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GAO-11-776R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 11, 2011:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Interagency Collaboration: Implications of a Common Alignment
of World Regions among Select Federal Agencies:
To carry out complex national security initiatives--such as combating
illicit financing of terrorist activities, undertaking development
projects in conflict zones, and countering piracy off the Horn of
Africa--U.S. government agencies must coordinate with a large number
of organizations in their planning efforts.[Footnote 1] Our prior work
on the federal government's national security initiatives has
determined that U.S. agencies face a number of challenges to
effectively collaborating with one another, potentially resulting in
gaps and overlaps in policy implementation.[Footnote 2] In particular,
we have found that agencies face challenges to developing overarching
strategies to achieve common goals, creating effective mechanisms for
operating across agencies, and sharing sensitive information.[Footnote
3] For example, our work has shown that the Department of State
(State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have
different planning time frames than the Department of Defense (DOD),
which poses a challenge for the three organizations.[Footnote 4]
This report summarizes and formally transmits the enclosed briefing in
response to Section 1055 of the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, which required us to examine
the need for and implications of a common alignment of world regions
in the internal organization of federal departments and agencies with
international responsibilities, specifically the Department of
Commerce (Commerce), DOD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
the Department of Justice (Justice), State, the Department of the
Treasury (Treasury), USAID, and the agencies comprising the
intelligence community.[Footnote 5] To address the mandate, we
organized our review into the following three objectives: (1) describe
how federal departments and agencies are geographically organized to
address their international responsibilities, whether they share a
common geographic alignment, and their rationales for their
alignments; (2) examine agencies' views on the advantages and
disadvantages of a common geographic alignment, and whether there are
obstacles to implementing a common alignment; and (3) assess
challenges, if any, to interagency collaboration, including those
related to different geographic alignments, and measures agencies have
taken to overcome those challenges.
Scope and Methodology:
For our first objective--to describe how federal departments and
agencies are geographically organized to address their international
responsibilities, whether they share a common geographic alignment,
and the rationales for those alignments--we examined agency maps,
organizational charts, strategic plans, and other relevant documents.
We analyzed and compared the agencies' alignments, and confirmed those
alignments by meeting with officials from Commerce, DHS, DOD, Justice,
State, Treasury, and USAID. We also received written documentation
from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) on
behalf of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.[Footnote 6]
We compared and contrasted agency alignments globally, and we
graphically depicted the geographic alignment of DOD, State, and
USAID, whose primary missions are international in nature.
For our second and third objectives, we reviewed our body of work
related to interagency collaboration and used those prior findings to
develop a uniform set of interview questions regarding the potential
advantages and disadvantages of a common geographic alignment; the
obstacles, if any, to implementing a common alignment; the interagency
collaboration challenges that agencies may face; and measures agencies
have taken to overcome these challenges, as appropriate. Using these
questions, we interviewed senior officials and gathered documentation
from Commerce, DHS, DOD, Justice, State, Treasury, and USAID. We also
received responses to our questions from the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Policy's regional offices and the
State and USAID regional bureaus that are responsible for northern
Africa and southwest Asia. We focused on this region of the world for
our examination of the relationship between alignment and interagency
collaboration because we assessed that the differences in DOD, State,
and USAID alignments in this area are significant, and because of
sustained congressional interest in our work in national security
programs in this region. The regional offices we contacted included
the following:
* DOD's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East, and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central
Asia.
* State's Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs,
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Assistant
Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs.
* USAID's Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Sub-Saharan
Africa, Assistant Administrator for Asia, Special Assistant to the
Administrator for the Middle East, and Office of Afghanistan and
Pakistan Affairs.
