


UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548



FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-199870

AUGUST 15, 1980

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(961103)

The Honorable Sam Nunn Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Subject: (Recruiting Management in the Armed Services) (FPCD-80-78)

This is a report on a portion of our work which we have completed for you relating to the management of recruiting in the armed services. As we previously discussed with you and your staff, we conducted a limited review of recruiting management practices of the armed services. In this review, we found some service-unique problems that we felt were worthy of reporting. We have discussed these problems with the services, and many problems either have already been corrected or are now being corrected. We summarized these problems in letters to the services and the National Guard Bureau. (See enclosures.)

This initial effort of ours will be followed by two additional reports. The first report deals with the decisionmaking processes used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the individual service headquarters in managing recruiting. Preparation of this report is in its final stages. The second report is based on a questionnaire survey of production recruiters, noncommissioned officer supervisors, and officers in charge of recruiting programs. It addresses the broad questions that deal with recruiter malpractice. We are presently analyzing the responses.

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You also asked us to review the Army investigation of recruiter malpractice. The investigation, in our opinion, represented a reasonable, systematic effort to detect recruiters who violated regulations or procedures-particularly those who furnished inappropriate test assistance to applicants on tests. The accuracy of the data base and the methodology used to identify recruiters to be investigated had limitations, however. Whereas the inaccuracies in the data base were, for the most part, beyond the Army's control, the methodology may not have identified all violations. Nevertheless, it was an attempt to reach a reasonable balance between the need to identify violators and the need to minimize the demoralizing effects of placing large numbers of innocent recruiters under suspicion. We summarized the investigation in the appendix to this letter.

We compliment the individual services and the National Guard Bureau for their cooperation in assisting us with our work and for the speed with which they are addressing the shortcomings we have identified.

If we can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to call on us.

Sincerely yours,

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H. L. Krieger Director

Enclosures - 5

ARMY INVESTIGATION OF RECRUITER MALPRACTICE

On May 31, 1979, the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) established a task force and initiated a special investigation into allegations of dishonest or unethical recruiting practices. About 400 recruiter personnel were relieved as a result of this investigation, which was officially disbanded on December 28, 1979. As of July 28, 1980, about 288 (including 5 officers) of the relief actions were upheld and approximately 83 recruiters were reinstated. Another 22 individuals were awaiting results of the Commanding General's review of their relief action. In addition to the detection of malpracticing recruiter personnel, the special investigation has been credited with various management improvements in the recruiting function.

Two key developments led to the investigation:

- --An indication, from test score patterns, of unauthorized coaching for the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).
- --An investigation at the Charlotte District Recruiting Command (DRC) during May 1979 as a result of recruiters using unauthorized test material to coach Army applicants.

The task force, upon finding substantial evidence that a dishonest or unethical recruiting practice was committed, was authorized to direct DRC commanders to

- --initiate relief, reclassification, and reassignment of malpracticing recruiters and
- --take any other action deemed appropriate under the specific circumstances of the case.

The investigation was directed primarily at detecting the use of unauthorized test materials to coach Army applicants. However, investigating teams were directed to investigate every lead and allegation of dishonest or unethical recruiting practices.

INVESTIGATION METHODOLOGY

USAREC's special investigation included several tasks. Initially, it analyzed data to select recruiter personnel suspected of recruiting malpractice on the basis of irregular test score patterns of related enlistees. Enlistees were then interviewed to obtain sworn statements indicating whether their

recruiter engaged in malpractice. Investigating teams visited DRCs primarily to confront suspect recruiters with evidence obtained from the interviews and to determine the nature and extent of dishonest recruiting practices.

Task force

To conduct the investigation, USAREC formed a special investigation task force and an operations center at USAREC Headquarters. USAREC's self-investigation was approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the Department of Army Inspector General because USAREC surfaced the problem and the matter did not cross command lines.

The task force was composed of investigating teams who were briefed on legal matters (such as sworn statements), enlistment policy, illegal test materials, interview techniques, and irregular test score patterns during a 1- or 2-day session at USAREC Headquarters. Team members were USAREC personnel who were appointed on a temporary basis. Initially, four such teams were formed, each composed of five to seven members and headed by a team chief with the rank of colonel. According to the special investigation staff, investigating officers were not assigned to conduct investigations at DRCs within their home regional recruiting command. Efforts were also made to obtain a mix of personnel from various regional recruiting commands on individual investigation teams.

The task force operations center performed data control functions. These included developing data files for matching recruiters with enlistees and applying the methodology for selecting suspect recruiters. The operations center also performed operational control functions.

Data analysis

Data analysis identified recruiters suspected of providing illegal test assistance to enlistees and selected enlistees for interview. Enlistees during October 1977 through November 1979 were matched with a file of recruiter personnel updated during the investigation. Suspect recruiters were identified by applying two separate but related measurements of irregularity in mental qualification test scores attained by enlistees on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test.

Because of incomplete and/or inaccurate data and limitations in the methodology for soliciting suspect recruiters, the data analysis probably did not identify all recruiters who may have given illegal test assistance to enlistees.

APPENDIX I

RECRUITER AND ENLISTEE DATA FILES

By the time the investigation was officially disbanded, a file of over 337,000 enlistees for matching with more than 8,400 recruiter personnel had been developed. The enlistee file was extracted from the reporting system of the Military Enlistment Processing Command and included Regular Army and Army Reserve accessions since October 1977. Recruiter location files as of December 1978 were expanded to include reserve recruiters and recruiter personnel at DRC level and below as of about August 1979.

In the initial phase of the investigation, up to 759 recruiters were identified for investigation on the basis of irregular test scores for related enlistees from a total of about 5,770 recruiters matched with about 177,000 enlistees. An additional 40,000 enlistees, however, could not be matched because of recordkeeping errors.

Field investigation

The field investigation of recruiting malpractice was a two-part process. The first step was to gather evidence of malpractice by suspect recruiters in the form of sworn statements by respective enlistees. Secondly, investigating teams visited DRCs to determine the nature and extent of malpractice. Enlistees associated with a recruiter were interviewed at the same time the recruiter's DRC was being investigated or after the DRC had already been visited.

