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entitled 'Tactical Aircraft: DOD's Cancellation of the Joint Strike 
Fighter Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive 
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May 22, 2006: 

The Honorable John Warner: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 
The Honorable Curt Weldon: 
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Subject: Tactical Aircraft: DOD's Cancellation of the Joint Strike 
Fighter Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive 

The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to purchase about 2,400 Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft, with potential international sales of 
2,000 to 3,500 aircraft. When the number of aircraft engines and spare 
parts expected to be purchased is considered--along with the lifetime 
support needed to sustain the engines--the future financial investment 
will be significant. DOD implemented the JSF alternate engine 
development program in 1996 to provide competition between two engine 
manufacturers in an effort to achieve cost savings, improve 
performance, and gain other benefits. 

Since then, DOD has invested $1.2 billion in the alternate engine 
program, and, in August 2005, it awarded a $2.4 billion contract for 
system development and demonstration of an alternate engine. However, 
in its fiscal year 2007 budget submission, DOD proposed canceling the 
alternate engine program. Concerned whether this decision was based on 
sound analysis, you asked us to review DOD's rationale for canceling 
the program and the analysis supporting it, including the life cycle 
savings, benefits, and risks assessed. 

To determine DOD's rationale for and analysis supporting the decision 
to cancel the alternate engine program, we obtained and discussed data 
from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics; the Office of the Director of Program 
Analysis and Evaluation; and Air Force and Navy acquisition offices. We 
also interviewed officials from the Office of the Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation, and the F-22A engine office, the predecessor 
engine for the JSF engine. We reviewed the data, analyses, assumptions, 
and results of two prior program management advisory group 
studies[Footnote 1] and the justification briefing provided to Congress 
by the department. The advisory group studies and briefing were 
identified as the analytical underpinnings of the decision. We also met 
with the Air Force executive who co-led both advisory groups and was 
the Air Force's propulsion product group manager. Finally, the JSF 
program office stated that it was not involved in the termination 
proposal. In performing this review, we used data and information from 
that office collected on other assignments. We performed our review 
from March to April 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 


DOD's decision to cancel the JSF alternate engine program was driven by 
the need to identify sources of funding in order to pay for other 
priorities within the department. In making the decision, the 
department did not conduct a new and comprehensive analysis, but 
instead relied on selective elements of two prior studies done in 1998 
and 2002. In supporting the decision to cancel, officials focused only 
on the potential up-front savings in engine procurement costs. They did 
not, however, consider the full long-term savings that might accrue 
from competition for providing support for maintenance and operations 
over the life cycle of the engine. Both prior studies had recommended 
proceeding with the alternate engine program, despite the lack of 
significant procurement cost savings, because of a number of other 
benefits competition was likely to provide. Also in supporting the 
decision to cancel, officials cited favorable progress made by the 
primary JSF engine and its predecessor F-22A engine as reducing 
operational risks from a single source. However, the primary JSF engine 
has completed only a small portion of its ground tests and has not yet 
been flown, while the F-22A engine has completed about 10 percent of 
its hours needed for system maturity and is not currently meeting some 
reliability goals. Further, experts from one early study concluded that 
the commonality with the F-22A engine is of limited benefit for 
reducing development risk of the JSF engine. 

DOD's Rationale For Terminating The Alternate Engine Program: 

The decision for canceling the JSF alternate engine program was driven 
by budget needs outside the JSF program. The decision was a consequence 
of budget-cutting exercises to meet Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) spending targets and to begin implementing Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) decisions. The alternate engine program was deemed to have 
a lesser priority than other major DOD activities and programs. DOD 
officials and the justification briefing stated that the rationale for 
canceling the program was no net cost savings from competing engine 
buys and minimum operational risk from relying on a single source. 