We also received written responses to our questions from ODNI, on
behalf of key intelligence agencies, and from U.S. Africa Command and
U.S. Central Command. We compiled and systematically analyzed the
agency responses to determine common themes and develop summary
observations through a content analysis. Two analysts independently
reviewed each agency's response; coded the information to categorize
the responses, such as whether an agency indicated that there were
obstacles to implementing a common alignment; and entered the coded
data into a spreadsheet. The two analysts compared their results, and
all initial differences regarding the categorizations of agencies'
responses were discussed and reconciled. To obtain additional
perspectives on these issues, we reviewed studies by the Project on
National Security Reform and met with project officials.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to July 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
Global geographic alignments differ among agencies, which have a
variety of rationales for how they are organized and aligned in
different regions of the world. To address their international
responsibilities, DOD, State, USAID, and certain intelligence agencies
are organized by geographic region. These agencies also have
functional components or issue-based offices that serve across all
geographic regions. The other four agencies we reviewed--Commerce,
DHS, Justice, and Treasury--have missions that are predominantly
domestic in nature, and are organized primarily by functions or
issues; however, these agencies also have some offices and components
that are organized geographically. Moreover, we determined that, in
northern Africa and southwest Asia, DOD, State, and USAID have
alignments that are notably different from one another. Officials we
interviewed from all of the agencies stated that the rationale behind
their current alignment is related to achieving agency-specific
mission objectives. Several agencies also cited other rationales, such
as cultural, historical, or economic connections among countries, or
the need to balance workloads within the agencies. All of the agencies
indicated that they need the flexibility to reorganize their
geographic alignments to better meet mission requirements. For
additional information on the results on our first objective, see
enclosure I, pages 13 through 17.
Four agencies identified advantages to a common geographic alignment.
Three of these agencies pointed to DOD's creation of U.S. Africa
Command as an advantage of a common alignment because it improved the
coordination among a DOD combatant command, State, and USAID.[Footnote
7] However, these three agencies--in addition to Commerce, DHS, and
Treasury--also identified disadvantages to having a common geographic
alignment. For example, State officials indicated that realigning
State's regional bureaus to look like DOD's combatant commands could
lead international partners to view this step as emphasizing a
military approach towards U.S. diplomacy. Commerce, DHS, and Justice
identified specific obstacles to changing their alignments, such as
the potential need to increase personnel or retrain staff, because the
agencies are tailored in size and expertise to their current regional
responsibilities. For additional information on the results on our
second objective, see enclosure I, pages 18 though 20.
In examining interagency collaboration challenges in northern Africa
and southwest Asia, we found that the different geographic alignment
among DOD, State, and USAID does not appear to be a significant
factor. However, we also found that agencies continue to face
collaboration challenges, consistent with those that we have
identified in our prior work, and that agencies are taking some steps
to address such challenges. Our prior work identified challenges to
interagency collaboration, such as the lack of a comprehensive
strategy and milestones for counterterrorism activities in northern
Africa,[Footnote 8] the lack of clear agency roles and
responsibilities for undertaking counterpiracy operations,[Footnote 9]
and problems in creating a database of development projects in
Afghanistan that is accessible to all relevant agencies.[Footnote 10]
During this review, agencies identified similar challenges, including
differences among agency cultures and planning processes, and
difficulties in developing consensus around competing priorities. We
also found that State, DOD, USAID, and others are taking some steps to
address interagency collaboration challenges by elevating the
importance of interagency collaboration in their strategic plans and
through other measures. For example, U.S. Central Command embeds
civilian personnel into its command structure and stated that a "whole
of government" approach is integral to the command's operational
design. For additional information on the results on our third
objective, see enclosure I, pages 21 though 26.
We are not making new recommendations based on this review, because
many of the examples of interagency collaboration challenges that we
identified are similar to those that we have identified in prior work.
[Footnote 11] Agencies generally agreed with the recommendations from
our prior work, and have taken steps to implement some of them. For
example, the administration implemented a recommendation we made in
April 2008 to published a comprehensive plan involving all elements of
national power--including diplomatic, military, intelligence,
development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--for
meeting U.S. national security goals in Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas.[Footnote 12]
Agency Comments:
Commerce, DHS, DOD, Justice, ODNI, State, Treasury, and USAID provided
us with technical comments on a fact sheet drawn from our draft
report, which we incorporated as appropriate. Commerce, DHS, DOD,
ODNI, State, and USAID each told us that the fact sheet accurately
presented the agencies' perspectives. Subsequently, DOD provided us
with additional technical comments after reviewing a draft of this
report. We incorporated those comments, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretaries of State,
Defense, the Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security; the U.S.
Attorney General; the Administrator of USAID; and the Director of
National Intelligence. The report also is available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact either John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or
pendletonj@gao.gov or Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers at (202) 512-3101 or
williamsbridgersj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
enclosure II.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by:
Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Enclosures - 2:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Lindsey Graham:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Kay Granger:
Chairman:
The Honorable Nita Lowey:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I:
Interagency Collaboration: Implications of a Common Alignment of World
Regions among Select Federal Agencies:
Briefing for Congressional Committees:
July 2011:
Congressional Mandate and GAO Objectives:
Section 1055 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011, which was enacted on January 7, 2011, required GAO
to assess the need for and implications of a common alignment of world
regions in the internal organization of federal departments and
agencies with international responsibilities and report within 180
days of enactment, or by July 6, 2011.
