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entitled 'Limitations in the Air Force's Proposed Housing Plan for 
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May 19, 2006: 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Chair: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans' Affairs, and 
Related Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Senator Hutchison: 

Subject: Limitations in the Air Force's Proposed Housing Plan for 
Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany: 

The Air Force plans to construct 233 military housing units on 
Spangdahlem Air Base,[Footnote 1] Germany at a cost of $131.3 million 
spread over fiscal years 2006-2008, and to fund 270 build-to-lease 
units nearby at an annual cost of $32,888 per unit over 20 years. The 
Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act for 
fiscal year 2006 directed the Secretary of the Air Force to submit to 
the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of Congress a report 
containing a housing plan for Spangdahlem[Footnote 2]. The House 
Conference Report accompanying H.R. 2528 stipulated that the report 
must include a complete cost-benefit analysis of available housing 
options to include build-to-lease housing[Footnote 3], and that none of 
the funds appropriated for family housing at Spangdahlem--nearly $45.4 
million--may be obligated until the Secretary of the Air Force 
certified to the Appropriations Committees that the report had been 
completed and received the Committees' response or a 30-day period has 
elapsed after the Committees receive such report[Footnote 4]. In 
response to the mandate, the Air Force issued a report in January 2006 
that compared its proposed plan with four other housing 
options[Footnote 5] that included a combination of traditional military 
construction, build-to-lease housing, and replacement of existing 
housing units to meet its housing requirements at Spangdahlem[Footnote 
6]. In the report, the Air Force recommended implementation of its 
proposed plan and release of the military construction appropriations 
for fiscal year 2006. The Air Force also concluded that, depending on 
the results of its efforts to explore cooperative ventures with the 
local German government and communities and the potential for a larger 
build-to-lease program, the scope of its military construction projects 
for future years may need to be adjusted. The Air Force also stated it 
would provide a status report regarding these adjustments to Congress 
within 365 days of the Appropriations Committees' release of the fiscal 
year 2006 military construction appropriation. Specifically, the Air 
Force proposed to report on the results of the cooperative ventures, 
number of housing units procured in the fiscal year 2006 military 
construction project, and proposed adjustments in the scope of the 
fiscal years 2007 and 2008 military construction projects. In February 
2006, the Appropriations Committees released nearly $45.4 million in 
fiscal year 2006 military construction budget authority for 79 housing 
units at Spangdahlem. 

As you know, during our ongoing review of the Department of Defense's 
(DOD) comprehensive overseas master plans,[Footnote 7] we met with Air 
Force officials and visited family housing units at Spangdahlem and the 
base's Bitburg Annex. We briefed your office on the results of our site 
visits on February 27, 2006. Subsequently, on March 1, 2006, you 
requested that we review the assumptions and methodologies used in the 
Air Force's report issued in January 2006. This report responds to your 
request. 

To meet our objective, we made extensive use of information gleaned 
from our site visits of Spangdahlem and the Bitburg Annex in December 
2005. We also interviewed officials of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense; U.S. European Command; U.S. Air Force Europe; Air Force 
Headquarters Civil Engineer Directorate; and Parsons Corporation--the 
contractor that conducted analyses for the Air Force's report. We 
reviewed and evaluated the housing requirements and market analysis the 
Air Force used in preparing its housing report and interviewed Air 
Force officials regarding the data and assumptions they used in 
preparing their analysis. We analyzed the Air Force's efforts in 
considering build-to-lease opportunities by interviewing Air Force 
officials and reviewing correspondence to and from the German 
government involving limitations and possible cost sharing for these 
initiatives. We also compared the assumptions, methods, and economic 
cost analyses used to develop the Air Force's proposed plan and 
alternatives with the guidance contained in Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), DOD, and Air Force instructions and manuals. We also 
worked with Air Force officials to assess whether their economic cost 
analysis was based on this guidance. We determined that our data were 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

We conducted our review from March through May 2006 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

Although there is no basis to question whether the Air Force needs to 
upgrade its housing at Spangdahlem, key assumptions and methodology 
used in the Air Force report on housing plans for Spangdahlem, in some 
instances, were based on dated and incorrect information. As a result, 
there is uncertainty as to how many housing units are needed and which 
method--traditional military construction, build to lease, or other 
methods--is the most appropriate means to meet the housing requirement 
given costs and other considerations. The Air Force has recognized that 
there may be a need to adjust the scope of the military construction 
projects proposed for future years, and is in the process of updating 
its information and reassessing the mix of housing methods. 
Nevertheless, we identified the following weaknesses in its 2006 report 
that the Air Force should address before it issues a status report to 
the Appropriations Committees. Specifically: 

Air Force officials stated that they relied on a 2003 housing 
requirements and market analysis[Footnote 8] as the foundation to 
determine the need for family housing in the Air Force's 2006 
Spangdahlem housing report. Although the 2003 analysis concluded that 
no additional family housing construction was needed, according to Air 
Force officials the analysis did not take into consideration the 
inadequate condition of some existing housing units and was based on 
outdated information, such as demographic data almost 2 decades old. 
Officials said that they also used other sources of information to 
develop the housing requirements identified in their 2006 report. While 
we reviewed these sources, we made no assessment of their suitability 
in determining the housing requirements. At the same time, we are 
concerned that the Air Force report may have overestimated the number 
of new housing units needed because it did not take into account other 
information indicating that a new highway had recently opened up access 
to more villages, increasing opportunities for off-base housing. Air 
Force officials said that this information will be contained in a new 
housing requirements and market analysis to be issued in July 2006, but 
they did not expect it to significantly change their housing 
requirements. However, we believe that the Air Force may not fully know 
the amount or mix of housing needed until it recalculates its on-base 
housing requirements using this and other new information. 

In the House Conference Report to H.R. 2528, the conferees urged the 
Air Force to consider all options to address the housing needs, and 
stated specifically that build-to-lease housing has the potential to 
provide quality housing quickly to the families at Spangdahlem, while 
also providing a more cost-effective and flexible option to the United 
States. Although the Air Force plans to use off-base, build-to-lease 
housing to meet over half of its requirements for new family housing in 
Spangdahlem, it did not recommend a larger number of build-to-lease 
units because it assumed that local conditions existed that limited 
support for such projects. For example, Air Force officials assumed, 
based upon limited discussions with state and local German officials, 
that local developers considered the projects too financially risky to 
undertake, without officially testing the market. As a result of its 
assumption, the Air Force may have underestimated the number of build- 
to-lease opportunities and overestimated the need for military 
construction funding or vice versa. Information the Air Force received 
from German officials after publishing its report suggests that some 
limitations may no longer exist, that additional build-to-lease 
opportunities may exist, and that military construction needed under 
the Air Force proposed plan could differ from that previously planned. 
For example, a concern that large, U.S.-style developments were not in 
keeping with the culture of the region is being addressed by 
designating small residential zones for appropriately 50-60 units near 
the air base that can be planned, developed, and offered as the U.S. 
need increases.[Footnote 9] Accordingly, to determine local interest in 
build-to-lease developments, the Air Force plans to provide a 
requirements document for 364 build-to-lease units to the German 
government by June 2006 and expects a final build-to-lease agreement to 
be complete in February 2007.[Footnote 10] Until the Air Force tests 
its original assumptions about build-to-lease developments and 
completes all assessments of available housing off base, Congress will 
not be in a position to know whether the Air Force's planned allocation 
of new family housing units in Spangdahlem between build-to-lease and 
military construction units is fully justified or to what extent other 
amounts may be required depending on the availability of military 
construction funding. 

