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


REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

U.S. General Accounting Office

Movement Of American Forces From France (Operation FRELOC) B-161507

Department of Defense



BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES

AUG. 7, 1968

749355 / 087843



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-161507

To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This is our summary report on the movement of
American Forces from France (Operation FRELOC)--
Department of Defense.

Copies of this report are being sent to the Direc-
tor, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and
the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James B. Aboites".

Comptroller General
of the United States

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CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA.

D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

Strong congressional interest has been expressed concerning the movement of American Forces from France (Operation FRELOC). In this connection, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has undertaken a broad survey covering military supply matters, disposition of surplus material, disposition of real property and related personal property, and construction requirements arising from the movement of supplies and personnel by the Departments of the Army and the Air Force.

In May 1967, GAO issued a preliminary classified report entitled "Report on Survey of the Movement of American Forces from France" which summarized observations to that date.

This summary report is intended to supplement our previous report and to summarize GAO's overall findings with respect to Operation FRELOC. Because of the significance of the matters involved, we intend to issue separate reports on stock control and the activities of the Military Liquidation Section, a part of the American Embassy in Paris.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite the relatively short period of time available and the magnitude of the move from France (p. 4), the Army and Air Force were able to relocate their personnel, supplies, and equipment by March 31, 1967, in a generally effective manner. However, as could be expected in an operation of this nature, many difficulties arose, some of which were directly related to problems existing prior to the move. The most significant problems noted during our review were that:

- Control was lost over large quantities of supplies and equipment, including weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies. Inaccurate inventory records contributed to the inability to maintain proper controls over shipments.
- Supplies were shipped to locations with inadequate storage facilities while available facilities were not fully used.
- Requirements for construction of additional ammunition storage facilities were overstated.

--Some of the fixtures and personal property removed from former French bases were used ineffectively.

--Some usable personal property was not removed from French bases.

In the opinion of the GAO some of these difficulties were caused by the fact that the Secretary of Defense did not approve new sites and locations until relatively late dates. Officials of the Department of Defense advised that these decisions had been delayed because of complex problems associated with gold flow, relations with foreign governments, and the need to formulate acceptable lines of communications to support U.S. Forces in Europe.

RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS

Specific recommendations are not included in this report. They will be made in our more detailed reports on specific aspects of FRELOC to be issued subsequently.

AGENCY ACTIONS

Certain findings were brought to the attention of appropriate agency officials during our review. Agency actions or positions are discussed in this report, as appropriate.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

None.

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LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

None.

INTRODUCTION

The General Accounting Office has examined into certain aspects of the movement of American Forces from France (Operation FRELOC). Specifically, we inquired into the policies, procedures, and management practices related to (1) the control over material being moved, (2) the disposition of excesses, (3) the planning and requirements for new construction, (4) the control and utilization of personal property removed from real property in France, and (5) the sales of U.S. property to the Government of France. Our review was made pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We held discussions with appropriate officials, examined pertinent records, and made such selected tests of transactions as we believed necessary. The locations where our review was performed are listed in appendix II.

In May 1967 we issued to certain committees of the Congress a preliminary classified report entitled "Report on Survey of the Movement of American Forces from France," which summarized our observations based on limited work to that date. This summary report is intended to supplement our previous report and to summarize our overall findings with respect to Operation FRELOC. Because of the significance of the matters involved, we intend to issue separate reports on stock control and the activities of the Military Liquidation Section.

During our examination we brought certain matters to the attention of the Office of the Secretary of Defense through reports addressed to that Office. Those reports are listed in appendix III.

Although we have not followed our usual practice of submitting a draft report to the agency for comments, we have met with officials of the Department of Defense to provide them the opportunity to review this report. Where appropriate, their comments have been incorporated in the report.

BACKGROUND

On March 7, 1966, in a letter to the President of the United States, President DeGaulle of France stated that France believed that significant changes in world conditions had occurred since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreement in 1949. He further stated that, because of the changes that had taken place, conditions no longer justified "*** the arrangements of a military nature made after the conclusion of the alliance, either jointly or in the form of multilateral agreements, or by special agreements between the French Government and the American Government." The letter went on to point out that "France intends to recover, in her territory, the full exercise of her sovereignty, now impaired by the permanent presence of allied military elements or by the habitual use being made of its airspace ***."

