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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS  
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

MAR 8 1976

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED STATES




# Improving The Effectiveness And Efficiency Of Recruiting

Department of Defense *AGC00005*

Recruiting costs increased from \$430 million in the last year of the draft to \$508.1 million during the first year of the all-volunteer force. This report discusses the lack of central control for monitoring quality control, recruiter malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment. As a result, unqualified recruits slip through the enlistment process, fail during training, and receive early discharges, unnecessarily increasing recruiting costs.

The Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations are best suited to perform quality controls over mental and medical examinations, moral fitness, and enlistment paperwork. They have been precluded from independently monitoring these functions because of subordination to recruiting services, fragmented and incomplete procedural controls, noncompatible recruiting boundaries, and service administered mental examinations. The Department of Defense has taken and is taking action to correct these problems.





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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

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
To the President of the Senate and the  
Speaker of the House of Representatives

We have reviewed the military services' recruiting activities for the All-Volunteer Force. This report, which is one of four, discusses the procedural controls over the enlistment process, management of the recruiting forces, and adequacy of program evaluation.

In addition, GAO has prepared three other reports:  
(1) "An Assessment of All-Volunteer Force Recruits,"  
(2) "Advertising for Military Recruiting: How Effective Is It?" and (3) "Overview of Military Recruiting Activities." These reports will be issued under separate covers.

We have made our study pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

  
Comptroller General  
of the United States



C o n t e n t s

	<u>Page</u>
DIGEST	i
CHAPTER	1
1 INTRODUCTION	
All-Volunteer Force concept and first-year results	1
Scope of review	3
2 BETTER CONTROLS OVER THE ENLISTMENT PROCESS NEEDED	4
Change in AFEES operations in an AVF environment	6
Managing quality control functions	6
Subordination to the recruiting services	7
Fragmented and incomplete procedural controls	9
Medical	10
Mental	13
Moral	14
Noncompatible recruiting service boundaries	15
Service-administered mental examinations	15
Inefficiencies affect AFEES performance and costs	16
Distorted AFEES standards	16
Monthend enlistment quotas	20
Service-administered mental examinations	20
Varying service-imposed paperwork requirements	20
Double contract processing	21
Efforts to improve AFEES operations	22
Conclusions	22
Recommendations	22
DOD comments and planned actions	23
3 RECRUITER FORCE MANAGEMENT	25
Improvements in recruiting during AVF	25
Nonrecruiting personnel	27
Control over recruiter assistant and canvasser programs	32
Effectiveness of recruiter assistant and canvasser programs	34

CHAPTER		<u>Page</u>
	Congressional concern over recruit- ing costs	35
	Conclusions	35
	Recommendations	35
	DOD comments and planned actions	36
4	PROGRAM EVALUATION	37
	Evaluation performed by DOD and the recruiting services	37
	Data base expansion and improvement needed	39
	Overall plan needed for program evalua- tion	43
	Conclusions	44
	Recommendations	44
	DOD comments and planned actions	44

#### APPENDIX

I	Principal officials responsible for adminis- tering activities discussed in this report	46
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#### ABBREVIATIONS

AFEES	Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations
AVF	All-Volunteer Force
DOD	Department of Defense
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GAO	General Accounting Office
GED	General Educational Development
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
USAREC	United States Army Recruiting Command

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S  
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS  
AND EFFICIENCY OF RECRUITING  
Department of Defense

*The Military Services under  
Shelter of the draft had 3 years to design and  
organize resources to recruit an  
All-Volunteer Force (AVF)*

D I G E S T  
Recruiting costs increased from \$430 million during the last year of the draft, fiscal year 1973, to \$508.1 million during the first year of the All-Volunteer Force, fiscal year 1974. Second year budgeted, costs rose to \$511.3 million.

↓ Although all services except the Air Force encountered initial problems recruiting in a nondraft environment, the Department of Defense has essentially met the services' strength goals without any appreciable drop in quality in fiscal year 1974, the first full year of operation under the all-volunteer force concept. Recruiting successes were even better in fiscal year 1975, but were probably helped by depressed economic conditions.

*F/C* ~~There~~ is no central focus for monitoring quality control, recruiter malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment. *all of* As a result, many unqualified recruits slip through the enlistment process, fail during training, and receive early discharges. Forty-one thousand early discharges during fiscal year 1974 for conditions which were potentially identifiable before enlistment cost the services about \$70 million.

Although many of these conditions are difficult, if not impossible, to detect during preenlistment screening, each 1-percent reduction can save \$700,000. (See pp. 4 to 6.) All the services recognize the damage such practices can cause and have worked hard to prevent them. However, the principal thrust of their efforts have been after the fact, that is, identifying those instances that do occur and attempting to relate them back to the recruiter.

The Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations are best suited to perform quality control over mental and medical examinations, moral fitness, and enlistment paperwork. They have been precluded from independently monitoring these functions because of subordination to the recruiting services, fragmented and incomplete procedural controls, noncompatible recruiting boundaries, and service-administered mental examinations. (See pp. 6 to 12.)

- √ Inefficiencies caused by distorted workload standards, monthly enlistment quota systems, varying service-imposed paperwork requirements, and double contract processing of individuals who delay entry into the military also wasted valuable time and increased examining station costs. (See pp. 16 to 21.)
- √ GAO estimated that standardizing paperwork and eliminating double contract processing could save \$1.2 million annually.

The Department of Defense and the Joint Service Task Force have acted to develop a standard enlistment application and an enlistment agreement which would allow all possible enlistment transactions to be completed on one form and would revise examining station workload standards and adjust staffing levels. (See p. 24.)

The Defense Department has issued instructions to the services that require a single mental test for all the services to be given under the control of the examining stations.

- √ In addition, GAO reviewed the management of the services' recruiter forces. Since 1971, Defense has increased recruiter staff-years by 3,800 and the services have made numerous changes to increase recruiter effectiveness. The services used increased effectiveness to eliminate enlistment incentives and end 2-year enlistments instead of reducing recruiter force size. GAO believes force size can be reduced at least 10 percent at a \$16 million annual savings. Congress decreased the military personnel recruiting budget request for fiscal year 1976 by about 9 percent. (See pp. 25 and 27.)



↘ Each service used nonrecruiting personnel to help recruiters locate prospects. Army studies show that nonrecruiting personnel productivity is higher than that of additional recruiters. None of the services, however, have conducted controlled field testing to explore the potential for using nonrecruiting personnel to reduce recruiter force size. (See pp. 33 to 35.)

GAO learned numerous organizations, military and contractor, evaluate recruiting programs. The Defense Department and the services perform or contract for evaluations independently. The Department of Defense has not given the services an overall plan specifying programs to evaluate and methods to use. As a result, programs GAO examined had not been evaluated; received limited, inconclusive evaluation; or were evaluated by more than one service. (See pp. 37 to 44.)

The Department of Defense has been precluded from making many interservice comparisons in its evaluations because the information received from the services was not uniform, parallel data was difficult to obtain, program costs were not always compiled, and recruiting boundaries are not uniform. (See pp. 37 to 44.)

*Rec.*

→ To help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of recruiting, GAO recommends among other things that the Secretary of Defense:

- Remove the examining stations from operational control of the recruiting organizations.
- Eliminate those factors precluding the examining stations from independently monitoring quality, malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment.
- Adjust staffing levels between the examining stations and recruiting services to give the examining stations the resources to perform quality control and monitoring functions.

- Insure that the examining stations assess reliability of revised workload standards.
- Insure that the recruiting services change the system of monthend enlistment quotas; establish common boundaries and a common entrance examination; and adhere to timetables to standardize enlistment paperwork and eliminate double processing of personnel who delay entry into the service.
- Adjust recruiting force levels.
- Establish uniform procedures to monitor recruiting results and assess recruiting force needs.

Department of Defense officials' responses to GAO's recommendations are as follow:


- The examining stations will be removed from operational control of the recruiting organizations in July 1976.
- Elimination of those factors precluding the examining stations from independently monitoring quality, malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment. However, final decisions on enlistment should be left up to the services.
- Staffing levels will not be adjusted. (See p. 24.)
- An industrial management survey will evaluate the examining stations' capacities and precise workload.
- Agreed to change the system of monthend enlistment quotas.
- Many actions, including the reorganization of the examining stations management structure, were considered necessary before pursuing the issue of compatible boundaries. Mental testing for the examining stations was centralized January 1, 1976.

--Elimination of double processing of personnel under the delayed-entry program has not been completely resolved.

--The Defense Department does not agree that recruiter force levels need to be adjusted. (See p. 36.)