The 22-page interview document developed with the assistance of the USAREC Inspector General contained specific questions to obtain from enlistees an identification of recruiters by name and physical characteristics and to describe:

- --The circumstances of the enlistee's first contact with the recruiter and visit to the recruiting station.
- --The extent of testing which the enlistee was given at the recruiting station.
- --The nature and extent of test assistance and material that the enlistee may have been given.
- --How much of this test material actually appeared on the ASVAB test and helped the enlistee in taking the test.

--The frequency, physical environment, and results of enlistment tests taken by the enlistee.

Sworn statements from the enlistees interviewed were forwarded to the task force and were classified as positive, negative, or as possible allegations of recruiter malpractice. Enlistees' allegations were the principal criteria for scheduling DRC visits.

Investigation at DRCs

The purpose of the DRC visits was to confront recruiters with evidence and to obtain their sworn statements. Teams were also directed to followup all leads and allegations of dishonest or unethical recruiting practices and to evaluate the extent of possible involvement in such practices throughout the chain of command.

Generally, visits were scheduled according to the number of recruiters with three or more positive allegations against them. Special investigation staffs indicated, however, that the scope of the investigation varied with teams. In some cases, team chiefs would interview people other than those suspected. Team chiefs were authorized, upon finding substantial evidence that a recruiter had committed a dishonest or unethical recruiting practice, to direct suspension of the recruiter.

When the investigation was complete, the team chief was to review the evidence with a staff or regional judge advocate and recommend exoneration, relief, or continuation of the investigation for each suspected recruiter. The task force chief, a Brigader General, was authorized to direct DRC commanders, through regional recruiting command commanders, to initiate relief, reclassification, and reassignment of the individual and to take any other appropriate action.

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

USAREC statistics show that 393 personnel involved in the recruiting function were relieved from duties as a result of the special investigation. Noncommissioned supervisory personnel and recruiters account for 99 percent of the reliefs. Relief actions were taken against personnel in all five regional recruiting commands and in 43 of the 57 DRCs. Most reliefs--221 or 54 percent of the total--occurred in the Southeast Region. Most relief actions--263 or 67 percent of the total--resulted from unauthorized pre-enlistment training.

MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE RECRUITING FUNCTION

The special investigation is credited with various management improvements in the recruiting function. The establishment of an enlisted standards directorate at Headquarters, USAREC, seems to be one of the more significant results. USAREC established this directorate in July 1979 to insure quality control in the recruiting process. The directorate was intended to have three primary divisions:

- --The Malpractice and Investigations Division for directing the centralized malpractice investigation program.
- --The Trends and Analysis Division to perform statistical analysis for assisting recruiting managers in identifying adverse or positive trends in the quality of accessions and in adherence to regulations and laws governing the recruiting process.
- --The Waivers and Delayed Entry Program Discharge Division to centralize the processing of waivers and discharge.

Other improvements credited to the special investigation relate to changes in selecting and assigning recruiters, training recruiter personnel, accounting for Army Reserve enlistments and transfers to the Individual Ready Reserve, and retesting Army applicants. A broad range of other recruiting management improvements are planned, including a recruiter profile report. This report will identify by individual recruiter all recruits enlisted over a 12-month period, include a tabulation of the recruiters' enlistees in a number of categories, and indicate whether the recruiter ranks among the top 10 percent in terms of the proportion of enlistees by indicator.

USAREC'S CONCLUSIONS FROM SPECIAL INVESTIGATION

An interim report dated November 12, 1979, to Department of Army Headquarters included the following observations:

- --Malpractice has and probably always will exist.
- --The existence of organization pressure as the impetus for recruiter malpractice is contradicted by the characteristics of recruiters relieved as a result of the special investigation. Most recruiters reportedly

were more experienced and tenured in the recruiting function, had voluntarily remained in the recruiting command, and had already achieved success as measured by awards. Also, most recruiters were not malpracticing and less-than-100 percent producers were also receiving promotions.

- --Only 11 of 57 DRCs were heavily involved (i.e., where 11 or more recruiters were relieved).
- --Less than 9 percent of USAREC personnel were implicated in malpractices.
- --Officers were not directly involved in malpractices, and their inability to detect malpractice was related to their inexperience. Officers relieved to date were generally as a result of failure in leadership.
- --Many applicants (about 90 percent) who were coached did not need coaching to meet minimum mental requirements for enlistment.
- --About 12,428 personnel were fraudulently enlisted between October 1977 and May 1979 primarily because of falsification of educational level achievement.
- --Recruiting duty is not more stressful than many other duties performed by noncommissioned officers.

--No one is forced to cheat in order to recruit.

USAREC's observations, based on the special investigation, tend to portray recruiting malpractice as minimal. Given the inaccuracy of available data and the methodology used during the investigation, these observations may not be true.

Since the interim report was issued, USAREC staff has recognized that the investigation probably identified between 40 and 70 percent of suspect recruiters. The proportions of malpracticing recruiters could be higher since the possibility of unauthorized coaching on the aptitude portion of the test was not explored. Aptitude coaching could assist an enlistee in obtaining the type of schooling desired.



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

PEDERAL PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-199870

The Honorable Edward Hidalgo The Secretary of the Navy

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Subject: Recruiting Management in the United States Navy Recruiting Command (FPCD-80-60)

We recently reviewed recruiting management in the United States Navy Recruiting Command at the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee. We also reviewed recruiting management in the other services and in the National Guard and have issued separate reports to each of the other service Secretaries, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

We are also preparing two reports to the Congress addressing (1) the recruiting decisionmaking processes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the service headquarters (including the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard) and (2) the extent and causes of, and the potential for, correcting recruiter malpractice. At the same time, we are sending a summary of our work to the Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.

We included in our review selected recruiting activities performed at command headquarters, the 3rd and 7th area commands, and selected recruiting districts located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Nashville, Tennessee. At these offices, we examined documentation and interviewed officials, including recruiters, concerned with management and production. We also observed your Standardization Audit Team (SAT) inspection at the Recruiting District in Louisville, Kentucky.

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We noted that the Navy had taken positive steps to improve recruiting operations, including establishing standard operational procedures and the Standardization Audit Team to insure that such procedures are being carried out effectively. We also observed that your Freeman Plan and Enlisted Tracking System appeared to be useful management tools for overseeing recruit quality results and potential incidents of recruiter malpractice.