We found that the Air Force did not follow OMB, DOD, and Air Force 
guidance on performing life-cycle cost analysis in two instances--when 
it used an incorrect discount rate to calculate the present value of 
the costs and benefits of the Air Force's proposed plan and four 
housing alternatives, and when it incorrectly calculated the remaining 
worth of the housing units funded with military construction 
appropriations after 20 years. However, our recalculations based on 
OMB, DOD, and Air Force guidance did not result in a significant 
variance from the Air Force's analysis, in that the estimated life- 
cycle costs of both analyses fell between the other alternatives. As a 
result, there is little, based on our recalculations of the life-cycle 
costs, to support a change in the Air Force's selected proposal, 
especially given the risk assessment criteria the Air Force assigned to 
compare the housing options. Nevertheless, the Air Force should use the 
correct discount rate and remaining worth of the housing in its 
analysis of the housing options presented in its upcoming status report 
to the Appropriations Committees. 

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of the Air Force to 
ensure that the Air Force's upcoming status report to the 
Appropriations Committees includes an analysis of available housing 
options that is based upon the most currently available data and sound 
assumptions and methodology, including (1) the new housing requirements 
and market analysis scheduled to be completed in July 2006 and (2) 
calculations of life-cycle costs in accordance with government guidance 
on the use of discount rates and how to calculate the remaining worth 
of housing. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD 
concurred with our recommendations. We discuss DOD's comments and our 
evaluation of them later in this report. 

Background: 

Spangdahlem is an enduring installation designed to ensure a strong 
presence in the European theater and to facilitate close cooperation 
with North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies and currently has a 
total population of 12,014 servicemembers, civilians, contractors, and 
dependents. Historically, the air base has hosted a fighter-aircraft 
mission; however, its mission was enhanced by the closure of Rhein-Main 
Air Base in December 2005 when a portion of its airlift mission was 
moved to Spangdahlem. Spangdahlem is currently comprised of a main base 
and four annexes, which are geographically separated from the main base 
by 7 to 15 miles.[Footnote 11] The Air Force plans to consolidate all 
activities, such as base support and family housing, at Spangdahlem and 
close the four annexes. According to Air Force officials, the plan 
would provide operational efficiencies and reduce the exposure of U.S. 
service members and their families traveling on roads between the 
annexes and Spangdahlem. According to Air Force officials, they 
recorded a total of 196 accidents on the road between the Bitburg Annex 
and Spangdahlem in 2004 and 2005. 

Legislative Reporting Requirement: 

The Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act 
for fiscal year 2006 directed the Secretary of the Air Force to submit 
to the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of Congress a report 
containing a housing plan for Spangdahlem.[Footnote 12] In the House 
Conference Report accompanying H.R. 2528,[Footnote 13] the conferees 
noted the current need for housing at Spangdahlem and provided funding 
for such purpose. The conferees urged the Air Force to consider all 
options to address the housing need at Spangdahlem and stated that 
build-to-lease housing has the potential to provide quality housing 
quickly to the families at Spangdahlem, while also providing a more 
cost-effective and flexible option to the United States. In the 
Statement of Managers accompanying the Conference Report for H.R. 2528, 
the conferees directed the Air Force to report the results of a 
complete cost-benefit analysis of all available housing options at 
Spangdahlem, including build to lease, and that the analysis should 
include but not be limited to the cost per housing unit of each option 
and evidence of efforts made to lower such cost. 

The Conference Report also stated that none of the funds appropriated 
for family housing at Spangdahlem--nearly $45.4 million--may be 
obligated until the Secretary of the Air Force certified to the 
Committees on Appropriations that the report had been completed and 
received the Committees' response or a 30-day period has elapsed after 
the Committees receive such report. These military construction funds 
were released to the Air Force in February 2006. 

Air Force's Proposed Plan and Alternatives: 

The Air Force's January 2006 report to both Appropriations Committees 
includes a proposed housing plan and four alternatives for Spangdahlem 
representing a combination of traditional military construction, 
replacement of existing housing units, and build to lease. This report 
also provides an overview on Spangdahlem's mission, the Air Force 
housing strategy, and coordination efforts involving cost sharing with 
the German government. The Air Force's proposed plan calls for military 
construction of 233 family housing units at Spangdahlem at a total cost 
of $131.3 million spread over fiscal years 2006-2008, using housing 
units at Bitburg Annex as temporary living quarters (but eventually 
closing them), and obtaining 270 build-to-lease units at an annual cost 
of $32,888 per unit for 20 years in the communities surrounding 
Spangdahlem. The Air Force anticipates that it would take 5 to 6 years 
from the start of the fiscal year 2006 military construction to fully 
implement the proposed plan. The report also offers four other 
alternative ways to meet the projected housing needs of servicemembers 
stationed at Spangdahlem. 

Alternative 1 provides for military construction of 139 family housing 
units at Spangdahlem in fiscal years 2006-2007, using family housing 
units at Bitburg Annex as temporary living quarters (but eventually 
closing them), and obtaining 364 build-to-lease units. 

Alternative 2 provides for no military construction at Spangdahlem and 
obtaining 503 build-to-lease units. 

Alternative 3 provides for military construction of 164 family housing 
units at Spangdahlem over fiscal years 2006-2008, and replacing 339 
housing units at Bitburg Annex. 

Alternative 4 provides for military construction of 503 family housing 
units at Spangdahlem and using family housing units at Bitburg Annex as 
temporary living quarters (but eventually closing them). 

Table 1 shows the quantities and sources of proposed housing units as 
well as the life-cycle costs as projected and reported by the Air Force 
for its proposed plan and four alternatives. All of the housing options 
include continued use of 134 units the Air Force considers adequate on 
Spangdahlem and 200 units currently leased in German communities near 
Spangdahlem. 

Table 1: Quantities and Sources of Housing Units and the Air Force's 
Estimated Life-cycle Costs for Its Proposed Plan and Four Alternatives: 

Sources:  Fiscal year 2006 military construction; 
Proposed plan: 79; 
Alternative 1: 79; 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: 79; 
Alternative 4: 79. 

Sources:  Fiscal year 2007 military construction; 
Proposed plan: 60; 
Alternative 1: 60; 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: 60; 
Alternative 4: 60. 

Sources:  Fiscal year 2008 military construction; 
Proposed plan: 94; 
Alternative 1: [Empty]; 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: 25; 
Alternative 4: 364. 

Sources:  Build to lease; 
Proposed plan: 270; 
Alternative 1: 364; 
Alternative 2: 503; 
Alternative 3: [Empty]; 
Alternative 4: [Empty]. 

Sources:  Replace existing Bitburg Annex housing[A]; 
Proposed plan: [Empty]; 
Alternative 1: [Empty]; 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: 339; 
Alternative 4: [Empty]. 

Sources:  Use existing Spangdahlem housing; 
Proposed plan: 134; 
Alternative 1: 134; 
Alternative 2: 134; 
Alternative 3: 134; 
Alternative 4: 134. 

Sources:  Renew existing leases; 
Proposed plan: 200; 
Alternative 1: 200; 
Alternative 2: 200; 
Alternative 3: 200; 
Alternative 4: 200. 

Sources:  Total housing units; 
Proposed plan: 837; 
Alternative 1: 837; 
Alternative 2: 837; 
Alternative 3: 837; 
Alternative 4: 837. 

Sources:  Total life-cycle costs[B]; 
Proposed plan: $228,437; 
Alternative 1: $253,560; 
Alternative 2: $287,034; 
Alternative 3: $154,276; 
Alternative 4: $135,688. 

Source: Air Force. 

[A] This alternative also includes the costs to construct front gate 
improvements, a fire station, and demolition of 715 existing, 
inadequate housing units located at Bitburg. 

[B] Total life-cycle costs are in fiscal year 2005 dollars in thousands 
using the Air Force's 3.5 percent nominal discount rate. 

