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BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

Report To The Congress

OF THE UNITED STATES

Lack Of Control And Feedback Hinders Army Manpower Management Improvements

The Army's manpower management system has major shortcomings which GAO discussed in prior reports. The Army has recently consolidated many headquarters manpower functions and has taken steps to solve other problems. But major weaknesses will not be solved until the Army's top management makes a long-term commitment to establish a control and feedback system for managing human resources. Over 50 percent of total Army dollars is used for human resources.

The Army needs to

- define and implement accountability for all manpower actions,
- link its major manpower activities to a common data base,
- use workload information to determine manpower needs at the operational level,
- provide the information and incentive for top-level managers to make the best use of the total labor force, and
- insure adequate development and availability of professional staff for manpower functions.



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To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

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This report identifies weaknesses in the Army's manpower management system. These weaknesses limit the Army's ability to justify and manage the human resources which consume over 50 percent of total Army dollars. We prepared this report to show that numerous deficiencies which we have reported on will not be corrected until the Army improves its system and top managers emphasize the importance of manpower management.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretary of the Army.

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Comptroller General
of the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

LACK OF CONTROL AND FEEDBACK
HINDERS ARMY MANPOWER
MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS

D I G E S T

The Army's ability to determine its manpower needs, justify its budget, and use its staff effectively depends on the adequacy of its manpower management system. GAO issued several reports during 1978 and 1979 which discussed major problems in the Army's manpower management.

The Army has tried to solve some of its problems by consolidating many headquarters manpower functions, but it needs to establish an integrated and reliable system of controls from Army headquarters and feedback from field offices to correct the weaknesses GAO found.

For example, management responsibilities are fragmented and not clearly defined. Under the Army's decentralized structure, subordinate commands are charged with setting goals, determining monitoring requirements, and establishing accountability for manpower needs. Top-level support, resources, and procedural guidelines are not always provided for programs designed to develop information on manpower needs at the operational level. (See ch. 2.)

The Army has no common data base for coordinating, budgeting, and evaluating manpower needs. Without an integrated and common data base, it cannot properly prepare a zero base budget. (See ch. 3.)

The Army's top managers do not have the policies and controls to make the best use of its total labor force. Total sources of labor, such as contract employees, and deployable troops are not considered in determining manpower requirements. As a result, headquarters cannot monitor the use of its total labor force or compare performance to standards. (See ch. 5.)

The success of any system depends on the adequacy of its managers and support staff. The Army should emphasize this need by (1) developing an officer career field for manpower management, (2) improving the development of civilian managers, and (3) allocating sufficient support staff. (See ch. 6.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

To promote successful manpower management and implementation of an integrated and reliable manpower system, the Secretary of the Army should design a system integrated at all organizational levels. It should identify the functions and accountability of headquarters and commanders at each lower level so that information flows freely. Activities and functions should be tied together with common data bases and reporting systems which are simple and can be adapted to meet the manpower and budgeting needs of managers at all levels.

The system should be an extension of recent efforts to consolidate manpower functions at headquarters. But it cannot merely consolidate existing functions. The Army should develop a long-range plan, and in preparing and carrying out the plan the Army should:

- Involve top-level managers and use outside expertise when appropriate in designing the integrated system.
- Make sure a headquarters organization, such as the newly formed Director of Manpower, Plans, and Budget, has adequate support and staff to implement and monitor the plan.
- Design management activities that use common data for operational and headquarters management as well as budget development.
- Develop methods for determining detail manpower needs which are based on sound techniques, use accurate workload and

manpower data, can directly relate manpower to workload, can be aggregated from detail to budget level, and are cost effective.

- Make the best and most cost-effective use of Active and Reserve military, civilian, and contractor personnel.
- Establish an officer career field for manpower managers and place more emphasis on developing and using civilian managers in both manpower and personnel.
- Allocate sufficient staff to develop the data base needed by manpower managers.
- Evaluate audit agencies' recommendations and make improvements which are best for the total manpower function rather than for each component of manpower management.

Defense and Army officials were given an opportunity to study and verify the accuracy of the report and discuss it with GAO. In general they agreed that the report accurately addresses the problem areas and offers viable alternatives.

To date the Army has not taken the recommended corrective action. GAO plans to follow up on these recommendations as well as those recommended in previous reports.

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ABBREVIATIONS

DOD	Department of Defense
FORSCOM	Forces Command
GAO	General Accounting Office
MACRIT	manpower authorization criteria
MOS	military occupational specialty
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The fiscal year 1979 budget authorized about one million active duty military and civilian personnel and over one half million National Guard and Reserve personnel for the Army. Thus, manpower is a major resource which consumes over 50 percent of total Army dollars. (See app. II.) Rising personnel costs and the increased competition for funds have increased the Army's need to use credible techniques to determine and support its human resource needs to the Congress. Moreover, Army manpower management should effectively use these limited and expensive human resources.

Army manpower managers identify the human resources needed to carry out assigned missions and allocate the limited resources approved by the Congress. Manpower managers also evaluate alternative means of providing needed resources and develop policies to be followed in using human resources. Personnel managers, on the other hand, deal with the acquisition, training, and assignment of people to fill the positions which manpower managers identify and allocate.

Many constraints affect the manpower management process, such as manpower availability, mandated ceilings, scarce dollars, and various personnel policies. The most common constraint managers must face is money. There is never enough money available to hire people to meet all requirements. The Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of the Secretary of the Army establish policies such as ceilings on hiring personnel and tour lengths that affect manpower decisions. All serve to complicate the task of determining and making available the spaces to supply the Army with personnel at the desired level of readiness.

Issues arising from the use of human resources are more critical today than before because of changes brought on by the All-Volunteer Force and the Total Force management policies.

EFFECTS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

In recent years the Army has experienced profound changes affecting its management and use of personnel. For many years it relied on the draft to acquire a large, continuing supply of new personnel. Since the draft ended it has pursued an aggressive program to recruit volunteers, paying bonuses to enlistees for critically needed skills. After years

of training, maintaining, and moving a large force, primarily for combat duty, its force has been drastically reduced in size, and it operates in a peacetime environment to maintain its forces in a state of combat readiness.

Clearly, one of the most important effects of the All-Volunteer Force is the increased visibility accorded military manpower management. The nearly three decades of post-World War II draft procedures provided Army managers with a virtually unlimited and relatively inexpensive source of manpower. Since the military forces were at least partially isolated from competition in the labor market during the draft, the effectiveness of manpower management did not have much priority. The management policies used seemed to evolve out of a driving concern for equal promotion opportunity and administrative simplicity, which encouraged management rigidity.

TOTAL FORCE MANAGEMENT POLICY

Since its inception as a management concept in the late 1960s, Total Force management has become a Department of Defense (DOD) policy with an increasingly significant impact on the ways in which the services are organized and staffed to manage their human resources. In essence, Total Force management seeks to integrate and consolidate the Active, Guard, and Reserve military forces, as well as civilian and contractor personnel, into a resource mix which will minimize cost while maintaining force readiness.

REASON FOR REPORT

We have issued several reports (see app. I) which discuss major shortcomings with various portions of the Army's manpower management system. This report summarizes those problems which need to be corrected before the Army can develop a good manpower system. We stress these problems in this overview report because they affect the Army's ability to determine, justify, and use manpower funded by the Congress. In reports issued to the Secretary of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress, we have identified weaknesses and recommended

- centralizing manpower functions into one organization which has control and accountability for manpower requirements and assessment of use,
- coordinating manpower management activities so that requirements determined at low levels can

be tied into the budget process and changes in workload or manpower can be quantified and anticipated,

- improving the methods and reliability of data used for determining manpower requirements for civilian and military personnel,
- implementing better policies, controls, and information on the training and use of personnel, and
- hiring professional managers and adequate staff to run the manpower system.

The Army has made nominal changes to a complex manpower management system which has grown piecemeal to accommodate changing requirements imposed within the Army and by higher authorities.

During a time of manpower cuts and ever-increasing demand, the attitude of some Army officials is that, although the Army manpower management system does not provide the control, data, and accountability needed, a new system cannot be established. The Army, according to these officials, must do the best it can with an imperfect system.

Other Army officials believe an integrated system of organizations, data, and accountability is a must. For example, the Army's manpower management task force under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is making improvements by designing a system to determine manpower needs by function and planning an automated process to report the number of spaces used against the number authorized. But lacking a long-term commitment by top Army management, these officials' efforts will affect only a small segment of the total system. Ongoing Army projects and studies in the manpower and force management area and in related areas are listed in appendix III.

SCOPE

Using the information and findings from the reports listed in appendix I, we evaluated the adequacy of the Army manpower management system to effectively determine manpower needs, justify its manpower budget, and direct and monitor manpower use. This report identifies actions the Army is taking to correct some of its more significant problems.

CHAPTER 2

PROBLEMS FROM POOR CONTROL AND FEEDBACK

The Army's management philosophy is to give subordinate commands as much flexibility as possible to manage resources. Under this philosophy many problems in the Army manpower management system have resulted from lack of control by Army headquarters and lack of feedback from subordinate commands. Commanders are assigned missions and are provided resources to accomplish those missions; in turn, they are held accountable for accomplishing those missions. The Army says this is designed decentralization but should not be interpreted as an absence of rules and procedures. But the Army has implemented this philosophy without adequate headquarters' guidelines and monitoring. For example:

- Army resource management has been fragmented due to the lack of clearly defined responsibilities. A recent headquarters reorganization was made to improve control over manpower activities, but problems still exist. (See pp. 5 to 7.)
- The Army's manpower management activities are not coordinated with a common data base. (See ch. 3.)
- Top-level support, technical assistance, resources, and procedural guidelines are not always provided for programs designed to develop detail manpower requirements at the operational level. (See pp. 36 and 37.)
- Organizational placement of programs to determine manpower needs and evaluate manpower use are not controlled. (See p. 19.)
- Standards for organizational alinement and minimum staffing cannot be developed on a commandwide basis because every installation can perform similar support activities differently. (See p. 19.)
- The determination of the best use of personnel is many times left up to installation managers, with the chain of command being the only overview. (See pp. 24, 27, and 28.)

PAST PROBLEMS

Resource management in the Army since the revolution has been the process by which funds and manpower have been distributed throughout the Army under strict congressional limits. Before 1973 the Army had successfully resisted all

efforts to integrate manpower management activities. Manpower management was fragmented with no single authority having effective control.

