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UNITED STATES  
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

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Need For Better Assessment Of  
Interservice Training Opportunities

Department of Defense

This report recommends that the Secretary of Defense expand the role of his office in overseeing the activities of the Interservice Training Review Organization to better assess and organize training consolidations. Thus, proposed interservice training which offers opportunities for saving without impairing military missions would be more effectively accomplished.

FPCD-76-92

OCT. 12, 1976



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND  
COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-175773

The Honorable  
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This report summarizes our review of interservice training and shows the need for an expanded role by your office to better assess and organize training consolidations. We have informally discussed this report with your staff. They generally agreed with its contents and have taken some actions to become more involved in interservice training.

The report contains recommendations to you on page 17. As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House and Senate Committees on Government Operations not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Copies are also being sent to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, Government Operations, and Armed Services.

We wish to acknowledge the courtesy and cooperation extended by your staff to our representatives during the review.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "H.L. Krieger".

H.L. Krieger  
Director

C o n t e n t s

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APBREVIACTIONS

GAO	General Accounting Office
ITRO	Interservice Training Review Organization
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

D I G E S T

The four military services expect to spend about \$4.2 billion in fiscal year 1977 for training their members in specialized skills including flight training. In August 1972 the services established the Interservice Training Review Organization to identify opportunities and, where feasible and economical, to plan for consolidation, collocation, or joint use of courses which the services were teaching separately.

From August 1972 through June 1976, the Organization reviewed to some degree about 5,400 (nearly all) of the services' specialized-skill courses. Its report of cumulative saving over this period was about \$1.2 million. But the Army, Navy, and Air Force training loads estimated for fiscal year 1977 included only about 3 percent training by other services. This contrasts with about 17 percent for the Marine Corps which has historically relied on the other services for more of its training. (See pp. 6 and 7.)

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has rarely participated in Organization studies. Since the Organization's working committees are comprised of representatives from the four services, any service can refuse to seriously consider having its members trained at the facilities of another service. The committees have stopped studies of proposed consolidations when they appeared to adversely affect the interest of one of the services. For example, one committee stopped a study on consolidating combat engineer training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, apparently because the Marine Corps' Commandant did not want to reduce training at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. (See pp. 9 and 10.)

When the Office of the Secretary of Defense actively participates in the Organization's operations, economic consolidations can

result. This is demonstrated by the planned consolidation of undergraduate helicopter pilot training. Because of congressional interest the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Organization to intensify its study of the proposed consolidation. The study showed that interservice training would be cost effective, but the Navy objected to the consolidation on the basis that certain of its peculiar needs would not be met. The Office of the Secretary of Defense intervened and directed the services to consolidate. The saving from this action is expected to total \$178 million during the first 5 years after consolidation. (See p. 14.)

The Organization has measured its progress in terms of the number of courses consolidated rather than the extent of training in consolidated courses. A more meaningful system for measuring its progress would be to track the changes in the amount of interservice training.

The Department of Defense and the services may have forgone opportunities for interservice consolidation during base closures and functional realignments. For example, in 1972 the Navy planned to relocate its air traffic control training programs to new facilities in Memphis, Tennessee. After the Organization was formed, it did not consider, nor did the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Navy consider, the alternative of integrating that training with ongoing programs in the Army and Air Force. The new facilities are expected to be operational in September 1976 and cost about \$5 million. (See pp. 12 and 13.)

The Secretary of Defense should expand his management role to include oversight authority and responsibility for the Organization. His management role should include:

- Establishing a responsible focal point in his office to provide program overview to insure maximum cooperation among the services and, when necessary, to direct the Organization to initiate or accelerate studies.

--Directing warranted consolidations not being made by the Organization.

--Developing improved reporting practices to show how much the Organization has increased interservice training.

GAO<sup>6</sup> also recommends that the Secretary re-emphasize to the services the need to consider existing facilities of other services when new training facilities are required. As part of this process the services should be required to include the results of Organization studies in their justification for new training facilities.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

For fiscal year 1977 the four military services estimate cost of specialized-skill and flight training to be \$4.2 billion. While weapon systems and tactics peculiar to one service reduce opportunities for interservice training, the services teach many of the same skills. Thus training costs can be reduced by consolidating courses if the commonality of skills is sufficient and adequate facilities are available. Department of Defense policy requires that (1) training facilities of a military service be used to the maximum extent in meeting the requirements of the other services and (2) duplication be eliminated or avoided when practicable.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has essentially left the responsibility for increasing the amount of interservice training collectively to the military services on the premise that best initial results would be obtained if the services were allowed to agree among themselves on the courses to be consolidated.

