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November 30, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

Subject: Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security 
Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities 
Are Not Fully Developed: 

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, issued by the National 
Security Council in November 2005, asserted the Coalition's intention 
to adjust its "posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi 
capabilities grow," and for Coalition troop levels in Iraq to decrease 
over time as the Iraqis take on more responsibilities for themselves. 
Some three months later, in response to the growing capability of the 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and some other indicators of progress, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) recommended a decrease in the U.S. force 
structure in Iraq from 17 to 15 combat brigades--a reduction of about 
7,000 troops. Following the bombing of the Golden Mosque of Samarra on 
February 22, 2006, however, an upsurge in violence throughout the 
country undermined political gains and challenged the Government of 
Iraq. 

In light of these developments, the President commissioned a strategic 
review in November 2006 that resulted in a new U.S. strategy for Iraq, 
entitled the New Way Forward. President Bush announced this new 
strategy on January 10, 2007, noting that he had made clear to the 
Iraqi Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America would hold 
the Iraqi Government to a set of political, security, and economic 
benchmarks. On May 25, 2007, the President signed into law the U.S. 
Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 (the Act), which contained 18 
benchmarks against which progress by the Government of Iraq was to be 
measured.[Footnote 1] One of those benchmarks is the increase of the 
number of Iraqi Security Force units capable of operating 
independently. 

Since passage of the Act, several reports assessing the ability of the 
Iraqi Security Forces to operate independently have been issued. 

* DOD's June 2007 report to Congress[Footnote 2] stated that although 
the United States, its Coalition partners, and the Iraqi government 
continued to expand the size and capability of the Iraqi forces to meet 
emerging requirements, the persistence of violence by insurgents, 
terrorists, and militias means that Iraqi forces will require continued 
training, development, and equipping from Coalition forces in order to 
progressively assume missions on their own. The report outlined four 
major areas on which the Coalition would focus, one of which was 
support for the expansion of the Iraqi army. 

* Also in June 2007, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight 
& Investigations released its Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing 
Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces, in which it reported 
that despite making significant progress in generating a sizeable 
national force, the Iraqi Security Forces have not developed as fast as 
the Coalition planned; that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) and 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) were not capable of accounting for, 
supporting, or fully controlling their forces in the field; and that 
the ISF did not have critical enablers such as intelligence and 
logistics systems and processes that permit independent planning and 
operations. 

* In its Initial Benchmark Assessment Report to Congress, submitted on 
July 12, 2007, the Administration asserted that while the Coalition had 
significantly enhanced its training and mentoring commitment to the 
ISF, the Iraqi Government had made unsatisfactory progress toward 
increasing the number of Iraqi Security Force units capable of 
operating independently, and thus the presence of Coalition partners 
and support remained necessary for ISF operations. 

* In GAO's September 4, 2007, report to Congress (Securing, 
Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most 
Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks),[Footnote 3] we 
assessed that although the ISF had grown in size and was increasingly 
leading counterinsurgency operations the Government of Iraq had not met 
the benchmark of increasing the number of Iraqi Security Force units 
capable of operating independently. Furthermore, we reported that 
because of Iraq's immature logistics systems, many Iraqi military and 
police units would continue to depend on Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-
I) for key sustainment and logistics support until December 2008. 

* On September 6, 2007, the Independent Commission on the Security 
Forces of Iraq released its report, stating that in general Iraqi 
Security Forces have made uneven progress but would continue to rely on 
the Coalition to provide key enablers such as combat support (aviation 
support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support 
(logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. 

* In its September 2007 report to Congress,[Footnote 4] DOD stated that 
although there had been further improvement in the maturation of the 
Army and, to a lesser degree, the police since its last (June 2007) 
report, Ministry of Defense logistics from tactical to strategic levels 
and Ministry of Interior logistics at the strategic level were fragile 
and not capable of independent execution. 

* Finally, the Administration's September 14, 2007, Benchmark 
Assessment Report stated that although some Iraqi Army and police 
forces were operating independently, it also stated that the greatest 
constraints on independent operations were a shortage of trained 
leaders and an immature logistics capability, and that for the present 
time Coalition partnership and support remained necessary for most ISF 
operations. 

Since January 2006, GAO has been assessing three support capabilities 
that all the aforementioned reports have cited in whole or in part as 
being key to the ISF's achieving independence. Those three capabilities 
are logistics, command and control, and intelligence. The first of our 
reports,[Footnote 5] issued in March 2007, presented our preliminary 
observations on the Iraqi Security Forces' support capabilities as of 
August 2006. In those reports we noted that significant challenges had 
to be overcome before the ISF attained self-sufficiency. Those 
challenges included developing an effective logistics infrastructure to 
support the Iraqi military and police; training Iraqi logisticians and 
communications and intelligence specialists; maintaining vehicles and 
equipment; and developing policies and procedures within the 
ministries. In light of the continuing broad congressional interest in 
Iraq, we have undertaken this follow-on engagement under the authority 
of the Comptroller General[Footnote 6] to conduct evaluations at his 
own initiative to examine in more detail the progress achieved in the 
development of these capabilities. Specifically, our objectives were to 
determine: (1) what progress has been made toward the development of 
Iraqi Security Forces' logistical, command and control, and 
intelligence capabilities, and what factors have affected further 
progress; and (2) to what extent can DOD reports that ISF units are 
capable of fully independent operations be supported. This report is 
one of a series of products that GAO has produced since June 2004 
addressing the security situation in Iraq and the ISF. A list of our 
related unclassified GAO products appears at the end of this report. 

We use the term ISF in this report to refer to the combined forces of 
the MOD and the MOI. However, the composition, structure, and 
logistical, command and control, and intelligence systems of the two 
ministries are significantly different. For example, the MOD is 
developing a centrally directed logistics system composed of 
organizations with specific responsibilities at various levels of the 
chain of command but the MOI's logistics concept envisions a system 
with a hybrid of centralized and decentralized logistics support 
structures and mechanisms. Likewise, command and control in the MOD is 
predicated on a classic military model headed by ministerial officials 
who rely on commissioned and noncommissioned officers supported by a 
communications and intelligence network that facilitates the 
transmission of information both up and down the chain of command, 
while command and control and intelligence in the MOI are organized 
very differently. Some MOI forces, such as the National Police, receive 
direction and intelligence from the ministry itself; others, most 
notably the Iraqi Police Service, receive their intelligence 
information from and are commanded and controlled by provincial 
officials. Because of these differences, the factors we have identified 
as impacting the development of each ministry's support capabilities 
have affected the ministries in commensurately different ways and we 
address the two in separate sections, starting with the Ministry of 
Defense. 

To determine the factors that have affected progress toward the 
development of ISF support capabilities we reviewed relevant documents, 
orders, and data that we obtained from the Department of Defense. We 
also submitted written questions to DOD, received and reviewed those 
responses, and met with and interviewed DOD officials in the United 
States and Iraq, including representatives from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency. We also conducted telephone, e-mail, and in-person 
interviews with former senior Coalition officials who recently returned 
to the United States after serving year-long tours in Iraq as advisers 
to the ISF and had teleconferences with Coalition officials still in 
Iraq, during which we obtained additional information directly from the 
appropriate individuals in Iraq. During our visits with individuals, we 
determined that the data they provided us was sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of this report. We conducted our review from December 2006 
through November 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Finally, in order to determine what progress has 
been made in developing the support capabilities of the MOD and MOI, we 
compared the state of development of those capabilities as of summer 
2007 with what we found to be their state of development as of August 
2006. 

Results in Brief: 

While the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, with Coalition 
assistance, made some progress since August 2006 in developing their 
respective logistics, command and control, and intelligence 
capabilities--for example, the MOD has formed most of its lower echelon 
logistics units and the MOI has established an intelligence 
organization--persistent violence[Footnote 7] and sectarianism, along 
with immature ministerial capacity, continue to impede this progress. 
For example, sustained violence caused the Iraqi government to decide 
to increase the size of the MOD forces and to prioritize the formation, 
replenishment, and sustainment of its combat forces over combat 
support, combat service support, and training formations. As a result, 
the development of a national depot and garrison support units has 
lagged behind that of lower level logistics units; Iraqi recruits 
designated for training as logistics specialists have been diverted to 
combat roles; training schools are inadequately staffed; and the 
shortage of noncommissioned officers throughout the Iraqi Army has 
worsened. Moreover, because the Ministry of Defense has yet to develop 
adequate personnel management and support functions, Iraqi support 
specialists are not being employed in the positions for which they were 
trained, and schools with the mission of training these specialists 
lack fuel, equipment, and supplies. For the Ministry of Interior, 
violence has prevented contractors from completing the installation of 
a command and control network, hampered intelligence capabilities, and 
caused the ministry to implement force structure increases that have 
aggravated its logistics challenges, while sectarianism threatens the 
MOI's ability to exert effective command and control over its forces. 
Further, the MOI has not sufficiently developed its capacity to 
maintain or sustain its police forces, nor has it developed a personnel 
management system to accurately account for its personnel, thus further 
hindering its ability to provide command and control and logistical 
support for its units. 

