increase Partnership with Haitian Organizations

USAID and the USAID/Haiti mission, in particular, have sought to increase both partnership with local entities to implement activities and the effectiveness and sustainability of their foreign assistance. Since at least 2010, USAID has undertaken agency-wide initiatives to provide funding directly to partner-country organizations. In 2010, USAID established the Local Solutions initiative to increase the emphasis on providing funding directly to partner-country government entities and local non-profit and for-profit organizations rather than implementing programs through U.S.-based and multilateral organizations.<sup>24</sup>

In 2019, USAID established the New Partnerships Initiative to diversify its partner base by directing awards and subawards to new and underutilized organizations to enable local engagement. This initiative also sought to leverage private and non-U.S. government funding to promote local engagement and reform the agency’s procurement process to facilitate the participation of new and local partners.

In November 2021, the USAID Administrator also announced two targets to further promote the agency’s investment in local partners. First, local partners would directly receive at least a quarter of USAID’s development funds within the next 4 years. Second, local communities would lead the

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<sup>23</sup>The objectives of the ICS and the *USAID/Haiti Strategic Framework* generally correspond with the assistance sectors of the prior *Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy*. In August 2018, State issued its most recent ICS for Haiti, which State updated in February 2021 and March 2022. The three ICS objectives include supporting Haitian-led efforts to (1) restore and maintain security; (2) strengthen democratic governance; and (3) promote inclusive economic growth, educational opportunities, and healthcare to drive economic growth, reduce poverty, reduce irregular migration, and increase national self-reliance. The four development objectives of the *USAID/Haiti Strategic Framework: 2018-2020* include (1) improving the independence and accountability of Haitian government institutions, (2) advancing economic and food security, (3) improving health outcomes, and (4) improving education outcomes. In December 2020, USAID/Haiti issued an updated *USAID/Haiti Strategic Framework: 2020-2024*. The three development objectives of the updated strategic framework include (1) building a Haiti that is more resilient to environmental, political, and economic shocks and stresses; (2) advancing more inclusive, locally driven economic growth and social development; and (3) promoting governance that is more responsive to citizens’ needs.

<sup>24</sup>See GAO, *Foreign Aid: USAID Has Increased Funding to Partner-Country Organizations but Could Better Track Progress*, [GAO-14-355](#) (Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2014); *Foreign Aid: USAID Has Taken Steps to Safeguard Government-to-Government Funding but Could Further Strengthen Accountability*, [GAO-15-377](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2015).

planning, implementation, or evaluation for half of all agency funding by the end of the decade.<sup>25</sup> Additionally, the USAID/Haiti mission’s strategic frameworks have noted the importance of working with local organizations to support their participation in Haiti’s development and decrease dependency on foreign assistance.

Despite USAID’s efforts to increase partnership with local entities to manage its funding, we previously reported that U.S.-based partners have implemented the majority of USAID’s reconstruction activities in Haiti and have received most of the funding obligated for these activities in fiscal years 2010 through 2020. As we reported in 2021, USAID provided funding for 440 reconstruction activities in Haiti in fiscal years 2010 through 2020, 269 (61 percent) of which U.S.-based partners implemented, and 117 (27 percent) of which Haiti-based partners implemented (see table 1).<sup>26</sup>

USAID’s total obligations for each activity implemented by Haiti-based partners were generally smaller than its total obligations for each activity implemented by non-Haiti-based partners. For example, we previously reported that the median total obligation for activities implemented by Haiti-based partners was about \$350,000, while the total median obligation for activities implemented by multilateral organizations, U.S.-based partners, and partners based in a country other than the United States or Haiti ranged from \$1.8 million to \$2.9 million.<sup>27</sup>

**Table 1: Numbers of Implementing Partners and USAID Reconstruction Activities in Haiti, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2020, by Category of Implementing Partner**

Category of implementing partner	Number of implementing partners	Number of activities
U.S.-based partners	134 (57%)	269 (61%)
Haiti-based partners	82 (35%)	117 (27%)
Multilateral organizations	11 (5%)	41 (9%)

<sup>25</sup>The extent to which each USAID mission will contribute toward these two agency-wide targets will vary, according to USAID officials.

<sup>26</sup>See *GAO Haiti: USAID Funding for Reconstruction and Development Activities since the 2010 Earthquake*, [GAO-21-263](#) (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2021).

<sup>27</sup>See [GAO-21-263](#).

Category of implementing partner	Number of implementing partners	Number of activities
Partners based in another country <sup>a</sup>	10 (4%)	13 (3%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>440</b>

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) data. | GAO-23-105211

Notes: The data shown are as of September 30, 2020. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Data shown exclude 137 activities, which consisted solely of administration or of monitoring and evaluation because they did not provide technical assistance related to an assistance sector.

<sup>a</sup>The implementing partner was based in a country other than the United States or Haiti.

## Selected Infrastructure Activities Experienced Delays, Cost Increases, and Scope Changes and Had Gaps in Planning and Tracking

While USAID/Haiti’s infrastructure activities supported Haiti’s recovery—providing shelter, reliable electricity, and improved access to health services—most of the activities we reviewed did not achieve the planned results set out in USAID’s 2011 Haiti infrastructure planning documents. Most of these activities were delayed and over budget, and many underwent scope reductions or changes, in part because some of the initial 2011 plans were overly ambitious. USAID/Haiti has updated the scopes, costs, and time frames for these activities in response to better quality information, but it has not documented these changes in its current strategic plans, and does not completely and consistently track and assess results on infrastructure activities. In August 2021, during the course of our audit work, Haiti was also affected by another significant earthquake. However, the earthquake did not significantly affect most of the selected infrastructure activities we reviewed, according to officials. The exception was small damage, such as cracks in the walls, sustained at two clinics the mission renovated.

## USAID/Haiti Completed Half of Selected Infrastructure Activities with Numerous Changes to Planned Scopes, Costs, or Time Frames

As of September 2022, USAID/Haiti had completed four of the eight selected major infrastructure activities we reviewed across five infrastructure sectors—energy, economic and food security, health and disabilities, shelter, and ports. By this date, two of the eight selected infrastructure activities were still ongoing, and USAID/Haiti had canceled

the remaining two selected activities, primarily due to higher costs than USAID/Haiti initially anticipated.<sup>28</sup>

Most of the infrastructure activities that we reviewed did not achieve planned results—scopes, costs, and time frames—as outlined in USAID/Haiti’s 2011 planning documents.<sup>29</sup> For example, USAID/Haiti reduced the number of houses and plots it originally planned to complete by more than 75 percent. It also increased funding for the State University Hospital<sup>30</sup> by \$10 million and nearly doubled its planned funding and time frames for operating and maintaining the Caracol Industrial Park Power Plant. See table 2 for the status of the selected infrastructure activities and components that we compared with 2011 planning documents as of September 2022.

**Table 2: Status of All Selected USAID Infrastructure Activities in Haiti as of September 2022, by Sector, Based on 2011 Planning Documents**

Sector	Selected Activity/Component	Status as of September 2022	Within budget based on 2011 plans	On time based on 2011 plans	Implemented intended scope based on 2011 plans
Energy	1. Caracol Industrial Park Power Plant	Completed	✓	X	✓
	Design and Construction	Completed	✓	✓	✓
	Expansion	Canceled	—	—	X
	Operations, Maintenance, and Distribution	Completed	X	X	✓
	2. Electrical Substations Rehabilitation	Completed	X	X	✓
Economic and Food Security	3. Rural Roads Rehabilitation	Canceled	—	—	X

<sup>28</sup>USAID funded some infrastructure activities using multiple awards and partners. In defining what constituted an activity, we grouped awards contributing to a common infrastructure goal whose sole purpose was the construction, rehabilitation, or operation and maintenance of infrastructure (such as a building, physical system, or set of buildings or physical systems) at one or more sites. Our activity groupings are generally consistent with how we grouped activities for [GAO-15-517](#). For example, we grouped multiple awards in the energy sector that contributed to the construction, operation, and maintenance of one power plant. We then use the term “component” when discussing the portions of the broader activity.

<sup>29</sup>We were unable to determine the extent to which some activities and components met planned results—scopes, costs, or time frames—because either USAID’s 2011 planning documents did not include planned results for that activity, or because USAID/Haiti was unable to locate documentation with planned or final results information.

<sup>30</sup>The State University Hospital is also known as the General Hospital and the L’Hôpital Universitaire d’Etat d’Haiti.

Sector	Selected Activity/Component	Status as of September 2022	Within budget based on 2011 plans	On time based on 2011 plans	Implemented intended scope based on 2011 plans
Health and Disabilities	4. Haiti Health Infrastructure Program	Ongoing	X	X	N/A
	Architecture, Engineering, and Construction Management	Completed	N/A	X	N/A
	State University Hospital Reconstruction	Ongoing	N/A	X	N/A
	National Campus for Health Sciences Reconstruction	Completed	N/A	X	N/A
	Various Health and Public Facilities Renovation	Ongoing	N/A	X	N/A
	Justinian University Hospital Pediatric Clinic Renovation	Completed	N/A	X	N/A
Ports	5. New Port in the Cap-Haïtien Corridor Construction	Canceled	—	—	X
	6. Cap-Haïtien Port Rehabilitation	Ongoing	X	X	N/A
Shelter	7. New Settlements Program	Completed	X	X	X
	Housing, Community Infrastructure, and Plots Construction	Completed	X	X	X
	Housing and Community Infrastructure Repairs	Completed	N/A	N/A	N/A
	8. Retaining Wall Construction	Completed	N/A	N/A	N/A

Legend: N/A= Data not available because USAID/Haiti's 2011 planning documents did not include a budget, time frame, or scope for that item, USAID was unable to provide final results information for the item, or the activity or component was ongoing.

— =Results data is not available because the activity or component was canceled.

✓= Achieved planned budget, end date, or scope

X= Did not achieve planned budget, end date, or scope

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID) data. | GAO-23-105211

Notes: Infrastructure activities may include one or more awards contributing to a common goal, such as the design, construction, or maintenance of an infrastructure site or set of similar infrastructure sites. Our groupings of infrastructure activities, and components that make up these activities, is generally consistent with prior GAO reports.

USAID's 2011 strategic plan for the health and disabilities sector did not specify the planned budgets or scopes for the components of the Haiti Health Infrastructure Program, because, according to the plans, USAID was still coordinating with the Government of Haiti and other donors to determine what specific actions the U.S. would pursue to best support health reconstruction efforts in Haiti.

## Energy

We reviewed two infrastructure activities in the energy sector—the Caracol Industrial Park Power Plant and the rehabilitation of five electrical substations. Figure 1 shows planned results and the status of these two activities as of September 2022.

**Figure 1: Planned Results and Status of Selected USAID Energy Activities in Haiti, as of September 2022**

Selected Infrastructure Activities: Energy Sector		
Caracol Industrial Park Power Plant		
Status	Planned Results as of September 2011 <sup>a</sup>	Results as of September 2022
<b>Design and Construction</b>		
<b>Completed</b>	Build 10MW capacity facility.  <b>Planned Allocation:</b> \$20.6 Million <b>Planned End Date:</b> July 2013	Built 10MW capacity facility, which remained in good condition as of January 2022.  <b>Obligation:</b> \$18.3 Million <b>End Date:</b> June 2012
<b>Expansion</b>		
<b>Canceled</b>	Expand capacity to 25 MW.  <b>Planned Allocation:</b> \$36 Million <b>Planned End Date:</b> April 2014	Canceled due to insufficient demand.  <b>Obligation:</b> N/A <b>End Date:</b> N/A
<b>Operations, Maintenance, and Distribution</b>		
<b>Completed</b>	Provide operations and maintenance for 5 years and establish up to 30,000 residential connections to the grid.  <b>Planned Allocation:</b> \$27 Million <b>Planned End Date:</b> September 2016	Provided operations and maintenance for about 9 years, servicing about 14,000 customers as of January 2022.  <b>Obligation:</b> \$55.6 Million <b>End Date:</b> January 2022
<b>Electrical Substations Rehabilitation</b>		
Status	Planned Results as of September 2011 <sup>a</sup>	Results as of September 2022
<b>Completed</b>	Rehabilitate 5 electrical substations in the Port-au-Prince area.  <b>Planned Allocation:</b> \$13 Million <b>Planned End Date:</b> August 2012	Rehabilitated 5 electrical substations as planned, and handed over to Haitian government. One substation is no longer functioning.  <b>Obligation:</b> \$15.2 Million <b>End Date:</b> April 2013
<b>The Caracol Industrial Park Power Plant, June 2014.</b> 		<b>The Caracol Industrial Park Power Plant, June 2021.</b> 

Legend: N/A= not available because the activity was canceled.

Source: Data: GAO analysis of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) data. Images: June 2014 GAO. June 2021: USAID. | GAO-23-105211

Notes: Infrastructure activities may include one or more awards contributing to a common goal, such as the design, construction, or maintenance of an infrastructure site or set of similar infrastructure sites. For the Caracol Industrial Park Power Plant activity, we reported on three major components of the activity, consistent with how we reported this activity in prior GAO reports.

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We used allocations to describe planned funding, including planned funding amounts reported in USAID/Haiti's 2011 initial planning documents. We used more precise obligations data for activities completed by September 2020. For activities that were ongoing as of September 2020, we added obligation data reported as of September 2020, and additional planned allocation estimates that USAID/Haiti officials projected they had spent or would spend on the activity after September 2020.

<sup>a</sup>USAID's initial plan for this sector was finalized in September 2011.

**Caracol Industrial Park Power Plant (Completed, \$73.9 million):**

Through this activity, USAID/Haiti constructed, operated, and maintained a power plant to support businesses and residents in and around the Caracol Industrial Park. USAID/Haiti completed construction early and under budget, but as of September 2022, it had decided to cancel expansion plans and had funded operations, maintenance, and distribution for longer and for more money than initially planned.

- **Construction:** USAID/Haiti designed and constructed this 10 megawatt capacity power plant 1 year earlier than anticipated for \$2.3 million (11 percent) less than the planned budget. As of 2022, officials said the infrastructure remains in good condition.
- **Expansion:** USAID/Haiti canceled plans to expand the power plant's capacity from 10 megawatts to at least 25 megawatts in September 2014, because officials said that energy demand at the power plant was lower than expected and it no longer warranted an expansion. USAID/Haiti is instead pursuing plans to enhance the plant's renewable energy capabilities, including a \$6.5 million grant to install 12 megawatts of solar energy capabilities, expected to be complete by August 2024.
- **Operations, Maintenance, and Distribution:** USAID/Haiti funded the operation, maintenance, and energy distribution of the power plant for 5 years longer and \$28.6 million (106 percent) more than planned due in part to a lack of policy changes and reforms needed to secure a private operator and concerns over the Haitian energy utility's capacity to assume these responsibilities. According to the implementing partner's final report published in February 2022, the power plant was the most reliable in Haiti, serving nearly 14,000 customers, with electricity available 99 percent of the time on average.

**Electrical Substations Rehabilitation (Completed April 2013, \$15.2 million):**

USAID/Haiti funded the rehabilitation of five electrical substations, which took 8 months longer than planned and exceeded initial cost estimates by about \$2.2 million (17 percent) due to additional work required at one substation and design changes requested by the Haitian government. The Haitian government assumed full responsibility

for these substations following project completion in 2013, according to USAID/Haiti officials. While taking photographs for this report, USAID/Haiti officials observed that many of the substations appeared operational and in good condition, with the exception of one substation that appeared to be non-functioning (see fig. 2). USAID/Haiti officials said they could not explain why the equipment at this site was not functioning, because they are not responsible for monitoring, operations, or maintenance of the site.

**Figure 2: Condition of Functioning and Non-Functioning USAID-Funded Electrical Substations in June 2022**

**Functioning Canapé-Vert EDH Electrical Substation**



**Non-Functioning Electrical Substation at Nouveau Delmas**



Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. | GAO-23-105211

Note: The top row of photographs show the power transformer, which facilitates high voltage operation of the electrical network (left), and the high voltage circuit breaker to switch the network on and off (right), according to U.S. Agency for International Development/Haiti officials. Officials said the bottom row of photographs show inductive voltage transformers (left) and circuit breakers (right), which were non-functioning. USAID/Haiti handed these substations over to the Government of Haiti, and is therefore not responsible for the infrastructure's operations and maintenance, according to mission officials.

