

GAO

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
on Contracting Oversight, Committee
on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

February 2013

WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning



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Highlights of [GAO-13-212](#), a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has relied extensively on contractors for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade. At the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the number of contractors exceeded the number of military personnel, and a similar situation is occurring in Afghanistan. In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum noting the risk of DOD's level of dependency on contractors and outlined actions to institutionalize changes necessary to influence how the department plans for contracted support in contingency operations. The memorandum also called for leveraging the civilian expeditionary workforce to reduce DOD's reliance on contractors, but this workforce is not yet fully developed. GAO was asked to examine DOD's progress in planning for operational contract support. Our review determined how DOD is integrating operational contract support into its planning through efforts of the (1) OSD, Joint Staff, and military services, and (2) combatant commands and their components. To conduct its work, GAO evaluated DOD operational contract support guidance and documents and met with officials at various DOD offices.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force provide guidance on planning for operational contract support; that the Joint Staff provide training for all planners; that the planners broaden their focus to include areas beyond logistics; and that expertise is offered to service components to further integrate operational contract support into plans. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations.

View [GAO-13-212](#). For more information, contact Cary Russell at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov.

February 2013

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DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning

What GAO Found

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the services have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into planning for contingency operations. For example, in April 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, working with the Joint Staff, revised the Guidance for the Employment of the Force to require planning for operational contract support in all phases of military operations. Further, in December 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised an instruction and issued corresponding regulations establishing policies and procedures for operational contract support. The Army issued service-specific guidance that describes roles, responsibilities, and requirements to help integrate operational contract support into its planning efforts for contingency operations. However, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not issued similar comprehensive guidance for integrating operational contract support throughout each service. Instead, these services have taken actions such as developing training and other individual efforts to familiarize servicemembers with operational contract support. According to service officials, one reason that they have not issued comprehensive guidance similar to the Army's guidance is because the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not been the lead service for contracting in recent operations. However, these services combined spent over a billion dollars for contracted services in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011. Without specific, service-wide guidance, the other services' future planning efforts may not reflect the full extent of the use of contract support and the attendant cost and need for oversight.

The combatant commands and their components have begun to incorporate operational contract support into their planning for contingencies, but they have not fully integrated operational contract support in all functional areas. We found that the combatant commands and components are not planning for the potential use of contractors in areas where they may be needed beyond logistics such as communications. Recognizing the problem, DOD, in October 2012, issued guidance that calls on functional planners beyond the logistics area to identify major support functions planned for commercial support sourcing. GAO also found that officials involved with logistics planning at the commands receive training from the Joint Staff and assistance from embedded operational contract support planners to help integrate operational contract support into logistics planning. However, officials involved in planning for other areas—such as intelligence—that have used contractors in past operations, do not receive such training. Further, the embedded operational contract support planners do not focus on areas beyond logistics. Moreover, while the combatant commands have embedded experts to assist with operational contract support planning, the military service components do not have such expertise. Without training for all planners, a broader focus beyond logistics for embedded planners, and expertise offered at the military service components, DOD risks being unprepared to plan and manage deployed contractor personnel and may not be able to provide the necessary oversight during future contingencies.

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Abbreviations

DOD	Department of Defense
J-4	Joint Staff Logistics Directorate
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

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Accountability * Integrity * Reliability

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

February 8, 2013

The Honorable Claire McCaskill
Chairman
Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

Senator McCaskill:

The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied extensively on contractors for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade. At the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the number of contractors exceeded the number of military personnel, and a similar situation is occurring in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. According to DOD, in 2012, the number of contractors in Afghanistan exceeded 109,000 compared to the approximately 84,200 military personnel present at that same time. According to DOD regulations, operational contract support is the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing support to the joint force within a designated operational area.¹ In Afghanistan, contractors provide traditional logistical support, such as base operating support (food and housing) and maintaining weapon systems. Additionally, contractors provide nonlogistical support, such as intelligence analysts and interpreters who accompany military patrols. DOD anticipates continued reliance on contractors for future operations.

Our previous work has highlighted long-standing problems regarding the oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces and the department's failure to fully integrate operational contract support within DOD. For example, we and others have identified instances in Iraq and Afghanistan where DOD's acquisition and non-acquisition personnel were in short supply, were not properly trained, or were not fully aware of their responsibilities. Since 1992, we have designated DOD contract

¹32 C.F.R. § 158.3 (2012). DOD joint doctrine describes operational contract support as the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations along with the associated contractor management functions. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 4-10, *Operational Contract Support* at GL-8 (Oct. 17, 2008) (hereinafter cited as Joint Pub. 4-10 (Oct. 17, 2008)).

management as a high-risk area.² In our February 2011 report on high-risk areas, we reported that DOD needed to, among other things, fully integrate operational contract support throughout the department through education and predeployment training. In June 2010, because of the department not fully integrating operational contract support, we called for a cultural change in DOD—one that emphasized an awareness of operational contract support throughout all entities of the department to help address the challenges faced in ongoing and future contingency operations—and last September, we testified that DOD still faced challenges achieving such a change.³ We recognize that effecting a cultural change is a major undertaking for organizations, especially for an organization as large and multifaceted as DOD. Effecting a cultural change involves, for example, developing and communicating a vision for the future, neutralizing impediments to change, identifying stakeholders in the change process, and promoting continued support from senior leaders.⁴ Additionally, Congress has enacted legislation requiring DOD to take specific actions to improve its management and oversight of contractors in contingency operations.⁵ For example, in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress required DOD to develop joint policies for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting during combat and postconflict operations.⁶ A provision in the National Defense

²GAO, *High-Risk Series: An Update*, [GAO-11-278](#) (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2011).

³GAO, *Warfighter Support: Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans for and Manages Operational Contract Support*, [GAO-10-829T](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2010) and *Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies*, [GAO-12-1026T](#) (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012).

⁴GAO, *Aviation Acquisition: A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed for Cultural Change at FAA*, [GAO/RCED-96-159](#) (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 1996).

⁵A “contingency operation” is a military operation that either (a) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against U.S. enemies or against an opposing military force or (b) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under certain statutory provisions or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress. See 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13).

⁶See Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 854(a)(1) (2006).

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 added to this requirement,⁷ which is codified as amended at section 2333 of Title 10, United States Code.

DOD has taken steps toward making fundamental changes in how it approaches the issue of operational contract support. In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum in which he expressed concern about the risks introduced by DOD's current level of dependency on contractors, its future total force mix, and the need to better plan for operational contract support in the future.⁸ The Secretary outlined a number of actions needed to institutionalize the changes necessary to influence a cultural shift in how the department views, and accounts and plans for, contracted support in a contingency environment. In addition, in June 2011, the Director of the Joint Staff issued a memorandum to implement the direction in the Secretary's memorandum and assigned Joint Staff directors to specific tasks regarding the integration of operational contract support and the civilian expeditionary workforce throughout DOD.⁹ Further, in December 2011, DOD issued DOD Instruction 3020.41 and corresponding regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations. The instruction and regulations established policy, assigned responsibilities, and provided procedures for operational contract support, including operational contract support program management, contract support integration, and integration of defense contractor personnel into contingency operations outside the United States.¹⁰

In addition to operational contract support, the Secretary of Defense's January 2011 memorandum also addresses the need to better leverage the capabilities of the civilian expeditionary workforce in order to reduce the risk introduced by DOD's level of reliance on contractors. Created in 2009, the civilian expeditionary workforce is a DOD program that deploys civilian employees to support military operations. As of late 2012, it

⁷See Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 849(a) (2008).

⁸Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, "Strategic and Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support (OCS) and Workforce Mix" (Jan. 24, 2011).

⁹Memorandum from the Director of the Joint Staff, DJSM 0380-11, "Implementation of SecDef Memorandum on Strategic and Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support (OCS) and Workforce Mix" (June 1, 2011).