Although DOD has, in multiple reports, stated that a certain number of 
ISF units are either "independent" or "fully independent," it is 
unclear how DOD arrived at this determination for three reasons. First, 
since spring 2006 the process that Coalition transition teams use to 
assess ISF units does not allow the option of giving a rating of 
independent or fully independent; according to Multi-National Corps- 
Iraq's (MNC-I) Transitional Readiness Assessment Report Implementing 
Instructions Update, the highest rating any ISF unit can attain is 
"capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency 
operations."[Footnote 8] Second, in each of the reports in which DOD 
asserts that a certain number of ISF units are independent or fully 
independent it apparently contradicts this assertion by appending 
significant qualifiers to the achievement of ISF independence. For 
example, DOD reported in June 2007 that a certain number of MOD units 
were either "in the lead with Coalition enablers" or "fully 
independent" but then added the qualifying statements that fielded MOD 
forces "often do not get the support they require without substantial 
Coalition assistance" and "MOD's continued limited logistics and 
sustainment capacity is a key hindrance to Iraqi forces' ability to 
assume missions from the Coalition." Third, the MOD and MOI have yet to 
develop those support capabilities by which they can logistically 
sustain their forces, effectively command and control their forces, and 
provide intelligence to their forces--all of which are inherent to 
independence. As a result of DOD's lack of clarity, Congress and other 
decision makers may not obtain a clear picture of the progress of the 
ISF and whether it is becoming capable of truly conducting its 
operations independently, i.e., without Coalition assistance and 
support. Therefore, we recommend that DOD clarify its use of the terms 
"independent" or "fully independent" as they relate to the assessed 
capabilities of ISF units, and particularly as they relate to the 
logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of those 
units. We also recommend that it clarify the process it uses to make 
this assessment. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the department partially 
concurred with our two recommendations, although it did not explicitly 
outline any actions it would take to adopt them. Consequently, we 
continue to believe that the actions we recommended are needed in order 
to ensure that Congress and other decision makers are provided a clear 
picture of ISF capabilities. 

DOD agreed that the use of the terms "independent" and "fully 
independent" can cause confusion, but stated that these terms were 
still being used in reports and briefings because they are "more 
illustrative" than other terms, although the department also stated 
that it will evaluate its assessment terminology to more clearly 
describe progress in capability development for the Iraqi forces. We do 
not argue that some ISF units are more capable than others from an 
operational standpoint. However, given the present state of the ISF's 
capabilities, especially in the areas of logistics, command and 
control, and intelligence, we believe that using the terms 
"independent" or "fully independent" without clarification to describe 
the ISF in reports and briefings perpetuates the very confusion DOD 
acknowledges. The department also partially concurred with our 
recommendation that it clarify the process it uses to assess ISF units 
and replied that both the objective and subjective criteria defining 
effectiveness used by transition teams is contained in Multi-National 
Corps-Iraq's implementing instructions. The last time that DOD provided 
any information on this process in its quarterly reports to Congress, 
however, was July 2005. Since that time, the implementing instructions 
for the assessment process have changed at least twice. We believe, 
therefore, that in order to ensure Congress has a more complete and up- 
to-date understanding of the assessment process, DOD should provide it 
with an updated and detailed explanation of the current process. 
Finally, the department also provided more specific technical comments 
which we have reproduced and addressed individually at the end of this 
report. 

Background: 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which 
operates under Multi-National Forces-Iraq, leads the Coalition effort 
to train, equip, and organize the ISF. Previously, once ISF units were 
trained and equipped, operational responsibility for their employment 
was turned over to Multi-National Corps-Iraq. As of June 2007, the 
Iraqi Ground Forces Command has assumed operational control of 8 of the 
10 extant Iraqi Army divisions, and the Ministry of Interior has 
assumed operational control of the National Police. 

Overall, the number of Iraqi military and police personnel the 
Coalition has trained and equipped increased from over 171,000 in July 
2005 to about 359,600 in September 2007. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense 
forces consist of the Joint Headquarters; the Iraqi Ground Forces 
Command, which commands the Army and the Iraqi Special Operations 
Forces; the Air Force; and the Navy (including Marines). The Iraqi 
Ministry of Interior forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service, the 
National Police, the Directorate of Border Enforcement, and other, 
smaller forces. According to the September 2007 DOD report to Congress, 
as of September 3, 2007, the Coalition has trained approximately 
165,400 MOD personnel and 194,200 MOI personnel, although there is 
currently no reliable data concerning how many of these personnel are 
still serving with the MOI. Moreover, in 2006 the Iraqi Prime Minister, 
with Coalition support, decided to expand the size of Iraq's security 
forces by possibly as much as 62,500 by the end of 2007. This expansion 
includes an increase in the size of extant Iraqi Army units that will 
bring them to 120 percent of authorized strength, an initiative to 
expand the overall size of the Iraqi Army from 10 to 13 divisions, and 
an initiative to increase the number of Iraqi police. 

Ministry of Defense: 

In early 2005, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and MNF-I approved a 
multilayered logistics concept for the Iraqi military that called for 
the generation of a variety of organizations from the ministerial to 
the unit level. The provision of logistics support at the lowest levels 
is expected to be the purview of two organizations: Headquarters and 
Services Companies (HSC), which provide limited health, maintenance, 
supply, and transportation support to Iraqi Army battalions, brigades, 
and divisions; and Motorized Transport Regiments (MTR), which provide 
additional transportation, maintenance, and vehicle recovery support to 
each of the Iraqi Army's infantry divisions. Mid-level logistics 
support is expected to come from a National Depot, five Regional 
Support Units (RSU), and the number of logistics bases needed to 
support Iraqi Army requirements. A Support Command is to provide 
command and control of the National Depot and RSUs, while the Iraqi 
Joint Headquarters logistics staff (M-4) is to provide logistics input 
to plans and orders. Finally, atop the logistics structure are the 
Offices of the Director General, Armaments and Supply; Director 
General, Contracts and Purchases; Director General, Infrastructure; and 
Director General, Programs and Budget. These offices are tasked with 
management of the ministry's overall logistical capability and the 
acquisition of capital equipment, development of ministerial policies 
and procedures, and management of the budget. The envisioned end state 
is a comprehensive logistics system that will provide maintenance, 
supply, transportation, and garrison support to all elements of the 
Iraqi military. 

Concurrently, command and control and intelligence infrastructures are 
also being developed for the Iraqi military. The command and control 
system envisions approximately 3,600 Iraqi soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen to operate and maintain a command and control communications 
system, in concert with contractor support, that is responsive to 
program managers at the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. An additional element 
of this command and control system is a trained noncommissioned and 
commissioned officer corps. The MOD's intelligence system envisions two 
main intelligence organizations: the Directorate General of 
Intelligence and Security and the Joint Headquarters Intelligence 
Directorate (M-2). Both organizations are to provide effective 
intelligence support to Iraqi counterinsurgency operations. 
Additionally, each Iraqi Army division is to have an Intelligence, 
Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) company. 

To train the logistics, communications, and intelligence specialists 
for these systems, the Coalition and the MOD have established training 
schools at Taji. Logisticians are trained at the Iraqi Armed Service 
and Support Institute (IASSI), Iraqi communications specialists are 
trained at the Iraqi Signal School, and Iraqi intelligence specialists 
are trained at the Iraqi Military Intelligence School. 

Ministry of Interior: 

By November 2006, the Coalition had developed a logistics concept of 
support for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior that both MNSTC-I and MNF-I 
subsequently approved. While the MOI did not adopt the MNSTC-I 
Logistics Concept of Support, the MOI Logistics Directorate published 
its own Logistics Policy. The Coalition and MOI have started to 
implement certain aspects of the MOI approved concept, a concept 
composed of a hybrid of national, provincial, and regional logistics 
support structures and mechanisms. At the national level, the ministry 
is responsible for purchasing and distributing vehicles, weapons, and 
ammunition for all its forces as well as allocating budgeted money to 
police forces in 15 of Iraq's 18 provinces.[Footnote 9] Additionally, 
through the allocation of funds the ministry is responsible for the 
sustainment and maintenance of the National Police, the National 
Information and Investigation Agency, and about 40 other organizations. 
In the provinces, provincial Directors of Police are responsible for 
the sustainment and maintenance of each of their respective Iraqi 
Police Service (IPS) forces. Using the funds distributed to them by the 
MOI, the provincial Directors of Police direct funds to IPS police 
stations in their provinces. These local police stations, in turn, use 
the allocated funds to pay local vendors for life support (e.g. food, 
water, electricity), fuel, and vehicle maintenance. Finally, there are 
five regional headquarters of the Department of Border Enforcement 
(DBE) and Ports of Entry (POE) that also receive funds from the 
ministry that they, in turn, use to purchase life support, maintenance, 
and fuel from local sources. 