The Army reorganized and restructured its resource management systems in 1973 and 1974 to deal with budget cuts, provide information on manpower requirements, and reduce headquarters staff:

- It established the select committee composed of general staff chiefs who, by majority vote, decided which budget requests were to be cut back and by how much.
- It reorganized the Continental Army Command, due to political pressure, to reduce headquarters staff and to improve the ratio between combat and support forces. The reorganization split the Continental Army Command into a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and a Forces Command (FORSCOM).
- It reorganized the Army staff by transferring essential operation functions to the field in an attempt to reduce headquarters staff by 50 percent.
- As the second part of the reorganization, it sought to integrate all activities associated with a particular function in one agency and eliminate excessive reviews of proposed actions. The Army consolidated many of its manpower management policy responsibilities in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. But the reorganization divided manpower functions among three directorates.

REORGANIZATION FOR MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

The above actions did not solve the Army's problems of fragmented authority, inadequate data, or insufficient top management supervision. In fact, several headquarters officials blame the reorganization for the lack of staff or control needed to adequately supervise programs in manpower management.

The Army Chief of Staff initiated a resource management study in 1977 to evaluate the Army's capabilities in resource management. The task force completed its study in 1978, and the Chief of Staff decided to:

- Consolidate all headquarters manpower management responsibility under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

- Continue the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans' responsibility for force structure.
- Consolidate responsibility for all military training under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.
- Continue the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel's responsibility for leading the training base, professional development, career management, civil education, civilian training, and precommission training.

The headquarters reorganization is a start, but many of the problems identified in our reviews relate to systems in the organization which are not integrated. The 1978 manpower reorganization did not require any restructuring below the Army headquarters.

The new manpower organization, headed by the Director of Manpower, Plans and Budget, and under the Deputy chief of Staff for Personnel, recognizes that the Army manpower system lacks credibility and is still not an integrated system. Therefore, in March 1979 it established a task force to:

- Develop short-term improvements to the current manpower management system.
- Identify long-range improvements to increase the effectiveness of the Army manpower management system.
- Monitor implementation of system improvements.

ORGANIZATIONAL ALINEMENTS DUPLICATE EFFORTS AND FRAGMENT AUTHORITY

The Army operates under various organizational alignments to manage manpower. Some of these duplicate efforts and fragment authority, and others do not insure programs are effective.

Army headquarters has not staffed some of the components recently consolidated under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Other activities are still under fragmented control. For example, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has policymaking responsibility for work measurement functions relating to manpower requirements, but work measurement is under the Comptroller of the Army because it has historically been a program to encourage productivity. Moreover, Personnel has assigned no staff to the function.

FORSCOM has dispersed its manpower management functions among the (1) Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, responsible for manpower requirements, manpower budgets, and allocation of authorized resources, (2) Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, responsible for the Army authorization documents system, and (3) Deputy Chief of Staff Comptroller, responsible for the overall budget, organization structure, and work measurement.

The success of FORSCOM's manpower management depends on coordination of parallel organizations. Coordination makes some efforts successful, but it often results in duplication and lack of accountability. For example both the Deputy Chief of Staff Comptroller, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel are developing standards for manpower requirements.

TRADOC has consolidated its manpower functions under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, but this has not assured successful implementation of manpower programs. For example, TRADOC has not established a viable work measurement program to develop summary-level standards. TRADOC officials said they do not want to set up a work measurement program at command level until Army headquarters provides procedural guidance which will integrate the work measurement program with existing manpower and accounting systems.

CONCLUSIONS

The Army does not have an integrated manpower management system with common objectives. Data control and feedback are missing. Thus, the flexibility delegated to Army commanders has fostered many individual efforts lacking mutual direction and purpose.

Headquarters limits its management to writing policy, but top management does not adequately supervise to make sure the policy is implemented. Army headquarters officials do not believe they have the staff or authority to provide procedural guidance. As a result, lower echelons of the organizations implement policies differently, and Army headquarters cannot assess the benefits or adverse effects.

Decentralization can have the advantage of placing accountability at the level where the mission must be accomplished. However, the success of programs should not overrely on local commanders' interpreting general policy guidance and choosing the most cost-effective methods. Rather, Army headquarters should have enough control to direct the programs and inspect the outcome.

The Director of Manpower needs to obtain top-level support to make improvements and integrate manpower management activities at all levels. The Army, however, must be willing to give up or revise many components of manpower management which have evolved over a number of years and are not part of an integrated system.

CHAPTER 3

NEED TO COORDINATE MANPOWER MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

Poor control and feedback are responsible for the Army's difficulty in justifying its manpower needs and quantifying the impact of staff shortages under its planning, programing, and budgeting system. The Army lacks the capability to aggregate requirements from the detail level to the budget level; directly relate manpower to workload; trace budget changes to the work center level; and evaluate manpower use with a common data system. The need for direct traceable relationships between detail manpower requirements and those reflected in the budget is even more important for zero base budgeting. Therefore, the Army needs to design a manpower system which coordinates the following major activities with a common data base:

- Detail manpower requirements for garrisons, schools, and deployable units.
- Planning, programing, and budgeting, including zero base budgeting.
- Allocating manpower spaces.
- Evaluating manpower use.

GARRISON PROBLEMS MAY BE TYPICAL

In reviewing manpower functions of garrisons (primarily base operation administrative and support functions), we found that all the above activities seek the minimum number of employees to effectively perform required functions. Yet the activities are not part of a system with common data bases.

FORSCOM and TRADOC use manpower surveys to determine the detail requirements (work center level) for their garrisons. The survey teams determine how many people each work center needs to accomplish its missions, usually by reviewing past staffing patterns (documented in the Staffing Guide for U.S. Army Garrisons) and local conditions and workloads. Then, they summarize their recommendations for work centers to determine how many people the installation needs to operate its garrison.

The commands cannot use the survey team recommendations for budgeting because:

- Survey team recommendations are aggregated according to the organization structure and cannot easily be aggregated into the activities used for budgeting.
- Actual budget requests are less than detail manpower requirements determined for operational units. Major commands must provide their budget requests according to headquarters estimates rather than operational requirements so that requests and authorizations correlate.
- There is no audit trail until after Army headquarters allocates spaces to commands, commands allocate spaces to installations, and installations allocate spaces to specific positions in the garrison. The allocations are then documented against approved requirements in the Army authorization document system.
- Criteria and standards do not identify needs by source of labor. Four appropriations fund garrison activities, and installations use about nine labor sources other than permanent labor to do garrison work. Furthermore, the cost of some labor sources, such as borrowed troops, are not identified garrison costs.
- The commands cannot assess the impact of not getting the number of people recommended by the survey team. For example, FORSCOM received about 80 percent of its detail requirements in fiscal year 1978 but could not use manpower survey information to identify or quantify the adverse effects.
- The survey information does not directly relate manpower needs to workload. Therefore, the commands cannot accurately predict their manpower needs for budgeting, mobilization, or for changes in workload.
- The manpower surveys do not provide management with enough data to monitor and adjust manpower allocations between onsite surveys. Surveys are made about every 2 to 4 years.

SUCCESS OF ZERO BASE BUDGETING
DEPENDS ON AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM

President Carter directed agencies to prepare their fiscal year 1979 budget under a zero base budgeting system. The Army encountered a problem in its first attempt to develop a zero base budget because it did not have a common data base. This problem still exists, and the adequacy

of the Army's budget will be suspect until it develops a direct traceable relationship between manpower requirements and the budget and can directly relate manpower to workload.

Zero base budgeting is supposed to provide management with an operating tool to evaluate and allocate its resources effectively. It is also supposed to provide managers with a mechanism for identifying, evaluating, and communicating their activities and alternatives to higher levels of management. Zero base budgeting requires an agency to develop its budget by presenting the cost and ability of programs to operate at various levels, such as minimum, current, and enhanced. On the basis of this information, high-level managers evaluate and rank program or activity levels in decreasing order of priority to compete for funding. This process departs from the incremental budget preparation under the Army's planning, programing, and budgeting system where manpower allocations are not usually justified from a zero base but, instead, on the basis of changes from the last program or budget submission.

OMB instructions provide for agencies to base justifications on such information as detailed analysis of workload, productivity trends, and staffing requirements for measurable workload. Agencies are to use work measurement studies to estimate staff hours per unit of workload. Chapter 4 describes the Army's inability to relate its work measurement standards to parts of the budget.

Problems encountered in first attempt at zero base budgeting

The need for common data and an integrated system was evident in the Army's first attempt to meet zero base budgeting requirements for fiscal year 1979. The Army made its first attempt before it could analyze and use OMB and DOD guidelines. The Army encountered problems which showed that methods for determining manpower requirements at the operational level should be designed with full awareness of how the data can be used for budgeting. The Army found that it could not readily translate budgets developed by Army management structure codes (accounting structure) to groupings of data by broad issues.

Installations generally developed decision units for base operations through the functional accounts in the Army management structure. For the first-year implementation, installations had to use available information on operational hours, other operational parameters, and dollar values in issuing guidelines on how the program would operate at minimum, current, and enhanced levels. At Army headquarters the

problem became one of interpreting the data from installations and presenting it for decisions by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the zero base budgeting process.

Current attempts depend on
adequacy of data base

The zero base procedures for the fiscal year 1980 budget were substantially changed to make the process more meaningful and less complex. The budget was developed by issues rather than accounts from the Army management structure. Examples of these issues are off-post training, aviation training, force structure actions, and operation of utilities. In the issue-oriented budget, many accounts must be fragmented among issues. For example, the account for maintenance of material will support several issues, such as off-post training. Essentially, the fiscal year 1980 zero base budget attempts to portray how commanders would actually use additional funding or, conversely, how they would distribute reduced funds to their budget programs.

CONCLUSIONS

The Army needs an integrated systems approach to manpower management. That is, all components of manpower management should interrelate so that when one part of the system changes, changes in other parts of the system can be traced and quantified. The Army lacks one of the most important parts of an integrated system--a common data base which can aggregate manpower needs according to budget categories, directly relate manpower to workload, trace budget changes back to the detail level, and evaluate manpower use.

