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entitled 'Responses to Posthearing Questions Related to GAO's Testimony 
on the U.S. Government's Consolidated Financial Statements for Fiscal 
Year 2002' which was released on June 16, 2003.

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June 16, 2003:

The Honorable Todd R. Platts:

Chairman:

Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management:

Committee on Government Reform:

House of Representatives:

Subject: Responses to Posthearing Questions Related to GAO's Testimony 
on the U.S. Government's Consolidated Financial Statements for Fiscal 
Year 2002:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On April 8, 2003, I testified before your subcommittee at a hearing on 
our report on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements 
for fiscal year 2002.[Footnote 1] This letter responds to questions 
related to our testimony from you and the Ranking Minority Member and 
to subsequent questions from the Vice Chairman that you asked us to 
answer for the record. The questions and my responses follow.

Question from Chairman Platts:

What is the status of the financial management systems modernization 
effort, agency by agency?

At a meeting with subcommittee counsel and staff on April 16, we agreed 
on an approach based primarily on available data sources and an end-of-
June time frame for separately providing this information. We will 
compile a list of the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies' 
core financial systems along with key data related to each system, such 
as whether it is a commercial off-the-shelf system. We will identify 
the status of agencies' plans to acquire new core financial systems and 
whether any mixed financial systems at the agencies are slated to be 
updated.

Question from Ranking Minority Member Towns:

1. The Department of Energy for a number of years had problems 
estimating its environmental liabilities, which it has since corrected. 
How did Energy manage to correct its problem, and can these solutions 
be used at the Department of Defense?

The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for management and 
cleanup of environmental contamination related to the process of 
producing nuclear weapons. For fiscal year 1998, the DOE Inspector 
General's (IG) financial audit opinion stated that auditors were unable 
to satisfy themselves that DOE's recorded environmental liability of 
$186 billion was fairly stated because of the following deficiencies:

DOE lacked adequate documentation to support some cost estimates and 
cost-estimating methodologies.

Valid environmental liabilities were not included in the estimate.

Cost estimates had not been updated through the end of the fiscal year 
under audit.

Established cost-estimating guidelines were not consistently applied.

For fiscal year 1999, the DOE IG was able to conclude that DOE's 
reported $231 billion environmental liability was fairly stated. 
According to the DOE IG, DOE's Office of Environmental Management 
completed corrective actions during fiscal year 1999 that included 
strengthening internal controls over developing the estimate; assessing 
individual cost estimates that make up the environmental liability in 
terms of scope, cost, and schedule; and quantifying the uncertainty of 
the estimates caused by technical problems and funding shortfalls. To 
ensure the reliability of future environmental liability estimates and 
to guide cleanup efforts, DOE developed a program, which it documented 
in the June 1998 publication Accelerated Cleanup: Paths to Closure, 
based on site-developed, project-by-project forecasts of the scope, 
schedule, and costs to complete DOE's approximately 350 projects. The 
objective was to manage the cleanup of 90 percent of contaminated sites 
by 2006. This program, which had the support of top management, was key 
to DOE's success.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for management and 
cleanup of very diverse types of environmental contamination, 
including:

closed and open sites where past and current waste disposal practices, 
leaks, spills, and other activities have created a risk to public 
health or the environment;

closed, transferring, and active military ranges where contamination 
and unexploded ordnance create environmental hazards; and:

cleanup, demilitarization, and disposal of nuclear and non-nuclear 
weapons systems, chemical weapons, and munitions.