As of July 2007 MOI had not yet approved a communications plan. 
Nonetheless, the MOI and Coalition are working together to build a 
command and control structure throughout Iraq that, like the logistics 
concept, has three parts--national, provincial, and local. The nexus of 
the MOI's command and control architecture at the national level is the 
National Command Center (NCC), which is responsible for exercising 
command and control over all matters pertaining to police, receiving 
input from local and provincial police organizations, and reporting to 
the Government of Iraq's National Operations Center and National Joint 
Operations Center. Providing provincial input to the NCC are more than 
260 police, border, and port communication centers that are, in turn, 
supported by the Iraqi Command and Control Network (IC2N), which is 
designed to connect provincial sites to each other and the NCC. A 
second network, the Advanced First Responder Network (AFRN), is 
intended to link MOI first responders in 15 Iraqi cities with both MOD 
forces and to the MOI's National Command Center. Finally, underpinning 
this communications architecture are more than 108,000 radios used by 
MOI personnel. All told, the Coalition has spent approximately $360 
million to install this communications structure for the MOI. 

Criminal intelligence operations for the MOI are the responsibility of 
one organization, the National Information and Investigation Agency 
(NIIA). While other MOI organizations gather law enforcement 
information, the NIIA is akin to the American FBI, and is tasked with 
analyzing information gathered through criminal investigations to 
counter serious crimes and threats to Iraq's national security. The 
NIIA is organized as a headquarters with 15 provincial offices and is 
authorized about 6,000 employees, including investigators, criminal 
analysts, and surveillance personnel who are to work closely with the 
IPS on the local level and liaison with other MOI organizations such as 
the National Police and port forces. 

Funding for Development of ISF Support Capabilities: 

In September 2007, GAO reported that since 2003 the United States has 
provided about $19.2 billion to train and equip about 350,000 Iraqi 
soldiers and police officers in an effort to develop Iraqi Security 
Forces, transfer security responsibilities to them and the Iraqi 
government, and ultimately withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq.[Footnote 10] 
This figure includes approximately $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2007 
supplemental funding for the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) and an 
additional $2.0 billion of ISFF funding for fiscal year 2008.[Footnote 
11] Meanwhile, in calendar year 2007 the Iraqi Government has budgeted 
$4.14 billion for the MOD and $3.18 billion for the MOI. 

Based on DOD's ISFF budget justifications, GAO has determined that DOD 
intends to allocate about $3.5 billion--or more than half of the $5.8 
billion of fiscal year 2007 and 2008 ISFF money--to sustain the ISF and 
further develop its logistics, command and control, and intelligence 
capabilities. According to the categories in which DOD has organized 
its justifications, the $3.5 billion is to be spent on infrastructure, 
equipment, and transportation for the ISF and the training, operation, 
and sustainment of Iraqi forces. See Table 1 for specific funding 
requests for sustainment and development of ISF support capabilities. 

Table 1: FY07 and FY08 ISFF Requests for Sustainment and Development of 
ISF Support Capabilities: 

DOD Budget Justification Category: Infrastructure; 
ISFF Funding Requested for Sustainment and Development of ISF Support 
Capabilities in FY07 and FY08 (in millions): $409.8. 

DOD Budget Justification Category: Equipment & Transportation; 
ISFF Funding Requested for Sustainment and Development of ISF Support 
Capabilities in FY07 and FY08 (in millions): $1,835.6. 

DOD Budget Justification Category: Training & Operations; 
ISFF Funding Requested for Sustainment and Development of ISF Support 
Capabilities in FY07 and FY08 (in millions): $40.7. 

DOD Budget Justification Category: Sustainment; 
ISFF Funding Requested for Sustainment and Development of ISF Support 
Capabilities in FY07 and FY08 (in millions): $1,204.5. 

Total; 
ISFF Funding Requested for Sustainment and Development of ISF Support 
Capabilities in FY07 and FY08 (in millions): $3,490.6. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of table] 

Some Progress Has Been Achieved, but Persistent Violence, Sectarianism, 
and a Lack of Ministerial Capacity Continue to Impede Development of 
the Iraqi Security Forces' Support Capabilities: 

Although the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, with assistance from the 
Coalition, has made some progress in developing its logistical, command 
and control, and intelligence capabilities--for example, it has formed 
most of the lower echelon units required by its logistical concept, it 
has implemented more advanced communications training at its Signal 
School, and its intelligence architecture is nearly complete-- 
challenges remain because of the impact of the persistent high levels 
of violence and the inability of the ministry to carry out its 
responsibilities. Most notably, the persistent violence in Iraq has 
induced the MOD to prioritize the formation, replenishment, and 
sustainment of Iraqi Army combat forces above combat service support 
forces and training schools. As a result the development of mid-level 
logistics organizations has lagged behind the development of lower 
level logistics units; Iraqi recruits designated for training as 
logistics specialists have been diverted to combat roles; training 
schools are inadequately staffed; and the ratio of noncommissioned 
officers throughout the Iraqi Army has worsened. Moreover, because the 
Ministry of Defense has yet to develop adequate personnel management 
and support functions, Iraqi support specialists are not being used in 
the jobs for which they were trained, and schools with the mission to 
train these specialists lack fuel, equipment, and supplies. 

The Iraqi Ministry of Interior has likewise made progress in developing 
its logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities--it 
is in the process of implementing a logistics concept; increasingly 
capable personnel are manning its command and control centers; and it 
has established and largely equipped an intelligence organization--but 
escalated violence and, to a much greater extent than in the MOD, 
sectarianism have compelled its expansion to an extent that has 
strained its logistical capabilities and undermined command and 
control. The inability of the MOI to effectively perform its 
ministerial functions has further undermined the implementation of the 
MOI's logistical concept of support and eroded some intelligence and 
command and control capabilities. Moreover, the MOI cannot accurately 
account for its personnel, which makes questionable its ability to 
develop an effective command and control or logistical support 
capability. 

The Coalition and Iraqi Government have taken steps to address the 
persistent violence, sectarianism, and immature ministerial capacity 
that continue to impede progress in developing ISF support 
capabilities. For instance, the Iraqi government has decided to expand 
the size of MOD and MOI forces in response to this violence and since 
January 2007, the Iraqi government has replaced about 70 percent of the 
senior commanders in the National Police who were suspected of 
sectarianism. In addition, through its MOD and MOI transition teams, 
MNSTC-I works with both ministries to improve their capacity. 

Persistent Violence and Lack of Ministerial Capacity Impede Development 
of MOD's Support Capabilities: 

For the MOD, persistent violence has caused the establishment of a 
national depot and garrison support units to lag behind that of lower 
level logistics units, a condition we observed in 2006 that has served 
to undermine the development of the Iraqi military's logistic support 
capability. The violence has also aggravated shortages of trained 
logisticians, training center faculty, and noncommissioned officers. 
Poor ministerial oversight has also adversely impacted the training 
institutions charged with training support specialists and spawned the 
development of a bartering system as a workaround for shortages. 

Persistent Violence Has Forced the Prioritization of the Formation of 
Combat Over Critical Mid-Level Logistics Units: 

According to DOD and former senior Coalition officials, because of high 
levels of violence the Coalition and MOD have given priority to the 
formation, replenishment, and sustainment of combat units over mid- 
level combat service support units, a circumstance that has negatively 
impacted the development of the National Depot and Garrison Support 
Units (GSU). According to DOD, the goal is for the National Depot to be 
completely transitioned to Iraqi control in early 2008, while full 
transition of the GSUs to Iraqi control is projected for late 2007. 
Although the MOD's logistics concept does not specify any priority to 
the establishment of one type of logistics unit over another, since 
August 2006 the priority has been on generating lower echelon logistics 
formations, specifically HSCs and MTRs. In a previous GAO report, we 
noted that as of August 2006, most of the authorized HSCs and MTRs were 
already formed. According to updated information we obtained in July 
2007, all of the HSCs and MTRs originally envisioned for the Iraqi Army 
have been formed, while 32 additional HSCs and 2 additional MTRs 
required by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Initiative to increase the size 
of the Iraqi Army will be formed and transitioned to Iraqi control in 
2008. But the development of the National Depot at Taji and the 
formation of Garrison Support Units, which provide base support for 
Iraqi military installations and comprise the basic building blocks of 
the Iraqi Armed Forces' area support sustainment structure, have lagged 
behind. 

Coalition logisticians have emphasized that the development of all 
echelons of the logistics concept is crucial in order for the MOD to 
become capable of independently sustaining its forces. In February 
2007, DOD underscored this by requesting approximately $654 million for 
the development of infrastructure and various systems at the National 
Depot at Taji and another $593 million for the development of Regional 
and Garrison Support Units. In its justification for these funds, DOD 
called the National Depot at Taji "the epicenter" of the logistical 
infrastructure for the ISF and stated that without the capability to 
provide logistical sustainment for the ISF through the National Depot, 
the ISF will be unable to effectively conduct operations without 
extensive Coalition support. Moreover, it emphasized that without the 
funding requested for Regional and Garrison Support Units, those 
facilities may go months or years without use while waiting for 
equipment to be delivered through Iraqi acquisition systems. Yet, 
despite significant U.S. funding, persistent violence in Iraq has 
dictated the prioritization of combat over mid-level combat service 
supports units, thereby hampering the MOD's ability to logistically 
sustain itself. 

