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May 31, 2005:

The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:

United States Senate:

Subject: Questions for the Record Regarding the Department of Defense's 
National Security Personnel System:

It was a pleasure to appear before the Committee on April 14, 2005, to 
discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) implementation of the 
National Security Personnel System (NSPS).[Footnote 1] This letter 
responds to your request for my views on the following questions for 
the record.

Questions from Senator Inhofe:

American Federation of Government Employees:

Please comment on each of the "flashpoints" that the AFGE has raised 
through Mr. Gage's written statement:

Q. "DOD has proposed radically reducing the scope of collective 
bargaining in the proposed regulations. . . . The proposed regulations 
do not follow the law with respect to its instructions to maintain 
collective bargaining rights for affected DOD employees."

Our previous work on individual agencies' human capital systems has not 
directly addressed the scope of specific issues that should or should 
not be subject to collective bargaining and negotiations.

Q. "The board that hears labor-management disputes arising from NSPS 
must be independent of DOD management. . . . In the proposed NSPS 
regulations, DOD would establish an internal board made up entirely of 
individuals appointed by the Secretary."

In our previous testimonies on the proposed and final Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) regulations, we stressed the importance of the 
actual and perceived independence and impartiality of such 
boards.[Footnote 2] Members of these types of boards should be, and 
appear to be, free from interference in the legitimate performance of 
their duties and should adjudicate cases in an impartial manner, free 
from initial bias and conflicts of interest.

Consistent with fostering board independence and impartiality, DOD's 
proposed NSPS regulations provide for staggered-term appointments for 
members of the proposed National Security Labor Relations Board and 
place some limited conditions on the removal of a member. For example, 
members of the Board would be appointed for terms of 3 years, except 
that the appointments of the initial Board members will be for terms of 
1, 2, and 3 years. The Secretary of Defense may extend the term of any 
member beyond 3 years when necessary to provide for an orderly 
transition and/or appoint the member for up to two additional 1-year 
terms. DOD could further enhance the independence and impartiality of 
the Board through the appointment and removal process of Board members. 
This could include such areas as (1) a nomination panel that reflects 
input from appropriate parties and a reasonable degree of balance among 
differing views and interests in the composition of the Board to ensure 
credibility and (2) appropriate notification to interested parties in 
the event that a Board member is removed.

The proposed regulations allow the Secretary of Defense to appoint and 
remove individual Board members; however, this raises the question of 
the independence of the Board. If the proposed regulations were 
modified to allow the Secretary of Defense to appoint but not remove 
members, then this may help the credibility and independence of the 
Board.

Q. "The standard for mitigation by the Merit System Protection Board 
(MSPB) of discipline and penalties imposed on employees under NSPS in 
the proposed regulations is virtually impossible to meet and 
effectively removes the possibility of mitigation."

The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board will not know the actual impact 
until a number of cases are adjudicated.

Q. ". . . under the proposed regulations, not only is there no 
requirement for management to present written standards against which 
performance will be measured, but employees are also denied the right. 
. .to use negotiated grievance and arbitration system. . . ."

On the basis of our previous work, we believe that performance 
standards should be written. We also advocate the use of competencies-
-the skills, knowledge, and abilities staff need to accomplish the 
work. We have found that competencies can help reinforce employee 
behaviors and actions that support the department's mission, goals, and 
values, and can provide a consistent message to employees about how 
they are expected to achieve results. These core competencies must be 
in writing to assure that managers, supervisors, and employees see and 
understand the criteria that will be used to manage and assess employee 
performance.

Regarding grievance and arbitration systems, during testimony in April 
2005, we reaffirmed our position that that there should be both 
informal and formal appeal mechanisms within and outside of the 
organization if individuals feel that there has been abuse or a 
violation of the policies, procedures, and protected rights of the 
individual. Internal mechanisms could include independent Human Capital 
Office and Office of Opportunity and Inclusiveness reviews that provide 
reasonable assurances that there would be consistency and 
nondiscrimination.[Footnote 3] Furthermore, it is of critical 
importance that the external appeal process be independent, efficient, 
effective, and credible. As DOD's human resources management system 
efforts move forward, DOD will need to define, in more detail than is 
currently provided, how it plans to review such matters as the 
establishment and implementation of the performance appraisal system-- 
and, subsequently, performance rating decisions, pay determinations, 
and promotion actions--before these actions are finalized to ensure 
they are merit based.