¹⁰See *Operational Contract Support*, 32 C.F.R. pt. 158 (added by 76 Fed. Reg. 81,807 (Dec. 29, 2011)); Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS)* (Dec. 20, 2011) (hereinafter cited as DODI 3020.41(Dec. 20, 2011)).

comprised approximately 395 personnel, which is about 10 percent of the total number of civilians deployed in support of contingency operations.¹¹ DOD established this workforce to create a cadre of civilians who are trained, cleared, and equipped to respond urgently to expeditionary requirements. However, according to officials from the civilian expeditionary workforce program office, the use of these individuals, to date, has been on an augmentee basis to fulfill individual requirements. In an effort to utilize the program as originally intended with a ready pool of qualified and trained civilians to support contingency operations, civilian expeditionary workforce officials stated that they are currently developing a DOD instruction that includes defining the critical skill sets for the civilian expeditionary workforce program.¹² DOD expects to issue the instruction in late 2013. In the interim, DOD officials stated that they expect to release a policy memorandum ahead of the instruction that will address the civilian expeditionary workforce support and deployment procedures. According to officials from the services and combatant commands and their components, they are not planning for this workforce until the capabilities are further defined.

In light of continuing interest in DOD's integration and management of contracted support in support of contingency operations, you asked us to examine DOD's progress on institutionalizing the planning for operational contract support throughout the department. Specifically, our objectives were to determine how DOD is integrating planning for operational contract support through efforts of: (1) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the military services, and (2) the combatant commands and their components.

To conduct this review, we collected and analyzed documentation such as planning guidance and policies related to the integration of operational contract support into DOD's planning for contingency operations. We reviewed plans and other efforts to understand DOD's implementation of requirements to integrate operational contract support. We also interviewed officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, military services, and

¹¹According to DOD officials, DOD components and agencies concurrently continue to deploy their own civilians in support of contingency operations.

¹²DOD published a directive addressing the civilian expeditionary workforce in 2009. See Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, *DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce* (Jan. 23, 2009).

combatant commands to obtain a comprehensive understanding of DOD's efforts to integrate operational contract support. Specifically, to determine how OSD and the Joint Staff have taken steps to integrate operational contract support department-wide, we examined excerpts from strategic planning guidance and policies regarding operational contract support and met with officials from OSD and the Joint Staff. We reviewed DOD guidance on the civilian expeditionary workforce and interviewed officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, the civilian expeditionary workforce program office, military services, and combatant commands to understand the intent and the status of the development of the civilian expeditionary workforce program. To determine how the military services have integrated operational contract support into their operations, we collected and analyzed documentation related to operational contract support initiatives from each of the services. We also met with officials from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to gain an understanding of how each organization has implemented operational contract support to support strategic-level guidance and policy. To determine how combatant commands and their components have integrated operational contract support into planning, we reviewed selected operation and contingency plans to validate the integration of operational contract support considerations in those instances.¹³ We also met with officials from all of the geographic combatant commands (except U.S. Northern Command) and their components to gain knowledge about their current processes for planning for contingency operations.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to February 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our scope and methodology are in appendix I.

¹³For this review, in order to verify the level at which the combatant commands and components were integrating operational contract support into plans, we requested combatant command and component officials to provide sample operation plans that included base plans with operational contract support considerations, Annex Ws, and other functional area annexes that also contained operational contract support language.

Background


Organizational Responsibilities for Operational Contract Support

The U.S. military routinely uses contracted support in contingency operations. Military forces will often be significantly augmented with contracted support because of the continual introduction of high-technology equipment, coupled with force structure and manning limitations, and the high pace of operations. Accordingly, DOD has recognized that the planning for and integration of contracted support into joint operations is important for the successful execution of military operations. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense's January 2011 memorandum addresses the need to better plan for operational contract support at the strategic and operational levels. The following describes the roles of various DOD offices involved in planning for operational contract support:

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for policy, plans, and program development for the total force, which includes military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor personnel.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has the overall responsibility for the performance of the department's acquisition system, including establishing and publishing policies and procedures governing the operations of the acquisition system and the administrative oversight of defense contracts.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has specific responsibilities in the areas of strategic direction as well as in strategic and contingency planning. The Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J-4) provides plans, policy, guidance, and oversight on joint logistics, including joint contingency operational contract support matters.
- The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force (under their respective Secretaries) are responsible for planning and executing contract support to their own forces unless directed otherwise by a combatant commander. The Secretaries of the military departments have been tasked in the Secretary of Defense's January 2011 memorandum to assess how total force data (that is, the mix of military forces, contractors, and civilians) can inform planning and to assess opportunities for in-sourcing contracted capabilities that represent a high risk to the warfighter.

- The geographic combatant commands plan and oversee the military operations for their areas of responsibility. Combatant commanders are assigned military service components that assist them with further planning and execution of the missions (see fig. 1).¹⁴

Figure 1: The Geographic Combatant Commands' and Their Components' Areas of Responsibilities



Source: DOD.

¹⁴Additionally, the Secretaries of the military departments provide administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to the combatant commands, augmenting military support capabilities with contracted support when appropriate through their respective service component commands assigned to the combatant commands.

-
- The Defense Logistics Agency, at the request of the combatant commands, has two expert planners from its Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office placed in the logistics offices at each combatant command to improve the incorporation of operational contract support into combatant command plans.

Contingency Planning

The combatant commands and their components create plans to prepare for possible missions in their area. This planning begins with broad strategic guidance provided by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This strategic guidance includes DOD documents, such as the Guidance for the Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,¹⁵ which tell combatant commanders what to plan for within their areas of responsibility. On the basis of the strategic guidance, combatant command planners write an operation plan to address particular contingencies. During this stage, a combatant commander can also task and provide guidance to the component commands to develop supporting plans for an operation plan. DOD doctrine suggests that, as a plan is developed, frequent dialogue between planners and senior DOD leadership is necessary to ensure that results are sufficient and feasible to meet mission objectives.

An operation plan describes how DOD will respond to a potential contingency that might require the use of military force. Such plans are used to deal with a wide range of events, such as terrorism, hostile foreign nations, and natural disasters. An operation plan consists of a base plan and annexes. A base plan describes the concept of operations, major forces, sustainment concept, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. Base plans are written following a five-paragraph structure—Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, and Command and Control. Plans will generally include assumptions that are relevant to the development or successful execution of the plan and the concept of operation that the commander plans to use to accomplish

¹⁵The Guidance for the Employment of the Force provides 2-year direction to combatant commanders for operational planning, force management, security cooperation, and posture planning. The 2011 version of the Guidance for the Employment of the Force directs contract support integration planning and contractor management planning for all phases of military operations. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan implements the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, providing military strategic and operational guidance to the combatant commanders, service chiefs, and combat support agencies for the preparation of campaign plans and contingency plans based on current military capabilities.

the mission, including the forces involved, the phasing of operations, and the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted. In addition to the base plan, operation plans sometimes include annexes that provide further details on areas such as intelligence (Annex B), operations (Annex C), logistics (Annex D), personnel (Annex E), communications (Annex K), and operational contract support (Annex W)—the latter generally includes information such as contract support, contracting capabilities, and capacities support estimates. While Annex D includes operational contract support considerations, we have previously reported that because DOD has typically relied on contractors in areas beyond logistics,¹⁶ it is important for DOD to conduct up-front planning for the use of contractors in all functional areas, not just logistics. In 2010, we recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff require all base plans and nonlogistics annexes (e.g., intelligence and communication) to address the potential need for contractor support where appropriate.

**OSD, the Joint Staff,
and the Services Have
Taken Steps to
Integrate Operational
Contract Support, but
Most of the Military
Services Have Not
Issued
Comprehensive
Guidance**


OSD and the Joint Staff have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into departmental planning, but the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not issued comprehensive guidance for integrating operational contract support throughout each service's planning efforts.

¹⁶GAO, *Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using Contractors to Support Future Military Operations*, [GAO-10-472](#) (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010).