We found some situations which, if unaddressed, could hamper effective recruiting operations. The areas in which we noted problems were:

--Recruiters' quality of life.

--Treatment of urban versus rural recruiters.

-- Control operations.

--Delayed Entry Program usage.

--Recruiter training.

RECRUITERS' QUALITY OF LIFE

We noted some actions that the Navy and the Congress should take to improve the quality of life of recruiters. These actions include providing monetary assistance to recruiters to overcome excessive costs of such necessities as housing, utilities, automobile insurance, property taxes, and food.

Information provided by the Navy Recruiting Command shows that recruiters paid between \$4,360 and \$7,900 a year (depending on where they lived) for utilities, property taxes, auto insurance, and food.

On the average, recruiters in enlisted grades E5 to E9 receive annually about \$1,400 in special duty pay, \$1,300 in subsistance, and between \$2,200 and \$3,500 for quarters allowance. Thus, some recruiters have been "out-of-pocket" as much as \$1,700. The Department of Defense has taken several initiatives which may offset some of these differences, ranging from a proposal to accelerate special-duty pay to a proposal to increase family-based housing rental limits. These initiatives are now under congressional

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consideration. A favorable congressional vote on these items would improve the quality of life for the recruiter. Other changes may be possible without congressional approval.

We urge the Navy to continue its attempts to upgrade the recruiters' quality of life. In our view, the failure to provide greater assistance is having detrimental effects on recruiter's performance and is resulting in personal hardships and in a poor image of the Navy recruiting program.

TREATMENT OF URBAN VERSUS

The Navy may be favoring urban recruiters over rural recruiters in terms of being able to meet their assigned goals of four or more new contracts each month. At one location, our analysis showed that during fiscal year 1979 rural recruiters achieved an average of 3.33 new contracts, compared to an average of 4.75 contracts for recruiters in metropolitan areas. Other records showed that 85 percent of the metropolitan recruiters achieved assigned goals of four new contracts or more each month, whereas only 24 percent of rural recruiters achieved this goal. We recognize that the Navy Recruiting Command is attempting to counter this situation by developing more refined methods of goal allocations. We endorse this effort and believe the Navy should insure removal of such rural/urban inequities.

CONTROL OPERATIONS

The Navy has numerous controls for preventing and detecting recruiting irregularities. When the recruiter, recruiter-in-charge, zone supervisor, processing clerk, and classifier do their jobs properly, processing errors or irregularities may be eliminated; when they do not, the Recruiting Command's SAT is likely to discover the errors.

SAT is composed of officers and enlisted men who volunteer to serve on SAT, are functional experts, and have proven to be outstanding recruiters. The Navy closely screens and trains them.

SAT uses a standard audit program that allows it to audit about 2,500 items in each recruiting district. Not only does it formally assess recruiting performance, but it also provides informal guidance, assistance, and training to a large portion of the Navy's production and processing personnel. SAT also makes its audit approach available to higher command management.

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In March 1980, we monitored a SAT audit at the Recruiting District in Louisville. We observed the thoroughness of a SAT review and became familiar with the type of discrepancies needing corrective action. These discrepancies were brought to management's attention. Some observations SAT made included:

- --The Recruiting District maintained inadequate training records.
- -- Poor controls existed over the use of the facsimile signature stamp.
- --The Recruiting District had not certified recruiters as being qualified.

As of June 1980, SAT had reviewed the operations of 40 of 43 recruiting districts and 2 of 6 area commanders' staffs. SAT will audit three additional districts by September 1980. SAT teams are doing a fine job in improving the recruiting management. But the Navy should expand its operations to allow more frequent visits (at least once a year) to the recruiting districts.

DEP USAGE

The Navy could eliminate some controls, especially in the post-enlistment verification program, by increasing its use of Delayed Entry Program (DEP). The post-enlistment verification program includes verifying, on a sample basis, mental test scores, physical examinations, educational attainment, and moral information recorded for enlistees during the enlistment process. If the Navy placed more emphasis on DEP, it could move these controls to the initial stages of enlistment, rather than the training phase, and thereby eliminate duplicative testing.

New enlistees who have been in DEP for several months are likely to have a better chance of completing a full contracted tour of duty than enlistees who have not been in DEP. As a Center for Naval Analyses study shows, enlistees who have been in DEP for 2 to 3 months stay longer in the service. than those in DEP 1 month or less. Increased use of DEP would also reduce attrition costs.

The Navy Recruiting Command is now emphasizing DEP and expects each district and area to have 65 percent of the current months' ships (i.e., people who are entering the

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service) come from DEP. Because of command emphasis, the Navy has greatly improved its DEP position over the past year. The Navy could realize more benefits, however, if it placed even greater emphasis on DEP.

RECRUITER TRAINING

In its study of the training program, the Recruiting Command identified various weaknesses in the following areas:

--Curricula development and documentation.

--Instructional materials and staff.

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--Student selection and counseling.

-- Testing and evaluation.

--Adequacy of training.

--Applicability of training.

From this study, the command developed an implementation plan for establishing a comprehensive recruiter orientation and training program. The program will provide for field orientation, periodic training, and evaluation to monitor and refresh recruiters throughout their tour of duty. Our discussions with personnel and our review of documentation available at the locations visited confirmed that the Navy could improve recruiter training. We urge you to consider the Recruiting Command's proposals for a revised training program.

We are pleased with the cooperation we received during our review from people in the various organizational levels associated with Navy recruiting. Where we identified potential problems, the Recruiting Command provided an immediate response and, in many cases, took corrective action.

We look forward to a continued cooperative working relationship in the future.

Sincerely yours,

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H. L. Kieger Directo

ENCLOSURE I



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-199870

The Honorable Clifford L. Alexander The Secretary of the Army

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Subject: Recruiting Management in the United States Army Recruiting Command (FPCD-80-61)

We recently reviewed recruiting management in the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) at the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee. We also reviewed recruiting management in the other services and in the Nationa Guard and have issued separate reports to each of the other service Secretaries, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

We are also preparing two reports to the Congress addressing (1) the recruiting decision making processes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the service headquarters (including the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard) and (2) the extent and causes of, and potential for, correcting recruiter malpractice. At the same time, we are sending a summary of our work to the Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.