Economic and Food Security

We reviewed one activity in the economic and food security sector that intended to rehabilitate rural roads, which USAID has since canceled. Figure 3 shows the planned results of the activity and its status as of September 2022.

**Figure 3: Planned Results and Status of Selected USAID Economic and Food Security Activities in Haiti, as of September 2022**

Selected Infrastructure Activities: Economic and Food Security Sector		
Rural Road Rehabilitation		
Status	Planned Results as of August 2011 <sup>a</sup>	Results as of September 2022
Canceled	Rehabilitation of roads in the Cap-Haïtien, Port-au-Prince, and St-Marc corridors, but no specific targets established.  Planned Allocation: \$108.6 million Planned End Date: Not established	Activity canceled due to higher than anticipated costs and changes in program priorities.  Obligation: \$1 million for pre-construction work. End Date: N/A

Legend: N/A= not available because the activity was canceled.

Source: Data: GAO analysis of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) data. | GAO-23-105211

Note: We used allocations to describe planned funding, including planned funding amounts reported in USAID/Haiti's 2011 initial planning documents. We used more precise obligations data for activities completed by September 2020.

<sup>a</sup>USAID's initial plan for this sector was finalized in August 2011.

**Rural Roads Rehabilitation (Canceled, \$1 million):** USAID/Haiti initially planned to spend about \$108 million to construct and repair an undefined number of roads to increase farmers' access to local markets. In 2014, USAID/Haiti reduced the budget to \$28.2 million—or \$80 million less than originally planned, due to shifting priorities, and contracted with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to assist with pre-construction activities, including cost estimates, design work, and environmental assessments. Based on initial assessments completed in May 2014, USACE determined the activity would far exceed the reduced budget. After attempts by USAID/Haiti and USACE to reduce the scope to fit the budget, the mission ultimately canceled the activity in September 2015, after spending about 1.5 years and roughly \$1 million on pre-construction work.

Health and Disabilities

We reviewed one infrastructure activity in the health and disabilities sector, the Haiti Health Infrastructure Program (HHIP), which consisted of a number of components aimed at designing, constructing, and rehabilitating several buildings to improve health facilities and access for people with disabilities. Figure 4 shows planned results and status of the activity and components as of September 2022.

**Figure 4: Planned Results and Status of Selected USAID Health and Disabilities Activities in Haiti, as of September 2022**

Selected Infrastructure Activities: Health and Disabilities Sector				
Haiti Health Infrastructure Program (HHIP)				
Status	Planned Results as of April 2011 <sup>a</sup>		Results as of September 2022	
Ongoing	Reconstruct the State University Hospital and other unidentified damaged health infrastructure.  Planned Allocation: \$60.3 million Planned End Date: March 2014		Completed renovation of the National Campus for Health Sciences, Justinian University Hospital Pediatric Clinic, and at least 23 other health and public facilities. Reconstruction at the State University Hospital in progress and upgrades at one clinic planned.  Obligations and Planned Allocations: \$89 million End Date: June 2024	
	Components	End Date	Obligations and Planned Allocations	Results as of September 2022
Completed	Architecture, Engineering, and Construction Management	March 2018	\$18.9 Million	Provided various levels of design, engineering, construction management, and quality assurance support across the HHIP.
Ongoing	State University Hospital Reconstruction	June 2023	\$31.4 Million	About 90 percent finished constructing one of Haiti's primary hospitals and health training facilities.
Completed	National Campus for Health Sciences Construction	March 2018	\$21.7 Million	Constructed new health science campus facilities, including classrooms, library, and laboratories.
Ongoing	Various Health and Public Facilities Renovations	June 2024	\$12.2 Million	Renovated at least 23 health clinics and public facilities, with at least one more planned.
Completed	Justinian University Hospital Pediatrics Clinic	October 2017	\$4.8 Million	Renovated a 75-bed facility servicing infants and children.
		State University Hospital construction, June 2014	State University Hospital construction, May 2021	
				

Source: Data: GAO analysis of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) data. Images: June 2014: GAO. May 2021: USAID. | GAO-23-105211

Notes: Infrastructure activities may include one or more awards contributing to a common goal, such as the design, construction, or maintenance of an infrastructure site or set of similar infrastructure sites. Consistent with prior GAO reports, we reported on the Haiti Health Infrastructure Program at the activity-level. We then described major components of this activity by grouping similar awards.

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We used allocations to describe planned funding, including planned funding amounts reported in USAID/Haiti's 2011 initial planning documents. We used more precise obligations data for activities completed by September 2020. For activities that were ongoing as of September 2020, we added obligation data reported as of September 2020, and additional planned allocation estimates that USAID/Haiti officials projected they had spent or would spend on the activity after September 2020.

Any planned end dates, allocations, or results listed for ongoing activities represent the current status of that activity reported by USAID/Haiti as of September 2022, and may change before the activity is completed.

<sup>a</sup>USAID's initial plan for this sector was finalized in April 2011. This plan did not specify the components of the Haiti Health Infrastructure Program, including planned budgets, time frames, or scopes, because, according to the plans, USAID was still coordinating with the Government of Haiti and other donors to determine what specific actions the U.S. would pursue to best support the country's health reconstruction plan.

**Haiti Health Infrastructure Program (HHIP) (Ongoing, \$89 million):** As of September 2022, USAID/Haiti had constructed or rehabilitated many facilities under the HHIP, but two components were ongoing and officials estimated they would not be complete until June 2024, 10 years longer than planned, and the total HHIP funding would exceed the planned budget by about \$28.7 million (48 percent).


- **Architecture, Engineering, and Construction Management:** This component provided various levels of design, engineering, construction management, and quality assurance support across HHIP for 6 years. According to the activity's final progress report, the implementing partner received high ratings for schedule, cost control, and management.
- **State University Hospital Reconstruction:** This reconstruction, jointly funded by USAID, the French Development Agency, and the Haitian government, and managed by the Haitian Ministry of Finance, aimed to reconstruct and equip one of Haiti's primary hospitals and health training facilities that was damaged in the 2010 earthquake. According to USAID, technical issues and political issues have resulted in significant delays and cost overruns. Examples of challenges included design and material adjustments to address soil composition concerns, disputes between contractors and hospital management, and lack of direct project oversight because it is managed by another country, according to officials. In July 2022, USAID/Haiti increased its contributions by \$10 million more than planned because the Haitian government was no longer able to fulfill its financial commitments as anticipated. At that time, USAID/Haiti reported that construction was about 90 percent complete, and as of September 2022, officials estimated that the reconstruction would be finished by June 2023—about 9 years longer than initially planned.
- **National Campus for Health Sciences Reconstruction:** This reconstruction included the demolition and reconstruction of several

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facilities for the National Campus for Health Sciences, which was completed in 2018 (see fig. 5). Key results included construction or renovation of the Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy and the School of Nursing facilities, including administrative areas, classrooms, laboratories, offices, an auditorium, a library, and a cafeteria. USAID/Haiti officials said a post-construction assessment found that about 1,500 students used the facility over a 1-year period, and a 2019 inspection found that the school kept proper inventory of equipment and maintained systems appropriately.

**Figure 5: Condition of Completed Construction at the National Campus for Health Sciences in Haiti in May 2021**

May 2021



Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. | GAO-23-105211

- **Various Health and Public Facilities Renovations:** This component included a number of renovations at various health and public facilities to improve accessibility and to address damage from Hurricane Matthew. For example, USAID funded renovations at 24 clinics and schools to improve access for people with disabilities, such as upgrading ramps, doorways, and toilet facilities, as shown in figure 6. These renovations cost from \$100,000 to \$300,000 per facility. As of fall 2022, USAID/Haiti officials said the various health infrastructure renovations on all but one facility were complete, and they projected the renovations of that facility would be complete in spring 2024. Officials said that two of the clinics they renovated sustained minor damage—such as cracks in the walls—from the 2021 earthquake, that they were able to address during the construction process. The HHIP construction management implementing partner noted that the

limited scope and complexity of some of these renovations made the projects more manageable.

**Figure 6: Completed Renovation at Labiche Clinic in Haiti in May 2021**

May 2021



Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. | GAO-23-105211

- **Justinian University Hospital Pediatric Clinic Reconstruction:** This component demolished and reconstructed a 75-bed facility servicing newborns, infants, and children. According to officials, a post-construction inspection found maintenance issues with the ventilation system due to lack of training of the maintenance staff and lack of sufficient warranty periods, which USAID/Haiti partially sought to address through additional training. Officials also said they took steps to prevent similar issues in the future, including building longer warranty clauses into their construction contracts, and requiring sustainability assessments and additional trainings.

## Ports

We reviewed two activities in the ports sector—one to build a new port in the Cap-Haïtien Corridor and one to rehabilitate the existing Cap-Haïtien Port. Figure 7 shows planned results and status of the activities as of September 2022.

**Figure 7: Planned Results and Status of Selected USAID Ports Activities in Haiti, as of September 2022**

Selected Infrastructure Activities: Port Sector		
New Port in the Cap-Haïtien Corridor Construction		
Status	Planned Results as of August 2011 <sup>a</sup>	Results as of September 2022
<b>Canceled</b>	Build a new greenfield port in the Cap-Haitien corridor. <b>Planned Allocation:</b> \$67.5 Million <b>Planned End Date:</b> September 2015	Activity canceled due to higher costs than anticipated. <b>Obligation:</b> \$4.2 Million for pre-construction work. <b>End Date:</b> N/A
Cap-Haïtien Port Rehabilitation		
Status	Planned Results as of August 2011 <sup>a</sup>	Results as of September 2022
<b>Ongoing</b>	Minor upgrades to existing port at Cap-Haïtien. <b>Planned Allocation:</b> \$5.0 Million <b>Planned End Date:</b> March 2014	Expanded plans to rehabilitate landside infrastructure at the existing port at Cap-Haïtien. Pre-construction work is complete, but most major reconstruction activities are yet to commence. <b>Planned Allocation:</b> \$34.2 million <b>Planned End Date:</b> December 2024

Electrical box (left) and police office (right) at Cap-Haïtien Port, taken in June 2021, which USAID plans to upgrade as part of its upcoming activity.



Legend: N/A= not available because the activity was canceled.

Source: Data: GAO analysis of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) data. Images: USAID. | GAO-23-105211.

Notes: Infrastructure activities may include one or more awards contributing to a common goal, such as the design, construction, or maintenance of an infrastructure site or set of similar infrastructure sites.

We used allocations to describe planned funding, including planned funding amounts reported in USAID/Haiti's 2011 initial planning documents. We used more precise obligations data for activities completed by September 2020. For activities that were ongoing as of September 2020, we added obligation data reported as of September 2020, and additional planned allocation estimates that USAID/Haiti officials projected they had spent or would spend on the activity after September 2020.

Any planned end dates, allocations, or results listed for ongoing activities represent the current status of that activity reported by USAID/Haiti as of September 2022, and may change before the activity is completed.

<sup>a</sup>While all other sectors' planning documents were completed by June 2012, the planning document for the ports sector had not been completed as of March 2015. As with [GAO-15-517](#), we used the August 2011 draft to show initial plans for this sector.

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- **New Port in the Cap-Haïtien Corridor Construction (Canceled, \$4.2 million):** USAID/Haiti initially planned to build a new port in the north of Haiti, but a 2012 USAID-funded feasibility study found the new port construction plan was not viable for a variety of technical, environmental, and economic reasons. The study also projected the costs would range from \$109 to \$183 million—far exceeding the intended budget of \$67.5 million. On the basis of these projections, and a lack of private sector support for the activity, USAID/Haiti determined its plans to build a new port were not practical and it canceled the activity after spending \$4.2 million on the feasibility study.
  - **Cap-Haïtien Port Rehabilitation (Ongoing, \$34.2 million estimated):** USAID/Haiti’s plans to rehabilitate the existing port in Cap-Haïtien have undergone a number of scope, cost, and schedule changes. As of September 2022, design work had been completed but the major construction had not begun.
  - After canceling plans to build a new port, USAID/Haiti reallocated some port sector funds to rehabilitate the existing Cap-Haïtien Port, increasing the budget from \$5 million to \$70.5 million, and expanding the scope to include more extensive upgrades to landside and marine infrastructure. In 2018, after the rehabilitation’s pre-construction and initial design work was completed, USAID/Haiti canceled the activity because the construction bids it received substantially exceeded the planned budget and officials were unable to identify additional funds it would have needed to proceed.
  - In 2019, USAID/Haiti reopened the activity with a reduced scope to focus on just landside infrastructure, and to forgo marine infrastructure improvements. Consequently, the port’s marine infrastructure, pictured in figure 8 from fieldwork photos we took in June 2014 and from photos USAID/Haiti took in June 2021, will remain unchanged unless its rehabilitation is funded by another organization. The reduction in scope also resulted in a multiyear, multi-million dollar process to redesign the activity and resolicit the construction work, according to officials. As of September 2022, USAID/Haiti had spent more than 8 years and obligated about \$14.6 million on designs and pre-work for the rehabilitation activity, and officials said they were in the final solicitation stages for the construction portion of this activity. In November 2022, however, officials said that construction was delayed due to security issues. They estimated it would not be complete until December 2024 at the earliest, and would cost about \$19 million.

**Figure 8: Comparison of Mooring Dolphins at the Cap-Haïtien Port in June 2014 (top left and bottom left) and in June 2021 (top right and bottom right) Showing No Change in Conditions Because USAID Reduced the Scope of its Port Renovation Activity**

June 2014



June 2021



Source: GAO (top left and bottom left) and U.S. Agency for International Development (top right and bottom right). | GAO-23-105211

Note: According to U.S. Agency for International Development/Haiti officials, the structures shown are derelict mooring dolphins. Renovations of these and other marine infrastructure are no longer included in the reduced scope of the upcoming rehabilitation activity. Consequently, this infrastructure will remain in this condition unless addressed by another organization.

- Although USAID’s primary renovation activity has not begun, USAID has funded improvements to the port for about \$534,500. USAID reported that the port improvements included the demolition of unused or derelict port structures, establishment of a larger container yard, paving of roads, and construction and renovation of office facilities for the National Port Authority. It also performed security upgrades, including the installation of port lighting and improvements to the port’s security wall and fire systems.

Shelter

We reviewed two activities in the shelter sector—the New Settlement Program activity and an activity to construct a retaining wall. Figure 9

shows planned results and status of the activities and components as of September 2022.

**Figure 9: Planned Results and Status of Selected USAID Shelter Activities in Haiti as of September 2022**

Selected Infrastructure Activities: Shelter Sector				
New Settlements Program				
Status	Planned Results as of July 2011 <sup>a</sup>		Results as of September 2022	
Completed	Prepare 15,000 plots of land for housing construction and build up to 4,000 houses.  <b>Planned Allocation:</b> \$55.4 million <b>End Date:</b> December 2012		Prepared 1,865 plots of land and built 906 homes, a reduction of about 88 percent and 77 percent, respectively. Funded emergency repairs to 750 homes post-construction, and community upgrades, and constructed a retaining wall.  <b>Obligation:</b> \$83.5 million <b>End Date:</b> August 2018	
	Components	End Date	Obligation	Results as of September 2022
Completed	Housing, Community Infrastructure, and Plots Construction	December 2016	\$62.5 Million	Prepared 1,865 plots of land and built 906 homes.
Completed	Housing and Community Infrastructure Repairs	August 2018	\$21 Million	Performed emergency repairs on 750 homes.
Construct a Retaining Wall				
Status	Planned Results as of July 2011 <sup>a</sup>		Results as of September 2022	
Completed	N/A		<b>Obligation:</b> \$15 million <b>End Date:</b> June 2012	
		House at Caracol EKAM site, June 2014.	House at Caracol EKAM site, June 2021.	
				

Legend: N/A= not available because USAID/Haiti was unable to locate documents for this activity.  
Source: Data: GAO analysis of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) data. Images: June 2014: GAO. June 2021: USAID. | GAO-23-105211

Notes: Infrastructure activities may include one or more awards contributing to a common goal, such as the design, construction, or maintenance of an infrastructure site or set of similar infrastructure sites. Consistent with prior GAO reports, we reported on the New Settlement Program at the activity-level. We then described major components of this activity by grouping similar awards.

We used allocations to describe planned funding, including planned funding amounts reported in USAID/Haiti's 2011 initial planning documents. We used more precise obligations data for activities completed by September 2020.

<sup>a</sup>USAID's initial plan for this sector was finalized in July 2011.