**OSD and the Joint Staff
Have Taken Actions and
Have Other Efforts
Underway to Plan for
Operational Contract
Support**

OSD and the Joint Staff have issued several new or revised policies, undertaken other actions, and are revising other policies regarding operational contract support. These efforts are described in figure 2.

Figure 2: OSD and Joint Staff Actions Taken and Efforts Underway to Integrate Operational Contract Support into Departmental Planning



Source: DOD.

OSD and the Joint Staff Have Issued New or Revised Policies and Undertaken Other Actions

OSD and the Joint Staff have issued several new or revised policies on planning for operational contract support. In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to address the risks introduced by DOD's level of dependency on contractors, its future total force mix, and the need to better plan for operational contract support in the future. The memorandum required, among other things, that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy integrate operational contract support considerations into strategic planning documents and provide policy guidance on planning for contracted support in force planning scenario development. Also, the memorandum required that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff collaboratively develop procedures to support operational contract support planning in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System,¹⁷ including contractor support estimates and visibility of contractors accompanying the force. A memorandum issued by the Director of the Joint Staff in June 2011 further assigned Joint Staff directors to either lead or support specific tasks to implement the Secretary of Defense's direction.

Working with the Joint Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy completed revisions in April 2011 to the Guidance for the Employment of the Force requiring that the combatant commands, together with their service components and relevant combat support agencies, plan for the integration of contracted support and contractor management in all phases of military operations. Additionally, the Joint Staff completed revisions in April 2011 to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The revisions included the requirement that operational contract support planning must occur at all plan levels and that, at a minimum, plans will identify anticipated contract support requirements by joint capability area, phase of operation, and area of need.

In addition to policy revisions, OSD and the Joint Staff have undertaken additional actions to ensure that planners better integrate operational contract support into the planning process. For example, at the request of the combatant commands, the Joint Staff has conducted operational

¹⁷The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System consists of manuals that are used by joint commanders and war planners to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations, and provides users with access to joint operations planning policies and procedures. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System is presently transitioning to the Adaptive Planning and Execution System.

contract support training that explains changes to the planning requirements for the integration of operational contract support. Specifically, the Joint Staff held training seminars for operational contract support planners at Central Command and Southern Command in November 2011, at Pacific Command in January 2012, and at Africa and European Commands in May 2012 to highlight recent changes in guidance and processes.

In addition, the Functional Capabilities Integration Board, which was created in 2010, is actively monitoring ongoing operational contract support-related efforts across DOD and the progress toward timely completion of the direction in the Secretary's January 2011 memorandum. Chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support and the Vice Director for Logistics of the Joint Staff, the Functional Capabilities Integration Board is a senior executive-level body that includes officials from OSD, the military services, defense agencies, and the Joint Staff. The board meets quarterly to conduct independent assessments and analyses of operational contract support capabilities (to include supporting doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities of the armed forces). It also seeks to establish and assess ways to improve performance and processes for assessing operational contract support readiness.

OSD and the Joint Staff Are Also Revising Other Guidance

OSD and the Joint Staff are also revising other guidance on operational contract support and examining the extent to which operational contract support is integrated in DOD's planning for operations, as noted in figure 2. For example, the Joint Staff is overseeing an effort to revise a key doctrine document, Joint Publication 4-10, to incorporate, among other things, lessons learned from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Joint Publication 4-10 establishes doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing operational contract support integration and contractor management functions in support of joint operations.¹⁸ The joint doctrine in the publication applies to the combatant commands and their service components, subunified commands, joint task forces, the services, and defense agencies in support of joint operations. According to Joint Staff officials, they expect to complete revisions to the guidance in November 2013.

¹⁸See Joint Pub. 4-10 (Oct. 17, 2008).

Moreover, the Joint Staff recently published, on October 18, 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.03 on Adaptive Planning and Execution, Planning Formats and Guidance, which replaces the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II.¹⁹ This manual will be used by joint commanders and war planners to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations and provide users with access to joint operations planning policies and procedures. Specifically, the Adaptive Planning and Execution manual requires that functional planners identify major support functions planned for commercial support sourcing. The manual also references Annex W in the instructions for many of the individual annexes. Also, the Adaptive Planning and Execution manual, in keeping with the Secretary of Defense's memorandum requirements, requires the expansion of the Annex W, the operational contract support annex, in operation plans to include appendixes on (1) estimates of contracting capabilities and capacities support, (2) a contractor management plan, and (3) estimates of contractor support. As stated in the recently revised Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, operational contract support planning is now required in much greater detail because of the volume of participation and resulting lessons learned in current operations.

Additionally, the Joint Staff is drafting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 4300.01, which will include information on integrating operational contract support in joint logistics planning.²⁰ Specifically, the manual will assist logistics planners in developing procedures and guidance for a logistics planning process that effectively integrates, synchronizes, prioritizes, and focuses joint logistics capabilities on achieving a supported commander's operational objectives and desired effects for various types of plans, including contingency plans, tasked in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or as directed by the combatant commander. The Joint Staff's revisions will include setting minimum requirements for operational contract support by plan level and providing templates and tools for planners to use to estimate contractor support and contracting capabilities. DOD officials stated that this manual will be

¹⁹See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance* (Oct. 18, 2012).

²⁰Draft Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 4300.01, *Planning Joint Logistics Support*.

published following revisions to the Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, expected by the end of 2012.

Finally, OSD has drafted an action plan, in conjunction with the Joint Staff and military services, that will establish operational contract support objectives and performance measures in the department's attempt to fully institutionalize operational contract support by the end of fiscal year 2016. Specifically, the draft action plan identifies major actions and the projected cost to institutionalize operational contract support capabilities and capacity across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy spectrum.²¹ It identifies timelines and lead organizations for specified tasks to help guide operational contract support planning and programming initiatives required to resolve urgent capability gaps. DOD officials stated that they expect the draft of the action plan to be approved by January 2013.

The Military Services, with the Exception of the Army, Have Not Issued Comprehensive Guidance on Integrating Operational Contract Support

The military services, with the exception of the Army, have not issued comprehensive guidance to enable the integration of operational contract support into their planning efforts, thus limiting the institutionalization of operational contract support at the service level. Joint Publication 4-10, issued in 2008, notes that each military service, under its respective military department, is responsible for planning and executing contracting support to its forces, unless otherwise directed by the combatant commander.²² Joint Publication 4-10 also notes that the military services are responsible for integrating identified contract requirements into training.²³ Further, the Secretary of Defense's January 2011 memorandum also directs the military services to take certain actions, which could improve how they plan for and use operational contract support.

²¹DOD intends to use the draft action plan to guide and measure how it closes specific critical capability gaps related to operational contract support, which are listed in the plan by priority.

²²See Joint Pub. 4-10, at II-7 (Oct. 17, 2008).

²³See *id.* at II-8. Similarly, DOD regulations and guidance require the secretaries of the military departments to incorporate elements of operational contract support policy and procedures, conveyed in that guidance, into applicable policy, doctrine, programming, training, and operations. See 32 C.F.R. § 158.5(k); DODI 3020.41, encl. 4, para. 11 (Dec. 20, 2011).

The Army Has Issued Guidance and Taken Several Actions to Integrate Operational Contract Support into Its Planning

In large part because of the Army's leading role in the major contingencies over the past decade that required it to employ operational contract support, the Army has issued guidance and created various organizations for integrating contract support into its planning and for developing related training. The Secretary of the Army established an independent panel, known as the Gansler Commission, which issued a final report in October 2007 that highlighted issues and needs for better military operations and cited critical deficiencies in the Army's contracting and contract management.²⁴ Since that report's issuance, the Army has made it a priority to address highlighted deficiencies in areas such as guidance and training. In particular, the Army has issued service-specific guidance for integrating contract support into the service. For example, the Army issued Army Regulation 715-9 in 2011 that provides guidance regarding planning and managing operational contract support for the nonacquisition force, such as operational commanders or contracting officer's representatives.²⁵ It describes responsibilities, policy, and implementing procedures for operational contract support. Specifically, the regulation describes, among other things, planning, requirements definition, and oversight in the context of contracted support. For example, the regulation notes that, in general, contracted support will be utilized after full consideration of all sources of support, including deployable civilians.²⁶ The Army also developed a manual containing tactics, techniques, and procedures for operational contract support.²⁷ The manual provides "how to" guidance about operational contract support for Army operational commanders and their nonacquisition officer staff. In addition, the manual describes the roles of Army officials and organizations regarding operational contract support and serves as the primary reference document for execution of operational contract support planning, integration, and oversight tasks provided in other guidance,

²⁴Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, *Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting* (Oct. 31, 2007). The Secretary of the Army established an independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations to review the lessons learned in recent operations and provide forward-looking recommendations to ensure that future military operations achieve greater effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency.

