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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
November 2011:
Haiti Reconstruction:
Factors Contributing to Delays in USAID Infrastructure Construction:
GAO-12-68:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-12-68, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
On January 12, 2010, a powerful earthquake struck Haiti, resulting in
an estimated 230,000 deaths, including more than 16,000 Haitian
government personnel, and the destruction of many ministry buildings.
In addition to immediate relief efforts, in July 2010, Congress
appropriated $1.14 billion in supplemental funds for reconstruction,
most of which was provided to the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State). USAID and
State are administering about $412 million in supplemental and regular
fiscal year appropriations for infrastructure construction activities.
In May 2011, in response to a congressional mandate, GAO reported on
overall U.S. plans for assistance to Haiti. This report addresses
infrastructure construction activities, including (1) USAID and State
obligations and expenditures; (2) USAID staffing; (3) USAID planning;
and (4) potential sustainability challenges USAID faces. GAO reviewed
documents and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and
Haiti, and visited ongoing and planned construction sites in Haiti.
What GAO Found:
USAID and State have obligated and expended a small amount of funds
for infrastructure construction activities in six sectors: energy,
ports, shelter, health, food security, and governance and rule of law.
As of September 30, 2011, USAID and State had allocated almost $412
million for infrastructure construction activities, obligated
approximately $48.4 million (11.8 percent), and expended approximately
$3.1 million (0.8 percent). Of the almost $412 million, about 87
percent was allocated from the 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act
and 13 percent from regular fiscal year appropriations. USAID accounts
for about 89 percent of the $412 million, including funds for
construction in the energy, ports, shelter, health, and food security
sectors. State activities in the governance and rule of law sector
account for the remaining 11 percent.
USAID had difficulty staffing the Haiti mission after the earthquake,
a factor that has contributed to delays in infrastructure construction
activities. Soon after the earthquake, 10 of the 17 U.S. citizen
Foreign Service Officers, known as U.S. direct-hire staff, in Haiti
left. USAID, lacking a process for expediting the movement of staff to
post-disaster situations, had difficulty replacing them and recruiting
additional staff. These staff included key technical personnel such as
engineers and contracting officers needed to plan and implement
infrastructure activities in sectors such as energy and ports, where
the mission had not previously worked. With limited U.S. direct-hire
staff on board, the mission relied heavily on temporary staff, and
remaining staff assumed duties outside their normal areas of
expertise. The mission plans to have all U.S. direct-hire staff on
board by February 2012. Since infrastructure activities will continue
until at least 2015, the mission will need to maintain sufficient
staff for several years to manage the activities supported by the
increase in Haiti reconstruction funds.
USAID and State are planning activities in Haiti, but various
challenges have contributed to some of USAID’s delays. As of October
2011, USAID had drafted eight Activity Approval Documents (AADs) that
include planned activities, costs, risks, and assumptions. AADs for
the education, energy, food security, governance and rule of law,
health, and shelter sectors have been approved. The AAD process has
been more comprehensive and involved than is typical for such efforts,
according to USAID officials. Although USAID made progress in
planning, construction of some activities was delayed for various
reasons, and some activities do not yet have planned start dates. For
example, the mission was delayed in awarding contracts in the shelter
sector due to issues such as identifying sites for shelter and
obtaining land title.
The sustainability of USAID-funded infrastructure depends, in part, on
improvements to the Haitian government’s long-standing economic and
institutional weaknesses. USAID has considered various sustainability
issues and is planning institutional strengthening activities, such as
management reform of the power utility, but USAID planning documents
acknowledge that these reforms will be challenging and that
infrastructure activities face risks. These challenges are consistent
with prior GAO reports that address sustainability of U.S.
infrastructure projects in other countries.