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**New Settlement Program (Completed August 2018, \$83.5 million):**

USAID/Haiti's New Settlement Program intended to help expand shelter opportunities for Haitians, including for some of the roughly 2.3 million people who were internally displaced after the 2010 earthquake. The activity comprised many awards to fund construction, preparation, and repair of houses, community infrastructure, and plots of land, which took about 5.5 years longer and cost \$28.1 million (51 percent) more than initially planned.

- **Housing, Community Infrastructure, and Plots Construction:** USAID/Haiti completed the activity 4 years later and \$7.1 million (13 percent) more than planned. USAID/Haiti also reduced the scope of the activity because it found that the actual costs to build each house and prepare each plot substantially exceeded planned costs. Specifically, USAID/Haiti reduced the number of homes it built from 4,000 to 906 (a 77 percent reduction) and the plots it prepared from 15,000 to 1,865 (an 88 percent reduction), according to officials. The cost differences stemmed from inaccuracies in initial estimates, design changes, and upgrades requested by the Haitian government, and additional land preparation and water system work at some sites, according to USAID officials and reports. As shown in figure 10, USAID/Haiti provided photos that suggest that many homes were in good condition as of 2021. However, the pictures revealed a few maintenance issues, including some plumbing degradation and drainage ditches blocked by debris (see figs. 11 and 12). Officials said that USAID/Haiti was not responsible for maintenance for the houses because they handed these sites over to the Government of Haiti or private housing residents after construction. Therefore, officials could not comment on these maintenance issues.

**Figure 10: Condition of USAID-Funded Homes at the Terrier Rouge Housing Development Site in Haiti in June 2021**

June 2021



Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. | GAO-23-105211

**Figure 11: Comparison of USAID-Funded Homes at the Caracol EKAM Housing Development Site in Haiti in June 2014 (left) and in June 2021 (right)**

June 2014



June 2021



Source: GAO (left) and U.S. Agency for International Development (right). | GAO-23-105211

Note: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials in Haiti speculated that the 2021 picture may depict a plumbing issue. According to USAID/Haiti officials, the mission handed the shelter sector infrastructure over to the Government of Haiti or housing beneficiaries post-construction. USAID/Haiti officials told us they are not responsible for tracking or maintaining these sites and therefore were unable to comment further on this issue or the extent to which this issue occurred at other homes.

**Figure 12: Comparison of USAID-Funded Drainage Channels at Caracol EKAM Housing Development Site in Haiti in December 2012 (left) and in June 2021 (right), Showing Buildup of Debris**



Source: GAO (left) and U.S. Agency for International Development (right). | GAO-23-105211

Note: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials in Haiti confirmed that the 2021 photo shows debris in the drainage channel, which they said was a common issue in Haiti and can lead to flooding during heavy rains. According to USAID/Haiti officials, the mission handed over these drainage channels to the Government of Haiti or housing beneficiaries following construction and the mission is not responsible for operations and maintenance.

- **Housing and Community Infrastructure Repairs:** Post-construction, USAID/Haiti funded emergency repair work at 750 of the 906 homes (more than 80 percent) and some utility systems it constructed, due to critical construction-related deficiencies. Deficiencies included leaking roofs, substandard foundations and wall construction, drainage issues, and improperly installed and substandard sewer and water pipes. USAID reached a legal settlement with the original construction contractor to reimburse the U.S. Government approximately \$86,000 for the deficiencies found in the initial construction work, according to USAID/Haiti officials. Officials said the contractor was satisfying the settlement through monthly payments, and as of October 2022, the contractor had reimbursed \$24,000 of the total settlement amount.

**Retaining Wall Construction (Completed June 2012, \$15 million):** USAID/Haiti was not able to locate documents related to this activity, including the initial contract or final report. Consequently, we are unable

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to provide more specific information about this activity, including the extent to which it achieved intended results.

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### USAID/Haiti Has Not Consistently Used Quality Information to Develop Strategic Infrastructure Plans or Track Results

#### USAID/Haiti Has Not Consistently Used Quality Information to Develop Strategic Infrastructure Plans

From our review of agency documents and discussions with USAID officials, we found several instances where the initial 2011 infrastructure plans included overly ambitious costs, time frames, and scopes, which affected USAID/Haiti's ability to achieve intended results for most of the eight selected infrastructure activities we reviewed. Pursuing overly ambitious plans resulted in delays, cost increases, reduced scopes, canceled activities, and a costly redesign. For example, USAID/Haiti underestimated the cost for both of the selected port activities we reviewed, resulting in the cancelation of the new port and a multi-million dollar, multiyear redesign to rehabilitate the Cap-Haïtien Port.<sup>31</sup>

In some cases, the initial 2011 plans were unrealistic because officials did not incorporate quality information when developing these documents, such as seeking and using sufficient technical information and expertise in the type of construction activities they were pursuing, to set realistic time frames, budgets, and scoping expectations. For example, USAID/Haiti did not have staff with technical expertise in port construction when it initially developed plans to design and construct a new port in the Cap-Haïtien Corridor within 2.5 years. Soon after developing these plans, however, officials learned that construction could take up to 10 years, and other organizations—including the USACE, which has extensive port expertise—estimated that the port planning and design process alone would take 2.5 to 5 years, and the construction could take up to 10 years. In other cases, accurate information may not have existed when the initial plans were developed, given that USAID/Haiti had not been implementing

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<sup>31</sup>For the activity to construct a new port in the Cap-Haïtien corridor, USAID/Haiti's planned budget of \$67.5 million was between \$41.5 million and \$115.5 million less than the estimated cost of a port. For the activity to rehabilitate the existing port, two contractors that met USAID's minimum level qualifications submitted bids in response to USAID/Haiti's solicitation for the full marine infrastructure rehabilitation, but the proposed budgets in these bids were too large relative to USAID's planned budget, according to officials.

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some of these types of infrastructure activities at the time, and given the challenging and evolving environment in Haiti immediately following the earthquake.

Since the initial 2011 planning documents were developed, USAID/Haiti has made substantial changes to its infrastructure activities, including reducing or changing the scope of some activities, increasing budgets, and extending time frames, in response to new and more realistic information, but it has not documented these updates in its strategic documents. USAID transitioned from using the 2011 strategic infrastructure planning documents in December 2017, and officials have not developed a new infrastructure strategy, or included infrastructure information in other subsequent mission-level strategies, such as the USAID/Haiti Strategic Frameworks. Officials said USAID/Haiti excluded infrastructure activities in the new strategies and frameworks because it was unlikely that it would receive new funding for infrastructure activities. Instead, USAID/Haiti officials said their strategies and frameworks focused on sectors for which it was better positioned to receive new funding. However, USAID/Haiti has continued to obligate funding for major ongoing and planned infrastructure activities—including the Cap-Haïtien Port rehabilitation activity and the State University Hospital reconstruction activity—which are not reflected in its current strategic plans.

USAID's *Management of Construction Risk* calls for agency officials to identify construction objectives in country and regional strategic plans and to define construction activities using realistic assessments and sound technical information. Without updating its strategic plans for infrastructure activities in Haiti to include clear and realistic outcomes based on quality information, USAID/Haiti will lack the strategic vision to effectively and efficiently manage ongoing and future USAID infrastructure investments.

USAID/Haiti Has Not Completely and Consistently Tracked and Assessed Infrastructure Results

We found that USAID/Haiti has not consistently or completely tracked and assessed basic information needed to understand results for all selected infrastructure activities we reviewed. At the award level, key results information was inconsistent and often inadequate. For example, USAID/Haiti was unable to provide final reports for 16 of the 34 awards in our scope that had ended by September 2022. In some cases, USAID/Haiti provided other documents, such as final inspection certificates, final invoices, and quarterly progress reports, in lieu of final reports. However, we often found that the final documents it provided were incomplete or inconsistent. Specifically, key information for

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understanding results of infrastructure efforts, such as final costs, time frames, outputs, and lessons learned were inconsistently reported, as some award documents included these data while others did not. For example, some final documents included a date and a signature, but no cost information or information on specific outputs.

USAID officials also did not consistently or completely track and assess key results information for infrastructure activities at the activity or mission levels. For example, our review of State and USAID's *Performance Plan and Report* (PPR) for Haiti for each of fiscal years 2010 through 2020, found USAID/Haiti had five performance indicators related to the infrastructure sectors we reviewed, but had elected to not report on them since fiscal year 2016. In addition, USAID/Haiti is no longer required to produce status reports to Congress to report key results at the mission-level, and it has elected to not track and report this information elsewhere, including in the PPRs.

We found that because infrastructure activities can consist of multiple awards with multiple modifications to budgets, time frames, and outputs, it can be difficult to track and assess key results information for infrastructure awards and activities over time. Such tracking and assessment is especially difficult or impossible when USAID is missing key final report documents, when key results data are incompletely or inconsistently tracked, and when staff turnover has occurred and current officials are unable to speak to the results or identify relevant documentation.

USAID/Haiti officials said that due to extreme staffing turnover and staffing gaps at the USAID/Haiti mission, recordkeeping and results tracking processes for infrastructure activities have not been standardized or consistent. Some activity records have been stored in official files, while other records were saved in other locations, such as on hard or shared drives or in emails, according to officials. USAID/Haiti officials also told us that since 2015 USAID has required missions to store key award documents in a records management system. However, officials said that the USAID/Haiti mission has been slow to adopt the system, partly because of the challenging situation in Haiti. Moreover, officials do not consistently collect, track, or analyze standard results information for each infrastructure award or activity. For example, officials said some infrastructure awards have specific results reporting requirements to determine that the award met the initial contract and subsequent modifications. Other awards, however, do not have these specific requirements, so it is left to the discretion of USAID project oversight

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officials to determine what associated results information to collect and save to demonstrate completion.

USAID's *Management of Construction Risk* calls for the agency officials to establish processes for assessing results and measuring progress toward the objectives of completed projects. USAID records management criteria also call for officials to create, maintain, and preserve official records documenting USAID activities, and to ensure timely access and retrieval.

Inconsistent and incomplete tracking and assessment of key results information prevented USAID from having readily available records of results of infrastructure activities in Haiti, such as the extent to which some of the selected activities met planned costs, time frames, and scopes. It also led to challenges with activity oversight and management, especially during staff turnover at the USAID/Haiti mission. For example, USAID/Haiti officials were unable to verify that a contractor had completed its construction responsibilities because of staff turnover at the mission, and consequently, USAID/Haiti has no award documentation memorializing the substantial amount of work completed on this activity. Inconsistent and incomplete tracking of key results also limits USAID/Haiti's ability to track progress toward infrastructure goals, to hold contractors responsible for results, or to apply the lessons learned to ongoing and future activities. Completely and consistently tracking results information for infrastructure efforts and assessing this information could help USAID/Haiti to address these shortcomings.

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## Across Key Development Sectors At Least Half of Results Were Successful and At Least One-Third Were Unsuccessful Due to Several Factors

We reviewed 29 evaluations, each of which discussed multiple results for USAID development activities in Haiti. We found that at least half of the results were successful and at least one-third of the results were unsuccessful across key sectors with the largest numbers of activities—economic and food security, governance and rule of law, and health and disabilities. Successful results met or exceeded a target or goal, had a favorable effect, provided intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or met scheduled time frames, while unsuccessful results did not meet any of these criteria. Successful results cited in the evaluations included assisting farmers in obtaining agricultural market information, improving municipal property tax systems, and increasing HIV testing and counseling services. The remaining results across the sectors were unclear because the evaluations did not specify whether the results were

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successful or unsuccessful.<sup>32</sup> Factors that limited development results included the lack of participation and support of activity stakeholders, social and political instability, natural disasters, and insecurity, according to our review of the final or most recent progress reports for 42 selected development activities. For example, the August 2021 earthquake damaged at least 40 schools and five health facilities supported by USAID activities and delayed assistance in affected areas, according to officials. Factors that facilitated the achievement of development results included USAID's and implementing partners' effective management of activities and the support of activity stakeholders and other donors, according to our review of progress reports for the 42 selected development activities.

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### At Least Half of Results Were Successful and At Least One-Third Were Unsuccessful in Key Development Sectors

Our review of 29 evaluations of USAID development activities in Haiti, each of which discussed multiple results, found that at least half of the 271 total results were successful and at least one-third were unsuccessful for the three key development sectors with the largest numbers of activities—economic and food security, governance and rule of law, and health and disabilities combined.<sup>33</sup> Specifically, across the three sectors, at least 52 percent of results (140 results) were successful, and at least 33 percent (89 results) were unsuccessful (see fig. 13).<sup>34</sup>

Each of the sectors also had a percentage of unclear results for which the evaluations we reviewed did not specify whether the results were successful or unsuccessful.<sup>35</sup> In some cases, we found that the

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<sup>32</sup>Because activity results we determined to be “unclear” may have been successful or unsuccessful, we use the term “at least” to describe the successful and unsuccessful results that we were able to identify and report on.


<sup>33</sup>For this review, we defined development activities as activities that were not focused solely on constructing or rehabilitating physical systems or buildings. See appendix II for more information about the 29 evaluations of USAID development activities in Haiti. USAID also funded development activities in the education sector. However, evaluations of education activities did not provide information about the results of activities in Haiti.

<sup>34</sup>For this review, we defined results as outputs and outcomes related to different types of assistance provided by an activity in a sector.

<sup>35</sup>We excluded from our analysis the results of sector categories if the percentage of unclear results exceeded 30 percent.

percentage of unclear results in a sector was large enough to make determining the overall success of a sector uncertain.<sup>36</sup>

**Figure 13: Number and Percentage of Successful, Unsuccessful, and Unclear Results for the USAID/Haiti Economic and Food Security, Governance and Rule of Law, and Health and Disabilities Sectors Combined, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2020**



Source: GAO analysis of USAID data and information. | GAO-23-105211

Note: For our analysis, we define successful results for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities in Haiti as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance met or exceeded a target or goal, had a favorable effect, provided intended benefits to all


<sup>36</sup>To determine the results of USAID development activities in Haiti, we reviewed the evaluations completed for USAID development activities in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020. According to USAID guidance, an evaluation uses systematic data collection and analysis of information about the characteristics and outcomes of one or more organizations, programs, policies, strategies, projects, or activities as a basis for judgments to improve effectiveness, and timed to inform decisions about current and future programming. USAID/Haiti officials noted that they are typically involved in the evaluation process and meet regularly with the evaluation team to discuss preliminary results, which gives them the opportunity to clarify the evaluation’s key findings and conclusions. In addition, USAID/Haiti officials told us that they use other sources of information to understand the progress and results of development activities and inform decisions about programming, including quarterly progress reports from implementing partners, performance data and information collected annually for the PPR, and indicators identified in the mission’s performance management plans. USAID/Haiti officials also explained that they discuss the progress and results of development activities and possible approaches to improve and adapt mission programming at regular intervals, including during visits to activity sites, quarterly meetings with implementing partners, and the mission’s periodic reviews of strategies or activities.

beneficiaries, or met scheduled time frames. We define unsuccessful results as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance did not meet an expected target or goal, had an unfavorable effect, did not provide intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or did not meet scheduled time frames. We define unclear results as instances in which the sources we reviewed did not specify whether the assistance met a target or goal, had a favorable or unfavorable effect, reached all intended beneficiaries, or met planned time frames.

## Economic and Food Security

At least 56 percent of the results (93 results) for the activities that supported the economic and food security sector were successful, and at least 26 percent (43 results) were unsuccessful. Seventeen percent of the results (29 results) were unclear (see fig. 14).

**Figure 14: Number and Percentage of Successful, Unsuccessful, and Unclear Results for the USAID/Haiti Economic and Food Security Sector, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2020**




Source: GAO analysis of USAID data and information. | GAO-23-105211

Notes: Percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

For our analysis, we define successful results for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities in Haiti as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance met or exceeded a target or goal, had a favorable effect, provided intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or met scheduled time frames. We define unsuccessful results as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance did not meet an expected target or goal, had an unfavorable effect, did not provide intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or did not meet scheduled time frames. We define unclear results as instances in which the sources we reviewed did not specify whether the assistance met a target or goal, had a favorable or unfavorable effect, reached all intended beneficiaries, or met planned time frames.