²⁵Army Regulation 715-9, *Operational Contract Support Planning and Management* (June 20, 2011).

²⁶See *id.*, § 2-1(a).

²⁷*Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures No. 4-10* (FM 3-100.21), "Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures" (June 20, 2011).

including Army Regulation 715-9. Moreover, the manual contains checklists that include considerations related to operational contract support. Furthermore, in direct response to the Gansler Commission report, the Army created the Army Contracting Command in 2008, which performs the majority of the contracting work for the Army, including assisting in operational contract support planning needs, training development, and execution.²⁸ Other Army entities, along with DOD's Defense Acquisition University, have developed and are implementing additional operational contract support training initiatives. Key Army training initiatives include the following:

- The Expeditionary Contracting Command, a subordinate to the Army Contracting Command, provides contracting support to the Army and other federal organizations at installations outside of the United States. Additionally, the Expeditionary Contracting Command has seven contracting support brigades that provide direct support to Army service component commanders, including providing predeployment contingency contracting unit training, which includes training contracting officers' representatives.
- The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) Integration Office works with other entities including the Expeditionary Contracting Command to develop collective and individual training standards and material for acquisition and nonacquisition personnel involved with the planning, requirements definition, contracting, and management of operational contract support. Also, the integration office oversees the incorporation of planning of operational contract support for brigade-level training.

²⁸Army Contracting Command, a major subordinate command within the Army Materiel Command designated as a two-star billet, provides theater support contracting services to deployed Army forces and systems contracting support to Army program executive officers and program managers. It also provides contracting services to garrison operations through its two subordinate commands, the Expeditionary Contracting Command and the Mission and Installation Contracting Command. The Army Contracting Command also provides reach-back contracting support from its continental United States contracting centers. The Expeditionary Contracting Command provides trained and ready forces for theater support contracting for Army deployed forces and garrison contracting for Army installations outside the continental United States. The Mission and Installation Contracting Command provides contracting support related to continental United States installations. All active-component Army contracting modular commands, units, and teams serve under the Expeditionary Contracting Command; these units train at Mission and Installation Contracting Command and Expeditionary Contracting Command installation contracting offices when not deployed.

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- The Army Contracting Command, along with other entities, developed and launched enhanced training of contracting officer's representatives through the Defense Acquisition University. This course assists with deploying more prepared and trained contracting officer's representatives into contingencies.²⁹

Finally, according to statements of senior Army officials before the Commission on Wartime Contracting, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) chartered the Operational Contracting Support and Policy Directorate in December 2009.³⁰ As described in an Army briefing, this directorate develops, issues, manages, and measures the effectiveness of policies regarding operational contract support. According to the briefing, it provides strategic contract management and oversight of the U.S. Central Command Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, an organization that provides theater contracting support to the combined joint operations area of Afghanistan. The directorate provides oversight of contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as the focal point for the Army for contracting in-theater. According to the briefing, among other activities, such as validation of operational contract support in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel considerations, members of the directorate also serve on DOD's Operational Contract Support Functional Capabilities and Integration Board. In addition, this directorate, along with the Army's other efforts, assists the Army in meeting the operational contract support requirements in both Joint Publication 4-10 and the Secretary of Defense's January 2011 memorandum.

²⁹Contracting officer's representatives are generally military or civilian DOD nonacquisition personnel that have acquisition-related responsibilities, such as helping to manage and oversee contracts by acting as the eyes and the ears of DOD's contracting officers and by serving as the liaisons between the contractor, the contracting officer, and the unit receiving support or services. Contracting officer's representatives have no authority to make any commitments or changes that affect price, quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of a contract.

³⁰According to Army officials, this directorate is now named the Expeditionary Contracting Support Plans and Policy Directorate, as of September 2012.

The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Have Not Issued Comprehensive Guidance for Integrating Operational Contract Support into Their Planning

While the Army has established guidance and taken several steps to integrate operational contract support within its service, the other services have not taken similar actions to incorporate operational contract support into their planning. Joint Publication 4-10 and the Secretary of Defense's January 2011 memorandum require the military departments to take certain steps that could improve how they plan for and use operational contract support. While the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have developed some training and other efforts to improve the planning and use of operational contract support, they have not developed service-specific guidance detailing how operational contract support will be integrated into each of their services' planning and execution efforts for contingency operations. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force officials told us that they generally do not have a major role in operational contract support because the Army has been the lead service for contracting in present conflicts.

Navy officials acknowledged that some sailors need to understand the role that operational contract support plays in their deployed locations. As a result, Navy officials have included information about operational contract support in logistics training, which provides a basic overview of contract execution. However, as acknowledged by Navy officials, the Navy has not issued guidance that includes information regarding roles and responsibilities for ensuring better execution of planning, integration, and oversight of operational contract support within the service. Marine Corps officials acknowledged that the Marine Corps has also not issued service-wide, specific operational contract support guidance,³¹ although they explained that the service's role in the Afghanistan and Iraq contingencies showed that operational contract support was important and that the Marine Corps needed specific, related training. In Afghanistan, the Marine Corps established two operational contract support cells, which have managed contract support and management-related activities for the service and provided oversight of operational contract support training to relevant personnel. In addition, a 2009 Marine Corps reference publication on contingency contracting contains doctrinal information for commanders and their staff members to plan for and obtain contracting support when deployed. While this information is helpful to commanders and their staff to understand the process for

³¹Although Marine Corps officials did not identify any service-wide guidance, they discussed the use in Afghanistan of standard operating procedures for the Operational Contract Support Branch of the Marine Expeditionary Forces in-theater.

contingency contracting, the document does not comprehensively describe how the Marine Corps plans to integrate operational contract support throughout the service. Further, as part of planning before deployment, the Marine Corps identified and trained contracting officer's representatives prior to their deployment. Additionally, officials told us that the Marine Corps has begun to include some operational contract support in training in areas such as on regulations related to contracting. While the Marine Corps has incorporated some operational contract support in predeployment planning, the training is limited and, according to Marine Corps officials, it is at the commanders' discretion to include it into their units' training. According to Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps has not provided guidance detailing the roles and responsibilities for nonacquisition personnel on how operational contract support will be integrated into the Marine Corps' planning and execution efforts for contingency operations. Since training often changes, there is no permanent enforcement to maintain competencies of operational contract support, such as contractor oversight, into planning or training within the Marine Corps, thus limiting full institutionalization of operational contract support.

Air Force officials acknowledged that the Air Force has not developed service-wide guidance regarding the integration of operational contract support within the service. The guidance that officials did identify is focused on the role of contracting officer's representatives and actions for deployed commanders and contingency contracting officers to take during initial deployment (such as establishing shelter requirements and other needs of the unit). GAO identified similar acquisition-related implementing guidance related to basic contingency contracting actions during phases of an operation as well as implementing guidance regarding review of operation plans for contractor support integration plans, contractor management plans, and other contracting considerations. However, these documents do not comprehensively describe how the Air Force plans to integrate operational contract support throughout the service. Further, it is not clear how familiar officials are with these documents, as they were not mentioned during the course of discussions. The Air Force's current training related to operational contract support is limited to the contract familiarization training provided to the contracting officer's representatives, which is typical of training provided to contracting officer's representatives in all services. As a result, the integration of operational contract support throughout the Air Force's planning is limited because, as acknowledged by Air Force officials, the Air Force has not issued comprehensive guidance explaining the roles and responsibilities

for the execution of planning, integration, and oversight of operational contract support within the service.