What GAO Recommends:
To facilitate USAID’s progress in planning and implementing its many
post-earthquake infrastructure construction activities in Haiti over
the next several years, particularly those requiring key technical
staff, GAO recommends that the USAID Administrator ensure that U.S.
direct-hire staff are placed at the mission within time frames that
avoid future staffing gaps or delays. USAID described certain actions
it is currently taking that, if continued, could address the
recommendation.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-68]. For more
information, contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or
gootnickd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
USAID and State Have Obligated and Expended Small Amounts of the
Almost $412 Million Allocated for Construction Activities:
USAID Staffing Difficulties Were a Factor in Delaying USAID
Infrastructure Construction Activities in Haiti:
USAID Planning Is Still Under Way; Various Factors Contributed to
Delays in Infrastructure Construction:
Haitian Government Capacity Is a Key Challenge to Sustainability of
U.S. Government Infrastructure Reconstruction Activities:
Conclusion:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Sector Fact Sheets:
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Supplemental Funding for Post-Earthquake Reconstruction in
Haiti:
Table 2: USAID and State Total Funds Allocated, Obligated, and
Expended for Bilateral Post-Earthquake Infrastructure Construction
Activities in Haiti, as of September 30, 2011:
Table 3: USAID and State Sector-Specific Funding Allocations for Post-
Earthquake Construction Activities in Haiti, as of September 30, 2011:
Table 4: USAID and State Total Obligations and Expenditures for Post-
Earthquake Construction Activities, as of September 30, 2011:
Table 5: Status of USAID Activity Approval Documents (AADs), as of
October 2011:
Figures:
Figure 1: Timeline of Actions Taken by the Government of Haiti,
International Donors, and the U.S. Government since the January 12,
2010, Earthquake:
Figure 2: Development Corridors and Selected Sites Targeted by the
U.S. Post-Earthquake Assistance:
Abbreviations:
AAD: Activity Approval Document:
Act: Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010:
Action Plan: Action Plan for National Recovery and Development in
Haiti:
ADS: Automated Directives System:
CRC: Civilian Response Corps:
EDH: Electricité d'Haiti:
ESF: Economic Support Fund:
FY: fiscal year:
Haiti Strategy: Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and
Economic Opportunity:
HTT: Haiti Task Team:
HUEH: State University Hospital:
IHRC: Interim Haiti Recovery Commission:
INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement:
MCC: Millennium Challenge Corporation:
Mission: USAID Mission in Haiti:
NSDD-38: National Security Decision Directive 38:
PSC: personal services contractor:
State: Department of State:
State/INL: State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement:
Treasury: Department of the Treasury:
UN: United Nations:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
WINNER: Watershed Initiative for Natural Environmental Resources:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 16, 2011:
Congressional Committees:
The January 12, 2010, earthquake centered near Port-au-Prince, Haiti,
caused physical, social, and economic devastation to the poorest
country in the Western hemisphere. The earthquake is estimated to have
caused approximately 230,000 deaths, 300,000 injuries, and displaced
approximately 2 million people from their homes. According to the
United Nations (UN), the earthquake killed more than 16,000 of Haiti's
civil service employees and destroyed almost all ministry buildings.
The World Bank reported that the earthquake caused $7.8 billion in
damage (exceeding Haiti's 2009 gross domestic product). The UN Office
of the Special Envoy for Haiti reported that the country received
unprecedented pledges of support from around the globe, with bilateral
and multilateral donors, including the United States, pledging more
than $5.6 billion to help Haiti recover from the earthquake through
2011. Individuals and private companies gave an additional $3.1
billion in private donations.
In July 2010, Congress passed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of
2010 (the Act), which provided more than $1.14 billion in
reconstruction funds for Haiti.[Footnote 1] In January 2011, the U.S.
government issued the 5-year Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy:
Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity, which targets the Port-au-
Prince, Saint-Marc, and Cap-Haïtien areas. The U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) is allocating supplemental and other
funds to support the construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure
in the energy, food security, health, ports, and shelter sectors,
while the Department of State (State) is allocating supplemental and
other funds to support the construction and rehabilitation of
infrastructure in the governance and rule of law sector. As currently
planned, nearly half of USAID's and State's funding for post-
earthquake reconstruction assistance is for infrastructure
construction activities.[Footnote 2]
In the Act, Congress made funds available for GAO to monitor U.S. post-
earthquake assistance to Haiti.[Footnote 3] In response, in May 2011,
we issued a report that described the planned uses for U.S.
reconstruction assistance, USAID's internal controls for overseeing
U.S. reconstruction funds, and Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
governance and oversight structures.[Footnote 4] This report
addresses, for infrastructure construction activities only, (1) the
amounts of USAID and State obligations and expenditures; (2) USAID's
staffing; (3) USAID's planning; and (4) potential sustainability
challenges USAID faces.
