

GAO

Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight  
and Investigations, Committee on  
International Relations, House of  
Representatives

February 2006

# PEACEKEEPING

## Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti





Highlights of [GAO-06-331](#), a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives

### Why GAO Did This Study

The UN employs about 85,000 military and civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations in 16 countries. The United States has provided about \$1 billion annually to support UN peacekeeping operations. In addition, the United States has led and participated in many such operations. UN reports and congressional hearings have raised concerns about accountability for UN peacekeeping operations and the need for reforms.

We were asked to provide information relating to the cost and relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping. In particular, we have (1) compared the cost of the ongoing UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti with the cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN involvement; (2) analyzed factors that could materially affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation; and (3) identified the strengths of the United States and the UN for leading the operation.

We developed our cost estimate of a U.S.-led operation using cost models from the Departments of Defense and State. The estimate is based on various military assumptions, such as the use of primarily active duty troops. It includes only those costs directly attributable to the operation that would not otherwise be incurred.

[www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-331](http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-331).

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or [christoffj@gao.gov](mailto:christoffj@gao.gov).


## PEACEKEEPING

### Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti

#### What GAO Found

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as the United Nations (UN) to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the current UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (designated “MINUSTAH”). The UN budgeted \$428 million for the first 14 months of this mission. A U.S. operation in Haiti of the same size and duration would cost an estimated \$876 million, far exceeding the U.S. contribution for MINUSTAH of \$116 million. Virtually all of the cost difference is attributable to (1) civilian police, (2) military pay and support, and (3) facilities, and reflects high U.S. standards for police training, troop welfare, and security.

Comparison of Cost Estimate for a U.S. Operation and UN MINUSTAH Budget



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data.

Various military and nonmilitary factors can substantially affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation. We analyzed three military factors: the mix of reserve and active duty troops, the rate of deployment, and the operational tempo. Deploying all reserve troops would increase the cost estimate by \$477 million, since it would require paying more reservists a full salary. Deploying troops at a faster rate than the UN—within the first 60 days instead of 180—would cost an additional \$60 million. Conducting the operation at a higher tempo—with more intensive use of vehicles and equipment—would increase estimated costs by \$23 million. In addition to military considerations, including nation-building and development assistance activities in the scope of the operation would increase the cost significantly. Official donors, including the United States, distributed \$382 million for these activities during the first year of MINUSTAH.

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the UN should lead an operation, and each offers strengths for this responsibility. U.S.-led operations in Haiti between 1994 and 2004 benefited from a vast military infrastructure, which provided strong communications, command and control, readiness to deploy, tactical intelligence, and public information. The UN’s strengths include multinational participation, extensive peacekeeping experience, and an existing structure for coordinating nation-building activities. Complex political considerations are likely to influence decisions about the role of the United States and the UN in peacekeeping.

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## Abbreviations

DOD	Department of Defense
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
UN	United Nations
COST	Contingency Operations Support Tool

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United States Government Accountability Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548

February 21, 2006

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher  
Chairman  
The Honorable William D. Delahunt  
Ranking Minority Member  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
Committee on International Relations  
House of Representatives

As of November 2005, the United Nations (UN) maintained about 70,000 peacekeeping troops and about 15,000 related international civil servants in 16 countries, including Haiti, Lebanon, Georgia, Cyprus, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Currently, the United States provides about \$1 billion annually to support UN peacekeeping missions. In addition to these financial contributions, the United States has led and participated in a variety of peacekeeping operations, most recently in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. UN reports and congressional hearings have raised concerns about accountability for UN peacekeeping operations and the need for management reforms.

To advance UN reform efforts and determine the value of peacekeeping operations to the United States, you asked us to provide information relating to the cost and relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping. In particular, we have (1) compared the cost of a specific UN mission with the cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN involvement; (2) analyzed factors that could affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation; and (3) identified strengths of U.S. and UN peacekeeping forces in leading the operation. We selected the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (officially designated "MINUSTAH") as a case study for comparison. This mission provides a strong basis for estimating costs and assessing UN and U.S. strengths because it is located in a country in which both the U.S. and UN have a history of military intervention. However, given the operational, structural, and doctrinal differences between the U.S. and UN military and civilian infrastructures, it is uncertain whether the United States would implement a peacekeeping operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN, as we have generally assumed for the purposes of this report. Moreover, because the results of our review are based on a single case study, they cannot be generalized to all U.S. and UN peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, we believe this case study provides some useful

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insights into cost and effectiveness-related issues for other peacekeeping missions.

We analyzed detailed cost and operational data from the UN relating to MINUSTAH for the first 14 months of this mission. Using these data, we developed a comparable scenario for a U.S. operation, which officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated as reasonable; this scenario assumes deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel and aircraft in Haiti over the same period. We derived a cost estimate for the military portion of this scenario using the Department of Defense's (DOD) Contingency Operation Support Tool, the official DOD cost estimation mechanism for all contingency military operations. For the civilian portions, we based cost estimates primarily on historical data and formulas from the Department of State. We determined that data we collected for this report are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of estimating U.S. peacekeeping costs and comparing them with UN budget figures. We conducted our work from June to February 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix I for a detailed description of our scope and methodology.