Funding for the alternate engine was included in the Navy's and Air 
Force's initial 2007 budget submissions, according to the services' 
acquisition officials. However, because of budget constraints, OSD 
directed the military services to identify alternative sources for 
reducing the fiscal year 2007 future years defense budget. Both 
services proposed the termination of the alternate engine program. DOD 
officials estimated that canceling the program would result in savings 
of about $2 billion over the remaining 8 years of the alternate engine 
development program, which could then be used to fund higher-priority 
programs. In recent testimony, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics stated that the department 
ultimately concluded that maintaining two engine suppliers for the JSF 
program was not the most efficient use of its resources. Department 
officials also noted that the primary engine development program was 
progressing well, making a second engine program unnecessary. On the 
basis of its assessments of the progress of the primary engine for the 
JSF, the F-22A engine (which served as the basis for the primary JSF 
engine), and past fighter engine experience, officials deemed 
operational risks associated with a single engine supplier acceptable. 

DOD'S Decision To Cancel The Engine Competition Was Based On 
Insufficient Cost, Savings, And Performance Data: 

DOD did not conduct an up-to-date, comprehensive analysis of the total 
life cycle costs, savings, and benefits to support its decision to 
terminate the JSF's alternate engine development program. Instead, DOD 
officials used two prior studies and considered the savings from engine 
procurement only, excluding potential life cycle cost savings 
associated with supporting, operating, and maintaining the fleet. These 
officials also stated that the operational risk from relying on a 
single supplier is reduced by favorable test and operational 
experiences with the primary JSF and F-22A engines. However, this 
assessment is based on: 

* limited ground testing of the primary JSF engine and no actual flight 
test results; 

* experience with the F-22A engine, which has only completed about 10 
percent of the operational flight hours needed to achieve system 
maturity and which has still not achieved its reliability goal; and: 

* comparisons with the F-22A engine, which will likely have different 
operational uses than the JSF engine. 

DOD's Decision Is Not Supported by a Current and Comprehensive Analysis 
of Costs and Benefits: 

DOD officials stated that the decision to cancel the JSF alternate 
engine program is based largely on studies conducted in 1998 and 2002 
by program management advisory groups. These groups recommended that 
DOD proceed with the alternate engine program, noting that the 
recommendation was made independent of the services' abilities to fund 
the program. The advisory groups determined that developing an 
alternate JSF engine had significant benefits in the areas of 
contractor responsiveness, industrial base, readiness, and 
international relations. They also reported finding marginal benefits 
in the areas of cost savings and additional engine growth capabilities 
(ability to add future engine improvements), and no benefit to reducing 
development risk without restructuring the program. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the program management advisory group study results. 

Table 1: 1998 and 2002 Program Management Advisory Group Study Findings 
on the Benefits of an Alternate Engine Program: 

Factor assessed: Costs; 
Beneficial: 1998: [Empty]; 
Beneficial: 2002: [Empty]; 
Marginal: 1998: [X]; 
Marginal: 2002: [X]; 
No Value: 1998: [Empty]; 
No value: 2002: [Empty]. 

Factor assessed: Development risk reduction; 
Beneficial: 1998: [Empty]; 
Beneficial: 2002: [Empty]; 
Marginal: 1998: [Empty]; 
Marginal: 2002: [Empty]; 
No Value: 1998: [X]; 
No value: 2002: ". 

Factor assessed: Engine growth potential; 
Beneficial: 1998: [Empty]; 
Beneficial: 2002: [Empty]; 
Marginal: 1998: [X]; 
Marginal: 2002: [X]; 
No Value: 1998: [Empty]; 
No value: 2002: [Empty]. 

Factor assessed: Fleet readiness; 
Beneficial: 1998: [X]; 
Beneficial: 2002: [X]; 
Marginal: 1998: [Empty]; 
Marginal: 2002: [Empty]; 
No Value: 1998: [Empty]; 
No value: 2002: [Empty]. 

Factor assessed: Industrial base; 
Beneficial: 1998: [X]; 
Beneficial: 2002: [X]; 
Marginal: 1998: [Empty]; 
Marginal: 2002: [Empty]; 
No Value: 1998: [Empty]; 
No value: 2002: [Empty]. 