To address these objectives, we reviewed reports, documents, and data
and interviewed officials from USAID and State in Washington, D.C.,
and Haiti. In Haiti, we also met with representatives from
organizations involved in the reconstruction efforts. In Port-au-
Prince, we visited sites damaged by the earthquake where USAID and
State have ongoing or planned reconstruction activities. In the Cap-
Hatien area, we visited sites USAID is considering for reconstruction
assistance.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 through
November 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our work
objectives. (App. I contains a more detailed description of our scope
and methodology. App. II contains a more detailed description of each
of the six sectors with infrastructure construction we reviewed.)
Background:
Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with more than
75 percent of the population living on less than $2 per day and the
unemployment rate estimated at 60 to 70 percent. These conditions were
exacerbated when the largest earthquake in Haiti's recorded history
devastated parts of the country, including the capital, on January 12,
2010. Since then, Haiti has suffered from a cholera epidemic that has
affected over 450,000 persons and caused over 6,000 deaths. In
addition, Haiti has experienced political uncertainty following the
earthquake. Due to the inconclusive presidential election of November
2010, the new President was not inaugurated until May 2011. On May 13,
2011, the U.S. and Haitian governments signed the Haiti Reconstruction
Grant Agreement. Later, the Haitian Parliament rejected two candidates
nominated by the new President for the post of Prime Minister, who
serves as head of government. In early October 2011, the Parliament
approved the President's third nominee.
In response to the earthquake, in the Act, Congress provided more than
$1.14 billion in reconstruction funds for Haiti, available through the
end of fiscal year 2012. Of this amount, about $918 million was
directed to USAID and State,[Footnote 5] of which $770 million was
provided through the USAID-administered Economic Support Fund (ESF)
account and about $148 million through the State-administered
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account (see table
1).
Table 1: Supplemental Funding for Post-Earthquake Reconstruction in
Haiti:
Dollars in millions:
Recipient: USAID and State:
Reconstruction amount[A]: $917.7;
USAID: $770.0;
State: $147.7.
Recipient: Treasury[B];
Reconstruction amount[A]: $219.8.
Recipient: USAID Inspector General;
Reconstruction amount[A]: $4.5.
Recipient: Total;
Reconstruction amount[A]: $1,142.0.
Sources: Congressional Research Service, GAO analyses of U.S.-
government fiscal year 2010 supplemental budget request, and final
appropriation in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 (Pub. L.
No. 111-212).
Note: Funding amounts do not add to total due to rounding.
[A] In addition to reconstruction funding, the Act provided about
$1.64 billion for post-earthquake relief activities, which were
primarily implemented by the Department of Defense and USAID's Offices
of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Transition Initiatives, and Food for
Peace, as well as $144 million for diplomatic-related expenses.
[B] Funding for the Department of the Treasury includes $212 million
for Haitian debt relief and $7.8 million for a Treasury attaché office
in the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince and technical assistance.
[End of table]
Of the almost $918 million in supplemental funds, as of September 30,
2011, $356.9 million was allocated for the construction and
rehabilitation of infrastructure. In addition to these supplemental
funds, USAID and State allocated funding for reconstruction activities
from other budgetary sources, such as annual appropriations for fiscal
years 2010 and 2011, of which $54.8 million was allocated for
construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure. In total, the
agencies allocated almost $412 million from both supplemental and
other budgetary sources for construction and rehabilitation of
infrastructure.[Footnote 6]
In September 2010, State and USAID, as required by the Act, issued a
joint spending plan that showed allocations of supplemental
reconstruction funds (see figure 1 for a timeline of key government of
Haiti and international donors and U.S. government actions and events
after the earthquake).
Figure 1: Timeline of Actions Taken by the Government of Haiti,
International Donors, and the U.S. Government since the January 12,
2010, Earthquake:
[Refer to PDF for image: timeline]
2010:
Jan. 12, 2010: the earthquake:
February:
U.S. government: USAID establishes the Haiti Task Team.