Within the economic and food security sector, results varied for different types of assistance (see fig. 15).<sup>37</sup>

**Figure 15: Number and Percentage of Successful, Unsuccessful, and Unclear Results for the USAID/Haiti Economic and Food Security Sector by Types of Assistance, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2020**



Source: GAO analysis of USAID data and information. | GAO-23-105211

Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

For our analysis, we define successful results for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities in Haiti as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance met or exceeded a target or goal, had a favorable effect, provided intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or met scheduled time frames. We define unsuccessful results as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance did not meet an expected target or goal, had an unfavorable effect, did not provide intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or did not meet scheduled time frames. We define unclear results as instances in which the sources we reviewed did not specify whether the assistance met a target or goal, had a favorable or unfavorable effect, reached all intended beneficiaries, or met planned time frames.

The evaluations we reviewed cited successful and unsuccessful results across activities supporting the economic and food security sector. For example,

- A final evaluation of an activity that supported access to agricultural markets noted that it developed an agricultural information system that targeted cacao, rice, and plantain farmers in a dozen markets in

<sup>37</sup>USAID also funded an activity that provided technical assistance and financial incentives to financial institutions and property developers for the development of an affordable housing market in Haiti. We do not include the results of this activity in our analysis because 33 percent of the results were unclear.

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the north and northeastern regions of Haiti.<sup>38</sup> The activity provided more than 33,000 farmers with real-time data on the price of agricultural products using mobile communication systems, which helped them to negotiate better prices for their products, according to the evaluation.

- An activity that supported increased access to capital sought to expand financial inclusion by increasing the availability of financial products and services, including through the development of financial services by mobile phones in Haiti. However, mid-term and final evaluations of the activity noted that these financial services, known as mobile money, had not achieved financial and economic sustainability due, in part, to limits in the size of transactions supported by mobile money, the unwillingness of consumers to use mobile money, and the lack of a market and legal framework in Haiti for mobile money.<sup>39</sup>

## Governance and Rule of Law


At least 44 percent of the results (29 results) for activities that supported the governance and rule of law sector were successful, and at least 42 percent (28 results) were unsuccessful. Fourteen percent of the results (9 results) were unclear. Because the percentage of unclear results may have been successful or unsuccessful, the overall success of the governance and rule of law sector is uncertain (see fig. 16).

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<sup>38</sup>Social Impact, Inc., *Final Evaluation Report: Haiti Feed the Future North (FTFN)/Appui a la Valorisation Du Potentiel Agricole Du Nord Pour La Sécurité Economique et Environnementale (AVANSE) Activity* (January 2020).

<sup>39</sup>Mendez England and Associates, *Evaluation of the USAID/Haiti Integrated Financing for Value Chains and Enterprises (HIFIVE) Program* (Bethesda, MD.: Aug. 1, 2012); PHAREVIEW S.A., *Final Performance Evaluation of the Haiti Integrated Financing for Value Chains and Enterprises (HIFIVE) Project* (Port-au-Prince, Haiti: June 23, 2016).

**Figure 16: Number and Percentage of Successful, Unsuccessful, and Unclear Results for the USAID/Haiti Governance and Rule of Law Sector, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2020**




Source: GAO analysis of USAID data and information. | GAO-23-105211

Note: For our analysis, we define successful results for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities in Haiti as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance met or exceeded a target or goal, had a favorable effect, provided intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or met scheduled time frames. We define unsuccessful results as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance did not meet an expected target or goal, had an unfavorable effect, did not provide intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or did not meet scheduled time frames. We define unclear results as instances in which the sources we reviewed did not specify whether the assistance met a target or goal, had a favorable or unfavorable effect, reached all intended beneficiaries, or met planned time frames.

Within the governance and rule of law sector, results varied for different types of assistance (see fig. 17).<sup>40</sup>

<sup>40</sup>USAID also funded activities to strengthen the legislative and oversight functions of Parliament and to support Haiti's elections processes. However, USAID did not complete an evaluation of these activities during the period we reviewed.

**Figure 17: Number and Percentage of Successful, Unsuccessful, and Unclear Results for the USAID/Haiti Governance and Rule of Law Sector by Types of Assistance, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2020**



Source: GAO analysis of USAID data and information. | GAO-23-105211

Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

For our analysis, we define successful results for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities in Haiti as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance met or exceeded a target or goal, had a favorable effect, provided intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or met scheduled time frames. We define unsuccessful results as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance did not meet an expected target or goal, had an unfavorable effect, did not provide intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or did not meet scheduled time frames. We define unclear results as instances in which the sources we reviewed did not specify whether the assistance met a target or goal, had a favorable or unfavorable effect, reached all intended beneficiaries, or met planned time frames.

Evaluations cited successful and unsuccessful results for activities that supported the governance and rule of law sector. For example,

- A final evaluation of an activity that sought to strengthen local governance noted that it intended to improve the local property tax system.<sup>41</sup> The activity helped municipalities establish a numbering system for the houses in their jurisdiction, a standardized instrument to collect fiscal information about homeowners and their properties, and a system of electronic files that enables taxpayers to monitor local tax collection and know how much in property taxes they are required to pay each year.
- An activity that supported access to justice and legal assistance supported Haiti’s High Judicial Council, which is tasked with overseeing and disciplining judges, according to a mid-term

<sup>41</sup>Democracy International, Inc., *Final Report: Evaluation of the Limyè ak Organizasyon pu Kolekyivite yo Ale Lwen (LOKAL) Program in Haiti* (Bethesda, MD.: April 2012).

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evaluation of the activity. However, the evaluation noted that the High Judicial Council did not have a strong commitment to act against judges who commit wrongdoing or unprofessional conduct, even for cases stemming from the findings of inspection reports or denunciations from legal professionals or the public.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, the High Judicial Council had not appointed a director for judicial inspections and operated without a budget or staff resources, according to the evaluation.


## Health and Disabilities

At least 45 percent of the results (18 results) for activities that supported the health and disabilities sector were successful, and at least 45 percent (18 results) were unsuccessful. Ten percent of the results (4 results) were unclear. Because the percentage of unclear results may have been successful or unsuccessful, the overall success of the health and disabilities sector is uncertain (see fig. 18).

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<sup>42</sup>Social Impact, Inc., *Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report: Haiti Justice Sector Strengthening Program (JSSP)* (Arlington, VA.: July 2020). USAID did not complete a final evaluation of the Haiti Justice Sector Strengthening Program during the period we reviewed.

**Figure 18: Number and Percentage of Successful, Unsuccessful, and Unclear Results for the USAID/Haiti Health and Disabilities Sector, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2020**




Source: GAO analysis of USAID data and information. | GAO-23-105211

Note: For our analysis, we define successful results for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities in Haiti as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance met or exceeded a target or goal, had a favorable effect, provided intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or met scheduled time frames. We define unsuccessful results as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance did not meet an expected target or goal, had an unfavorable effect, did not provide intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or did not meet scheduled time frames. We define unclear results as instances in which the sources we reviewed did not specify whether the assistance met a target or goal, had a favorable or unfavorable effect, reached all intended beneficiaries, or met planned time frames.

Figure 19 shows the number and percentage of successful, unsuccessful, and unclear results for different types of assistance within the health and disabilities sector.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup>USAID also funded activities aimed at increasing access to clean water, improving sanitation services, and promoting safe hygiene practices. However, USAID did not complete an evaluation of these activities for the period we reviewed.

**Figure 19: Number and Percentage of Successful, Unsuccessful, and Unclear Results for the USAID/Haiti Health and Disabilities Sector by Types of Assistance, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2020**



Source: GAO analysis of USAID data and information. | GAO-23-105211

Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

For our analysis, we define successful results for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities in Haiti as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance met or exceeded a target or goal, had a favorable effect, provided intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or met scheduled time frames. We define unsuccessful results as instances in which the sources we reviewed indicated that the assistance did not meet an expected target or goal, had an unfavorable effect, did not provide intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or did not meet scheduled time frames. We define unclear results as instances in which the sources we reviewed did not specify whether the assistance met a target or goal, had a favorable or unfavorable effect, reached all intended beneficiaries, or met planned time frames.

Evaluations cited successful and unsuccessful results for activities that supported the health and disabilities sector. For example,

- A mid-term evaluation of two healthcare services delivery activities noted that both activities increased patient access to HIV testing, counseling, and treatment services.<sup>44</sup> For example, over 2 years, the activities increased the number of individuals who received testing and counseling services for HIV and received their test results from approximately 182,000 to approximately 238,000. In addition, over the same period, the number of adults and children receiving antiretroviral therapy increased from about 4,600 to about 7,700.

<sup>44</sup>Global Health Performance Cycle Improvement Project, *Services de Santé de Qualité pour Haïti (SSQH) Evaluation Report* (Washington, D.C.: August 2016).

- The mid-term evaluation of the two activities also noted that both activities sought to ensure the quality of healthcare services delivery and promote the uptake of the Haitian Ministry of Health’s primary care services. The evaluation noted that neither activity achieved consistent increases in access or uptake of most of the healthcare services.<sup>45</sup> The evaluation further noted that there were decreases of more than 10 percent in a number of key indicators, including the use of family planning services, the number of children under 5 years of age who received vitamin A, and the percentage of children under 1 year of age who were fully vaccinated.

## Education

USAID funded activities intended to improve quality education, provide early grade reading instruction, and increase access to education. However, no evaluations provided results of these activities in Haiti during the period we reviewed. Although USAID completed two evaluations of activities that supported early grade reading instruction, neither provided results specific to Haiti during this time frame. One was a baseline assessment intended only to compare against subsequent evaluations to assess results, and the other was an assessment of a USAID reading program implemented in the Latin America and Caribbean regions that did not show results specific to activities in Haiti.

## Stakeholder Support, Social and Political Instability, Natural Disasters, and Activity Management Affected Some Development Results

We found that various factors hindered or facilitated the success of development results for the 42 selected development activities that we reviewed.<sup>46</sup> Challenges cited in the final or most recent progress reports for the largest number of activities included (1) the lack of participation and support of activity beneficiaries, stakeholders, and other donors; (2) social and political instability; (3) the lack of support and investment of resources by Haitian government officials; (4) natural disasters such as the August 2021 earthquake; and (5) insecurity.

- **Lack of beneficiary, stakeholder, and donor participation and support:** Implementing partners of 26 selected development activities

<sup>45</sup>Global Health Performance Cycle Improvement Project, *Services de Santé de Qualité pour Haïti (SSQH) Evaluation Report* (Washington, D.C.: August 2016). USAID did not complete a final evaluation of these two activities—the SSQH activity in central and southern Haiti and the SSQH activity in northern Haiti—during the period we reviewed.

<sup>46</sup>To examine factors that affected development results, we reviewed the most recent or final implementing partner progress reports for 42 selected development activities included in our sample of USAID-funded reconstruction activities in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020 unless otherwise noted. See appendix III for information about the 42 selected development activities we reviewed.

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noted the lack of participation, capacity, investment, or resource support from beneficiaries, stakeholders, or other donor organizations. For example, a health sector activity that provided water and sanitation assistance was designed to leverage other donors' infrastructure investments in water and sanitation systems by providing assistance to ensure that these systems were properly managed. However, most of these other donors had not completed these investments before the end of the project, according to an implementing partner report. Consequently, the report noted that the infrastructure improvements in the water systems would not be completed until after the project ended, delaying the project's measurable impact.

- **Social and political instability:** Implementing partners of 25 selected development activities cited social and political instability as a challenge to achieving results, including shifting priorities and turnover within the Haitian government, civil unrest, strikes, postponed elections, or the dissolution of Parliament. For example, a governance and rule of law activity that provided assistance to local governments and promoted the decentralization of governance was challenged by a protracted electoral process that resulted in the dissolution of Parliament. Parliament's legislative agenda had included enactment of a decentralization framework law and a bill to create a local government civil service before the end of the activity, according to an implementing partner report. The report noted that the activity had facilitated various meetings between the members of Parliament and mayors to generate political will for passage of these reforms. However, Parliament had not voted on these reforms by the time the activity ended, according to the report.
- **Lack of Haitian government support and resource investment:** Implementing partners of 22 selected development activities cited a lack of support or resource investment from Haitian government officials as a challenge to achieving results. For example, Ministry of Education representatives, led by the directorate responsible for managing and approving education materials, participated in the validation of an education sector activity's reading instructional materials and teacher's guide, according to an implementing partner report. However, the report noted that the directorate had a severely limited number of staff available, which slowed the pace at which the review sessions could be scheduled and contributed to a delay in the delivery of the materials by more than a month after the scheduled date.

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- **Natural disasters:** Implementing partners of 20 selected development activities reported challenges stemming from hurricanes and tropical storms, drought, and earthquakes. For example, the August 14, 2021, earthquake damaged facilities at some activity sites, including 40 schools and five health facilities supported by USAID activities, and it led to the postponement of trainings and delays of other activity assistance in affected areas, according to officials.<sup>47</sup> It also caused damage to two water systems supported by a water and sanitation activity in the health sector. The implementing partner of the activity noted that technicians were able to repair the damaged water systems. These repairs allowed the public utility to use its wells to pump water into water trucks that provided water to more than 11,000 people. However, the earthquake severely damaged the water distribution network, and it was unlikely to produce the expected amount of water per month, according to the implementing partner. In addition, although the public utility restored water distribution to one town affected by the earthquake, the supply was limited due to leaks in the distribution network caused by the earthquake.
  - **Insecurity:** Implementing partners of 13 activities reported that gang violence or other security-related challenges made it difficult for beneficiaries to participate in some activities, limited access to some activity sites, or delayed the implementation of some activities. For example, gang violence hindered staff members, who were part of an economic and food security activity that assisted out-of-school youth, from conducting their field visits and monitoring the activity during its pilot phase. To address these challenges, the implementing partner noted that it relied on field agents who resided in the areas in which they worked to provide regular monitoring and updates. The implementing partner also reported that it used satellite phones, radio, and internet access to improve communication with staff. However, due to insecurity, the pilot phase of the activity began implementation 6 months later than anticipated. Consequently, the implementing partner received a 1-year extension to incorporate lessons learned from the pilot phase and complete activities.

Conversely, for the largest number of activities, implementing partners cited the following factors as facilitating results, when they occurred: (1) USAID and implementing partners' effective management of activities; (2)

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<sup>47</sup>These damaged facilities may include activity sites not related to the 42 selected development activities we reviewed.

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the participation and support of Haitian government officials; and (3) the support of activity beneficiaries, stakeholders, and other donor partners.

- **USAID and implementing partner management:** Implementing partners of 25 selected development activities reported that effective collaboration between USAID officials and implementing partners and the ability to make adjustments to improve implementation facilitated results. For example, a health sector activity developed tracking tools and mobilized peer educators to trace and relocate clients in response to challenges following up with HIV patients. The activity's participating health facilities also dispensed multi-month prescriptions to reduce the transportation burden to HIV patients of having to reach health facilities frequently.
- **Haitian government participation and support:** Implementing partners of 20 selected development activities reported that when Haitian government officials collaborated in the planning and implementation of activities and provided resource support, it facilitated results. For example, a governance and rule of law sector activity that sought to strengthen local governance provided training and technical assistance to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the management of municipal budgets. During the activity, the Ministry of the Interior and Local Collectives developed a municipal budget preparation manual, based in part on the activity's materials, and helped to implement a national training program for all 140 Haitian communities, resulting in standardized municipal budgets for the first time in Haiti. The standardized budgets provided a foundation for the use of the budget as a management and governance tool, according to the implementing partner.
- **Beneficiary, stakeholder, and donor support:** Implementing partners of 19 selected development activities reported that the participation of beneficiaries and the collaboration and support of stakeholders and other donors facilitated the implementation of activities and the achievement of results. For example, the implementing partner of an economic and food security sector activity that assisted out-of-school youth with basic education and life skills, technical training and coaching, and work experiences formed a partnership with another organization to place trainees in construction trades. Through the partnership, the implementing partner reported that the activity placed about 31 youth in construction-related jobs in 1 year and continued to place more youth in construction jobs during the activity.

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## State Achieved About Half of its Targets, but Has Not Assessed the Overall Effectiveness of its Activities to Develop the Haitian National Police

The three INL activities to develop the HNP that we reviewed for which implementing partners reported targets in the most recent monitoring reports met about half of their intended targets combined. The results that implementing partners reported from their performance monitoring of these activities primarily focused on outputs, such as the number of trainings or equipment provided. However, INL has not evaluated the outcomes of these activities, limiting information about their overall effectiveness.