Factor assessed: International implications; 
Beneficial: 1998: [X]; 
Beneficial: 2002: [X]; 
Marginal: 1998: [Empty]; 
Marginal: 2002: [Empty]; 
No Value: 1998: [Empty]; 
No value: 2002: [Empty]. 

Factor assessed: Other considerations[A]; 
Beneficial: 1998: [X]; 
Beneficial: 2002: [X]; 
Marginal: 1998: [Empty]; 
Marginal: 2002: [Empty]; 
No Value: 1998: [Empty]; 
No value: 2002: [Empty]. 

Factor assessed: Overall; 
Beneficial: 1998: [X]; 
Beneficial: 2002: [X]; 
Marginal: 1998: [Empty]; 
Marginal: 2002: [Empty]; 
No Value: 1998: [Empty]; 
No value: 2002: [Empty]. 

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

[A] Other considerations include contractor responsiveness, improved 
design solutions, and competition at the engine subsystem level. 

[End of table] 

DOD's current conclusion that net savings from an alternate engine 
program would be negligible at best was largely based on a break-even 
analysis in the 2002 study that calculated how many engines would need 
to be purchased at prices reflecting savings from competition to 
recover the costs incurred to develop the second source. The analysis 
used the total projected costs of the alternate engine development 
program, an estimated $2.8 billion at that time.[Footnote 2] However, 
DOD has now invested about one-third of that total since the 2002 
study. Excluding these sunk costs and basing the break-even analysis on 
development costs to go from this point forward would reduce the engine 
costs that would need to be recovered through cost savings associated 
with ongoing competition between engine suppliers. For example, on the 
basis of the estimated development costs to go and using the same 
assumptions and data as the 2002 study, we estimate that achieving 20 
percent savings from competition would allow a break-even point to 
occur at about 1,700 engines--not 2,500, as projected in the 2002 
study. An earlier break-even point in the purchase of engines would 
increase the potential for savings over the life of the program. 

Officials indicated that DOD's decision did not consider all the costs 
and savings over the projected 30-year life cycle of the weapon system. 
A life cycle cost-benefit analysis would consider all the potential 
costs and savings associated with the competition, including operations 
and support, over the expected life of the system. DOD did not analyze 
the potential impact that a second supplier and supply chain could have 
on long-term support costs for buying spares, engine parts, and 
maintenance services. Given that a large percentage of a fighter 
aircraft's total life cycle costs are incurred after it has been 
acquired and fielded, potential savings from competition could be 
significant. Competition could also yield savings through reliability 
improvements. The 1998 study stated that a 10 percent improvement in 
reliability could allow the user to omit one heavy maintenance cycle of 
the engine, saving $3 billion in operating and support costs, and 
concluded that the costs for developing the alternate engine would 
likely be recovered through production and operational cost savings. 
The 2002 study did not quantify potential operations and support 
savings, but supported the earlier study's conclusions on the benefits 
from competition. 

Finally, DOD officials indicated that the decision to cancel the engine 
competition did not fully consider the other, less quantifiable 
benefits that were strongly considered by the program management 
advisory groups in recommending the continuation of the program in 1998 
and 2002. These studies concluded an alternative engine program would: 

* maintain the industrial base for fighter engine technology, 

* enhance readiness, 

* instill contractor incentives for better performance, 

* ensure an operational alternative if the current engine developed 
problems, and: 

* enhance international participation. 

Many of these were important benefits realized by past competitions 
such as that for the Air Force's F-16 engines. While these benefits are 
difficult to quantify, the Air Force engine manager who co-led both 
advisory group studies explained that they are valuable when trying to 
manage significant numbers of fighter-type engines to ensure combat 
readiness. He told us that problems are magnified when trying to manage 
a single engine system, which can require substantial manpower and 
extra hours to keep aircraft flying when engine problems occur. In his 
opinion, the benefits of a dual-source engine would outweigh the costs. 
He stated that he had not seen anything that would change this 
conclusion since the last advisory group study was conducted. 