Q. "Strong and unambiguous safeguards must be in place to prevent a 
general lowering of pay for DOD civilian workforce. The proposed 
regulations permit a general reduction in salaries for all DOD 
personnel compared to rates they would have been paid under statutory 
systems."

Under the proposed regulations, DOD could not reduce employees' basic 
rates of pay when converting to pay bands. However, employees' 
compensation may increase at a rate higher or lower than under the 
current compensation system because under NSPS compensation is designed 
to be (1) market sensitive, with consideration of local market 
conditions to set pay rates, and (2) performance based.

Q. "Procedures for deciding who will be affected by a reduction in 
force must be based on more than a worker's most recent performance 
appraisal. The proposed NSPS regulation would allow an employee with 1 
year of service and an outstanding rating to have superior retention 
rights to an employee with 30 years of outstanding appraisals and 1 
year of having been rated merely "above average."

Under DOD's proposed regulations, greater emphasis will be given to job 
performance in the reduction-in-force process by placing performance 
ahead of length of service. Under the proposed regulations, employees 
will be placed on a competitive group's retention list in the following 
order of precedence: (1) tenure group, (2) veterans' preference, (3) 
individual performance rating, and (4) length of service. DOD may also 
establish a minimum reduction-in-force competitive area on the basis of 
one or more of the following factors: geographic location(s), line(s) 
of business, product line(s), organizational unit(s), and funding 
line(s). The proposed regulations provide DOD with the flexibility to 
define competitive groups on the basis of career group, pay schedule, 
occupational series or specialty, pay band, and/or trainee status.

Questions from Senator Lieberman:

Civilian Pay:

Q. John Gage in his testimony expressed concern that the NSPS will 
create downward pressure on DOD civilian pay. Are there mechanisms that 
you could suggest to assure that pay levels are adequate for employee 
recruitment and retention and to truly reward good performance?

We have observed that a competitive compensation system can help 
organizations attract and retain a quality workforce.[Footnote 4] To 
begin to develop such a system, organizations assess the skills and 
knowledge they need; compare compensation against other public, 
private, or nonprofit entities competing for the same talent in a given 
locality; and classify positions along levels of responsibility. While 
one size does not fit all, organizations generally structure their 
competitive compensation systems to separate base salary--which all 
employees receive--from other special incentives, such as merit 
increases, performance awards, or bonuses, which are provided based on 
performance and contributions to organizational results.

We have reported that direct costs associated with salaries were one of 
the major cost drivers of implementing pay for performance systems, 
based on the data provided us by selected Office of Personnel 
Management demonstration projects.[Footnote 5] We found that some of 
the demonstration projects intended to manage costs by providing a mix 
of one-time awards and permanent pay increases. Rewarding an employee's 
performance with an award instead of an equivalent increase to base pay 
can help contain salary costs in the long run because the agency only 
has to pay the amount of the award one time, rather than annually.

This practice is consistent with modern compensation systems, which 
typically include a mix of base pay increases plus other compensation 
incentives, such as one-time performance awards or bonuses. In 
developing pay for performance systems, agencies must consider what 
percentage of performance-based pay should be awarded as base pay 
increases versus one-time cash increases while still maintaining 
fiscally sustainable compensation systems that reward performance. In 
addition, to the costs associated with base pay increases, modern 
compensation systems typically consider an employee's salary in 
relation to a competitive range when determining the amount of 
performance pay that should be provided as a base pay adjustment versus 
a cash bonus amount. This base versus bonus concept differs from the 
largely longevity driven base pay adjustments provided to employees 
under the General Schedule. This new direction concerns employees, 
especially those who are close to retirement, who see these regular 
base pay increases as the foundation of future retirement benefits.