We do not believe the Army can effectively manage manpower or comply with zero base budgeting requirements without an integrated data system. Top management must direct and support the development of such a system and should consider the needs of all users of manpower data. The Army may need to get outside expertise to help design the system.

We recommended that the Army develop a management information system for its garrison units (primarily base operations) which use a common data base for work center needs, garrison costs, budget requests, allocations, and evaluations of manpower use. The information should integrate accounting, manpower reporting, and staffing standards information.

CHAPTER 4

NEED TO IMPROVE METHODS

FOR DETERMINING MANPOWER NEEDS

The Army has not exercised sufficient control over systems used at the operational level to determine manpower needs. Army headquarters officials have great difficulty in using information fed back from lower levels for planning, programing, and budgeting. Some of the methods we reviewed are not based on sound techniques and accurate workload information and cannot be used to determine the effects of changes in manpower or workload. Some are not based on a design which assures that the information produced is that needed by manpower, personnel, and budget managers.

We reviewed the following criteria to determine whether they provide reliable and usable information. All these criteria consider, in varying ways, the estimated hours workers will be available:

- Manpower authorization criteria (MACRIT) determine how many people are needed for combat functions which have measurable workloads. In fiscal year 1978, 188,000 Army active duty employees and 248,000 National Guard and Reserve employees were assigned on the basis of these criteria.
- The Staffing Guide for U.S. Army Garrisons provides criteria for determining support and administrative personnel needs at FORSCOM and TRADOC installations. In fiscal year 1978, 71,254 spaces were authorized for these duties.
- The Staffing Guide for U.S. Army Schools provides criteria for determining instructor needs. In fiscal year 1978 the Army had 9,717 instructor spaces authorized.

LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS IN MACRIT STUDIES

GAO and the Army have found serious weaknesses in the Army's MACRIT system for determining the number of staff needed for positions which have measurable workloads and are required for the unit to accomplish its wartime mission. The Army has initiated a pilot study to correct many of the problems but needs a long-term commitment to make sure they are corrected.

Wartime personnel requirements are documented in tables of organization and equipment. 1/ Modification tables of organization and equipment give commanders the means to adjust standards to meet specific operational needs. These adjustments must be verifiable and traceable to adequately support the budget and management decisions.

MACRIT formulas divide workload estimates by estimated available worktime--the time that soldiers are available to perform their primary duties after deducting the time they are not available because of nonproductive activities. Errors in estimating either workload or soldiers' available worktime can affect the number of soldiers needed. For example, only 1 workday per month in the available worktime of active duty soldiers represents about 6,200 positions, costing \$77 million annually.

Estimated available worktime
should be more reliable

The Army has not updated its estimates of the time personnel in MACRIT-supported positions lose in nonproductive activities in 14 years. The old estimates show these personnel are available for productive activities 69 percent of their time and lose an average of 31 percent of their time in nonproductive activities and movement of their units. The lost time represents 58,543 positions costing \$727 million annually.

Several shortcomings are apparent in available worktime estimates. They

- do not recognize variances in nonproductive time between units;
- may be overstating unit movement factors because they assume units do not move in the 12-hour "off-duty" shift;
- have failed to consider that nonproductive time and unit movement time can overlap, which would increase available time;

1/Another type of criteria, called standard position criteria, prescribe staff needed for positions having no measurable workload, such as supervisory positions. These are also documented in the tables.

- can compound errors in estimating available time because unit movement factors are applied after deducting the nonproductive time; and
- do not account for differences between requirements based on an assumed wartime work schedule and requirements in peacetime.

Workload estimates should be more reliable

The Army has issued several reports since 1967 showing that workload estimates used in MACRIT studies are unreliable. Following Army Inspector General reports of recurring deficiencies in automotive maintenance criteria for 3 consecutive years, the Army proposed, in March 1978, restructuring the criteria for maintenance functions. The proposal was limited to maintenance functions and did not include plans to update the available worktime estimates. However, it suggested new methods to model personnel requirements and correct the following problems:

- MACRIT is intended to determine combat requirements, but the Army has known for at least 11 years that, except for aircraft maintenance, workload requirements are based on a peacetime environment.
- Workload hours may be understated because all personnel are not trained in the minimum skill levels assumed in estimating the time it takes to perform maintenance tasks.
- Several studies have questioned the Army's estimate that an additional 40 percent of the time estimated for direct hands-on labor will be needed for indirect labor and delays in awaiting parts.

Long-term commitment and resources needed

The Army has initiated an 18-month pilot study to solve many of the problems we and Army studies identified. The study plan was to be finalized by May 1979. It is still maintenance oriented but includes plans to examine nonproductive time factors and will be used to rewrite the instructions in the Army regulation for updating MACRIT studies. An Army official said the plan will provide for reviewing all of the problems that we and the Army noted, except the need for minimum skill-level standards which has not historically been a function of MACRIT studies.

Study implementation may depend on budget approval of about \$1 million for TRADOC and \$5 million for the Army

Materiel Development and Readiness Command to conduct the pilot study. The quality of the study will also depend on the availability of qualified staff to perform certain activities. For example, work measurement staff are needed to conduct studies of maintenance functions.

BETTER METHODS NEEDED TO DETERMINE
GARRISONS' MANPOWER NEEDS

The Army's manpower survey program fails to provide the information needed to justify and manage manpower for garrisons' administrative and support functions. Survey teams make subjective evaluations and adjust the criteria in the Staffing Guide for U.S. Army Garrisons, which is primarily a record of historical staffing patterns. Therefore, the survey team cannot provide information which shows a direct and traceable relation between manpower needs and workload. Army actions to use work measurement standards to supplement the staffing guide will provide more precise information but will not provide top management the information it needs.

Survey team recommendations of work center needs

--become garrison requirements after being documented in the table of distribution and allowances,

--are the primary source of information FORSCOM uses to update the garrison staffing guide, and

--are one source of information used by (1) major commands to make bulk allocations to installations and (2) installations to decide where to place limited resources.

Staffing Guide for U.S. Army
Garrisons does not provide
usable and verifiable requirements

The staffing guide outlines past staffing patterns and does not specifically compare workload to the number of people needed. Installations perform activities differently because their missions vary, and the Army allows installations to organize their functions differently. The staffing guide provides no way to take into account all the variations. Thus, survey teams often use the guide as a point of departure. This makes it more difficult to verify requirements or use the detail requirements to predict manpower needs on the basis of workload.

Organizational guidelines
are not authoritative

The staffing guide includes organizational guidelines to present quantitative standards. Because the Army allows installations to organize and use staff the way it believes is most effective, FORSCOM cannot develop organization and manpower guidelines to be used Army-wide. Therefore, survey teams must evaluate the difference between work performed by work centers and that described in the staffing guide and subjectively adjust the quantitative guidelines. For example, 4 of 30 randomly selected work centers at Fort Sill were not organized according to the staffing guide, and 12 of the 30 work centers performed more work than described in the guide.

Quantitative guidelines are
not objective or verifiable

Quantitative guidelines, referred to as yardsticks, are primarily an average of past survey team recommendations and are of little value in projecting the consequences of changes in workload or manpower at the work center level and are of no value at the budget level. The yardsticks generally identify needs on the basis of varying levels of workload or other quantifiable factors such as population served or the number of buildings. The usefulness of the yardsticks is diminished because:

--FORSCOM updates the yardsticks without knowing if they directly relate to the descriptions of work to be performed.

--The yardsticks often do not show a relationship between the amount of work performed and the number of workers required. Our sample at Fort Sill showed that only 10 percent of the work units examined had a significant correlation to the number of workers.

--The yardsticks cannot be related to parts of the budget.

Manpower survey findings are subjective

Manpower survey teams' onsite appraisals can identify inefficiencies and provide useful information for allocating staff resources. Their determinations, however, are based to a large extent on subjective evaluations and cannot provide a direct and traceable relationship between manpower and output. Once surveys are completed, it is difficult or

impossible to quantify manpower needs on the basis of changes in workload or to evaluate the impact of manpower reductions on workload.

A survey team used subjective criteria to recommend 348 employees for the 30 work centers we randomly selected at Fort Sill. It used:

- Three yardsticks which described a specific amount of work and had a meaningful relation between workload output and manhours input, but the survey team adjusted all three yardsticks to compensate for differences in local missions.
- Seven yardsticks in which the work unit was expressed as a staffing ratio. This method is not precise but can be effective where there is no quantifiable output. The survey team adjusted two of these for local differences.
- Ten yardsticks which did not represent a specific amount of work and could not be related to manhours needed. The survey team adjusted eight of these for local differences.
- A statistical analysis of past performance to recommend employees for three work centers, but the analyses were not valid.
- Subjective evaluations of local conditions to recommend employees for seven work centers but did not document how manpower needs related to workload in any of the centers.
- No work measurement standards as the basis for staff recommendations for any work centers, although Army regulations require their use and Fort Sill has them for 60 percent of its garrison.

Need to improve approach to developing staffing standards

An Army command and at least one installation are developing work measurement standards for garrison activities. Although they will provide some useful information, the standards are not consistent, do not meet minimum specified characteristics, and cannot be related to total programs or missions. The Army recognized the need for better staffing standards more than 4 years ago and directed commands to use work measurement to develop them. It, however, did not

directly involve its top management officials in developing the standards, nor did it provide sufficient guidelines and staff support.

Army headquarters allows commands to decide the organizational level where work measurement programs will be directed. FORSCOM has centralized its program at the command level, and TRADOC allows its installations to operate a work measurement program if they can staff and support it. In fiscal year 1977 only 9 of 17 TRADOC installations had work measurement personnel, and only 2 or 3 were making any effort to develop staffing standards.

Current development is inadequate

People at FORSCOM and Fort Sill have taken initiatives to develop standards for assessing the needs of individual work centers. FORSCOM officials estimated that about 4 years will be required to cover its installations' work centers. Fort Sill had studied about 60 percent of its garrison functions when we made our review in 1978.

Staffing standards based on work measurement will provide some valuable information for installations and major commands in assessing work centers' efficiency and in allocating manpower resources. But the standards will not provide top Army management the information it needs for planning, budgeting, and monitoring.