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## Results in Brief

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as the United Nations to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to MINUSTAH. According to UN records, the UN budgeted \$428 million for the first 14 months of MINUSTAH, for which the United States is responsible for 27.1 percent, or \$116 million.<sup>1</sup> A similar U.S. operation would cost an estimated \$876 million. Virtually the entire cost difference can be attributed to three major elements: civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities, as shown in figure 1. First, the estimated cost of deploying U.S. civilian police officers is \$217 million, compared to \$25 million budgeted by the UN for foreign police officers. Unlike the U.S. cost estimate, the UN budget does not include police salaries and compensation, as they are funded voluntarily by police-contributing

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<sup>1</sup>This total does not include an allocation for peacekeeping support costs—essentially overhead costs incurred outside of Haiti—primarily at UN headquarters in New York and the UN Logistics Base in Italy.


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nations.<sup>2</sup> Compensation rates for U.S. police officers reflect a high standard of skills and experience. Second, we estimate that military pay and support would cost \$260 million, compared to \$131 million in the UN budget, reflecting high salary and equipment standards for U.S. soldiers and a higher level of support in health, nutrition, and morale. Third, facilities-related costs would total about \$208 million, compared to \$100 million in the UN budget. Under MINUSTAH, mission facilities are donated by the Government of Haiti, while the U.S. estimate reflects the cost of posting U.S. civilian personnel in a secure embassy compound.

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<sup>2</sup>We did not calculate the value of these donations, which are likely to vary widely by contributing country.

**Figure 1: Comparison of UN Budget for MINUSTAH and Cost Estimate for a U.S. Operation**



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data.

Various military and nonmilitary factors can affect the estimated costs of a U.S. peacekeeping operation in Haiti. We analyzed the influence of three military factors on the cost estimate: the mix of reserve and active duty troops, the rate of troop deployment, and the operational tempo. First, deploying reserve soldiers instead of primarily active duty military personnel<sup>3</sup> could increase the operation's costs by as much as \$477 million. Regular pay for active duty soldiers is not included in the cost estimate,

<sup>3</sup>Our estimate is based on a force consisting of 85 percent active duty and 15 percent reserve troops.



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since DOD would incur this cost regardless of where these soldiers were deployed. However, DOD pays reservists a full salary and provides other benefits only when they are called into active duty. Second, deploying troops at a faster rate than the UN—within the first 60 days of the operation instead of 180—would raise estimated U.S. costs by about \$60 million. Third, conducting the operation at a higher operational tempo, which entails heavier use of vehicles and equipment, would increase maintenance and support costs by \$23 million. Most nonmilitary costs for nation building and development assistance are not included in the UN and U.S. estimates, and including them would increase both estimates substantially. International bilateral and multilateral donors contributed at least \$382 million for such activities during the first year of MINUSTAH, of which the United States directly funded more than a quarter. We did not include these costs in our estimate because the United States would rely on the international community to help achieve such goals in any case.

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation, and, in Haiti, each offers strengths suited to this responsibility. The United States' strengths include strong communications, command, and control, which were proven militarily effective in past Haiti peacekeeping operations. The U.S. military infrastructure also afforded U.S.-led operations in Haiti three elements found by UN studies to be critical for effective peacekeeping but largely absent in MINUSTAH: rapid deployment capacity, tactical intelligence, and a public information strategy. For example, rapid troop deployment to Haiti in 1994 enabled a U.S.-led force to achieve its primary military objectives within 76 days. The UN's strengths are rooted in the multinational character of its operation as well as its extensive experience with peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN has developed a structure for coordinating the activities of international organizations and has access to experienced and skilled international civil servants, including personnel with diverse language capabilities. The relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping forces may differ in other conflict zones. Furthermore, complex political considerations, including the interests of the United States and other UN member countries, are likely to influence decisions about the role of the United States and the UN in any peacekeeping operation.

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## Background

Both the UN and United States have a long history of peace support operations upon which to base cost estimates. The UN has carried out 60 peacekeeping missions worldwide since 1948. For each mission, the UN

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Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) prepares a budget, which is reviewed in detail at high levels of UN management and is ultimately approved by the General Assembly. The UN assesses each member for its allocated portion of this amount based on the country's per capita gross national income and its membership status on the Security Council. The United States currently pays about 27 percent of the total for each mission, and in fiscal year 2005 directly contributed about \$1.3 billion in support of UN peacekeeping operations overall. The United States has also led and participated in a variety of peacekeeping operations since World War II, most recently in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. U.S. military operations are funded largely by DOD appropriations, and, under DOD regulations, the budgets are based primarily on cost estimates generated with the department's Contingency Operations Support Tool.<sup>4</sup> This computer model uses financial formulas that draw upon a database of historical costs from past military operations and other regularly updated cost information. In addition, the State Department has extensive experience posting foreign service officers in conflict areas and funding U.S. police officers to support UN peacekeeping missions, for which it maintains cost estimation formulas and historical cost databases.

The UN Security Council has authorized five peacekeeping missions in Haiti since 1993, of which the United States has led two between 1994 and 2004. The primary task of the ongoing MINUSTAH operation is to provide a secure and stable environment through its military and police presence and operational support to the Haitian National Police. MINUSTAH assists the transitional government in police reform and institutional strengthening; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; elections monitoring; and promotion and protection of human rights and the political process. The initial authorized force strength was 6,700 troops, 1,622 civilian police officers, and 1,697 civilian administrators and staff. Although initially authorized for 6 months, the UN Security Council has renewed the mission's authorization and funding through June 2006.