Recruiter assistants are effective in helping the services meet special recruiting objectives or seasonal differences.

While agreeing with Defense's actions, GAO believes that the Department of Defense and the services need to determine the optimum mix of recruiter force and recruiter aides. As far as GAO could tell, neither the Defense Department nor the services know what the optimum mix is.



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE CONCEPT AND FIRST-YEAR RESULTS

↘ The military services, under shelter of the draft, had 3 years to design and organize their resources to recruit an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). In October 1970 the Secretary of Defense set July 1973 as the target for ending the draft. To help meet this objective, the Congress increased military pay and allowances and authorized various bonuses. To ease the transition the services initiated several programs, such as selectively replacing military personnel with civilians, recruiting more women, and reducing irritants associated with military life.

The Congress, the Department of Defense (DOD), the individual services, scholars, the news media, and GAO have made many studies of the AVF. In a May 1973 report, 1/ we assessed the practicality and cost of meeting quantitative and qualitative military manpower objectives during the initial year of the AVF. The report provided alternatives to assist the services in meeting their requirements.

The true test of the services' ability to recruit volunteers came when induction authority expired on June 30, 1973. During the AVF's first year, the military met a tremendous challenge. Both the Navy and Air Force met or exceeded their recruiting goals, while the Marine Corps and Army fell slightly short. Fiscal year 1975 results were even better, as all four services had waiting lists of qualified volunteers. For fiscal year 1976, as of October 1975, the services are continuing to meet their goals.

The services' efforts to improve recruiting and training efficiency have also increased the use of delayed enlistment programs. Under these programs, applicants enlist in a reserve component for entry into active duty at a later date. The entry date is scheduled so that the applicant can enter initial skill training immediately after basic training, which would eliminate the need for retaining the individual in an unassigned status between the completion of basic training and the start of initial skill training.

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1/"Problems in Meeting Military Manpower Needs in the All-Volunteer Force" (B-177952).

Recruiting success in a nondraft environment is costly. The services recruited 470,000 volunteers during fiscal year 1974 at a cost of \$508.1 million and budgeted \$511.3 million to recruit 472,000 volunteers during fiscal year 1975. In comparison, 523,000 men and women entered the military during fiscal year 1973, the last draft year, at a cost of \$429.5 million, as shown in the following table.

	FY 1973 (note a)		FY 1974		FY 1975 (note b)	
	Recruits (note c)	Cost (millions)	Recruits (note c)	Cost (millions)	Recruits (note c)	Cost (millions)
Army	a/223,000	\$203.6	199,000	\$235.8	219,000	\$278.8
Navy	d/137,000	d/110.1	d/88,000	d/134.9	d/122,000	d/118.1
Marine Corps	60,000	49.5	50,000	62.5	53,000	46.5
Air Force	<u>103,000</u>	<u>66.3</u>	<u>75,000</u>	<u>74.9</u>	<u>78,000</u>	<u>67.9</u>
Total	<u>523,000</u>	<u>\$429.5</u>	<u>412,000</u>	<u>\$508.1</u>	<u>472,000</u>	<u>\$511.3</u>

a/Includes Army inductees.

b/Budgeted accessions and costs.

c/A detailed breakout of costs by service can be found in appendix I.

d/Includes Navy reservists, officers, and merchant marine personnel.

During the early years of the AVF, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps had trouble meeting recruiting objectives. These objectives were based on the number of volunteers needed to achieve personnel strengths and were passed down to individual recruiters or recruiting stations. A combination of early shortfalls and individual or station quotas put tremendous pressure on recruiters to meet quantitative objectives. Later successes enabled the services to emphasize qualitative as well as quantitative requirements. Because the number of volunteers has increased, the services have been more selective. About 66 percent of the enlistees during fiscal year 1974 were high school graduates, exceeding the congressionally imposed minimum by 11 percent. One service was not able to meet the quality goals set by the Congress. Ninety-two percent of the enlistees were in the top three mental categories.

Many of the early recruiting problems encountered in the first year of the AVF have been either corrected or are under study. Recruiting success during fiscal year 1975 and

early 1976 appears to have stemmed from improved recruiting operations and prevailing economic conditions. This report assesses recruiting progress to date and identifies the measures needed to enable DOD and the services to more effectively manage recruiting programs.

#### SCOPE OF REVIEW

We examined the policies, procedures, and practices used by DOD and the four services to recruit volunteers for the military. Our fieldwork was completed in February 1975. We reviewed records and interviewed officials at DOD, the 3 military departments, each service's recruiting headquarters, 53 intermediate recruiting commands, 8 Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES), and 5 reception centers. We interviewed 178 recruiters and interviewed or sent questionnaires to about 1,000 enlistees representing all 4 services.

Our study evaluated procedural controls over the enlistment processes. The main points covered were

- controls over quality, recruiter malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment;
- operation of the AFEES;
- management of the recruiting forces;
- adequacy of the services' program evaluation;
- management of advertising and research programs; and
- quantity and quality of military enlistees.

We have reviewed aspects of the services' recruiting efforts in connection with the AVF. Also, Senators James Abourezk and George McGovern asked us to look into certain recruiting improprieties. Due to the complexity of the review we have prepared four reports, as follows: (1) "Overview of Military Recruiting Activities" (FPCD-75-171), (2) "An Assessment of All-Volunteer Force Recruits" (FPCD-75-170), (3) "Advertising for Military Recruiting: How Effective Is It?" (FPCD-75-168), and (4) this report.

## CHAPTER 2

### BETTER CONTROLS OVER

#### THE ENLISTMENT PROCESS NEEDED

Since the AVF began, allegations have been made about improprieties in recruiting activities. These allegations range from giving assistance to recruits to out-and-out forging of documents, such as high school diplomas. The services have taken these allegations seriously. Each service investigates allegations, but the Army makes the most intensive effort to check out each one. Recruiters have been disciplined, a few severely, but most allegations are impossible to prove or disprove since they involve conflicting statements by the recruit and the recruiter on what was said or done. The whole process, however, centers on the integrity of the recruiter, which we believe is unfair to him.

The AVF's success depends largely on the recruiters' effectiveness. Their role is to meet quotas by recruiting personnel that meet predetermined quality standards or by obtaining official waivers from these standards when warranted. The recruiters, therefore, are under great pressure, and they feel their careers depend on meeting quotas month after month.

Recruiters also play an important role in determining whether a recruit is eligible to enlist. These two roles-- finding and recruiting personnel and determining eligibility-- often conflict, and recruiters tend to emphasize obtaining the recruit rather than thoroughly checking his qualifications.

AFEES, which could act as an independent check on the recruit's qualifications, have emphasized examining and processing recruits into the military--so the independent check is missing. We believe that, as a result, a considerable number of recruits who do not meet the recruiting standards are completing the enlistment process.

We believe the absence of independent monitoring over quality, malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment substantially increases the AVF's cost and endangers its image. Recruits not meeting standards often fail early in the training process, receive early discharges, and must be replaced. Our limited tests showed

--a substantial percentage of recruits interviewed claimed to have been improperly helped through AFEES processing by recruiters.



--a significant increase in the percentage of recruits falling in the lowest mental category resulted after retesting at reception centers, and

--a considerable number of recruits had disqualifying medical conditions or police records which were not uncovered at the time of enlistment.

More emphasis is needed on preenlistment screening. Although the degree of these conditions varied among the services, at least some evidence of them was found in all services. Collectively they indicate the continued seriousness of existing problems and the need to strengthen AFEES examining and processing operations.

Early discharges, allegations of improprieties, and procedural inefficiencies significantly affect costs and image. Forty-one thousand early discharges during fiscal year 1974 for conditions which might have been identified before enlistment cost the services about \$70 million. Although many of these conditions are difficult, if not impossible, to detect during AFEES preenlistment screening, each 1-percent reduction could save \$700,000. During the same year the military spent \$100 million on advertising to sell its product and improve its image. Adverse publicity created by early discharges and numerous media references to recruiting improprieties erode that effort. Procedural inefficiencies, such as using non-standard contract data and forms and double processing of individuals who delay their entry into the service, accounted for \$1.2 million of the AFEES \$37 million fiscal year 1974 operating budget.

The services recognize the damage such practices can cause and have worked hard to prevent them. However, the principal thrust of their efforts has occurred after the fact, that is, identifying those instances that do occur and attempting to relate them back to the recruiter.

In commenting on our report, DOD generally agreed with the need to improve the independence of and quality controls at the AFEES. It informed us that it was making changes in AFEES operations and that a single mental test for all the services would be given under AFEES control, effective January 1, 1976. DOD officials also provided us with plans for other actions to conform to our recommendations.