Persistent Violence Has Undermined the Development of the National 
Depot and Garrison Support Units: 

In August 2006, the National Depot was plagued by manpower shortages, 
security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, and poor maintenance. 
According to a former senior Coalition adviser to the National Depot, 
as of June 2007 these challenges remained because of the relatively low 
priority afforded the development of the depot vis-à-vis the formation 
of Iraqi combat units. For example, according to this former Coalition 
official, although there was a 100 percent increase in the number of 
Iraqi personnel assigned to the National Depot since August 2006, that 
increase brought the depot to only about 50 percent of its authorized 
personnel complement. According to this official, manning levels at the 
depot went from about 300 personnel assigned to about 600 personnel 
assigned. The authorized complement is approximately 1,200. This 
official attributed this personnel shortage to the higher priority 
given to filling Iraqi Army combat over combat service support units. 

Security at the National Depot is also problematic because of lack of 
personnel. We reported that in August 2006, the National Depot's 
security detachment was not filled. As of June 2007, this remained the 
case, necessitating the formation of an ad hoc security force composed 
of those Iraqi logisticians on hand, thereby further decrementing the 
depot's capacity. Fuel, too, remained a scarce commodity at the 
National Depot, a situation that adversely affected quality of life 
there, as well as the depot's maintenance, inventory management, and 
communications systems, all of which require generator-supplied 
electricity. According to a former senior Coalition official we 
interviewed, this fuel shortage was, like the shortage of trained 
logistics specialists, a direct effect of the decision to supply combat 
over combat service support units--again, a decision made in large part 
because of the operational environment. 

The priority given to combat over combat service support units has also 
affected the development of GSUs. As of August 2006, the Coalition and 
MOD had not yet determined the exact number of GSUs to be formed, and 
only five were in the process of being formed. By July 2007, the 
Coalition and MOD had agreed to form a total of 80 GSUs, but only 3 had 
been completed while another 14 were under construction. According to 
DOD, as the security situation in Iraq continues to be tenuous the 
force generation of security forces, to include those required by the 
Prime Minister's Initiative, has taken precedence over the generation 
of Iraqi soldiers with some of the special skill sets required to fill 
GSU sites. Underscoring this is an observation by a senior Coalition 
adviser to IASSI. He stated that those logisticians who were trained at 
IASSI were all sent to combat units. As a result, other purely 
logistical formations, such as Regional and Garrison Support Units, did 
not receive their quota of trained logisticians and were therefore 
short-staffed and ineffective. 

Persistent Violence Aggravates Shortages of Trained Logisticians, 
Training Center Faculty, and Noncommissioned Officers: 

The persistent violence in Iraq has also affected the MOD's combat 
support and combat service support training institutions. For example, 
according to two former senior Coalition logistics advisers to the 
Iraqi Army, Iraqi Army recruits identified for training as logistics 
specialists were often diverted during their basic training into combat 
roles because of the Prime Minister's announced increases to the size 
of the Army's combat formations. That diversion contributes to a 
paucity of trained logistics specialists across the MOD. 

According to DOD, the MOD's Military Intelligence School, which is 
responsible for training Iraqi soldiers in intelligence skills, has 
only 24 of 81 authorized instructors, a circumstance attributed in part 
to security concerns for Iraqi faculty members who live outside the 
military complex at Taji. Persistent violence also contributed to the 
faculty shortfalls at IASSI. As of July 2007, of the 217 faculty 
positions authorized for IASSI, only 153 were assigned and only 138 
were present for duty. According to a former senior Coalition advisor 
to IASSI as well as information provided by DOD, this shortfall is a 
direct result of the higher priority given to combat units in the 
present operational environment. 

Finally, the persistent violence in Iraq has also contributed to a 
dearth of trained noncommissioned officers in the Iraqi Army. As of 
July 2007, the Iraqi Army was short 18,000 corporals, 14,500 sergeants, 
and 7,500 sergeants first class. With MNSTC-I advice and assistance, 
the Iraqis are working a number of initiatives to address this 
leadership shortage. However, DOD notes that despite this shortage of 
trained noncommissioned officers--leaders that are critical to 
establishing effective command and control in the Iraqi military-- 
attendance at noncommissioned officer schools is unsatisfactory because 
Iraqi Army commanders are challenged to balance the needs of the fight 
with the requirements to release students for training. 

Underdeveloped Ministerial Capacity Undermines the Development of 
Support Capabilities: 

The lack of ministerial support has also stymied the development of the 
MOD's support capabilities by allowing Iraqi commanders to 
inappropriately assign trained logisticians and communications 
specialists and by perpetuating insufficiencies of fuel, equipment and 
instructional materials at the training institutions for these 
specialists. In our March 2007 report, we addressed some of these 
ministerial capacity challenges as they affected the development of the 
MOD's support capabilities. Updated information provided by DOD and 
obtained through interviews with former senior Coalition officials 
confirms the persistence of several of these challenges--particularly 
personnel management and support for IASSI and the Signal School. 

For example, we noted in March 2007 that, according to a senior Iraqi 
Army signal officer, there was a tendency throughout the Iraqi Army to 
inappropriately assign the Signal School's enlisted graduates to jobs 
as infantrymen while officers, who may not have graduated from the 
Signal School, operated the radios. According to updated information 
obtained from DOD in July 2007, this practice persists for both 
communications and logistics specialists. DOD noted that although the 
Iraqi personnel management system is evolving and that new systems for 
automated tracking of personnel should improve the ability of senior 
levels of command to monitor the proper assignment of trained 
personnel, Iraqi Army commanders continue to have discretion regarding 
soldiers' position assignments. 

The problem of managing trained personnel is also endemic in the Iraqi 
Army's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance companies, one of 
which is assigned to each Iraqi Army division. According to DOD, ISR 
company soldiers are routinely used as personal security details and 
guards, or to fill out combat units within the division. As a result of 
these personnel decisions, as well as challenges in recruiting and 
maintaining personnel, as of July 2007 DOD's assessment is that, 
overall, ISR companies are mission-ineffective throughout Iraq. 
Additionally, according to a former senior Coalition adviser to the 
National Depot, trained logistics specialists also often tend to be 
assigned to personal security detachments or as aides to senior Iraqi 
officers. 

According to former senior Coalition advisers and updated information 
provided by DOD, none of the three schools have enough fuel to run 
their generators, a circumstance DOD attributed to the Ministry of 
Defense receiving only about 50 percent of its stated fuel 
requirements. To mitigate the effect of these fuel shortages senior 
Iraqi leaders, supported by Coalition advisers, are to negotiate the 
hours for which fuel for generators and hence electricity will be 
provided so that the impact on training and critical life support is 
minimized. However, at both IASSI and the Signal School, this has not 
always been possible. In September 2006, for example, fuel shortages 
were so acute that the Iraqi commandant of IASSI was forced to shut 
down training completely. As a result, 450 Iraqi soldiers who were to 
be trained in a variety of logistics disciplines were sent back to 
their divisions. According to a former senior Coalition adviser to the 
Signal School, the Iraqi commandant there had also to shut down 
operations completely in January because of a lack of fuel. 

Training equipment and instructional materials used to support that 
training were also in short supply, again the result of lack of support 
from the MOD. For example, according to a former senior Coalition 
adviser to the Signal School, MOD did not supply any instructional 
supplies, such as pens, pencils, or paper, to the school during this 
adviser's year-long tenure. All supplies were either purchased by 
Signal School faculty, obtained by students themselves while they were 
on leave, or donated by U.S. companies. 

This lack of ministerial support also spawned a bartering system on 
which, according to former senior Coalition advisers, both IASSI and 
the Signal School came to rely and without which they could not perform 
their missions. For example, according to a former senior Coalition 
adviser to IASSI, during his year-long tenure there were never enough 
high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) on which to train 
Iraqi mechanics because MOD support to IASSI was minimal or 
nonexistent. He said that IASSI was tasked with training 200 Iraqi 
mechanics per class and required 10 HMMWVs to do so effectively. 
However, IASSI had only 2 partial HMMWVs for the first 6 months of his 
tenure. In January 2007, IASSI picked up 2 more by bartering with a 
nearby Coalition unit and obtained another 2 later through the 
intervention of a Coalition general officer. Furthermore, both IASSI 
and the Signal School also obtained fuel through bartering. When IASSI 
had to shut down its training completely for lack of fuel in September 
2006, the Signal School was able to obtain some in exchange for 
allowing a Coalition unit to use its buildings. According to a former 
Coalition adviser to IASSI, the practice of advisors obtaining fuel 
from Coalition fuel points for their Iraqi counterparts became so 
pervasive that eventually the fuel points were instructed not to supply 
any more fuel to these advisors. Beyond fuel, however, the Signal 
School also obtained computer maintenance support through bartering. 
According to a former senior Coalition adviser to the Signal School, 
there were approximately 150 laptop and desktop computers at the school 
for use in instruction, yet the MOD had no means to repair them if they 
broke down. To alleviate this problem the Iraqi commandant of the 
Signal School bartered for computer repair services with a nearby U.S. 
sustainment unit. In exchange for the use of a civilian pickup truck, 
the U.S. sustainment unit agreed to provide computer maintenance 
support for the Signal School. According to this official, the Signal 
School would not have been able to accomplish its mission of training 
Iraqi communications specialists without this support. 