March:
Government of Haiti and international donors: Government of Haiti
issues a 10-year Action Plan for National Recovery and Development in
Haiti and Post-Disaster Needs Assessment; requests $3.9 billion for
reconstruction efforts in 2010 and 2011. In response, 55 donor
countries pledge over $5.6 billion for 2010 and 2011.
U.S. government: The U.S. government pledges $1.15 billion for Haiti
reconstruction.
April:
Government of Haiti and international donors: The joint Haiti-
international Interim Haiti Recovery Commission is established with a
mandate until October 2011.
May:
Government of Haiti and international donors: The Haiti Reconstruction
Fund, a multilateral trust fund, is established.
July:
U.S. government: Congress passes the Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2010, which appropriates approximately $1.14 billion for Haiti
reconstruction through September 2012.
September:
U.S. government: State creates the Office of the Haiti Special
Coordinator. State and USAID issue a joint spending plan for the
supplemental appropriations.
October 2010: cholera outbreak confirmed:
November:
Government of Haiti and international donors: National elections are
held, but the results are inconclusive.
U.S. government: The U.S. government disburses $120 million to the
Haiti Reconstruction Fund and $204 million to the government of Haiti
for debt relief.
2011:
January:
U.S. government: U.S. government releases a 5-year Post-Earthquake USG
Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal Economic Opportunity.
March:
Government of Haiti and international donors: Run-off elections are
held.
May:
Government of Haiti and international donors: The governments of Haiti
and the United States sign the Haiti Reconstruction Grant Agreement.
Michel Martelly is inaugurated as President and Jean-Max Bellerive
resigns as Prime Minister.
U.S. government: The governments of the United States and Haiti sign
the Haiti Reconstruction Grant Agreement.
June:
Government of Haiti and international donors: Haitian Parliament
rejects the first candidate nominated for Prime Minister.
August:
Government of Haiti and international donors: Haitian Parliament
rejects the second candidate nominated for Prime Minister.
October:
Government of Haiti and international donors: Haitian Parliament
ratifies Dr. Garry Conille as Prime Minister.
Source: GAO analysis of official documents and news media.
Note: See GAO, Haiti Reconstruction: U.S. Efforts Have Begun, Expanded
Oversight Still to Be Implemented, GAO-11-415 (Washington, D.C.: May
19, 2011), for a description of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
and the Haiti Reconstruction Fund.
[End of figure]
In January 2011, the U.S. government issued the 5-year Post-Earthquake
USG Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity.
Consistent with the government of Haiti's development priorities, the
U.S. strategy seeks to, among other things, encourage reconstruction
and long-term economic development in several regions of the country--
known as "development corridors"--including a region on the northern
coast of Haiti that is not close to the earthquake epicenter, but
where some people displaced by the earthquake moved. The strategy
notes that 65 percent of Haiti's economic activity was located in
greater Port-au-Prince[Footnote 7] and states the U.S. government's
intent to support new economic opportunities in the Saint-Marc and Cap-
Haïtien development corridors, in addition to assisting with
reconstruction in the Port-au-Prince corridor, which suffered the most
damage from the earthquake (see figure 2).
Figure 2: Development Corridors and Selected Sites Targeted by the
U.S. Post-Earthquake Assistance:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map]
Depicted on the map:
Earthquake epicenter;
Cap-Haitien Corridor;
Saint-Marc Corridor;
Port-au-Price Corridor.
Source: Multiple U.S. government agencies: Post-Earthquake USG Haiti
Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity (Washington, D.C.,
January 2011): USAID planning documents; Map Resources.
[End of figure]
The U.S. strategy identifies planned U.S. reconstruction assistance in
eight sectors.[Footnote 8] Six of these sectors--energy, ports,
shelter, health, food security, and governance and rule of law--
involve infrastructure construction and rehabilitation, while two
sectors--economic security and education--do not. The strategy also
encompasses some of the objectives set forth in the Haitian
government's 10-year Action Plan for National Recovery and Development
in Haiti, issued in March 2010. The Action Plan identified and
prioritized short-and long-term reconstruction needs in four areas:
(1) territorial rebuilding in Port-au-Prince and three targeted
regions of Cap-Haïtien, Saint-Marc, and Les Cayes; (2) economic
rebuilding in sectors such as construction, agriculture, and tourism;
(3) social rebuilding in the health, education, food security, and
other sectors; and (4) institutional rebuilding focused on developing
government capacity, justice, and a legal and regulatory framework.