The AFEES are a service organization that provides quality control for the services, but final decisions on quality control and enlistment are made by the services. DOD did not agree that the number of AFEES personnel should be increased because it has an industrial management survey of

workload structure that is underway. Details of DOD actions are noted in the appropriate sections of this chapter.

#### CHANGE IN AFEES OPERATIONS IN AN AVF ENVIRONMENT

DOD established the AFEES in 1965 as joint service facilities. The Army, which was designated executive agent, assigned operational control to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC).

The AFEES' purposes, during the draft and during AVF, were to (1) ascertain the mental and medical eligibility of all enlistees and selective service registrants, (2) determine the moral eligibility of registrants, and (3) process those individuals found acceptable according to the individual services' standards into the service. AFEES also performed much of the quality control over enlistment paperwork. The AFEES quality control procedures are guided by the standards established and provided to them by the four services. In the AVF, the AFEES' purposes were not being carried out. AFEES no longer induct registrants into the military, determine mental eligibility for Navy and Air Force applicants, or perform quality control over enlistment paperwork.

The number of medical examinations given to nonprior-service males during fiscal year 1974 was 617,000--a 40-percent reduction from the preceding year. Of the nonprior-service males examined, 353,700 enlisted into the active forces, 180,300 were medically rejected, and 85,400 were medically accepted but did not enlist. In addition, 59,200 females and males with prior service enlisted in the Active Forces. Statistics on the total number of females and prior-service males medically examined and on the total number of mental examinations given were not available.

Because of the reduced workload, the Army, under congressional pressure, reduced AFEES staffing by about 650 positions. These figures subsequently proved to be incomplete because they did not reflect the total workload and administrative matters which were added.

#### MANAGING QUALITY CONTROL FUNCTIONS

The regulations governing the quality of enlistments are provided for in Title 10, United States Code, in loosely worded terms. DOD regulations refine these standards and convey them to the services. Each service refines and implements these standards to meet individual service needs. The AFEES quality control procedures are guided by the standards established and provided to them by the four services.

Individuals processed for enlistment through the AFEES are matched against the appropriate service quality standards. The service may, if it desires, waive any applicant provided the waiver does not violate established regulations.

The AFEES performs as a supporting agency to the recruiter. The AFEES provides service in terms of physical examinations, mental testing, and a review of the data supplied by the recruiter or elicited from the individual regarding his moral character. The AFEES then provides the services with its findings so that appropriate decisions concerning an applicant's enlistment can be made.

The AFEES, because they do not have a recruiting mission, are better suited than the recruiting services to perform quality control over mental and medical examinations, moral fitness, and enlistment paperwork. Subordination to the recruiting services, fragmented and incomplete procedural controls, noncompatible recruiting service boundaries, service-administered mental examinations, and operational inefficiencies have precluded the AFEES from acting as a central, independent monitoring agent. These problems have probably resulted in a considerable number of recruits entering the military services who do not meet recruiting standards.


Recruiting standards are designed to identify and exclude potential recruits who for physical, mental, or moral reasons are likely to fail military training. At the 5 training centers we visited, more than 19,000 recruits (about 10 percent) were discharged during the first 60 days of training during fiscal year 1974, and, according to DOD statistics, more than 41,000 were discharged within 6 months during the same year. No one knows how many recruits enter the service who do not meet recruiting standards, much less the number of those who subsequently receive early discharges. However our tests indicate it is likely to be significant.

All the services appear to be vigorously pursuing programs for discharging unsatisfactory recruits, although the Marine Corps has at times limited the number of recruits that could be discharged so it could meet its end strength goals. The limitation was modified in 1973 and lifted in August 1975. However, some recruits who never would have gotten in if the recruiting standards had been enforced are being discharged. We believe this problem is costing the services a substantial sum.

#### Subordination to the recruiting services

Although the AFEES are joint service facilities, they are subordinate to the recruiting services. They receive

and must follow numerous special instructions from the four recruiting headquarters. The AFEES' immediate superiors, as shown in the following chart, are the U.S. Army Regional Recruiting Commands, which are strictly Army recruiting organizations.



USAREC's Production Management Directorate supervises the AFEES' operational procedures. It monitors AFEES processing, the Army Command Moral Waiver Program, the flow of recruits to reception stations, and the use of mental tests. The USAREC Surgeon provides technical supervision and advice to the AFEES Chief Medical Officer. This duty includes evaluating the professional qualifications of civilian physicians applying for employment with AFEES and reviewing specialty consultations performed by civilian physicians. In addition, the Medical Division reviews medical waiver requests and the medical records of individuals separated for physical conditions which existed before entering the service.

USAREC and the recruiting services coordinate to solve common AFEES problems. USAREC conducts joint service conferences and makes liaison visits to AFEES, reception stations, and recruiting service organizations.

Except for insuring medical eligibility for all applicants and mental eligibility for Army and Marine Corps applicants, AFEES quality control procedures are restricted to their own activities. Procedures used by the AFEES to monitor their operations vary but include such methods as having the applicants complete questionnaires on the quality of service, personal observations by the commander, and close liaison with reception stations. Other methods include monitoring discharge rates for medical conditions which existed before entry into the service as well as the number of complaints and congressional inquiries received.

We were told that before the reduced staffing the AFEES verified data on the enlistment contract. Because of increases in quality standards, increased workload, and congressional mandate requirements, the error rate in contract data has increased. Our review showed for applicants processed through the Oakland AFEES, the error rate increased from 0.5 percent to 8 percent, and in the San Antonio AFEES the rate increased from 2 percent to 5.5 percent. Some errors may result in early discharges for breach of contract.

#### Fragmented and incomplete procedural controls

Procedural controls for monitoring quality, malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment are divided between the recruiting services and their basic training reception centers. The services approach these problems differently and have not coordinated their efforts. As a result, each service has varying degrees of control over these problems, and controls are not uniform or complete.

The Army is the only service which requires that AFEES personnel conduct one-on-one interviews with every applicant. The other services warn enlistees of the effects of fraudulent statements during group counseling. At the AFEES visited, we interviewed 104 enlistees representing all 4 services. Only one enlistee said he received help or was coached on methods for qualifying on the mental and physical examinations. The enlistees' comments contrasted sharply with the ones made by recruits at training centers and in response to our questionnaire. (See pp. 10 and 11.) We believe the comments by recruits at the AFEES indicate the one-on-one interview alone is not an effective technique for identifying recruiter malpractice or fraudulent enlistment. According to a USAREC official, the interview is effective for insuring that contract terms are understood but not for identifying irregularities.

Most of the emphasis is on detection after enlistment. For example, the Army monitors low-producing stations which suddenly become high producing, the Navy and Marine Corps attempt to correlate various test scores, and the Air Force compares preenlistment qualifications with post enlistment performance.

Many enlistees are discharged during initial basic training for medical and behavioral problems, fraudulent or erroneous enlistment, dependency, inaptitude, underage, and juvenile offenses. At the five basic training centers we visited, 10.5 percent of the enlistees received during fiscal year 1974 were discharged, as shown by the following table.

	FY 1974		
	<u>Number of enlistees</u>	<u>Number discharged</u>	<u>Percent discharged</u>
U.S. Army Training Center, Fort Jackson, S.C.	38,938	6,062	15.6
U.S. Army Training Center, Fort Polk, La.	32,945	2,905	8.8
Naval Training Center, Orlando, Fla.	26,380	2,474	9.4
Air Force Processing Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Tex.	66,040	4,735	7.2
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, S.C.	<u>23,161</u>	<u>3,465</u>	15.0
Total	<u>187,464</u>	<u>19,641</u>	10.5

The services use different categories to report early discharges, so we could not compare discharges by type.

#### Medical

A considerable number of recruits are given early discharges for medical reasons, as shown by the following table.

	FY 1974		
	<u>Number discharged</u>	<u>Number medically discharged</u>	<u>Percent medically discharged</u>
U.S Army Training Center, Fort Jackson, S.C.	6,062	1,643	27.1
U.S. Army Training Center, Fort Polk, La.	2,905	a/615	21.2
Naval Training Center, Orlando, Fla.	2,474	440	17.8
Air Force Processing Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Tex.	4,735	1,046	22.1
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, S.C.	<u>3,465</u>	<u>986</u>	28.5
Total	<u>19,641</u>	<u>4,730</u>	24.1

a/Estimated.