Persistent Violence, Widespread Sectarianism, and Lack of Ministerial 
Capacity Impede Development of MOI Support Capabilities: 

The continued high levels of violence have hampered MOI communications 
networks and intelligence capabilities while sectarianism has 
undermined effective command and control in the Iraqi police forces. In 
addition, the inability of the MOI to perform certain basic ministerial 
functions has negatively impacted the development of its logistical, 
command and control, and intelligence capabilities. 

Persistent Violence Hampers MOI Communications Networks and 
Intelligence Capabilities and Exacerbates Logistics Challenges: 

Persistent high levels of violence have seriously degraded the MOI's 
national communications architecture, thereby leading to a commensurate 
degradation of the MOI's ability to provide effective command and 
control over its forces. Additionally, the high levels of violence have 
also curtailed MOI intelligence operations. According to DOD, 
persistent attacks on the Advanced First Responder Network in Basrah 
and southern Iraq in the summer of 2007 have degraded the network's 
capability. Likewise, persistence violence has also affected use of the 
Iraqi Command and Control Network. According to DOD, one IC2N 
communications site has been the target of insurgent activity, and a 
contractor has been unable to install the network's final node due to 
insurgent activity in the area. MOI intelligence capabilities have also 
been severely hampered by violence. According to DOD, the current 
security environment in Baghdad and other cities restricts the National 
Information and Investigation Agency's staff from traveling to crime 
scenes. Because of this, the NIIA'a ability to conduct investigations 
and intelligence operations is significantly degraded. Due to the high 
levels of violence that have curtailed NIIA operations, as well as 
delays in the construction of the NIIA's headquarters which was 
supposed to be complete by May 2007 but for which construction had not 
begun as of July 2007,[Footnote 12] the Coalition stated that it cannot 
estimate when the NIIA will be self-sufficient. 

Persistent violence has also aggravated the MOI's logistics challenges. 
This is because, in response to the violence, the MOI has increased its 
authorized strength without a commensurate increase in its ability to 
support its increased size. In 2006 the Iraqi Minister of Interior, in 
conjunction with MNSTC-I, responded to the persistent violence in Iraq 
by expanding the authorized strength of the MOI from approximately 
188,000 to about 195,000 personnel. Additionally, 2006 saw the 
incorporation of security forces from 27 different Iraqi ministries 
into one Facilities Protection Service, which, in turn, was placed 
under the MOI, bringing an estimated 98,000 more personnel into the 
ministry. However, the MOI's logistics infrastructure may not be able 
to accommodate these rapid increases in size and organizational 
structure. Indeed, MNSTC-I's 2007 Campaign Action Plan states that the 
accelerated growth and transition of the MOI may exceed the ministry's 
ability to adapt both operationally and logistically. More 
specifically, a July 2007 Coalition assessment indicates that MOI 
increases in end strength will stress the MOI's ability to meet its 
requirements for general materials such as clothing, individual 
equipment, construction materials, and some major end items. 

Widespread Sectarianism Has Undermined the Effective Command and 
Control of Iraqi Police Forces: 

The MOI continues to be plagued by sectarianism at the ministerial 
level as well as in the National Police and Iraqi Police Service. For 
example, in June 2007, DOD reported that sectarianism impacts every 
aspect of the ministerial offices in Baghdad and several other cities, 
an observation underscored by a recent MNSTC-I report which states that 
although it cannot quantify the amount of insurgent influence at the 
ministerial level, it suspects that various insurgent groups have 
significant influence throughout the ministry. According to both the 
former and current MNSTC-I commanders, the National Police are also 
beset with widespread sectarianism. In June 2007, the former MNSTC-I 
commander testified that the Iraqi National Police was the "single most 
sectarian organization in Iraq." Two months later, the current MNSTC-I 
commander echoed his predecessor's assessment, stating that the 
National Police were "overly infiltrated with militia elements" and 
that "there's no doubt that in the National Police the sectarian 
influence remains and will be hard to eradicate." Finally, evidence 
indicates that the Iraqi Police Service is also heavily infiltrated 
with sectarian elements. The former commander of the Iraq Assistance 
Group[Footnote 13]characterized the Iraqi Police Service as the ISF 
element most vulnerable to sectarianism, despite the MOI's removal of 
over 3,000 members considered to have a sectarian bias in January 2007. 
Finally, in September 2007, GAO determined that the Iraqi government 
has not eliminated militia control over local security forces, and that 
sectarianism in the ISF remains a serious problem in Baghdad and other 
areas of Iraq.[Footnote 14] 

Such widespread sectarianism in the MOI has undermined Coalition 
efforts to develop Iraqi police forces that are ethical, competent, 
loyal to the principles of the Iraqi constitution, and accountable to 
the civilian leadership and people of Iraq. Furthermore, efforts to 
root out sectarian influence in the MOI have resulted in personnel 
turbulence among senior police commanders. Since January 2007, the 
Iraqi government has replaced 70 percent of senior commanders in the 
National Police due to their sectarianism, a list that includes 2 
division, 7 brigade, and 17 battalion commanders. These high level 
command changes are especially significant given that the National 
Police are facing a critical officer shortage; by the summer of 2007 
they had filled fewer than half of their officer positions. Despite 
these officer changes, however, according to a July 2007 DOD report, 
there continues to be a sectarian bias in the appointment of senior 
Iraqi police commanders. 

Undeveloped Ministerial Capacity Adversely Affects the Development of 
MOI Support Capabilities: 

The inability of the MOI to develop key ministerial functions at the 
national and local levels has also negatively impacted the development 
of the ministry's logistic, command and control, and intelligence 
capabilities. This, in turn, has had a negative impact on the ability 
of certain MOI forces to perform their missions and has caused DOD to 
request further funding for several of these programs. For example, 
according to a DOD assessment, because the MOI does not have a unit 
that maintains the National Police's vehicular fleet, the National 
Police cannot sustain deployments without support from either the Iraqi 
Army or the Coalition. Because of this, as well as an unexplained delay 
in the construction of MOI maintenance facilities, DOD explains that 
the Coalition may extend the duration of the Baghdad Area Maintenance 
Contract by six months. DOD officials stated that this contract, which 
provides maintenance for all MOI vehicles in Baghdad, is planned to 
cost the Coalition at least $22 million. Maintenance support for the 
MOI's border and port forces is also a challenge. According to DOD, 
maintenance support for both the border and port forces is "virtually 
non-existent" and DOD estimates that the DBE will not be self- 
sufficient in maintenance until the summer of 2011, although in its 
2007 Iraqi Security Forces Fund request DOD sought $175 million to 
build and sustain MOI vehicle maintenance facilities in order to 
redress this shortcoming. Maintenance problems have also plagued the 
MOI's communications systems. For example, MOI personnel in two of the 
three zones in which the AFRN is located have not demonstrated the 
ability to maintain the network or the equipment required to run its 
systems, negatively impacting command and control. As a result, in 
fiscal year 2007 the Coalition planned to spend at least $18 million to 
bolster the MOI's command and control architecture, which accounts for 
90 percent of the amount the ministry had budgeted for command and 
control. 

The MOI's inability to perform key ministerial functions also means it 
has had difficulty supplying its forces. For example, the MOI has had 
difficulty supplying adequate amounts of fuel for its forces. According 
to DOD, the MOI is not wholly responsible for this problem; one reason 
for this lack of fuel is that the Ministry of Oil has not supplied the 
MOI with sufficient amounts of fuel. This has most notably affected the 
MOI's National Police which, because of these fuel shortfalls, have had 
difficulty conducting patrols. However, the IPS and border and port 
forces, which are to use local vendors for fuel, have also experienced 
shortages. According to the Iraq Assistance Group, this is because only 
one-fourth of the National Police's fuel requirements are funded while 
the IPS, border, and port forces pay black market prices for fuel, 
which are substantially higher than the official price. Overall, 
although the Coalition transferred responsibility for fuel to the MOI 
in December 2006, because of these shortages it was still supplying 
fuel to the MOI as of July 2007. Moreover, the sustainment to two key 
MOI organizations, the National Police and the National Intelligence 
and Investigation Agency, is undermined by the fact that neither has an 
independent budget. Although the reason for this is unclear, the result 
is that sustainment requirements for both the National Police and the 
NIIA are subsumed in the budgets for other MOI organizations. One 
result of this circumstance is that the National Police have been 
unable to redress certain equipment shortfalls and the Coalition has 
stated that because of challenges regarding maintenance, fuel, budget 
independence, and manning, it cannot estimate when the National Police 
will be able to operate self-sufficiently. In an effort to rectify some 
of these challenges, DOD sought $493 million in its 2007 ISFF request 
to modernize or replace MOI equipment that will be lost due to combat 
loss or life cycle attrition, including 52,200 weapons, 1,720 trucks, 
130 police sedans, and equipment for personnel. 