More Engine Performance Data Are Needed to Reduce Operational Risks: 

Despite DOD officials' assertions that testing to date has reduced 
risks, there has not been sufficient testing to demonstrate that the 
primary JSF engine will perform as expected. At the time of the 
decision to cancel the alternate engine, the primary JSF engine had 
only completed about 4,600 hours of ground tests--about one-third of 
the hours planned--and had not yet been flight-tested in a JSF 
aircraft. The first flight of the conventional takeoff and landing 
variant aircraft is not expected until October 2006. First flight of 
the short takeoff and vertical landing variant is scheduled for early 
2008, and the carrier variant in early 2009. The first dedicated 
operational testing that will measure the JSF's operational 
effectiveness and suitability is scheduled for 2011. Specific 
propulsion flight testing starts out slowly and begins to increase 
significantly beginning in 2009 (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Planned Propulsion Performance Flight Testing and First 
Flights for the Three JSF Variants: 

[See PDF for Image] 

[End of Figure] 

The maturity of the JSF engine is also reflected in the program's 
contract strategy, in which initial production orders for the JSF 
engines will be on a cost reimbursement basis. This type of contract is 
used when the uncertainties involved in contract performance do not 
permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type 
of fixed-price contract. This places the risk from the uncertainties 
with the buyer--in this case, DOD. The program plans to transition to 
fixed-price-type contracts for the engine when processes stabilize and 
the system matures, sometime before full-rate production begins in 
2013. This will shift more risk to the contractor. 

DOD officials also cite the good performance to date of the F-22A 
engine as reducing the risk from relying on a single source, but this 
argument has several qualifications. First, although the JSF primary 
engine is a derivative of the F-22A engine, the F-22A has completed 
only about 20,000 operational engine hours; this represents about 10 
percent of the 200,000 hours considered sufficient for system maturity. 
F-22A program engine officials noted that while overall performance has 
been good, the F-22A engine is currently not meeting several 
reliability goals. For example, the engine's mean time between 
maintenance actions was expected to be 100 hours on average at its 
initial service release in 2002. However, as of April 2006, the engine 
was experiencing an average of 60 hours between maintenance actions. 
The program projects that at system maturity in 2010, the F-22A engine 
mean time between maintenance actions will be about 100 hours, but that 
is only 50 percent of its performance requirement for 200-hour mean 
time between maintenance actions. Officials also cited four other 
reliability goals, two that are currently being met and two that are 
not being met. 

Second, the two aircraft have different missions and operational 
concepts that may produce different stresses on the engines. The single-
engine JSF aircraft is being designed to rapidly transition between 
different air-to-surface and air-to-air missions while still airborne. 
The JSF aircraft design has three variants, each with a different 
operational concept. In contrast, the dual-engine F-22A will primarily 
be an air-to-air fighter that will fly at high speed and high altitude. 
Both test and engine officials stated that the operational environment 
for the JSF may put more stress on the plane's engine than the 
operational environment for the F-22A puts on its engine. According to 
engine officials, the fact that the JSF relies on a single engine for 
its performance magnifies any potential problems that it may incur and 
increases the maintenance needed to sustain its readiness. 

Third, the 1998 study stated there was limited commonality between the 
F-22A engine and the JSF engine configurations and for that reason 
there was limited reduction in development risk achieved from F-22A 
experience. The study stated the development risk for the JSF engine 
was commensurate with a new fighter engine, and of particular concern 
were the high temperature and short takeoff and vertical landing 
integration requirements. Engine and acquisition officials we talked to 
had differing views on the degree of commonality between the two 
engines and impacts on development risk. We note that the development 
effort on the JSF primary engine is expected to cost $5.8 billion, 
indicating a substantial development effort. 