We noted the following problems with the Army's current development of work measurement standards:

- TRADOC installations and FORSCOM have selected various work measurement techniques for the same type activity on the basis of local appraisals of which technique is best or more cost effective.
- The Army has not provided procedural guidelines to make sure data on workload and manhours is valid. As a result, work measurement programs are not including information on all sources of labor performing garrison work and are not always validating workload data used to compute standards.
- FORSCOM and Fort Sill have not summarized their staffing standards to relate to programs in the budget.
- The Army's approaches to developing work measurement standards will result in a different standard for the same type function at every garrison.

--The work measurement staff can use methods studies to identify inefficiencies and differences in operations, but FORSCOM does not plan to perform any methods studies until all garrison activities are covered by statistical standards in about 4 or 5 years.

We believe the Army's current efforts will lead to a piecemeal, evolutionary approach which will not achieve the full potential of work measurement or serve management's information needs.

CRITERIA OVERSTATE INSTRUCTOR STAFFING NEEDS

Requirements for instructors are based on criteria in the Staffing Guide for U.S. Army Service Schools. At the time of our review, these criteria included a factor which inflated the Army's estimated need for instructors by at least 39 percent compared with the other services. Survey teams use this criteria to establish manpower requirements for the schools. The inflated criteria increased the Army's authorized instructor positions by about 1,529 for fiscal year 1977.

To estimate instructor requirements, each service has established a staffing criterion which includes the number of hours an instructor is available to teach skill training courses. Before our audit, the Army required its instructors to teach 900 hours, compared to the Air Force's 1,380 hours, the Navy's 1,320 hours, and the Marine Corps' 1,250 hours. The Army had no study to support the 900 class hours. However, it had been using 1,250 hours to compute requirements for interservice training courses.

The Army now requires all instructors to teach 1,250 classroom hours. It said that, since instructors have been performing other duties in training development and combat development, it has transferred the requirement for some of the instructors to these functions. The net change in requirements from fiscal years 1978-79 follows:

	<u>Requirements</u>
Reduction in instructors	- 2447
Increase in training development staff	911
Increase in combat development staff	404
Net decrease	- 1132

Our review did not assess the need for increased requirements for training development and combat development, but we believe the Army should be required to verify the need for these requirements.

AVAILABLE WORKTIME ESTIMATES MAY UNDERSTATE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The Army uses a 1952 study to estimate that workers will be available 90 percent of the time and on annual and sick leave 10 percent of the time. (This estimate does not cover absences for training.) But employees' leave often exceeds this 10-percent estimate. Recent studies show that the 10-percent estimate is understated, but the Army has not updated it.

Overstating available time may have little impact on criteria in the staffing guides because few are based on a precise determination of the number of available manhours needed to produce the output. But staffing determinations and efficiency reports based on work measurement are directly affected by the available time estimate. Both Fort Sill and FORSCOM work measurement groups use the 90-percent estimate of available time which can understate manpower requirements and indicate that units are less efficient than actual.

Fort Sill computed staffing requirements for its Adjutant General's staff for a 7-month period on the basis of work measurement standards and the 90-percent availability estimate. It found that the Adjutant General needed a monthly average of 396 employees, 50 less than the average actual staff of 446. The 50 employees were considered to represent inefficiencies (differences between the standard which reflects how long it should take to produce an output and the actual manhours). Our review showed that 20 of the 50 employees represented errors in the computation because actual leave was 13.4 percent instead of 10 percent.

CONCLUSIONS

Plans, programs, and budgets are only as accurate and verifiable as the data which supports them. The Army needs to improve its methods for determining manpower needs at the work center or operational level. It should consider the accuracy of input data, the method used to compute requirements, and the data's usefulness to managers from the lowest level through the budget. Data systems should be implemented or corrected only after top managers from all Army organizations using the information determine the data needed and the cost.

CHAPTER 5

NEED FOR BETTER POLICIES, CONTROLS, AND INFORMATION ON THE USE OF PERSONNEL

Poor control and feedback are seen in Army top management's difficulty in training and making the best use of its total labor force. The following problems indicate the Army cannot integrate and consolidate its labor force as intended by the Total Force management policy. (See p. 2.) The Army does not

- determine manpower needs on the basis of all sources of labor;
- have sufficient policies and controls to make the best and most cost-effective use of civilians, contract employees, and deployable troops; and
- have adequate controls and monitoring to make sure persons are needed and used where they are justified.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS SHOULD INCLUDE ALL SOURCES OF LABOR

The Army does not include all labor sources in manpower requirements. Personnel doing similar work are managed by different programs, total program costs are not known, and standards cannot be developed which represent the total program output.

Manpower survey teams generally recommend that permanent staff should do garrison work, but in fiscal year 1978, garrisons received about 80 percent of the spaces survey teams recommended. Therefore, installations used up to nine sources of labor in addition to permanent garrison staff to make up the shortage and perform locally authorized missions. These labor sources are managed by different programs, and only part of the labor is justified for garrison work.

As shown below, Fort Sill supplemented its allocated staff for a total garrison labor force which exceeded total survey team recommendations.

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Other</u>
Survey team recommendations	3,583	2,676	719	188
Allocations	2,743	2,119	624	0
Total labor force	3,772	2,210	893	669

Fort Sill used 1,029 personnel from the following labor sources to supplement its allocated staff.

<u>Source of Labor</u>	<u>No. as of Nov. 1977</u>
Surplus, table of distribution and allowances staff	360
Contract	344
Borrowed military manpower	168
Nonappropriated fund	66
Students	8
Volunteers	42
Command staff assigned to Fort Sill	13
Temporary	27
Active duty reservists	1
Total	<u>1,029</u>

Many of these labor sources are justified for another purpose and cannot be related to garrison requirements or costs. For example, borrowed military manpower is justified for combat but may have insufficient work during peacetime. Sometimes the borrowed personnel are working in their area of training, but many times they are not. Contract labor is paid for with funds authorized for the garrison, but survey teams do not review their work, and actual man-year equivalents have not been developed for this labor source. Nonappropriated fund workers are not part of the manpower management process even though they work in the Army's recreation services program which is partially funded and staffed with appropriated funds.

As a result of a recent Army staff study, the Army Chief of Staff told the Director of Manpower to give special attention to integrating nonappropriated fund and contract labor with manpower programs. But the decision stopped short of actually making these labor sources part of the manpower function and did little to increase manpower managers' control of the total labor source.

NEED TO USE MORE CIVILIANS AND CONTRACT PERSONNEL

The Army is resisting further implementation of DOD's longstanding policy to use civilians in positions which do not require military personnel. DOD initiated two major civilianization programs in the past 15 years, and by the end of 1975 the Army had replaced 16,890 military positions and established 14,080 civilian positions. When DOD requested a study in 1977 to determine the feasibility of

further civilianization, the Army expressed strong reservations about converting more positions.

The Army still has many opportunities to save by hiring more civilians. For example, it could significantly reduce training costs by using more civilian instructors and by contracting for more skill training. Only about 14 percent, or 1,373, of the Army's training instructors for fiscal year 1978 were civilians; 8,344 were military. This low percentage exists in spite of widespread recognition that it is more economical to use civilians than military.

Also, contracting for some skill training courses is beneficial because of their similarity to courses taught in the private sector. For example, the Army contracts for portions of helicopter pilot training and saves about \$2,096,000 a year by hiring 196 contract instructors.

Army comments

Since our reports, the Army has done little to convert from military to civilians. Army officials said they are still reluctant because civilian spaces are more susceptible to budget cuts, readiness is adversely affected, and military spaces are needed to provide positions for military personnel rotating from overseas assignments.

The Army is evaluating the benefits of having contractors teach six courses. An Army official said using contract personnel is a problem also because (1) contract spaces are not under manpower management, (2) contract personnel are subject to union demands and escalating costs, and (3) if the contract service sharply increases in cost or becomes ineffective, spaces are virtually impossible to convert back to inhouse spaces.

USE OF DEPLOYABLE TROOPS COULD BE IMPROVED DURING PEACETIME

The Army's first priority is combat readiness, but it needs to make better use of its enlisted personnel during peacetime. To do so we recommended that it designate a single authority to prescribe and enforce policies and regulations and establish a working system for managing and using its enlisted personnel as effectively as practicable. The Army continues to rely on the chain of command but is implementing a personnel development distribution management system to solve the kinds of problems we have been finding in our reviews. For example, the Army

- had not made sure enlisted personnel were sent where they were needed;
- had not made the best use of enlisted personnel with critically needed skills during peacetime;
- had overrecruited for certain skills which were previously in short supply, and paid unnecessary enlistment bonuses; and
- had no criteria to gauge the training needed to maintain proficiency in a certain skill and, therefore, did not know how much time it needed to keep an enlisted person proficient in peacetime.

Assignment and use of enlisted personnel

The Army's inventory of personnel who are qualified in many skills does not meet requirements. Moreover, Army regulations have not provided the headquarters effective controls to match available personnel and authorized spaces. During our review at Fort Carson, the Army's distribution of enlisted personnel was not in accordance with its priority distribution plan which shows where personnel are most needed. We found a similar situation where both the total Army and FORSCOM had surplus personnel in several critical skills, but some units had significant shortages.

The Army's utilization policy is designed for combat and does not insure enlisted personnel are assigned where they are needed during peacetime. At December 31, 1976, about 67 percent of Fort Carson's enlisted personnel were not assigned or were not working in assigned positions. Out of 4,131 enlisted persons with critical skills,

- 28 percent, or about 1,145, were unassigned and
- 39 percent, or about 1,150, were improperly used because the assigned job was not being done and the soldier was working in other duties.

Army officials say complexities in Army manpower create many of the problems. For example:

- The Army's problems in maintaining an inventory of personnel with skills to match its needs are intensified by changes in the Army force structure, congressional mandates on authorized strength, inaccurate forecasting of retainable strength, and the difficulties in manpower procurement.

--Many of the imbalances between qualified personnel and requirements exist in skills mostly needed overseas, but personnel in these skills have to rotate from overseas assignments.

Overrecruiting

The Army overrecruited personnel in skills previously in short supply and paid unnecessary bonuses. For example, six of the seven skills with the most people and which the Army identified in November 1975 for special management attention had more people than necessary within 14 months. In January 1977 the Army had 1,178 surplus people in military occupational specialty (MOS) 11C (infantry indirect fire crewman) and a 2,173 surplus in MOS 11E (armor crewman). Army officials did not have information to explain the causes for the surpluses. As of February 1977 the Army was paying enlistment bonuses to recruits for 15 skills, 6 of which were surplus. Unnecessary bonuses paid for these skills totaled \$9.6 million. In addition it cost the Army \$48.7 million to recruit these surplus people into the Army and keep them for a year.