The principal organizations responsible for training in each service are: the Air Force's Air Training Command, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, the Marine Corps' Training and Education Division, and the Navy's Chief of Naval Education and Training. Training for most medical specialities is directed by the Air Force, Army, and Navy Surgeons General.


### INTERSERVICE TRAINING REVIEW ORGANIZATION

In August 1972 the military services initiated the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO), a voluntary program to increase interservice personnel training within the Department of Defense. ITRO has no authority to direct actions by the services but merely recommends action in those instances where consensus has been reached. The program was formed under the provisions of a Joint Service Regulation governing interservice training. Its organization is shown on page 2.

The top management level of ITRO is the review board, which is responsible for establishing policy and guidance. Its members are the chiefs of the services' training commands. The board meets twice a year, and its chairmanship rotates among the services.

The next level of ITRO management is the executive committee. Its members are general or flag officers drawn from

INTERSERVICE TRAINING REVIEW ORGANIZATION





training commands and department levels. They are responsible for executing ITRO policy. This committee meets quarterly and its chairmanship rotates among the services.

The steering committee is responsible for screening ITRO proposals, executing assignments, and coordinating the review program as directed by the executive committee. The steering committee meets as often as necessary, usually monthly, and is composed of officials from the services' training commands who are appointed by the executive committee.

Working committees were established for reviews of curriculum, costing, training technology, instructional systems development, correspondence, education, flying training, medical, and officer education and training. Working committees are composed of representatives from each of the services and meet as required to accomplish actions directed by the executive committee. The permanent chairman designated for each committee makes a detailed report to the executive committee quarterly. Task groups are established to carry out the assignments of the working committees.

#### PRIOR GAO REVIEWS

In May 1972 <sup>1/</sup> we reported to the Secretary of Defense that the Air Force was instituting separate training capabilities instead of continuing to use existing courses of other military services.

OSD responded that

--a selective review of interservice training would be undertaken and

--the military departments would be requested to examine carefully any major contemplated departure from the common training concept and to more frequently agree to accommodate new training requirements.

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<sup>1/</sup>"Instituting Separate Training Capabilities in the Air Force Instead of Continuing To Use Existing Courses of Other Military Services" (B-175773, May 23, 1972).

In November 1973 1/ we reported that OSD had not aggressively promoted interservice training and had not assessed the services' efforts to promote interservice training. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense

--insure that all existing and future interservice training opportunities are recognized and acted on,

--continue to require a joint review of training programs and resources, and

--monitor this review closely to see that the respective services continue their cooperative efforts.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated in a response of February 13, 1974, that the Department's role in interservice training was being evaluated and would be put into a directive by May 1974. As of May 1976 such a role had not been established nor had a directive been issued.

Moreover we reported on the potential opportunities for interservice training of helicopter pilots, 2/ fixed-wing pilots and navigators, 3/ and chaplains. 4/ The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have decided to consolidate their advanced navigator training. Also, consolidation of all helicopter pilot training had been planned for October 1, 1976, until the recent congressional action to delay consolidation pending further study.

#### SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review concentrated on how effectively the military services have managed the ITRO program in terms of systematically reaching objective evaluations and implementing feasible consolidations or other improvements in training programs.

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1/"Opportunities for Increased interservice Use of Training Programs and Resources" (B-175773, Nov. 27, 1973).

2/"Need to Assess Potential for Consolidating Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training" (B-157905, May 3, 1974).

3/"Potential for Consolidating Pilot and Navigator Training Programs" (FPCD-75-145, Apr. 11, 1975).

4/"Feasibility of Consolidating Military Chaplain Schools" (FPCD-75-123, July 1, 1975).

At the Department of Defense, at the training headquarters of the military services, and at selected operational organizations of ITRO committee members, we reviewed the policies, practices, and procedures for evaluating potential consolidations or improvements. We examined records, reports, and workpapers relating to ITRO efforts. We did not attempt to verify the costs and saving attributed to potential consolidations or improvements. We also talked with training management officials and with members of ITRO working committees about the merits of the ITRO organizational arrangement.