Safeguards Against Abuse:

Q. In your testimony you expressed concern that the proposed 
regulations do not contain adequate safeguards to help ensure fairness 
and guard against abuse. Could you elaborate on what kinds of 
safeguards you believe should be considered in this context?

As we noted in our statement, although DOD's proposed regulations 
provide for some safeguards to ensure fairness and guard against abuse, 
additional safeguards should be developed. We have developed an initial 
list of possible safeguards to help ensure that pay-for-performance 
systems in the government are fair, effective, and credible.[Footnote 
6] The safeguards include, among other things, the following.

* Assure that certain predecisional internal safeguards exist to help 
achieve the consistency, equity, nondiscrimination, and 
nonpoliticization of the performance management process (e.g., 
independent reasonableness reviews by Human Capital Offices and/or 
Offices of Opportunity and Inclusiveness or their equivalent in 
connection with the establishment and implementation of a performance 
appraisal system, as well as reviews of performance rating decisions, 
pay determinations, and promotion actions before they are finalized to 
ensure that they are merit-based; internal grievance processes to 
address employee complaints; and pay panels whose membership is 
predominately made up of career officials who would consider the 
results of the performance appraisal process and other information in 
connection with final pay decisions).

* Assure that there are reasonable transparency and appropriate 
accountability mechanisms in connection with the results of the 
performance management process. This includes reporting periodically on 
internal assessments and employee survey results relating to the 
performance management system and publishing overall results of 
performance management and individual pay decisions while protecting 
individual confidentiality.

Assure that the agency's performance management systems (1) link to the 
agency's strategic plan, related goals, and desired outcomes and (2) 
result in meaningful distinctions in individual employee performance. 
This should include consideration of critical competencies and 
achievement of concrete results.

Involve employees, their representatives, and other stakeholders in the 
design of the system, including having employees directly involved in 
validating any related competencies, as appropriate.

Q. Do you know of agencies where such mechanisms have proven effective 
to guard against unfairness and abuse in a pay-for-performance system?

The list of safeguards mentioned above are based on our extensive body 
of work looking at the performance management practices used by leading 
public sector organizations both in the United States and in other 
countries. However, we previously reported that DHS created a Homeland 
Security Compensation Committee that is to provide oversight and 
transparency to the compensation process. The committee--consisting of 
14 members, including 4 officials of labor organizations--is to develop 
recommendations and options for the Secretary's consideration on 
compensation and performance management matters, including the annual 
allocation of funds between market and performance pay adjustments. We 
also reported that high performing organizations seek to create pay, 
incentive, and reward systems based on valid, reliable, and transparent 
performance management systems with adequate safeguards and link 
employee knowledge, skills, and contributions to organizational 
results.[Footnote 7] To that end, we found that the demonstration 
projects took a variety of approaches to designing and implementing 
their pay for performance systems to meet the unique needs of their 
cultures and organizational structures. For example, the Department of 
Commerce uses a second-level review process as a safeguard. In this 
review process, the pay pool manager is to review recommended scores 
from subordinate supervisors and select a payout for each employee. The 
pay pool manager is to present the decisions to the next higher 
official for review if the pay pool manager is also a supervisor. In 
addition, the department had a grievance procedure that allowed 
employees to request reconsideration of performance decisions, 
excluding awards, by the pay pool manager through the department's 
Administrative Grievance Procedure or appropriate negotiated grievance 
procedures.

Questions from Senator Akaka:

Employee Training:

Q. An issue raised repeatedly in discussions over the personnel changes 
at DOD and DHS is the need for adequate training for all employees on 
the new personnel system. Have you looked into this issue, and if so, 
what recommendations do you have regarding the amount, type, or 
regularity of personnel training that is needed to launch and sustain a 
new personnel system?

As we noted in our report, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing 
Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal 
Government,[Footnote 8] training and developing new and current staff 
to fill new roles and work in different ways will be a crucial part of 
the federal government's endeavors to meet its transformation 
challenges. DOD and DHS are significant components of this 
transformation.