To advise and support U.S. earthquake reconstruction efforts in Haiti,
USAID and State created special offices in Washington, D.C.
* In February 2010, USAID created the Haiti Task Team (HTT) to help
coordinate U.S. emergency relief and reconstruction work and provide
technical and staff support. At its peak, the HTT had approximately 50
staff positions, primarily U.S. full-or part-time staff who were
temporarily reassigned from USAID's Bureau for Latin America and the
Caribbean and other bureaus, as well as contracted staff.
* In September 2010, State created the Office of the Haiti Special
Coordinator to oversee the planning and implementation of the U.S.
strategy in Haiti in coordination with USAID and other U.S.
departments and agencies. The Haiti Special Coordinator has
approximately 20 staff positions, primarily staff temporarily
reassigned full-or part-time from other bureaus and offices within
State, and other U.S. agencies as well as contracted staff.
USAID and State Have Obligated and Expended Small Amounts of the
Almost $412 Million Allocated for Construction Activities:
As of September 30, 2011, USAID and State allocated $411.6 million for
bilateral post-earthquake infrastructure construction activities in
Haiti using $356.9 million in fiscal year (FY) 2010 supplemental funds
and $54.8 million from regular fiscal year appropriations.[Footnote 9]
In addition, USAID and State had obligated $48.4 million[Footnote 10]
(11.8 percent) and expended $3.1 million (0.8 percent) of the total
allocated, as shown in table 2.[Footnote 11]
Table 2: USAID and State Total Funds Allocated, Obligated, and
Expended for Bilateral Post-Earthquake Infrastructure Construction
Activities in Haiti, as of September 30, 2011:
Dollars in millions:
Total funds allocated;
USAID: $365.7;
State: $45.9;
Total: $411.6.
FY 2010 supplemental;
USAID: $311.2;
State: $45.7;
Total: $356.9.
Other sources;
USAID: $54.6;
State: $0.2;
Total: $54.8.
Total funds obligated;
USAID: $42.6;
State: $5.8;
Total: $48.4.
FY 2010 supplemental;
USAID: $41.8;
State: $5.6;
Total: $47.4.
Other sources;
USAID: $0.8;
State: $0.2;
Total: $1.0.
Total funds expended;
USAID: $1.4;
State: $1.7;
Total: $3.1.
FY 2010 supplemental;
USAID: $0.6;
State: $1.7;
Total: $2.4.
Other sources;
USAID: $0.8;
State: $0.0;
Total: $0.8.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data.
Notes: Other sources are regular fiscal year 2010 and 2011
appropriations. For food security infrastructure construction
activities, USAID plans to provide $55.5 million during fiscal years
2011 through 2014; however, we did not include this amount because
USAID did not provide the funding data by fiscal year. Total amounts
may not add due to rounding.
[End of table]
USAID and State Allocated Almost $412 Million in Supplemental and
Other Funding for Post-Earthquake Infrastructure Construction
Activities in Haiti:
Combined, USAID and State allocated $411.6 million for post-earthquake
infrastructure construction activities as of September 30, 2011 (see
table 2). USAID is responsible for implementing most of the
infrastructure construction activities. USAID activities in five
sectors--shelter, energy, ports, health, and food security--account
for $365.7 million (88.9 percent) of the $411.6 million in total funds
allocated for infrastructure construction. State has activities in the
governance and rule of law sector, which account for $45.9 million
(11.1 percent) of the total funds allocated for infrastructure
construction. See appendix II for additional detailed information on
each of the six sectors. Table 3 shows USAID and State funding
allocations by sector.
Table 3: USAID and State Sector-Specific Funding Allocations for Post-
Earthquake Construction Activities in Haiti, as of September 30, 2011:
Dollars in millions:
Sector: Energy (USAID);
FY2010 supplemental funds: $85.3;
Other funding sources: $13.0;
Total (percentage of supplemental and other funds): $98.3 (23.9%).