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### State's Activities to Develop the Haitian National Police Met about Half of Intended Targets

State's INL activities to develop the HNP achieved mixed results, which were focused on outputs. These activities seek to strengthen Haiti's law enforcement capacity through advisory support, training, equipment provision, technical assistance, and enlargement of the HNP force. Implementing partners of INL activities that we included in our review provided trainings, logistical support, equipment, and police and corrections advisor support to the HNP. Three activities we reviewed for which implementing partners reported targets in the most recent monitoring reports met about half (25 of 53, or 47 percent) of their intended targets combined. Specifically, one implementing partner reported that an activity met 18 of 26 (69 percent) of its targets. The other two partners reported their activities met less than one-third of their targets (6 of 20, or 30 percent; and 1 of 7, or 14 percent). In addition, the performance data and information they reported for these activities primarily focused on the outputs of the activities, such as the trainings and equipment provided. Examples of results that implementing partners reported for each of the three activities include the following:

- **Development of the Directorate of Prisons and the HNP:** During its final year of implementation, an activity that supported the development of the Directorate of Prisons and the HNP and provided training support to the HNP Academy, among other objectives, achieved targets for 18 of 26 indicators (69 percent). For example, in April 2018, the implementing partner reported that 49 new agents graduated from basic narcotics training at the HNP Academy, increasing the total force of the HNP counternarcotics unit to 257 officers. In addition, the implementing partner reported in December 2018 that more than 1,700 HNP officers graduated from the HNP Academy, surpassing the target of 1,500 graduates for the year. However, the implementing partner also reported that 1,242

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corrections recruits were assigned to the Directorate of Prisons, falling short of the target of 1,600.

The Haitian government's lack of funding to increase the number of corrections officers contributed to the results falling short of the target, according to the implementing partner. The implementing partner also reported that the HNP had not implemented any standard operating procedures or policies for the management of the HNP vehicle fleet. However, the implementing partner reported that the activity intended to implement two major standard operating procedures for training and professionalizing HNP management of the fleet for the year. The activity fell short of the target because the HNP had insufficient vehicles, instructors, and safety equipment to complete the training on fleet management, and the implementing partner had yet to establish an inventory system for the fleet because the HNP lacked computer equipment, according to an implementing partner report.

- **Development of the HNP's financial, administrative, and human capital management capabilities:** During its final full year of implementation, an activity that supported the development of the HNP's budgetary and strategic planning capabilities, procurement and supply chain management, and personnel management and career development, achieved targets for six of 20 indicators (30 percent). For example, in September 2015, the implementing partner reported that 100 percent of the HNP administration and finance personnel who participated in training workshops acquired knowledge and skills commensurate with their position, surpassing the target of 85 percent for the year. The implementing partner also reported that it met the target of implementing and maintaining a procurement plan to support training programs at the HNP Academy.

However, this implementing partner also reported falling short of other targets. The HNP Academy delivered one basic training class in the final full year of the activity, falling short of the target of two for the year. In addition, no HNP personnel in supply chain management roles applied new skills in the performance of their duties in the final full year of the activity, falling short of the target of 15 because no formal training workshops had been held during the year.

- **Development of the workforce and investigative capacity of the HNP counternarcotics unit:** The implementing partner of an activity that supported the development of the workforce and investigative capacity of the HNP counternarcotics unit through professional development courses and techniques reported that it achieved one of seven targets (14 percent) in its final full year. For example, the implementing partner reported that trainers traveled to Haiti to provide

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training on narcotics investigations and undercover operations. Ninety percent of training participants reported overall satisfaction with the training, surpassing the target of a 70 percent overall satisfaction rate.

However, the implementing partner also reported that HNP counternarcotics agents disrupted one significant drug trafficking organization in Haiti, falling short of the target of disrupting at least three such organizations by September 2018. In addition, the implementing partner reported that the HNP counternarcotics unit conducted one joint operation with the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration outside of Port-au-Prince during the activity's final year, which did not meet the target for the unit to organize and coordinate at least four large-scale operations annually.

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### Political and Social Instability, Haitian Government Support, Natural Disasters, and Stakeholder Engagement Affected HNP Results

Similar to USAID, we found that various factors hindered or facilitated the achievement of results of INL activities to develop the HNP in Haiti. INL officials, HNP officers, and implementing partners mentioned political instability, civil unrest and insecurity, lack of funding and resource support from the Haitian government, and the August 2021 earthquake as the most common challenges that hindered results. For example:

- **Political instability:** Changes in the Haitian government and the HNP force due to political instability has affected INL assistance at times. For example, frequent changes to Haitian government administrations over the years has contributed to turnover of officers in HNP leadership positions, according to INL officials in Haiti. Consequently, INL officials noted instances of HNP officers who have been trained for certain positions being removed from them later on, reducing the effectiveness of the training. In addition, political instability has contributed to shifts in the level of commitment for INL assistance by various Haitian government administrations over the years, making it difficult for the HNP to conduct long-term resource planning and address its resource deficiencies, according to INL officials in Haiti.
- **Civil unrest and insecurity:** Civil unrest and insecurity have negatively affected both the operations of the HNP and the implementation of INL assistance to the HNP. For example, an implementing partner reported that a series of riots and increased gang violence from July to November 2018, taxed the resources and negatively affected the public perception of the HNP. In addition, in September 2021, an implementing partner reported that increasing gang activity and kidnappings had undermined public trust in the HNP. Consequently, the public avoided contacting the police to report incidents, according to the implementing partner report.

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- **Lack of Haitian government budgetary and resource support:** The Haitian government is expected to supplement the assistance and resources that INL has provided to the HNP, but chronic budget shortfalls and lack of equipment have negatively affected the HNP's ability to plan operations and fulfill its mission, according to INL officials. For example, an implementing partner reported in April 2020 that Haitian government funding was insufficient to pay officer salaries and provide the equipment needed to manage HNP units. Although the size of the HNP force increased from 11,000 in 2015 to 15,000 in 2020, its budget did not increase during the period, leading to an increased strain on resources, according to the implementing partner report. The report further stated that low salaries and benefits made the police force less attractive as a career, resulting in officers leaving the force.
  - **August 2021 earthquake:** The earthquake caused damage to HNP facilities and delayed officer trainings as the HNP deployed officers to the affected region. Following the earthquake, the commander of the HNP counternarcotics unit reported damage at the Haitian Coast Guard Maritime Base, according to an implementing partner report. The report noted that the base sustained moderate to significant cement cracking around the boat docking area and numerous cracks and fissures existed throughout the compound, including in the housing. In addition, the implementing partner reported that the earthquake caused damage to two HNP commissariats, including the collapse of a perimeter wall at one and heavy damage to another, which was condemned. The HNP built a temporary shelter within the compounds of the damaged commissariats so that it could continue supporting operations until the police stations could be repaired or replaced, according to the implementing partner report. INL officials stated that the HNP also deployed officers in the career development program to help with the post-earthquake response in the affected region, delaying officers' completion of HNP training programs.

In contrast, the most commonly mentioned factors INL officials, HNP officers, and implementing partners stated that facilitated the implementation and achievement of results of some INL activities included support from HNP leadership for INL's assistance and close and ongoing communication among stakeholders. For example:

- **HNP leadership support:** INL officials noted that HNP leadership support for the assistance provided by INL-funded activities has facilitated the development of the HNP. For example, INL officials in Haiti noted the HNP's commitment to the sustainable and accountable use of donated vehicles as a key success. In September 2021, INL

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officials in Haiti completed an agreement with the HNP for the accountability of donated vehicles. INL officials explained that this new agreement has helped to address fraud because it specifies that the HNP is responsible for assigning the donated vehicles to units mutually agreed upon by INL and the HNP. It also ensures the units use them in an official capacity. According to the 2021 agreement, the HNP is responsible for identifying the donated vehicles in its inventory and for allowing INL officials access to the inventory to monitor and oversee their use.

- **Communication among stakeholders:** HNP officials noted that communication among the stakeholders of INL-funded activities provides opportunities to address the needs of the HNP. HNP officials stated that HNP leadership communicates with HNP officers about the needs and the challenges of their units. HNP leadership, in turn, communicates this feedback to the advisors of INL-funded activities. These advisors may then recommend program adjustments to address needs and challenges. For example, an implementing partner reported that officers of an HNP unit had been assigned tactical equipment, but they had not received training on how to properly use it. The unit's commander and other stakeholders coordinated with the advisor of an INL-funded activity to develop and deliver a training course for all unit officers who were issued the equipment.

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## State Has Not Assessed the Overall Effectiveness of Its Activities

State has limited information available on the overall effectiveness of INL's activities to develop the HNP because INL has not conducted an evaluation of them for the period we reviewed and has no plans to do so, according to INL officials.<sup>48</sup> Program evaluations are individual systematic studies conducted periodically or on an ad hoc basis to assess how well a

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<sup>48</sup>Although INL has not conducted an evaluation of the overall effectiveness of its activities in Haiti, it has conducted reviews and assessments of its assistance in Haiti during the period of our review. Reviews conducted by INL officials have described the types of assistance that INL has provided to support its objectives in Haiti, factors affecting activity implementation and HNP operations, and assessed implementing partner performance. In addition, INL assessments of its assistance in Haiti have reported on the alignment of its assistance with the needs of the HNP, best practices and lessons learned from the implementation of the assistance, and actions needed to improve implementation and build the capacity of the HNP.

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program is working.<sup>49</sup> They are often conducted by experts, either internal or external to the agency, who are not working on the program and typically examine achievement of program objectives in the context of other aspects of program performance or in the context in which it occurs. In contrast to performance monitoring, program evaluations typically examine a broader range of information on program performance and its context than is feasible to monitor on an ongoing basis.<sup>50</sup> During the period of our review, INL officials stated that INL was not required to complete an evaluation of its activities to develop the HNP because activities in Haiti did not meet State's requirements for evaluation. Specifically, activities in Haiti did not meet or exceed the mean cost of activities for the bureau, or meet the definition of a program supporting an objective of INL's Functional Bureau Strategy, or of a pilot activity expected to be expanded, according to INL officials.<sup>51</sup> However, INL's evaluation guidance notes that these evaluation requirements are

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<sup>49</sup>Evaluations of foreign assistance programs may vary in type, timing, and method. According to INL's implementation guidance for State's evaluation policy, INL may conduct performance or impact evaluations. A performance evaluation addresses descriptive, normative, or cause-and-effect questions, generally without a rigorous counterfactual. An impact evaluation tests a hypothesis by comparing those affected by the intervention and a comparable group that was not affected. The specific evaluation questions to be answered and the feasibility of various evaluation design options may determine which type of evaluation to conduct. See Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *INL Implementation Guidance for the Department's Evaluation Policy* (June 2021).

<sup>50</sup>For further information about program evaluation and the distinction between performance monitoring and program evaluation, see GAO, *Program Evaluation: Key Terms and Concepts*, [GAO-21-404SP](#) (Washington, D.C.: March 2021) and *Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and Relationships*, [GAO-11-646SP](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 2011).

<sup>51</sup>In February 2012, State issued its program evaluation policy, requiring bureaus to evaluate all large programs, projects, or activities at least once in their lifetime or every 5 years. INL defined large programs as those whose dollar value equaled or exceeded the mean program level for the bureau. In June 2021, INL issued its implementation guidance for State's evaluation policy in which INL revised the definition of programs to evaluate from large programs to those identified as objectives in the bureau's Functional Bureau Strategy. In addition, State's evaluation policy requires each bureau, including INL, to complete at least one evaluation each fiscal year, and evaluate pilot programs before deciding whether to replicate or expand them. See Department of State, 18 Foreign Affairs Manual 301.4; *Department of State Program and Project Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation*; and Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *INL Implementation Guidance for the Department's Evaluation Policy* (June 2021).

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minimum requirements and allow for additional and more frequent evaluations to meet learning and accountability needs.

Since the 2010 earthquake, INL has funded longstanding activities to develop the HNP through training and technical assistance as part of its ongoing efforts to strengthen Haiti's law enforcement capacity by developing a professional and accountable HNP that can manage the country's security. State's January 2019 guidance for the department's design, monitoring and evaluation policy states that bureaus managing multiyear, indefinite programs, such as INL's activities in Haiti, should conduct comprehensive evaluations to examine their performance and impacts at least once every 5 years.<sup>52</sup> The guidance further notes that evaluations can identify the underlying factors that affect implementation, efficiency, sustainability, and effectiveness of a bureau's activities, and help a bureau learn how to improve them. In some cases, evaluations may assess the value of continuing the investment, according to the guidance.

By evaluating its longstanding activities in Haiti, INL could obtain important information about the effectiveness of its efforts in meeting its objective to develop the HNP. For example, an evaluation could assess the effectiveness of INL's assistance in improving the HNP's budgetary and strategic planning capabilities, the investigative capacity of the HNP's counternarcotics unit, or the professional development of officers trained at the HNP Academy. Understanding how INL could strengthen the effectiveness of this assistance is particularly important given the significant investment made by the U.S. over time and the amount of gang-related deaths, displacements, kidnappings, civil unrest, and distrust in the judicial system currently reported in the country.

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<sup>52</sup>Department of State, *Guidance for the Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy at the Department of State* (January 2019).

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## USAID/Haiti Has Sought to Increase Local Partnership, but Does Not Track Sufficient Data on its Local Partnerships or Related Activities

For over a decade, USAID/Haiti has committed to increasing its partnership with local Haitian organizations to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of its efforts. However, we found that Haitian organizations receive limited USAID funding relative to international or multilateral organizations. According to USAID, its limited partnership with local organizations is partially due to gaps in organizational capabilities, such as management, finance, and reporting processes, needed to implement USAID awards and comply with U.S. regulations. USAID/Haiti also lacks processes to completely and consistently track and analyze key data on its local partnerships in Haiti to measure progress toward its commitments for increasing them. USAID/Haiti has taken steps to improve the capacity of local organizations, through mission-level efforts and at least six USAID-funded activities since fiscal year 2010, worth about \$25.7 million. However, USAID/Haiti does not systematically track USAID-funded activities to increase the organizational capacity of local Haitian entities.

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## USAID/Haiti Has Longstanding Commitments to Increase Local Partnership, but Does Not Track Sufficient Data on its Partnership with Local Organizations

USAID/Haiti has longstanding commitments to increase local capacity and its partnerships with Haitian organizations. These commitments are outlined in mission-level strategies. These include the *USAID/Haiti Strategic Framework: 2018-2020*, which highlighted strengthening local partner capacity to manage programming as a strategic priority, and the *USAID/Haiti Strategic Framework: 2020-2024*, which had an overall goal to increase Haitian engagement in achieving USAID/Haiti's development objectives. USAID/Haiti has also implemented several efforts and programs aimed at increasing its partnership with local Haitian entities, including obligating at least \$25.7 million in assistance to increase the capacity of local organizations to implement USAID awards.

Despite these longstanding goals, strategies, efforts, and programming aimed at increasing local capacity and local partnerships, USAID/Haiti does not know if it has increased its partnership with local entities. This fact is because USAID/Haiti does not have a process to completely and consistently track and analyze basic data on its partnerships with local organizations, such as the amount and percentage of funding awarded to local organizations and the percentage of USAID awards made to them.

- **Amount and percent of total USAID funding awarded to local organizations:** USAID/Haiti has not consistently measured the amount or percentage of total funding it has awarded to local organizations. In the past, USAID/Haiti collected and reported such data as part of the USAID Forward Local Solutions reporting process. However, USAID/Haiti officials said they stopped collecting and

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reporting these data in fiscal year 2018 when the agency dropped this reporting requirement, and USAID/Haiti elected to discontinue systematically tracking this information at the mission-level.

- **Percent of total USAID awards made to local organizations:** USAID/Haiti has not consistently tracked data on the percentage of awards it has made to local organizations to determine the share of total awards they constitute. While USAID/Haiti has consistently measured one performance indicator on local partnerships—the number of awards made to local partners—from fiscal years 2012 through 2020 as part of its annual PPR, it has not consistently tracked the percentage of total awards this constitutes. USAID/Haiti also does not track the total number of awards it makes each fiscal year to determine the share of total awards it makes to local organizations over time. In addition, according to the data for the performance indicator, the number of awards made to local organizations has trended downward since fiscal year 2015. Specifically, in the PPRs from fiscal years 2012 through 2020 USAID/Haiti reported the highest number of awards made to local partners in fiscal year 2015, when it awarded 28 awards to local partners. Since fiscal year 2015, USAID/Haiti reported fewer awards made to local partners, ranging between eight and 18 for fiscal years 2016 through 2020. However, USAID/Haiti officials said that because they lack institutional knowledge or any contextual data about this measure, they cannot explain why the numbers for this indicator have decreased in recent years. In addition, they cannot explain whether this trend was a consequence of how USAID measured the indicator, or a reflection of it having fewer partnerships with local organizations.