In April 2004, GAO and the National Commission on the Public Service 
Implementation Initiative hosted a forum on whether there should be a 
governmentwide framework for human capital reform and, if so, what this 
framework should include. As part of the criteria that agencies should 
have in place as they plan for and manage their new human capital 
authorities, participants generally agreed that adequate resources for 
planning, implementation, training, and evaluation were needed. 
Additionally, they noted that agencies should ensure adequate training 
as they implement new human capital authorities.

Selected Office of Personnel Management personnel demonstration 
projects trained employees on the performance management system prior 
to implementation to make employees aware of the new approach, as well 
as periodically after implementation to refresh employee familiarity 
with the system. The training was designed to help employees understand 
their applicable competencies and performance standards; develop 
performance plans; write self-appraisals; become familiar with how 
performance is evaluated and how pay increases and awards decisions are 
made; and know the roles and responsibilities of managers, supervisors, 
and employees in the appraisal and payout processes. According to the 
DHS regulations, its performance management system is designed to 
incorporate adequate training and retraining for supervisors, managers, 
and employees in the implementation and operation of the system.

GAO currently is reviewing training and development issues at DHS. Our 
work includes a review of DHS's training efforts on its new personnel 
system, maxHR. Our report is scheduled to be released this fall.

Employee Performance:

Q. Both the DHS and DOD personnel systems permit managers to convey 
performance expectations to employees orally. I think this can put 
employees at a disadvantage, especially as their pay will be more 
closely tied to their performance. How can employees be held 
accountable for performance expectations provided orally?

To help enhance credibility and fairness and avoid any problems, some 
sort of written documentation of performance expectations is 
appropriate, in addition to orally communicating performance 
expectations. However, the means can vary.

Guard Against Abuse:

Q. You testified as to the lack of details in the NSPS proposed 
regulations, including the absence of adequate safeguards to ensure 
fairness and guard against abuse in measuring performance and paying 
employees. What sort of oversight do you believe is needed to promote 
consistency of the performance management system and do you believe 
external review of pay and performance decisions is necessary?

In April 2003, when commenting on DOD civilian personnel reforms, we 
testified that Congress should consider establishing statutory 
standards that an agency must have in place before it can implement a 
more performance-based pay program, and we developed an initial list of 
possible safeguards to help ensure that pay-for-performance systems in 
the government are fair, effective, and credible.[Footnote 9] One of 
the safeguards we identified is to assure that certain predecisional 
internal safeguards exist to help achieve the consistency, equity, 
nondiscrimination, and nonpoliticization of the performance management 
process. For example, independent reasonableness reviews by Human 
Capital Offices and/or Offices of Opportunity and Inclusiveness or 
their equivalent in connection with the establishment and 
implementation of a performance appraisal system, as well as reviews of 
performance rating decisions, pay determinations, and promotion actions 
before they are finalized to ensure that they are merit-based; internal 
grievance processes to address employee complaints; and pay panels 
whose membership is predominately made up of career officials who would 
consider the results of the performance appraisal process and other 
information in connection with final pay decisions.

Q. What kind of external review would you propose?

We reported that independent reasonableness reviews by Human Capital 
Offices and/or Offices of Opportunity and Inclusiveness or their 
equivalent in connection with the establishment and implementation of a 
performance appraisal system and the effective implementation of a 
compensation committee similar to the Homeland Security Compensation 
Committee are important to assuring that predecisional internal 
safeguards exist to help achieve consistency and equity and assure 
nondiscrimination and nonpoliticization of the performance management 
process.[Footnote 10]

In our report on implementing pay for performance at selected personnel 
demonstration projects, we mentioned that some of the demonstration 
projects implemented as safeguards a second-level review and grievance 
process, as these examples illustrate.

Second-level review process:

Second-level supervisors are to review all assessments. In addition, an 
overall assessment of "highly successful" is to be sent to the 
appropriate department's Performance Review Board for the assignment of 
an official rating of "1" or "2". The supervisor and reviewer are to 
assign a "4" or "5" rating based on a problem-solving team's findings 
and a personnel advisor's input.