We conducted our audit work at USAREC Headquarters and the Midwest Region Recruiting Command, both in Fort Sheridan, Illinois, and the Army Recruiting Districts in Albany, New York; Chicago, Illinois; Nashville, Tennessee; and San Antonio, Texas. We reviewed pertinent records, interviewed management and recruiting officials, and observed the organizational structure.

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ARMY INVESTIGATION

As you know, the Army recently completed the most massive investigation of recruiter malpractice in its history. The investigation, in our opinion, represented a reasonable, systematic effort to detect recruiters who violated regulations or procedures, particularly those recruiters who inappropriately assisted applicants on tests. The accuracy of the data base and the methodology used to identify recruiters to be investigated had limitations, however. Whereas the inaccuracies in the data base were, for the most part, beyond the Army's control, the methodology may not have identified all violations. Nevertheless, it was an attempt to reach a reasonable balance between the need to identify violators and the need to minimize the demoralizing effects of placing large numbers of innocent recruiters under suspicion.

RECRUITING MANAGEMENT PROBLEM AREAS

We found some situations which, if unaddressed, could hamper effective recruiting operations. The three areas in recruiting in which we noted problers were:

- --Training of supervisory personnel.
- --Coordination of management control systems.
- --Performance evaluations of minagement at district recruiting commands (DRCs), area commands, and recruiting stations.

We are pleased to note that USAREC has taken action to deal with the first concern, and we encourage USAREC to address the remaining two.

TRAINING OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL

Our review in two of the four Army recruiting districts visited indicated that the training provided to area commanders and the more senior district commanders may be inadequate. For example, we noted that an area commander and the executive officer assigned to one district had not attended the course designed to train them for their positions. Further, area commanders who attended the course said it was ineffective and also did not cover vaiver processing, although

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area commanders approve waivers. In addition, some station commanders who were also serving as production recruiters had not taken the station management course.

After our discussions with officials on this issue early this year, USAREC improved their training program for management personnel to provide more comprehensive information on the recruiting process, with emphasis on waivers and methods to identify malpractice. In addition, the USAREC commander instituted a policy that all key recruiting management personnel at DRCs and below receive supervisory training en route to their duty assignment. If not feasible at that time, the training must start within the first 30 days after their assignment begins. In our view, USAREC's action in instituting the above changes is likely to counter the identified problems. The effectiveness of the training cannot be measured at this time, however.

COORDINATION OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS

On the basis of our limited observation, it appears that controls employed by local recruiting managers may not be as effective and efficient as they should be and that various management reporting systems are not interrelated and do not achieve anticipated results.

Although information produced by one system could be logically integrated into another system or systems, the DRC management did not always interrelate them. For example, some DRCs did not use recruiter production records to target recruiter training needs, project the probability of meeting their recruiting goals, or identify recruiters needing assistance to achieve their goals. At one DRC, although production information was available, management did not readily know whether any of its recruiters were on probation or whether those on probation were receiving assistance from the DRC's professional development teams.

At the DRCs visited, we noted that another control mechanism not tied into other systems was DRC guidance counselors' review of enlistment packages prepared by recruiters. Although the guidance counselors knew which recruiters consistently made errors in preparing individuals' enlistment forms, the counselors did not provide this information to management. As a result, managers have not initiated corrective measures.

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In an effort to aid DRC commanders in detecting recruiters who have been performing unsatisfactorily, USAREC has recently initiated a monthly profile report on each of the Army's production recruiters. This report consolidated, for the first time, information for DRC commanders that was previously available from a variety of sources at different levels within USAREC. The data in this monthly profile report help DRC commanders to better allocate their professional development resources.

This action by USAREC is a step towards correcting the above-mentioned problems. More work still needs to be done, however.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS OF MANAGEMENT

In our opinion, the Army's monitoring and evaluation of recruiting units need improvement. Unit evaluations are concerned more with unit appearance and recordkeeping than formalized and systematic feedback management practices.

Army regulations require parent commands to periodically evaluate units in implementing recruiting regulations. USAREC's Inspector General staff is required to conduct evaluations of regional and district recruiting commands. Regions are supposed to be evaluated at least annually, districts biannually. Regions, in turn, are required to periodically evaluate recruiting districts. Recruiting districts, through their area commanders and professional development teams, evaluate recruiting stations quarterly.

Regional inspections did not appear to be comprehensive and were not always documented or maintained by the districts. According to the commander at one DRC, regional inspections provide very little information that is not already known. One type of regional evaluation that was consistently documented was the quarterly inspection of the REQUEST computer system controls used by DRC guidance counselors. The DRC, however, did not retain all of these reports. Therefore, the value of the reports as a record of problems identified and corrected was limited.

At the DRCs visited, we noted that district inspections of recruiting stations centered on recordkeeping and appearance and were inconsistent in their approach. The report on one recruiting station, which was meeting only 57 percent of its recruiting mission, noted that station appearance was excellent and files and recordkeeping were in good order. The

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report failed to note any problem areas or identify corrective actions needed. By contrast, inspection reports on two of the DRCs productive stations meeting 116 percent and 91 percent of their goals, respectively, recommended area command assistance with the stations' files.

We are pleased with the cooperation we received during our review from people in the various organizational levels associated with Army recruiting. Where we identified potential problems, the Recruiting Command provided an immediate response and, in many cases, took corrective actions.

We look forward to a continued cooperative working relationship in the future.

Sincerely yours,

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H. L. Krieger Director

ENCLOSURE I



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-199870

General Robert H. Barrow Commandant of the Marine Corps

Dear General Barrow:

Subject: Recruiting Management in the United States Marine Corps (FPCD-80-59)

We recently reviewed recruiting management of the United States Marine Corps recruiting program at the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee. We also reviewed recruiting management in the other services and in the National Guard and have issued separate reports to each of the service Secretaries and to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

We are also preparing two reports to the Congress addressing (1) the recruiting decisionmaking processes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the service headquarters (including the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard) and (2) the extent and causes of, and potential for, correction of recruiter malpractice. At the same time, we are sending a summary of our work to the Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.