USAID/Haiti officials said they have not established processes to completely and consistently track and analyze these key data on the mission's local partnerships because the agency does not require the mission to do so, and the mission has elected not to do so. While officials said they may be able to collect and analyze this type of information going forward, it would be difficult or impossible to retroactively measure this information because they have not collected the data as part of their record keeping processes since the agency discontinued this reporting requirement. Officials agreed, however, that USAID/Haiti's current measurement processes were inadequate to understand and measure its partnerships with local organizations. They also acknowledged that benefits could come from tracking and analyzing additional data related to USAID/Haiti's mission-level commitment to enhance locally-led development, such as the amount and percentage of the mission's total funding awarded to local organizations.

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Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for management to collect and use quality information—information that is complete and appropriate—to make informed decisions and to evaluate achievement of the agency’s objectives.<sup>53</sup> Best practices we identified on enhancing the use of data in management activities and managing for results call for federal agencies to use data and evidence to inform decision-making, to understand and evaluate the performance of their programs toward achieving their objectives, and to make adjustments if performance is not being met.

Although the agency does not currently require the USAID/Haiti mission to track and analyze key data on the number and percent of funds and contracts awarded to local entities in Haiti, important benefits come from doing so. For example, the mission has formal strategic plans to strengthen local partner capacity and increase Haitian engagement in achieving USAID/Haiti’s development objectives. Establishing a process to completely and consistently track and analyze these key data would allow USAID/Haiti to collect and use quality information to measure progress toward achieving its locally-led development goals. Moreover, USAID/Haiti officials could also use these data to identify and assess trends and barriers in partnering with local organizations in Haiti, and to inform future strategies and interventions.

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## Local Organizations Receive Limited USAID Awards and Funding in Haiti, Partly Due to Gaps in Capacity to Implement USAID Awards

Although USAID/Haiti does not routinely collect and analyze data on local partnerships, our prior analysis of USAID award data found that local Haitian organizations received limited awards and funding to implement USAID reconstruction activities in Haiti.<sup>54</sup> For example, we previously found that local partners in Haiti implemented about one-quarter (27 percent) of reconstruction activities in Haiti from 2010 through 2020. We also found that obligations for activities implemented by Haiti-based entities were generally smaller than for activities implemented by partners based outside of Haiti. Our further assessment of these awards found that they accounted for 4 percent of USAID/Haiti’s total funding for reconstruction activities in Haiti during this period.

According to USAID reports and USAID/Haiti officials, many local organizations are interested in working with USAID, but the small-scale Haitian organizations often lack the financial, reporting, human resources,

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<sup>53</sup>See GAO *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, [GAO-14-704G](#) (Washington, D.C.: September 2014).

<sup>54</sup>See [GAO-21-263](#).

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and management capacities to manage the size and scope of USAID activities while complying with U.S. regulations. Another challenge is that USAID/Haiti may have to dedicate additional resources to oversee funding awarded to local partners to ensure requirements are met, according to officials. Implementing partners we interviewed echoed statements about local organizations struggling to meet USAID requirements. They added that language barriers, inability to compete with more established organizations, and lack of financial resources to pay for upfront costs may also hinder a local organization's ability to partner with USAID and implement USAID awards.

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### USAID Has Taken Steps to Improve the Capacity of Local Organizations in Haiti to Increase its Local Partnerships, but It Does Not Systematically Track its Activities

Through the course of our review, we identified three mission-level efforts and at least six USAID-funded activities to improve the organizational capacity and number of USAID's partnerships with local Haitian organizations.

Mission-level efforts included the use of transition awards, implementation of a co-creation process, and the creation of a Resiliency and New Partners Unit.

- **Transition Awards:** USAID/Haiti introduced "transition awards" to allow new and local organizations to partner with more experienced, prime implementing partners to build their capacity to manage USAID awards until they are ready to assume the prime implementing partner role. For example, we reviewed one activity focused on strengthening health capabilities in Haiti, where the prime implementing partner provided training and mentorship to two Haitian sub-awardees to prepare them to become primary implementing partners.
- **Co-Creation:** USAID/Haiti is implementing co-creation efforts in which it invites local organizations to participate in the design of USAID activities to increase engagement with local organizations and include their perspectives in the activity development process. For example, in developing its new civil-society strengthening program, USAID/Haiti hosted a co-creation workshop that included a series of collaborative sessions with local organizations.
- **Resiliency and New Partners Unit:** USAID/Haiti created a Resilience Unit, including a New Partnership Initiative team, to increase and expand the mission's engagement with local communities and assist the mission in attracting and facilitating work with local partners. USAID/Haiti officials said the unit began operating in early 2020 and has focused on identifying potential local partner organizations, opportunities for engagement, and areas where it could

incorporate resiliency into Haitian government planning documents. As of November 2022, officials said the unit was working to facilitate coordination and collaboration among USAID/Haiti's programs to enhance USAID's resiliency goals.

We identified at least six USAID-funded activities implemented between 2010 and 2020 that included assistance to strengthen the organizational capacity of local Haitian entities. Two of these activities focused on building organizational capacity of local entities. The remaining activities focused on another area of development, such as health or agriculture, but included assistance to build local organizational capacity.<sup>55</sup> Organizational capacity building assistance generally included training and coaching on various topics such as administrative, finance, and governance procedures, as well as award management and compliance with U.S. government regulations. For some activities, USAID also provided small grants to local organizations so they could exercise award and finance management.

Funding for local organizational capacity building assistance activities we identified from fiscal years 2010 through 2020 totaled about \$25.7 million, based on officials' estimates.<sup>56</sup> See table 3 for a list of organizational capacity building activities we identified in Haiti and their associated obligations.

**Table 3: USAID/Haiti and GAO-Identified USAID-Funded Organizational Capacity Building Activities in Haiti, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2020**

Activity Title	Sector or Primary Focus	Start Date	End Date	Obligations <sup>a</sup>
Local Capacity Konbit for Haiti	Organizational Capacity Building	9/28/2015	12/31/2020	7,666,712
Advancing Partners and Communities	Organizational Capacity Building	10/1/2012	9/1/2017	7,634,535
Konekte	Good Governance	10/18/2012	4/30/2018	3,721,397
Feed the Future, Chanje Lavi Plante	Agriculture	5/1/2015	5/1/2018	2,513,872
Health Leadership Project	Health	5/2/2019	5/1/2024	1,860,380
<b>Total</b>				<b>\$25,714,910</b>

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data and information. | GAO-23-105211

<sup>55</sup>In September 2022, USAID signed a \$15 million, 5-year cooperative agreement—the Civil Society Strengthening Program—focused on building such capacity for local organizations. We did not include this activity because it was not initiated within our time frames.

<sup>56</sup>For USAID-funded activities that did not have a primary focus on organizational capacity, the funding amount shown is USAID/Haiti's estimated portion of the activity's funding for organizational capacity building assistance.

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<sup>a</sup>For U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded activities that did not have a primary focus on organizational capacity, the obligations shown is USAID/Haiti's estimated portion of the activity's award amount for organizational capacity building assistance.

We cannot confirm that we identified all USAID-funded local organizational capacity building activities in Haiti since fiscal year 2010, because USAID/Haiti does not systematically track these activities. We initially asked USAID/Haiti to identify USAID-funded activities in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020 whose primary purpose was to build the organizational capacity of local entities to become potential USAID partners. However, USAID/Haiti's activity database does not have fields to track organizational capacity building activities, according to officials. While officials said an agency-level database can search for activities coded for capacity building, they said these codes are not consistently applied. We also found that the mission's search of this database only resulted in one activity with organizational capacity building assistance. Besides these databases, officials said the USAID/Haiti mission does not have another mechanism to track these activities. However, according to our conversations with officials, they may consider developing such a tool because they recognize the utility in collecting information on local capacity building. GAO identified the remaining five activities—including the two activities that exclusively focused on assisting local Haitian entities to build organizational capacity—through a review of USAID activity data and information and discussions with implementing partners. USAID/Haiti verified the activities we identified did include organizational capacity building.

USAID guidance requires officials to create and maintain records providing adequate and proper documentation and evidence of USAID activities, including programs and transactions, and to ensure they maintain the records for timely access and retrieval. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government also calls for managers to maintain sufficient documentation to retain organizational knowledge and to mitigate the risk of having that knowledge limited to a few personnel. It also calls for a means to communicate that knowledge as needed to external parties, such as outside auditors.<sup>57</sup>

Without systematically tracking and documenting these activities, USAID/Haiti lacks comprehensive institutional knowledge of past USAID investments intended to strengthen organizational capacity to increase USAID's local partnerships in Haiti, including the activities USAID/Haiti

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<sup>57</sup>See [GAO-14-704G](#).

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implemented and basic information about them. It also lacks knowledge of key interventions, entities involved, results achieved, and lessons learned. Tracking prior activities and understanding key information about them could help USAID/Haiti to understand the effectiveness of these investments toward achieving local partnership goals. USAID/Haiti could then use this information to better inform ongoing and future organizational capacity building efforts, such as the \$15 million Civil Society Strengthening Program that it co-designed and finalized during the course of this review. Finally, better tracking may also improve coordination and communication of these activities—which one implementing partner identified as areas of potential improvement during our audit work.

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### USAID-Funded Organizational Activities That Were Tracked Had Mixed Results

Our review of the final or most recent annual progress report available for the six activities found that implementing partners reported meeting about half (26 of 45, or 58 percent) of the targets for total performance indicators related to local organizational capacity building.<sup>58</sup> Examples of achievements reported by implementing partners included increased scores on organizational capacity assessments, sub-awardees being ready to take over primary program implementation, and beneficiary organizations successfully winning awards. For example, according to the implementing partner report and USAID/Haiti officials, the two local sub-awardees for one activity successfully passed all requirements needed to assume primary implementation of the activity, and the transition to them was slated to occur imminently. Areas where activities fell short of their performance goals included implementing partners not reaching the target number of beneficiaries or not supporting organizational reforms enough for organizations to reach the target, or beneficiaries failing to secure grant funding. For example, one activity aimed to assist five organizations to improve their cost accounting practices, such as budget tracking and cost allocation, but according to the most recent annual progress report we received, the activity only assisted two organizations with such support.

We identified one formal, USAID-funded mid-term evaluation pertaining to one of our six activities that found mixed results for a USAID-funded activity to build local organizational capacity. This mid-term evaluation found that financial management, project management, and monitoring and evaluation capacities were highly variable among the activity's

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<sup>58</sup>Progress reports are by the implementing partner, and therefore differ from formal, independent evaluations.

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beneficiaries. It also found that the degree of capacity change was inconsistent. Seven of the assessed beneficiary organizations had made at least moderate improvements after participating in the activity, and six appeared capable of effectively managing USAID funding, but these abilities may not be sustainable, according to the evaluation. The evaluation noted that varying levels of engagement on the part of the 23 beneficiaries affected the activity's ability to identify and address gaps in organizational capacity. USAID/Haiti officials said the mission's new Civil Society Strengthening Program activity will assess and account for beneficiary motivation and engagement with the program.

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## Conclusions

For more than a decade, USAID and State have both implemented activities intended to help Haiti reconstruct damaged infrastructure, strengthen its economy, and promote long-term stability in the country. These activities have been critical to supporting Haiti after a series of devastating catastrophes and setbacks, but their effectiveness is not fully known. Moreover, the results that are known have been mixed, and some key opportunities to learn from these activities on how to improve future efforts have been missed.

USAID's infrastructure activities have supported Haiti's recovery in a number of ways, including by providing shelter, reliable electricity, and improved access to health services. However, most infrastructure activities have experienced substantial delays, cost increases, and lower than expected results. The lessons learned from both successes and errors in planning would be valuable to USAID officials who are currently working to complete millions of dollars of ongoing and future infrastructure activities. However, USAID has no current strategic planning document that incorporates and builds on these lessons for the ongoing and future infrastructure activities. Developing such a document could guide USAID/Haiti in better identifying clear and realistic time frames, scopes, and budgets for ongoing and future projects before undertaking costly and lengthy redesigns or lowering expected results. Doing so could also provide USAID, USAID/Haiti officials, and others with important information about USAID's current infrastructure goals in Haiti and plans to achieve these goals.

With a U.S. investment in the billions, USAID and State are missing opportunities to obtain more information about the effectiveness of these reconstruction investments. Consequently, they have been unable to use such information to better manage and oversee their efforts in Haiti. USAID has not consistently and completely tracked some basic information about the results of its infrastructure activities, which limits

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accountability in terms of costs, time frames, and scopes of its major investments in Haiti. Similarly, without formally evaluating their activities to develop the HNP, State/INL officials and others lack information about the effectiveness of their longstanding efforts to improve law enforcement capacity in Haiti. This information is vital at a time when the country is struggling with poverty, violence, and political instability.

Finally, a major and longstanding goal of USAID is to support countries to become self-reliant and capable of leading their own development journeys. To support this goal, USAID's leadership and the USAID/Haiti mission have sought to increase partnerships with local Haitian organizations and to improve their capacity to manage USAID awards. However, local Haitian organizations are receiving very little USAID funding, and USAID/Haiti has limited visibility into what progress it is making in helping to build local organizational capacity to manage such funding. USAID/Haiti also does not have a process to accurately track and analyze data on its partnerships with local organizations. Nor does it know the full scope or effectiveness of activities that it has undertaken to help build local partner capacity. In light of the USAID Administrator's announced goal to award one-quarter of USAID development funds to local partners, tracking this information would better position USAID/Haiti and the agency to understand their current progress in reaching their goals and the effectiveness of their related activities. It would also help to inform future investments in this key area.

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## Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making the following five recommendations, four to USAID and one to State.

The Administrator of USAID should ensure USAID/Haiti updates or develops strategic infrastructure plans using quality information, such as technical information and expertise. (Recommendation 1)

The Administrator of USAID should ensure that USAID/Haiti develops a process to track and assess consistent and complete results information for infrastructure activities, such as the final outputs, outcomes, costs, time frames, and lessons learned. (Recommendation 2)

The Secretary of State should ensure that the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs conducts an evaluation of the effectiveness of its activities to develop the Haitian National Police. (Recommendation 3)

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The Administrator of USAID should ensure that USAID/Haiti establishes a process to completely and consistently track and analyze data on awards made to local organizations, such as the amount and percent of total funding awarded and the percent of total awards provided to these organizations. (Recommendation 4)

The Administrator of USAID should ensure that USAID/Haiti systematically tracks information on the activities that the mission funds to strengthen organizational capacity of Haitian organizations, including which activities USAID funds, and basic information about these activities, such as key interventions, entities involved, results achieved, and lessons learned. (Recommendation 5)

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## Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to State and USAID for comment. In their written comments, reproduced in appendix IV and V, both State and USAID concurred with our recommendations. USAID provided additional information about its efforts to address our recommendations. For example, USAID noted that USAID/Haiti has awarded a new monitoring, evaluation, and learning contract to collect and analyze data to assess and learn from ongoing and completed activities, including infrastructure activities. In addition, USAID noted that USAID/Haiti has begun to track data on direct awards made to local organizations and performance indicator data to measure whether capacity development efforts have led to improved organizational performance in organizations receiving organizational capacity development support from USAID. We will monitor State's and USAID's efforts to determine if they address our recommendations.

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We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at <https://www.gao.gov>.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4409 or [lovegrayerl@gao.gov](mailto:lovegrayerl@gao.gov). Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

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the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.



Latesha Love-Grayer  
Director, International Affairs and Trade

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# Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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This report examines the extent to which: (1) selected U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) infrastructure activities in Haiti achieved intended results from fiscal years 2010 through 2020, and what is known about the effects of the 2021 earthquake on those activities; (2) selected USAID development activities in Haiti achieved intended results during the period, and what is known about the effects of the 2021 earthquake on those activities; (3) the Department of State met its goals to develop the Haitian National Police (HNP); and (4) USAID undertook efforts to help build the capacity of Haitian entities to implement reconstruction activities in Haiti.