The relative advantages and disadvantages of the JSF alternate engine 
program can change significantly depending upon the factors assessed 
and considered. In deciding to terminate the program in 2007, DOD did 
not conduct a current and comprehensive study of the costs and benefits 
of the alternate program. It relied on selected elements of two older 
studies that reviewed the JSF alternate engine program in 1998 and 
2002. It focused on the estimated savings to be accrued from the 
reduced price to buy engines based on competition between two sources. 
It did not consider the benefits, including potential cost savings, 
that might be derived from competition during the life of the JSF 
program--future engine buys, spare parts, maintenance, reliability 
improvements, support improvements, industrial base benefits, and other 
longer-term factors. The two prior studies both concluded that these 
benefits would be substantial and sufficient reason to continue the 
program. In addition, the decision was based on a break-even analysis 
for the total investment cost (sunk costs as well as costs to go) of 
the alternate engine program. Sunk costs should be excluded from the 
break-even analysis upon which the decision is based, thereby lowering 
the number of engines required to break even. In deciding to cancel the 
competition, DOD determined that it could not afford this program, 
given other needs in DOD and the government. It had to find money for 
other budget priorities, and the alternate engine program was not 
accorded a high enough priority. The question remains whether a more 
current, comprehensive, and independent study including all costs, 
benefits, and risks--not just up-front procurement costs--would result 
in a different answer that would cause DOD to reconsider its decision 
to cancel the alternate engine program and instead afford it a higher 
priority and cause it to continue the JSF engine competition. 

Agency Comments and our evaluation: 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The 
comments appear in the enclosure to this letter. 

In summary, DOD believes the report is misleading in a number of 
respects in that there are many important issues that deserve more 
thoughtful and balanced consideration than the information presented in 
our report. It highlights these in its comments, which include its 
beliefs that (1) data showing savings from competition do not exist and 
(2) certain higher costs would exist if the competitive alternate 
engine program continued. We agree that there is a mix of factors that 
can increase and decrease costs as well as influence readiness and the 
industrial base. However, as pointed out in DOD comments, there is 
currently a paucity of empirical data about the costs and benefits of 
this program; therefore we think the issues raised by DOD in its letter 
need to be considered within an overall and comprehensive analysis of 
the life cycle costs and benefits of a competitive alternate JSF engine 

Our tasking, from both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the 
House Armed Services Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, was to 
review DOD's rationale for canceling the program and the analysis 
supporting that decision. It was not our tasking to perform the 
analysis for DOD. Our conclusions were that DOD had not conducted a 
current and comprehensive study of the costs and benefits of an 
alternate engine program over the entire life of the JSF. Instead of 
undertaking a new study, DOD relied on selective elements of two older 
studies, both of which concluded that significant benefits, beyond 
price savings in the acquisition program, justified continuing the 
alternate engine program. DOD supported and funded the alternate engine 
program in prior years but now believes the program is not cost- 
beneficial and presents a low risk if canceled. We found that the 
affordability pressures caused by other more pressing demands on the 
DOD budget this year caused DOD to look for sources of funding. As a 
result, DOD viewed the alternate engine program as a lesser priority 
within the agency. 

We are sending copies of this letter to the Honorable Donald H. 
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Michael W. Wynne, 
Secretary of the Air Force; and the Honorable Donald C. Winter, 
Secretary of the Navy. We will make copies available to other 
interested parties upon request. The letter is also available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staffs have any 
questions. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations 
and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other 
major contributors to this letter were Mike Hazard, Matt Lea, Bruce 
Fairbairn, and Gary Middleton. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Michael J. Sullivan, Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 


Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Acquisition Technology And Logistics: 
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

May 16, 2006: 

Mr. Michael J. Sullivan: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street: 
N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Sullivan: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report, "Tactical Aircraft: DoD's 
Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine Program Was 
Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis" dated May 5, 2006 (GAO Code 

The GAO offered no recommendations; however, the Department would like 
to provide a written response (enclosure). 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 


Signed by: 

Mark D. Sullivan: 
Acting Director: 
Defense Systems: 

As stated: 

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED MAY 5, 2006 GAO CODE 120548/GAO-06-717R: 

"TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: DOD's Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter 
Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis" 
(GAO Code 120548): 


In examining the JSF second engine supplier issue, GAO's draft report 
to Senator Warner was misleading in a number of respects and left out 
important information that runs counter to the draft report 

The draft report concluded that the Department of Defense did not 
conduct a current and comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits 
of maintaining two engine suppliers. Central to this argument was the 
claim that DoD focused on the high investment and procurement costs of 
establishing two suppliers and did not examine the "full long-term 
savings which might accrue from competition. . . ." The draft report's 
argument would lead one to believe that there are data providing 
evidence of Operations and Support (O&S) savings from competition when, 
in fact, such data do not exist. 