We included in our review selected recruiting activities performed at USMC headquarters; the 1st, 4th, and 8th Marine Corps recruiting districts; and four selected subordinate stations in Baltimore, Maryland; Albany, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; and San Antonio, Texas. We also performed a limited amount of work at the Recruit Training Depot in Parris Island, South Carolina. At these offices, we examined documentation and interviewed officials, including recruiters, concerned with management and production.

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We found that the Marine Corps had taken positive steps to improve its recruiting operations, including establishing a systematic recruiting process and procedures for retesting enlistees at training depots to deter and prevent incidents of recruiter malpractice and fraudulent enlistments.

We found some areas which, if unaddressed, could hamper effective recruiting operations. Some of these areas were related to only one or more of the locations visited. The areas in which we noted problems were:

-- Operational control practices.

--Goal inflation practices.

--Enlistment processing and recruit reporting systems.

--Training provided to recruiting personnel and adequacy of training records.

--Perceptions about awards and management support.

--Policy adherence by station commanders.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL PRACTICES

Operational control responsibilities for recruiting rests with the two recruit training depots. We noted, however, that the Personnel Procurement Division, which is responsible for providing administrative, logistical, and fiscal support to recruiting, in practice, was also performing operational functions. These functions included providing policy and guidance on quota allocations and reviewing recruiter reliefs. In addition, the division was planning to assign recruiters by name to recruiting stations. As a result, lower echelon recruiting commanders have been responding to both the Personnel Procurement Division and a training depot. Some confusion exists as to who was accountable for particular recruiting functions. This confusion also affects district commanders because both the training depot commander and the Director of Personnel Procurement evaluate them. This practice, in our opinion, does not create a conducive working environment and does not follow established lines of authority.

Although we did not detect instances of recruiter malpractice, we believe that the operational control practices have the potential for fostering malpractice. For example,

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the Personnel Procurement Division is involved in establishing overall production quotas, whereas the training depots control actual shipping quotas. Thus, a situation could occur where training depots would cease enlistments into the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) to fill shipping needs. This action would prompt added pressure on the recruiters and could cause malpractice. The limited data we reviewed did not indicate that training depots were exercising this practice, but some officials we interviewed said that the practice of stopping DEP enlistments has occurred.

We believe the Marine Corps should insure that their clear cut lines of responsibility are followed. Also, the Marine Corps could consider having one organization control recruiting operations. Although the Personnel Procurement Division has exercised the control function, direct-line responsibility is with the two training depots. Each depot separately controls operations of three districts. Without proper oversight, each depot could be administering recruiting functions inconsistently.

GOAL INFLATION PRACTICES

At two of the three recruiting stations we visited, goal inflation practices were inconsistent with headquarters recommendations. Marine Corps headquarters has recommended that stations not establish goals in excess of their assigned goals because doing so places unnecessary pressures on the recruiters, lowers morale, and increases the possibility of malpractice. In practice, however, several stations are increasing recruiters' goals by increasing either the assigned shipping goals or the assigned production goals. For example, one station commander determined that such a level of accession was needed to finish as the top recruiting station in the country (in terms of numbers shipped). This same station commander encountered difficulties later in the year and had to request relief from short-term shipping goals to replenish his DEP needs. Similarly, another station increased its recruiter production goals from the district average of 2.4 per recruiter to 4.0.

Some further isolated examples of unrealistic goal allocations follow.

--Black recruiters at one location received full goal allocations but were limited to recruiting in areas having heavy Black population density which could not support the goal expectations.

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- --Recruiters were given full goal allocations that were unrealistic because of additional supervisory responsibilities.
- --New recruiters received full goal allocations rather than a lesser requirement. Management did not expect these recruiters to achieve their assigned goals, but recruiters were not aware of this expectation.

We believe the Marine Corps should insure that its headquarters' recommendation concerning goal inflation is carried out.

ENLISTMENT PROCESSING AND RECRUIT REPORTING SYSTEMS

The Marine Corps has established enlistment processing and recruit reporting systems to aid management in its decisionmaking to (1) help long-range planning, (2) insure quality recruits, and (3) show management how recruiters are performing. At the locations we visited, some controls of the systems were repetitive, excessive, and not well integrated. We also noted that the manual reporting procedures used by the Marine Corps were time-consuming, and the information they generate is not used consistently. In addition, Marine Corps evaluations of recruiting stations and substations did not always provide feedback on management decisionmaking and problems.

Excessive and repetitive controls

One procedure used to insure quality enlistment is a 100 percent recruit retesting program. This program requires that each recruit take an alternative form of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test at the training depot. Wide discrepancies between test scores are investigated to determine whether the recruit was coached by the recruiter to qualify for the Marines. Although this procedure has resulted in detecting unqualified recruits, we believe the same results could be achieved at a lower cost through sampling techniques. A retesting on a sample basis could give adequate assurance of recruit quality and still deter recruiter coaching, since no recruiter will know which candidates would be retested.

Another control procedure is related to the recruiter verifying whether the potential enlistee has had a police

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record. While the initial control is necessary, we noted that the verification is often repeated at five different management levels.

At one recruiting station, personnel were verifying police records for 100 percent of candidates. Marine Corps policy requires the station to verify with police departments 20 percent of all candidates with or without indications of a record.

The waiver process also entails progressive levels of review, depending on the seriousness of the situation and the amount of time and documentation increases with the level of approval needed. Waivers for less serious types of offenses had to be obtained at levels where waivers for serious offenses were also obtained.

For example, a waiver for a recruit who is one-fourth inch too tall requires approval from headquarters. In contrast, the recruit requiring a waiver because he was convicted of a felony and served time in jail would also need an approval from headquarters. More of the less serious types of waivers could be delegated to the district or recruiting station levels, resulting in less paperwork (because of less stringent documentation requirements at the local levels) and quicker processing.

Also, the Marine Corps should determine whether waivers are needed for other common, minor offenses, such as parking tickets and traffic violations. It does not appear reasonable to require a waiver to enlist a person who has received a parking ticket and paid a \$10 fine, which is now the case.

Lack of integrated reports

Management at various levels requires detailed reports of recruiter activities. The districts, for example, require as many as 40 reports from the recruiting station on a recurring basis. To provide these reports, stations require 20 reports from their individual substations. Some of these required reports are merely compilations of information from other reports. For example, recruiter activity reports are required from substations daily, weekly, and monthly.