Thus, while the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have developed some training and other individual efforts to familiarize servicemembers with operational contract support, these services have not issued comprehensive guidance to assist in fully institutionalizing operational contract support. DOD and service officials told us that they do not need to plan for operational contract support in advance because the Army has been the lead service in recent conflicts. However, according to DOD, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force spent over a billion dollars combined for contracted services in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011, and therefore contracted support has been utilized for which planning should have occurred. Without specific service-wide guidance to help institutionalize operational contract support, the other services may not fully understand their role in operational contract support and may not be prepared to execute operational contract support in the future—when it is possible that one of these services, instead of the Army, will play a leading role. Further, unless the services' guidance describes how each service plans to integrate operational contract support into each organization—including planning for contingency operations and training—the other services' planning efforts may not reflect the full extent of the use of contract support and the attendant cost and requirements for oversight.

Combatant Commands and Components Have Taken Positive Steps, but Face Challenges in Fully Integrating Operational Contract Support into Their Contingency Planning Processes

The combatant commands and their components have begun to incorporate operational contract support into their planning,³² but they have not fully integrated operational contract support into their planning for contingencies. While the combatant commands and their components have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into contingency planning, mostly in the area of logistics, they are not planning for such support across all areas—such as intelligence and communications—that are likely to use contractors in future contingencies. We found that DOD’s efforts to fully integrate operational contract support at the command and component levels are hindered by not training all planners about new operational contract support requirements, a lack of focus of operational contract support planners on areas beyond logistics, and not providing operational contract support planning expertise at the commands’ components.

The Combatant Commands and Their Components Have Taken Some Positive Steps to Integrate Operational Contract Support in Their Planning Processes

The combatant commands and their components have taken some positive steps to integrate operational contract support in their planning processes. According to DOD officials, at the time of this review, there were 95 plans with 45 approved Annex Ws. In addition, our current review of selected operation plans at each of the combatant commands found that officials are now including planning assumptions about operational contract support within either the base plan or Annex W. For example, in a draft humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster response plan that we reviewed, officials at Southern Command had included an Annex W that integrated assumptions for operational contract support. Similarly, officials incorporated assumptions for operational contract support in operation base plans and Annex Ws that we examined at Central Command, Pacific Command, Africa Command, and European Command. This integration of operational contract support is an improvement from February 2010 when we found that only 4 of 89 operation plans had approved Annex Ws.

Also, the Joint Staff has developed training for logistics officials at the combatant commands and components to better understand how to integrate operational contract support into their planning processes. The

³²A service component command, assigned to a combatant commander, consists of the service component commander and the service forces (such as individuals, units, detachments, and organizations, including the support forces) that have been assigned to that combatant commander.

Joint Staff's training informs planners of requirements in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force that the combatant commands, together with their service components and relevant combat support agencies, plan for the integration of contracted support into all phases of military operations. The training also makes officials aware of the new requirement in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan that states that geographic combatant commands, together with their service components and logistics planners, will synchronize and integrate contracted support into military operations. According to U.S. Central Command officials, they have already begun to employ the new guidance shared with them during the training for developing the Annex W.

We also noted several other positive efforts to integrate operational contract support into planning. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency, at the request of the combatant commands, has assigned two expert planners from its Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office to the logistics offices at each combatant command to improve the incorporation of operational contract support into combatant command plans.³³ Also, U.S. Africa Command has developed its own instruction to help the command integrate operational contract support into its planning process.³⁴

³³The Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office assists with operational contract support program management across DOD. When requested, the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office provides to the DOD combatant command commanders a deployable operational contract support capability to effectively and efficiently coordinate operational contract support program activities.

³⁴United States Africa Command Instruction 4800.01A, Operational Contract Support (OCS) (May 1, 2012).

Combatant Commands and Components Did Not Plan for the Potential Use of Contractors in All Areas Where They Might Be Needed, and Have Recently Been Issued Guidance

While the combatant commands and their components have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into contingency planning, mostly in the area of logistics, they are not planning for such support across all areas—such as intelligence and communications—that are likely to use contractors in future contingencies. Under regulations and DOD Instruction 3020.41, when officials anticipate the need for contractor personnel and equipment to support military operations, military planners are directed to develop orchestrated, synchronized, detailed, and fully developed contract support integration plans and contractor management plans as components of concept plans and operational plans in accordance with appropriate strategic planning guidance.³⁵ The regulations and instruction also state that plans should contain additional contract support guidance, as appropriate, in applicable annexes and appendixes within the respective plans.³⁶ Our previous work has shown that DOD has typically relied on contractors in areas beyond logistics, and thus we have emphasized the importance of the up-front planning for their use across all functional areas.³⁷

A Joint Staff official indicated that, in 2011, the Joint Staff added a requirement to incorporate planning for operational contract support in the base plan and Annex W of all operation plans; but the official noted that requirement did not include incorporating operational contract support in the nonlogistics annexes of plans. In a briefing document on changes and anticipated changes to strategic and planning guidance, the Joint Staff suggested that, among other things, planners would be required to include assumptions for the use of contractor support in paragraph one of the base plan and provide estimates of contractors in the Annex W. Although the combatant commands and their components have integrated operational contract support in the base plans and Annex Ws we reviewed, they did not, at the time we reviewed their plans, have more-specific and comprehensive guidance within the key operations planning system manual for integrating planning for operational contract

³⁵ See 32 C.F.R. § 158.6(b); DODI 3020.41, encl. 2, para. 2 (Dec. 20, 2011). According to the regulations and instruction, concept plans without time-phased force and deployment data and operations orders are to contain contractor support integration plan-like and contractor management plan-like guidance to the extent necessary, as determined by the combatant commander. See *id.*

³⁶ See § 158.6(b)(1); DODI 3020.41, encl. 2, para. 2(a) (Dec. 20, 2011).

³⁷ [GAO-10-472](#).

support across all functional areas where contractors might be used. As a result, officials working in areas outside of logistics were not integrating operational contract support into their respective sections of plans. For example, nonlogistics officials at Central Command—such as those in the communications (Annex K) and intelligence (Annex B) divisions—stated that they do not plan for operational contract support in their respective annexes although contract support had been utilized in the past in these areas. Similarly, at Southern Command, we found that operational contract support was incorporated in Annex D (logistics) and Annex W (operational contract support), but its Annex Ks (communications) and Annex Bs (intelligence) did not directly contain considerations for operational contract support. Moreover, nonlogistics officials at Africa Command stated that they did not incorporate considerations of operational contract support in annexes other than Annex W. Some nonlogistics officials at Central Command further stated that they tend to assume the logistics planners will address the need to incorporate operational contract support throughout operation plans, but we found that this was not occurring. Finally, nonlogistics officials at Pacific Command stated that they had also used contracted support in past operations but believed they did not need to plan for operational contract support until a contingency was under way.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy completed revisions in April 2011 to include broad language in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force requiring that the combatant commands plan for the integration of contracted support and contractor management in all phases of military operations. However, the Joint Staff only recently issued in October 2012 the Adaptive Planning and Execution manual that calls on functional planners beyond the logistics area alone to identify major support functions planned for commercial support sourcing. As a result, the effect of this new manual remains to be determined. Until all functional area planners begin to integrate operational contract support into their respective sections of plans, the combatant commands and their components risk being unprepared to fully plan for the use of contractors in contingencies. Without plans that adequately consider the use of contract support in areas beyond logistics, DOD has an increased risk of being unprepared to manage deployed contractor personnel and services and to provide necessary oversight during contingencies.