Professional training center personnel estimated that 80 to 90 percent of the medical problems existed before service entry and many should have been detected. AFEES professionals, on the other hand, disagree. We interviewed about 250 recruits at training centers. We asked them if they had disclosed their medical problems when they were recruited, and some said they had not. All had been examined in groups, and our attempts to find out what kind of physicals they received were inconclusive. Their estimates of how long the physicals took ranged from 30 minutes to 5 hours.

In comparison, USAREC's analysis of medical records shows that 7 percent of the medical conditions which result in discharges existing before service should have been detected by the AFEES. Reasons for not detecting more disqualifying conditions were:

- Some conditions require an observation period or the stress of basic training to be detected.
- Some conditions are detected only by costly detailed examinations whereas the AFEES' examination is a screening process.
- Some applicants conceal or distort their medical histories.

--AFEES medical officers are general medical doctors who do not have the specialized skills found at training centers.

USAREC's analysis, however, is incomplete. First, USAREC does not always receive records on individuals discharged for medical reasons. Second, it often cannot evaluate medical discharges because the records received are incomplete.

Training center officials believe many conditions leading to medical discharges can be identified before enlistment. They also agree that more thorough preenlistment screening on all aspects of a recruit's qualifications is needed. Our limited enlistee interviews and records tests emphasized that need. For example:

- Twenty percent of the 264 enlistees interviewed at training centers admitted to making 1 or more fraudulent statement. In another test 5 of 25 Marine Corps recruits fraudulently claimed they had high school diplomas.
- Twenty-eight percent of the 851 "marginal performers" (mental category IV and non-high school graduates) who responded to our questionnaire said they received assistance in taking the mental examination or were advised to omit derogatory data when completing enlistment forms.
- Three percent of Navy recruits and 8 percent of Marine Corps recruits are in mental category IV according to enlistment statistics. Fifty percent of the Navy recruits of the Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida, are retested, and 15 to 20 percent are mental category IV. The Parris Island Marine Corps Recruit Depot retests all recruits, and 37 percent are mental category IV or V.
- Thirty-five percent of enlistees at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, read below the seventh grade level.
- Two percent of Army enlistees receive police record waivers. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) statistics show over 9 percent have police records.

Because our tests were limited, the results cannot be used to make projections for all enlistees. Although we recognize the possibility that the recruits interviewed may have made false statements to us, we believe our tests indicate the seriousness of existing problems and the need to strengthen AFEES examining, processing, and screening.



We believe that there is potential for reducing medical discharges by increasing the quality of the medical examination and that this should at least be tested at selected AFEES. While this probably would increase AFEES costs, if it significantly reduced the number of recruits discharged for medical reasons it would be more than worthwhile and cost effective.

DOD informed us that although the number of enlistees discharged for medical reasons accounted for 24.1 percent of the discharges, they represented only 2.5 percent of the total enlisted. We were also told that complicating the AFEES medical problem is the fact that the standards are different for all the services. In some cases tests are different and waiver policies are different.

### Mental

The standards for this category are the level of education and mental category rating. The services prefer but do not require high school graduates. They also prefer personnel from mental category III or above but accept some from mental category IV. The measure of scholastic attainment is the high school record or general educational development (GED) test. The applicants also take a test to determine their mental capability as well as aptitude.

Most of the problem in this category centers around the mental test. Each service generally uses its own test. The Air Force and Navy do not give the test at AFEES. Thus a youth eligible for one service cannot get into another without taking another test. When retests are given, different tests are often used. Both our work at AFEES and interviews with recruits convince us that the tests can be compromised in various ways and that cheating does occur.

The Marine Corps retested essentially all its recruits. The Navy retested about half the recruits at one training center we visited. Both used different tests and are continuing the testing programs during 1975. Both the Marine Corps and the Navy showed substantial increases in category IV personnel on retests, but none of this data is being reported back to the AFEES. The Army has a program for spot retesting at training centers, using the same test, and the results are reported back to the AFEES. At our request, the Army retested about 500 recruits at training stations. This data showed both increases and decreases but an overall increase in category IV personnel. The Army uses a standard of a change of 20 points as being significant, although it does not conclude that this necessarily means the test was compromised. (A Navy official said a change of 10 points probably meant it

was compromised.) Of the 500 plus the Army tested, 21 changed 20 points or more--all of them downward. A small test (85 recruits) made for us by the Air Force also showed increases and decreases. However, 7 changed more than 20 points and all these were downward.

These results cast doubt on the accuracy of the mental category statistics now being reported by DOD. A single test should be given at the AFEES for all services under circumstances that make compromising it difficult or impossible. We are told that there are ways this can be accomplished.

When we brought this matter to DOD's attention, it reacted immediately with a directive to the services specifying a common test to be given at the AFEES for all the services. It also is exploring ways to prevent the test from being compromised.

We did not make any serious attempt to verify high school records. AFEES are not verifying records either, although they once did. In one small test we found evidence the GED certificate may be a problem. We believe that, at least on a sample basis, AFEES should independently verify high school and GED records.

### Moral

The principal evidence of moral character results from police checks. Police checks are admittedly a problem because of concern over invasion of privacy. Nevertheless, we believe that there is a lack of information which might help improve the system. For instance, the only place we could find any overall statistics on the number of recruits entering the service that had police records was the FBI. Only the Air Force keeps records showing how many Defense Investigative Service checks show derogatory data and what is done about it. The services do give waivers for some offenses, but only the Army records how many waivers are given. Army records showed about 2 percent received waivers, but FBI records showed about 10 percent had police records. Since both the waiver statistics and FBI statistics included both minor and major offenses, we believe the data is comparable. No one knows what happened to the additional 8 percent. Some recruits told us that they did not disclose police records.

We believe that a better system for gathering and comparing data on waivers versus derogatory data subsequently disclosed and on what was done about these cases would give the services some evidence of how serious the problem is

and whether the AFEES would find it worthwhile to make additional attempts to determine the existence of police records.

#### Noncompatible recruiting service boundaries

Geographic boundaries governing the sending of volunteers to AFEES are not the same for all recruiting services. As a result, efforts to detect instances when applicants, disqualified at one AFEES, try to qualify at another are hindered.

In 1968 the Army requested that the other services conform their recruiting boundaries to the AFEES boundaries. Five years later an interservice audit group reported that the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force had not complied and recommended that DOD assure that the services comply. DOD replied that the necessary action was underway. However, as of January 1976, boundaries were still not compatible.

DOD informed us that it has taken a variety of actions to improve overall effectiveness of AFEES operations. Many of the actions, including the reorganization of the AFEES management structure, were considered necessary milestones before pursuing the issue of compatible boundaries. Now that these actions have been taken, DOD intends to ask the new AFEES organization to pursue this matter at the earliest practical date.

#### Service-administered mental examinations

Independent administration of different mental entrance examinations contributes to operating inefficiencies at the AFEES, increases recruiting costs, and weakens control over malpractice and fraudulent enlistment.

In 1973 the Air Force and Navy assumed responsibility for conducting their own mental examinations. Air Force applicants are tested by nonrecruiting personnel assigned to recruiting stations, and Navy applicants are tested by their recruiters. In addition, about 50 percent of the Navy applicants are retested before enlistment by personnel assigned to Navy recruiting districts. The balance are retested after reporting to a Naval Training Center.

The Navy has resisted a recent attempt to return mental testing to the AFEES even though this action might reduce discharges caused by the failure of enlistees to meet minimum mental requirements after enlistment. For example, 10.5 percent of the 2,474 discharges given by the Naval Training Center at Orlando, Florida, during fiscal

year 1974, were to enlistees who failed the second test. Entrance examinations administered by the AFEES might prevent some of those enlistments.

DOD informed us that effective January 1, 1976, centralized management of all mental testing will be handled by AFEES.

#### INEFFICIENCIES AFFECT AFEES PERFORMANCE AND COSTS


Inefficiencies caused by distorted standards, monthly enlistment quota systems, service-administered mental testing, varying service-imposed paperwork requirements, and double processing of individuals who delay their entry into the service waste valuable manpower resources. These inefficiencies not only comprise one factor precluding AFEES from monitoring quality, malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment, but they also increase AFEES' costs, thereby offsetting part of the savings associated with reduced staffing. Overall estimates of savings that could be achieved by improving all these operations were not available, but we estimate that standardizing enlistment contract data and forms and eliminating double processing of delayed entry personnel alone could save about \$1.2 million annually.