Criticism and controversy, including allegations of sexual misconduct of peacekeepers, have brought calls for reform of UN peacekeeping operations within the UN and from U.S. observers. In 2000, the UN Secretary General convened a high-level panel to review UN peace and

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<sup>4</sup>Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations, 7000.14-R, vol. 12, Ch. 23, para. 2304.

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security, which recommended a variety of reforms.<sup>5</sup> The 2005 bipartisan Task Force on the United Nations highlighted the need for more rapid deployment and more clearly defined mandates.<sup>6</sup> Proposed legislation, the Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005,<sup>7</sup> calls for more oversight and investigation over UN operations and mandates that the UN adopt and enforce a code of conduct for all peacekeeping personnel.

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## Estimated Cost of a Hypothetical U.S. Operation Is Twice as High as Ongoing UN Mission

We estimate that it would cost the United States twice as much as the UN to conduct an operation similar to MINUSTAH. The higher U.S. cost of civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities account for virtually the entire difference between our estimate and the MINUSTAH budget, and reflects the additional cost of ensuring high U.S. standards for training, troop welfare, and personnel security.

From May 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005—the first 14 months of MINUSTAH—the UN budgeted mission costs totaled \$428 million. This budget assumed a phased deployment of 6,700 military personnel, 750 personnel in formed police units, 872 civilian police officers, and 1,184 civilian administrators and staff. It included the cost of personnel, operational support, equipment, facilities, and transportation.<sup>8</sup> Using the same basic parameters of troop and staff deployment in Haiti for 14 months, we estimated that the United States would likely budget about \$876 million, nearly twice the UN estimate, for a comparable U.S. peacekeeping operation. (This cost estimate is based on a variety of assumptions, described in detail in app. I.) The United States was financially responsible for \$116 million of the budgeted cost of MINUSTAH, based on the U.S. assessed contribution of 27.1 percent of the DPKO regular budget. Hence, we estimate that

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<sup>5</sup>Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)*, a special report prepared at the request of the Secretary General of the United Nations. August 2000.

<sup>6</sup>United States Institute of Peace Task Force on the United Nations, *Report of the Task Force on the United Nations: American Interests and UN Reform*, a special report prepared at the request of Rep. Frank Wolf, U.S. House of Representatives. June, 2005.

<sup>7</sup>H.R. 2745, 109<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2005).

<sup>8</sup>The UN cost estimate does not include general overhead costs incurred to support all peacekeeping missions, such as the cost to run DPKO at the UN Headquarters in New York and the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy. We did not include these costs because we were unable to estimate comparable overhead costs for U.S. operations due to major differences in budgeting practices between the two organizations.

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conducting a U.S. operation similar to MINUSTAH would cost the United States about 7.5 times as much as its official contribution to the UN for that mission (\$876 million versus \$116 million).<sup>9</sup>

Major disparities in the cost for civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities account for virtually all of the difference between the UN budget and our cost estimate. Our estimate reflects the additional expense of paying salaries for personnel that would otherwise be donated by other countries as well as the cost of ensuring U.S. standards for police training, the equipment and welfare of military personnel, and the security of staff posted overseas. (See table 1 for a detailed comparison of the UN budget and our estimate by major cost category.)

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<sup>9</sup>This includes only cash contributions to the United Nations for MINUSTAH and does not include in-kind contributions, such as pay and benefits for U.S. police and military personnel participating in the UN mission. Since the United States has provided 25 police officers and 4 military personnel to MINUSTAH, this additional contribution of pay and benefits does not significantly affect the results of our analysis.

**Table 1: Comparison of UN and U.S. Costs for a Peacekeeping Operation in Haiti (dollars in millions)**

Major cost categories	Budgeted UN cost	Estimated U.S. cost	Difference between UN budget and U.S. estimate
Transportation	\$94	\$100	-\$6
Facilities and related costs	100	208	-108
Medical/health costs	5	22	-17
Military personnel pay and support	131	260	-129
Civilian personnel (non-police)	63	46	17
Civilian police	25	217	-192
Miscellaneous	10	23	-13
<b>Total cost</b>	<b>\$428</b>	<b>\$876</b>	<b>-\$448</b>

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State Department cost data.

*Civilian police.* The UN budgeted \$25 million to deploy 872 civilian officers for MINUSTAH, while we estimate that it would cost the United States \$217 million to deploy the same number of U.S. officers. The UN does not reimburse countries contributing police for the officers' salaries and only pays for living expenses, clothing allowance, and death and disability compensation.<sup>10</sup> U.S. costs, however, include salaries, special pay, benefits, equipment, and special training. Furthermore, U.S. officers deployed in Haiti under MINUSTAH are required to meet standards for training, experience, and skills significantly beyond those applied by the UN. For instance, U.S. officers deployed to Haiti must be proficient in French or Haitian Creole and have a minimum of 8 years' work experience with five years in a position of sworn civilian law enforcement. Candidates must pass several tests that measure physical capabilities and weapons proficiency. UN-sponsored officers deployed to Haiti are required by the UN to demonstrate only the ability to operate a firearm and drive a vehicle; the ability to communicate in French is preferred but not required.

<sup>10</sup>We did not calculate the value of the non-reimbursable salary and compensation costs incurred by police contributing nations, as the UN does not maintain data on these voluntary contributions. These costs are likely to vary widely depending on each nation's economic development. For MINUSTAH, 33 nations have provided civilian police officers, ranging from developing countries, such as Cameroon and Senegal, to more developed countries, such as Canada and France.