To examine the extent to which selected USAID infrastructure activities achieved intended results from fiscal years 2010 through 2020, and the effects of the 2021 earthquake on those activities, we reviewed information for eight selected major infrastructure activities included in a nongeneralizable sample of 440 USAID-funded reconstruction activities in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020.<sup>1</sup> Our sample included completed and ongoing reconstruction activities, including eight infrastructure and 42 development activities, for which USAID had obligated at least \$10 million as of September 30, 2020, or which were selected for our prior work on Haiti reconstruction.<sup>2</sup> As a result, our review of ongoing reconstruction activities included information about the progress and results of these activities as of 2022.

Because USAID funded some infrastructure activities using multiple awards and partners, we grouped awards contributing to a common infrastructure goal whose sole purpose was the construction, rehabilitation, operation, or maintenance of infrastructure, such as a building or physical system at one or more sites. For example, we grouped multiple awards in the energy sector that contributed to the

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<sup>1</sup>According to USAID guidance, activity is defined as an implementing mechanism that carries out an intervention or set of interventions to advance identified development results. We define infrastructure activities as those whose sole purpose was the construction and rehabilitation of buildings or physical systems. We define development activities as those whose purpose was not the construction and rehabilitation of buildings or physical systems.

<sup>2</sup>Because our review focused on longer-term reconstruction assistance, we excluded activities that related to short-term humanitarian assistance in Haiti. We also excluded activities that consisted solely of administration and of monitoring and evaluation assistance, as well as activities managed by USAID headquarters offices and bureaus. Findings cannot be used to make inferences about other reconstruction activities in Haiti that were not included in our final sample.

construction, operation, and maintenance of one power plant. We then use the term “component” when discussing the portions of the broader activity. Our groupings of activities were generally consistent with the sampling strategy for the prior report.<sup>3</sup> Our sample included eight major infrastructure activities in five reconstruction sectors—economic and food security, energy, health and disabilities, ports, and shelter.

We reviewed available USAID mission in Haiti (USAID/Haiti) progress documentation for each selected activity. Progress documents included initial award agreements, award agreement modifications, and the final or most recent implementing partner progress reports. We also reviewed other award documents, including final inspection reports in lieu of final implementing partner reports when USAID/Haiti could not locate such documents. In addition, we reviewed prior reports and audit documents from our prior work to obtain key results information.<sup>4</sup>

Using these sources, we then compared the results of these activities as of September 2022 with USAID/Haiti’s initially planned costs, time frames, and outputs reported in its 2011 post-earthquake infrastructure planning documents, including USAID/Haiti’s activity approval documents,<sup>5</sup> and with progress information we reported in a prior report.<sup>6</sup> We also interviewed knowledgeable USAID officials, including USAID/Haiti Office of Infrastructure, Engineering, and Energy officials, for their views on the planning process, results of selected infrastructure activities, and the effects of the August 2021 earthquake. We interviewed implementing partners for the ongoing port rehabilitation activity about the actual and planned results of this activity, and factors affecting results. We did not travel to Haiti and conducted all meetings by video or teleconference due to the COVID-19 pandemic and travel restrictions because of security concerns in the country.

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<sup>3</sup>See [GAO-15-517](#). We added two activity groupings for this report: one shelter sector activity that was not included in the prior report, and a port sector activity that we separated into two activities based on initial award documentation that described planned results for these activities separately.

<sup>4</sup>See [GAO-15-517](#).

<sup>5</sup>USAID developed activity approval documents for each sector to guide activity implementation in that sector. Activity approval documents are detailed planning documents that include a description of the related activities, their intended results, implementation methods and financing plans.

<sup>6</sup>See [GAO-15-517](#).

Our review of activity documentation and interviews with officials found the available results data for our selected infrastructure activities to be sufficiently reliable for reporting on high-level progress. We also reported on data quality issues we observed pertaining to the completeness and consistency of USAID/Haiti's processes for tracking and reporting infrastructure results documents and data, including instances in which these issues prevented us from determining the results of selected infrastructure activities.

We also reviewed photographs of our selected infrastructure sites obtained from USAID/Haiti. We provided USAID/Haiti officials with photographs we took of these sites during our prior field work in Haiti in 2012 and 2014 and requested updated photographs to the extent possible. We then reviewed photographs to compare prior conditions of these sites to current conditions and discussed our observations with knowledgeable officials.

To examine the extent that selected USAID development activities<sup>7</sup> in Haiti achieved their intended results, as well as the effects of the 2021 earthquake on those activities, we reviewed 29 of 57 evaluations completed from fiscal years 2010 through 2020.<sup>8</sup> We first developed a set of categories representing different types of assistance within each sector.<sup>9</sup> One analyst then independently coded all results for the 29 evaluations to describe which outcomes and outputs fell under which category.<sup>10</sup> Once the analyst coded all results for each of the evaluations,

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<sup>7</sup>We defined development activities as activities that were not focused solely on constructing or rehabilitating physical systems or buildings.

<sup>8</sup>Of the original 57 evaluations, we excluded 14 evaluations that did not relate to development activities in an assistance sector. We excluded another 13 evaluations because we found they evaluated activities in multiple countries and did not present data and information about results specific to activities in Haiti or had methodological limitations to measuring results. In addition, we excluded one evaluation because it was a baseline assessment and did not present activity results.

<sup>9</sup>Two analysts independently coded results to assess consistency and revised the list of categories as necessary. This process culminated in a list of 22 unique categories describing different types of assistance with sectors.

<sup>10</sup>The 29 evaluations included 21 final and eight mid-term evaluations of reconstruction activities in Haiti completed in fiscal years 2010 through 2020. For mid-term evaluations, we removed from our coding those statements of results that were interim or incomplete as of the time of the evaluation.

a second analyst reviewed the coded results. The two analysts discussed and reconciled any differences across the coding.

We then coded the categorized results as unsuccessful, successful, or unclear.<sup>11</sup> We defined successful results as instances in which the assistance met or exceeded a target or goal, had a favorable effect, provided intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or met scheduled time frames. We defined unsuccessful results as instances in which the assistance did not meet an expected target or goal, had an unfavorable effect, did not provide intended benefits to all beneficiaries, or did not meet scheduled time frames. We defined unclear results as instances in which the evaluations we reviewed did not specify whether the assistance met a target or goal, had a favorable or unfavorable effect, reached all intended beneficiaries, or met planned time frames. After completing coding, we analyzed the results and reported the number and percent that were successful, unsuccessful, or unclear by sector and sub-sector categories.

To understand the factors that affected the achievement of development results, including the effects of the August 2021 earthquake, we reviewed the most recent or final implementing partner progress reports for the 42 selected development activities included in our sample of USAID-funded reconstruction activities in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020. We reviewed each progress report to develop a list of unique factors that the implementing partners identified as hindering or facilitating the achievement of results.<sup>12</sup>

An analyst coded information from progress reports using this list of unique factors. A second analyst then reviewed the coded information to ensure consistent coding of the unique factors. The two analysts discussed and reconciled any differences across the coding. We then analyzed the coding to identify the number of activities for which implementing partners cited unique factors hindering or facilitating results

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<sup>11</sup>In some cases, we found that the percentage of unclear results for a type of assistance within a sector was large enough that an analysis of successful and unsuccessful results would have been insufficiently reliable for our purposes. Consequently, we excluded from our analysis the results of sector categories if the percentage of unclear results exceeded 30 percent.

<sup>12</sup>Three GAO analysts independently coded a sample of the recorded information from the progress reports, using the list of unique factors as a guide. The analysts compared their coding to assess consistency across analysts and revised the list of unique factors as necessary. This process culminated in a list of 36 unique factors that hindered or facilitated the achievement of development results.

for the 42 selected development activities. Finally, we interviewed USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and in Haiti, and implementing partners and available beneficiaries of seven of the 42 selected development activities that were ongoing at the time about activity results and factors affecting the achievement of results.

We reviewed the implementing partner reports and associated performance data, and interviewed knowledgeable USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and in Haiti, and implementing partners about the systems and methods used to report the performance data, the factors that affected the activities' performance, and any concerns or limitations about the data reported. We believe these steps were sufficient to allow for the use of these data for reporting on the factors affecting the achievement of results for selected USAID development activities in Haiti.

To examine the extent to which State met its goals to develop the HNP, for fiscal years 2010 through 2020 we reviewed Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) strategies for Haiti, implementing partner progress reports and other documents, and interviewed INL officials, HNP officials, and implementing partners of INL activities in Haiti. We reviewed INL Haiti strategies to identify the objectives of INL assistance to the HNP during the period. We analyzed data and information about the activities that INL funded in Haiti and interviewed INL officials in Washington, D.C., and in Haiti to identify the INL activities that supported the development of the HNP.<sup>13</sup>

For INL activities that supported the development of the HNP, we reviewed the most recent implementing partner progress reports and other documents to examine activity results and the factors affecting the achievement of results. For activities that implementing partners reported performance indicators, we compared target values with actual values for each performance indicator to calculate the percentage of the target achieved. We excluded from our analysis any performance indicators for

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<sup>13</sup>INL activities that supported the development of the HNP included those that supported the institutional development of the HNP Academy and the increase of the HNP force, and capacity building for specialized HNP units and the HNP corrections division. Because we focused on INL activities to develop the HNP workforce, we excluded from our analysis other activities that INL funded in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020 that focused on the construction and rehabilitation of HNP infrastructure, including police stations, HNP academy buildings, and corrections infrastructure. In addition, we excluded from our analysis INL activities that focused on peacekeeping support to the United Nations mission in Haiti and justice sector support to the Haitian judicial system and civil society organizations.

which the implementing partner did not report targets or reported targets as zero. We reviewed the implementing partner reports associated with the performance data, and interviewed knowledgeable INL officials in Washington, D.C., and in Haiti, and implementing partners about the systems and methods used to report the performance data, the factors that affected the activities' performance, and any concerns or limitations about the data reported. We believe these steps were sufficient to allow for the use of these data for reporting on the results and factors affecting the results of INL activities supporting the development of the HNP. In addition, we reviewed implementing partner reports and interviewed INL officials in Washington, D.C., and in Haiti, HNP officials, and implementing partners to further understand the results of the activities and the factors that hindered and facilitated the achievement of results.

We reviewed INL's bureau evaluation plans and interviewed INL officials in Washington, D.C., and in Haiti about plans for completing evaluations. We also reviewed State's evaluation policy and guidance and INL's implementation guidance for State's evaluation policy, and interviewed INL officials in Washington, D.C., about the agency's evaluation of activities supporting the development of the HNP, evaluation requirements, and the extent that these requirements applied to activities that supported the development of the HNP.<sup>14</sup>

To examine the extent of USAID's efforts to help build the organizational capacity of Haitian entities to implement reconstruction activities in Haiti, we reviewed documentation and interviewed USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and in Haiti about agency-wide and mission efforts and USAID-funded activities.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>See Department of State, 18 Foreign Affairs Manual 301.4, *Department of State Program and Project Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation*; Department of State, *Guidance for the Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy at the Department of State* (January 2019); and Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *INL Implementation Guidance for the Department's Evaluation Policy* (June 2021).

<sup>15</sup>For this report, we define organizational capacity building as activities intended to develop skills within the organization itself, including skills necessary to independently and appropriately manage USAID or other donor funding and programs. Organizational capacity-building activities may include strengthening an organization's governance, administration, human resources, financial management, organizational management, program management, and project performance management. Organizational capacity building differs from technical capacity building, which focuses on improving skills related to a specialized field, such as agriculture, education, or health.

Because USAID/Haiti does not completely and consistently collect data on its partnerships with local Haitian organizations, we determined the number of USAID reconstruction awards and the amount of USAID reconstruction funding awarded to local organizations by analyzing information and data we collected for our prior work.<sup>16</sup> We collected information from USAID/Haiti officials about the implementing partner organizations that implemented reconstruction activities in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020 and where they were headquartered. We categorized these organizations by their locations: U.S.-based entities, Haiti-based entities, entities based in a country other than the U.S. or Haiti, or multilateral organizations. We analyzed the information to identify the numbers of reconstruction activities that organizations in each category implemented as well as the total obligation amounts for these categories as of September 30, 2020.

To determine mission efforts, we reviewed USAID/Haiti documents. We also interviewed or reviewed written responses from knowledgeable USAID headquarters and USAID/Haiti officials about these activities and their processes for tracking and analyzing data on local partnerships and organizational capacity-building activities.

To identify relevant USAID-funded activities to help build the organizational capacity of Haitian entities, we compiled a list of relevant activities from documentation that USAID/Haiti officials provided on the activities it funded since 2010 that included such assistance. We also reviewed award data and information on USAID-funded activities in Haiti from fiscal years 2010 through 2020 collected for our prior work and award documents relevant to our current work to identify additional relevant activities.<sup>17</sup> Three GAO analysts then reviewed information reported in the final or most recent progress report for each activity to determine which activities provided organizational capacity building assistance to local Haitian entities.<sup>18</sup> From this process, we identified three relevant activities, which USAID/Haiti officials confirmed. During the course of our review, we identified three additional relevant activities, which USAID/Haiti officials also confirmed. Because USAID/Haiti does not systematically track data on its activities to build the organizational

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<sup>16</sup>See [GAO-21-263](#).

<sup>17</sup>See [GAO-21-263](#).

<sup>18</sup>We excluded activities that consisted solely of technical assistance, rather than organizational capacity-building assistance. We also excluded activities that assisted government institutions, rather than Haitian non-profit and for-profit entities.

capacity of local entities in Haiti, mission officials could not verify that our analysis identified all such activities. In total, we identified at least six activities that included a focus on organizational capacity of local entities.

We reviewed the final or most recent progress report for each identified activity that provided organizational capacity-building assistance and the one evaluation conducted to date that examined USAID/Haiti-funded organizational capacity building assistance. We also interviewed knowledgeable USAID officials, implementing partners of these activities, and representatives of Haitian organizations that received capacity-building assistance about the results of the assistance and the factors affecting the results. For the four activities that focused on another area of development, but included assistance to build organizational capacity, we obtained from USAID/Haiti officials estimates of the portion of funding for those awards that contributed to organizational capacity-building efforts.

Finally, to examine the extent to which USAID/Haiti's efforts and activities were successful in strengthening the organizational capacity of local Haitian entities so that they could implement USAID awards, and achieve USAID/Haiti's goals for increasing its local partnership, we reviewed USAID agency-wide and mission-level strategies, initiatives, and goals related to organizational capacity building and local partnership. We also reviewed State and USAID's *Performance Plan and Report* (PPR) for Haiti for each of fiscal years 2010 through 2020 to identify related performance indicators. In addition, we interviewed mission officials about the extent of mission-level data available on local partnerships in Haiti.

We found limitations to the completeness and consistency of the data USAID/Haiti collects on its local partnerships and organizational capacity-building activities, which we note in the report. However, we determined the data and documents we reviewed on the USAID/Haiti-funded activities in local organizational capacity building that we identified were sufficiently reliable for describing the activities and providing examples of their reported results.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2021 to March 2023 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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# Appendix II: U.S. Agency for International Development Evaluations of Development Activities in Haiti, Fiscal Years 2010–2020

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We reviewed the following 29 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) evaluations to determine the extent to which USAID-funded development activities in Haiti achieved intended results from fiscal years 2010 through 2020.

Global Health Action. *Final Evaluation Report: Healthy Mothers, Healthy Children: A Child Survival Initiative in Petit-Goâve, Haiti*. Decatur, GA: December 24, 2010.

The Global Health Technical Assistance Project. *Mid-Term Evaluation Report: USAID/Haiti: PROMARK Project*. Washington, D.C.: January 2011.

University of Wisconsin-Extension. *Mid-Term Evaluation of the Farmer-to-Farmer Program in Guyana, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti*. Madison, WI: March 15, 2011.

The Global Health Technical Assistance Project. *USAID/Haiti: Santé pour le Développement et la Stabilité d’Haïti (SDSH) Project Evaluation*. Washington, D.C.: November 2011.

Groupe d’Études de Consultation et d’Aide à la Décision Économique et Stratégique, S.A. *Konbit Ak Tèt Ansanm: A Final Evaluation*. Port-au-Prince, Haiti: January 16, 2012.

Democracy International, Inc. *Final Report: Evaluation of the Limyè ak Organizasyon pu Kolekyivite yo Ale Lwen (LOKAL) Program in Haiti*. Bethesda, MD: April 2012.