Army officials said that, even though they exceeded quotas for some skills, they would not be able to meet the quotas without bonuses. Moreover, they believe our analysis failed to account for changes they predicted would happen in future months. Nevertheless, the Congress deleted \$4.4 million from the fiscal year 1979 DOD appropriation bill to keep the Army from paying bonuses for surplus skills.

Need for criteria on training time

The Army needs a way to predict the amount of time it needs to keep an enlisted person proficient in combat skills. Then it would know how much time would be available for peacetime duties. Individuals' combat capability is tested every 2 years with a skill qualification test, but the Army has no standards or guidelines to gauge the experience or training necessary to maintain proficiency in authorized skills.

At Fort Carson, Colorado, we found that training activities for individual skills and unit or team operations constituted less than a normal full-time workload and that a substantial portion of enlisted personnel time was available and used for support functions in the garrison. During one period in 1978, Fort Carson had 350 deployable workers in the garrison. If the Army had standards for the required

frequency of training and records of how often individuals received it, the extent of individuals' availability for other duties could be determined more objectively.

In using deployable individuals for peacetime work, the Army should consider adverse effects. For example, only 2 of the 17 individuals we interviewed felt their duties in the garrison enhanced their skills, but 13 suggested other garrison positions they felt could benefit them. Army officials told us that personnel with skills needed to fill vacancies in the garrison are also needed in deployable units.

Army officials said they no longer count hours or keep individual attendance records for those in training because it does not measure combat readiness. The Army determines if training is adequate by administering the skill qualification test, but this does not predict how much time should be devoted to training and to peacetime duties. Again, the Army relies on the chain of command to make these decisions.

DOD officials agreed with our recommendation that the Army should improve its policies and procedures for peacetime use of deployable enlisted personnel. Moreover, they said they would track the changes which the Army implements. The Army told us it plans to maximize the use of deployable personnel by

- giving commanders maximum flexibility to exercise management decisions and

- placing more military personnel in positions vacated by civilian reductions in force.

We doubt that these plans will improve the Army's ability to predict how much time individuals can properly use for peacetime activities or for top management to track the implementation of improvements.

Improvement efforts

The Army is testing a personnel development and distribution management system which incorporates the assignment process and interrelates with reenlistment, accession, and training systems. The system will provide managers at all levels with a single source for authorization, utilization, and operating data which can be projected for 12 months. In addition the Army's recent reorganization of headquarters manpower functions was based in part on the need to make sure qualified personnel are available for authorized spaces. The staff study leading to the reorganization recognized that

numerous management actions, such as better reports on manpower use, are needed to improve the use of personnel and to match people with authorized spaces. The Army should evaluate these efforts and show how they will improve its control and use of enlisted personnel.

MONITORING SYSTEMS SHOULD BE IMPROVED

The more decentralized the accountability and responsibility for decisionmaking, the greater the need for evaluation and feedback. Army headquarters does not have adequate monitoring systems for the programs we reviewed because it places undue confidence in the chain of command to insure proper manpower use. Some programs established to measure performance have been ineffective.

OMB issued guidelines on March 23, 1979, which emphasized the importance of evaluation in overall management improvement and the budget process. The guidelines state that the heads of all executive departments and agencies are responsible for developing and pursuing comprehensive management improvement. The basis for identifying management improvement needs is a sound evaluation system which

- focuses on program operations and results;
- assists management in identifying program objectives, providing explicit statements of intended output related to objectives, and in developing realistic performance measures to be used in evaluations; and
- is relevant to the budget process in that evaluation results should be a major input to resource allocation decisions.

Every department and agency whose budget is subject to review by OMB is required to submit an annual report to OMB summarizing the resources devoted to management improvement and evaluation activities. OMB will use this information to identify good programs as well as those needing improvement. One specific objective is to promote the development and use of valid performance measures, such as efficiency, effectiveness, program impact, and program output.

Army productivity program needs emphasis

The Army consolidated several programs, including work measurement, under its productivity improvement program in 1976. We reviewed its work measurement program only as it

related to manpower requirements for the garrison. The program still is not viable. As noted on page 18, headquarters has not provided guidelines and support and has eliminated much of its technical program resources to meet reduced manpower ceilings.

Manpower surveys are ineffective for monitoring

Major commands use manpower surveys of garrisons to evaluate whether personnel are used in their proper positions. Although manpower surveys provide useful information at the time of their visit, they do not provide enough data to monitor and adjust manpower allocations between one onsite survey and the next for such things as changes in programs or workload because

- survey teams review each site every 2 to 4 years only,
- survey reports provide little or no evaluation of the various labor sources doing garrison work,
- commands approve numerous manpower changes between one onsite survey and the next without onsite evaluation, and
- survey reports do not provide a way to directly relate manpower to workload or to calculate efficiency rates.

Work measurement potential not realized

Work measurement programs provide the opportunity to develop monthly reports on personnel use and efficiency by comparing actual performance with standards on how long it should take to produce products. FORSCOM is implementing such a feedback system for its garrisons, but the information will not achieve the potential of work measurement until the system becomes a part of an Army's integrated manpower system and the problems identified in chapter 4 are corrected.

Better monitoring of enlisted manpower use is needed

Enlisted personnel can be assigned to deployable units, where the primary goal is to be trained and ready for combat, or to peacetime missions, such as working in administrative and support functions. Better monitoring of their use is needed.

Readiness reports do not consider use

The primary purpose of military forces in peacetime is to be prepared to fight in war. Because preparing enlisted personnel for combat is often less than a full-time job, deployable troops are available for peacetime duties. The problem is how to establish an effective feedback system on the status of readiness and also provide a useful management tool for other management actions. The Army's current readiness report focuses on status and, in our opinion, does not provide needed management information.

In the past, pressures to use the readiness reporting system for management information required lengthy reports which could not be prepared in a short time frame. Therefore, it was changed to primarily a status report. In February 1978 we reported that the criteria for readiness reporting was vague on whether persons must be assigned to or simply qualified for positions to be counted in combat readiness computations. Moreover, personnel were not always used where they were assigned. Therefore, we determined a readiness availability based on these criteria which shows that manpower use significantly affects readiness. The readiness availability under the three methods at Fort Carson, Colorado, during December 1976 was:

<u>Method</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Qualified and available but not necessarily assigned or working in position	96
Qualified and assigned to position but not necessarily working in assigned position	81
Qualified and working in position	76

Army officials said that it was not the intent of the readiness report to measure or control the assignment and use of personnel included in the table of organization and equipment. After our audit the Army clarified its regulations to show that personnel need only be qualified and available for an authorized position to count for a readiness computation. The person may be assigned to other duties without adversely affecting the readiness rating.

This decision disregards the need for integrated reporting systems and Army statements that using deployable troops for peacetime missions (borrowed military manpower) adversely affects readiness. Because the Army has failed to establish a readiness report that recognizes manpower

use, it has no assurance that the readiness rating is a realistic assessment, and it cannot quantify any adverse affects of using deployable troops for peacetime activities.

Peacetime

Fort Carson's personnel management reports were often inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading. They did not analyze mismatch situations in which persons were assigned to one job and working in another, and reports identifying MOS mismatches were not based on duties actually performed. The reports relied heavily on the duty specialty which is reported to the military personnel center.

Had Fort Carson used data on actual duties rather than recorded assigned duties, it would have reported that about 38.6 percent of its personnel was improperly used, rather than 9.2 percent. Also, the MOS mismatch rate would have been 9.4 percent instead of 1.6 percent.

The Army said its implementation of the personnel deployment and distribution management system will improve management reports on personnel use.

CONCLUSIONS

Work measurement standards provide the ability to monitor productivity and predict staff needs, but the Army's program has not achieved this potential. Inadequate policies, controls, and information on the use of personnel is another symptom of Army manpower management problems. The Army, under its current system, cannot seek the most cost-effective mix of people, or make sure the chain of command properly uses available people.

To be effective, manpower management should cover all sources of labor so it can determine the best mix of manpower. Even though the Army has numerous constraints, such as ceilings on its various labor sources, a more integrated approach could consider needed tradeoffs and make sure data is available to justify total needs and determine adverse effects. For example, the Army should be able to show how using combat personnel for peacetime duties affects readiness, and the number of military positions by skill needed for rotation.

The Army should identify its expectations or goals on how enlisted personnel should be assigned and used and be able to monitor actions accordingly. If goals are selectively chosen and reporting systems integrated, paperwork

should decrease because some reports could be eliminated. For example, standards by skill on the minimum training and experience needed to maintain proficiency would give local commanders more expertise on how to best use deployable personnel during peacetime.

CHAPTER 6

SUCCESSFUL MANPOWER PROGRAMS

DEPEND ON ADEQUATE PROFESSIONAL STAFF

An important reason why the Army does not have a better manpower control and feedback system is its lack of emphasis on developing professional manpower and personnel managers and adequate staff support. Good managers are critical during periods of budget restrictions. But Army officials say budget restrictions preclude increased staffing and headquarters emphasis of manpower and personnel functions.

The structuring of Army forces, the identification of detail manpower requirements, and the allocation of limited manpower resources are difficult tasks facing Army manpower and personnel managers. While manpower management deals with spaces, personnel management deals with people. The success of both manpower and personnel programs depends to a great degree on adequate numbers of well trained, motivated managers and staff running them. The Army has taken initiatives to develop such managers, but it needs an officer career field and more emphasis on developing and using civilian managers in both manpower and personnel functions.

NEED TO DEVELOP MORE PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS

The Army needs an officer career field for manpower managers which provides formal training and experience through a series of increasingly difficult and responsible assignments. Moreover, the Army's rotation and assignment practices could be improved. This would give officers the ability to acquire more technical expertise in manpower and personnel functions.

The Army has identified two officer career fields for personnel functions but has included manpower functions in an operations and force development specialty which may not be selected as a primary career field. Army officials say the Army does not have enough manpower positions requiring officers to justify a separate specialty.