Internal organizational challenges have also impeded development of the 
MOI's command and control capability. For example, although the MOI has 
a nascent communications network in place, the MOI has yet to develop a 
comprehensive communications plan that governs its use and the absence 
of such a plan makes effective command and control of MOI forces 
difficult. According to Coalition sources, the needed communications 
plan has not been developed because of internecine disagreements within 
the ministry that have hindered its acceptance. Another organizational 
challenge is the fact that, although the MOI's logistical concept 
envisions organizations that will be responsible for vehicle 
maintenance, spare parts management, and the running of national and 
provincial warehouses, the MOI has yet to develop official 
organizational structures or equipment requirements for these 
organizations. Without these plans, it is unclear how the MOI can 
effectively implement an effective maintenance support plan. In 
addition, the inability of the MOI to effectively manage contracts has 
led to challenges in sustainment and command and control. In its 2007 
ISFF request, DOD sought $25 million for sustainment of MOI training 
academies and medical facilities, explaining that the Government of 
Iraq does not have appropriate contracting and budgetary procedures 
established to sustain these facilities. MOI's ineffective contracting 
has also undermined the sustainability of one of two critical 
communications systems, the Advanced First Responder Network. According 
to DOD, in May 2007 the MOI signed a contract for the operation and 
maintenance of, and training of personnel for, the network. However, as 
of summer 2007, MNSTC-I reports that the MOI has not funded the 
contract, does not have the capacity to fund it, and is reluctant to 
fund it. The Coalition planned for the MOI to assume responsibility for 
operation and maintenance of the network by March 2007. However, 
because of the ministry's inability to maintain the network, as of July 
2007 the Coalition was unable to estimate when the MOI would be self- 
sufficient in operation of the AFRN. 

Finally, because of problems with its personnel management system, the 
MOI is facing the fundamental challenge of not being able to accurately 
account for its personnel. According to DOD's June and September 2007 
reports to Congress, there is currently no reliable data on how many 
Coalition-trained personnel are still serving in the MOI's forces. 
Moreover, DOD has also reported that the MOI has hired a significant 
number of police beyond those trained by the Coalition. According to 
testimony by the former MNSTC-I commander, the MOI's payroll accounts 
for about 60,000 to 74,000 more personnel than the number trained and 
equipped by the Coalition. However, he also stated that about 20 
percent of this overage are "ghosts," meaning personnel whose names 
appear on the MOI's payroll but who are not actually serving. Effecting 
command and control or fashioning a logistics system for an 
organization of indeterminate size is problematic because both these 
capabilities are, by their very nature, determined by the size of the 
organization for which they are designed. It is unlikely that the MOI 
can effectively ensure command and control of forces that it cannot 
accurately count, especially if thousands of the personnel who appear 
on its payrolls do not exist. In addition, basic logistics functions 
such as budgeting for and procuring the requisite sustainment stocks 
also require accurate knowledge of a force's size. 

DOD's Determination of ISF Independence Is Not Clear: 

Although DOD has in multiple reports stated that a certain number of 
ISF units are either "independent" or "fully independent," it is 
unclear how DOD arrived at this determination for three reasons. First, 
the process by which ISF units are assessed does not allow for a rating 
of "independent" or "fully independent." Second, statements in DOD 
reports seemingly contradict claims of ISF independence. Third, the MOD 
and MOI are still experiencing significant challenges with regard to 
developing the support capabilities on which independence is 
contingent. 

Assessments of ISF Independence Are Problematic: 

Since October 2005, DOD has asserted in its quarterly reports to 
Congress that a certain number of ISF units are "independent" or "fully 
independent," yet it is unclear how this determination can be made 
given the process by which ISF units are evaluated, qualifying language 
about ISF independence that DOD uses in its reports, and the challenges 
facing the development of the ISF's support capabilities. 

DOD began issuing quarterly reports to Congress in July 2005. In each 
of these reports, except for the first,[Footnote 15] DOD reported that 
a certain number of ISF units had been assessed as either "in the lead 
with Coalition enablers or fully independent" or "capable of planning, 
executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations independently or 
with Iraqi or Coalition forces." For example, in its most recent report 
to Congress, issued in September 2007, DOD stated that 95 Army, Special 
Operations Combat Forces, and Iraqi Army Infrastructure units; an 
indeterminate number of MOD logistics enablers; 7 National Police 
Combat Battalions; and 3 National Police Brigade Headquarters were all 
"capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency 
operations independently or with Iraqi or Coalition forces." Although 
in none of these reports does DOD distinguish between those forces that 
are capable of operating independently and those that require Coalition 
or Iraqi assistance, the tables in which DOD's data are presented lead 
one to believe that at least one if not more than one of the units was 
rated as independent. This was underscored during the MNF-I commander's 
September 10 and 11, 2007 testimony, during which he briefed the 
Congress that in every month since November 2005, with only one 
exception (February 2006) the Coalition has assessed at least one ISF 
unit as "fully independent." 

However, despite DOD's reports and the MNF-I commander's recent 
testimony that a certain number of ISF have been assessed as "fully 
independent," after March 2006 it was no longer possible for a 
Coalition transition team member to rate the readiness of an ISF unit 
using these terms. Previously, in guidance provided to Coalition 
transition teams for use in evaluating Iraqi Security Forces, a level 1 
unit was said to be "fully capable of planning, executing, and 
sustaining independent operations." However, in the spring of 2006, MNC-
I removed the words "fully" and "independent" from the definition. When 
we asked DOD officials for the reason for this change they were not 
able to provide us with an explanation. Therefore, according to the 
current guidance, a level 1 unit is one that is "capable of planning, 
executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations." It is 
important to note that, according to the guidance, a Coalition 
transition team cannot judge an ISF unit as "independent." However, in 
its most recent report to Congress, DOD asserted that an "independent 
unit is one that is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 
counterinsurgency operations." Thus, DOD's continued reporting that 
some ISF units are "independent" or "fully independent" is not 
congruent with MNC-I's instructions for filling out the Operational 
Readiness Assessments on which DOD's assertions and reports seem to be 
based. If independence is still a relevant descriptor of ISF unit 
capabilities, then why was the term removed from the definition of a 
level 1 unit in 2006? 

Further obfuscating the issue are statements that DOD has made in each 
of its reports to Congress that apparently contradict the assertion 
that at least some ISF units are "fully independent." For example, in 
its August 2006 report, DOD stated that in the absence of a self- 
reliant logistics system, MNF-I must provide extensive support to Iraqi 
forces. In its November 2006 report, DOD stated that perhaps the most 
significant shortcoming in both the MOD and MOI forces' capabilities 
lay in planning and executing their logistics and sustainment 
requirements, and that efforts were underway to reduce Iraqi forces' 
reliance on U.S. support and sustainment. The March 2007 report echoed 
this observation, stating that the most significant shortcoming in both 
the MOD and MOI forces' capabilities lay in planning and executing 
sustainment requirements. In its June 2007 report to Congress, DOD 
stated that building the logistics and sustainment capabilities of the 
MOD and MOI constitutes one of four major areas on which the Coalition 
is focusing. The report goes on to note that fielded MOD forces often 
do not get the support they require without substantial Coalition 
assistance. Finally, in its most recent report to Congress, released in 
September 2007, DOD stated that MOD logistics from the tactical to 
strategic levels, and MOI logistics at the strategic level, are fragile 
and not capable of independent execution. Underscoring these qualifying 
statements are the comments of the MNF-I commander, who stated during 
his recent Congressional testimony that although there are about 95 ISF 
units capable of taking the lead in operations, they still need some 
Coalition support and that, furthermore, were U.S. forces to withdraw 
rapidly from Iraq, the ISF would face "a high risk of disintegration." 

Finally, because of the many challenges facing the Coalition and Iraqi 
government in developing the ISF's support capabilities, it is clear 
that the ISF is not independent of the Coalition. From January 2006, 
when we began our investigation of ISF support capabilities, to 
September 2007, the date of the latest information contained in this 
report, the ISF have been unable to fully meet their logistics, command 
and control, and intelligence requirements. Because these capabilities 
are inherent to independence, until the ISF develops them, neither the 
MOD nor MOI can be considered independent. 

Although we are not discounting DOD assertions that there are some ISF 
units that are more capable than others from an operational standpoint, 
we find that using the terms "independent" or "fully independent" to 
describe their overarching development is both confusing and 
misleading. Every ISF unit, regardless of its operational ability, is 
dependent upon institutional logistic, command and control, and 
intelligence capabilities that are designed to support it and as this 
report and our previous reports demonstrate, these capabilities in both 
the MOD and MOI are facing significant challenges to their development. 

Conclusions: 

The MOD and MOI face significant challenges in developing their 
logistic, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. Two 
factors, in particular, have thwarted their development--the 
persistence of high levels of violence and sectarianism and a lack of 
ministerial capacity. As a result, the ability of both ministries to 
maintain and sustain their forces, provide effective command and 
control of their forces, and provide their forces with intelligence is 
undermined and cannot be accomplished without Coalition support. 
Furthermore, since these support capabilities have yet to be fully 
developed, DOD claims that ISF units are either "independent" or "fully 
independent" are confusing and misleading. Although we are not 
discounting DOD reports that there are some ISF units that are more 
capable than others from an operational standpoint, we do not find 
sufficient evidence for an assessment of "independent" or "fully 
independent" for any ISF unit. Moreover, without clarity regarding the 
criteria according to which ISF units are assessed as independent, 
especially with regard to their logistical, command and control, and 
intelligence capabilities, Congress cannot have clear visibility over 
DOD's role in assisting the ISF in becoming independent of Coalition 
support. 