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*Military pay and support.* The UN budgeted \$131 million for pay and support of military troops, while we estimate it would cost the United States \$260 million for the same number of soldiers. The UN costs are based primarily on a per-soldier payment to contributing nations of up to \$1,400 monthly for basic pay and allowances, clothing, gear, equipment, and ammunition. U.S. costs include pay and allowances for reservists and active duty personnel as well as clothing, arms, protective gear, and rations. The higher U.S. costs help ensure a basic standard of living for U.S. soldiers and their families and relatively high standards of welfare in the field in terms of equipment, nutrition, health, and morale. For example, estimated costs for food and water for U.S. military personnel total \$85 million, compared to \$20 million in the UN budget. Medical support for the military and civilian personnel on a U.S. operation would cost an estimated \$22 million, over four times the UN budgeted cost of \$5 million. According to officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, UN multinational forces in Haiti prior to MINUSTAH had difficulty providing adequate troop support and relied on accompanying U.S. forces for supplementary rations and health care. A Rand Corporation study of the multinational force cooperation in Haiti in 1994 indicates that the U.S. forces provided UN forces with intelligence and training, as well as logistical and communications support, including housing, food, transportation, and vehicle maintenance.<sup>11</sup>

*Facilities.* The UN budgeted \$100 million for facilities-related costs, while we estimate that the cost to the United States would be \$208 million. The UN budget includes acquisition and construction of troop and civilian housing and other facility-related equipment and supplies. While MINUSTAH staff offices are donated by the Government of Haiti, U.S. facilities must meet State Department security standards, which include posting civilian staff within secure U.S. embassy or consulate compounds. In addition to administrative and security expenses, U.S. government agencies with staff in these compounds would be required to contribute a total of about \$12 million to the State Department's Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program, which funds the construction of secure embassies worldwide.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Michele Tazini, et al., *The Army and Multinational Force Compatibility* (Arlington, VA, 2000).

<sup>12</sup>The Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program was developed to accelerate the building of 150 new secure embassies and consulates around the world. Each agency's assigned cost is based on its total overseas personnel. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 2920, Div. B., sec. 629 (2004).

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Estimated costs in other categories are likely to be similar for the UN and the United States. For example, we estimate that the transport of U.S. troops, civilian personnel, and equipment would cost about \$100 million; the UN budgeted \$94 million for these costs.

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## Alternative Scenarios with Differing Assumptions Could Generate Higher Cost Estimates

Various military and nonmilitary factors can influence the composition of a peacekeeping operation and thus impact the estimated cost. We identified three different military scenarios that could substantially affect the estimated costs of a U.S. peacekeeping operation. Greater concentration of reserve troops could almost double the military costs, while a quicker deployment of forces and higher operational tempo would also increase costs. Further, the addition of nation-building and development assistance activities to the scope of an operation in Haiti would increase the estimated cost substantially.


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## Analysis of Alternative Military Assumptions Generated Higher U.S. Cost Estimates

According to U.S. experts in military operations and cost estimation we consulted, various factors could significantly influence the cost estimate for a U.S. peacekeeping operation. These factors include the number of troops and types of military units deployed, the pace of deployment, the intensity or operational tempo, the modes of transportation for deployment, and the mix of active duty and reserve troops. These factors depend heavily on the needs of the operation and demands of other military commitments; decisions about such factors involve complex military, political, and financial considerations that can change rapidly.

We analyzed the potential impact of three principal cost factors by altering the assumptions of our cost estimate to reflect (1) military forces comprised entirely of reserve soldiers, (2) deployment of military forces within the first 60 days of the operation rather than 180 days, and (3) higher operational tempo (more intensive use of vehicles and equipment). Figure 2 illustrates how altering the assumptions for these factors affects the cost estimate.

**Figure 2: Impact of Three Cost Factors on Base Estimate for Hypothetical U.S. Operation**



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data.

*Deployment of all-reserve forces.* Our base cost estimates assume that the military contingent of a U.S. operation would consist primarily of active duty forces (85 percent). Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed that this is one of a number of possible scenarios, depending on the availability of active duty and reserve troops, ongoing military commitments, specific operational needs, and other factors. A change in this fundamental assumption can have a significant impact on the estimated cost of the operation, as pay for troops is one of the largest components of the estimate. We altered this assumption to reflect an operation comprised entirely of reserve forces, which increased the cost estimate by \$477 million. This difference has such a significant impact because DOD does not include regular pay for active duty troops in the cost estimates; the department would incur these costs regardless of whether the troops were deployed in Haiti, the United States, or elsewhere. In contrast, pay for reserve troops is considered a direct cost of the operation



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since DOD would pay reservists full salaries only when activated for the operation.

*More rapid deployment.* Although the UN Security Council Resolution establishing MINUSTAH calls for an immediate deployment of peacekeeping forces, the MINUSTAH budget reflects full military deployment within 180 days of mission authorization. Thus, similar to the UN budget, our base cost estimate assumes a military force strength below authorized levels during the first six months of the operation. We altered this assumption to reflect full deployment within the first 60 days. We estimate that this would increase U.S. costs by about \$60 million, consisting essentially of military pay and support for additional troops deployed during the operation's initial months.