Instead of developing an officer career field for manpower managers, the Army identifies positions which require manpower management expertise and officers who have the requisite training or experience for these positions. As of August 1978 the Army had identified only 107 positions which needed military manpower managers. Before officers can be

considered for manpower management positions, the Army requires only that they complete a 3-week manpower course or serve at least 1 year in a position requiring manpower management skills.

A 1978 Army staff study of resource management needs showed that the existing military and career specialties programs do not satisfy the need for highly trained, properly used personnel in positions which best satisfy the Army's manpower management needs. According to the study, the current lack of emphasis given to manpower management as a specialty hinders the professional development of personnel who want to be involved in this critical aspect of Army resource management. The Army has not acted on the staff study's recommendation to establish a career field for military manpower managers.

We obtained the following information from 470 Army officers working in manpower and personnel management positions:

--Sixty-nine percent of the officers responded that the Army's service assignment and rotation practices do not or only occasionally contribute to professional development for manpower and personnel careers.

	<u>Manpower</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
	(percent)	
Never	7.4	5.4
Occasionally	35.3	21.1
Fairly often	20.6	31.4
Very often or always	36.8	42.0

--The Army officers who responded to our questionnaires have spent only about 35 percent of their career in manpower and personnel areas. The average tenure is 6 years (manpower 5.2 years, personnel 6.1 years).

--The average assignment length has been only 1.6 years which indicates a frequent turnover of manpower and personnel managers.

--Fifty-six percent of the respondents believe formal training in manpower and personnel is necessary, but 38 percent believe their training has been insufficient.

Army officers in manpower and personnel jobs told us in response to the questionnaires that, although their organizations are generally staffed with the right number and kinds of people, they were promoted to colonel behind their peers.

Army comments

The Army believes its officer personnel management system is currently achieving corrective action concerning officer qualifications and assignment and rotation plans. One of the primary goals of the officer personnel management system is development of Army officers in two specialties, with necessary training and repeated assignments in each. Officers can have one or two personnel-related specialties. Army officers are selected for promotion on the basis of performance and demonstrated potential in both of their specialties. The Army originally advised us that it did not believe it had enough officer manpower management positions to create a separate specialty; it had identified only about 107 such positions. Manpower officials later identified more positions and said they would make a detailed study to see if such a career field is warranted.

NEED TO EMPHASIZE CIVILIAN MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL CAREER PROGRAMS

The Army is the only service which has formal civilian career programs for both personnel and manpower functions. But these civilians' perceptions about their jobs, organizations, or opportunities for professional development show that these career programs could be improved.

According to Army officials, the Army has made a large investment in civilian career programs because its top management sees a direct relationship between the civilian personnel management structure and Army mission readiness. The Army instituted its formal Army-wide manpower and force management career field in 1973 when it saw a need to develop manpower professionals as specialists, apart from the comptroller career field of which they had been a part. Currently, about 1,000 professionals enlisted in the program manage military, civilian, and Reserve forces. Fifty-three weeks of formal training are available to support the career field. Seven weeks of training are mandatory.

Responses to questionnaires showed that 783 civilian managers had the following perceptions on the Army organizations for manpower and personnel functions and their opportunities for professional development and advancement:

- Thirty-four percent of the civilian manpower managers and 40 percent of the personnel managers reported that their offices never or only occasionally are properly staffed.

--Forty-seven percent reported they never or only occasionally have the opportunity to gain experience for higher level work.

--Forty-three percent reported they are never or only occasionally informed on the adequacy of their job performance.

HEADQUARTERS DIRECTION AND STAFF SUPPORT MUST BE PROVIDED

Developing data for manpower management and budget purposes which is accurate, verifiable, and can directly relate manpower to workload requires a long-term commitment of resources. The Army has not provided the necessary top-level direction or made sure programs have adequate staff support.

Army headquarters must provide direction so that lower echelons in the organization will develop a common data base for their use as well as to satisfy the needs of top management. Headquarters should also make sure the data is developed by the most cost-effective means and is accurate within acceptable limits. Enough qualified people must be provided to develop the information within a reasonable time.

Army officials told us it is difficult to increase staff support for manpower functions during a period when most functions are taking staff reductions. Good data on manpower requirements is, however, most important during periods of budget constraints. The success of developing valid staffing criteria and standards for two programs we reviewed--manpower authorization criteria for table of organization and equipment units (see p. 13) and the Staffing Guide for U.S. Army Garrisons for table of distribution and allowances units--depends heavily on the commitment of adequate resources. It makes little sense to eliminate the staff needed to properly manage the reductions.

Staffing Guide for U.S. Army Garrisons

The Army has directed that work measurement staff under the Army's productivity program develop summary-level standards to supplement the Staffing Guide for U.S. Army Garrisons. The Army has not, however, provided adequate top-level management direction or staff support to make sure the staffing standards are cost effective, credible, consistent, and usable. One reason is Army headquarters has only one person assigned to direct the work measurement efforts of lower echelon organizations.

A successful work measurement program is dependent on getting key managers and staff specialists at the headquarters level involved. Work measurement should be based on a system designed by top management and should include experienced personnel from budgeting, manpower, workload planning and control, data processing, and work measurement. The headquarters organization should establish top-level policy and procedures, develop top-level work units for the agency, and monitor the way work units are selected at the lowest levels.

The person at the headquarters level assigned to work measurement efforts is on the Comptroller of the Army's staff and provides overall policy guidelines. Personnel at major commands and installations are allowed to design and implement programs to develop staffing standards. Personnel from budget, manpower, data processing, and the assigned person from headquarters have not designed a system to make sure the output data is common to all systems and usable.

Since Army headquarters did not design an overall system for manpower standards, FORSCOM designed a work measurement program to provide staffing standards for its garrisons. FORSCOM work measurement staff designed the program with little help from manpower, budget, or data processing experts. Although FORSCOM officials did not know how many people would be required to make work measurement studies of its garrison within a reasonable time, they plan to use the 49 work measurement people who are available. Many have been eliminated by reductions in force. Because of staff limitations, FORSCOM plans to use a nonengineered approach to obtain quick coverage.

Army headquarters assigned FORSCOM the responsibility for work measurement standards at both FORSCOM and TRADOC installations. This assignment was made without an overall integrated systems design and without plans on how TRADOC, which has very few work measurement people, will conduct studies at its installations.

CONCLUSIONS

GAO and Army studies' identification of weaknesses in manpower management will have little impact until the Army places high-level emphasis on the need for sufficient qualified managers and support staff. Army manpower and personnel organizations should be staffed with knowledgeable and experienced managers who are allowed to stay in one assignment for an appropriate time. Also, the Army should determine how many military manpower positions are needed and, if justifiable, establish a manpower officer career

field. In addition, officer assignment to manpower and personnel positions should be regarded as meaningful experience for advancement. Civilian career fields should emphasize individual development and career progression.

Headquarters must provide direction and staff support in developing detailed requirements data. Without direction, the programs will continue to use data which is not valid and which does not meet the needs of all users. Without staff support the programs cannot provide accurate data or develop information within a reasonable time. The Army may have to obtain outside help to properly design an integrated approach and provide adequate procedures.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The Army cannot effectively manage its Total Force because of ill-defined and uncoordinated manpower management responsibilities and an ineffective management information system. Although it has recently consolidated many headquarters manpower functions, it still has no line of accountability for all manpower management functions.

The Army's decentralized management philosophy gives subordinate commands complete flexibility in managing resources. We are not recommending that the Army do away with decentralized management. But, to effectively use it, the Army needs a defined structure for setting goals, acquiring needed information, and establishing accountability to compare performance with goals.

In earlier reports, we have recommended the Army correct various problems. (See app. I.) It has corrected some, but many still exist. Some improvements have been rather superficial because the Army is unable to view the overall effect of problems on total manpower functions. Other problems cannot or will not be corrected until headquarters emphasizes manpower management more. In either case, the problems cannot be corrected overnight; the Army's top leadership must make a long-term commitment to establish a control and feedback system for focusing management's attention on human resources. Correcting manpower management weaknesses will result in more economical and better use of human resources which account for more than 50 percent of all Army expenses.

The Army needs to continue to improve manpower management and consider the problems we and the Army Manpower Division studies have identified. It also needs to involve top-level managers from all manpower functions in planning improvements and obtain outside help when needed. The Army should strive for a coordinated system so that when one part of the system changes, related changes in other parts of the system can be traced and quantified.

With such a control and feedback system, the Army should be able to show:

- The status of improvement efforts on manpower authorization criteria, integration of work measurement standards and the garrison requirements program into the total manpower process, and the updating of available time estimates.
- Why it needs to increase requirements and authorizations for combat development and training development functions.
- That more civilian instructors could not be hired or contracted because the positions are needed for rotation or other legitimate military purposes.
- How its personnel development and distribution system or other improvements will solve the problems we identified in recruiting, assigning, and training enlisted personnel.
- Why readiness reports should not reflect the use of individuals outside assigned positions in view of the Army's argument that using deployable troops for peacetime duties adversely affects readiness.
- Why it does not need an officer career field for manpower management.
- Its plans to improve the development of both officer and civilian managers.
- Why headquarters cannot design criteria to make sure programs provide needed results.
- That sufficient staff are allocated to manpower functions.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

To promote successful manpower management, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army design a manpower management system integrated at all organizational levels. The system should be designed to identify the functions and accountability of headquarters and commanders at each lower level so they can exchange information on goals and results. Functions should be tied together with common data bases and reporting systems which are simple and can be adapted to meet the manpower and budgeting needs of managers at all levels.

The manpower management system should be an extension of recent efforts to consolidate headquarters manpower

functions. But it should do more than just consolidate these functions. The Army should develop a long-range plan, and in preparing and carrying out the plan the Army should:

- Involve top-level managers from all manpower functions and use outside expertise when appropriate to design the integrated system.
- Make sure a headquarters organization, such as the newly formed Director of Manpower, Plans, and Budget, has adequate support and staff to implement and monitor the plan.
- Design management activities that use common data for operational and headquarters management as well as budget development.
- Develop methods for determining detail manpower needs which are based on sound techniques, use accurate workload and manpower data, can directly relate manpower to workload, can be aggregated from detail to budget level, and are cost effective.
- Make the best and most cost-effective use of Active Force and Reserve military, civilian, and contractor personnel.
- Establish an officer career field for manpower managers and place more emphasis on developing and using civilian managers in both manpower and personnel.
- Allocate sufficient staff to develop the data base which manpower managers need.
- Evaluate audit agencies' recommendations and make improvements which are best for the total manpower function rather than for each component of manpower management.

