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entitled 'Information on Cancelled Integrated Flight Test-16 for 
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Element' which was released on May 08, 
2003.

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United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

May 8, 2003:

The Honorable Bill Nelson:

Ranking Minority Member:

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:

Committee on Armed Services:

United States Senate:

Subject: Information on Cancelled Integrated Flight Test-16 for Ground-
based Midcourse Defense Element:

Dear Senator Nelson:

At your request, we are providing information on a Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense (GMD) element flight test known as Integrated Flight 
Test (IFT)-16. This test was planned for the third quarter of fiscal 
year 2004 but was recently cancelled by the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA), the agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) responsible 
for developing the ballistic missile defense system and its elements. 
Specifically, you asked that we determine the original purpose of IFT-
16, how the test differed from IFT-14 and -15, and what new information 
IFT-16 would have provided had it been conducted.

We found that the primary objective of IFT-16 was similar to that of 
past flight tests. The test was planned to assess the ability of GMD 
components to work together as an integrated element, capable of 
engaging and destroying a mock warhead. However, as described in the 
enclosure to this letter, IFT-16 engagement conditions and components 
differ from those in earlier tests.

Had the Missile Defense Agency conducted IFT-16, it would have 
accomplished the following:

* Increased the agency's knowledge regarding the feasibility and 
effectiveness of GMD's initial defensive capability, which DOD still 
plans to begin fielding in September 2004.

* Provided an opportunity to assess GMD's capability under new engagement 
conditions. Also, IFT-16 would have tested the GMD element in another 
intercept region, designated as R15 (see the attachment for a depiction 
of the intercept regions). A test in this region will now be delayed 
until IFT-17.

* Offered the first opportunity to flight test the radar at Beale Air 
Force Base, California, in an upgraded early warning radar 
configuration, and to flight test a new version of the battle 
management software. Flight tests of both the battle management 
software and the radar will be delayed until the radar certification 
flight--a non-intercept flight test denoted IFT-16A--which is scheduled 
for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004.

Additionally, with the cancellation of IFT-16, MDA expects to have a 
13-month gap between IFT-15, planned for January 2004, and IFT-17, 
scheduled for February 2005.

Our analysis of the near-term flight test program provided in this 
report and its enclosure is based on the system-level GMD test 
document, Development Master Test Plan for the Ground-Based Midcourse 
Defense Element (draft), 15 November 2002. We also received MDA's 
comments on our analysis and have incorporated them where appropriate. 
We conducted our review during May 2003 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services 
Committee; and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate 
Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. We will also make copies 
available to other interested parties upon request. In addition, this 
correspondence will be available at no charge on the GAO web site at 
http://www.gao.gov.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Barbara Haynes at (256) 922-7535 
if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Randy 
Zounes was a key contributor to this report.

Sincerely yours,

Robert E. Levin:

Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:

Signed by Robert E. Levin:


Enclosure:

Background:

The Missile Defense Agency within the Department of Defense is 
developing and testing components of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
(GMD) element, which is intended to defeat long-range ballistic missile 
threats in the midcourse phase of flight.[Footnote 1] When fully 
deployed, the GMD element will include (1) space-and ground-based 
sensors to provide early warning and tracking of missile launches; (2) 
ground-based radars to identify and refine the tracks of threatening 
reentry vehicles and associated objects; (3) ground-based interceptors, 
each consisting of a three-stage booster and exoatmospheric kill 
vehicle, to destroy enemy missiles through "hit-to-kill" impacts 
outside the atmosphere; and (4) fire control nodes for battle 
management and execution of the GMD mission. Figure 1 depicts the 
principal components of the GMD element.

Figure 1: Components Of The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Element:

[See PDF for image]

Source: GAO, based on MDA documents.

[End of figure]

Integrated Flight Tests:

To assess its progress in the development of the GMD element, MDA 
conducts integrated flight tests (IFTs). These tests are demonstrations 
of system performance during which an interceptor is launched to engage 
and intercept a target reentry vehicle (mock warhead) above the 
atmosphere. Currently, integrated flight tests are limited to target 
launches out of Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), California, and 
interceptor launches out of Reagan Test Site (RTS) in the western 
Pacific.[Footnote 2] The Missile Defense Agency is progressing with the 
development of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Test Bed so 
that future integrated flight tests can be tested under new engagement 
conditions--different closing velocities, crossing angles, and 
interceptor flyout ranges.

Building on the existing infrastructure, the BMDS Test Bed adds an 
interceptor launch site at Vandenberg Air Force Base; target launch 
facilities at Kodiak Launch Complex, Alaska; a GMD fire control node at 
Fort Greely, Alaska; upgraded communication links between test bed 
components; and test infrastructure to support five new intercept 
regions (see Figure 2). In parallel, the early warning radar at Beale 
Air Force Base, California, and the Cobra Dane radar at Eareckson Air 
Station in Shemya, Alaska, are being upgraded for the missile defense 
mission. Finally, the ship-based Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar is available as a 
forward-deployed asset for early target tracking.

Figure 2: Intercept Regions Of Integrated Flight Tests:

[See PDF for image]

Source: Missile Defense Agency.

[End of figure]

Near-Term Integrated Flight Tests:

To address how IFT-16 differed from earlier flight tests, we compared 
IFT-16 to past and near-term GMD flight tests. The results of our 
analysis are shown in Table 1 at the end of this enclosure, which 
contrasts the engagement conditions and hardware / software 
configuration of IFT-16 with those of IFT-10, IFT-14, and IFT-15. To 
better understand the table, we have defined its terms below.