[End of table] 

In its January 2006 report to both Appropriations Committees, the Air 
Force recommended implementation of the proposed plan. In addition, the 
Air Force committed to executing the fiscal year 2006 military 
construction project for 79 housing units and, since it considered 
traditional military construction appropriations as the most cost- 
effective solution, it also included military construction projects for 
fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Because more military construction over 
these proposed levels will require utilization of additional contiguous 
tracts of land from the German government, the Air Force also 
recommended pursuit of 270 build-to-lease units. In addition, the 
primary benefits of using build to lease, according to Air Force 
officials, are that it provides service members housing faster and 
requires less up-front appropriations than traditional military 
construction. Given current budget limitations, these officials believe 
that housing options requiring less up-front funds may be more 
acceptable to DOD and Congress despite their greater life-cycle costs 
than options with lower life-cycle costs but greater up-front funding 
requirements, such as those that rely primarily on traditional military 
construction appropriations. 

At the same time, Air Force also reported it will continue to explore 
cooperative ventures with the German State of Rheinland-Pfalz and local 
communities, and a larger build-to-lease program to meet its housing 
requirements. Depending on the results of these efforts, the Air Force 
concluded that the scope of future years' military construction 
projects may be adjusted. The Air Force also proposed to provide a 
status report and report these adjustments to Congress within 365 days 
of the Appropriations Committees' release of the fiscal year 2006 
military construction funds appropriated for Spangdahlem family 
housing. Specifically, the Air Force proposed to report on the (1) 
realized savings from cooperation with the State of Rheinland-Pfalz or 
the success of its proposed build-to-lease program, (2) number of 
housing units procured in the fiscal year 2006 military construction 
project, and (3) proposed adjustments in the scope of the fiscal years 
2007 and 2008 military construction projects to meet its housing 
requirements. The Air Force concluded by stating that it was committed 
to reassessing its housing requirements and adjusting its strategy to 
provide the most cost-efficient housing investment solution at 
Spangdahlem. 

Air Force May Have Overestimated Requirements: 

While the Air Force relied on a housing requirements and market 
analysis that concluded no additional family housing construction was 
needed at Spangdahlem to develop its 2006 housing report, it also used 
other sources of information for this analysis but overlooked other 
information that may also affect on-base housing requirements. We are 
concerned that the Air Force may have overestimated the number of new 
housing units needed on base in its 2006 report because it did not take 
into account information showing that a new highway had recently opened 
up, which has created access to more villages and subsequently more 
rental housing and potentially more build-to-lease locations. Air Force 
officials said that this information will be contained in a new housing 
requirements and market analysis to be issued in July 2006, but that 
they did not expect it to significantly change their housing 
requirements. However, we believe that the Air Force may not fully know 
the amount or mix of housing needed until it recalculates its on-base 
housing requirements using this new information. 

Air Force Selectively Relied on Housing Requirements and Market 
Analysis: 

Although Air Force officials say that they relied on its 2003 housing 
requirements and market analysis to estimate the total family housing 
requirement for Spangdahlem, they used other sources of information for 
their analysis. A key finding in the housing requirements and market 
analysis, which concluded that no additional family housing 
construction was needed, does not support the Air Force's current 
request for military construction. However, Air Force officials said 
the 2003 housing requirements and market analysis did not take into 
consideration the inadequate condition of some existing housing units 
in the Spangdahlem area. Thus, they believe the number of surplus 
family housing units identified in the 2003 analysis did not represent 
an accurate depiction of the amount of family housing available for 
military personnel and their dependents. Air Force officials also used 
data provided in another document completed in June 2005 called the 
housing community profile, which provided an assessment of housing 
conditions and improvements required to meet Air Force standards, to 
support the Air Force's proposed housing plan and alternatives. 

Air Force officials recognized that, in some instances, the 2003-2008 
analysis reflected dated information, and the Air Force used additional 
sources of information to develop its housing requirement. Although Air 
Force officials said they used the most current information available 
when they prepared the 2003 housing requirements and market analysis, 
in some cases they used information that was almost 20 years old. 
Specifically, in its assessment of the ability of the private sector to 
potentially house military families, the 2003 analysis used data 
collected by the German national census of 1987 as a reference for the 
amount of suitable rental housing in the community around Spangdahlem. 
The Air Force also relied on more current housing data, on-site 
surveys, and interviews with local experts in the real estate market 
and base personnel. While we reviewed these added sources, we did not 
make an assessment of their suitability in determining the housing 
requirement. 

Updated Analysis Could Change Overall Military Family Housing 
Requirement: 

The Air Force plans to complete another housing requirements and market 
analysis for Spangdahlem in July 2006 using more current data, which 
could change--increase or decrease--the overall military family housing 
requirement.[Footnote 14] Our prior work, and that of the DOD inspector 
general, has emphasized the importance of determining the availability 
of off-base housing for military families in communities surrounding 
military installations to prevent overstated government housing 
requirements.[Footnote 15] The Air Force may have overestimated the 
number of new housing units needed in its plan because it did not take 
into account areas near Spangdahlem that may be able to support build- 
to-lease opportunities. In a letter to the German government dated 
March 2006, an Air Force official said the results of the new housing 
requirements and market analysis this summer would incorporate factors 
such as a new highway that has created access to more villages and 
subsequently more rentals and potential construction locations for 
build-to-lease units. Air Force officials acknowledge that this updated 
analysis may reduce the overall family housing requirements at 
Spangdahlem by taking into account these newly accessible areas that 
may provide additional rental units and be able to support build-to- 
lease housing. Air Force officials said, however, that they did not 
expect this information to significantly change their housing 
requirements. Until the Air Force reevaluates its housing requirements 
based upon more current information in its new housing requirements and 
market analysis, it may not fully know the amount or mix of housing 
needed at Spangdahlem. 

Some Limitations in Build-to-Lease Housing May Have Been Overcome and 
Additional Opportunities May Now Exist: 

Information the Air Force received after publishing its report suggests 
that some previous limitations in build-to-lease housing near 
Spangdahlem may have been overcome and, consequently, additional build- 
to-lease opportunities may exist. The Air Force considered build-to- 
lease housing as a significant source of off-base housing under its 
proposed plan and under two alternatives, but at the time the Air Force 
wrote its report, Air Force officials stated that they did not 
recommend pursuing larger numbers of build-to-lease housing units 
because of local conditions that limited support for such projects. The 
Air Force has received information since publishing its report 
suggesting that these limitations may no longer exist, that additional 
build-to-lease opportunities may exist, and that military construction 
needed under the Air Force proposed plan may be less than stated. To 
test its original assumptions about local interest in build-to-lease 
developments near Spangdahlem, the Air Force plans to provide a 
requirements document for 364 build-to-lease units to the German 
government by June 2006 and expects a final agreement to be complete in 
February 2007. 

Air Force Information Indicated Limitations on Numbers of Build-to- 
Lease: 

At the time of the Air Force's 2006 report, Air Force officials said 
that information indicated there were limitations to pursuing greater 
numbers of build-to-lease units than those proposed in the Air Force 
plan. Air Force officials cited meetings with representatives of the 
State of Rheinland-Pfalz and local communities where these 
representatives expressed various concerns. Air Force officials 
considered the primary challenge for a build-to-lease proposal at 
Spangdahlem to be the ability of local developers to acquire loans from 
banks to pay for construction of the housing units, because the 
projects were considered too financially risky to undertake. According 
to Air Force officials, the military services, by statute,[Footnote 16] 
are limited to leasing family housing units for a maximum of 10 years, 
which may not provide sufficient time for developers to recoup their 
investment. Further, the State of Rheinland-Pfalz was reluctant to 
guarantee lease payments beyond 10 years because of concerns that the 
Air Force might close Spangdahlem at some time in the near future. Air 
Force officials stated that, at the Army's Grafenwoehr Garrison in 
Germany, the Army addressed this limitation by obtaining local German 
government commitment to guarantee an additional 10-year lease period, 
thus providing a 20-year leasing agreement for the developers of build- 
to-lease housing projects. At Spangdahlem, the State of Rheinland-Pfalz 
has been reluctant to provide the same type of commitment for build-to- 
lease housing because Rheinland-Pfalz officials believe there is not a 
secondary market of German citizens in the area who could lease the 
large number of build-to-lease units that could be available at the end 
of the 10-year lease period. 