By Aide Memoire delivered to the American Embassy in Paris on March 29, 1966, the French Government indicated that April 1, 1967, would be an appropriate date for completing the necessary transfer of American Forces from France. The memorandum indicated, however, that a longer period of time could be envisaged to solve certain complex problems. On April 12, 1966, the United States replied to the French Aide Memoire, stating that, while the United States intended to remove its facilities from France as promptly as possible, it could not agree that April 1, 1967, would be an appropriate date for completing the necessary operations.

The French Government responded to our Government's note by Aide Memoire dated April 22, 1966, stating that it could only adhere to its position and conclusions previously set forth. The French response, however, failed to give specific recognition to the problems itemized in the United States April 12, 1966, reply. We were informally advised that the President of the United States issued instructions specifying that the relocation would be accomplished by the end of March 1967. The military forces in France were advised by the Department of Defense to complete the move by that time, and they proceeded accordingly.

As a result of President DeGaulle's decision, the United States was faced with an enormous task, which encompassed:

1. Moving about 70,000 military, civilian, and dependent personnel.
2. Moving or otherwise disposing of over 800,000 short tons of supplies and material.
3. Evacuating approximately 190 installations representing an investment of about \$565 million.
4. Relocating major headquarters to Germany.
5. Constructing or otherwise obtaining new storage facilities outside of France.
6. Providing for the disposition of installations in France.
7. Providing for other matters necessary for the support of troops now stationed outside of France.

The specific steps necessary to accomplish the move were the responsibilities of the military services involved--primarily the Army and the Air Force. The Secretary of Defense, however, made all major decisions relating to new storage locations, disposition of personnel transferred from France, and the locations of new bases to be established outside of France.

An organization known as the Military Liquidation Section was established as an integral part of the American Embassy in Paris for the purpose of managing the remaining installations, disposing of personal property at those installations, negotiating sales with the Government of France for the personal property in which the French were interested, and handling residual military interests in France after March 31, 1967. The activities of this organization have not yet been completed, since a number of bases in France have still not been turned over to the Government of France.

FINDINGS

Despite the relatively short period of time available and the magnitude of the move from France, the Army and Air Force were able to relocate their personnel, supplies, and equipment by March 31, 1967, in a generally effective manner. As could be expected in an operation of this nature, many difficulties arose, some of which could have been avoided by better planning and some of which were directly related to basic problems that existed prior to the move.

In our opinion, some of the difficulties encountered by the Army and Air Force were due to the fact that the Secretary of Defense did not approve the selection of new storage sites and new Air Force base locations until relatively late dates. Department of Defense officials advised us that these decisions had been delayed because of complex problems associated with gold flow, relations with foreign governments, and the need to formulate an acceptable line of logistics support for U.S. Forces in Europe.

The most significant problem areas that we noted during our review were:

Control was lost over large quantities of supplies and equipment moved from France. Inaccurate inventory records contributed to the inability of the Army and Air Force to maintain proper controls over shipments.

Supplies were shipped to locations with inadequate storage space while, at the same time, available storage facilities were not fully utilized.

Requirements for construction of additional ammunition storage facilities were not properly evaluated and were therefore overstated.

Some of the fixtures and personal property removed from former French bases were not effectively utilized.

Some usable personal property was not removed from French bases.

We also looked into (1) the procedures utilized in contracting for construction and design services, (2) the controls over excess construction material moved from France, and (3) the procedures utilized by the Army and Air Force to screen excess property. We found that those procedures and controls were generally adequate.

Details of our findings and conclusions follow.

STOCK CONTROL

During Operation FRELOC, the Army and Air Force lost control over large quantities of material, including weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies. In many instances the quantities shipped from France did not agree with the quantities shown on the stock records and the quantities received in Germany and England did not agree with what had been reported as being shipped. At the conclusion of our review, there were major discrepancies that had not yet been resolved and military officials estimated that it might require a substantial period of time to reconcile the differences, properly locate stocks on hand, and determine whether any material had actually been lost.