Although there are numerous reports at many levels, they generally are not integrated with other reports. For example, information from situation reports received by substations from the recruit depots showing recruit performance and

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discharges do not establish trends for individual recruiters; cumulative reports of recruiter performance must then be maintained separately to establish trends.

Stations differed in how they used the situation reports provided to them by the recruit depots. Some of the stations had no rules of thumb as to when a situation highlighted by these reports warranted action.

The Marine Corps is installing a computerized system to integrate reports throughout the Corps' recruiting program. The Corps plans to have the computerized system on line sometime late in 1980.

Marine Corps recruiting stations and substations are evaluated by headquarters, districts, and training depots. Generally, the resulting evaluation reports show the condition of the record system and do not highlight management practices which hamper effective recruiting.

For example, several district evaluations showed that recruiting substations are complying in their recordkeeping systems and standards of operations and are including such information as identifying which recruiters are overweight and which offices have peeling paint. Some management issues, such as placement of recruiters, identification of enlistment trends, or motivational techniques employed, were not documented. Districts were, however, aware of station problems, such as failing to use the DEP or placing new recruiters with only 1 month's experience in supervisory positions.

Evaluations should identify areas where change is needed, the steps necessary to accomplish the change, and the time needed to effectively implement transitions. This information would help recruiting stations change their management style of reacting to crisis situations to one of devising plans to deal with and prevent such crises from occurring.

TRAINING PROVIDED AND ADEQUACY OF RECRUITING PERSONNEL TRAINING

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Marine Corps' policy requires continuous training of its officers and recruiters to perform at peak efficiency Certain types of training, however, were not being given in the frequency required or were not given on time. Following are some examples:

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- --Block training is a continuing 16 hour per month program required for all people. At one recruiting station, this training averaged from 4 to 6 hours a month. Some recruiters missed the training altogether.
- --At one recruiting station, officers and noncommissioned officers-in-charge were not always receiving the management training required for their new jobs before filling the positions. The training was sometimes provided long after the assignment or not at all. We noted cases in which untrained noncommissioned officers in charge were removed for failure to manage and were sent back to production recruiting.

The recruiter instructor has the primary responsibility for continually providing training and assistance to the recruiting force. At two locations we visited, training records had not been maintained. This limited the recruiter instructor's effectiveness as he had no way of knowing the extent of training given or counseling that was needed. At one location, the recruiter instructor had not reviewed recruiter performance and production records to plan needed training and assistance visits.

The Marine Corps should insure that recruiters receive required training before assignment to recruiting duty and that records are maintained and used to improve the quality of training given.

PERCEPTIONS ABOUT AWARDS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

We noted that recruiters at the locations visited were disenchanted with the awards program as an incentive tool. We also saw indications of a lack of management support which affected the recruiters' ability to do their jobs. Following are examples of areas needing management support:

- --In fiscal year 1979, 1 station received as many as 149 awards with 2 recruiters getting as many as 18 each. Some recruiters believed the awards had become so common that their value had diminished.
- --Recruiters at one location were forced to cancel visits or drive their own vehicles for an extended duration, causing financial hardships and personal inconvenience. One recruiter logged about 7,000 miles before being given a recruiting vehicle, and

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a noncommissioned officer-in-charge had driven his own car, for whic he received no compensation, nearly 2 months, thus burdening his family transportation needs.

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- --At one recruiting station, higher grade recruiters occupied leased housing, whereas three lower grade recruiters were unaware of how to obtain leased housing, not given cooperation in finding it, or unable to obtain it after previously being told they could.
- --Recruiters at one location did not perceive meritorious promotions as attainable or fairly administered. One recruiter achieved better than a 4.0 production rate for 24 months and, once promoted, his productivity dropped to 0. This recruiter was promoted over others having outstanding production records. The recruiter was later removed for malpractice.

Recruiting management could have improved its support with little difficulty in each of the above examples. The recruiting station commanding officer has total flexibility to develop an equitable and meaningful awards program and recognition system. Manag ment could also take several actions to furnish needed motor transportation, including leasing vehicles from commercial sources on a short-time basis to fill temporary deficiencies. Further, the commanding officer should make every effort to inform recruiters about subsidized housing and otherwise aid their efforts to find it. For instance, at one recruiting station, management was preparing to terminate a Government lease on one house rather than give it to another recruiter who could qualify.

POLICY ADHERENCE BY STATION COMMANDERS

Station commanders should follow official guidance; yet, in cases concerning probation of recruiters and recruiter assignment policies, we noted several instances where local commanders were not adhering to policy.

For example, Marine Corps guidance indicates recruiters should serve a 6-month trial period and then be placed on probation for 3 months, if their productivity is low but will likely improve to an acceptable level. The commander at one station, however, gave recruiters a 9-month trial period, with a possible 3-month probation afterwards. Thus, low producers were kept on probation for a year. The commanding officer at another recruiting station carried low productivity recruiters

on probation up to 2 years before initiating a removal action. At yet another station, the commander adhered to the 9-month probation period but removed a recruiter for cause in the 10th month for poor production when the recruiter clearly established his inability to produce during the probation period. This station retained at least 12 more recruiters past their probationary period, although their inability to produce was clearly established.

In another instance, we found that one new recruiter had been assigned to a station where he was the only recruiter. Marine Corps policy states that a new recruiter should not be assigned alone to any location during the first year. He was subsequently removed from recruiting duty.

At one recruiting station, 4 recruiters were relieved from a single substation over a 9-month period. These actions adversely affected the recruiting mission. New and inexperienced recruiters replaced the relieved recruiters but were unable to achieve the recruiting mission. In several cases, these new recruiters suffered mental and financial hardships. As a result, the substation's market potential, the fourth largest at this particular recruiting station, was virtually untapped; it had the lowest accession average in the entire station.

Concerning such cases, we believe that station commanders should be following official guidance. We urge you to take whatever actions necessary to insure adherence to policy in the future.

We appreciate the cooperation given us during our review. The Marine Corps is commended for the strides it has made in improving its recruiting operations. Correcting unique problems such as those highlighted in this report will further improve Marine Corps recruiting.