Discussions in December 2005 between Air Force officials and 
representatives of the State of Rheinland-Pfalz and local communities 
also yielded concerns regarding a lack of public infrastructure to 
create more than 270 private units in a short period of time. In 
addition, local officials expressed concerns that large, U.S.-style 
developments were not in keeping with the culture of the region. In its 
report to Congress, the Air Force acknowledged the difficultly of this 
situation and stated that it does not want to pursue a large amount of 
build-to-lease units, because the result could be little or no family 
housing if the limitations they identified cause build-to-lease plans 
to fail due to low investor confidence in the long-term future of the 
air base coupled with a questionable secondary market if the base was 
closed or its mission significantly reduced. This could force military 
families to live in inadequate existing housing and consequently 
require additional military construction funds at a later date. 

Some Build-to-Lease Limitations May No Longer Exist and Some Military 
Construction Funds May Not Be Necessary: 

Some limitations to build-to-lease developments may no longer exist or 
may have been mitigated by recent events. Air Force officials have 
stated that the release of fiscal year 2006 military construction funds 
for family housing units at Spangdahlem provided assurance to the 
German private market that the U.S. government was committed to 
maintaining a presence in the area and that the State of Rheinland- 
Pfalz is now more likely to provide lease guarantees. As a result, the 
Air Force has accelerated its efforts to pursue cooperative ventures 
with the State of Rheinland-Pfalz and local villages for a build-to- 
lease program. 

Recent correspondence between the Air Force and the German government 
suggests that additional build-to-lease opportunities may exist and 
that some military construction funds requested under the Air Force 
proposed plan may not be necessary. From January through March 2006, 
the Air Force and the German government discussed progress toward 
attaining additional built-to-lease units in the Spangdahlem area. A 
January 2006 letter to the Air Force from an official of the State of 
Rheinland-Phalz discussed overcoming their concern that U.S.-style 
developments were not in keeping with the culture of the region by 
designating small residential zones for appropriately 50-60 units near 
the air base that can be planned, developed, and offered as the U.S. 
need increases. The letter also discussed overcoming the concerns of 
local developers that the projects were too financially risky by 
providing financial grants to assist developers by reducing their total 
cost liability. Another letter from the Air Force to the State of 
Rheinland-Phalz predicted that the results of a new housing requirement 
and market analysis will recognize access to more villages, rental 
units, and potential housing construction locations. This should reduce 
the overall military family housing requirement, which may reduce local 
concerns about the size and obtrusiveness of off-base build-to-lease 
efforts. 

The Air Force plans to test the local market interest in build-to-lease 
developments through the German government starting with the Air 
Force's requirements document for 364 build-to-lease units in June 2006 
and expects a final build-to-lease agreement to be complete in February 
2007--an action that could provide a more complete picture of the 
potential use of build-to-lease units. Air Force officials said that if 
this effort is successful, the fiscal year 2008 military construction 
requirement for 94 family housing units may no longer be required. 
However, the Air Force is not in a sound position to fully know the 
amount or mix of housing needed until it has received the results of 
the build-to-lease proposal and other new information. The Air Force 
proposes to report any adjustments in its upcoming status report to the 
Appropriations Committees. Until the Air Force tests its original 
assumptions about local interest in build-to-lease developments and 
completes all assessments of available housing off base, Congress will 
not be in a sound position to know whether the Air Force's planned 
allocation of new family housing units in Spangdahlem between build-to- 
lease and military construction units is fully justified. 

Air Force Did Not Always Follow Guidance in Its Life-cycle Cost 
Analysis of Housing Options: 

The economic analysis the Air Force used in estimating the life-cycle 
costs of its proposed plan and four alternatives presented in its 
Spangdahlem housing report did not follow applicable guidance from OMB, 
DOD, and Air Force in two instances. The Air Force varied from the 
guidance in (1) using a discount rate of 3.5 percent to calculate the 
present value of expected costs, and (2) calculating the remaining 
worth of the housing units funded with military construction 
appropriations at an estimated replacement value. On the basis of the 
applicable guidance, we adjusted the Air Force's calculations by (1) 
using a discount rate of 5.2 percent to calculate the present value of 
expected costs, and (2) depreciating the housing units constructed with 
military construction appropriations to calculate the remaining worth 
of the housing at the end of the period of analysis. (We describe the 
details of the Air Force's and our calculations in enclosure I of this 
report.) 

However, as shown in table 2, our recalculations did not result in a 
significant variance from the Air Force's analysis.[Footnote 17] Like 
the Air Force's life-cycle cost estimate ($228.4 million), our adjusted 
life-cycle cost ($225.6 million) of the Air Force's proposed plan falls 
between the life-cycle costs of other four housing alternatives and the 
difference between the life-cycle cost estimates for the proposed plan 
was only -1.3 percent. As a result, there is little, based on our 
recalculations of the life-cycle costs for the current housing options, 
to support a change in the Air Force's selected proposal, especially 
given the risk assessment criteria the Air Force assigned to compare 
the housing options. Nevertheless, the Air Force should use the correct 
discount rate and remaining worth of the housing in its analysis of the 
housing options presented in its upcoming status report to the 
Appropriations Committees. 

Table 2: Comparison of Air Force Reported Life-cycle Costs with GAO 
Adjusted Life-cycle Costs for the Proposed Plan and Four Alternatives: 

Proposed plan; 
Air Force life-cycle costs: $228,437; 
Adjusted life-cycle costs: $225,557; 
Difference: -$2,880; 
Percentage difference: -01.3%. 

Alternative 1; 
Air Force life-cycle costs: 253,560; 
Adjusted life-cycle costs: $237,614; 
Difference: -$15,946; 
Percentage difference: -06.3%. 

Alternative 2; 
Air Force life-cycle costs: 287,034; 
Adjusted life-cycle costs: $245,113; 
Difference: -$41,921; 
Percentage difference: -14.6%. 

Alternative 3; 
Air Force life-cycle costs: 154,276; 
Adjusted life-cycle costs: $150,910; 
Difference: -$3,366; 
Percentage difference: -2.2%. 

Alternative 4; 
Air Force life-cycle costs: 135,688; 
Adjusted life-cycle costs: $163,646; 
Difference: +$27,958; 
Percentage difference: +20.6%. 

Source: Air Force and GAO. 

Notes:Fiscal year 2005 dollars in thousands. 

The life-cycle costs to retain 134 housing units at Spangdahlem and to 
continue to lease 200 units in the local community are common to all 
five options and, consequently, are not included. 

[End of table] 

Air Force officials stated that the Air Force would not change its 
conclusions and recommendation supporting the proposed housing plan 
based on our recalculations, because the Air Force also relied on its 
established criteria to measure the benefits and risk of each housing 
option. The benefits criteria considered whether each option supported 
construction of government-owned housing; provided flexible funding and 
execution; consolidated operations at Spangdahlem and returned land and 
facilities to the German government; leveraged cost sharing with the 
German government; or capitalized on build-to-lease housing. The risk 
criteria considered whether each option kept military construction 
investment below, over, or at the current program level;[Footnote 18] 
included 270 or more units in a build-to-lease program; or provided no 
U.S. military construction investment resulting in a lack of private 
developer confidence in investing in build-to-lease housing for 
Spangdahlem. For example, as shown in table 3, the Air Force concluded 
that its proposed plan represented the best-case scenario in that the 
plan provides for a large number of benefits while the risks were low. 
On the other hand, according to the Air Force, alternative 4 provides 
for the worst-case scenario in that, while the alternative supports the 
goal of consolidating operations at Spangdahlem, the risk is considered 
high due to the overreliance on U.S. government funding for all housing 
construction. In addition, this alternative requires the German 
government to acquire land adjacent to Spangdahlem, which increases 
risks due to the potential difficulties and delays in acquiring the 
land from private owners.[Footnote 19] Based on the results of the 
benefits and risk analysis, Air Force officials believe our 
recalculations by themselves would not have caused the Air Force to 
change the overall conclusions and recommendation in its report to 
Congress. We have no basis to challenge the Air Force's position 
regarding its risk assessment. 