To address the mandate, we organized our review into the following
three objectives:
* Objective 1: Describe how federal departments and agencies are
geographically organized to address their international
responsibilities, whether they share a common geographic alignment,
and their rationales for their alignments.
* Objective 2: Examine agencies' views on the advantages and
disadvantages of a common geographic alignment, and whether there are
obstacles to implementing a common alignment.
* Objective 3: Assess challenges, if any, to interagency
collaboration, including those related to different geographic
alignments, and measures agencies have taken to overcome those
challenges.
Objective 1: How Federal Agencies are Organized and Whether they Share
a Common Geographic Alignment:
DOD, State, USAID, and certain intelligence agencies are organized by
geographic region to address their international responsibilities.
These agencies also include functional components or issue-based
offices that serve across all geographic regions, for example, State's
Bureau of Arms Control Verification, Compliance, and Implementation.
Commerce, DHS, Justice, and Treasury, whose missions are predominantly
domestic in nature, are organized by functions or issues. For example,
Justice's missions are carried out by components such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration.
However, these agencies may have geographically organized offices and
components for their international operational responsibilities; for
example, Justice's Office of International Affairs in its Criminal
Division serves as a nerve center for the agency's international
efforts.
Global geographic alignments differ among agencies; DOD, State, and
USAID have different alignments in northern Africa and southwest Asia.
Objective 1: Regional Alignments of Federal Agencies:
Figure 1: Geographic Alignment of Select Federal Agencies:
[Refer to PDF for image: interactive world map]
Interactivity instructions:
Click on the button to view agencies' alignment.
Click clear to view base map.
State Regional Bureaus and DOD combatant commands:
State Regional Bureaus and OUSD-Policy (DOD):
State Regional Bureaus and USAID Regional Bureaus:
USAID Regional Bureaus and DOD combatant commands:
USAID Regional Bureaus and OUSD-Policy (DOD):
OUSD-Policy (DOD and DOD combatant commands:
Other federal agencies:
Intelligence: agencies:
Clear:
Source: GAO analysis of agency information.
[End of figure]
Note: Noninteractive graphics and text from figure 1 are reproduced in
appendix I to this briefing.
Objective 1: Different DOD, State, and USAID Alignments in Northern
Africa and Southwest Asia:
Figure 2: Differences in Alignment among DOD, State, and USAID
Alignments in Northern Africa and Southwest Asia:
[Refer to PDF for image: map of Northern Africa and Southwest Asia]
Map depicts areas aligned with the following:
U.S. European Command: EUCOM;
U.S. Pacific Command: PACOM;
U.S. Africa Command: AFRICOM.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD State Department, and USAID information.
[End of figure]
Objective 1: Agency Views on Rationales for Specific Geographic
Alignments:
Agencies indicated a variety of reasons for their alignments,
including:
* To achieve agency-specific mission objectives (all agencies).
* To reflect commonalities among countries with cultural, historical,
or economic connections (DHS, DOD, Justice, ODNI, State, Treasury,
USAID).
* To address management issues, such as the need to balance workloads
within the agency (Commerce, DOD, Justice, State, USAID).
All of the agencies indicated that they need the flexibility to
reorganize their geographic alignments in order to better meet mission
requirements.
* DOD's Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has
modified its organization three times since 2005 to adjust to new
priorities.
* Treasury placed its Afghanistan Office under the same leadership as
its Office of Technical Assistance because of the unique needs with
respect to developing Afghanistan's financial sector, which has little
or no infrastructure or existing financial systems.
Objective 1: Examples of Rationales for Specific Geographic
Alignments:
* DOD placed Pakistan and India in separate geographic combatant
commands in order to foster U.S. military relationships with each
country, given their history of tension and conflict. In contrast,
State placed Pakistan and India in the same regional bureau because of
political-military issues between the two nations, as well as other
crosscutting issues that affect the region as a whole.
* DOD brought all African countries other than Egypt into U.S. Africa
Command in order to bring focus to African issues, whereas State and
USAID draw distinctions between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa
because of historic, cultural, and economic differences between the
regions.