The loss of control over assets moved from France was partly due to the lack of advance information on shipments at receiving locations, the loss of documents needed for inspection and accounting purposes, the late inspection of receipts, and the delayed recording of receipts. In our opinion, the loss of control was also symptomatic of a long-standing problem--the high incidence of error in stock records. In a recent report to the Congress (B-146828, November 14, 1967) for example, we pointed out that inaccuracy of inventory records in the various military services was a significant problem requiring high-level management attention.

It appeared to us that the Army and Air Force problems were further complicated by the relatively late dates of decisions by the Secretary of Defense regarding new storage sites and new air base locations. In December 1966, less than 4 months prior to the March 31, 1967, deadline, the Army was authorized to establish a general depot at

Burtonwood, England, and the Air Force was informed that it could utilize interim storage sites at Sculthorpe, Chelveston, and Greenham Common, also in England. The interim Air Force sites were to be used until the Secretary of Defense reached a decision as to the location of dispersed operating bases to replace those that had been given up in France.

Department of Defense officials advised us that the decisions were delayed intentionally in order to carefully study the various alternatives available. The Secretary of Defense was concerned not only with military capabilities, but with cost, gold flow, and relations with foreign governments.

Earlier decisions by the Secretary of Defense, in our opinion, would have permitted better planning by the services with respect to specific quantities and locations of material to be relocated. Army and Air Force officials also informed us that the transfer of experienced personnel, coupled with the short time period available to complete the move, was a limiting factor on their ability to adequately plan and control shipments. We recognize, however, the need to consider the cost and other matters discussed above.

Another factor that precluded better control over shipments was the shortage of storage space in Germany. During February and March 1967, incoming shipments at some depots in Germany were unloaded and placed in any available open space to avoid demurrage costs for rail cars. Because of the volume of material and the physical condition of the storage locations, checking and recording of these receipts were delayed for substantial periods of time. Furthermore, the significant increase in workload in Germany was coupled with a shortage of experienced personnel. Stock control and depot operations in France were largely carried out by French nationals, most of whom chose not to accompany the American Forces to Germany.

Following is a brief summary of the pertinent facts revealed by our review. Further details on these and other problem areas related to stock control will be included in a separate report to be issued subsequently.

Army

The Army's stocks in Europe (exclusive of war reserve material) were valued at about \$1 billion prior to Operation FRELOC. The extent of adjustments made to the inventory records in Europe indicated that there was a high degree of discrepancy between those records and the stocks actually on hand in the depots. We suggested to Army officials that efforts be made to determine the specific causes of the high volume of adjustments so that corrective action could be taken, but they advised us that they did not have the personnel necessary to analyze the adjustments and determine the causes of the errors.

In controlling and accounting for the movement of assets from one location to another, it is essential that the intended recipient be informed of (1) the items being shipped, (2) the quantity of items, and (3) their condition. Such notice is essential in order to plan for proper storage, to establish due-in files, and to initiate follow-up actions if the proper items are not received. Furthermore, documents should accompany all shipments so that the recipient can identify, inspect, and reconcile the receipts with the advance notices of shipments. Although standard procedures require the implementation of these basic controls, we found that the necessary documentation was not received in many instances during Operation FRELOC.

As a result of inaccurate records and loss of documentation, we noted that:

1. Ammunition was shipped from France in quantities different from those directed to be shipped. Quantities received at destinations differed from those reported as shipped, and some ammunition shipments were still not accounted for.
2. Army depots in France contained medical supplies valued at about \$19.4 million, according to the stock records. Receipts from France exceeded shipping orders by quantities valued at more than \$400,000.

3. An additional \$490 million worth of stocks were moved from France. Due to a computer program error, control was lost over \$107 million worth of these items. At the time of our review, assets valued at \$32 million had been located but Army officials estimated that it would require 5 years to ascertain the locations of the remaining \$75 million worth.

Air Force

The Air Force encountered problems similar to those of the Army and found it advisable to take complete physical inventories at the new storage sites in England in order to determine what was at each location after Operation FRELOC was completed.

Some of the matters we noted in connection with Air Force inventories were:

1. Small caliber munitions in the amount of 207,000 rounds, purportedly shipped to Italy, were not yet located.
2. Aircraft pylons valued at \$175,000, and 86,000 gallons of deicing fluid valued at about \$73,000, were not accounted for.
3. Over 1,100 gun barrels in excess of the quantities ordered shipped were received in England.

UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE STORAGE SPACE

During our review we visited Army general storage sites in both Germany and England and noted that the depots located in Germany were extremely overcrowded. Material requiring covered storage space was being stored in the open, and the overall conditions made control over stocks difficult. At the Burtonwood Depot in England, we noted that there was a substantial amount of covered storage space that was not being utilized.

We advised the Secretary of Defense of our observations on September 26, 1967, and were advised in February 1968 that (1) greater use would be made of the depot facility in England and (2) construction requirements in Germany would be reduced accordingly. In May 1968, however, the Department of Defense advised us that the overall utilization of the Burtonwood Depot was being reevaluated.

REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF
ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION STORAGE FACILITIES

The United States Army, Europe, advised the Department of the Army that, as a result of the movement of supplies from France, it would be necessary to construct 73 ammunition storage igloos in the Saar region of Germany. Our analysis of requirements data for ammunition indicated that the need for 73 igloos was predicated on the storage of some ammunition that was excess to the Army's requirements in Europe.

On January 3, 1968, we advised the Secretary of Defense that, in our opinion, construction of 15 of the igloos should be reconsidered. The Department of Defense did not contest the general content of our report nor the statistical information but explained that safety factors and certain classified reasons were involved in the computation of requirements and should have been given further weight in our report. The Department of Defense advised us that, in view of fund limitations, the entire project was being deferred.

MILITARY LIQUIDATION SECTION

At March 31, 1967, the United States still held more than 300 leaseholds in France. A group known as the Military Liquidation Section (MLS) was established as a part of the American Embassy in Paris to (1) manage the remaining installations until they were turned over to the Government of France, (2) dispose of the personal property at the installations through sales either to the Government of France or to private interests, and (3) assume responsibility for all residual military interests.

At the time we concluded our review, in early 1968, MLS had returned 89 installations to the French Government and had negotiated sales of personal property at 65 installations. The sales prices for the personal property amounted to over \$13 million, representing about 27 percent of acquisition costs.

Following is a summary of the significant matters noted during our review of MLS operations. Further details on these and other matters related to the disposition of property in France will be included in a separate report on MLS and related matters to be issued subsequently.

1. The United States has a substantial investment in a housing project in the Paris area that is presently vacant. There are 78 units that could be utilized by U. S. Government personnel living in Paris, which would result in significant annual savings as well as a reduction in the gold flow. We believe that such utilization should be given consideration as an alternative to a forced sale of the United States' interest in the property.
2. In January 1968, we advised officials of the Departments of State and Defense of our concern that key personnel employed by MLS would not be available to assist in negotiations with the Government of France on residual values of real property. MLS has been reducing its staff as more installations are turned over to France and the workload decreases. Some of these personnel, however, would be required to

analyze real property values and otherwise assist the State Department.

We were advised that plans were being made to ensure the retention of key personnel.

3. Agreements between the United States and France for use of the former bases in France stipulated that, when the bases were vacated by the United States, negotiations would be undertaken to determine a method for establishing the residual values (amounts due the United States) of such properties. Beginning in 1952, a number of major military installations in which the United States had a significant investment have been turned over to France. Negotiations have never been started, however, to establish a method for determining the value of that investment.

In our subsequent report on these matters, we intend to make specific recommendations to the Secretary of State concerning possible use of the housing discussed in item 1 above.

PERSONAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT FORMER FRENCH BASES

We looked into the procedures employed by the Army and Air Force to identify related personal property (RPP) and construction materials, and to ascertain the utilization of such property and materials moved from France. We found that the Army had adequate control over a substantial amount of the construction materials removed from France. We did note that the Army had not made effective utilization of personal property removed from the French bases and that neither the Army nor the Air Force had identified and removed all usable property. Summaries of these matters follow. Further details will be included in our separate report on MLS and related matters.

Effective utilization of related personal property not accomplished

The Army removed large quantities of RPP that could not be used immediately because of (1) the poor condition

in which it was received, (2) the lack of sufficient personnel to receive, examine, and repair items, and (3) the receipt of excess and unusable material. It was not practical for us to determine the dollar value of such items because of the lack of adequate records at the time of our examination. The Army has taken steps to inventory and utilize these items, but progress has been slow because of personnel shortages and organizational changes.