It has been a pleasure dealing with such a fine group of dedicated professionals.

Sincerely yours,

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H. L. Krieger Director

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ENCLOSURE I



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND COM- NEATION DIVISION

B-199870

Major General LaVern E. Weber Chief, National Guard Bureau

Dear General Weber:

Subject: Recruiting Management in the National Guard (FPCD-80-79)

We recently reviewed recruiting management in the National Guard at the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee. We also reviewed recruiting management in the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force. The results are being addressed in separate reports to each of the service Secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

We are also preparing two reports to the Congress addressing (1) the recruiting decisionmaking processes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the service headquarters (including the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard) and (2) the extent and causes of, and the potential for, correcting recruiter malpractice. At the same time, we are sending a summary of our work to the Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.

In doing this review we visited the National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C., and the Virginia and Illinois National Guards. We reviewed pertinent records, interviewed management and recruiting officials, and observed the various organizational structures in operation.

We are pleased with the immediate response of your organization in providing detailed data concerning the National Guard's recruiting operations. During the course of our review of recruiting, such information proved to be of great value in improving our understanding of the various organizations, procedures, and systems used to operate the recruiting programs.

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On the basis of our limited review, we found that the Air National Guard appears to be selecting, training, and managing its recruiting force in a manner which will achieve its recruiting objectives. In contrast, our review of the Army National Guard (ARNG) reconfirmed our earlier findings (FPCD-79-58, July 1979, and FPCD-79-71, August 1979) that ARNG goal-setting practices may be detracting from the depth of the actual recruiting problem.

We also determined that:

- --State ARNG practices may be hindering recruiting effectiveness.
- --Recruiting management tools are not being fully utilized.
- --Recruiting monitoring and evaluation can be improved.

GOAL-SETTING PRACTICES MAY DETRACT FROM DEPTH OF RECRUITING PROBLEM

ARNG has an official policy that its units should develop their recruiting objectives on the basis of their ability to recruit personnel rather than on the manpower needed to reach desired peacetime manning levels.

We recognize that ARNG has lowered its overall recruiting objectives to reflect the recruiting inputs possible within the limited resources which have been allocated by the Department of the Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress. We question the appropriateness of this procedure because of a general tendency to lose sight of ARNG's actual recruiting needs and concentrate instead on a lower objective. For example, if State A actually needs 10,000 recruits but instead establishes a recruiting goal of 7,000, accomplishment of the 7,000 goal may illustrate good management of available resources but not achievement of the numbers necessary to staff the units in that State.

This policy has resulted in manning strength levels considerably below those authorized. As of late 1979, ARNG was about 80 percent of authorized strength. Nineteen of the 53 States and territories had less than 80 percent of their authorized strength. One of the States we visited had 9 of its 15 battalion level organizations at below 80-percent strength.

We recognize that ARNG cannot recruit greatly increased numbers unless additional resources are provided. We also recognize that limited funds and personnel may preclude providing these additional resources. However, we believe that the use of the actual objectives needed to reach peacetime manning and the related resources necessary to accomplish that goal should be the driving force in all recruiting management resourcing decisions. In this way, if reductions in recruiting goals and related resourcing levels are necessary, then they would be viewed in the proper context of providing less than adequate levels.

STATE PRACTICES MAY HINDER RECRUITING EFFECTIVENESS

ARNG officials informed us that States use different criteria in developing their recruiting objectives and that the National Guard Bureau is unable to totally reconcile these differences in allocating recruiting resources to the States. This has resulted in some inequities and inefficiencies in managing recruiting operations. If ARNG Headquarters were to develop uniform criteria for the States to use in developing their recruiting objectives, our view is that management of recruiting would improve.

RECRUITING MANAGEMENT TOOLS ARE NOT FULLY UTILIZED

We believe that the National Guard Bureau is not fully utilizing several tools in its management of recruiting operations. These tools are:

- -- Use of probation authority for individual units.
- --Withdrawal of Federal recognition for subordinate units.
- --Withdrawal of Federal recognition for units as a whole.

During fiscal year 1979, despite the availability of these tools, the National Guard Bureau placed only one-half of 1 percent of all ARNG units on probation. Furthermore, the ARNG Director made no use of his authority to withdraw Federal recognition from units.

We believe that some ARNG units--operating within the limits of current funding levels and policies--are not fully supporting their recruitment and retention programs and that

using the above-mentioned tools would prompt greater achievement of recruiting and retention goals. We recognize that ARNG Headquarters can apply these tools against units which are at 80 percent or below of their authorized manning, but some units above the 80-percent level may also not be fully supporting their recruiting programs. Within the limits possible, however, the National Guard Bureau's use of these tools would, in our view, contribute to a more successful recruiting program.

RECRUITING MONITORING AND EVALUATION CAN BE IMPROVED

We found evidence that ARNG may not have accurate and necessary information to provide guidance to units, withdraw recognition of units performing unsatisfactorily, and allocate financial support to units. Furthermore, it appeared that, in the areas we examined, headquarters' officials did not attempt to correct inaccurate data to monitor States' progress toward achieving recruiting objectives.

Our examination of evaluations by the Inspector General of the Army indicated that they appeared to continue to focus on compliance with forms rather than problems in recruiting performance. In one State we visited, we found that the last Inspector General's evaluation, which was conducted in November 1979, included recruiting in its scope. The resulting report, however, addressed the recruiting problems only in broad terms.

We urge you to work with the Inspector General of the Army to insure that audits of recruiting operations include more detailed information. We also urge you to address the issue of inadequate data.

We are pleased with the cooperation we received during our review from people in the various organizational levels associated with National Guard recruiting. We look forward to a continued cooperative working relationship in the future.

Sincerely yours,

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H. L. Krieger Director

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ENCLOSURE I



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-199870

The Honorable Hans M. Mark The Secretary of the Air Force

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Subject: Recruiting Management in the United States Air Force Recruiting Service (FPCD-80-62)

We recently reviewed recruiting management in the United States Air Force Recruiting Service at the request of the Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee. We also reviewed recruiting management in the other services and in the National Guard and have issued separate reports to each of the other service Secretaries, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

We are also preparing two reports to the Congress addressing (1) the recruiting decision making processes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the service headquarters (including the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard) and (2) the extent and causes of, and potential for, correcting recruiter malpractice. At the same time, we are sending a summary of our work to the Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.