We selected and reviewed nine ITRO specialized-skill studies, which included construction equipment operator, general automotive, food service, carpentry, masonry, electrician, combat engineering, air traffic control, and weather training. ITRO had previously identified these skill areas as having potential for consolidation.

A list of locations visited during our review is included in appendix I.

## CHAPTER 2

### PROGRAM PROGRESS AND CONTINUING EFFORTS

Since inception of the Interservice Training Review Organization, about 5,400 (nearly all) enlisted, specialized-skill training courses have been reviewed to some extent for possible consolidation. From September 1972 through September 1975, ITRO reported that 163 training courses were reduced to 103 courses for either interservice or collocation of training. Some of these consolidated courses were inactive; the sizes of others ranged from few students to hundreds.

Cumulative savings reported by ITRO since its inception, in August 1972, through June 1976 total about \$5.2 million. Other reported accomplishments of ITRO were exchange of educational literature, exchange of research and studies, combined research projects and studies, and cross use of training aids and devices.

ITRO has no system for evaluating the amount of interservice training resulting from its agreements. Training loads (average number of students in training) are included with other interservice training arrangements which have existed for years. The table below shows the estimated portion of the fiscal year 1977 training load within the Department of Defense that is to be trained by another service, including active reserve components. This understates the amount of interservice training by at least one-half because it fails to show host-service personnel participating in joint courses. Data on total interservice training was not readily available. Comparisons with prior years, including the period before ITRO was formed, could not be made because of changes in accounting for such training.

	<u>Total training loads</u>	<u>Trained by another service</u>	
		<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Army	101,256	2,330	2.3
Air Force	52,949	1,683	3.2
Marine Corps	29,063	5,065	17.4
Navy	<u>68,171</u>	<u>2,141</u>	3.1
Total	<u>251,439</u>	<u>11,219</u>	4.5

EFFORTS TO INCREASE  
INTERSERVICE TRAINING

From September 1972 to September 1973 ITRO attempted to consolidate courses with few students. The saving anticipated through consolidation was not available, so ITRO decided that review of occupational groups would be more productive.

The specialized-skill training courses were placed into 151 occupational specialty subgroups, and a service was selected as proponent for each subgroup. If the preliminary review by the proponent service showed a high degree of course commonality and availability of facilities, the executive committee or steering group approved the formation of a task group to determine the potential for consolidation. Members assigned to the task group were responsible for their regular duties and the task group analyses were additional duties.

In general, the study process by a task group consists of three phases. Phase I includes a cursory survey and screening to determine commonality, facility availability, and equipment compatibility. In phase II the group determines whether individual service training requirements can be met through consolidation or collocation of training, and on the basis of limited cost analysis, if it will be less expensive overall. In phase III the group develops a detailed implementation plan and full cost analysis. Each study phase is approved by the executive committee or steering committee.

All courses to be reviewed

ITRO has planned a review of all the 151 Department of Defense occupational specialty subgroups containing the 5,400 enlisted, specialized-skill courses during the period from July 1975 through June 1978 and has authorized the first complete review of officer training courses. The objective for the first year of the 3-year review cycle was to review one-third of the courses. All courses will be reviewed to insure that all factors have been considered and that reviews include any officer courses that use the same equipment.

ITRO procedures recognize the possible need to accelerate a particular review. A service may recommend that an occupational specialty subgroup or course be examined out of turn if there is evidence that changes have occurred since the earlier review.

But ITRO has not established definitive goals in terms of estimated savings and estimated increases in interservice training loads. In September 1975, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials proposed goals for fiscal year 1976 and requested the services to suggest goals for 1977, but no action was taken by ITRO.

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## CHAPTER 3

### SERVICE PREFERENCES IMPEDE CONSOLIDATIONS

Although Interservice Training Review Organization studies have, in the past, resulted in a number of course consolidations and collocations, its determinations are often unduly influenced by objections raised by one or more of the services. Faced with such objections, ITRO has stopped some of its studies in the early phases.

We reviewed 9 ITRO studies of 75 courses. Of these:

- 4 studies of 24 courses were stopped by service officials.
- 3 studies of 24 courses resulted in partial consolidations by two or more Services. One of the three studies containing nine courses is being reviewed for the fifth time.
- 1 study of 13 courses is being continued by two services.
- 1 study of 14 courses was stopped, according to ITRO, because no single service had the capacity to handle the combined student loads.