Sector: Ports (USAID);
FY2010 supplemental funds: $77.7;
Other funding sources: $0.0;
Total (percentage of supplemental and other funds): $77.7 (18.9%).
Sector: Shelter (USAID);
FY2010 supplemental funds: $55.1;
Other funding sources: $1.6;
Total (percentage of supplemental and other funds): $56.7 (13.8%).
Sector: Health (USAID);
FY2010 supplemental funds: $50.5;
Other funding sources: $40.0;
Total (percentage of supplemental and other funds): $90.5 (22.0%).
Sector: Food Security (USAID);
FY2010 supplemental funds: $42.6;
Other funding sources: $0[A];
Total (percentage of supplemental and other funds): $42.6 (10.3%).
Sector: Governance and Rule of Law (State);
FY2010 supplemental funds: $45.7;
Other funding sources: $0.2;
Total (percentage of supplemental and other funds): $45.9 (11.1%).
Sector: Total;
FY2010 supplemental funds: $356.9;
Other funding sources: $54.8;
Total (percentage of supplemental and other funds): $411.6.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data.
Note: Other sources are regular fiscal year 2010 and 2011
appropriations.
[A] For food security infrastructure construction activities, USAID
plans to provide $55.5 million during fiscal years 2011 through 2014;
however, we did not include this amount because USAID did not provide
the funding data by fiscal year.
[End of table]
Examples of post-earthquake infrastructure activities are as follows:
* The energy sector includes rehabilitating substations in the Port-au-
Prince area and in the Cap-Haïtien development corridor, providing
power to the North Industrial Park--an activity that is key to Haiti's
economic development with donor and private-sector commitments of
about $400 million and a goal of creating about 60,000 direct and
indirect jobs, according to USAID and State officials.
* The ports sector includes the construction of a new port along the
northern coast of Haiti in the Cap-Haïtien development corridor. Upon
completion, the port could provide improved shipping access for firms
operating in the North Industrial Park and other locations in the area.
* The shelter sector includes the development of approximately 15,000
service plots, which include housing and access to essential services,
in new residential settlements in the Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien
development corridors.
* The health sector includes the reconstruction of the State
University Hospital in the Port-au-Prince development corridor.
* The food security sector includes the construction of irrigation
canals and farm-to-market roads in the Cap-Haïtien, Port-au-Prince,
and Saint-Marc development corridors.
* The governance and rule of law sector includes construction
activities funded through State's Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement (State/INL); the activities include the
rehabilitation of facilities at the Haitian National Police Academy.
USAID and State Have Obligated Almost 12 Percent and Expended 0.8
Percent of Funds Allocated for Infrastructure Construction:
As of September 30, 2011, USAID had obligated $42.6 million for
activities in the energy, ports, shelter, health, and food security
sectors. The majority (67 percent) of USAID's obligations have been
for two energy activities--$15.8 million for construction of power
generation at the North Industrial Park and $12.9 for rehabilitation
of 5 power sub-stations in the Port-au-Prince area. State had
obligated $5.8 million, as of September 30, 2011, for its activities
in the governance and rule of law sector. State officials said that
designing and planning of construction activities generally involves a
more lengthy process than for other activities, and they expect
obligations to grow at a faster pace later this year and during 2012
as USAID and State infrastructure construction activities reach the
implementation stage. See table 4 for obligation and expenditure data.
Table 4: USAID and State Total Obligations and Expenditures for Post-
Earthquake Construction Activities, as of September 30, 2011:
Dollars in millions:
USAID Activities Total;
Obligations: $42.6;
Expenditures: $1.4.
Energy sector: Rehabilitation of 5 Port-au-Prince electrical
substations;
* architectural and engineering design services;
Obligations: $40.2;
Expenditures: $0.2;
* construction;
Obligations: $12.7;
Expenditures: $0.
Energy sector: North Industrial Park short-term power generation;
* architectural and engineering design services;
Obligations: $0.8;
Expenditures: $0.3;
* construction;
Obligations: $15.0;
Expenditures: $0.
Ports sector: Feasibility study for the design of a new port in
northern Haiti;
Obligations: $2.8;
Expenditures: $0.