*Higher operational tempo.* DOD measures the intensity of a military operation, or operational tempo, on a scale from 1 to 3, with normal operations being level 1.<sup>13</sup> The higher the operational tempo, the more heavily the forces use equipment and vehicles and the higher the cost for fuel, operations, and maintenance. Military experts we consulted at the Institute for Defense Analysis and the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that a peacekeeping operational tempo would normally be considered to be at level 1.5, as reflected in our base cost estimate. We altered this assumption to reflect a slightly higher operational tempo, level 2, which increased the estimated military costs by \$23 million due to increased equipment, maintenance, and other support costs.

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**Including Nation-Building and Development Assistance in the Operation's Scope Would Significantly Increase Costs**

Our estimate does not include costs for complementary nation-building and development activities, which would be needed to support the economic and political goals of a peacekeeping operation. In 2004, to bolster MINUSTAH, official donors agreed with the Government of Haiti on an Interim Cooperative Framework, to which they pledged a total of \$1.3 billion for an array of activities to strengthen political governance and promote national dialogue, strengthen economic governance and contribute to institutional development, promote economic recovery, and

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<sup>13</sup>Operational tempo level 1 is the equivalent to peacetime operations, with tank miles and flying hours being those normally accrued during peacetime. Level 2 reflects heightened operations short of combat, with tank miles and flying hours (and associated total operational costs) at twice the rate of level 1. Level 3 reflects high intensity combat, with tank miles, flying hours (and associated total operational costs) at three times the rate of level 1.

improve access to basic services. From July 2004 to March 2005, bilateral and multilateral donors have spent more than \$382 million for such activities (see table 2). The United States directly funded over 27 percent of this total, or \$102 million, through its bilateral aid programs in Haiti.<sup>14</sup> The United States has made additional contributions to this aid effort through its financial support of UN agencies and multilateral financial organizations, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Table 2 shows the distribution of funding for these activities by donor and type of activity.

**Table 2: Additional MINUSTAH-Related Funding Disbursed by Donor, July 2004 to March 2005 (dollars in millions)**

Type of assistance	United States	Canada	European Community	Japan	World Bank	Inter-American Development Bank	UN agencies	Total
Political governance	\$6.9	\$19.7	\$1.3	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1.3	<b>\$29.2</b>
Economic governance	7.6	2.5	4.3	0	47.8	18.6	3.8	<b>\$84.6</b>
Economic recovery	24.6	0.8	10.4	0.4	1.1	2.7	1.0	<b>\$41.0</b>
Access to basic services	66.1	35.7	30.8	5.7	1.1	4.0	28.5	<b>\$171.9</b>
Other	0	14.8	10.4	0.4	0.5	3.6	25.8	<b>\$55.5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$105.2</b>	<b>\$73.5</b>	<b>\$57.2</b>	<b>\$6.5</b>	<b>\$50.5</b>	<b>\$28.9</b>	<b>\$60.4</b>	<b>\$382.2</b>

Source: UN Development Program.

Note: UN agencies include the UN Population Fund; the UN Children's Fund; the Food and Agriculture Organization; the UN Organization for Education, Science and Culture; the World Health Organization/Pan-American Health Organization; the UN Development Program; and the World Food Program.

Our cost estimate assumes that the United States and other donors would spend the same amount on these programs and activities regardless of whether the United States undertook a peacekeeping operation in Haiti. Historically, the United States has depended on other official donors and multilateral organizations to participate in reconstruction and rebuilding efforts following an armed conflict.

<sup>14</sup>This does not include U.S. donations for development and humanitarian assistance programs not as closely related to MINUSTAH, such as \$6 million in disaster relief in fiscal year 2004.

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## U.S. and UN Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti Each Have Key Strengths

In addition to cost, other factors would be considered when determining the most appropriate role of the United States and the UN in conducting peacekeeping operations. The United States and the UN each have strengths that can affect the achievement of peacekeeping objectives in Haiti. Past U.S. operations in Haiti have benefited from a strong central communications, command and control structure and a vast military infrastructure supporting its operations, particularly in terms of troop deployment, military intelligence, and public information. Among the strengths of a UN mission are its multinational participation, its extensive experience in peace operations, and a coordinated network of agencies to assist nation building.

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## U.S. Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti Had Elements Found to Be Critical for Effective Peacekeeping

U.S. peacekeeping operations have benefited from strong communications, command and control structures, direct access to well-trained military personnel and equipment, and other advantages of a large, well-established military infrastructure. U.S.-led peacekeeping efforts in Haiti have been widely recognized as operationally effective, having achieved their military objectives rapidly and with minimal loss of life. As we previously reported, U.S. leadership has enhanced operational effectiveness of UN peacekeeping in Haiti.<sup>15</sup> In the 1995 UN Mission to Haiti, the United States provided leadership to multinational forces that ensured adequate troops and resources were available to carry out assigned tasks, used its command and control structure for the operation, and applied its doctrine for “operations other than war” to help guide actions. Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff with experience with more recent multinational forces in Haiti also highlighted rigorous training, a reliable communications infrastructure, and a cohesive command structure as key factors that made U.S. forces operationally effective there.

Furthermore, by virtue of the vast U.S. military infrastructure of DOD and other U.S. agencies, U.S. peacekeeping forces have many elements that UN peacekeeping studies have identified as critical for mission effectiveness, particularly in Haiti. In March 2000, the UN high-level panel reviewing UN peace and security identified elements critical to effective peacekeeping. In

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<sup>15</sup>GAO, *U.N. Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform*, [GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139](#) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2001).