The working papers from these studies were retained by members of the task groups. We reviewed the working papers and developed the following examples which illustrate how preferences of the individual services influence ITRO operations.

#### COMBAT ENGINEERING TRAINING

The ITRO task group found commonality between the Marine Corps' combat engineer course at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and the Army's combat engineer course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. But during the study the Commandant of the Marine Corps notified ITRO that this course would not be a candidate for consolidation. Because of the early withdrawal by the Marine Corps, cost data reflecting potential savings by consolidation was not developed.

According to an ITRO official, the Marine Corps had just consolidated with the Army its construction equipment operators training which had been located at Camp Lejeune. Also, two other training programs at Camp Lejeune were being considered for possible consolidation. The Marine Corps' ITRO

task group member said that reasons why the Marines withdrew their support of consolidation were not documented. The Marine Corps' apparent reluctance stemmed from a desire to maintain the mission at Camp Lejeune.

#### BUILDING CONSTRUCTION TRADES TRAINING

In 1974 ITRO reported that building construction trades (i.e., the carpentry, masonry, and electrician skills) had a high potential for interservice training. The Army requirement for fiscal year 1976 called for training 1,445 students in these skills. The reports recommended the training be consolidated at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, because the Air Force had better facilities and climate for the training than the Army and because the Army had no formalized masonry training. Navy training in similar skills was apparently excluded from consideration in these reviews. But, during the indepth studies ITRO stopped further consolidation efforts because

- the Army was studying the restructure of its Enlisted Personnel Management System, which would combine the duties of the carpenter with the mason, the sawyer, and the construction and utilities worker, and

- the changing of the Army's engineer construction battalion to a combat engineer battalion (heavy) would require the construction building trades to perform multiple combat engineering duties;

Review of ITRO records and discussions with Army officials disclosed the following series of events which raise questions about the Army's claim that further consolidation efforts should be stopped because of the enlisted skills study.

- Correspondence between Army officials in October 1974 showed that ITRO officials were pressured by the Army Engineer School not to relinquish training courses at Fort Leonard Wood.

- In November 1974 a high-level Army training official advised the Commandant of the Army Engineer School that the enlisted skill study would not affect the location of the training. But he cautioned that the Army's one-station training concept could preclude consolidation of training at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, because of temporary duty status costs and other dual training costs.



--Army officials at the Army Engineer School said the enlisted skills study should not affect the consolidation of the building construction trades, because most of the combat engineering training would be done in the operational units.

We concluded that the reasons cited by the Army in the ITRO report to justify stopping consolidation effort were inconsistent with other events and motives. Further, the Army's one-station training concept, which combines recruit and skill training at a single installation, is not applicable to all skills but rather is planned for high-density skills. The building and construction trades are not high-density skills and much of this training would be at more than one installation.

#### WEATHER TRAINING

Weather training courses are conducted by the Army, Air Force, and Navy at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois; and Naval Air Technical Training Center, Lakehurst, New Jersey; respectively. The three services' annual training load for the observer, forecaster, and equipment training courses were estimated by an Air Force official at approximately 1,376 students.

ITRO weather task group reviewed weather training four times and began a fifth review early in 1976. The first three reviews concluded that consolidated training was not feasible. The Army did not send representatives to these reviews, but the Air Force reviewed the Army's weather training after an exchange of course documents with the Army and determined a lack of course commonality for consolidation. ITRO also reported that consolidation of Air Force and Navy training was not feasible because courses lacked commonality.

In late 1975 the Army asked ITRO to review one of its weather training courses again. According to an Army official, the Army wanted to consolidate the course which is located at Fort Sill with the Navy or Air Force, so the Army could use the weather facilities for another training mission. The Army and Air Force agreed to consolidate, but the Navy's participation was still under study as of March 1976. The annual saving if only the Army and Air Force consolidate will be about \$167,000.

At the Army's request, the weather task group began a fifth review of other courses in March 1976. The group has tentatively concluded it was feasible and cost effective to consolidate three Navy weather courses with the Air Force. The

estimated annual saving could be about \$1.6 million if consolidated.