Defense and Army officials were given an opportunity to study and verify the accuracy of the report and discuss it with us. In general they agreed that the report accurately addresses the problem areas and offers viable alternatives.

REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON ARMY MANPOWER ACTIVITIES

THE ARMY CAN IMPROVE PEACETIME USE OF DEPLOYABLE ENLISTED PERSONNEL. (FPCD-78-66, September 7, 1978)

GAO found that the Army needed to develop plans and guidelines to make the most effective use of deployable personnel during peacetime.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, with the cooperation of the Secretary of the Army, develop:

- Policy guidelines and officially recognize the extent of the Army's need to use its deployable military personnel to maintain its combat capability and accomplish its garrison responsibilities as effectively and productively as practicable.
- Plans and issue guidelines that will assist commanders at all levels in assigning deployable personnel from their units to special duty in the garrison that will, to the extent practicable, maintain or enhance individual skill proficiency and unit combat capability.
- Cost-effective means of recording reliable and realistic data on individuals' skill qualifications and on training and experience needed to maintain skill proficiency.

We have noted that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services have undertaken studies and new initiatives which offer the potential for meaningful improvements in the methods used to determine manpower requirements. Long-term programs include the Army's restructuring of manpower authorization criteria for combat service and service support personnel and the Navy's program for developing staffing standards for shore based support.

To supplement these initiatives, we recommend that an interim system be developed and tested for controlled management of deployable personnel at an installation such as Fort Carson. Such a system might include:

- Developing and maintaining an inventory by MOSs of the personnel available.

--Establishing and implementing a program for rotating individuals in and out of garrison duty for specified periods of time which would enable them to acquire training and supplementary special duty experience to enhance their skill proficiency. At the same time, work needed to maintain the garrison effectively and economically could be accomplished.

At the end of a specified test period an evaluation should be made using criteria for effectiveness to overcome the present problems discussed in this report.

CONTINUOUS MANAGEMENT ATTENTION NEEDED FOR ARMY
TO IMPROVE COMBAT UNIT PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
(FPCD-78-61, September 5, 1978)

GAO found that the Army's determination of personnel requirements for combat units was not reliable because of weaknesses in basic planning factors.

Recommendations

To promote successful development and implementation of a reliable system, we recommend that the Armed Services Committees:

- Direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a comprehensive program for developing, implementing, and operating a reliable system to determine personnel requirements for combat units. The program should identify the system's objectives and include Army funding, organizations, personnel, and other resources needed to achieve the objectives. It should also include milestones for accomplishing various program phases from design to a fully operative system. To keep the Congress informed, the Army should report progress on the program to the Armed Services Committees initially 6 months from the date of this report and annually thereafter as part of the normal budget process of justifying its end strength. In addition, progress in using the new system, when operational, to justify personnel requirements should be reported in the Defense Manpower Requirements Report.
- Direct the Secretary of Defense to see that the improvement program is complete, credible, and supported by viable funding and staffing, and that the Army's budget contains funds specifically set aside to support the improvement effort.

In developing its plans to establish more reliable factors to determine available worktime, we recommend that the Army:

- Allocate sufficient staffing to establish and update available worktime as needed to provide current and reliable estimates.
- Develop methods and procedures that recognize variances among units, unit movement during the full day, overlapping allowances, a proper base for unit movement, and differences between wartime and peacetime.
- Fully document and support factors used.

MANAGEMENT AND USE OF ARMY ENLISTED PERSONNEL--WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE. (FPCD-78-6, February 16, 1978)

GAO found that the Army needed an improved working system for managing and using its people as effectively as practicable.

Recommendations

In view of opportunities for improving the Army's management and use of enlisted personnel, including those with critically needed skills, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, with the cooperation of the Secretary of the Army:

- Designate a single authority to prescribe and enforce policies and regulations and to issue specific instructions to guide officials at all levels. Under these regulations and instructions, officials should be held accountable for attaining the most effective distribution, assignment, and use of enlisted personnel practicable.
- Develop techniques for managing enlisted personnel by MOS to provide more effective control over the acquisition, distribution, assignment, and use of personnel, and a more realistic determination of the number needed in each skill.
- Determine whether the Army's policies and practices for the payment of enlistment bonuses are administered prudently and in accordance with the intent of the Congress.
- Clarify the criteria to be used in measuring personnel readiness.

- Modify the personnel reporting system to provide realistic data for each individual on his job, experience obtained to maintain proficiency in his MOS, and other data needed by management officials for realistic assessment of combat readiness.
- Direct audit, inspection, and other evaluation organizations to intensify their examination of and reporting on the effectiveness of enlisted personnel management and use and to identify areas in which improvements can be made.
- Incorporate the improvements made into the Personnel Deployment and Distribution Management System now being developed.

OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS IN
ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY SKILL TRAINING PROGRAMS.
(FPCD-78-13, February 14, 1978)

GAO found that the Army could save millions of dollars a year by using the least costly method of staffing training activities.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Army to:

- Schedule a minimum of 40 hours a week in the classroom, laboratory, or shop for skill training whenever possible. Exceptions desired by the services should be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval as appropriate.
- Determine the number of hours its instructors spend in teaching and adjust its criterion accordingly.
- Use, pending such a determination, a minimum of 1,250 hours a year to estimate its requirements for instructors.
- Review the military positions in support of training to identify those which meet the criteria for conversion to civilians.
- Determine the least-cost method of staffing the positions as instructed by the Congress in the fiscal year 1975 Defense Appropriation Authorizations Act.

--Based on these determinations, proceed without delay to staff the training establishment accordingly or arrange for contracting as appropriate.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MANAGERS OF DEFENSE MANPOWER:
IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN THEIR EXPERIENCE, TRAINING,
AND REWARDS VOLUME I. (FPCD-79-1, February 16, 1979)

GAO found that the Army needs to improve its career fields and programs for officers and civilians working in manpower and personnel management.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the services establish both manpower and personnel management career fields. The career fields should have established standards of background, education, training, experience, and tenure for all manpower and personnel management positions.

At least these minimum standards and criteria should be identified.

- Qualifications for each grade level, including performance, experience, level of training, and formal education.
- Visible career progression plans, including training requirement, professional education, experience, and advancement based on demonstrated performance.
- Assignment lengths should be long enough to ensure effective management and continuity.
- Promotion opportunities should be equivalent to those in other operational command and line positions.

The services should specify certain manpower and personnel positions as the equivalent of command and operational experience and instruct promotion boards to consider such assignments as meaningful, equivalent experience for advancement.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that all services establish viable, complete, and timely career management systems for civilians in both the personnel and manpower functions to include employees working in the military personnel function. The career programs should be structured to balance rewards to the organization and to

individuals by emphasizing individual development and career progression equally with management information and control.

We recommend also that the Secretary of Defense consider increased emphasis on the role of his Office in the monitoring and evaluation of DOD civilian career management and the formulation of civilian career management policy.

ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AVAILABLE TIME FOR WORK
DISTORT WORK FORCE REQUIREMENTS.
(FPCD-78-21, March 67, 1978)

GAO found that the Army, as well as other agencies, do not use current and reliable data to estimate the time workers are available to perform their primary duties after deducting time for absences, such as leave and training.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Office of Management and Budget provide guidance to agencies for estimating the availability of workers. Guidance could be incorporated in Circular A-11, "Preparation and Submission of Budget Estimates." It requires indexes to determine personnel requirements. Since estimated availability of workers, as well as workload, affects the number of workers needed, the circular could be expanded to:

- Provide a definition of availability. The definition should identify the kinds of leave that must be accounted for in estimating availability. Moreover, it should indicate that leave used rather than leave earned should be considered. Agencies should also be prepared to identify and justify the training accounted for.
- Require agencies to validate or adjust their estimates annually. For most agencies, the data needed is in existing reporting systems. If availability estimates are not changed annually, information should be available to show that the previous estimate continues to be valid.
- Require that agencies document and retain supporting data used to estimate availability in order to justify their personnel requirements.
- Require that availability be analyzed by organization, location, or function and that any significant differences be recognized in estimating personnel requirements and distributing the work force.

Each agency should examine the data resulting from a more accurate reflection of available time to assure itself that available time is used productively and effectively. This will permit each agency to review available time from a perspective of maximizing effective utilization of the work force.

IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN ARMY'S DETERMINATION OF
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
FUNCTIONS. (FPCD-79-32, May 21, 1979)

GAO found that the Army manpower survey teams and the Staffing Guide for U.S. Army Garrisons do not provide the Army with information it needs to justify, manage, and evaluate manpower.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense identify the type of information the Army needs to prepare and support its manpower budget.

Army headquarters should use personnel experienced in budgeting, manpower, workload planning and control, data processing, and work measurement to design a manpower management system with the following characteristics.

- An organization structure that combines the manpower related responsibilities and staffing into one organization at all levels. The organization should centralize manpower control, eliminate duplication, and establish a manpower review function independent of those being reviewed. The staffing standards organization could be located at the commands for developing and updating standards but should be responsive to criteria and procedures directed by Army headquarters.
- A methodology for determining manpower needs based on work measurement where it is feasible and cost effective and uses onsite reviews only to review methods, procedures, and organizational efficiency in connection with the development and validation of staffing standards. The Army headquarters should provide procedural guidance on
 - when to use work measurement or other techniques to establish standards,

- how to develop garrison-wide standards using similar work units and allowing only legitimate differences for such things as physical layout or mission,
- when to conduct methods studies considering the need to define and standardize methods and procedures prior to setting standards,
- how to summarize work center standards so that manpower requirements can be related to budget elements described in Army management structure codes and be estimated based on changes in programs, and
- how to collect and validate information for
 - (a) total labor working in the garrison including costs, (b) available work time, and (c) workload.
- A management information system which uses a common data base for work center needs, garrison costs, budget requirements, allocations, and evaluations of manpower use. The information system should integrate accounting, manpower reporting, and staffing standards information.
- A determination of the spaces needed to implement the system and and allocation of these manpower resources to the program.

USING CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FOR MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE
AND SUPPORT POSITIONS--CAN MORE BE DONE.
(FPCD-78-69, September 26, 1978)

GAO found that the services are resisting further implementation of DOD's policy to replace military personnel with civilians.