Joint Staff Training on Operational Contract Support to Commands and Components Is Focused on the Logistics Area

As previously discussed, the Joint Staff J-4 has developed training on the requirements for planning for operational contract support at the combatant commands and their components, but, up to this point, this training has been focused on planners only in the logistics area and not on planners in all functional areas. Joint Staff J-4 officials stated that they are developing an operational contract support planning and execution training course to train all strategic and operational planners on the specific requirements and complexities of planning for operational contract support in all functional areas and types of operations. However, this training has not been fully developed and implemented. According to regulations and DOD guidance, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will incorporate, where appropriate, program management and elements of the operational contract support guidance into joint training.³⁸ Further, according to the Secretary of Defense's January 2011 memorandum, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall sustain ongoing efforts and initiate new efforts to institutionalize processes, tools, and doctrine that facilitate and strengthen planning for operational contract support and, by extension, joint operational contract support training, exercises, and execution.

Although the Joint Staff has developed new training for planning for operational contract support, this training is not focused on training officials from functional areas other than logistics. According to a Joint Staff official, while the training was open to all planners, it was focused on training operational contract support planners on the new operational contract support requirements and guidance. With the lack of training across all functional areas, along with the absence, until recently, of more-specific and comprehensive joint operations planning guidance on including operational contract support in plans, we found that planning by the combatant commands and their components included limited integration of operational contract support in areas where contracted support has been used, such as communications or intelligence. For example, some officials involved in intelligence and communications planning at Central Command acknowledged that, while contracted support has been used in these areas in recent operations, they have not initially planned for the capability. In addition, in the operation plans that we reviewed at the various combatant commands, the potential use of contracted support was not mentioned in any of the nonlogistics annexes.

³⁸See 32 C.F.R. § 158.5(l)(1); DODI 3020.41, encl. 4, para. 12(a) (Dec. 20, 2011).

In our previous work,³⁹ we reported weaknesses in DOD's planning for using contractors to support future military operations, and that DOD risked being unprepared to provide the management and oversight of contractor personnel deployed in contingencies. In this review, we found in some cases that officials outside of the logistics area were unaware of the planning requirements for operational contract support that are outlined in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force. Without training to incorporate operational contract support into all areas of their plans, the combatant commands and components risk not fully understanding the extent to which they will be relying on contractors to support combat operations outside of the logistics area and may be unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor personnel. Until DOD takes steps to address these gaps, it may be limited in its ability to fully institutionalize operational contract support in planning for current and future contingency operations at both the combatant command and component levels—where the planning for specific operations generally occurs.

Planners Are Aiding the Combatant Commands with Operational Contract Support, but They Are Not Focused on Working with All Planners throughout the Commands

At the request of the combatant commands, the Defense Logistics Agency has assigned planners from its Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office to assist all combatant commands with the integration of operational contract support into the commands' planning. However, the two planners embedded within each combatant command are not integrated across all functional areas and are not always focused on working with the planners from all the functional directorates to integrate operational contract support in all areas of plans.

According to guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSD established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office within the Defense Logistics Agency in July 2008 as one of several initiatives to respond to congressional mandates in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.⁴⁰ As explained in the guidance, DOD viewed the act as requiring the department to adopt a preplanned

³⁹GAO-10-472.

⁴⁰See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 4130.01, *Guidance for Combatant Commander Employment of Operational Contract Support Enabler—Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO)*, encl. A, para. 1 (Dec. 20, 2011) (hereinafter cited as CJCSN 4130.01 (Dec. 20, 2011)).

organizational approach to program management and to provide a deployable team during contingency operations when requested, to ensure jointness and cross-service coordination.⁴¹ According to the guidance, the purpose of the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office is to help synchronize, integrate, and manage the implementation and execution of operational contract support among diverse communities in support of U.S. government objectives during peacetime and contingency operations.⁴² As envisioned by the guidance, the planners of the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office assigned to each combatant command would enable joint operational contract support planning and strengthen combatant commands' planning for contingencies. Specifically, among other things, the guidance directs the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, when requested, to

- provide resources and expertise to the combatant commands to conduct deliberate operational contract support planning, and establish and implement program management strategies to address and resolve operational contract support challenges;
- assist combatant commands in preparation of plans and orders by drafting, coordinating, and establishing Annex Ws; and
- participate in exercises, training, meetings, and conferences to integrate and advance operational contract support across DOD.

All planners from the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office have been organizationally placed within the logistics directorate at each of the combatant commands. According to combatant command officials, these planners have helped to integrate operational contract support into combatant command planning through their participation in planning meetings, communication of new planning requirements for operational contract support to the combatant command planners, and the development—and sometimes the writing—of the Annex W for certain plans. However, because these planners are placed within the logistics

⁴¹ See *id.* In a 2008 report to Congress, DOD identified the provisions of the act codified at subsections 2333(c)(2) and (c)(3) of Title 10, U.S. Code, as the impetus for the creation of the Joint Contingency Contract Support Office, an organization later renamed the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office. See Department of Defense, *Report to the Congress of the United States: Department of Defense Program for Planning, Managing, and Accounting for Contractor Services and Contractor Personnel During Contingency Operations* (April 2008).

⁴² CJCSN 4130.01, encl. A, para. 3 (Dec. 20, 2011).

directorates, the planners are not integrated across all functional areas and are not always focused on working with all planners at the combatant commands to enable planning for the use of contracted support. Some planners, such as those at U.S. Southern Command, coordinate with combatant command planners from the nonlogistics areas and have helped these planners to become aware of operational contract support considerations. Other planners, such as those at U.S. Central Command, focus on integrating operational contract support into the logistics annex and Annex W sections of plans and are not involved in other areas such as communications or intelligence, which are areas that also have relied on contracted support in recent operations.

The Secretary of Defense's January 2011 memorandum calls for better planning for contracted support at the strategic and operational levels. Further, our prior work on DOD's development of contract support plans recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff require personnel to address the potential need for contractor support where appropriate.⁴³ In addition, the DOD guidance for combatant commander employment of the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office calls for the office, when requested, to embed planners from the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office within the combatant commands to enable joint operational contract support planning, and to integrate and synchronize operational contract support efforts across DOD and other partners.⁴⁴ Without full coordination of the planners from the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office with all planners at the combatant commands to incorporate operational contract support into all areas of their plans, the combatant commands risk not fully understanding the extent to which they will be relying on contractors to support combat operations outside of the logistics area and may be unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor personnel. Until DOD takes steps to address these gaps, it may be limited in its ability to fully institutionalize operational contract support in planning for current and future contingency operations.

⁴³ [GAO-10-472](#).

⁴⁴ See CJCSN 4130.01, encl. A, para. 4(b)(2) (Dec. 20, 2011).

Components Have Not Received Expertise Such as Provided to Combatant Commands to Integrate Operational Contract Support into Their Planning

While the Defense Logistics Agency, at the request of the combatant commands, has provided planning expertise to aid combatant commands in integrating operational contract support into planning, the combatant commands' components have not been provided such expertise to aid them in meeting their operational contract support planning requirements. As a result, the components face difficulties incorporating operational contract support considerations into their planning efforts. Two planners are assigned to each combatant command. After a combatant command plan is developed, it is sent to the combatant command's components for those organizations to develop their own plans to support the combatant command's requirements, including the requirements for the integration of operational contract support. For example, a component may be required to develop its own Annex W to support a combatant command's Annex W within a particular plan. This level of planning is essential since components generally identify and provide the resources necessary to support the combatant command's requirements in order to accomplish the mission of the specific operation.

Without this expertise, component planners are limited in their ability to integrate operational contract support into their plans to support combatant command requirements and, in some cases, are unaware of the overall requirements to integrate operational contract support into their planning as directed by the combatant commander. For example, some component officials with whom we met stated they were unfamiliar with the operational contract support planning requirements found in DOD's strategic planning guidance such as the Guidance for the Employment of the Force. Some component officials also stated that they were not familiar with how to write an Annex W to support the combatant command requirements. There was consensus among the component officials whom we interviewed, as well as several combatant command officials, that the components would benefit from additional training or expertise in planning for operational contract support.