An ITRO official told us the main reason the Air Force and Navy weather training is progressing toward consolidation, is that strong proprietary interests exhibited in past studies by the operational commands is not as prevalent. Due to the number of studies conducted by ITRO and large potential savings identified, we believe the Office of the Secretary of Defense should closely monitor this study in order to resolve any impasses.

#### AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TRAINING

Air traffic control training is conducted by the Army, Air Force, and Navy at Fort Rucker, Alabama; Kessler Air Force Base, Mississippi; and the Naval Air Station, Memphis, Tennessee; respectively. The total fiscal year 1976 training requirement is approximately 2,500 students. Course length varies from about 14 weeks for the Navy to 20 weeks for the Air Force.

As part of a plan to realine its shore facilities, the Navy relocated its air traffic control training to the Memphis Naval Air Station, Tennessee, and to the Fleet Combat Support System Training Center, San Diego, California, from Glyco Naval Air Station, Georgia, in 1974. During 1972 when realignment involving several stations was planned, the Navy did not consider the possibility of consolidating training programs of the other services, nor did it do so when ITRO was formed in late 1972. As part of the transfer the Navy spent approximately \$5 million for new training facilities and new equipment at the Memphis Naval Air Station. Installation of the equipment began in September 1975, and the facility was to be operational by September 1976.

Differences between the services in student to instructor ratios, hour of instruction each week, and course length were subsequently disclosed by ITRO studies in 1975. While these matters further polarized the Navy from the Air Force and Army in considering consolidation, the Navy's unilateral decision to relocate its training to Memphis and to modernize its facility discouraged any interservice training options involving the Navy. A key issue in the cost-effectiveness study on consolidating the Navy training with that of the Air Force or the Army was the estimated \$1 million cost to dismantle and relocate the equipment at Memphis. Consolidation with the other services at Memphis was not practical because additional training facilities would have to be built which would further tax support facilities at that station.

Ruling Navy participation out, ITRO has concentrated on options to consolidate or collocate Air Force and Army training. As of January 1976 ITRO was studying the consolidation of these two services at Kessler Air Force Base. Preliminary estimates of saving for this option were \$475,300 annually.

#### GENERAL AUTOMOTIVE TRAINING

The Army's plan for one-station training may reduce some opportunities for interservice training. The ITRO task group determined that Fort Dix, New Jersey, had enough unused facilities to accommodate several interservice training courses such as automotive training. But Fort Dix was eliminated as a potential consolidation location because the Army wanted to close the installation under its one-station training plans. Other Army locations were not considered cost effective since they lacked capacity for Marine Corps' students at one location. Later, the Army determined that Fort Dix would not be closed, but action was not taken to restudy the practicability for consolidation of automotive training there.

## CHAPTER 4

### MORE INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT BY THE

#### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COULD

#### INCREASE INTERSERVICE TRAINING

The Interservice Training Review Organization system for consolidating training requires service consensus; there is no central decisionmaking point. Although the Office of the Secretary of Defense has occasionally intervened in the studies, the interventions generally followed GAO reports on specific consolidation opportunities and interest expressed by the Congress. The interventions have caused ITRO to intensify its studies of certain courses, and in one instance the consolidation planned is expected to save about \$178 million. But OSD has not formally established the required management information system which would enable it to assess ITRO's overall effectiveness.

ITRO was formed by the services with the top management being a review board made up of chiefs of the services' training commands. The Joint Service Regulation for implementing the interservice review program does not authorize ITRO to direct interservice training agreements when one service opposes a proposal. The regulation requires that each service will "consider" the capabilities of the other services in its development of training resources. But each service independently decides on such things as instructional week length, instructor to student ratios, and facility capacity, all of which weigh heavily on the ability to consolidate courses.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs coordinates and integrates training policies and programs within the Department of Defense. But that Office has not acted as a centrally responsible point for interservice training decisions except in instances brought to its attention, often by GAO reports.

OSD can effectively serve this role by making decisions when there are unresolved differences among the services. For example, OSD directed ITRO to intensify its study of helicopter pilot training and established a reporting date. The study showed that interservice training would be cost effective but contained no recommendations on consolidation. The Navy objected to the consolidation claiming that certain of the Navy's peculiar needs would not be met. OSD, after considering ITRO's findings and the Navy's objections, directed the consolidation of all helicopter pilot training.

The saving from this action is expected to total \$178 million during the first 5 years after consolidation; however, the Congress has delayed implementation pending a further study.