Recommendations: 

In order to provide the Congress and other decision makers with a clear 
picture of ISF capabilities, we recommend that DOD clarify 1) its use 
of the terms "independent" or "fully independent" as they relate to the 
assessed capabilities of ISF units, especially with regard to the 
logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of those 
units, and 2) the process it uses to make this assessment. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with our two recommendations and provided a matrix of narrower 
technical comments. In its written comments, DOD stated that it would 
evaluate its assessment terminology to more clearly describe progress 
in capability development for the Iraqi forces. However, DOD did not 
explicitly outline any actions it would take to adopt our 
recommendation to clarify its terminology. Furthermore, DOD stated that 
while the terms "independent" and "fully independent" can cause 
confusion, they are still being used in reports and briefings because 
they are "more illustrative" than other terms. Consequently, we 
continue to believe that the actions we recommended are needed in order 
to ensure that Congress and other decision makers are provided a clear 
picture of ISF capabilities. DOD's written comments and its technical 
comment matrix are reprinted in appendix I. 

With regard to the first recommendation that DOD clarify its use of the 
terms "independent" or "fully independent" as they relate to the 
assessed capabilities of Iraqi Security Force units, especially with 
regard to the logistical, command and control, and intelligence 
capabilities of those units, the department partially concurred. DOD 
agreed that the use of the terms "independent" and "fully independent" 
can cause confusion, but stated that these terms were still being used 
in reports and briefings because they are "more illustrative" than 
other terms, although the department also stated that it will evaluate 
its assessment terminology to more clearly describe progress in 
capability development for the Iraqi forces. We believe, however, that 
DOD's evaluation of the terms is insufficient; that the continued use 
of "independent" or "fully independent" in briefings and reports only 
perpetuates the very confusion that DOD recognizes; and that therefore 
our recommendation that DOD clarify its terms is warranted for three 
reasons. First, the process by which ISF units are assessed does not 
allow for a rating of "independent" or "fully independent," a point 
amplified by the definition of a level 1 unit DOD supplied in its 
written comments. Second, statements in DOD reports seemingly 
contradict claims of ISF independence. This was underscored by the 
written statement submitted by the MNF-I commander in conjunction with 
his September 2007 Congressional testimony, in which he stated that 
although there are about 95 ISF units capable of taking the lead in 
operations, they still need some Coalition support and that were U.S. 
forces to withdraw rapidly from Iraq, the ISF would face "a high risk 
of disintegration." Finally, as this report demonstrates, the MOD and 
MOI are still experiencing significant challenges with regard to 
developing the logistics, command and control, and intelligence 
capabilities on which independence is contingent. 

DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that it clarify 
the process its uses to assess ISF units, stating that although MNC-I 
modified the wording used to describe a level 1 unit in 2006, the 
metrics and processes transition teams use to assess Ministry of 
Interior and Defense units have not changed and that this process is 
clearly defined in the MNC-I Transition Readiness Assessment Report 
Implementing Instructions Update. We examined both the March 2006 and 
the December 2006 updates (the latter being, according to DOD, the most 
current update). Even a cursory look at the example forms reproduced in 
the respective updates shows that the metrics have, in fact, changed. 
For example, the number of sustainment and logistics categories by 
which units are evaluated has gone from 3 to 5 and the subjective and 
objective criteria used to determine unit ratings in the areas of 
leadership, communications, administration, and training have also 
changed. Furthermore, the last time that DOD provided any information 
on the ISF assessment process in its quarterly reports to Congress was 
July 2005. Since that time, the implementing instructions for the 
assessment process have changed at least twice. We believe, therefore, 
that in order to ensure Congress has a more complete and up-to-date 
understanding of the assessment process, DOD should provide it with an 
updated and detailed explanation of the current process. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies 
available to others upon request. This report will also be available at 
no charge on the GAO web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov if you or your 
staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our 
Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report included 
Marilyn Wasleski, Assistant Director, Whitney Havens, Kate Lenane, Guy 
LoFaro, Terry Richardson, Leo Sullivan, Christopher Turner, and Cheryl 
Weissman. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis: 
Director: 

Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Lantos: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
2400 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, Dc 20301-2400: 

November 8, 2007: 

International Security Affairs: 

Mr. William M. Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Solis: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-08-143R, "Operation Iraqi 
Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units as Independent 
Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed," 
dated October 5, 2007 (GAO Code 350948). 

Recommendations: The GAO recommends that DoD clarify 1) its use of the 
terms "independent" or "fully independent" as they relate to the 
assessed capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces units, especially with 
regard to the logistical, command and control, and intelligence 
capabilities of those units, and 2) the process it uses to make this 
assessment.

DoD Response: 

1) Partially Concur. The use of the terms "independent" and "fully 
independent" can cause confusion. The term "independent" was removed 
from the Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level 1 definition 18 
months ago. However, because it is more illustrative than terms such as 
"ORA 1," it is still used in briefings and reports. The current, 
complete definition for a Level 1 unit as found in the ORA states: 

"Level 1 (green): A Level 1 Iraqi Army (IA) unit is capable of 
planning, executing and sustaining counter insurgency operations. The 
status of resources and training will neither limit flexibility in 
methods for mission accomplishment nor increase vulnerability of unit 
personnel and equipment. The unit does not require any compensation for 
deficiencies by Coalition forces. Extreme situations may cause 
Coalition forces' mitigation." 

In February 2007, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), recognizing 
the limitations of the existing Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) 
metrics, added a new metric called "Operational Effectiveness." This 
measure allows the senior transition team advisor and the Iraqi 
contingent to provide a subjective assessment of a unit's ability to 
conduct operations, regardless of other measures. Assessment of this 
metric is based on historical performance and on the level of outside 
assistance required to execute a unit's missions. Concurrently, the 
assessment process was renamed Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA). 

2) Partially Concur. Although MNC-I modified the wording used to 
describe a Level 1 unit in 2006, the metrics and processes transition 
teams use to assess Ministry of Interior and Defense units have not 
changed. The process is clearly defined in the MNC- I Transition 
Readiness Assessment (TRA) Report Implementing Instructions Update. The 
instruction, which remains in place as guidance for the ORA process, 
defines the objective criteria used to determine capabilities and the 
subjective rating criteria defining effectiveness used by transition 
teams to apply to the conditions on the ground. 

DoD will evaluate the assessment terminology to more clearly describe 
progress in capability development for the Iraqi forces. 

Attached is a comment matrix with technical comments to the draft 
report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Brigadier General Robin: 
Rand Principal: 
Director for the Middle East: 

Unclassified: 
Centcom/MNF-1 Comments: 
Unclassified GAO Draft Report: 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units 
as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully 
Developed (GAO-08-143R): 

Formal Comment Resolution Matrix: 

Serial: 1; 
Page #: 9; 
Para #: 1; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (S)/Formal; 
Recommendations: Change: “and 80 Garrison Support Units” to “and the 
number of logistics bases needed to support Iraqi Army requirements”; 
Comment/Rationale: Based on current analysis, pending approval of the 
MoD and JHQ Logistic Concept and procedures, discussions envision one 
logistics base for every Iraqi Army division, with Regional Support 
Units and a National Depot. 

(See Comment 1.)

Serial: 2; 
Page #: 10; 
Para #: 1; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (C)/Formal; 
Recommendations: Change: “But for reasons that remain unclear,as of 
March 2007 the MOI itself had yet to approve the concept. Despite 
lacking the MOI’s official endorsement, the Coalition and MOI have 
started to implement certain aspects of the concept, ...” To: “While 
the MOI did not adopt the MNSTC-I Logistics Concept of Support the MOI 
Logistics Directorate published its own Logistics Policy. The Coalition 
and MOI have started to implement certain aspects of the MOI approved 
concept, ...”; 
Comment/Rationale: The report refers to MNSTC-I FRAGO 06-085, approved 
by MNSTCI on 6 November 2006. While this has never been endorsed by the 
MOI, the MOI Logistics Directorate has adopted many of the concepts 
into their own plans and has published its own Logistics policy. The 
MOI has documented and distributed its logistics procedures, they have 
established and automated their accountability system, and they have 
streamlined their procedures for receipt, store and issue functions. 
The MOI has demonstrated initiative and the capability to procure 
material and equipment independent of coalition support, although they 
are still hampered by contracting and finance laws, rules and 
procedures; specifically for imported goods. This has been mitigated by 
embracing the US Foreign Military Sales Program. In addition they have 
developed a logistics reporting policy that provides visibility into 
the Provinces’ logistical readiness. The overall MOI logistics system 
remains, however, problematic. One of the benefits of successful 
offensive operations of recent months has been the rapid growth of the 
Police Force. This growth has strained an already ailing MOI 
Maintenance System. 

(See Comment 2.)

Serial: 3; 
Page #: 11; 
Para #: 2; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (S)/Formal; 
Recommendations: Change:“Intelligence operations for the MOI are the 
responsibility of one organization, the National Information and 
Intelligence Agency (NIIA).” To: “the National Information and 
Investigation Agency”; 
Comment/Rationale: Change:“Intelligence operations for the MOI are the 
responsibility of one organization, the National Information and 
Intelligence Agency (NIIA).” To: “the National Information and 
Investigation Agency”. 