#### Distorted AFEES standards

Each of the AFEES has been assigned a rated capacity representing the workload it can be expected to complete in 1 day. Although statistics show that the AFEES often operate above capacity, our review showed that the capacities neither measure operating efficiency nor serve as a basis for establishing staffing levels. The formula used to establish capacity for each of the AFEES was developed in the 1960s during the draft environment. It was based on the concept that there would be an orderly flow of personnel who would be mentally tested, physically examined, and processed on the same day. In today's environment, workload fluctuates widely from day to day. Rated capacities, average daily workloads, and authorized staffing do not always correlate, as shown below, for the eight AFEES visited.


DOD has underway an industrial survey (contracted in April 1975) of the AFEES. The objectives of the survey are changing the workload evaluation and reviewing geographic local and facility size.

## AFEEES-RATED CAPACITY COMPARED TO AUTHORIZED STAFFING




STAFFING PERSONNEL  
 RATED CAPACITY

# MEDICAL SECTION ANALYSIS OF RATED CAPACITY, WORKLOAD, AND AUTHORIZED STAFFING



## PROCESSING SECTION ANALYSES OF RATED CAPACITY, WORKLOAD, AND AUTHORIZED STAFFING



### Monthend enlistment quotas

Part of the fluctuating AFEES workload stems from the quota systems used by the services. Because each service establishes monthly recruiting goals, the AFEES experience a heavy influx of applicants at monthend as recruiters strive to make their objectives. Uneven workloads, combined with reduced staffing levels, affected the AFEES' ability to examine and process all applicants. To counteract these problems, USAREC developed a procedure to even the daily flow of applicants. However, visits to eight AFEES showed the procedure was not working. One potential solution is for the services to establish staggered quota systems. The Army has recently implemented weekly quotas.

### Service-administered mental examinations

As mentioned previously, independent administration of different mental entrance examinations by the Navy and Air Force weakens control over malpractice, contributes to AFEES standards and workload problems, and increases costs. The cost to procure and maintain inventories of test booklets, answer sheets, and scoring keys is higher for several tests than for a single, common test. Test administration is more costly and duplicative, since the AFEES, Air Force, and Navy have their own trained testing personnel. In addition, the Navy and Marine Corps retest most applicants using their own tests. A common test administered by the AFEES to all applicants could help USAREC establish realistic AFEES workload standards, reduce costs, and lessen the number of test personnel. The services set January 1, 1976, as the date for establishing a common test and centralized management of all mental testing by AFEES.

### Varying service-imposed paperwork requirements

All four services have used different ways to put the same basic information on the enlistment contract. Another longstanding problem that wastes time and money is including service-unique forms in the enlistment packet. The following table depicts the number of forms that comprise each service's enlistment packet and the number that are service unique.



<u>Service</u>	<u>Total number of forms</u>	<u>Number of forms which are service unique</u>
Army	30	8
Navy	32	12
Air Force	30	9
Marine Corps	36	17

A 1966 GAO report "Potential Savings by Consolidation of Field Organizations and Facilities for Recruiting Military Personnel, B-157371," recommended that enlistment forms be consolidated and standardized. Other groups have studied the AFEES and made similar recommendations. A DOD task force achieved these objectives. It developed an "Application for Enlistment" which replaced 13 forms and an "Enlistment Agreement" that would allow all possible enlistment transactions to be completed on 1 form. June 1, 1975, was the date for initiating use of the new forms. We estimate that the new forms will reduce AFEES processing time by 50 staff-years and will save about \$450,000 annually.

DOD informed us that a DOD task force convened in November 1974 to standardize enlistment documents and successfully concluded its work in January 1975. The number of documents used in the enlistment process were reduced by one-third. New multiple use forms were introduced and management data collected by the services standardized. These actions were implemented on July 1, 1975.

#### Double contract processing

Each service has a program which allows an individual to enlist in the service and delay entry into the Active Forces for up to 9 months. During fiscal year 1974, 213,000 applicants enlisted under a delayed entry program. Under existing procedures these individuals process through the AFEES when they enlist and reprocess when they report for active duty. The proposed Enlistment Agreement developed by the DOD task force provides for the transition to the Active Forces on the same form used to enlist the individual. We estimate that using the proposed form could reduce AFEES processing time by 77 man-years and save \$699,400 annually. The Enlistment Agreement was implemented on July 1, 1975.

## Efforts to improve AFEES operations

To solve the problems created by reduced staffing and operating inefficiencies, USAREC and the AFEES have taken several measures. Cross training is being instituted throughout the AFEES system. Regional recruiting commands have been authorized to place military personnel on temporary AFEES duty and to hire temporary and part-time employees. Part-time, fee-basis physicians have been used where full-time civilian doctors were not available. Except for cross training, these procedures are only temporary measures. Correcting inefficiencies and continuing the cross-training program could result in more effective use of AFEES resources and enhance their ability to examine and process applicants.

## CONCLUSIONS

Procedural controls for monitoring quality control, recruiter malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment are fragmented among AFEES, recruiting services, and basic-training reception centers. As a result, we believe a great number of recruits who do not meet recruiting standards are completing the enlistment process. The AFEES are best suited to perform all quality control over the recruits' medical, mental, and moral qualifications and enlistment paperwork. They have, however, emphasized examining applicants and processing them into the service. Subordination to the recruiting services, fragmented and incomplete procedural controls, noncompatible boundaries, service-administered mental examinations, and operating inefficiencies have precluded the AFEES from being more active as a central, independent agent for monitoring these functions.

Reorganizing the AFEES in an independent status, improving their operations, and establishing an adequate followup system over early discharges would reduce such discharges, adverse publicity, and total costs. Although reorganizing AFEES as an independent monitoring component could increase costs, the recruiting service personnel now performing quality control and monitoring functions and correcting the operating inefficiencies will be eliminated.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

--Remove AFEES from operational control of the recruiting organizations.

- Eliminate those factors, including fragmented controls, noncompatible boundaries, and independent testing, which preclude the AFEES from acting as a central, independent component for monitoring quality, malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment.
- Increase the number of AFEES personnel and decrease the recruiting service personnel so AFEES can perform quality control and monitoring functions.
- Insure that USAREC, the recruiting services, and the AFEES:
  1. Assess the reliability of revised AFEES workload standards.
  2. Change the system of monthend enlistment quotas.
  3. Adhere to timetables to standardize paperwork and eliminate double processing of personnel under the delayed entry program.

#### DOD COMMENTS AND PLANNED ACTIONS

DOD has taken or is planning to take the following actions on our recommendations.

To remove AFEES from operational control of the recruiting organizations, a DOD working group has recommended an alternative command and control organization, which could be operational in 180 days, with provisions for transition to a completely freestanding organization after operational experience and analysis. The services concur in and will implement the working group's recommendation in July 1976.

DOD agreed that AFEES' monitoring should be independent. DOD pointed out that the separate services make the determination to accept or deny enlistment. AFEES support the recruiter. They make physical examinations, give mental tests, and review data supplied by the recruiter or elicited from the individual regarding his moral character. AFEES then provide the services with the findings so that appropriate decisions on an applicant's enlistment can be made.

DOD stated that, after improvements to the AFEES organization are implemented, it will look into the feasibility of common boundaries. Effective January 1, 1976, AFEES assumed central management of all mental testing.

DOD did not agree with our recommendation to increase AFEES personnel and decrease recruiting personnel so that AFEES could perform quality control and monitoring functions. DOD stated that a task force on AFEES operations has recognized that their role in enlistment processing has changed since the commencement of the AVF. The recognition of this fact accounts, in large measure, for making the industrial management survey and the review of the AFEES command and control structure.

These two initiatives, along with the other projects currently underway and previously discussed, will involve substantive, detailed reviews of personnel requirements.

DOD agreed to assess the reliability of revised AFEES workloads. DOD stated that an important task in the industrial management survey of the AFEES is to evaluate the capacities of AFEES, the actual workload performed, and the number of personnel assigned.

DOD generally agreed with changing the system of month-end enlistment quotas. DOD stated that our solution, however, did not consider the overall impact on enlistment quotas.

DOD has standardized or is in the process of standardizing much of the enlistment paperwork. It has eliminated or replaced 3 DOD and 24 service forms previously used in recruiting. The elimination of double processing of personnel under the delayed entry program has not been completely resolved.

## CHAPTER 3

### RECRUITER FORCE MANAGEMENT

Between fiscal years 1971 and 1975, the services invested considerable resources in recruiting to improve the probability of AVF success. Advertising quadrupled; recruiter time increased 3,800 staff-years, about 51 percent; nonrecruiting personnel were used to assist recruiters; and recruiter selection and training improved. Successful recruiting was emphasized; the recruiting commands tended to staff to meet maximum needs. Although such an approach may have been desirable at the time, the services now need to determine the optimum recruiter force size and the proper proportion of nonrecruiting personnel. A 10-percent reduction, which seems possible, would save \$16 million annually. While nonrecruiting personnel were used by all the services, they were not used to reduce force size and augment it during seasonal fluctuations. Army studies show nonrecruiting personnel are more cost effective than additional recruiters, but their overall use has declined.