* State and DOD each distributed the countries of the former Soviet
Union into separate regions for a variety of reasons, including to
balance the workloads across different DOD or State offices and
because of historic, cultural, linguistic, and trade ties among the
newly independent countries and their neighbors.
Objective 2: Agency Views on Common Geographic Alignment--Advantages:
Three agencies (DOD, State, and USAID) pointed to DOD's creation of
U.S. Africa Command as an advantage because it created a more common
geographic alignment between a DOD combatant command and civilian
agencies.
* State and USAID indicated that the U.S. Africa Command's
establishment was beneficial because they can now coordinate with one
combatant command on African issues, compared to coordinating with
three in the prior situation, and DOD stated that the consolidation
helped elevate African issues.
* However, during our prior work State and USAID had raised concerns
that U.S. Africa Command's establishment could blur traditional
boundaries among diplomacy, development, and defense functions.
Four agencies (Commerce, DHS, Justice, and ODNI) did not identify any
advantages of a common alignment, while Treasury stated that a common
alignment could be advantageous if the realignment also accounted for
the agency's changing priorities and missions.
Objective 2: Agency Views on Common Geographic Alignment--
Disadvantages:
Six agencies (Commerce, DHS, DOD, State, Treasury, and USAID) identified
disadvantages to having a common geographic alignment.
* DOD, State, and USAID indicated that regional relationships could
suffer if agencies were required to implement a common geographic
alignment. For example, State indicated that realigning its regional
bureaus to look like DOD's combatant commands could lead international
partners to view this step as emphasizing a military approach toward
U.S. diplomacy.
* DOD, State, and Treasury indicated that a requirement to implement a
common geographic alignment could impair their flexibility to realign
based on mission objectives For example, State and Treasury indicated
that a common alignment would limit their capabilities to group
countries based on the agency's changing policy and program
priorities, such as financial markets and refugee populations.
Objective 2: Agency Views on Implementing a Common Geographic
Alignment--Obstacles:
Three agencies (Commerce, DHS, and Justice) identified resource
limitations and organizational biases as being obstacles to
implementing a common geographic alignment.
* Commerce indicated that the International Trade Administration and
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration would have to increase
or retrain staff because they were tailored in size and expertise to
their current regional responsibilities.
* Stating that its components were individually aligned to perform
border protection, customs enforcement, and other responsibilities,
DHS indicated that it would be unlikely to concur with a proposal that
DHS or its components reflect another agency's alignment because other
agencies' responsibilities are different.
Five agencies (DOD, ODNI, State, Treasury, and USAID) did not identify
specific obstacles to changing their alignments.
Objective 3: Challenges to Interagency Collaboration and Measures
Taken to Overcome Them:
Our past work has identified challenges to interagency collaboration
other than differences in geographic alignment; these factors included
different strategic planning timelines and processes, difficulties in
creating interagency mechanisms for collaboration, and problems in
information sharing.
We focused this review on northern Africa and southwest Asia because
we assessed that the differences in DOD, State, and USAID alignments
in this area were significant, and because of sustained congressional
interest in our work on programs in this region. Our review determined
that:
* the agencies continue to face interagency collaboration challenges
that are similar to those that we've identified in this region in the
past, and,
* different geographic alignments do not appear to be a significant
factor.
Agencies have taken some measures to address interagency collaboration
challenges, but these measures have not emphasized geographic
realignment.
Objective 3: GAO's Prior Work Has Identified Challenges
and Enablers to Interagency Collaboration:
Table 1: Key Characteristics, Challenges, and Enablers to Interagency
Collaboration:
Characteristic: Developing and implementing overarching strategies to
achieve collaborative goals;
Challenges:
* Agency-specific strategies developed without coordination with other
agencies or with overarching strategies;
* Unclear agency roles and responsibilities for implementation;
* Insufficient guidance to set agency priorities;
* Lack of goals, milestones, and performance metrics;
* Unclear or ineffective mechanisms to assess performance.
Enablers: Strategic planning and coordination; identifying roles,
responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms; identifying agency
priorities; setting milestones; and establishing and tracking
performance measures.