Table 3: Air Force Reported Benefit and Risk for the Proposed Plan and 
Four Alternatives: 

Proposed plan; 
Benefit: High; 
Risk: Low. 

Alternative 1; 
Benefit: High; 
Risk: Moderate. 

Alternative 2; 
Benefit: High; 
Risk: High. 

Alternative 3; 
Benefit: Low; 
Risk: High. 

Alternative 4; 
Benefit: Moderate; 
Risk: High. 

Source: Air Force. 

[End of table] 

Conclusions: 

The Air Force 2006 report to the Appropriations Committees provided an 
assessment of housing options that was not always based on current 
information, and did not follow the government guidance on cost-benefit 
analysis methodology. Although we found no basis to question whether 
the Air Force needs to upgrade its housing at Spangdahlem, there is 
uncertainty over how many housing units are needed and which housing 
method--traditional military construction, build to lease, or other 
methods--is the most appropriate means to meet its housing 
requirements. Consequently, we believe, as the Air Force concluded in 
its 2006 report, that there may be a need to adjust the scope of the 
military construction projects proposed for the future. While the Air 
Force specified that the results of its efforts to explore cooperative 
ventures and develop a larger build-to-lease program are needed to make 
these adjustments in its upcoming status report to the Appropriations 
Committees, it did not identify other factors, such as its new 
Spangdahlem housing requirements and market analysis, it planned to 
consider in making these adjustments. Until the Air Force fully 
explores cooperative ventures and a larger build-to-lease program, as 
well as the results of its new housing requirements and market 
analysis--all of which the Air Force expects to be completed later in 
2006 or early 2007--the Air Force and Congress will not be in a sound 
position to know the full potential for build-to-lease housing near 
Spangdahlem and the need for military construction in fiscal years 2007 
and 2008. Until then, there is a possibility of overestimating or 
underestimating the number of housing units needed to be built on base 
with military construction appropriations. 

While Air Force did not fully follow OMB, DOD, and Air Force guidance 
on performing life-cycle cost analysis, our recalculations based on the 
guidance did not result in a significant variance from the Air Force's 
analysis, in that the estimated life-cycle costs of both analyses fell 
between the other alternatives. As a result, there is little based on 
our recalculations of the existing life-cycle costs using current 
information to support a change in the Air Force's selected proposal in 
its 2006 report or the Air Force's reliance on its established criteria 
to measure the benefits and risk of each housing option. Nevertheless, 
since there may be a need to adjust the scope of the military 
construction projects proposed for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and the 
other housing methods presented in its upcoming status report, the Air 
Force cannot accurately calculate and objectively assess the costs and 
benefits of different housing options unless it follows OMB guidance on 
the use of discount rates and with DOD and Air Force guidance on the 
use of depreciation to calculate the remaining worth of housing. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force take the following two 
actions and reflect the results of these actions in its upcoming status 
report to the Appropriations Committees. 

Because of the uncertainty associated with which factors the Air Force 
plans to consider when it adjusts the scope of the military 
construction projects proposed for fiscal years 2007-2008, the 
Secretary should include, at a minimum, the results of its new housing 
requirements and market analysis for Spangdahlem (scheduled to be 
completed in July 2006) in making the required adjustments. 

To ensure that the status report is based upon sound economic 
assumptions and methods, the Secretary should calculate life-cycle 
costs in accordance with OMB guidance on the use of discount rates and 
in accordance with DOD and Air Force guidance on the use of 
depreciation to calculate the remaining worth of housing. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Assistant Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental, Safety, and Occupational 
Health) agreed with our recommendations. However, the Assistant Deputy 
Under Secretary commented that DOD expects the implementation of our 
recommendations would have minimal effect on the outcome of the Air 
Force's analysis and would not significantly change the recommended 
course of action. We are reluctant to agree with this expectation since 
many of the key data needed to base such a conclusion will not be known 
until later this year. For example, the results of the new Spangdahlem 
housing requirements and market analysis due to be completed this 
summer would incorporate factors such as a new highway that has created 
access to more villages and subsequently more rentals and potential 
construction locations for build-to-lease units. This updated analysis 
has the potential to reduce the overall family housing requirements at 
Spangdahlem by taking into account these newly accessible areas that 
may provide additional rental units and be able to support build-to- 
lease housing. We believe that until the Air Force has sufficient time 
to assess the results of its efforts to further explore cooperative 
ventures and develop a larger build-to-lease program, as well as the 
results of its new housing requirements and market analysis, DOD will 
not be in a sound position to know the full potential for build-to- 
lease housing and more rental housing near Spangdahlem, and the need 
for military construction funding in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. As a 
result, we continue to believe, as the Air Force concluded in its 2006 
report, that there may be a need to adjust the scope of the proposed 
military construction projects because of the uncertainty over how many 
housing units are needed and which housing method--traditional military 
construction, build to lease, or other methods--is the most appropriate 
means to meet its housing requirements. 

In addition, the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary's comments outlined 
what DOD believed were three deficiencies of our draft report. However, 
in its comments DOD misquoted our draft report and made incorrect 
conclusions as discussed below: 

First, DOD stated that our report "supports the Air Force's selected 
proposal, especially given the risk assessment criteria the Air Force 
assigned to compare the housing options." In addition, DOD concluded 
that this quote should have been the primary focus of our audit and 
reflected in the results and conclusions sections of our report. 
However, we actually reported that "As a result, there is little, based 
on our recalculations of the life-cycle costs for the current housing 
options, to support a change in the Air Force's selected proposal, 
especially given the risk assessment criteria the Air Force assigned to 
compare the housing options." By misquoting our report, DOD failed to 
recognize that our statement referred to our recalculations of the life-
cycle costs using then currently available information for the housing 
options identified in the Air Force's January 2006 report. As discussed 
above, there may be a need for the Air Force to adjust the housing 
options in its upcoming status report based on the results of its 
efforts to further explore cooperative ventures and develop a larger 
build-to-lease program, as well as the results of its new Spangdahlem 
housing requirements and market analysis. While we appreciate DOD's 
view that our recalculations of the life-cycle costs should be the 
primary focus of our report, we believe that DOD should recognize that 
we completed this review in response to a request from the Chair of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans' Affairs, and 
Related Agencies, who asked that we review all the key assumptions and 
methodologies the Air Force used to develop its January 2006 report, 
and that the life-cycle costs analysis was only one aspect of our 
review, not the primary focus. Accordingly, we have made no change to 
our report. 

Second, DOD commented that our draft report stated the 2003 housing 
requirements and market analysis did not take into consideration the 
inadequate condition of some existing housing units and that we 
reported the Air Force substituted other sources of information for its 
2003 housing requirements and market analysis. Actually, our draft 
report stated that "Although the 2003 analysis concluded that no 
additional family housing construction was needed, according to Air 
Force officials, the analysis did not take into consideration the 
inadequate condition of some existing housing units and was based on 
outdated information, such as demographic data almost 2 decades old. 
Therefore, officials say, they substituted other sources of information 
to develop the housing requirements used in their 2006 report." By 
using the term "substituted" in this case and other instances in our 
draft report, we were attempting to reconcile the differences between 
the Air Force 2003 market analysis' conclusion that no additional 
family housing construction was needed and its 2006 report's conclusion 
that additional housing construction was needed at Spangdahlem. We were 
also trying to explain that the Air Force used other sources of 
information along with the 2003 market analysis to determine the 
housing requirements identified in its 2006 report. Because we continue 
to believe that it is important to reconcile the differences between 
the conclusions of the 2003 market analysis and 2006 report, we did not 
change our report in this respect. However, we revised our report to 
eliminate the use of "substituted" as DOD suggested. Further, our draft 
report did not state that the 2005 housing community profile was done 
to complete the Air Force's January 2006 report as DOD stated in its 
written comments. Accordingly, we made no change to our report in that 
regard. 