Although the types of cleanup are different, the obstacles to reliable 
cost estimation are similar to those faced by DOE in fiscal year 1998. 
For the past few years, the DOD IG has reported that the environmental 
liability figure reported in DOD's financial statements is not 
auditable because of problems related to insufficient guidance, lack of 
audit trails, use of inconsistent or unvalidated cost-estimating 
models, and incomplete inventories of sites. We have also cited 
deficiencies in DOD's reported environmental liabilities as a 
disclaimer issue in the governmentwide audit reports since fiscal year 
1997, and we have issued reports on several kinds of environmental 
cleanup issues, including training ranges and ongoing 
operations.[Footnote 2]

In its fiscal year 2002 performance and accountability report, DOD 
management included a discussion of progress being made to address 
material weaknesses, including environmental liabilities. According to 
the report, DOD 
has issued improved guidance--for all areas except ongoing operations-
-that will help its components compile complete, accurate, and fully 
substantiated environmental liability data;

is developing and maintaining adequate supporting documentation and 
audit trails for cost-to-complete estimates for the environmental 
restoration of more than 30,000 closed contaminated sites on open 
installations, closed installations, and Base Realignment and Closure 
sites;

has validated the cost-estimating models used in the calculation and 
documentation of environmental liability costs;

has developed a sound methodology for estimating liabilities associated 
with nuclear-powered ships and submarines; and:

has completed inventories of all but training ranges and sites with 
ongoing operations that result in contamination.

DOD has also reviewed Paths to Closure and believes that DOE's approach 
is similar to that used by DOD to estimate and report for the Defense 
Environmental Restoration Program (DERP). DOD reports site-by-site 
information in its DERP report to Congress each year and estimates 
cleanup costs for those sites out to the year 2030. DOD has stated that 
it has also begun reconciling the DERP reported costs to the financial 
statement reported costs. Finally, DOD has designated the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) as the focal point 
for all environmental restoration and cleanup issues except for 
chemical demilitarization, which is the responsibility of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics).

DOD claims that various components of its environmental cleanup and 
disposal costs are now auditable. For fiscal year 2003, the DOD IG 
plans to review the Navy's methodology for estimating liabilities 
associated with nuclear-powered ships and submarines and also to audit 
the Army's chemical demilitarization cost estimates.

Questions from Vice Chairman Blackburn Submitted on April 24:

1. What are your recommendations to arrest spending on Medicare/
Medicaid and Social Security?

As I have testified on numerous occasions before various committees, 
reducing the relative future burdens of Social Security and health 
programs is critical to promoting a sustainable budget policy for the 
longer term.[Footnote 3] While much of the public debate concerning the 
Social Security and Medicare programs focuses on trust fund balances--
that is, on the programs' solvency--the larger issue concerns program 
sustainability. Absent reform, the impact of federal health and 
retirement programs on budget choices will be felt long before 
projected trust fund insolvency dates when the cash needs of these 
programs begin to seriously constrain overall budgetary flexibility.

Early action to change these programs would yield the highest fiscal 
dividends for the federal budget and would provide a longer period for 
prospective beneficiaries to make adjustments in their own planning. 
Waiting to build economic resources and reform future claims entails 
risks. First, we lose an important window where today's relatively 
large workforce can increase saving and enhance productivity, two 
elements critical to growing the future economy. Second, we lose the 
opportunity to reduce the burden of interest payments, thereby creating 
a legacy of higher debt as well as elderly entitlement spending for the 
relatively smaller workforce of the future. Finally, and most 
critically, we risk losing the opportunity to phase in changes 
gradually so that all can make the adjustments needed in private and 
public plans to accommodate this historic shift.

Unfortunately, the long-range challenge has become more difficult, and 
the window of opportunity to address the entitlement challenge is 
narrowing. In fact, the leading edge of the baby boom generation will 
become eligible for Social Security in only 5 years. As baby boomers 
retire and the numbers of those entitled to these retirement benefits 
grow, the difficulties of reform will be compounded. Accordingly, it 
remains more important than ever to deal with these issues over the 
next several years.

Many proposals to control spending, increase revenues, and restructure 
Social Security and Medicare have been put forth by various 
commissions, members of Congress, and independent "think tanks." 
Although we do not make specific policy recommendations, to assist 
Congress in its deliberations, we have developed criteria for 
evaluating Social Security reform proposals and soon will issue 
criteria for evaluating health care reforms. Our criteria for 
evaluating Social Security reform proposals aim to balance financial 
and economic considerations with benefit adequacy and equity issues and 
the administrative challenges associated with various proposals. The 
use of these criteria can help facilitate fair consideration and 
informed debate of reform proposals. The weight that different 
policymakers may place on different criteria will vary, depending on 
how they value different attributes.