DOD believes that changes in the more variable influences on recruiting should be made before changes in recruiting force. Reductions have been or are being made in the services' advertising programs, the Army's unit-of-choice programs, and the enlistment bonus program. DOD also cites its support of reducing G.I. Bill benefits as a further indication of adjusting resources to the changing recruiting climate. In addition, the Air Force recruiter staff has been reduced. We noted that Congress decreased DOD's military personnel recruiting budget request for fiscal year 1976 by about 9 percent.

We believe DOD's actions will reduce the costs of the recruiting programs. We also believe that now is an opportune time to develop the optimum mix of nonrecruiting personnel to adjust the recruiter force size. As far as we can tell, neither the services nor DOD know what the optimum mix should be. Adjusting the force by employing nonrecruiting personnel in the field, on a test basis, should help determine the proper mix and meet seasonal fluctuations at less cost.

#### IMPROVEMENTS IN RECRUITING DURING AVF

Although fiscal year 1974 was the first full year of the AVF, recruiter staff-years increased from 7,548 in fiscal year 1971 to 11,405 in fiscal year 1975, 51 percent. Two aspects of the draft eased the work of the recruiter. First, the presence of a draft encouraged many young men to visit a recruiter to investigate enlistment options. Second, the

recruiters were furnished the results of the selective service preinduction physical. This information included the man's name, address, telephone number, examination results, and education level and enabled the recruiter to easily locate qualified prospects. The absence of this data increased the AVF recruiter's workload.

To compensate for the increased recruiter workload the services made changes designed to increase recruiter effectiveness. For example:

--The Marine Corps:

1. Reoriented its recruiting school to give more emphasis to salesmanship.
2. Prepared a guidebook of successful recruiting techniques.
3. Disseminated new recruiting techniques to recruiters trained under the old system.

--The Air Force:

1. Developed recruiter manpower standards.
2. Established intermediate command overhead requirements.

--The Army:

1. Contracted for a comprehensive evaluation of recruiter training needs, including a master plan to meet them.
2. Assigned 266 captains as area commanders to reinforce recruiting force management.
3. Established a 1-year probationary period for new recruiters.

--The Navy:

1. Improved recruiter selection and schooling.
2. Expanded recruiter incentives.

First-year AVF recruiting efforts were successful. Although most services experienced initial recruiting difficulties, later successes offset the shortfalls. Even more impressive were fiscal year 1975 results, when the services consistently met increased recruiting goals.

Although fiscal year 1976 enlistment requirements are slightly lower than the previous year's, the services have been able to increase quality standards and decrease enlistment incentives while continuing to meet their goals. Some changes include:

- The Army's goal for enlistments to be 65 percent high school graduates in fiscal year 1976 is 10 percent higher than the congressionally established minimum for fiscal year 1974. This goal was the basis for determining fiscal year 1976 recruiter force size.
- The Army, early in 1975, eliminated or reduced enlistment bonuses for 21 skills.
- The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps ended 2-year enlistments in fiscal year 1976.


Another indication of the continued recruiting success for AVF is the size of the delayed-entry-program pool. Each service has a program which allows individuals to enlist and delay reporting to active duty for up to 9 months. The charts on pages 28 to 31 show that pool size growth has permitted recruiters to concentrate more on meeting future enlistment objectives.

Factors beyond the services' control or ability to predict, such as the state of the economy, unemployment, and world tensions, prevent precise determinations as to the ease of AVF recruiting. However, considering the success achieved thus far in recruiting and the sizes of the delayed entry pools, we believe that now is an opportune time for the services to determine the optimum recruiter force size by systematic employment of nonrecruiting personnel in the field.

One advantage of using nonrecruiting personnel is their availability during peak periods on a part-time basis, which results in cost savings. Accessions to active duty are seasonal; the heaviest recruit influxes are in January and June and the lightest in April and December. The services use their delayed entry programs to level off the recruiting workload. In contrast, recruiter force size is not readily adjustable for shortrun fluctuations.

#### NONRECRUITING PERSONNEL


Each service used nonrecruiting personnel to help obtain enlistments. These personnel were usually enlistees just out of basic training who could relate more readily than recruiters






NUMBER

NAVY





to youthful prospects. Their duties varied but primarily involved locating new prospects for the recruiter.

The services have developed their own programs to employ nonrecruiting personnel in the recruiting effort. The Army's programs were considerably larger than those of the other services.

Staff-years for Nonrecruiting Personnel  
Assisting Recruiters, Fiscal Year 1974

Army	1,150
Navy	73
Marine Corps	35
Air Force	(a)

a/Terminated in 1973.

The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force programs returned enlistees to their hometowns after graduation from training. There, they assisted their local recruiter for 10 to 30 days.

The Army had two programs for using nonrecruiting personnel. A recruiter assistant program, similar to those of the other services, operated from April 1971 through February 1973. The Army's major effort, however, was devoted to the unit canvasser program, initiated in February 1972. In this program, unit representatives known as canvassers were deployed throughout the United States to help recruiters obtain enlistments for their units. The House Committee on Appropriations estimated the fiscal year 1974 cost of the program at \$16.4 million.

Control over recruiter assistant  
and canvasser programs

The services exercised minimal control over their recruiter assistant and canvasser programs. Navy and Marine Corps recruiters selected their assistants from personnel they recruited. The recruiters used them as they wished. The recruiters liked this approach and thought it worked well; apparently, it did. The Air Force officially terminated its recruiter assistant program in fiscal year 1973, but some recruiters were unofficially still using it late in fiscal year 1974. Air Force recruiting headquarters did not have information on the use of recruiter assistants in fiscal year 1974. It is common practice for all services to use recruits on leave to assist recruiters.

The Army recruiting command did not have information on the cost of the program and had only limited information on its management. There was no central plan for the program. Each unit or major command operated its own program to meet its needs for junior enlisted personnel. After our inquiries, the recruiting command studied the canvasser program and concluded that a definitive policy and better reporting were needed. The Army's study was limited in scope and did not compile program costs, so we obtained details from the participating units from a questionnaire and from interviewing selected recruiters and intermediate command personnel.

The fiscal year 1974 canvasser program cost the Army \$27.1 million--\$10.7 million more than the Committee on Appropriations had estimated when the program was funded. The lack of central management created problems which reduced effectiveness and increased costs. Selection and deployment of the canvassers was left to the individual units, instead of the recruiting command. The recruiting command attempted to coordinate these activities but lacked the authority to do so. Some of the canvassers weren't suitable for canvasser duty and could not be used effectively. In other cases, too many canvassers were deployed to an area. The recruiters interviewed disagreed about the overall effectiveness of the canvasser program. More than half found the program effective. The remaining recruiters attributed the program's ineffectiveness to lack of central management.

Duplication and inefficiencies in staffing, supervision, and publicity added to the canvasser program's cost. Although the canvassers were nominally under the supervision of the recruiting command, some number of units sent out their own supervisory personnel. We estimate that this added \$680,000 to the program's cost. The Army used higher paid personnel, which increased the program's cost by \$611,000, even though an Army consultant had concluded that the lower paid personnel used by the other services were more cost effective. The units supplied \$1,064,000 worth of their own recruiting literature and publicity items without coordinating with the recruiting command. These actions added \$2.4 million to the cost of the canvasser program.

In December 1974 the Army recruiting command issued guidance bringing the management of the canvasser program under its control. This action was taken in response to program criticism by Members of Congress during consideration of DOD's fiscal year 1975 appropriation. This guidance was developed in coordination with the major Army commands and if fully implemented would correct many of the weaknesses in the canvasser program. Authorized staff-years for the canvasser force were to be reduced from 1,200 to 900.

However, because of restrictions on the use of travel funds, the number of canvassers in the field was reduced to 250 and canvasser deployment in the balance of fiscal year 1975 was uncertain. A United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) study recommended 750 canvasser staff-years for fiscal year 1975, while maintaining the production recruiter force at 4,725.