Third, DOD expressed concern that our draft report stated that the Air 
Force had "limited discussions with state and local German officials" 
and DOD noted instead that there had been numerous discussions. DOD 
also noted that the Air Force cannot issue a request for proposals to 
test the level of interest by local developers in build-to-lease 
projects and that German government will conduct the acquisition 
process in this instance for the Air Force. With respect to DOD's first 
concern, we actually reported that "Air Force officials assumed, based 
upon limited discussions with state and local German officials, that 
local developers considered the projects too financially risky to 
undertake, without officially testing the market [through] a request 
for proposals." Our use of "limited" in this instance was based 
primarily on both: (1) the Air Force 2006 report's description of only 
one meeting with state government of Rheinland-Pfalz representatives 
where Air Force and German officials discussed options involving the 
German government cooperation including cost-sharing, road repair, and 
loan guarantees; and (2) that the Air Force had not yet tested the 
local market by having the German government issue a request for 
proposals. We continue to believe our use of limited in this instance 
is proper. In addition, the statement in our report that the Air Force 
planned to issue a request for proposal was based on the documentation 
Air Force officials provided to us, which states that the "USAFE [U.S. 
Air Force Europe] plans to test the market through a Request for 
Proposal (RFP) for 364 units." This documentation did not state, nor 
did Air Force officials mention, that the German government would 
actually issue the request for proposals. Nevertheless, as DOD 
suggested, we revised this report to reflect that the German government 
would conduct the acquisition process in this instance for the Air 
Force. 

The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary's comments are reprinted in their 
entirety in enclosure II. DOD also provided technical clarifications, 
which we incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 
committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; and the 
Director, OMB. We will also make copies available to others upon 
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. The GAO staff members who made 
key contributions to this report are listed in enclosure III. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call 
me at (202) 512-5581 or email at holmanb@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by:

Barry W. Holman, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of Section]

Enclosure 1: 

Description of Both Air Force's and Our Calculations of Life-cycle 
Costs: 

The economic analysis the Air Force used in estimating the life-cycle 
costs presented in its Spangdahlem housing report varied from 
applicable Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Department of Defense 
(DOD), and Air Force guidance in (1) using a discount rate of 3.5 
percent to calculate the present value of expected costs, and (2) 
calculating the remaining worth of the housing units funded with 
military construction appropriations at an estimated replacement value 
at the end of the period of analysis--in this case 20 years. Using Air 
Force data, we recomputed the life-cycle costs based on the applicable 
guidance by (1) using the correct discount rate of 5.2 percent, and (2) 
depreciating the housing units constructed with military construction 
appropriations to calculate the remaining worth of the housing. 

Air Force's Economic Analysis and Key Assumptions: 

The Air Force used a variety of data sources and analytical steps to 
estimate the life-cycle costs of its proposed plan and the four other 
housing alternatives for Spangdahlem. 

First, the construction costs of the family housing units were derived 
from the cost estimates contained on DD form 1391 for projects where 
they existed,[Footnote 20] and from DOD's family housing cost model, 
which contains estimates of construction costs. To compute the present 
value of these construction costs in fiscal year 2005 dollars, the Air 
Force used a 3.5 percent nominal discount rate. Air Force officials 
said the 3.5 percent discount rate was selected automatically from a 
Web-based program model that is available for public use in making net 
present value calculations. 

Second, to follow DOD guidance on economic analysis,[Footnote 21] the 
Air Force offset the costs of the military construction projects by 
their remaining worth, which the guidance and the Air Force's report 
call residual value, of the family housing units at the end of the 
period of analysis. The guidance specifically states that residual 
value should be calculated for alternatives that have assets 
(buildings, equipment, structures, etc.) that will still have a useful 
value at the end of the period of analysis. It is important to note 
here that the term "residual value" used in the Air Force's analysis 
should not be confused with the residual value terminology also 
commonly used overseas to describe an amount a host nation would pay 
the United States for improvements made to property when it is returned 
to the host nation. In no instances do Air Force officials believe the 
United States would receive the amount of residual value used in its 
economic cost analysis if the housing were to be returned to Germany 
sometime in the future. Although Air Force guidance further states that 
residual value amounts are normally calculated using a straight line 
depreciation method[Footnote 22] of the started value over the 
project's economic life,[Footnote 23] the Air Force did not depreciate 
the value of housing in its economic cost analysis. Instead, Air Force 
officials assumed that the Air Force would fully fund the sustainment 
of the housing necessary to cover expenses of all recurring maintenance 
costs as well as major repairs (e.g., replacing the roof or repairing 
the air conditioning) and, consequently, they concluded these units 
would not depreciate in value. However, it is important to note that 
historically the Air Force has not fully funded sustainment of its 
facilities. For example, we have reported that hundreds of millions of 
dollars designated for sustainment continues to be redesignated by the 
services to pay for base operations support services and other programs 
and priorities, and that amounts spent on facilities sustainment have 
fallen short of what is needed to halt the deterioration of 
facilities.[Footnote 24] 

Third, on the basis of historical data on actual operation and 
maintenance costs for family housing, the Air Force estimated that it 
would incur $4,900 in annual operation and maintenance costs. To 
compute the present value of these construction costs in fiscal year 
2005 dollars, the Air Force used the Web-based program model to inflate 
the $4,900 estimate 2.5 percent per year and adjusted for the time 
value of money by 3.5 percent. 

Fourth, using historical cost data for build-to-lease agreements, the 
Air Force estimated that the annual cost of the build-to-lease housing 
was $32,888 per unit. To compute the present value of these costs in 
fiscal year 2005 dollars, the Air Force used the Web-based program 
model to inflate the $32,888 estimate 2.5 percent per year and adjusted 
this figure for the time value of money by 3.5 percent. 

As shown in table 4, the estimated life-cycle cost ($228.4 million) of 
the Air Force's proposed plan falls between the life-cycle costs of 
other four housing alternatives, which range from $135.7 million to 
$287 million. 

Table 4: Air Force Life-cycle Costs for Its Proposed Plan and Four 
Alternatives: 

Fiscal year 2005 dollars in thousands: 

Military construction: 

New family housing at Spangdahlem; 
Proposed plan: $126,205[A]; 
Alternative 1: $80,769; 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: $96,097; 
Alternative 4: $210,146. 

Demolition at Spangdahlem; 
Proposed plan: [Empty]; 
Alternative 1: [Empty]; 
Alternative 2: $2,755; 
Alternative 3: [Empty]; 
Alternative 4: [Empty]. 

Replace Bitburg Annex housing[B]; 
Proposed plan: [Empty]; 
Alternative 1: [Empty]; 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: $128,140; 
Alternative 4: [Empty]. 

Subtotal (total military construction); 
Proposed plan: $126,205; 
Alternative 1: $80,769; 
Alternative 2: $2,755; 
Alternative 3: $224,237; 
Alternative 4: $210,146. 

Less residual value; 
Proposed plan: (69,982); 
Alternative 1: ($44,634); 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: ($112,316); 
Alternative 4: ($116,813). 

Subtotal (military construction less residual value); 
Proposed plan: $56,223; 
Alternative 1: $36,135; 
Alternative 2: $2,755; 
Alternative 3: $111,921; 
Alternative 4: $93,333. 