The proposals we have examined, both in 2002 and earlier, reflect the 
likelihood that the structural changes required to restore Social 
Security's long-term viability generally may require some combination 
of reductions from currently scheduled benefits and revenue increases, 
and may include the use of some general revenues.[Footnote 4] Proposals 
employ possible benefit reductions within the current program 
structure, including modifying the benefit formula, raising the 
retirement age, and reducing cost-of-living adjustments. Revenue 
increases might take the form of increases in the payroll tax rate and/
or wage base, expanding coverage to include the relatively few workers 
who are still not covered under Social Security, or allowing the trust 
funds to be invested in potentially higher-yielding securities, such as 
stocks. Similarly, some proposals rely on general revenue transfers to 
increase the amount of money going toward the Social Security program. 
Some proposals include individual accounts that would also involve 
Social Security benefit reductions and/or revenue increases.

Medicare also faces a long-range, fundamental, and more serious 
financing problem driven by known demographic trends and projected 
escalation of health care spending beyond general inflation. As with 
Social Security, Medicare reform would be done best with considerable 
lead time to phase in changes and before the changes that are needed 
become dramatic and disruptive. Given the size of Medicare's financial 
challenge, it is only realistic to expect that reforms intended to 
bring down future costs will have to proceed incrementally. We should 
begin this now, when retirees are still a far smaller proportion of the 
population than they will be in the future. The sooner we get started, 
the less difficult the task will be.

We should also remember that the sources of some of Medicare's 
problems--and its solutions--are outside the program and are universal 
to all health care payers. Some tax preferences mask the full cost of 
providing health benefits and can work at cross-purposes to the goal of 
moderating health care spending. Therefore, it may be important to 
reexamine the incentives contained in current tax policy and consider 
potential reforms. Advances in medical technology are also likely to 
keep raising the price tag of providing care, regardless of the payer. 
Although technological advances unquestionably provide medical 
benefits, judging the value of those benefits--and weighing them 
against the additional costs--is more difficult. Consumers are not as 
informed about the cost of health care and its quality as they may be 
about other goods and services. Thus, while the greater use of market 
forces may help to control cost growth, it will undoubtedly be 
necessary to employ additional transparency and cost control methods as 
well. Ultimately, we will need to look at broader health care reforms 
to balance health care spending with other societal priorities. In 
doing this, it is important to note the fundamental differences between 
health care wants, which are virtually unlimited; needs, which should 
be defined and addressed; and overall affordability and sustainability, 
of which there is a limit.

We are preparing a health care framework that includes a set of 
principles to help policy makers in their efforts to assess various 
health financing reform options. This framework will examine health 
care issues systemwide and identify the interconnections between public 
programs that finance health care and the private insurance market. The 
framework can serve as a tool for defining policy goals and ensuring 
the use of consistent criteria for evaluating changes. By facilitating 
debate, the framework can encourage acceptance of changes necessary to 
put us on a path to fiscal sustainability.

For Medicare and Medicaid, the sustainability challenge has three 
levels--the level of the individual programs, the health care system in 
which they are embedded, and our long-term federal fiscal challenge. 
GAO's long-term budget simulations continue to show that to move into 
the future with no changes to federal health and retirement programs is 
to envision a very different role for the federal government. Assuming, 
for example, that the tax reductions enacted in 2001 do not sunset and 
discretionary spending keeps pace with the economy, by midcentury 
federal revenues may not even be adequate to pay Social Security and 
interest on the federal debt. To obtain budget balance, massive 
spending cuts, tax increases, or some combination of the two would be 
necessary. Neither slowing the growth of discretionary spending nor 
allowing the tax reductions to sunset eliminates the imbalance. In 
addition, while economic growth would help ease our burden, the 
projected fiscal gap is too great for us to grow our way out of the 
problem.

2. What is your recommended course of action to address the true cost 
of new legislation (for example, veterans' benefits, prescription drug 
plans)?