Characteristic: Creating effective interagency mechanisms that
facilitate integrated national security approaches;
Challenges:
* Unclear lines of authority and accountability for each agency
involved;
* Not all stakeholders are involved;
* Participant planning processes are misaligned or incompatible;
* Lack of policies, procedures, resources, trained personnel, and
other means to effectively operate across different agencies;
Enablers: Key organizational factors that enable common or compatible
organizational structures, planning processes, funding sources, and
coordination mechanisms
Characteristic: Sharing and integrating information across agencies;
Challenges:
* Lack of standards for data collection, usage, storage, protection,
or a combination of these;
* Cultural or political barriers that inhibit information sharing;
* Lack of interagency agreements on procedures for sharing information;
* Security clearance requirements are not harmonized;
Enablers: Communications mechanisms to appropriately share and
integrate information in a timely manner among federal, state, local,
and private-sector partners, to plan for, assess, and respond to
current and future threats to U.S. national security.
Source: Based on GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies,
Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing, GAO-09-904SP
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009).
[End of table]
Objective 3: Examples of Interagency Collaboration Challenges from
GAO's Prior Work:
Figure 3: Interagency Collaboration Challenges in Northern Africa and
Southwest Asia Identified in Prior GAO Work:
[Refer to PDF for image: interactive map of Northern Africa and
Southwest Asia]
Interactivity instructions:
Click on a silver button to view prior GAO Command work in that region.
Click "Clear all" to view base map.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State Department, and USAID information,
and previous GAO reports.
Note: Noninteractive graphic and text from figure 3 are reproduced in
appendix II of this briefing.
[End of figure]
Objective 3: Recommendations from Our Prior Work on Interagency
Collaboration:
GAO has made multiple recommendations in its prior work that would
address interagency collaboration challenges, and agencies have
generally agreed with them. For example:
* Treasury partially agreed with our recommendation that it work with
other agencies involved in anti-money laundering and counterterrorist
financing issues to develop and implement (1) compatible policies and
procedures for working together, and (2) a mechanism for monitoring,
evaluating, and reporting on interagency collaboration (GAO-09-794).
* State and USAID agreed, and DOD partially agreed, with our
recommendations to enhance the implementation of the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership to eliminate terrorist safe havens in
northwest Africa (GAO-08-860).
* DOD and USAID agreed with our recommendation that the U.S.
government develop a comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national
security goals in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (GAO-
08-622); the administration has implemented this recommendation.
Objective 3: Continuing Interagency Collaboration Challenges Surfaced
in the Current Review:
* Challenges to strategic planning. State indicated that differences
among agency cultures, communications processes, and planning
structures inhibit strategic planning.
* Differences in planning processes. DOD and State indicated that
differences between the agencies' planning processes and lines of
authority create challenges to synchronizing and collaborating on
regional and country-level plans.
* Challenges to working across different agencies. Commerce, DHS, and
Justice identified difficulties in developing consensus around their
priorities with other agencies.
Objective 3: Measures Taken to Address Challenges to Interagency
Collaboration:
* Emphasizing collaboration in strategic plans.
- DOD's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review indicated that planning and
executing "whole-of-government" operations requires significantly
improved interagency collaboration.
- State and USAID's 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
identified the need to turn to other government agencies for experience
and expertise in performing international functions. DHS and Justice
officials told us that they viewed this recognition as positive.
* Establishing coordinating mechanisms. U.S. Africa Command and U.S.
Central Command embed personnel from civilian agencies into their
command structures. U.S. Central Command stated that a "whole-of-
government" structure involving civilian personnel from other agencies
is integral to the command's operational design.
* Identifying agency priorities. DHS is preparing the department's
first-ever International Strategic Framework in order to articulate
its priorities and improve its ability to collaborate with State,
USAID, and DOD.
Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (State and
DOD Combatant Commands):
Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (State and
OUSD Policy):
Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (State and
USAID):
Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (USAID and
DOD Combatant Commands):
Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (USAID and
OUSD Policy):
Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (OUSD Policy
and DOD Combatant Commands):
Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (Other
Agencies):
Agency: Commerce[A]:
Geographic alignment: Office of Market Access and Compliance;
* Europe;
* Asia;
* Western hemisphere;
* Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.
Geographic alignment: Commercial Service
* Europe;
* East Asia and Pacific;
* Western Europe;
* Africa, Near East, and South Asia;
* Western hemisphere.