Operation and maintenance; 
Proposed plan: 19,620; 
Alternative 1: $11,704; 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: $42,355; 
Alternative 4: $42,355. 

Build to lease; 
Proposed plan: $152,595; 
Alternative 1: $205,721; 
Alternative 2: $284,279; 
Alternative 3: [Empty]; 
Alternative 4: [Empty]. 

Total life-cycle costs; 
Proposed plan: $228,437; 
Alternative 1: $253,560; 
Alternative 2: $287,034; 
Alternative 3: $154,276; 
Alternative 4: $135,688. 

Source: Air Force. 

Notes:Totals may not add due to rounding. 

The life-cycle costs to retain 134 housing units at Spangdahlem and to 
continue to rent 200 units in the local community are common to all 
five options and, consequently, are not included in this table. 

[A] $131.3 million in original military construction costs for fiscal 
years 2006-2008 presented in fiscal year 2005 dollars. 

[B] This alternative also includes the costs to construct front gate 
improvements, a fire station, and demolition of 715 existing, 
inadequate housing units located at Bitburg. 

[End of table] 

Although military construction and build-to-lease programs are 
typically analyzed on a 40-year basis, the Air Force used a 20-year 
time frame to generate the life-cycle costs of each of the housing 
options shown in table 4. According to Air Force guidance, the time 
frame for the economic cost-analysis period used to compare various 
alternatives is normally the construction period plus the shortest of 
the known economic life of the different alternatives[Footnote 25]. In 
this instance, according to Air Force officials, the initial lease 
period for housing units is not to exceed 10 years with a 10-year 
renewal option[Footnote 26]. Air Force officials also said to go beyond 
20 years in its analysis would create several challenges because of the 
lack of information on the costs of build-to-lease units since the 
lease would have to be renegotiated and housing built with military 
construction appropriations would have to be renovated, which would 
require adjustments in its cost estimates for the different housing 
options. Consequently, the Air Force chose to use a 20-year time frame 
in its economic costs analysis, as we did when we adjusted the Air 
Force's life-cycle costs analysis. 

Our Adjusted Life-cycle Cost Analysis: 

We recalculated the life-cycle costs of the Air Force's proposed plan 
and the four alternatives after making two adjustments to better follow 
OMB, DOD, and Air Force guidance. (See our adjusted life-cycle costs in 
table 5.) First, we used a 5.2 percent discount rate to calculate the 
present value of the expected military construction costs, annual 
operation and maintenance costs, and annual build-to-lease housing 
costs. OMB guidance on economic cost analysis, such as those performed 
by the Air Force, provides specific guidance on the discount rates to 
be used in evaluating federal programs whose benefits and costs are 
distributed over time.[Footnote 27] DOD's instruction on economic 
analysis decision making states that the estimate of the discount rate 
for use in economic analysis shall be issued annually in accordance 
with OMB guidance and the data shall be based on estimates of real and 
nominal borrowing rates provided by OMB.[Footnote 28] Air Force 
guidance on military construction and family housing economic analysis 
also requires an economic analysis to use discount rates provided by 
OMB.[Footnote 29] For fiscal year 2005--the base year of the Air Force 
study--OMB guidance requires that 5.2 percent be used for a 20-year 
period by federal agencies as the nominal discount rate for their 
economic cost analyses.[Footnote 30] Second, to follow Air Force 
guidance, we depreciated the housing units constructed with military 
construction appropriations using a straight line method to calculate 
the residual value of the housing at the end of the period of analysis. 
Air Force guidance states that residual value is normally calculated 
using a straight line depreciation method. 

Table 5: Adjusted Life-cycle Costs for the Air Force's Proposed Plan 
and Four Alternatives: 

Fiscal year 2005 dollars in thousands: 

Military construction: 

New family housing at Spangdahlem; 
Proposed plan: $118,620[A]; 
Alternative 1: $77,124; 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: $91,123; 
Alternative 4: $195,280. 

Demolition at Spangdahlem; 
Proposed plan: [Empty]; 
Alternative 1: [Empty]; 
Alternative 2: $2,662; 
Alternative 3: [Empty]; 
Alternative 4: [Empty]. 

Replace Bitburg Annex housing[B]; 
Proposed plan: [Empty]; 
Alternative 1: [Empty]; 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: $89,554; 
Alternative 4: [Empty]. 

Subtotal (total military construction); 
Proposed plan: $118,620; 
Alternative 1: $77,124; 
Alternative 2: $2,662; 
Alternative 3: $180,677; 
Alternative 4: $195,280. 

Less residual value; 
Proposed plan: ($39,979); 
Alternative 1: ($24,943); 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: ($65,890); 
Alternative 4: ($67,757). 

Subtotal (military construction less residual value); 
Proposed plan: $78,641; 
Alternative 1: $52,181; 
Alternative 2: $2,662; 
Alternative 3: $114,787; 
Alternative 4: $127,523. 

Operations and maintenance; 
Proposed plan: $16,773; 
Alternative 1: $9,982; 
Alternative 2: [Empty]; 
Alternative 3: $36,123; 
Alternative 4: $36,123. 

Build to lease; 
Proposed plan: $130,143; 
Alternative 1: $175,451; 
Alternative 2: $242,451; 
Alternative 3: [Empty]; 
Alternative 4: [Empty]. 

Total life-cycle costs; 
Proposed plan: $225,557; 
Alternative 1: $237,614; 
Alternative 2: $245,113; 
Alternative 3: $150,910; 
Alternative 4: $163,646. 

Source: Based on Air Force data. 

Notes:The life-cycle costs to retain 134 housing units at Spangdahlem 
and to continue to rent 200 units in the local community are common to 
all five options and, consequently, are not included in this table. 

[A] $131.3 million in original military construction costs for fiscal 
years 2006-2008 presented in fiscal year 2005 dollars. 

[B] This alternative also includes the costs to construct front gate 
improvements, a fire station, and demolition of 715 existing, 
inadequate housing units located at Bitburg. 

[End of table] 

Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
9000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-9000: 

May 12 2006: 

Mr. Barry Holman: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr Holman, 

This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-06-736R, "Limitations in the Air Force's Proposed Housing 
Plan for Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany," dated May 9, 2006 (GAO Code 
350835). 

Thank you for allowing us to comment on your draft report. We concur 
with the GAO recommendations that the Air Force update the Housing 
Requirements and Market Analysis (HRMA) and correct assumptions in the 
life-cycle cost analysis (LCCA) prior to its next status report to the 
Appropriations Committees. However, we expect these revisions will have 
a minimal effect on the outcome of the Air Force's analysis and will 
not significantly change the recommended course of action. Our comments 
below outline what we believe are three specific deficiencies of the 
report. We will provide our technical comments under separate cover. 

First, the report concludes that it "supports the Air Force's selected 
proposal, especially given the risk assessment criteria the Air Force 
assigned to compare the housing options." This should be the primary 
focus of the GAO audit, reflected in the results and conclusions 
sections of the report. The AF's proposal is based upon the fact that a 
MILCON solution is more cost-effective than the build-to-lease (BTL) 
solution. This was proven by the average MILCON cost per unit of 
$338,357 in comparison to the average BTL cost per unit of $565,167. 
The only finding from the GAO report was an incorrect discount rate and 
present value costs. Revising these assumptions will continue to 
support the AF's recommended solution. 

Second, the report says that the "HRMA did not take into consideration 
the inadequate condition of some existing housing units." It further 
says that the AF "substituted other sources of information to develop 
the housing requirements used in their 2006 report." The "other 
sources" refers to the Housing Community Profile (HCP). The HCP was not 
completed as a "substitution for this information" as stated on page 
12, but an integral part of the Housing programming process. Our 
process has four major steps. First, the HRMA determines the on-base 
housing requirement. Second, the HCP determines the condition of the 
existing housing, calculates the cost effectiveness of renovation vs. 
replacement, and develops a funding strategy for accomplishing the 
housing requirement. Third, the Family Housing Master Plan (FHMP) takes 
each individual base HCP and uses business rules to build the AF 
program. Finally, the FHMP is developed into DD 1391s and is submitted 
to the Congress through the POM process. The report's assertion that 
the HCP was done to complete the report is inaccurate. 