Effectiveness of recruiter assistant  
and canvasser programs

The Army is the only service to have evaluated its programs for using nonrecruiting personnel. Several evaluations were made using different approaches and showed different results. In November 1973 and later in April and September 1974, an Army consultant evaluated the effectiveness of the canvasser programs using economic analysis techniques. The studies concluded that additional recruiter assistants and canvassers would be more cost effective in obtaining quality enlistments than increases in the recruiter force. In June 1974, the Army completed a task force study of the canvasser program. The study was based on field visits to the intermediate recruiting commands and participating units and installations. It identified many problems we have cited and recommended improvements in managing the program. The study concluded that canvassers do assist in the recruiting program. In a different study the USAREC Internal Review Division concluded in August 1974 that canvassers had little effect on enlistments. This conclusion was based on comments from a sampling of new recruits interviewed by the USAREC auditors. The Army recognizes its canvasser program as one of its most effective recruiting programs.

USAREC is developing a better base of information for evaluating canvasser effectiveness, which should make it possible to reconcile some conflicts posed by these studies. Previous statistics on canvasser results were inflated and unreliable. The Army's current evaluation plan for the canvasser program does not provide for trial use of recruiter assistants, nor has this alternative been evaluated since the November 1973 consultant's study. While the changes in the canvasser program will improve its effectiveness, they don't address the effectiveness of recruiter assistants compared to canvassers or the potential that either program has for reducing the overall recruiter force.

## Congressional concern over recruiting costs

The House Committee on Appropriations, in a November 1973 report, criticized the number of recruiters requested by DOD. The report cited two Army studies which concluded that the Army had too many recruiters and also noted that a considerable number of recruiters from all four services were enlisting two or fewer recruits per month. The Committee questioned the need for increases in the Air Force's recruiting force, since the Air Force had not encountered any major problems in recruiting, and pointed out that these increases might aggravate the Army's and Marine Corps' recruiting problems. The Committee did not reduce the recruiting force but stated that it expected the services to study their needs and identify potential economies.

## CONCLUSIONS

Additional recruiting resources and economic conditions favorable to enlistment have contributed to AVF recruiting success. The services have not, however, determined the optimum mix of recruiting and nonrecruiting personnel for a stable but flexible recruiter force base which could respond to changing enlistment requirements and economic conditions. Using nonrecruiting personnel has been tried, but the lack of central management and reliable information has prevented the services from refining these programs so they can be relied on to augment a reduced recruiting force. Centralizing management and controlled field testing would enable the services to refine the alternatives, reduce force size, and save money.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

- Reduce recruiter force size and increase the ability of the services to respond to prevailing conditions.
- Make controlled field tests of recruiter assistants to develop a means for reducing the services' recruiting forces by augmenting them with recruiter assistants.
- Institute uniform procedures to monitor recruiting results to assess recruiting force needs.

## DOD COMMENTS AND PLANNED ACTIONS

DOD does not agree that it should reduce recruiter force sizes. DOD stated that it has reduced advertising, enlistment bonuses, the Army's unit-of-choice canvasser program, and it supports the reduction of G.I. Bill educational benefits. DOD does not believe that changes in the recruiting force should be made to adapt to short-term changes in the recruiting market. DOD informed GAO that Congress reduced the military personnel recruiting budget request for fiscal year 1976 by about 9 percent.

DOD does not agree that controlled field testing of recruiter assistants is necessary to develop a means for reducing service recruiting forces. DOD believes that recruiter assistants are effective and permit the services to meet special recruiting objectives or seasonal differences in recruit availability.

We believe that now is an opportune time to develop the optimum mix of nonrecruiting personnel to adjust recruiter force size. As far as we can tell, neither the services nor DOD know what the mix should be. DOD agreed that uniform procedures should be instituted to monitor recruiting results to assess recruiter force needs.

## CHAPTER 4

### PROGRAM EVALUATION

The one-half-billion-dollar recruiting budget finances many separate programs to help attract enlistments. Some of the programs are operated independently by each service, while others, such as high school testing, are a joint effort. Because of the similarity, overlap, and interdependence in these programs, DOD needs more sophisticated procedures to coordinate and evaluate them. DOD and the services have undertaken considerable study to meet the need for evaluation. Because each service acts independently without uniform guidance, a need exists for:

- Improving the existing data base.
- Refining and expanding program data collection efforts.
- Formulating an overall plan for evaluating recruiting programs.

The Congress has shown considerable interest in the actions of DOD and the services to evaluate their recruiting operations and has often criticized them. In considering the DOD appropriation for fiscal year 1975, the Conference Committee stressed the need for evaluating program effectiveness. Its concern was directed at the management of the Army's unit of choice recruiting program, and it offered specific guidance for the evaluation.

DOD stated that it intends to develop a common recruiting data base for measuring expenditures that will parallel existing common data bases for measurement of recruiting results. It believes such a common data base can be developed without common recruiting boundaries using geographic identifiers, such as a zip code, county, metropolitan area, or State.

#### EVALUATION PERFORMED BY DOD AND THE RECRUITING SERVICES

Numerous organizations, military and contractor, participate in the evaluation process. Although cataloging the entire range of evaluative activities was beyond the scope of our review, we did obtain certain insights into the process. DOD and the services act independently when performing or contracting for studies.

DOD does not coordinate evaluative efforts. It participates in the process on a servicewide level, making inhouse analyses or contracting for studies in such areas as recruiting incentive programs and the economic background of



volunteers. Plans call for preparing a propensity-to-enlist model and a geographic trend analysis. DOD seldom gets involved below the recruiting headquarters level, leaving such evaluations to the discretion of the recruiting services.

The services prepare recurring reports, make inhouse analyses, and contract for outside studies. For example, the Army, Navy, and Air Force have completed or planned studies on the feasibility of aligning recruiting boundaries with zip code boundaries. Other examples of the reports and studies used by the services are:

Army:

- Automated financial, statistical, and recruiter management reports are prepared for DOD and the four services.
- Continuing study is made inhouse of the optimum recruiter force size.
- Contract studies are made, including analysis of the management of recruiting resources and characteristics of female accessions.

Navy:

- A low quality recruit report is used by fleet commanders to inform the recruiting command of individuals not meeting Navy standards even though they passed the preenlistment screening and were accepted into the service.
- Characteristics of male and female recruits and of effective and ineffective districts are analyzed.

Marine Corps:

- Weekly reports are prepared on recruiting accomplishments and characteristics of accessions, and recruit discharges during training are reported monthly.

Air Force:

- A computerized procurement management information system matches monthly accomplishments with technical school requirements and starting dates.
- Studies have been made to develop a manpower standard for recruiters.

## DATA BASE EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT NEEDED

Each service has a recruiter force managed by intermediate commands and a recruiting headquarters. The advertising programs of each service have similar components--magazine advertising, billboards, and public service advertising. The programs' basic objective--to attract the best qualified youth they can find--is also similar. Such similarities permit interservice comparisons. Economies achieved by one service can be adopted by the others.

DOD was precluded from making many interservice comparisons in its evaluations because of the lack of uniformity in the information it received from the services and the difficulty of obtaining compatible data. The services' recruiter productivity, advertising, use of commercial facilities, and recruiter training were compared in a November 1973 report issued by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). It identified potential savings of \$32 million and said:

"One method available for evaluating the effectiveness of recruitment operations was the semi-annual submission of Personnel Procurement Cost Reports, DD Form 804, to OSD. This document was supposed to show in detail all Service costs of recruitment in various formats, versus the number of enlistments achieved. The report was only receiving limited usage by OSD officials, however, because of inconsistencies and lack of reliability of the data reported. Correction of these reporting deficiencies would result in a beneficial management tool for OSD to evaluate Service recruitment performance."

Corrective action was promised on the DD Form 804 to provide a beneficial tool for OSD.

These improvements failed to materialize. As of January 1976, the instructions for DD Form 804 had not been revised. Although the form is the basic cost accounting document used by the services for reporting recruiting costs, the information is not reported uniformly. For example, reserve recruiting costs and the costs of nonrecruiting personnel are reported differently. The Army and Air Force recruiters don't recruit for the reserves, so their costs don't include reserve recruiting. Navy and Marine Corps recruiters do recruit for the reserves. The Marine Corps excludes reserve recruiting costs from its form 804, while the Navy combines regular and reserve recruiting costs into a single report. The Navy and Marine Corps include the costs of their recruiter

assistants in their cost reports; the Army does not. Accordingly, comparisons on the basis of the cost reports would be meaningless. Because of limited staff, DOD cannot reconstruct the information into a usable form.

The services cannot readily provide information needed to evaluate the recruiting programs. Individual program costs require considerable effort to compile. For example, we attempted to obtain accurate costs on the Army's canvasser program. USAREC did not have this information. Thus we had to obtain it from the 51 participating units and stations. The costs for the high school testing program were not readily available either.