Geographic alignment: National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration[B];
* Canada;
* South America;
* China;
* Europe;
* Latin America and the Caribbean;
* Middle East and South Asia;
* Arctic;
* Africa;
* Antarctica;
* East Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific
Islands.
Agency: DHS;
Geographic alignment: Office of International Affairs;
* Canada;
* Middle East, Africa, and South Asia;
* Mexico;
* Europe and Multilateral Affairs;
* Latin America and the Caribbean;
Asia-Pacific.
Agency: Justice;
Geographic alignment: Office of International Affairs, Criminal
Division;
* United Kingdom (and overseas territories), Ireland, Australia, New
Zealand, English-speaking Caribbean, Haiti, Belize, Guyana, and
Gibraltar;
* South America (except Guyana);
* Central, Eastern, and Western Europe, former Soviet republics, and
Dutch and French-speaking Caribbean (except Haiti);
* Canada;
* Mexico, Central America, and Spanish-speaking Caribbean;
* Asia, Middle East, and Africa.
Agency: Treasury;
Geographic alignment: Office of International Affairs;
* Middle East and North Africa;
* East Asia;
* Sub-Saharan Africa;
* South and Southeast Asia
* Western hemisphere;
* Afghanistan
* Europe and Eurasia.
Geographic alignment: Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial
Crime[C];
* Asia/Europe;
* Middle East/Africa/Western Hemisphere.
Source: GAO presentation of Commerce, DHS, Justice, and Treasury
information.
[A] Commerce lacks a headquarters-level geographic alignment. The
Offices of Market Access and Compliance and Commercial Service are
part of the Department's International Trade Administration, and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has its own
geographic alignment. Components of DHS (e.g., the Transportation
Security Agency) and Justice (e.g., the Federal Bureau of
Investigation) have their own geographic alignments.
[B] The following represents the alignment of the Office of
International Affairs at NOAA headquarters, and does not necessarily
represent the geographic alignment of NOAA's line offices.
[C] This office is part of the Office of Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence.
[End of table]
Appendix I: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Figure 1 (Select
Intelligence Agencies):
Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence[A]:
Geographic alignment: National Intelligence Managers;
* Africa;
* South Asia
* East Asia;
* Near East
* Europe;
* Russia-Eurasia
* Iran;
* Western hemisphere
Geographic alignment: National Intelligence Council;
* Africa;
* Near East;
* East Asia;
* North Korea;
* Europe;
* Russia-Eurasia;
* Iran;
* Western hemisphere;
* South Asia.
Agency: Defense Intelligence Agency;
Geographic alignment: Directorate of Analysis;
* Asia-Pacific;
* Middle East and North Africa;
* Latin America, Europe-Eurasia, and Africa.
Geographic alignment: Defense Intelligence Officers
* Africa;
* Latin America;
* East Asia;
* Middle East-North Africa;
* Eurasia;
* South Asia;
* Europe-NATO.
Agency: Central Intelligence Agency;
Geographic alignment: Directorate of Intelligence;
* Asian-Pacific, Latin America, and Africa;
* Russia and Europe;
* Iraq;
* South Asia;
* Middle East and North Africa.
Agency: Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research;
Geographic alignment: Analysis and Production;
* Africa;
* Near East and South Asia.
* East Asia and Pacific;
* Russia and Eurasia.
* Europe;
* Western Hemisphere.
Source: GAO presentation of Office of the Director of National
Intelligence information.
[A] The following does not reflect information pertaining to
functional managers.
[End of table]
Page 34 GAO-11-776R
A GAO
4E Accountability * Integrity * Reliability
Appendix 2: Noninteractive Graphic and Text for Figure 3:
GAO-0&-880:
U.S. agencies lacked a comprehensive strategy and milestones to
measure progress for their trans-Saharan counterterrorism partnership
(ISGTP) activities and disagreed about authority over DOD personnel
temporarily assigned to assist State's TSGTP activities. (Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia. Mauritania. Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad).
GAO-09-120 and GAO-11-124:
State, USAID. and their international stakeholders lacked a
comprehensive strategy to address the Iraqi refugee situation and
lacked strategic goals and intended outcomes for reintegrating
displaced Iraqis. (Iraq, Jordan, Syria and others).
GA0-10-375:
Treasury could not provide other agencies with complete and timely
information regarding its licensing of exports to Iran in accordance
with the trade ban.
GAO-09-615 and GAO-11-138:
DOD and USAID officials lacked a common database of Afghanistan
reconstruction projects accessible by all parties.