Recommendation

• In view of congressional concern over this matter, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services to initiate without further delay a program to replace military personnel with civilians that is in accordance with DOD policy.

We recognize the Congress has set a fiscal year-end civilian personnel ceiling for DOD. If the authorized ceiling does in fact constrain DOD from fully implementing a civilianization program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, through the Office of Management and Budget, request

the Congress to adjust the appropriate authorizations and appropriations to accomodate increases in civilian personnel and decreased in military personnel.

DOD TOTAL FORCE MANAGEMENT--FACT OR RHETORIC.
(FPCD-78-82, January 24, 1979)

GAO found that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not taken an active leadership role in guiding the services toward total force management--the most cost-effective mix of available people.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the lead to develop with the services, a comprehensive total force policy which includes all manpower resources. The policy should define:

- The objectives of total force management in determining the most cost-effective force, consistent with military requirements and resource constraints.
- The manpower elements of the total force--that is, active and reserve military, civilian, and contractor--and its respective peacetime and wartime roles.
- Manpower systems that provide for integrated management and concurrent consideration of all manpower resources.
- The consideration of host nations' manpower in determining U.S. manpower requirements.

The Secretary should also prescribe guidance to help the services manage the total force and determine the DOD work force composition, while allowing the services needed flexibility. This guidance should at least cover the following areas:

- The services' need to provide a balance between determining manpower requirements and the ability to acquire the desired mix.
- Factors influencing short- and long-term manpower requirements, supplemented by recognition of external constraints which may preclude optimum total force solutions, in annual program planning guidance.
- Methodology to determine manpower requirements.

- Cost elements to be used in figuring manpower.
- The need for cost-benefit analysis in examining manpower mix alternatives.
- Measures of improved capability over the current force and methods of effecting that capability.
- Clarification of criteria used to decide between performing inhouse or contracting out for products and services.
- The information OSD needs to evaluate service requests.

When formulating DOD legislation and making DOD authorization and appropriation decisions, the Congress should consider the interrelationships between available manpower resources and the impact its decisions may have on DOD's ability to manage the total force in the most cost-effective manner.

FISCAL YEAR 1979 ARMY MANPOWER

	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Active Army</u> (Thousands)	<u>Army National Guard</u>	<u>Army Reserve</u>
Strategic:				
Offensive strategic forces	-	-	-	-
Defensive strategic forces	-	-	-	-
Strategic control and surveillance	0.1	0.4	-	-
Total	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Tactical/mobility:				
Land forces	19.3	480.6	340.7	149.0
Tactical air forces	-	-	-	-
Naval forces	-	-	-	-
Mobility forces	2.7	0.4	-	-
Total	<u>22.0</u>	<u>481.1</u>	<u>340.7</u>	<u>149.0</u>
Auxiliary activities:				
Intelligence	1.8	8.3	-	-
Centrally managed communications	2.9	7.2	-	-
Research and development	20.6	7.1	-	-
Geophysical activities	-	0.1	-	-
Total	<u>25.4</u>	<u>22.8</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Support activities:				
Base operating support	133.2	44.6	10.9	7.2
Medical support	24.6	30.4	0.2	7.0
Personnel support	7.2	12.2	-	-
Individual training	12.1	38.8	5.1	32.7
Force support training	0.9	0.8	-	-
Central logistics	94.1	7.9	-	-
Centralized support activities	32.2	17.7	-	-
Management headquarters	13.6	9.0	-	-
Federal agency support	-	0.2	-	-
Total	<u>317.8</u>	<u>161.4</u>	<u>16.1</u>	<u>46.8</u>
Total force structure allowance	<u>365.4</u>	<u>665.7</u>	<u>356.9</u>	<u>195.8</u>
Individuals:				
Transients	-	22.6	-	-
Patients, prisoners, and holdees	-	4.9	-	-
Students, trainees	-	74.2	11.6	4.8
Cadets	-	4.3	-	-
Total	<u>-</u>	<u>106.0</u>	<u>11.6</u>	<u>4.8</u>
Total	<u>365.4</u>	<u>771.7</u>	<u>368.5</u>	<u>200.6</u>

Note: Details may not add to total due to rounding.

ONGOING ARMY MANPOWER AND FORCE MANAGEMENT
PROJECTS AND STUDIES

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Scope</u>	<u>Milestone Dates</u>
<u>MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS</u>			
1	Short Range Improvements in the Manpower Requirements Determination Process	This process will test supportable staffing requirements that can be related to the budget and program development process; the functional approach will be emphasized	Conduct test survey in 1st Quarter, FY 80
2	Long Range Improvements in the Manpower Requirements Determination Process	This effort will provide manpower data to satisfy Army needs in accomplishing major manpower activities of planning, programing and budgeting; resource allocation; and manpower utilization evaluation	Final Plan: Sep 79
<u>STAFFING STANDARDS</u>			
3	Manpower Authorization Criteria (MACRIT)	This pilot study will utilize the M60A1 Tank as a test vehicle to determine validity of MACRIT standards	Complete: 3rd Quarter, FY 81
4	Project to Revise Safety Staffing Guide for US Army Installations	This project will result in workload data to show how much time it actually takes to accomplish the required safety functions	Complete: Nov 79
5	Integration of Summary Level Performance Standards With	This will insure that summary level performance standards developed through the Methods and	Complete: Dec 79

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Scope</u>	<u>Milestone Dates</u>
	the Manpower Requirements Determination Process	Standards Program are integrated into the manpower requirements determination process	
		<u>MOBILIZATION</u>	
6	Mobilization Exercises (MOBEX)	This exercise will result in initiatives and programs to increase and sustain the pool of trained military manpower in the transition from peacetime to wartime manpower demands	MOBEX-80 is scheduled to be conducted in Oct 80
7	Mobilization Preassignment Program	This program will provide for the issuance of reporting orders to the Individual Ready Reserve in peacetime for the members of the Individual Ready Reserve to follow upon mobilization	Complete: 80
8	Individual Ready Reserve Credibility Project	This project will provide for techniques for managing the initial entrance of Individual Ready Reservists into active service at local Reserve Centers through the medium of Mobilization Personnel Management Teams	Complete: Jan 81
9	Retiree Recall System	This system will provide for reassignment orders for Regular Army and, when authorized by change in statutes, Reserve retirees	Complete: Apr 80
10	Show Rate Feasibility Study	This study will determine the yield of reserve manpower pools at mobilization	Follow-on actions 1980-1981
11	Screening Criteria for Transfer to	The criteria to be developed will be used to screen all persons	Publication date of implementing

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Scope</u>	<u>Milestone Dates</u>
	the Individual Ready Reserve in Lieu of Discharge	(Active Army, ARNG, and USAR) being separated prior to completion of their first term to ensure that those with potential to meet mobilization requirements are retained in the Individual Ready Reserve	
<u>MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND REPORTING</u>			
12	Force Development Integrated Management System (FORDIMS)	Integration of Force Accounting, Budgeting and Authorization Subsystems	Complete: Dec 79
13	Vertical Force Development Management Information System (VFDMIS)	An extension of FORDIMS, this system extends FORDIMS to the installation/division levels through automation	Complete: End CY 82
14	Structure and Composition System (SACS)	This system redefines functional and systems requirements for an on-line SACS	Completion: Unknown
15	Shared Army Management Structure Code/Program Element data base	This system provides for a data base interface with manpower management information systems	Completion: Unknown
16	New Automatic Data Processing System	This system will provide for a means of compliance with Standards of Grade Authorization	Completion: Unknown
17	Enhancements to the Enlisted Loss Inventory Module - Computation of the Manpower Program using Linear	This project will provide the manpower programming system a quick reaction, reasonably precise capability to adjust the force structure allowance as notional changes are	Completion: Sep 80

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Scope</u>	<u>Milestone Dates</u>
	Programing (ELIM-COMPLIP) System/Development of the FORECAST (an all-encompassing title for Active Army military manpower programming) System	made in the force structure during the programming and budgeting cycles	
18	Manpower Utilization and Requirements Report (CSGPO 78)	This effort will update guidance on the manpower reporting system	Completion: Dec 79
19	The Design and Development of an Automated Management Information System to Align Civilian and Military Manpower Authorizations with Corresponding Personnel Assets, Workload and Financial Data and to Highlight Inconsistencies	This system will provide for a capability to compare and interrelate manpower requirements/manpower allocations/manpower authorizations/assigned personnel assets/workload performed/dollars expended data	Completion of Phase I (of three phases): May 80
<u>UTILIZATION</u>			
20	Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM)	This effort will re-define BMM and other diversions of military personnel and develop a reporting capability to collect data needed to defend support manpower needs	Completion: 4th Quarter, FY 79
21	Integration of Human Resources Management Study	This test will examine installation human service activities to	Completion: Jun 80

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Scope</u>	<u>Milestone Dates</u>
		eliminate redundancies, overlaps, and voids; techniques will be developed to resolve problems encountered	
22	Quantitative Procedure for Position and Identity Definition	This study being conducted by the General Research Corporation will provide procedure for position identity definition to include civilian or military delineation; military identity will be further delineated as enlisted, warrant officer or commissioned officer	Completion: Oct 79
<u>MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT</u>			
23	Evaluation of the Battalion Administrative Officer Concept	The test will measure the impact on the unit personnel management capability with the assignment of additional military personnel and administrative specialists.	Completion: Sep 81
24	Shortage of Officers	This study will define officer personnel management policies and procedures that will minimize impact of Captain shortages over next five years	Completion: Sep 79
25	Overseas Tour Lengths (18 month tour for 3 year enlistees)	This effort addresses the impact of reduction of overseas tours (18 month tour for three-year enlistees)	Concept approval expected and implementation plan development: Jul 79

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Scope</u>	<u>Milestone Dates</u>
26	Performance of Mixed Sex Combat Support Terms on Contingency Missions	This test will investigate group performance of support personnel with varying proportions of women given rear area protection missions	Under development pending approval of FY 80 Statement of Work
<u>CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT</u>			
27	Guidance on Position Management	This guidance will improve civilian position and grade management to achieve a more effective job structure	Completion: Jul 79

Source: The Office of the Chief of Staff for Personnel,
Department of the Army.

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