Third, the report states that "limited discussions with state and local 
German officials" were conducted. To the contrary, there have been 
numerous discussions with the German officials before and during the 
Spangdahlem Report to Congress. For example, General Hobbins (COMUSAFE) 
personally met with Minister Bruch (State Secretary, German State of 
Rheinland-Pfalz) and has highlighted the recent Rheinland-Pfalz 
commitments to loan guarantees and stressed the importance of the FY07 
project in continued progress of the BTL/private investment. This shows 
a high level of commitment and has personal involvement from the 
Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on Spangdahlem Housing. 
Also, the Air Force cannot issue a request for proposal; it must be 
issued by BlMA (Bundesanstalt fur Immobilienaufgaben - German 
Government Real Estate). BIMA now has a draft of AF's requirements 
document and awaits the official accommodation request so they can 
begin the acquisition process. 

Because of the importance of the FY07 project in signaling commitment 
to Spangdahlem housing, support for the FY07 project at Spangdahlem AB 
remains critical. Any deferral may directly impact the Air Force's 
ability to realize the maximum number of build to lease units and cause 
their Spangdahlem airmen to remain in inadequate quarters indefinitely. 

If you have any questions regarding the attached report please contact 
me at (703) 602-3669.  

Signed by:  

Alex A. Beehler: 
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: 
(Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health): 

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED May 9, 2006 GAO CODE 350835/GAO-06-736R: 

"MILITARY HOUSING: Limitations in the Air Force's Proposed Housing Plan 
for Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany" 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS: 

GAO RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Air 
Force include, at a minimum, the results of its new housing 
requirements and market analysis (HRMA) for Spangdahlem in making the 
required adjustments. (Page 21/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE TO GAO RECOMMENDATION 1: 

We concur with adjusting the Spangdahlem housing program as a result of 
the 2006 HRMA and the success of BTL. 

GAO RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Air 
Force calculate life-cycle costs in accordance with Office of 
Management and Budget guidance on the use of discount rates and in 
accordance with DOD and Air Force guidance on the use of depreciation 
to calculate the remaining worth of housing. (Page 21/GAO Draft 
Report): 

DOD RESPONSE TO GAO RECOMMENDATION 2: 

We concur with updating the report with the correct discount rate and 
depreciation value with the understanding that the resulting report 
will not fundamentally change the ranking of the alternatives nor the 
Air Force's position on the proposed option being the most viable 
alternative. 

[End of Section] 

Enclosure III: 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements: 

GAO Contact: 

Barry W. Holman, (202) 512-5581 (holmanb@gao.gov): 

Acknowledgements: 

In addition to the person named above, Nelsie Alcoser, Susan Ditto, 
Mark Little, Charles Perdue, Gary Phillips, and Roger Tomlinson also 
made major contributions to this report. 

(350835): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Hereafter referred to simply as Spangdahlem. 

[2] Pub. L. No. 109-114, § 130 (2005). 

[3] According to Air Force officials, the primary benefits of using 
build to lease are that it provides housing quicker and requires less 
up-front appropriations from the United States than the traditional 
military construction method. Under a build-to-lease agreement, the 
United States contracts with a developer to construct housing for a 
specified number of units for use by military personnel under a fixed 
lease term, such as 10 years, with renewal options for additional 
periods of time. A developer builds the housing with no U.S. government 
funds and the only investment by the United States is a commitment to 
lease the housing from the developer once the housing is built. 

[4] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-305, at 34 (2005). 

[5] The Air Force's proposed plan and four housing alternatives are 
described on pages 6 and 7 of this report. 

[6] Air Force, Report to the Committee on Appropriations of Both Houses 
of Congress on A Housing Plan for Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2006). 

[7] Senate Report 108-82 on the Military Construction Appropriations 
Bill, 2004 directed GAO to monitor the infrastructure master plans 
developed and implemented for the overseas regional commands and to 
provide the congressional defense committees with annual assessment 
reports. 

[8] Parsons Corporation, Housing Requirements and Market Analysis 2003 
- 2008: Spangdahlem Air Base Germany (Oct. 6, 2003). 

[9] According to DOD, the 50-60 unit limitation levied by the German 
government limits the ability for large-scale development and 
encourages multiple, small developers that will increase the complexity 
and risk of the build-to-lease projects. 

[10] According to DOD, the German government real estate office 
(Bundesanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben) will conduct the acquisition 
process in this instance for the Air Force. 

[11] The annexes are Bitburg, Oberweis, Zemmer, and Sulm. 

[12] Pub. L. No. 109-114, § 130 (2005). 

[13] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-305, at 34 (2005). 

[14] Housing requirements and market analyses are routinely updated 
every 4 years to determine whether housing requirements in an area have 
changed. The upcoming analysis at Spangdahlem will cover the 2008-2013 
time frame. 

[15] GAO, Military Housing: Management Improvements Needed As the Pace 
of Privatization Quickens, GAO-02-624 (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 
2002). 

[16] Section 2828 (d) (1) of Title 10, United States Code provides that 
"Leases of housing units in foreign countries under subsection (c) for 
assignment as family housing may be for any period not in excess of 10 
years, or 15 years in the case of leases in Korea, and the costs of 
such leases for any year may be paid out of annual appropriations for 
that year." 

[17] More complete data on the potential for build-to-lease housing and 
the number of available rental units in the local communities near 
Spangdahlem, which will affect life-cycle costs, will not be available 
until the Air Force analyzes the results of its solicitation for 
proposals about build-to-lease housing and updates its housing 
requirements and market analysis later in 2006. 

[18] The Air Force assigned a higher level of risk to options in which 
the U.S.-funded military construction exceeded the current program 
because an increase in up-front funding requirements was expected to be 
less acceptable to DOD and Congress than the current level. 

[19] According to the Air Force, the acquisition of additional land 
will occur at no cost to the U.S. government and ownership will 
ultimately remain with the German government. 

[20] DD form 1391 is used by DOD to submit requirements and 
justifications in support of funding requests for military construction 
to Congress. 

[21] DOD Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis for Decision Making 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7, 1995). 

[22] Straight line depreciation is a method of calculating the 
depreciation of an asset which assumes the asset will lose an equal 
amount of value each year. The annual depreciation is calculated by 
subtracting the salvage value of the asset from the purchase price, and 
then dividing this number by the estimated useful life of the asset. 

[23] Air Force Manual 32-1089, Air Force Military Construction and 
Family Housing Economic Analysis Guide (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 
1996). 

[24] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in 
Managing and Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support, GAO-05-556 
(Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005), and Defense Infrastructure: Changes 
in Funding Priorities and Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the 
Condition of Military Facilities, GAO-03-274 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 
19, 2003). 

[25] Air Force Manual 32-1089. 

[26] 10 U.S.C. 2828 § (d) (1). 

[27] OMB Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost 
Analysis of Federal Programs, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 1992). The 
circular states that the standard criterion for deciding whether a 
government program can be justified on economic principles is the net 
present value, which is calculated by assigning monetary values to 
benefits and costs, discounting future benefits and costs using an 
appropriate discount rate, and subtracting the sum total of discounted 
costs from the sum total of discounted benefits. 

[28] DOD Instruction 7041.3. 

[29] Air Force Manual 32-1089. 

[30] OMB Circular No. A-94, App. C, Discount Rates for Cost- 
Effectiveness, Lease Purchase, and Related Analyses (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 5, 2006). The 5.2 percent rate is available in a table of past 
years discount rates from Appendix C of Circular No. A-94. 

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