This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-879R entitled 'Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System Program' which was released on August 11, 2003. This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. August 11, 2003: The Honorable Jerry Lewis: Chairman: Subcommittee on Defense: Committee on Appropriations: House of Representatives: The Honorable John P. Murtha: Ranking Minority Member: Subcommittee on Defense: Committee on Appropriations: House of Representatives: Subject: Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System Program: The recent emergence of software-defined radio technology offers the potential to address key communications shortfalls and significantly improve military capabilities. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program was initiated in 1997 to develop and apply this technology and to bring together separate service-led programs into a joint software- defined radio development effort. JTRS radios are intended to interoperate with existing radio systems and provide the war fighter with additional communications capability to access maps and other visual data, communicate via voice and video with other units and levels of command, and obtain information directly from battlefield sensors. As such, the JTRS program is considered a major transformational effort for the military and is expected to enable information superiority, network-centric warfare as well as modernization efforts, such as the Army's Future Combat Systems.[Footnote 1] Although total program costs have yet to be determined, the Army's effort to acquire and field close to half of the estimated 250,000 JTRS radios that are needed is expected to cost $14.4 billion. You asked us to review the JTRS program to determine if there are either management or technical challenges and risks that could jeopardize a successful program outcome. We briefed your staff on May 5, 2003, on the results of our review. This report summarizes that information and transmits the briefing itself (see enc. I). Challenges Facing the JTRS Program: We found that the JTRS Program has made considerable progress to date in planning and developing key aspects of the JTRS radios. At a fundamental level, a Joint Program Office has been established to bring together the services' individual efforts to develop software-defined radios. The program office was instrumental in developing a standard software communications architecture that provides a foundation for building JTRS radios and evolving an open systems approach to facilitate technology insertion. The program office has reduced risk by employing an evolutionary acquisition strategy, whereby improved communications capabilities will be delivered in increments. However, the program still faces several managerial and technological challenges that could affect the Department of Defense's (DOD's) ability to develop and procure JTRS radios successfully. These include managing requirements and funding, maturing key technologies, integrating system components, testing, and developing secure communications. The most significant challenge we identified is the lack of a strong, joint-management structure. The current JTRS management structure is made up of a Joint Program Office, designated service-led program clusters, and other DOD organizations carrying out several related acquisition activities.[Footnote 2] The Joint Program Office is responsible for developing the communications architecture, radio waveforms, and security components, while the services are primarily responsible for developing, acquiring, and funding the actual radios. This structure, while preferable over individual service efforts, is still fragmented, making it difficult to resolve interservice differences involving requirements and funding, and hampering the production of key program documents, as in the following examples: It has been difficult to get the services to commit the funding necessary to execute the JTRS program. The program management structure has been unable to get the services to reach agreement over new and changing requirements expeditiously. Key program documents, such as the Concept of Operations and Migration Plans, have not effectively provided a joint vision for how JTRS capabilities will be developed and used. As a consequence, several program development efforts, such as handheld radios, have been delayed by more than a year. In the meantime, the Army has purchased more existing radios with fewer communications capabilities, which may further delay the delivery of JTRS capabilities to users. Technology maturity is another significant challenge facing the JTRS program. Our work on best practices has shown that programs that move to product development with immature technologies have greater difficulty meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements than programs that mature technologies before moving into product development.[Footnote 3] The initial JTRS radio development, for helicopters and ground vehicles, was allowed to proceed into the Systems Development and Demonstration phase with technology readiness levels lower than those recommended by best practices. Further, technologies that are critical to several JTRS variants--such as miniaturized components, batteries, and multimodal antennas--are not sufficiently advanced to meet requirements and will take several more years to mature. Examples of other technological challenges include the development of complex software, the difficulty of integrating radios with host platforms, and a compressed testing schedule. In addition, developing encrypted capabilities and secure communications will be difficult because of the complex nature of the radio. Recommendations for Executive Action: While significant accomplishments have been realized, management and technological challenges exist that could impair JTRS's success. We recommend the Secretary of Defense take steps to strengthen the joint- program management structure to facilitate program funding and requirements outcomes and assure configuration management of JTRS. In strengthening the structure, the Secretary should consider (1) establishing centralized program funding, (2) realigning the Joint Program Office under a different organizational arrangement, and (3) placing the cluster development programs under the Joint Program Office control. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense take action to ensure the JTRS Program realizes its full potential by (1) directing the completion of key program documents detailing the program's vision; (2) making sure key enabling technologies, such as networking capabilities, are adequately addressed; and (3) assessing the impact that the continued purchase of existing radios may have on JTRS. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: In written comments to a draft of this report (see enc. II), DOD concurred with our findings and both of our recommendations. However, DOD disagreed with one of the options we suggested for implementing our recommendation on strengthening the JTRS joint management structure. While DOD supports consolidation of all research, development, test, and evaluation funding for JTRS, it believes that procurement and integration funding is best left in the individual service budgets. We agree that this would be a good first step, but we also believe funding needs to be closely monitored as the program progresses towards procurement. Scope and Methodology: To assess the status of the program, we reviewed relevant DOD and service program documents and interviewed key officials. In examining the program, we analyzed technological and management factors that could affect the program's success and key program development efforts as well as projected funding and schedule profiles. We conducted our work from October 2002 through April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. - - - --: We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; Secretary of the Air Force; Secretary of the Army; Secretary of the Navy; Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please contact me on (202) 512-2811 or John Oppenheim at (202) 512-3111. Principal contributors to this report were Joel Christenson, Gary Middleton, John Swain, Hai Tran, and Nicole Volchko. Paul L. Francis: Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: Signed by Paul L. Francis: Enclosures: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Comments from the Department of Defense: OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000: July 29, 2003: NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION: Mr. Paul L. Francis: Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management US General Accounting Office: 441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548: Dear Mr. Francis: This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft report, "Challenges And Risks Associated With The Joint Tactical Radio System Program," dated June 23, 2003 (GAO Code 120182/GAO-03-879R). The DoD has reviewed the findings of the GAO and appreciates the efforts of the GAO staff to present different viewpoints regarding the management and implementation of the JTRS program. We have reviewed the draft report and, with the inclusion of the below comment, concur with the GAO findings and recommendations. The DoD concurs with the recommendation to strengthen the joint program management structure. The DoD supports the consolidation of all related Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding, but does not agree with the consolidation fo procurement and integration funding. These latter funding elements are best left in the individual Service budgets. We concur with the recommendation to take action to ensure the JTRS Program realizes its full potential. My Point of Contact for GAO Code 120182/GAO-03-879R is Mr. Vic Russell, assigned to Communications Programs Directorate. He can be reached at 703 607-0274 or e-mail vic.russell@osd.mil. Sincerely, Dr. Michael S. Frankel: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3, Space and IT Programs): Signed by Dr. Michael S. Frankel: [End of section] (120182): FOOTNOTES [1] The Future Combat Systems program is a major Army transformational effort, comprised of 18 networked weapon systems that will replace several current combat systems. [2] Clusters are radio development efforts that are organized around weapons platforms, such as ground vehicles and helicopters, as well as fixed-wing aircraft and maritime systems. [3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01- 288 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2001).