We also noted that the Army had not taken proper steps to utilize prefabricated buildings removed from France. We brought this matter to the attention of Army officials and were informed that corrective actions were being taken.

Usable related personal property not identified and recovered at former military bases and sites in France

The Army and Air Force had not removed all the potentially usable installed equipment and supplies, such as prefabricated buildings, boilers, transformers, and certain electrical fixtures from the bases in France. In October 1967, we suggested to Army officials that a final review of the remaining items be made before negotiations with France for the disposal of United States bases and sites were completed. Army officials advised us in December 1967 that such a review would be made and that MLS had furnished the Army with lists of property still available. Construction and repair projects were to be screened to determine whether any items still left in France could be utilized. Army officials also informed us that the Air Force would be requested to participate in this screening program.

In following up on this matter, we found that Army representatives, during an inspection in February 1968, identified additional property valued at \$128,000 for removal from France. However, we found no evidence that the Air Force had participated in a reexamination of the property remaining in France.

CONTROL AND SCREENING OF EXCESS PROPERTY

The Army and Air Force generally followed their standard procedures for the screening of excess material during

Operation FRELOC; i.e., excesses were reported to the applicable inventory control point in the United States for disposition instructions. Our review disclosed that excess property screening procedures during Operation FRELOC were generally adequate for those items reported as excess; however, we noted some problem areas, as follows:

1. The Army in Europe does not notify inventory control points in the United States of items that are excess to its operating and reserve requirements but are being retained for potential future needs. As a result, the inventory control points have no opportunity to direct redistribution of such stocks to meet needs in other parts of the world.

During Operation FRELOC, the Army in Europe reduced its retention levels for such excess items from an 18-month supply to a 6-month supply. We noted that the percentage of excesses that were redistributed, rather than disposed of, increased substantially during that period, which indicated that needs do exist for many of the items being retained in Europe.

This matter has been called to the attention of officials of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army in previous reports by the General Accounting Office. We have recommended that all assets classified as retention stocks be reported to inventory managers in the United States for possible redistribution.

2. Some stocks are held in excess of normal retention levels if a future requirement is believed to exist. Although many of these are common use items, no attempt has been made to determine whether the Air Force or Navy in Europe can utilize them.
3. The Army, at June 30, 1967, had assets on hand valued at \$57.6 million that were excess to all requirements and retention levels but had not been reported to the national inventory control points for screening.

4. During Operation FRELOC, the Air Force shipped many items to Germany that were subsequently sold as scrap. Shipments of such material resulted in unnecessary transportation and handling costs.

CONCLUSIONS

Although faced with major problems with respect to the control over assets, the adequacy of new storage sites, and the need to complete the move within a short period of time, the Army and Air Force were able to accomplish the move from France in a generally effective manner. Difficulties were encountered during Operation FRELOC, but many, in our opinion, were due to long-standing problems inherent in the military supply systems, such as inaccurate inventory data and the retention of excess material. In addition, the late date of decisions by the Secretary of Defense in approving new storage locations probably contributed to the loss of control over some material and the failure to adequately utilize some storage facilities.

At the time of our review, the return of the former French bases to the Government of France was still in process but no steps had been taken to initiate discussions with respect to residual values of the properties. However, we were advised that information needed in the preparation and negotiation of United States claims against France was being assembled. The settlement of residual values will no doubt be difficult because the agreements with the French Government did not specify how such values were to be determined.

In our subsequent more detailed reports on specific aspects of FRELOC, we intend to make recommendations regarding the significant matters identified. We are therefore including no recommendations in this summary report.