We do know that some O&S costs will be higher with two suppliers of 
engines-a fact not mentioned in the draft report to Senator Warner. 
Although the Pratt & Whitney and General Electric engines are designed 
to have identical external interfaces to the aircraft, making them 
interchangeable, the two internal designs are significantly different. 
Most of the engine parts are unique, including the fans, turbines, 
combustors, and compressors. Use of the two types of engines would 
require establishing two separate spares pipelines for fleet and depot- 
level maintenance, providing additional training and tools for 
maintenance personnel, creating two separate depot capabilities 
(thereby increasing non-recurring costs and recurring unit repair costs 
since each repair line would handle fewer units), and making future 
modifications for growth, reliability improvements, safety 
enhancements, and obsolescence management on two different engines. 

The draft report critiques DoD for not considering the O&S savings from 
buying engine spares from two suppliers instead of one supplier. This 
argument, also used in testimony by GE Aviation President and CEO Scott 
Donnelly, is misleading. Engine spares are not purchased in a 
competitive environment, since, for example, DoD would not buy spares 
made by Pratt & Whitney to support the GE engine. Therefore, we do not 
expect competition to significantly affect the price of engine spare 

If we do face engine problems in the future, we believe that fixing any 
problems with the original engine will cost less than developing and 
producing a second engine (which might develop its own unique 
problems). To date, the performance of the Pratt & Whitney engine has 
been excellent, giving us confidence in its reliability. The 2002 RAND 
study, Military Jet Engine Acquisition, noted the key performance 
requirements that led all three contractors to select the F119 
derivative were "very high reliability for the single-engine Navy JSF 
variant and sufficient non-augmented thrust for the short takeoff and 
vertical landing JSF variant.". 

The draft report does not mention why it is so difficult to achieve a 
net cost savings from engine competition, despite considerable 
discussion on this point with DoD officials. In addition to the upfront 
development cost of at least $2.4 billion, several key factors work to 
increase procurement costs. Producing a given amount of engines with 
two suppliers instead of one supplier reduces the advantage from 
"learning curve" effects (whereby costs decrease as a company produces 
more units) and from "rate effects" (whereby fixed costs are spread 
over production units). Our experience with the F404 engine in early- 
model F/A-18s illustrates the point; the average unit costs of this 
engine did not decrease after competition was introduced. 

Finally, the draft report mischaracterizes DOD's rationale for 
terminating the alternative engine program. The draft report states, 
"The alternative engine program was deemed to have a lesser priority 
than other major DoD activities and programs." A more accurate 
description would address DOD's process of weighing the upfront costs 
of paying for a second supplier against the risk of relying on a single 
engine supplier. While DoD recognizes that there are benefits to having 
two engine sources, the risk of a single engine supplier for JSF was 
judged manageable compared to other risks the Department faces. 

In summary, GAO's draft report to Senator Warner focuses on benefits 
that cannot be supported by empirical data. The draft report criticizes 
DoD for ignoring O&S savings but does not specify what those savings 
are, how they might be achieved, and: 

how they would outweigh the known costs-in investment, procurement, and 
O&S-of maintaining two engine suppliers. We hope you'll agree that this 
response raises important issues that deserve more thoughtful and 
balanced consideration in your draft report. 


[End of Section] 


[1] Advisory groups composed of DOD and foreign partner representatives 
from the technical, operational, and financial communities were 
established under the aegis of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development, and Acquisition to review technical and 
programmatic issues of the alternate engine program, determine its 
costs and benefits, and make recommendation for either continuing or 
terminating the program. 

[2] Dollars are fiscal year 2002 constant for comparison with the 2002 
DOD break-even analysis. 

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