The Secretary of Defense's memorandum regarding DOD's implementation of operational contract support requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take various steps to improve operational contract support planning. In addition, as described by DOD guidance for the employment of the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, combatant commands are responsible for strategic theater planning, and the joint force commander and component commands are responsible for

operational planning.⁴⁵ Further, the DOD guidance states that the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office's mission is to bring its enabling capability to support planning activities at the strategic and operational levels. However, the Joint Staff has not acted to ensure that both the combatant commands and their components have planning expertise to address operational contract support in planning for operations. As a result, the components may not be able to fully integrate operational contract support into their planning for contingency operations; therefore, they may be unprepared to manage deployed contractor personnel and provide the necessary oversight.

Conclusions

The Secretary of Defense's January 2011 memorandum, and several of the ongoing and recently completed efforts we have noted in this report, illustrate the department's recognition of and commitment to integrating operational contract support throughout all aspects of military planning. While progress has been made at high levels within the department to emphasize an awareness of operational contract support, DOD has not yet fully institutionalized planning for operational contract support throughout the military services, or at the combatant commands or components where much of the operational planning occurs for contingencies. Although the Army has made strides in creating guidance and training on the importance of planning for operational contract support because of the challenges it encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, the other military services have not taken additional steps to develop and implement comprehensive guidance within each service to ensure the full institutionalization of operational contract support. Moreover, at the combatant commands and components, there is a lack of emphasis on training for all planners, operational contract support planners are not working with all planners, and expertise on operational contract support is not provided for component planners. As a result, these challenges hinder DOD's ability to achieve the cultural change that we called for 2 years ago—a change that emphasizes an awareness of operational contract support throughout all entities of the department. Without a focus on recent changes in planning guidance and more training on incorporating operational contract support in all areas of operation plans—not just in the logistics area—DOD may face challenges to successfully plan for the use of contractors in critical areas such as intelligence and communications.

⁴⁵See CJCSN 4130.01, encl. A, para. 2 (Dec. 20, 2011).

Similarly, without the operational contract support planners assisting the commands with planning in all areas and without such expertise at the service component commands, DOD risks being unprepared to manage deployed contractor personnel and provide the necessary oversight in the next contingency.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To further the integration of operational contract support into all of the services' planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force to provide comprehensive service-wide guidance for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force that describes how each service should integrate operational contract support into its respective organization to include planning for contingency operations.

To further the integration of operational contract support into all areas of the operation planning process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to focus its training about operational contract support, which is currently focused on the logistics planners, on training all planners at the combatant commands and components as necessary.

To further enable all planners at the combatant commands to integrate operational contract support into plans across their functional areas, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify and implement actions by the combatant commanders needed to ensure that planners from the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office supporting the combatant commands expand their focus to work with planners throughout all functional areas.

To enable the integration of operational contract support into service component command-level planning efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to work with the military services as necessary to improve the level of expertise in operational contract support for the combatant commands' components.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three of our recommendations and partially concurred with one. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments which we have incorporated where appropriate.

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force to provide comprehensive service-wide guidance for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force that describes how each service should integrate operational contract support into its respective organization to include planning for contingency operations. DOD stated that the Marine Corps has made significant progress in integrating operational contract support into its warfighting capabilities. DOD noted that the Marine Corps uses Marine Corps Reference Publication 4-11E, "Contingency Contracting," dated February 12, 2009, which it described as the service-wide guidance on contingency contracting support. According to DOD, this publication contains doctrine for commanders and their staff to plan for and obtain contracting support when deployed. DOD also noted that the Marine Corps has integrated operational contract support with respect to its primary mission, with a focus on support to the Marine Air Ground Task Force. While our report acknowledges the progress made by the services to integrate operational contract support into service training, as well as acknowledging the Marine Corps' use of Marine Corps Reference Publication 4-11E, we believe that the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force should develop comprehensive service-wide guidance to fully institutionalize operational contract support.

DOD also agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to focus its training about operational contract support on training all planners at the combatant commands and components as necessary. DOD stated that the Joint Staff is working with the services and the geographic combatant commands to develop an appropriate training plan and gather the necessary resources to conduct operational contract support training. We agree that if fully implemented this action could address this recommendation.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency to identify and implement actions needed to ensure that planners from the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office expand their focus to work with planners throughout all functional areas at the combatant commands. DOD agreed with the thrust of our recommendation—the need for efforts

to broaden the focus of planners from the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office as part of an effort to integrate operational contract support in combatant command planning. DOD stated, however, that the combatant commands—not the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office—are responsible for operational contract support planning across “all functional areas.” DOD also stated that, when requested, the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office operational contract support planners support combatant commands in meeting this planning requirement. DOD noted that the geographic combatant commanders are responsible for conducting the planning of their respective war plans, not the Defense Logistics Agency. Consequently, DOD stated that, to enable all planners at the combatant commands to integrate operational contract support into plans across their functional areas, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to continue efforts to develop operational contract support planning capabilities and encourage the geographic combatant commanders to utilize the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office for planning. We recognize that the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office supports the combatant commands in their efforts to incorporate operational contract support planning within their respective war plans, and that the individual combatant commanders are ultimately responsible for how they utilize embedded Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office planners. We acknowledge that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is in a position to encourage the combatant commanders to utilize the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office planners. As such, we agree that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be an appropriate official to implement our recommendation, and we have revised our recommendation accordingly. However, we continue to believe that the Defense Logistics Agency, which is responsible for the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, must ensure that its planners are prepared to assist the combatant commanders in these efforts, when requested. Full implementation of the recommendation would therefore likely necessitate cooperation and coordination by the Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the geographic combatant commands.

Finally, in concurring with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to work with the military services as necessary to improve the level of expertise in operational contract support for the combatant commands’ components, DOD stated that the Joint Staff is taking action to integrate operational contract support into the services’ component command-level planning efforts. DOD also stated that the Joint Staff is developing a Joint

Professional Military Education course that focuses on the planning and execution of operational contract support. DOD noted that this course is additive to other courses offered by Defense Acquisition University as well as courses offered by the U.S. Army Logistics University. According to DOD, the Joint Staff will continue to work with the other services on operational contract support issues. We agree that if DOD takes these actions, these efforts could address our recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense. The report also is available at no charge on GAO's website at <http://www.gao.gov>.

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Cary Russell". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "C".

Cary Russell
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) is integrating planning for operational contract support through efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and military services, we collected and analyzed documentation such as planning guidance and policies related to the integration of operational contract support into DOD's planning for contingency operations. Specifically, we analyzed the implementation of DOD guidance, such as Joint Publication 4-10, the Secretary of Defense's memorandum on Strategic and Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support and Workforce Mix, and related policies and instruction through discussions with officials from OSD and the Joint Staff to understand the various efforts to address the integration of operational contract support throughout the department. We reviewed and analyzed provisions from the Guidance for the Employment of the Force to understand the new requirements DOD has in place for planning for operational contract support in all phases of military operations. We also spoke with officials specifically focused on integrating operational contract support department-wide, such as officials from the Operational Contract Support Functional Capabilities Integration Board to obtain their perspective on the progress the department has made in integrating operational contract support as well as learning of related initiatives. We reviewed DOD guidance on the civilian expeditionary workforce and interviewed officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, the civilian expeditionary workforce program office, military services, and combatant commands to understand the intent and the status of the development of the civilian expeditionary workforce program. To determine how the military services have integrated operational contract support into their operations, we collected and analyzed service-specific documentation related to operational contract support initiatives from each of the services and met with officials from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. We also held discussions with officials from each of the services to gain an understanding of how each organization has implemented operational contract support. Further, we reviewed related GAO reports on operational contract support, as well as related reports issued by other agencies.