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May 2005, a UN Security Council evaluation of MINUSTAH<sup>16</sup> emphasized the particular importance of three of these elements for operations in Haiti—rapid troop deployment, effective tactical intelligence, and a public information strategy—noting that MINUSTAH was hindered by weaknesses in these elements.

Dedicated DOD organizations support U.S. military operations in these three elements, and have contributed to military successes in past operations in Haiti. Funding for these organizations is not reflected in cost estimates in this report because they are part of the infrastructure that supports all DOD objectives and operations, and costs are not readily attributable to specific contingency operations.

*Rapid deployment.* The 2000 UN report on peacekeeping indicated that it was important to fully deploy an operation within 30 to 90 days after the adoption of a Security Council Resolution establishing the mission. According to the report, the first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical for establishing a stable peace and a credible new operation; opportunities lost during that period are hard to regain. At DOD, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness is responsible for developing and overseeing policies and programs, including training, to ensure the readiness of U.S. forces for peacetime contingencies, crises, and warfighting. Military readiness of both personnel and equipment is a major objective throughout DOD. The department spends more than \$17 billion annually for military schools that offer nearly 30,000 military training courses to almost 3 million military personnel and DOD civilians. With continued heavy military involvement in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD is also spending billions of dollars sustaining or replacing its inventory of key equipment items. The United States has historically deployed troops in Haiti relatively rapidly. (Fig. 3 illustrates deployment of U.S. marines in Haiti.) For example, in 1994 the United States deployed an operation in Haiti within 60 days of the issuance of a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the restoration of Haiti's constitutionally elected leadership to power. The 20,000-member force quickly established itself in 500 locations throughout Haiti and achieved its primary goals within 76 days.

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<sup>16</sup>United Nations, Security Council mission. *Report of the Security Council Mission to Haiti*, 13 to 16 April 2005. May 2005.

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**Figure 3: U.S. Marines Arrive in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Via C-17 Military Transport in March, 2004**



Source: DOD photo.

*Intelligence apparatus.* The 2000 UN report on peacekeeping indicated that missions should be afforded the necessary field intelligence and other capabilities to mount an effective deterrence against violent challengers. For its intelligence needs in an operation in Haiti, DOD can draw upon the extensive resources of the U.S. intelligence community, consisting of a wide array of agencies, departments, and offices throughout the U.S. government. The Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, employing over 7,500 military and civilian employees worldwide, produces and manages foreign military intelligence for warfighters, defense policymakers, and force planners in support of U.S. military planning and operations. The Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, among other organizations, also provide intelligence support to U.S. military operations. U.S. forces had these resources at their disposal when they led multinational forces in Haiti in 1994-95, successfully disbanding the Haitian army and paramilitary groups and confiscating the weapons caches held by government opponents within 7 months.

*Public information.* The 2000 UN report indicated that an effective communications and public information capacity is an operational

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necessity for nearly all UN peacekeeping operations. According to the report, “effective communication helps to dispel rumor, to counter disinformation, and secure the cooperation of local populations.” Furthermore, it can provide leverage in dealing with leaders of local rival groups and enhance the security of UN personnel. The report recommends that such strategies and the personnel to carry them out be included in the very first elements deployed to help start up a mission. At DOD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs is responsible for developing programs and plans relating to DOD news media relations, public information, internal information, community relations, and public affairs in support of DOD objectives and operations. DOD developed a public affairs strategy that was a central element of the operation it led in Haiti in 2004; it included issuing regular press releases and briefing local and international media frequently on the progress and developments of the operation. U.S. military forces in Haiti were met with relatively little violent opposition, resulting in a minimal loss of life, either Haitian or American.

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### UN Has Multinational Participation, Extensive Experience, and Structure for Coordinating Nation Building

The UN’s strengths in peacekeeping in Haiti are rooted in the multinational character of its operation as well as extensive experience with peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN’s experience has enabled it to develop a structure for coordinating international organizations involved in nation building and give it access to a pool of experienced and skilled international civil servants, including personnel with diverse language capabilities.

*Multinational participation.* The multinational cooperation on UN peacekeeping missions, such as in MINUSTAH, provides some notable advantages. According to a 2005 study sponsored by the Rand Corporation, the UN may have the ability to compensate for its relatively small military presence with its reputation of international legitimacy and local impartiality.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, its multinational character likely lends the UN a reputation for impartiality that a single nation may not enjoy. The study concluded that this has afforded the UN a degree of success with relatively small missions that include both security and nation-building components. MINUSTAH represents a multinational effort that is not dominated by any single country. (Fig. 4 illustrates multinational peacekeeping operations

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<sup>17</sup>James Dobbins, et al. *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building, From the Congo to Iraq* (Arlington, VA, 2005).

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under MINUSTAH.) During its first year of operation in Haiti, MINUSTAH comprised 7,624 military staff and police personnel from 41 countries. Unlike earlier U.S.-led operations, where the U.S. troops represented up to 90 percent of military personnel, U.S. participation on the ground in MINUSTAH was limited to 29 U.S. military and police personnel—less than 1 percent of the total. As officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, development of coalition partners through multinational operations is important not only for strengthening ongoing and future operations in Haiti, but also for building strong international capacity for facing future military challenges globally. The advantages for the United States include a lower overall cost for peacekeeping and reduced exposure of U.S. personnel to the inherent dangers of operating in conflict zones. However, according to DOD and State Department officials, the multinational nature of a military force may also limit its operational effectiveness by introducing variations in training among the personnel from different nations and difficulties in communications, command, and control.