Comparative nonfinancial information is equally difficult to obtain. We attempted to compare recruiter malpractice statistics for the services and found the task next to impossible. The statistics were incomplete and the periods were incompatible. We attempted to obtain statistics to assess the effectiveness of the high school testing program. Service estimates of the percentage of high school examinees who actually enlisted were unreliable. For example, the Army had two estimates, 15 percent and 6 percent. More reliable estimates were obtained for Army, Navy, and Marine Corps using the computerized enlistment information. However, considerable effort was required, and this approach was not effective for Air Force enlistments.

Data currently collected by DOD and the services do not permit meaningful comparisons of recruiter productivity. DOD has made some refinements to eliminate the effect of draft-motivated enlistments on comparisons of recruiting results, as the following chart illustrates.

Differences between the services' recruiting operations impair the validity of this and other information for evaluating each service's recruiting force effectiveness, and size is impaired by differences in the scope of recruiting between the services. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps recruiters had responsibility for recruiting 14,000 and 13,000 people, respectively, for their reserves in fiscal year 1974. The Army and Air Force handle reserve recruiting separately from their regular recruiting. The Army used many more nonrecruiting personnel to assist its recruiters than did the other services.

Another factor affecting recruiting is that difficulty in recruiting differed between the services. The Air Force consistently met its objectives in fiscal year 1974 and attracted a larger proportion of high school graduates and upper mental category personnel than the other services.

COMPARISON OF ENLISTMENT AND TRUE  
VOLUNTEERS PER STATION RECRUITER  
FISCAL YEARS 1971-1975



□ ENLISTMENTS PER STATION RECRUITER.

▨ TRUE VOLUNTEERS PER STATION RECRUITER.

1/ Budget data were used for fiscal year 1975.

2/ DOD average for volunteers per station recruiter for fiscal year 1974

The Marine Corps experienced a 1974 shortfall because of difficulties in meeting the minimum high school limitations established by the Congress. Neither DOD nor the services has made the refinements necessary to reconcile these differences to permit meaningful comparisons.

Each service has established its own boundaries, which are the basis for the data it collects to monitor recruiting results. Thus the information each receives from the other services is of little benefit. For example, the Marine Corps receives reports from USAREC on Army recruiting, but can't compare them with its own results because they are structured according to Army boundaries. Since these statistics cannot be aggregated into common regions, only national comparison is possible. National comparisons, while helpful, do not permit identifying important regional differences.

Limitations in USAREC's data-processing capability have restricted its ability to provide the information needed for analyzing recruiting results. USAREC's data-processing component collects and maintains information on all examinations and enlistments processed by the AFEES. This information is critical to DOD's recruiting effort. The need for improving USAREC's data-processing capability was cited in a 1971 contractor study of Army advertising program effectiveness. According to the study the existing data processing did not give USAREC

"\* \* \* sufficient flexibility to react quickly and variably to the demands of a modern, cost-oriented marketing organization."

These problems hindered USAREC's ability to respond to unusual requests for information and delayed the preparation of recurring reports. For example, the automated reports used to monitor medical discharges were delayed up to 17 weeks. The reports were finally discontinued, and medical discharge statistics are now compiled manually.

DOD informed us that:

- USAREC concurred that its data processing capability has restricted its ability to effectively respond to the needs of the managers of the recruiting effort. The need for upgraded hardware has long been recognized.
- Authority has been received for the installation of a Univac 1108 computer system. Site construction is underway, with computer installation planned for April 1976.

- The new system will include random access data storage and communication features providing for system access from remotely located communications terminals. These features will greatly enhance the ability to respond to user's needs. Preparation for the hardware upgrade is underway, including personnel training and systems planning and analysis functions.
- The system for monitoring medical discharges for conditions existing prior to entry into service is included in the systems proposed for development for implementation subsequent to the computer upgrade.

#### OVERALL PLAN NEEDED FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION

DOD has not furnished guidance to the services specifying the programs to evaluate and methods to use. Understandably DOD must rely on the services to evaluate their programs. Likewise, the personnel associated with a program are often in the best position to evaluate it. The programs we examined, however, had either not been evaluated or received limited, inconclusive evaluation. In other cases evaluation of similar aspects by each service had not been coordinated. The services could, therefore, benefit from guidance to assure that an unbiased evaluation is made of all pertinent aspects of their recruiting efforts on a planned and coordinated basis.

No evaluations were made or scheduled for some of the major recruiting programs. For example, the high school testing program operated jointly by the four services had not been evaluated or scheduled for evaluation before our audit. One of the program's primary objectives was to stimulate interest in enlistment. Although the Armed Forces Vocational Testing Group was responsible for managing the program, it had not determined total program costs or the number of enlistments stimulated by the program. Instead it monitored the number of high schools and students tested annually. We found these statistics unsatisfactory as indexes of program success, since they were unrelated to the program's primary objective. Details of our evaluation are covered in our report "An Assessment of All-Volunteer Recruits" (FPCD-76-170).

A November 1973 interservice audit report identified weaknesses in common aspects of the services' recruiting activities, such as recruiter productivity and training, and prompted the services to study them. DOD did not establish a central plan for reviewing and correcting these weaknesses. The resulting evaluations were largely uncoordinated. For example, the report criticized the

the services' recruiter-training programs, which varied in length, curriculum, and cost. Each service independently studied and revamped its own recruiter training. In fact, when we obtained the consultant's study on the Army's recruiter training needs, we were asked by a USAREC official not to release it to the other services.

### CONCLUSIONS

The services need a common basis for evaluating their recruiting programs. The problems they encounter are often unique from those experienced in the private sector. Each service's recruiting consists of separate programs to attract enlistees. Each service has studied its programs and improved its inhouse reports and analyses. Yet, the differences in recruiting boundaries and the way financial and non-financial data is compiled and summarized precludes meaningful comparison of similar programs.

The services' evaluation of their recruiting programs should be coordinated to assure that timely, systematic evaluation is made. DOD had not furnished guidance specifying the programs to evaluate and the methods to use. As a result some programs have not been evaluated, and in other cases evaluation of similar programs by each service has not been coordinated.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense coordinate the services' evaluation of their recruiting programs and insure that:

- All pertinent aspects of recruiting are evaluated.
- Information on the cost and results of essentially similar programs or aspects of recruiting are maintained on a common basis to facilitate interservice comparisons.

### DOD COMMENTS AND PLANNED ACTIONS

DOD agreed that all pertinent aspects of the recruiting efforts should be evaluated and that information on the cost and results of essentially similar programs or aspects of recruiting should be maintained on a common basis to facilitate interservice comparisons. DOD stated that it intends to develop a common recruiting data base for the measurement of resource expenditures that will parallel existing common data bases available for measurement of recruiting results. It believes such a common data base can


be developed independently of common recruiting boundaries by use of geographic identifiers such as zip code, county, metropolitan area, or State.



PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS  
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING  
ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	Tenure of office	
	From	To
<u>DOD</u>		
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
Donald H. Rumsfeld	Nov. 1975	Present
James R. Schlesinger	July 1973	Nov. 1975
William P. Clements (acting)	May 1973	July 1973
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
William P. Clements	Jan. 1973	Present
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
William K. Brehm	Sept. 1973	Present
Carl W. Clewlow (acting)	June 1973	Aug. 1973
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:		
Martin R. Hoffmann	Aug. 1975	Present
Norman R. Augustine (acting)	July 1975	Aug. 1975
Howard H. Callaway	May 1973	July 1975
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
Donald G. Brotzman	Mar. 1975	Present
M. David Lowe	Feb. 1974	Jan. 1975
Carl S. Wallace	Mar. 1973	Jan. 1974
CHIEF OF STAFF:		
Gen. Fred C. Weyand	Sept. 1974	Present
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams	Oct. 1972	Sept. 1974
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:		
J. William Middendorf II	Apr. 1974	Present
John W. Warner	May 1972	Apr. 1974

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (cont.)</u>		
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
Joseph T. McCullen, Jr.	Sept. 1973	Present
James E. Johnson	June 1971	Sept. 1973
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS:		
Adm. James L. Holloway III	July 1974	Present
Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.	July 1970	July 1974
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS:		
Gen. Louis H. Wilson	July 1975	Present
Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.	Jan. 1972	June 1975
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:		
Thomas C. Reed	Dec. 1975	Present
John L. McLucas	May 1973	Dec. 1975
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AF- FAIRS):		
David P. Taylor	June 1974	Present
James P. Goode (acting)	June 1973	June 1974
CHIEF OF STAFF:		
Gen. David Jones	Aug. 1974	Present
Gen. George S. Brown	Aug. 1973	July 1974
Gen. John D. Ryan	Aug. 1969	July 1973



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