Mendez England and Associates. *Evaluation of the USAID/Haiti Integrated Financing for Value Chains and Enterprises (HIFIVE) Program*. Bethesda, MD: August 1, 2012.

Personna, Yves Robert and Wesner Antoine. *Performance Evaluation Final Report: Développement Economique pour un Environnement Durable (DEED)*. August 2013.

The QED Group, LLC. *Final Evaluation of the USAID/OTI Haiti Recovery Initiative*. October 2013.

Social Impact, Inc. *Performance Evaluation: USAID/Haiti Feed the Future West/Watershed Initiative for National Natural Environmental Resources*. Arlington, VA: November 2015.

BRIDES. *Final Performance Evaluation Report: Haiti Improved Cooking Technology Program (ICTP)*. Pétiion-Ville, Haiti: December 2015.

Cultural Practice, LLC. *Final Performance Evaluation of the Leveraging Effective Application of Direct Investments (LEAD) Project*. Bethesda, MD: March 3, 2016.

PHAREVIEW S.A. *Final Performance Evaluation of the Haiti Integrated Financing for Value Chains and Enterprises (HIFIVE) Project*. Port-au-Prince, Haiti: June 23, 2016.

Fulton, Joan, Farid Waliyar, Medson Chisi, and Eric Welch. *External Evaluation of Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Collaborative Research on Peanut Productivity and Mycotoxin Control*. August 2016.

Global Health Performance Cycle Improvement Project. *Services de Santé de Qualité pour Haïti (SSQH) Evaluation Report*. Washington, D.C.: August 2016.

BRIDES. *Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report: Feed the Future North Project (AVANSE)*. Pétiion-Ville, Haiti: February 2017.

CHASE Consulting. *Final Performance Evaluation Report: Chabon Boul Project*. Port-au-Prince, Haiti: November 13, 2017.

Social Impact, Inc. *Evaluation Report: Final Performance Evaluation of the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) Activity*. March 5, 2018.

Alter Modus International Corp. *Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of the Caribbean Marine Biodiversity Program*. Washington, D.C.: May 2018.

Social Impact, Inc. *Final Evaluation Report: Final Performance Evaluation of the Limiyé ak Òganizasyon pou Kolektivite yo ale Lwen (LOKAL+) Activity*. July 2018.

Social Impact, Inc. *Final Evaluation Report: Voucher School Feeding Pilot (VSFP) Activity*. August 2018.

Social Impact, Inc. *Performance Evaluation of Workforce Augmentation Program*. November 2018.

Social Impact, Inc. *Performance Evaluation Report: Local Value Chain Enhancement (LEVE) Activity*. July 2019.

Social Impact, Inc. *Final Evaluation Report: Haiti Feed the Future North (FTFN)/Appui a la Valorisation Du Potentiel Agricole Du Nord Pour La Sécurité Economique et Environnementale (AVANSE) Activity*. January 2020.

Social Impact, Inc. *Final Performance Evaluation Report: Chanje Lavi Plantè Activity*. March 2020.

Social Impact, Inc. *Evaluation Report: Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of the Konbit Program*. April 15, 2020.

Social Impact, Inc. *Final Evaluation Report: Performance Evaluation of Smallholder Alliance for Sorghum in Haiti (SMASH) Activity*. May 2020.

Social Impact, Inc. *Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report: Haiti Justice Sector Strengthening Program (JSSP)*. July 2020.

Social Impact, Inc. *Final Report: USAID/Haiti Home Ownership and Mortgage Expansion (HOME) Performance Evaluation*. August 2020.

# Appendix III: Selected U.S. Agency for International Development Development Activities in Haiti, Fiscal Years 2010–2020

Table 4 shows the activity title or purpose, start and end dates, and total obligation amounts for fiscal years 2010 through 2020 as of September 30, 2020, for the 42 selected U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) development activities we reviewed. These activities are organized by the four development sectors we reviewed, including economic and food security, governance and rule of law, health and disabilities, and education.

**Table 4: Selected USAID Development Activities in Haiti, Fiscal Years 2010–2020**

Sector	Activity title or purpose	Activity start	Activity end	Total obligation amount for activity (dollars) <sup>a</sup>
Economic and food security	Feed the Future West – Natural Resources and Biodiversity, and Agricultural Sector Capacity Building	2009	2015	126,428,514
	Konbit Ak Tet Ansanm Private Sector Competitiveness Activity	2011	2011	104,630,744
	Food Distribution Program	2004	2012	92,288,010
	Feed the Future North – agricultural development	2013	2020	85,775,004
	Haiti Integrated Financing for Value Chains and Enterprises	2009	2017	36,877,749
	Local Enterprise and Value Chain Enhancement	2013	2019	33,975,455
	USAID Reforestation Project	2017	2022	30,702,078
	Feed the Future West – Chanje Lavi Plante	2015	2018	25,032,755
	Economic Development for a Sustainable Environment	2008	2012	20,655,999
	The Haitian Out-of-School Youth Livelihood Initiative	2003	2011	16,988,560
	Leveraging Effective Application of Direct Investments	2011	2017	16,966,996
	Home Ownership and Mortgage Expansion	2015	2021	10,299,683
Governance and rule of law	Haiti Justice Sector Strengthening Program	2016	2022	24,573,383
	Improving Justice Service Delivery and Sector Reform in Haiti	2009	2016	22,253,425
	Support of local government activity	2013	2018	21,958,172
	Elections and Political Processes Support Activity	2017	2022	12,568,778
	Election support	2015	2018	12,553,841
	Integrated Financial Management System Activity – Phase V	2014	2019	11,955,379
Local government and decentralization	2005	2011	11,655,727	

**Appendix III: Selected U.S. Agency for  
International Development Development  
Activities in Haiti, Fiscal Years 2010–2020**

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Activity title or purpose</b>	<b>Activity start</b>	<b>Activity end</b>	<b>Total obligation amount for activity (dollars)<sup>a</sup></b>
	Parliamentary Strengthening Program	2011	2014	7,825,501
	Protecting the Rights of Children, Women, and Youth	2012	2014	4,460,176
Health and disabilities	Health for the Development and Stability of Haiti	2011	2012	79,975,721
	Maternal and child health, reproductive health, and HIV services to the Haitian population; support for the Ministry of Health	2014	2019	69,992,711
	Integrated HIV/AIDS Community Care Program in Haiti	2009	2013	39,300,029
	Services de Santé de Qualité Pour Haiti—Central/South	2013	2016	35,706,640
	Water, sanitation, and hygiene project	2017	2022	33,364,727
	HIV/AIDS health project	2015	2023	27,739,433
	Health for the Development and Stability of Haiti II	2012	2014	24,982,536
	Services de Santé de Qualité pour Haiti—North	2013	2015	20,421,626
	Byenèt ak Sante Timoun Activity - Support to orphaned and vulnerable children	2013	2019	19,986,149
	Linkages across the Continuum of HIV	2014	2021	18,535,725
	Strengthening and Expanding Social Marketing in Haiti	2009	2014	16,549,795
	Leadership Management Science	2010	2015	15,121,289
	Global health supply chain procurement and supply management	2015	2023	14,362,716
	Aksyon Kominote nan Santé pou Ogmante Nitrisyon	2016	2021	12,844,001
	Nutrition Surveillance Program	2013	2016	12,000,000
	Health private sector flagship project	2015	2021	11,410,550
	Impact Youth	2018	2022	10,500,000
Education	Phare-Programme Haïtien d'Appui à la Réforme de L'Éducation	2008	2011	27,926,793
	Haiti Wins: Read, Write, Succeed!	2007	2021	15,731,260
	The Tout Timoun Ap Li – All Children Reading	2012	2014	12,965,510
	An n Ale	2015	2016	11,323,854

Source: GAO analysis of data and information provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). | GAO-23-105211

Notes: The data and information shown were current as of September 30, 2020.

Total obligation amounts shown include total amounts of obligations, including disbursements, for each activity that USAID funded in fiscal years 2010 through 2020. These total obligation amounts may include funds appropriated before fiscal year 2010.

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**Appendix III: Selected U.S. Agency for  
International Development Development  
Activities in Haiti, Fiscal Years 2010–2020**

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<sup>a</sup>For this report, obligations are orders placed, contracts awarded, and similar transactions during a given period that will require payments during the same or a future period. USAID categorizes such transactions as subobligations, because it considers these funds to have been obligated through a bilateral agreement with Haiti to deliver assistance.

# Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State



United States Department of State  
*Comptroller*  
Washington, DC 20520

MAR 6 2023

Jason Bair  
Managing Director  
International Affairs and Trade  
Government Accountability Office  
441 G Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Dear Mr. Bair:

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "HAITI: USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities" GAO Job Code 105211.

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "William B. Davisson".

William B. Davisson (Acting)

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc: GAO – Latesha Love  
INL – Lisa Johnston (Acting)  
OIG - Norman Brown

Department of State Comments on Draft GAO Report

**HAITI: USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of  
Reconstruction Activities**  
(GAO-23-105211, GAO Code 105211)

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the GAO draft report, "*Haiti: USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities.*"

**Recommendation 3:** The Secretary of State should ensure that the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs conducts an evaluation of the effectiveness of its activities to develop the Haitian National Police.

**The Department concurs with the recommendation.** INL will conduct an independent internal evaluation of the effectiveness of its activities to develop the Haitian National Police. A social scientist from INL's Office of Knowledge Management will work with the Haiti program team to evaluate the extent to which the overall program and related projects have achieved their expected results, and to make recommendations as needed.

# Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development



March 1, 2023

Jason Bair  
Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade Team  
U.S. Government Accountability Office  
441 G Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20226

Re: USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities (GAO-23-105211)

Dear Mr. Bair:

I am pleased to provide the formal response of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to the draft report produced by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) titled, *USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities* (GAO-23-105211).

USAID concurs with the four recommendations directed to the Agency.

I am transmitting this letter and the enclosed comments from USAID for inclusion in the GAO's final report. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the draft report, and for the courtesies extended by your staff while conducting this engagement. We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the complete and thorough evaluation of our post- 2010 earthquake reconstruction activities in Haiti.

Sincerely,

*Colleen R. Allen*

Colleen R. Allen  
Assistant Administrator  
Bureau for Management

Enclosure: a/s

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**Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency  
for International Development**

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**COMMENTS BY THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ON THE DRAFT  
REPORT PRODUCED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) TITLED, *USAID  
and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities*  
(GAO-23-105211)**

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) would like to thank the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) for the opportunity to respond to this draft report. We appreciate the extensive work of the GAO engagement team, and the specific findings that will help USAID achieve greater effectiveness in our ongoing post-2010 earthquake reconstruction activities in Haiti.

Provided below is USAID's response to the four Recommendations (1, 2, 4 and 5) directed to USAID.

**Recommendation 1:** The Administrator of USAID should ensure USAID/Haiti updates or develops strategic infrastructure plans using quality information such as technical information and expertise.

**Response:** USAID concurs. USAID/Haiti will review and will update, as necessary, its planning documents for all on-going infrastructure projects to ensure that they include accurate and complete information, including, but not limited to, current project scopes and related technical requirements, current project budgets and financial information, current project timelines, and current project implementation approaches and related mechanisms. USAID/Haiti plans to complete this action by August 31, 2023.

If USAID/Haiti undertakes new infrastructure projects in the future, it will ensure that all planning and other requirements for USAID infrastructure projects are adhered to and documented, including policy requirements for the management of construction risks.

USAID/Haiti will also ensure that staff with the requisite technical and other skills are engaged in the planning, design, implementation, management, and oversight of its infrastructure projects.

Finally, USAID/Haiti will ensure that all infrastructure project planning documents and reports submitted by implementers of such projects pursuant to the terms of their USAID awards are properly maintained in accordance with applicable record keeping requirements.

**Recommendation 2:** The Administrator of USAID should ensure that USAID/Haiti develops a process to track and assess consistent and complete results information for infrastructure activities, such as the final outputs, outcomes, costs, timeframes, and lessons learned.

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**Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency  
for International Development**

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**Response:** USAID concurs. To assess and learn from projects and activities that are ongoing and completed, including our infrastructure projects, USAID/Haiti awarded, in August 2022, a new monitoring, evaluating, and learning contract (Evaluation Survey and Services Plus (ESS+)), to collect and analyze data to build USAID/Haiti's knowledge and evidence base on its programs and the local context. ESS+ will use these findings to support learning and adaptive management within the Mission. To sustain and multiply the impact of ESS+, this mechanism works with USAID and our partners to instill best practices in monitoring and evaluation and collaborating, learning, and adapting.

In addition, USAID/Haiti will utilize the Agency's new information tracking system, Development Information System (DIS), to track and assess results information for our infrastructure projects as well as other USAID/Haiti projects and activities. The Mission is currently uploading this information into DIS and expects to complete this process by December 31, 2023. Data will be updated in the system as necessary. USAID/Haiti considers this recommendation to be partially addressed and expects to complete this action by December 31, 2023.

**Recommendation 4:** The Administrator of USAID should ensure that USAID/Haiti establishes a process to completely and consistently track and analyze data on awards made to local organizations, such as the amount and percent of total funding awarded, and the percent of total awards provided to these organizations.

**Response:** USAID concurs. Following the launch of the Agency's *Localization at USAID: The Vision and Approach* in August 2022, USAID/Haiti, through its Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA), began tracking the following data on direct awards to local organizations: 1) the number of direct awards to local organizations as defined by the Agency; 2) the total amount of funding per fiscal year awarded to local organizations; 3) the percent of total funding awarded directly to local organizations; and 4) the percent of total awards provided to local organizations. USAID/Haiti will continue to track this information for its direct awards to local organizations and will analyze this information to both inform our work in Haiti and to support the achievement of the Agency's localization goals. USAID considers this recommendation to be fully addressed.

**Recommendation 5:** The Administrator of USAID should ensure that USAID/Haiti systematically tracks information on the activities that the mission funds to strengthen organizational capacity of Haitian organizations, including which activities USAID funds, and basic information about these activities, such as key interventions, entities involved, results achieved, and lessons learned.

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**Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency  
for International Development**

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**Response:** USAID concurs. USAID/Haiti started tracking USAID’s standard indicator “Capacity Building (CBLD)-9: Percent of USG-assisted organizations with improved performance [Implementing Mechanism-level]” in FY 2020. This indicator measures whether USG-funded capacity development efforts have led to improved organizational performance in organizations receiving organizational capacity development support from USAID. Realizing that it was only tracking one set of indicators through the annual Performance Plan and Report (PPR), USAID/Haiti plans to modify our internal tracker to include PEPFAR-funded activities, to gather a full spectrum of our work and impact on activities primarily focused on strengthening the organizational capacity of Haitian organizations. USAID/Haiti considers this recommendation to be partially addressed and expects to complete this action by September 30, 2023.

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# Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

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## GAO Contact

Latesha Love-Grayer, Director, (202) 512-4409 or [lovegrayerl@gao.gov](mailto:lovegrayerl@gao.gov)

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## Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Rob Ball (Assistant Director), Bradley Hunt (Analyst-in-Charge), Karl Antonsson, Mairé Gebhard, Kayli Westling, Ashley Alley, Suzanne Kaasa, Chris Keblitis, Patricia Palao Da Costa, and Aldo Salerno made key contributions to this report.

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# Related GAO Products

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*Haiti: USAID Funding for Reconstruction and Development Activities Since the 2010 Earthquake.* [GAO-21-263](#). Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2021.

*Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Has Achieved Mixed Results and Should Enhance Sustainability Planning.* [GAO-15-517](#). Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2015.

*Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed Results and Face Sustainability Challenges.* [GAO-14-47T](#). Washington D.C.: October 9, 2013.

*Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed Results and Face Sustainability Challenges.* [GAO-13-558](#). Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2013.

*Haiti Reconstruction: Factors Contributing to Delays in USAID Infrastructure Construction.* [GAO-12-68](#). Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2011.

*Haiti Reconstruction: U.S. Efforts Have Begun, Expanded Oversight Still to Be Implemented.* [GAO-11-415](#). Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2011.

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Chuck Young, Managing Director, [youngc1@gao.gov](mailto:youngc1@gao.gov), (202) 512-4800  
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149  
Washington, DC 20548

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## Strategic Planning and External Liaison

Stephen J. Sanford, Managing Director, [spel@gao.gov](mailto:spel@gao.gov), (202) 512-4707  
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814,  
Washington, DC 20548