To determine the extent to which DOD is integrating planning for operational contract support in operations planning at the combatant commands and their components, we reviewed plans, such as operation and contingency plans, and other efforts, such as specific related guidance, to understand the commands' and components' implementation of requirements to integrate operational contract support. As mentioned above, we interviewed officials from OSD and the Joint Staff in order to assess the extent to which DOD has integrated

operational contract support requirements for planning in policies. We then spoke with officials from all of the geographic combatant commands (except Northern Command) and their components regarding their knowledge of the requirements and the extent to which they are planning for operational contract support. Additionally, we spoke to officials to gain knowledge about their current processes for planning for contingency operations. During our meetings with the combatant commands, we spoke with officials from various directorates, such as strategic plans, logistics, and intelligence, in order to obtain an understanding of the extent to which operational contract support is being planned for in the base plan and the directorates' respective annexes. During our meetings we also reviewed sample operation plans and annexes to analyze the extent to which DOD has integrated operational contract support considerations in its contingency planning. To determine the level at which the combatant commands and components are integrating operational contract support into plans, we requested combatant command and component officials to provide sample operation plans that included base plans with operational contract support considerations, Annex Ws, and other functional area annexes that also contained operational contract support language. Further, we obtained and analyzed specific policies the combatant commands and service component commands had in place governing the planning for operational contract support in their contingency and operation plans.

Our review focused on DOD's planning efforts and thus did not include an examination of how operational contract support is integrated in professional military education or in the execution of current operations.

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review:

Department of Defense

- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Washington, D.C.
 - Civilian Expeditionary Workforce Program Office, Washington, D.C.
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Washington, D.C.
 - Force Development, Washington, D.C.
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support), Washington, D.C.

- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
 - Operational Contract Support Functional Capabilities Integration Board
- U.S. Africa Command, Stuttgart, Germany, and several of its service components
- U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Florida, and several of its service components
- U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, and several of its service components
- U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii, and several of its service components
- U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida, and several of its service components

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

- Joint Staff J-4 (Logistics) Directorate, Washington, D.C.

Department of the Army

- Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology-Integration Office, Hopewell, Virginia
- G-43, Strategic Operations, Washington, D.C.
- Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Washington, D.C.

Department of the Navy

- U.S. Navy Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
- Navy Expeditionary Contracting Command, Little Creek, Virginia
- U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Department of the Air Force

- U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Acquisition, Washington, D.C.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to February 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for this assessment based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense



LOGISTICS AND
MATERIEL READINESS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500

FEB 4 2013

Mr. Cary Russell
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Russell:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report, GAO-13-212, "WARFIGHTER SUPPORT: DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning," dated January 2013, (GAO Code 351692).

The DoD concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation. Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Technical comments were provided separately for your consideration. Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Kevin Doxey, Logistics and Materiel Readiness, at kevin.doxey@osd.mil or 703-697-1685.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Alan F. Estevez".

Alan F. Estevez

Enclosure:
As stated

GAO Draft Report Dated January 2013
GAO-13-212 (GAO CODE 351692)

“WARFIGHTER SUPPORT: DOD NEEDS ADDITIONAL STEPS TO FULLY
INTEGRATE OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT INTO CONTINGENCY
PLANNING”

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS
TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATION

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force to provide comprehensive service-wide guidance for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force that describes how each service should integrate operational contract support into their respective organizations to include planning for contingency operations.

DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Department agrees that the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force to provide comprehensive service-wide guidance that describes how operational contract support should be integrated into their organizations to include planning for contingency operations. However, it should be noted that the Marine Corps has made significant progress with integrating Operational Contract Support (OCS) into its warfighting capabilities.

Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 4-11E, titled "Contingency Contracting," dated 12 Feb 2009, is service-wide guidance on contingency contracting support. This publication contains doctrine for Commanders and their staff to plan for and obtain contracting support when deployed, the organizations necessary for its responsive and effective use, and the procedures to obtain supplies and services through contracting support. It is the Marine Corps' "how to" guide for contingency contracting support.

The Marine Corps has integrated operational contracting support in respect to its primary mission with focus on support to the Marine Air Ground Task Force. When assigned a specific mission by a Combatant Commander, actions have been taken to ensure Marines are trained to meet the requirements of OCS. As OCS requirements are put into the Combatant Commanders operational plans, the Marine Corps will establish a more comprehensive plan, through its Component Commanders, for those missions and responsibilities it is assigned. The Marine Corps will continue to improve on OCS and make changes to contracting doctrine as service-wide guidance is provided from the Secretary of the Navy, and as direction is provided from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Combatant Commands on improving OCS within the Component Commands.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to focus its training about operational contract support, which is currently focused on the logistics planners, on training all planners at the combatant commands and components as necessary.

DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Department agrees that the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to continue efforts to develop operational contract training support for all planners at the Combatant Commands and components as necessary. As such, the Joint Staff is working with the Services and the Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) to develop an appropriate training plan and gather the necessary resources to conduct OCS training.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency to identify and implement actions needed to ensure that planners from the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office expand their focus to work with planners throughout all functional areas at the combatant commands.

DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. The Department agrees that to enable all planners at the Combatant Commands to integrate operational contract support into plans across their functional areas, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vice directing the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), to continue efforts to develop OCS planning capabilities and encourage the Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCCs) to utilize the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) for planning. The Combatant Commands, not JCASO, are responsible for OCS planning across "all functional areas" and when requested, JCASO OCS Planners support Combatant Commands in meeting this planning requirement. As such, the GCCs are responsible for conducting the planning of their respective war plans, not DLA. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.0, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance, promulgates each functional area plan and documents their operational contract support requirements. The GCCs have JCASO planners on their staffs to assist with OCS planning and integration. Per Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 4130.01, "Guidance for Combatant Commander Employment of Operational Contract Support Enabler—Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office", JCASO is an on-call enabling capability providing OCS coordination and integration during planning and contingency operations. As such, the GCCs can request additional assistance from JCASO planners and use them with other functional planners on their OCS requirements.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to work with the military services as necessary to improve the level of expertise in operational contract support for the combatant commands' components.

DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Department agrees that the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to continue to work with and monitor the military services, as necessary, to improve the level of expertise in operational contract support for the Combatant Commands' components. The Joint Staff is taking action to integrate OCS into service component command-level planning efforts.

**Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Defense**

Additionally, the Joint Staff has published the CJCSM 3130.03 which directs all functional areas to plan for OCS and document requirements in the annexes/plans (this will cause the Service components to take specific action on OCS planning and execution; CJCSM 4300.01 (Draft) Planning for Operational Contract Support is being developed to assist planners on the processes, tools and techniques to implement OCS planning guidance. The Joint Staff is developing a Joint Professional Military Education (PME) course that focuses on the planning and execution of OCS. This new course is meant to fill a significant staff training gap and will provide a common level of knowledge for OCS planning and execution at the strategic and operational levels. This Joint PME course is additive to other courses offered by Defense Acquisition University as well as other courses offered by the Defense Acquisition University as well as courses offered by the US Army Logistics University. The Army, as your report states, has taken actions related to roles, responsibilities and other requirements to integrate OCS. The Joint staff will continue to work with the other Services on OCS issues.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Cary B. Russell, (202) 512-5431 or russelc@gao.gov

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Alissa Czyz, Assistant Director; Marilyn Wasleski, Assistant Director; Hia Quach; Michael Shaughnessy; Yong Song; and Natasha Wilder made key contributions to this report. Richard Powelson and Amie Steele provided assistance in report preparation.

Related GAO Products

Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies. [GAO-12-1026T](#). Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.

Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting. [GAO-12-977R](#). Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.

Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law. [GAO-12-750](#). Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2012.

Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. [GAO-12-854R](#). Washington, D.C.: August 1, 2012.

Defense Acquisition Workforce: Improved Processes, Guidance, and Planning Needed to Enhance Use of Workforce Funds. [GAO-12-747R](#). Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2012.

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Acquisition Workforce: DOD's Efforts to Rebuild Capacity Have Shown Some Progress. [GAO-12-232T](#). Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2011.

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Contingency Contract Management: DOD Needs to Develop and Finalize Background Screening and Other Standards for Private Security Contractors. [GAO-09-351](#). Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2009.

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. [GAO-09-19](#). Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2008.

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight. [GAO-08-572T](#). Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.

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