Current budget reporting is not always designed to promote the 
recognition and explicit consideration of the costs of some policies 
and programs. For example, the government undertakes a wide range of 
responsibilities, policies, programs, and activities that may obligate 
it to future spending or simply create an expectation for such 
spending. These "fiscal exposures" range from explicit liabilities to 
implicit promises embedded in current policy or public expectations. 
The examples you cite of new legislation for veterans' benefits or 
prescription drug plans could be viewed as creating new fiscal 
exposures. We have made the following recommendations[Footnote 5] to 
increase the visibility and transparency of such exposures:

First, we recommend that OMB report the future estimated costs 
associated with certain exposures as a new budget concept--"exposure 
level"--as a notational item in the Program and Financing schedule of 
the President's budget. As opposed to cash, the "exposure level" might 
be reported in present value terms. Specifying the estimated potential 
future costs associated with current decisions would promote 
transparency.

We also recommend that OMB report annually on fiscal exposures, 
including a concise list and description of such exposures, cost 
estimates where possible, and an assessment of methodologies and data 
used to produce the cost estimates. Explicitly and directly integrating 
this report with long-range projections and analysis of the budget as a 
whole would increase its usefulness for assessing the potential 
implications for long-range fiscal sustainability and flexibility. 
Legislation proposed by the President could be included if the report 
were issued as part of the President's budget and thus could help 
inform and provide long-term context to budget deliberations.

Other entities also can promote transparency and visibility of fiscal 
exposures by various actions:

FASAB. Continue to make progress on the accounting and reporting front 
(e.g., trust funds and social insurance).

Treasury. Enhance disclosures in the annual governmentwide performance 
and accountability report.

GAO. Continue to emphasize the issue in existing reports and 
testimonies. Comment on any annual fiscal exposures report published by 
OMB.

Congress. Consider requiring that discounted present value numbers be 
considered for major revenue-and spending-related legislative 
proposals before legislation is enacted.

In addition, we have stated that Congress may wish to consider 
exploring options for improving the information available on and the 
attention given to fiscal exposures.[Footnote 6] To increase 
congressional attention to such exposures, Congress could develop 
budget process mechanisms that prompt more deliberation about fiscal 
exposures. One type of mechanism that could be used is a point of 
order. Congress could modify budget rules to provide for a point of 
order against any proposed legislation that creates new exposures or 
increases the estimated costs of existing exposures over some specified 
level. Or, revised rules could provide for a point of order against any 
proposed legislation that does not include estimates of the potential 
costs of fiscal exposures created by the legislation. A second type of 
budget process mechanism that would prompt deliberation of fiscal 
exposures would be to establish triggers that require some action when 
the estimated future costs of a given exposure rise above some 
specified threshold.

3. How are audit results being used to affect budgeting processes for 
the current and next year, and how should they be used?

Ultimately, the objective is for agencies to generate high-quality data 
and measure performance in a meaningful way to help inform decision 
makers during the budget process when allocating resources and 
determining the most efficient and effective means of achieving policy 
objectives. Financial audit results are the beginning point in this 
process and should be considered along with the results of programmatic 
audits and performance reviews.

Financial statements are included in the annual performance and 
accountability reports for the 24 CFO Act agencies. These financial 
statements, along with the accompanying management analysis and 
performance reports, can provide a wealth of information regarding 
agency performance and financial condition that can be considered as 
budgeting decisions are made. One of the objectives of federal 
financial management reform legislation is to improve the quality and 
availability of information for decision makers. The results of agency 
financial statement audits, including the related identification of any 
internal control weaknesses, noncompliance, and systems issues, provide 
the starting point for considering an agency's ability to generate the 
information necessary to make informed decisions about its efficiency 
and effectiveness in achieving its mission and goals. For fiscal year 
2002, while 21 of the 24 CFO Act agencies received an unqualified 
opinion on their financial statements, auditors for 19 of the 24 
agencies reported that the agencies' systems did not comply 
substantially with at least one of the three requirements of the 
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act. This lack of compliance 
raises questions about the ability of these agencies to generate 
timely, useful, and reliable information needed for day-to-day 
management and congressional oversight.