We reviewed selected Air Force recruiting activities at Headquarters; the 03rd Group at Warner Robbins, Georgia; the 3551st, 3553rd, and the 3567th squadrons at Elwood, Illinois, Cleveland, Ohio, and Denver, Colorado; the Recruit Training Facility at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; various recruiting offices; and the Air Force Reserves in Macon, Georgia. We interviewed officials, supervisors, and recruiters.

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We reviewed the management of selected recruiting offices and their commands. We found some situations that, if left unaddressed, could hamper effective recruiting operations.

Our comments are limited to the following two areas:

--Goal (quota) and recruiting management.

--Various recruiting management practices.

GOAL (QUOTA) AND RECRUITING MANAGEMENT

The Air Force has been successful in recruiting the numbers of people needed for their active duty force since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). With the exception of fiscal year 1979, the Active Air Force has met its needs for new enlistees under the AVF concept. In addition, the Air Force appears to be more successful than any of the other services in meeting its recruiting goals. There are several reasons for this, but quantifying or assessing the impact of each of these reasons is difficult, if not impossible. The foremost of these reasons, however, is that the Air Force has a positive image which attracts applicants to the service. Another reason may be that the Air Force recruiting force is composed entirely of volunteers, which perhaps makes it more motivated than a force staffed with both volunteers and involuntarily assigned personnel. Additionally, the Air Force recruiting and basic training functions are both components of the Air Training Command, an organizational relationship which in our view tends to control and manage the recruiting programs better.

We did not observe any significant goal (quota) management functions that caused us concern. We feel that the system is quite equitable and fairly applied and managed.

In our opinion, the Air Forces' controls over its recruiting program are sufficient to insure that quality recruits are procured in a timely fashion. The intense use of automated control systems, such as PROMIS and other feedback programs that minimally involve the recruiter, provides good screening controls that eliminate a significant number of applicants and maintain the quality of recruits. This type of control system may be one of the reasons for the low incidence of malpractice in the Ai. Force Recruiting Service.

RECRUITER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

We did note some potential problems in our observation of recruiter management practices. In some of the flights, there are too few supervisors for the number of recruiters dispersed over large geographical areas.

The "typical" squadron, according to the Air Force, has a staff of about 100 and operates 29 recruiting offices covering an area of 90,000 square miles. The number of recruiters assigned to flights in our sample squadrons ranged from 7 to 13. The Air Force flight supervisors are responsible for an average of 10 recruiters. At one squadron we visited, the supervisor was responsible for 13 recruiters. When the recruiters are working out of widely dispersed offices, the amount of available time diminishes the likelihood of the close and frequent contact necessary to supervise daily operations. A smaller and much more manageable span of control would permit closer and more frequent contact with the production recruiters.

According to the Air Force, the Pacruiting Service has undertaken work to eliminate problems with span of control at the flight level. It is conducting an onsite survey at each recruiting squadron to analyze the squadron's market data. It has already analyzed 81 percent of the squadrons (26 of 32) and scheduled completion of all squadrons by November 1980. Span of control is a principal component specifically reviewed in each flight. As a result of onsite surveys, the Recruiting Service has recommended that eight new flights be created. Additionally, plans are currently underway to form four new squadrons to improve span of control and the management of increased goals for fiscal years 1981-82. In our opinion, the formation of these new organizations should help solve the identified span of control problems.

We also observed that production recruiters perceive the leased family housing program as a significant problem area. Few recruiters understand the policies and procedures of leased housing. An Air Force survey of more than 1,800 recruiters taken in 1979 showed that only about 45 percent claimed to understand the program and its benefits.

The objective of the leased hou ing program is to compensate recruiters for the high cost of living away from an Air - Force base. Effective January 1980, the Air Force issued a

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moratorium on leased housing due to budgetary constraints. At one squadron, four recruiters were waiting for approval of leases. Several recruiters at another squadron said they had known that leased housing would be unavailable. The moratorium was lifted on May 1, 1980, and the Recruiting Service is now advising prospective recruiters that the government can provide leased housing but that there are no guarantees. Before the moratorium was lifted, recruiters not residing in leased quarters absorbed the higher cost of living from their salaries. Many recruiters used their special duty assignment proficiency pay to compensate for the higher cost of living. This pay was originally intended to compensate recruiters for working outside their normal primary duty area.

An additional frustration for recruiters is that processing leased housing requests is very time consuming. The Air Force must undertake extensive work to insure that the lease is the cheapest available in the area. The service must also inspect and approve the site. While we understand that the Department of Defense is preparing a series of proposals for the Congress that address the shortcomings in the program, we believe that the Air Force can do more to address this problem.

We also found problems in the area of health care. The Air Force provides free health care to service personnel and their dependents when they are located near military installations with medical facilities. When such medical facilities are not available, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) provides insurance coverage. Recruiters generally believed that the CHAMPUS program is inadequate for their needs and that the program causes them significant financial and personal hardships. These hardships include:

--Extremely slow payments, causing recruiters to receive delinquent notices and threatening collection letters.

--Outdated allowable fee schedules, resulting in recruiters being charged a major portion of their medical care costs.

--Some hospitals and doctors who refuse to accept CHAMPUS patients unless the patients pay the bills and seek reimbursement from CHAMPUS themselves.

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In its 1979 survey of the recruiter force, the Air Force identified another problem; namely, that only 24 percent of those surveyed believed they had received sufficient information from management about the CHAMPUS program.

On the basis of our review, the Recruiting Service has established an education program to improve the recruiters' understanding of the administration and operation of the CHAMPUS program. It has also assigned an officer to act as the focal point for disseminating information and as a clearinghouse to help resolve CHAMPUS-related problems. We believe that this approach will help alleviate recruiters' lack of information and understanding of the CHAMPUS program.

We are pleased with the cooperation we received during our review from people in the various organizational levels associated with Air Force recruiting. Where we identified situations with a potential for problems, the Recruiting Service took immediate remedial action.

We look forward to a continued co perative working relationship in the future.

Sincerely yours,

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H. L. Krieger Director