(See Comment 3.)

Serial: 4; 
Page #: 12; 
Para #: 1; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (S)/Formal; 
Recommendations: Add footnote after “...for fiscal year 2008.” To 
address the increased request for ISFF funding to $3.0B in the FY08 
GWOT Budget Amendment Request; 
Comment/Rationale: To fund a portion of necessary expansion of the ISF, 
an additional $1.0B of ISFF was requested in the FY08 GWOT Budget 
Amendment request. 

(See Comment 4.)

Serial: 5; 
Page #: 13; 
Para #: 1; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (C)/Formal; 
Recommendations: Change: “and the shortage of noncommissioned officers 
throughout the Iraqi Army has worsened.” To: “and the ratio of 
noncommissioned officers throughout the Iraqi Army has worsened.”; 
Comment/Rationale: It is recognized that efforts are needed to increase 
Iraqi Army noncommissioned officer numbers and that there are a number 
of initiatives including recall and the early promotion of the top 10% 
of basic training graduates. However, the continuing rapid growth of 
the IA will have an adverse effect on the proportion of SNCOs available 
and therefore the perception of deepening leader shortages within the 
Iraqi Army. 

(See Comment 5.)

Serial: 6; 
Page #: 15; 
Para #: 1; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (C)/Formal; 
Recommendations: Delete: “But the development of the National Depot at 
Taji and the formation of GSUs, which provide base support for Iraqi 
military installations and comprise the basic building block of the 
Iraqi Armed Forces’ area support sustainment structure, have lagged 
behind.”; 
Comment/Rationale: The National Depot is not lagging behind.Indeed, in 
coordination with the Iraqi MoD, the depot is expanding rapidly. In 
December 2007, the Small Arms Weapon Repair Facility will begin 
operation, followed in 2008 by both the Tracked and Wheeled Maintenance 
Depots. The Depot Warehouse is expanding its capability for receipt, 
warehouse accountability, and issue of supplies and equipment. This 
also includes personnel training, warehouse refurbishment, and on-site 
life support functions. 

(See Comment 6.) 

Serial: 7; 
Page #: 17; 
Para #: 3; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (S)/Formal; 
Recommendations: Change: “As of Jul 2007 the MODs Mil Intelligence 
Academy, which is responsible for training Iraqi Soldiers in 
intelligence skills had only 43% of its authorized instructors.” To: 
“...had only 24 authorized Instructors”; 
Comment/Rationale: There was no MTOE in July from which to base a 
number. There are currently 24 of 81 authorized instructors, which is 
30%, the number has remained constant since July, although there are 
plans to redress this imbalance. 

(See Comment 7.) 

Serial: 8; 
Page #: 22; 
Para #: 1; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (C)/Formal; 
Recommendations: Change: “The Coalition stated that it cannot estimate 
when NIAA will be self sufficient.”To: “the Coalition recognizes that 
NIIA self sufficiency is condition dependent.”; 
Comment/Rationale: NIIA will become self sufficient when the following 
conditions are met: Basing: Construction of the new HQ complex and 
Baghdad Bureau, scheduled to be completed in April 2008. Basing 
improvements to the 14 other provincial and various border and ports of 
entry offices planned for 2008. Command and Control: Establishment of a 
secured communications architecture linking the new HQs with the 
provinces and ports of entry offices planned for 2008.Training: 
Establishment of an in-house training capacity in advanced 
investigative and technical skills such as polygraph, forensics, and 
biometrics. Resources: A separate and independent budget authorization 
for the NIIA. Political Reconciliation: A work environment free of 
intimidation and threats based on religious and tribal affiliations. 

(See Comment 8.) 

A= Administrative; S = Substantive; C = Critical; 
* Formal – recommends comments should be published as part of official 
DoD response to GAO. 
* Informal – recommends comments should be provided to GAO but not be 
published in report. 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments. 

1. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments. 

2. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments. 

3. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments. 

4. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments. 

5. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments. 

6. Although we have not assessed the rate at which the National Depot 
at Taji is currently expanding, according to information we obtained 
from DOD in July 2007 and interviews with a former senior Coalition 
official who was assigned to the depot until June 2007, many of the 
same challenges affecting the development of the National Depot that we 
identified in our March 2007 reports remain and continue to hamper its 
capacity. Moreover, in light of the persistent violence in Iraq new 
challenges have cropped up as well. As we point out in this report, the 
formation of lower-echelon logistics units is complete, save those 
required by the Prime Minister's expansion plan. DOD documents confirm 
that since August 2006 the priority has been on creating lower-echelon 
logistics units over national and regional logistics center, to include 
GSUs. Hence, both by design and because of persistent violence, the 
development of the National Depot and GSUs has lagged behind. 

7. We have changed the sentence to read "According to DOD, the MOD's 
Military Intelligence School, which is responsible for training Iraqi 
soldiers in intelligence skills, has only 24 of 81 authorized 
instructors, a circumstance attributed in part to security concerns for 
Iraqi faculty members who live outside the military complex at Taji." 

8. In written replies to our questions about the NIIA, DOD outlined the 
conditions by which NIIA self-sufficiency could be achieved. However, 
DOD could not give an estimate of when it expects those conditions 
would come about. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Related GAO Products: 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not 
Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. GAO-07-1220T. 
Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007: 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not 
Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. GAO-07-1195. 
Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007. 

Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has 
Reached Iraqi Security Forces. GAO-07-711. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2007. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Conditions in Iraq Are Conducive to 
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-525T. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2007. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security 
Forces' Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities. GAO-07-503R. 
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007. 

Stabilizing Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Budget and Management 
Challenges of Iraq's Security Ministries. GAO-07-637T. Washington, 
D.C.: March 22, 2007. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning 
the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to 
Future Operations Planning. GAO-07-444. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 
2007: 

Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi 
Security Forces. GAO-07-612T. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security 
Forces' Logistical Capabilities. GAO-07-582T. Washington, D.C.: March 
9, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audit Approach and 
Findings. GAO-07-385T. Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight. GAO-07-308SP. Washington, D.C.: January 9, 
2007. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Status of DOD's Reconstruction Program. GAO-07-30R. 
Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Competition for Iraq Reconstruction 
Contracts. GAO-07-40. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress Requires Overcoming Contract 
Management Challenges. GAO-06-1130T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 
2006. 

Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation, GAO-06- 
1094T. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help 
Achieve U.S. Goals. GAO-06-788. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help 
Achieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges. GAO-06-953T. Washington, 
D.C.: July 11, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private 
Security Providers, GAO-06-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing 
Challenges. GAO-06-697T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and 
Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and 
Sustainable Progress. GAO-06-179T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed To Improve Use of Private Security 
Providers. GAO-05-737. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring 
Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police. GAO-05-431T. 
Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, 
and Oversight Issues. GAO-04-902R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes:  

[1] Pub. L. No 110--28, §1314 (2007). 

[2] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraqi: Report to Congress 
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, 
Section 9010, Public Law 109-289 (June 7, 2007). 

[3] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government 
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, GAO- 
07-1195 (Washington, D.C.: September 2007). 

[4] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraqi: Report to Congress 
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, 
Section 9010, Public Law 109-289 (September 14, 2007). 

[5] The first report we issued, GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: 
Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Support 
Capabilities, GAO-07-120C (Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007) is 
classified secret. We then provided unclassified testimony on the 
development of the ISF's logistical capabilities in GAO, Operation 
Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' 
Logistical Capabilities, GAO-07-582T (Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007). 
The third report, GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary 
Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Logistics and Command and 
Control Capabilities, GAO-07-503R (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007) is 
an unclassified version of the first report. 

[6] 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(1)(2000). 

[7] In October 2007 we reported that although enemy-initiated attacks 
declined from a total of about 5,300 in June 2007 to about 3,000 in 
September 2007, the recent decrease in monthly attacks was primarily 
due to a decrease in the number of attacks against coalition forces. 
Attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and civilians have declined less 
than attacks against coalition forces. See GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, 
and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues, GAO-08-231T 
(Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007). 

[8] The Transitional Readiness Assessment process is now known as the 
Operational Readiness Assessment process. 

[9] The Kurdish Provinces are authorized 17 percent of Iraqi revenues 
(Gross National Product) from which the provinces fund budgets to meet 
all the financial obligations of their governments. There are two 
Ministries of Interior within Kurdistan. One is located in Sulaymaniyah 
and the other in Arbil. Both organizations are separate from the 
central Iraqi government's Ministry of Interior addressed in this 
report. 

[10] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government 
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmark, GAO-07- 
1195 (Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007). 

[11] To fund a portion of necessary expansion of the ISF, an additional 
$1.0 billion was requested in the fiscal year 2008 ISSF amendment 
request. 

[12] DOD did not give a reason for these delays. 

[13] The Iraq Assistance Group is the overall executive agency for MNC- 
I for all Iraqi Security Forces. 

[14] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government 
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, GAO- 
07-1195 (Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007). 

[15] DOD did provide a classified annex to its first report that 
contained a rollup assessment of Iraqi Army unit capabilities. 

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