Recently, OSD initiated through ITRO the development of a combined Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act training program. This is a pilot action involving ITRO for the first time in developing new training programs on a consolidated basis. OSD staff members have actively participated in this ITRO effort.

Although OSD has exercised management authority and participated in ITRO activities in certain instances, it has thus far not promulgated a system for effectively monitoring or participating in overall ITRO activities. OSD receives an annual report showing the number of conducted studies, consolidated courses, and estimated saving. But the report does not show

--the results of all individual studies which could alert OSD officials to instances where intervention is needed and

--the overall increase of interservice training from ITRO activities.

The only comprehensive data provided OSD on intraservice and interservice training loads are the services' reports on military manpower training. These reports do not show how much of the interservice training load is attributable to ITRO activities and how much results from prior agreements among the services. Moreover, each of the services had its own method for determining training loads, and the Navy changed its method for fiscal year 1977. Although the change almost doubled the reported interservice training for specialized skills compared with prior years, the Navy did not show how the change affected the reported training.

The need for a centrally responsible decision point within OSD was also supported in an April 1976 report of the Defense Manpower Commission. The Commission reported to the President and the Congress that the effectiveness of ITRO has been reduced because all services must agree to a change and a decision point is needed. The Commission recommended that a function within OSD be charged with review of the ITRO program to insure the effectiveness of the training and education programs.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Opportunities for increased interservice training are not being fully explored because of (1) individual service preferences which tend to impede operations and decisionmaking of the Interservice Training Review Organization and (2) the absence of a responsible role for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We believe that such a role for OSD would surface the merits of consolidations, collocations, or other improvements and would permit more timely and important decisions by the Secretary of Defense.

ITRO studies need to disclose all pertinent information affecting the various consolidation efforts. Such studies should be timely and dynamic, to encourage improvement whenever the assumptions underlying the studies change. If the services disagree, the unresolved issues should be promptly submitted for resolution by OSD. Otherwise, the most effective consolidations may not be made or limited consideration may preclude full development of a case for consolidation. The studies involving combat engineer, building construction trade, and automotive training definitely should be considered for review.

We believe the management of ITRO needs an overall measurement of ITRO progress to evaluate performance on the basis of changes in interservice training loads. The data included in the military manpower training reports shows neither how much of the interservice training load is attributable to ITRO activities nor the host service's personnel attending such training. Also, changes in accounting method, such as that by the Navy, render comparisons between years inaccurate.

We believe annual ITRO reports depicting program progress and accomplishments should provide an assessment of accomplishment compared to plans. Studies of occupational specialty groups should be inclusive, and reasons should be provided for not consolidating specific courses. Moreover, the report should show overall increases in interservice training resulting from ITRO activities.

OSD and the services may have forgone opportunities for interservice consolidations during base closures and functional realignments. We believe OSD needs to institute procedures which will assure that, when major realignments of training functions are planned, interservice training opportunities are fully evaluated.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense expand the management role of the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to include oversight authority and responsibility for ITRO. This oversight role should include:

- Establishing a responsible focal point to provide program overview to insure maximum cooperation among the services and to direct ITRO to initiate or accelerate studies of high potential consolidation.
- Directing warranted consolidations not being made by ITRO.
- Developing improved reporting practices to show how much ITRO has increased the interservice portion of the total training load.

We also recommend that the Secretary reemphasize to the services the need to consider existing facilities of other services when new training facilities are required. As part of this process, the services should be required to include the results of such considerations in their justification for new training facilities.

LOCATIONS VISITED

## OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower  
and Reserve Affairs), Washington, D.C.

## DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY:

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (Training Division),  
Washington, D.C.  
Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia  
Army Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE:

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (Training Programs  
Division), Washington, D.C.  
Headquarters, Air Training Command, Randolph Air Force  
Base, Texas

## DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY:

Office of Director, Naval Education and Training Com-  
mand (Plans and Policy Division), Washington, D.C.  
Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (Education and  
Training Command), Bethesda, Maryland  
Headquarters, Marine Corps Training and Education  
Division, Washington, D.C.  
Headquarters, Naval Facilities Engineering Command  
(Military Personnel Office), Washington, D.C.  
Chief of Naval Education and Training,  
Pensacola, Florida  
Chief of Naval Technical Training,  
Memphis, Tennessee