The audited financial statements also provide indications of the 
quality of certain data included in budget requests and historical 
information that could be considered during budget deliberations. For 
example, the Statement of Budgetary Resources in the agency's audited 
financial statements provides information as to the status and uses of 
budgetary resources, such as amounts remaining available for obligation 
as of the end of the fiscal year. Because this information is audited, 
it provides assurance as to the reliability of these amounts in 
relation to the financial statements as a whole. In areas such as 
direct loans and loan guarantees, the accounting used for the financial 
statements under generally accepted accounting principles closely 
mirrors the Credit Reform Act requirements used for the budget. This 
means that errors, weaknesses in the estimation process, or other 
issues identified during the financial statement audit may also be 
present in related budget requests.

In addition, the audited financial statements provide information not 
presented in the budget that could also be considered in the budgeting 
process. For example, liabilities for the total estimated cost of 
environmental cleanup and other liabilities, such as those for federal 
employees' and veterans' benefits, are presented in the financial 
statements. These amounts should include the entire estimated liability 
for these programs, rather than the projected cash flows for limited 
periods included in the budget. Further, the statements present 
information on social insurance programs, such as Social Security and 
Medicare, that shows the long-term fiscal challenges associated with 
these programs that could also be considered in the budget process. 
While much of this information is included in individual agency 
financial statements, the presentation of this information in the 
consolidated financial report of the U.S. government can provide a 
basis for analyzing the overall long-range fiscal challenges faced by 
our government as a whole, during the deliberative process on the 
budget.

The audited financial statements present data as of a single point in 
time or for a specific period. Even if an agency's financial statements 
received an unqualified opinion, there are no direct assurances about 
other data from the agency, such as quarterly results or performance 
information. However, as part of the audits, material weaknesses in 
internal control and inadequate financial systems are often identified. 
These deficiencies can affect an agency's ability to generate reliable 
cost information and measure the performance of its programs. The 
impact of these conditions on the reliability of other, unaudited 
agency data should be considered from an oversight or budget 
perspective.

I am providing copies of this letter to the Ranking Minority Member and 
Vice Chairman of your subcommittee. This letter is also available on 
GAO's Web site at www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have questions about the responses to your 
questions, please contact me at (202) 512-5500 or Gary T. Engel, 
Director, at (202) 512-3406 or engelg@gao.gov.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Walker:

Comptroller General of the United States:

Signed by David M. Walker:

(198195):

FOOTNOTES

[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Fiscal Year 2002 U.S. Government 
Financial Statements: Sustained Leadership and Oversight Needed for 
Effective Implementation of Financial Management Reform, GAO-03-572T 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2003). The fiscal year 2002 Financial Report 
of the United States Government, issued by the Department of the 
Treasury on March 31, 2003, is available through GAO's Web site at 
www.gao.gov and Treasury's Web site at www.fms.treas.gov/fr/
index.html. 

[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Environmental Liabilities: DOD 
Training Range Cost Estimates Are Likely Understated, GAO-01-479 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2001), and Environmental Liabilities: 
Cleanup Costs from Certain DOD Operations Are Not Being Reported, GAO-
02-117 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2001).

[3] See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, Medicare: 
Financial Challenges and Considerations for Reform, GAO-03-577T 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2003); Medicare: Observations on Program 
Sustainability and Strategies to Control Spending on Any Proposed Drug 
Benefit, GAO-03-650T (Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2003); Social 
Security: Analysis of Issues and Selected Reform Proposals, GAO-03-376T 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 15, 2003); Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal 
Challenges, GAO-02-467T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2002).

[4] See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, Social Security 
Reform: Analysis of Reform Models Developed by the President's 
Commission to Strengthen Social Security, GAO-03-310 (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 15, 2003), and Social Security: Evaluating Reform Proposals, GAO/
AIMD/HEHS-00-29 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 4, 1999).

[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Fiscal Exposures: Improving the 
Budgetary Focus on Long-Term Costs and Uncertainties, GAO-03-213 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 2003).



[6] GAO-03-213.