Pay pool managers review recommended scores from supervisors and select 
a payout for each employee. The pay pool manager is to present the 
decisions to the next higher official for review if the pay pool 
manager is also a supervisor.

Grievance process:

Employees may request reconsideration of their ratings in writing to 
the third-level supervisor and indicate why a higher rating is 
warranted and what rating is desired. The third-level supervisor can 
either grant the request or request that a recommending official 
outside of the immediate organization or chain of authority be 
appointed. The employee is to receive a final decision in writing 
within 21 calendar days.

Employees may grieve their ratings and actions affecting the general 
pay increase or performance pay increases. An employee covered by a 
negotiated grievance procedure is to use that procedure to grieve his 
or her score. An employee not under a negotiated grievance procedure is 
to submit the grievance first to the rating official, who will submit a 
recommendation to the pay pool panel. The pay pool panel may accept the 
rating official's recommendation or reach an independent decision. The 
pay pool panel's decision is final unless the employee requests 
reconsideration by the next higher official to the pay pool manager. 
The official would then render the final decision on the grievance.

Employee Appeals Process:

Q. The proposed regulations provide for an accelerated MSPB 
adjudication process for employee appeals. I have long been concerned 
about the impact a shortened processing time for one agency may have on 
employees at other agencies with cases pending before the MSPB. Do you 
believe the NSPS regulations will have an adverse effect on employee 
appeals both at DOD and at other federal agencies?

The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board will not know the actual impact 
until a number of cases are adjudicated.

Question from Senator Nelson:

Performance-Based Pay System:

Q. What do you recommend to minimize or mitigate risks?

The key to a successful organizational transformation is to implement 
strategies to help individuals maximize their full potential in the new 
organization, while simultaneously managing the risk of reduced 
productivity and effectiveness that often occurs as a result of the 
changes. While there is no one right way to manage a successful merger, 
acquisition, or transformation, the experiences of both successful and 
unsuccessful efforts suggest that there are practices that are key to 
their success. These key practices include the following.

Ensure top leadership drives the transformation. Leadership must set 
the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear, consistent rationale 
that brings everyone together behind a single mission.

Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the 
transformation. A clear set of principles and priorities serves as a 
framework to help the organization create a new culture and drive 
employee behaviors.

Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show 
progress from day one. Goals and a timeline are essential because the 
transformation could take years to complete.

Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process. A 
strong and stable team is important to ensure that the transformation 
receives the needed attention to be sustained and successful.

Establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and 
report related progress. The strategy must reach out to employees, 
customers, and stakeholders and engage them in a two-way 
exchange.[Footnote 11]

For additional information on our work on human capital issues at DOD, 
please contact me on 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov, or Eileen Larence, 
Director, Strategic Issues, on governmentwide human capital issues at 
512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov.

Derek B. Stewart:

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:

(350713):

FOOTNOTES

[1] GAO, Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed 
Regulations for DOD's National Security Personnel System, GAO-05-559T 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2005).

[2] GAO, Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed DHS Human 
Capital Regulations, GAO-04-479T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2004) and 
Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Final Department of Homeland 
Security Human Capital Regulations, GAO-05-320T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 
10, 2005).

[3] GAO, Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed Department 
of Defense National Security Personnel System Regulations, GAO-05-517T 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2005).

[4] GAO, Additional Posthearing Questions Related to Proposed 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Human Capital Regulations, GAO- 
04-617R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2004).

[5] GAO, Human Capital: Implementing Pay for Performance at Selected 
Personnel Demonstration Projects, GAO-04-83 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 23, 
2004).

[6] GAO, Defense Transformation: Preliminary Observations on DOD's 
Proposed Civilian Personnel Reforms, GAO-03-717T (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 29, 2003).

[7] GAO-04-83.

[8] GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and 
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington, 
D.C.: March 2004).

[9] GAO-03-717T.

[10] GAO-04-320T.

[11] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003).