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**Figure 4: MINUSTAH Peacekeepers from Jordan Prepare to Patrol The Slum of Cite Soleil in Haiti, July 2005**



Source: UN photo.

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*Experienced peacekeeping officials.* The UN has developed a cadre of senior officials that has gained experience with peacekeeping and nation-building activities over many missions. While there are acknowledged deficiencies in UN peace operations, the UN established a best practices unit in DPKO in 1995 to study and adopt lessons learned. Senior MINUSTAH officials, including the Chilean UN Special Representative and his deputies, the Brazilian Force Commander,<sup>18</sup> and the Canadian Police Commissioner bring experience in peacekeeping and development activities from diverse geographic areas, and particularly from other countries in the region. The international nature of the UN also provides access to a large pool of civil servants and security personnel with native language speaking abilities and translation skills. In Haiti, 11 French-speaking countries have provided peacekeeping troops and police officers for MINUSTAH.

*Structure for coordinating international assistance.* The UN has fostered a network of agencies and development banks. UN peacekeeping missions can draw directly upon this network in coordinating the extensive humanitarian and developmental activities that are related to operations with expansive, integrated mandates that include nation building. In Haiti, MINUSTAH has established a framework for coordination integral to the mission's organization. With UN co-sponsorship, official donors in this network, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, have pledged \$1.3 billion in development assistance. The UN Development Program coordinates the efforts of nine agencies in Haiti, which, during the first year of MINUSTAH, disbursed \$60 million in development assistance. To help ensure that these funds are well coordinated and support MINUSTAH's objectives, these UN agencies operating in Haiti report directly to a senior MINUSTAH official, who also serves as the chief UN Development Program representative for Haiti.

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## Conclusions

While a U.S. peacekeeping operation in Haiti would be more expensive than the current UN mission, it would be subject to higher operational standards and supported by an extensive military infrastructure. Strong, well-trained, and quickly deployed U.S. forces have proven militarily effective in short-term operations in Haiti in the past. However, involving the international community extensively in peacekeeping operations such

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<sup>18</sup>The original MINUSTAH Force Commander died on January 7, 2006. The Deputy Force Commander assumed command of all force elements.



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as MINUSTAH has notable advantages for leveraging development funding, experience, and other resources of nations and organizations. The situation in other peacekeeping missions may differ significantly from the conditions in Haiti, and complex domestic and international political considerations may ultimately weigh heavily in determining the role of U.S. and UN peacekeepers in future operations. Chief among these are the political interests of the United States and other UN member states.


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## Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense and State and the United Nations for their comment. They provided technical corrections, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate, but they had no further comments.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, it will be available at no cost on our Web site at <http://www.gao.gov>.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8979 or [christoffj@gao.gov](mailto:christoffj@gao.gov). Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix II.



Joseph A. Christoff  
Director, International Affairs and Trade

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# Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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To compare the cost of a specific United Nations (UN) mission with the cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN involvement, we obtained and analyzed cost data from the UN and the U.S. Government.

- To determine the UN costs for peacekeeping operations, we analyzed the 2004-2005 budget and supporting documents for the UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH). We spoke with officials of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other UN departments, offices, and agencies at UN headquarters in New York about the assumptions, cost factors and ratios, and cost estimation methods used to generate the budget. We used MINUSTAH as our case study because it illustrates the various categories of cost for a contemporary mission located in a country where the United States has an expressed national interest. Additionally, we believe this case provides a strong basis for estimating costs, given the long history of U.S. and UN military intervention in Haiti. We chose the period May 1, 2004 to June 30, 2005 for analysis because it reflected the first approved mission budget and incorporated the initial start-up costs. According to UN officials, the budget provides a reasonable estimate of costs, though actual expenses may vary from the budget. We also discussed with UN officials the methodology for determining the U.S. assessment for MINUSTAH, which was 27.1 percent of the mission budget. We did not include peacekeeping support costs, which are indirect costs allocated to the mission for overhead and administrative expenses incurred outside of Haiti (at UN headquarters and the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy), as the U.S. Government does not allocate corresponding overhead and administrative costs to individual operations in a comparable way.
- To estimate the military costs of a unilateral U.S. operation, we developed a comparable U.S. operational scenario based on the MINUSTAH budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police peacekeeping personnel and aircraft in Haiti over a similar time period of time (14 months). To devise the military portion of the scenario, we interviewed DOD officials and contractor staff involved in developing cost estimates for U.S. contingency operations. The Department of Defense (DOD) Office of the Comptroller and its contractor, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), generated cost estimates for the military components of this scenario using the DOD's Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST), since DOD financial management regulations designate COST

as the department's common cost-estimating platform. The cost estimate DOD provided included only the incremental costs of the operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place. We based the scenario, and hence the cost estimate, on the following assumptions, which correspond closely with MINUSTAH budget assumptions and actual UN personnel deployments.

- Military contingents: 6,594 total personnel divided as follows:

Hospital units: 500 personnel

Engineers: 200 personnel

Military police: 820 personnel

Light infantry: 5,074 personnel less the number of aviation support personnel for 8 UH-60 Black Hawk and 10 CH-47 Chinook helicopters.