Engagement Conditions:

Target Launch Location. The location from which the target missile, 
which deploys the mock reentry vehicle and decoys, is launched. The 
test bed will enable target launches out of VAFB, California, and 
Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC), Alaska. In all flight tests to date, the 
target launch location has been VAFB.

Interceptor Launch Location. The location from which the ground-based 
interceptor, which deploys the kill vehicle to engage the threat, is 
launched. The test bed will enable interceptor launches out of either 
RTS or VAFB. In all flight tests to date, the interceptor launch 
location has been RTS.

Intercept Region. The area over which an intercept is to occur. (Refer 
to Figure 2 for a pictorial representation of defined intercept 
regions.) In all intercept flight tests to date (IFT-3 through IFT-10), 
the intercept region has been "R1", which is about 700 kilometers from 
RTS.

Closing Velocity. The relative speed at which the kill vehicle 
approaches the designated target (mock warhead). In early integrated 
flight tests (e.g., IFT-3), the closing velocity was roughly 7 km/sec 
(15,600 miles/hr). The closing velocities of recent and future 
integrated flight tests are classified.

Crossing Angle. The geometric angle between the velocity vectors of the 
kill vehicle and designated target. A head-on collision has a crossing 
angle of 180 degrees, whereas a "tail-chaser" is any engagement with a 
crossing angle less than 90 degrees. In early flight tests (e.g., IFT-
3), the crossing angle was roughly 100 degrees. The crossing angles of 
recent and future integrated flight tests are classified.

Weapon Task Plan / Engagement Category. A weapon task plan consists of 
pre-launch instructions for generating an interceptor flyout solution 
that guides the interceptor toward the target. Associated with the 
weapon task plan is the type of engagement category, either "A", "B", 
or "C", under which the mission will be executed.[Footnote 3] A weapon 
task plan is required before an interceptor is launched, and in all 
flight tests to date, the mission was conducted under a Category-A 
engagement.

Fire Control Radar. The primary radar for providing the necessary 
targeting data to the fire control node that are used for generating a 
weapon task plan. Pending the outcome of ongoing analysis, the use of 
the Aegis SPY-1 radar in future flight tests for engagement planning 
(fire control) is under consideration. In all flight tests to date, the 
fire control radar had been a surrogate midcourse "radar", which was a 
combination of a C-band transponder and the FPQ-14 radar.[Footnote 4]

Midcourse Radar. The midcourse radar provides refined targeting track 
data to the fire control node for the generation of in-flight target 
updates.

Configuration:

The configuration of an integrated flight test refers to the 
description of hardware and software assets used during a particular 
test. The GMD element tested to date has been a functional 
representation of the GMD element, but all tests included some 
surrogate and prototype components.

Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). The kill vehicles used in flight 
tests so far have been prototype articles. Beginning with IFT-14, a 
production-representative kill vehicle will be flown that is similar to 
the configuration to be fielded as part of Block 2004.

Booster. The payload launch vehicle (PLV), a two-stage booster system 
consisting of modified Minuteman II motors and supporting subsystems, 
has been the surrogate for the interceptor booster in all integrated 
flight tests to date. It is scheduled to be replaced with two 
operationally representative test bed boosters that are currently under 
development - the Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) booster and the 
Boost Vehicle plus (BV+). These boosters will first be used in 
intercept attempts in IFT-14 and IFT-15, respectively.

Fire Control Node. The fire control software is evolving to achieve 
more functionality and to address interfacing issues (i.e., linking the 
fire control component with other GMD components).

Beale Radar. The early warning radar at Beale Air Force Base has 
participated in integrated flight tests in a missile-defense role using 
legacy hardware and developmental software. The conversion of the early 
warning radar (EWR) at Beale to an upgraded early warning radar (UEWR), 
which consists of hardware and significant software upgrades, is 
planned for completion sometime during the middle of fiscal year 2004.

X-Band Radar. The Ground Based Radar Prototype (GBR-P), located at RTS, 
is a prototype of an X-Band radar that supports integrated flight 
tests. A sea-based X-band radar is under development to support flight-
testing as a midcourse tracking and discrimination radar and is planned 
to become available in late 2005.

Cobra Dane Radar. Cobra Dane is a phased array radar located at 
Eareckson Air Station in Shemya, Alaska. After planned software and 
hardware upgrades, which are scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 
2004, Cobra Dane will have the additional mission of performing real-
time acquisition and tracking--functions critical for ballistic missile 
defense, especially for engagements out of northeast Asia. There are 
currently no plans to demonstrate the capabilities of the Cobra Dane 
radar during an integrated flight test.

Table 1: GMD Integrated Flight Test information:

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

(120251):

FOOTNOTES

[1] The midcourse phase of flight refers to that portion of a ballistic 
missile's trajectory between the boost phase and reentry phase when the 
warheads and decoys travel on ballistic trajectories above the 
atmosphere.

[2] Reagan Test Site (RTS) was formerly known as Kwajalein Missile 
Range (KMR).

[3] The detailed definitions of Category A, B, and C engagements are 
classified.

[4] A C-band transponder was placed on the target reentry vehicle 
during previous flight tests. It was essential for the execution of 
flight tests, because in conjunction with the FPQ-14 radar located on 
Oahu, Hawaii, there were no other non-artificial options available to 
track the reentry vehicle with sufficient accuracy for executing the 
mission.