GAO-08-622:
The U.S. government lacked a comprehensive plan to close the terrorist
safe haven in tribal areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan.
GAO-10-856:
The U.S. government's plan for countering piracy off the Horn of
Africa did not designate clear agency roles and responsibilities or
identify measures of effectiveness. (Somalia, Yeman, Oman, Saudi
Arabia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and other).
GAO-10-794:
U.S. Africa Command had not fully integrated interagency partners into
its planning processes, and Africa strategies for State and USAID had
different timelines from those of AFRICOM (the entire African
continent except for Egypt).
Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State Department, and USAID information,
and previous GAO reports.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Strategies and Efforts to Deny
Terrorists Safe Haven. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-713T]. Washington, D.C.: June 3,
2011.
Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains
Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-449T]. Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2011.
Displaced Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed to
Reintegrate Iraq's Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-11-124]. Washington, D.C.:
December 2, 2010.
Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Water Sector
Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-11-138]. Washington, D.C.:
November 15, 2010.
National Security: An Overview of Professional Development Activities
Intended to Improve Interagency Collaboration. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-11-108]. Washington,
D.C.: November 15, 2010.
Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and
Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off
the Horn of Africa. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-856]. Washington, D.C.: September
24, 2010.
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Improvements
Needed in Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key Users.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-799]. Washington, D.C.:
September 1, 2010.
Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency
Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges
Conducting a Large Military Operation. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-801]. Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2010.
Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency
Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-794].
Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.
Iran Sanctions: Complete and Timely Licensing Data Needed to
Strengthen Enforcement of Export Restrictions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-375]. Washington, D.C.: March 4,
2010.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and
Interagency Coordination for the Commander's Emergency Response
Program in Afghanistan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-09-615]. Washington, D.C.: May 18,
2009.
Iraqi Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress,
Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International
Strategic Plan. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-09-120].
Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2009.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860]. Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to
Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622]. Washington, D.C.: April 17,
2008.
[End of section]
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[End of Enclosure I: Briefing slides]
Enclosure II:
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, (202) 512-3101 or
williamsbridgersj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contacts named above, key contributors to this
report included Marie Mak, Assistant Director; Tetsuo Miyabara,
Assistant Director; Joseph Capuano; Susan Ditto; Nicole Harms;
Farahnaaz Khakoo; Kevin O’Neill; Michael Silver; Matthew Spiers; and
Amie Steele.
[End of Enclosure II]
Footnotes:
[1] For example, the Project on National Security Reform has noted
that the actors in U.S. national security policy include government
departments that have not traditionally been involved, like the
Departments of Agriculture, the Interior, Justice, Transportation, and
the Treasury, as well as agencies such as the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention within the Department of Health and Human
Services, and elements of state and local government and the private
sector.
[2] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce,
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2009).
[3] See related GAO products at the end of this report.
[4] GAO, Defense Management, Improved Planning, Training, and
Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-794] (Washington, D.C.:
July 28, 2010).
[5] Pub. L. No. 111-383, §1055, directed GAO to address: (1) problems
and inefficiencies that result from a lack of common alignment,
including impediments to interagency collaboration; (2) obstacles to
implementing a common alignment; (3) advantages and disadvantages of a
common alignment; and (4) measures taken to address challenges
associated with the lack of a common alignment.
[6] In providing us with written responses to our questions, ODNI
indicated that the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the State's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research are the federal government's key all-source intelligence
agencies.
[7] State and USAID previously raised concerns with us that U.S.
Africa Command's establishment could lead to the perception that U.S.
foreign policy was being "militarized" because the newly established
command blurred traditional boundaries among diplomacy, development,
and defense functions. See GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to
Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and
Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181] (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 20, 2009).
[8] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation
of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860] (Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2008).
[9] GAO, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan
and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy
off the Horn of Africa, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24,
2010).
[10] GAO, Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts to Support Afghan
Water Sector Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and
Coordination, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-138]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2010), and Military Operations: Actions
Needed to Improve Oversight and Interagency Coordination for the
Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-615] (Washington, D.C.: May 18,
2009).
[11] For example, in our prior work on U.S. Africa Command's efforts
to develop strategies and engage interagency partners, we recommended
that the command expedite the completion of its regional engagement
and country plans and its component support plans. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-794].
[12] GAO, Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive
Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17,
2008).
[End of section]
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