APPENDIXES

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ACTIVITIES
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Clark Clifford	Mar. 1968	Present
Robert S. McNamara	Jan. 1961	Feb. 1968

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Paul H. Nitze	July 1967	Present
Cyrus R. Vance	Jan. 1964	June 1967

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS):

Thomas D. Morris	Sept. 1967	Present
Paul R. Ignatius	Dec. 1964	Aug. 1967

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):

Alfred B. Fitt	Sept. 1967	Present
Thomas D. Morris	Oct. 1965	Aug. 1967

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Stanley R. Resor	July 1965	Present
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UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

David E. McGiffert	July 1965	Present
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS):

Dr. Robert A. Brooks	Oct. 1965	Present
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PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ACTIVITIES
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT (continued)

<u>Tenure of office</u>	
<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (continued)

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Gen. William C. Westmoreland	July 1968	Present
Gen. Harold K. Johnson	July 1964	June 1968

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL:

Lt. Gen. A. O. Connor	July 1967	Present
Lt. Gen. James K. Woolnough	Aug. 1965	June 1967

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS:

Lt. Gen. Jean E. Engler	July 1967	Present
Lt. Gen. Lawrence J. Lincoln	Aug. 1964	June 1967

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(M&RA) (Formerly Deputy Under
Secretary of the Army) (Manpower)
(Change effective January 1,
1968)

William K. Brehm	Apr. 1968	Present
Arthur W. Allen, Jr. (acting)	Jan. 1968	Apr. 1968
Arthur W. Allen, Jr.	Oct. 1963	Dec. 1967

ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND:

Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr.	July 1962	Present
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CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S ARMY EUROPEAN
COMMAND:

Lt. Gen. John W. Bowen	July 1964	Present
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PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ACTIVITIES
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT (continued)

<u>Tenure of office</u>		
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

Dr. Harold Brown	Oct. 1965	Present
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UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

Townsend Hoopes	Oct. 1967	Present
Norman S. Paul	Oct. 1965	Oct. 1967

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGIS-
TICS):

Robert H. Charles	Nov. 1963	Present
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CHIEF OF STAFF:

Gen. John P. McConnell	Feb. 1965	Present
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DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL:

Lt. Gen. H. M. Wade	Aug. 1966	Present
Lt. Gen. William S. Stone	July 1962	Aug. 1966

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. AIR FORCE
IN EUROPE (USAFE):

Gen. Maurice A. Preston	Aug. 1966	Present
Gen. Bruce K. Holloway	Aug. 1965	July 1966

LOCATIONS WHERE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

REVIEWS WERE PERFORMED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

American Embassy, Paris, France

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Headquarters, United States European Command, Stuttgart,
Germany

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, and 7th Army,
Heidelberg, Germany
Military Liquidation Section, American Embassy, Paris,
France, and the 15 installations under its custody in
France
Headquarters, United States Army Communications Zone,
Europe, Worms, Germany
United States Army Terminal Command, Europe, Bremerhaven,
Germany
Supply and Maintenance Agency, Zweibruecken, Germany
United States Army General Depot, Kaiserslautern, Germany
United States Army General Depot, Nahbollenbach, Germany
United States Army General Depot, Pirmasens, Germany
United States Army General Depot, Burtonwood, United
Kingdom
United States Army Depot Activity, Fauld/Bramshall,
United Kingdom
United States Army Depot Activity, Ditton Priors
United Kingdom
United States Army Ammunition Depot, Miesau, Germany
Taunus District Headquarters, Frankfurt, Germany
Palatinate District Headquarters, Kaiserslautern, Germany
United States Army Engineer Command, Europe, Frankfurt,
Germany
Taunus District Engineers, Frankfurt, Germany
Palatinate District Engineers, Kaiserslautern, Germany

7th Army Training Center District Engineers, Grafenwoehr,
Germany
North Baden District Engineers, Mannheim, Germany
North Wuerttemberg District Engineers, Stuttgart, Germany
South Bavarian District Engineers, Augsburg, Germany

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe, Wiesbaden,
Germany
Ramstein Air Base, Ramstein, Germany
Sembach Air Base, Sembach, Germany
Air Force Redistribution and Marketing Center, Mainz-
Kastel, Germany

REPORTS TRANSMITTED
TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DURING THE COURSE OF THE
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REVIEW OF
OPERATION FRELOC

1. Letter regarding increased utilization of depot facilities in the United Kingdom (classified) (B-162488, September 26, 1967)
2. Letter regarding storage sites for subsistence stocks in Europe (classified) (B-161507, October 10, 1967)
3. Letter regarding requirements for construction of ammunition storage facilities in Germany (classified) (B-163143, January 3, 1968)