- Type of military personnel: 85 percent active duty, 15 percent reserve.
- Theater of operations: Haiti.
- Operation dates: orders provided April 30, 2004; costs end June 30, 2005.
- Deployment schedule: gradual deployment to theater over 180 day period; 30-day pre-deployment and deployment phase for active duty units and 60 days for reserve units; 6-month rotation period for all units; 7-day re-deployment for all units.
- Operational tempo: level 1.5 for pre-deployment, deployment, and sustainment.
- Construction of troop housing equivalent to semi-rigid soft wall dormitory tents.
- Transportation: departure from Columbus, Georgia, to Port-au-Prince, Haiti; personnel deployed and rotated by commercial air; all equipment shipped by sea.

We obtained input on the scenario design from DOD's Joint Chiefs of Staff, who validated it as reasonable. However, the military component of the scenario and the corresponding cost estimate have some limitations. An actual U.S. military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan, due to differences between U.S. and UN military infrastructures in operations, structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation. Additionally, we did not include reconstitution—the cost of returning equipment to useable standards after operation—in our cost estimate, since the UN does not include this cost in its peacekeeping mission budgets, and we assumed that reconstitution would occur after the initial budget cycle on which our comparison is based. Further, some cost factors used in COST, such as some pre-deployment costs and transportation for certain supplies and mail, are based on various contingency operations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, and may not be representative of costs in Haiti.

- To estimate civilian police costs, we obtained and analyzed data from the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs on actual contract costs for providing civilian police to support UN missions. As these contracts do not include the costs for daily subsistence and transportation, we calculated these additional costs based on the U.S. government meals and incidental expense rate for Port-au-Prince and published contract airfare schedules. We applied the average costs per officer to the total number of civilian police officers included in the MINUSTAH budget. Formed police units were not calculated in this manner, as we assumed that such personnel would be provided in the military portion of the operation as military police and are included as such in that estimate.
- To estimate U.S. civilian personnel costs for the operation, we obtained and analyzed data from the Department of State to determine the average annual cost of a foreign service officer in Haiti during fiscal year 2005, including salary and benefits, office furnishings, housing, residential furnishings, post differential, airfare, shipping, rest and recuperation, danger pay, cost of living adjustments, educational allowance for one child, and miscellaneous expenses. We applied this average cost to the number of non-administrative international staff included in the MINUSTAH budget. (We subtracted several senior executive positions from this number, as the ambassador and U.S. Agency for International Development mission director and other senior U.S. officials already posted to Haiti would likely serve their functions.) To estimate the cost of locally-employed national staff, we obtained

staffing information for the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 from the Department of State and calculated the average annual salary for locally-employed national staff in Haiti. We applied this figure to the number of non-administrative national staff included in the MINUSTAH budget. We calculated benefits for this staff at 27.6 percent of salaries, per information on these costs provided by the Department of State.

- To estimate civilian facilities and administrative costs, we obtained and analyzed data provided by the Department of State and the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince. The department's Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program requires agencies posting staff overseas to pay fees into a cost-sharing pool that funds construction of secure embassies and consulates. We used data on these fees to calculate the total cost-sharing fee for the civilian staff in our U.S. operational scenario for Haiti. To determine administrative support costs, we obtained and analyzed cost data from the Department of State's International Cooperative Administrative Support Services program for the Port-au-Prince embassy for fiscal year 2004. We calculated the average administrative cost per non-administrative foreign service officer and applied this amount to the total number of non-administrative civilian personnel in the MINUSTAH budget.
- To estimate the cost of deploying civilian volunteers, we obtained and analyzed data from two U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations that contract with the U.S. government to provide volunteers for development and humanitarian activities overseas. These organizations provided the cost estimates for deploying 153 volunteers in Haiti for 14 months, which corresponds to the parameters of the MINUSTAH budget for volunteers. Our cost estimate includes the average of these two estimates.

For all of the cost data used in these estimates, we obtained and analyzed supporting information or discussed the data source with the corresponding officials and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

To analyze factors that could substantially affect the estimated costs of the U.S. operation, we developed alternative scenarios and cost estimates, varying one major assumption for each scenario. We identified the assumptions to vary through discussions with DOD and Institute for Defense Analysis officials, who identified those factors they believed,

based on their experience, would have the most influence on the cost estimate for the operation's military component. The three variations we selected were (1) an all-reserve force, (2) deployment of all troops in Haiti within the first 60 days of the operation, and (3) an operational tempo of 2. DOD generated alternative cost estimates for each scenario, using COST, and we compared these with the base estimate to identify and explain the major differences associated with each alternative scenario.

To identify and assess the strengths of the United States and the UN in leading peacekeeping operations in Haiti, we obtained and analyzed UN reports and evaluations relating to MINUSTAH and information on past U.S.-led operations in Haiti. We interviewed officials from DOD, the Department of State, and the UN, as well as peacekeeping experts from the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., to discuss their views on factors that contribute to successful peacekeeping operations. We also reviewed published reports from various organizations relating to the effectiveness of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations.

We conducted our review from June through February 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

# GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

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## GAO Contact

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Key contributors to this report include Tetsuo Miyabara (Assistant Director), James Michels, Charles Perdue, Kendall Schaefer, Suzanne Sapp, Grace Lui, Lynn Cothorn, Joseph Carney, and Sharron Candon.

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