Shelter sector: Residential shelter site preparation, environmental
assessment, and design (Caracol Ekam);
Obligations: $9.8;
Expenditures: $0.7.
Shelter sector: Residential shelter environmental assessments and
design;
Obligations: $0.3;
Expenditures: $0.3.
Health sector: Environmental assessment of the State University
Hospital (Port-au-Prince);
Obligations: $0.4;
Expenditures: $0.
Food security sector: Watershed Initiative for Natural Environmental
Resources (WINNER)[A];
Obligations: $0.5;
Expenditures: $0.
State Activities Total;
Obligations: $5.8;
Expenditures: $1.7[B].
Governance and rule of law sector: Haitian National Police Academy
repairs;
Obligations: $5.0;
Expenditures: $1.1.
Governance and rule of law sector: Prison repairs--site surveys of
Petionville and Carrefour facilities;
Obligations: $0.2;
Expenditures: $0.2.
Governance and rule of law sector: Construction supervision--oversight
of construction activities;
Obligations: $0.3;
Expenditures: $0.3.
Governance and rule of law sector: National Penitentiary repairs;
Obligations: $0.2;
Expenditures: $0.2.
Governance and rule of law sector: Police station repairs;
Obligations: $0.2;
Expenditures: $0.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data.
Note: Amounts may not add due to rounding.
[A] Estimated award, total obligation, and expenditure amounts are for
infrastructure, planning and design, and construction components of
WINNER. The total award amount for WINNER is $127 million; total
obligations and expenditures as of June 30, 2011, are $59 million and
$49 million, respectively. WINNER's infrastructure-related activities
include erosion prevention, irrigation restoration, and rebuilding and
repair of transportation infrastructure.
[B] State refers to expenditures as liquidations.
[End of table]
USAID Staffing Difficulties Were a Factor in Delaying USAID
Infrastructure Construction Activities in Haiti:
USAID Has Had Difficulty Replacing Staff Since the Earthquake:
Within a month after the earthquake, 10 of the mission's 17 U.S.
direct-hire staff[Footnote 12] had departed Haiti, leaving the mission
with 7 staff in country to manage a program heavily involved in
massive relief operations and anticipating an increase in
reconstruction activities. According to mission officials, U.S. direct-
hire staff were permitted to leave for several reasons, primarily
because approximately 40 percent of U.S. embassy housing was damaged
or destroyed, the school for mission staff children was damaged and
not functional, and staff were experiencing emotional challenges after
the earthquake.
To fill the U.S. direct-hire vacancies, USAID posted 10 routine agency
wide job announcements in March 2010, but no U.S. direct-hire staff
applied. According to USAID officials, potential applicants did not
apply due to, among other things, the damaged school, uncertainty
about the quality of life in Haiti, and the lack of financial or other
incentives in the job announcements. In May 2010, USAID again posted
the 10 job announcements and, this time, attracted a number of
applicants because the postings included financial incentives and
waived the requirement that successful applicants bid on positions in
four USAID-designated critical priority countries--Afghanistan, Iraq,
Pakistan, and Sudan--upon completion of their tours in Haiti.[Footnote
13] Having received a sufficient number of applicants for the May 2010
posting, the mission soon selected the staff. However, U.S. direct-
hire staff did not begin to arrive in Haiti until early 2011 because,
among other things, households and families had to be moved and some
staff required up to 6 months in language training. In addition to
filling existing positions, USAID received approval from the U.S.
Ambassador to Haiti in February 2011 for 15 additional U.S. direct-
hire staff to manage the surge in earthquake-related funding.[Footnote
14] These positions were announced and some candidates selected when
the approval was granted in February 2011. Eleven had arrived as of
September 2011 and, according to mission officials, all are expected
to arrive in Haiti by February 2012. However, the mission will be
implementing infrastructure construction activities until at least
2015, according to USAID planning documentation. During the next 4
years, U.S. direct-hire staff will have opportunities to bid for other
positions at other posts. As U.S. direct-hire staff leave Haiti, the
mission will need to replace them in order to continue the progress of
infrastructure construction activities.
Lack of Staff Created Planning Delays:
Since the earthquake, the mission has been operating with a reduced
number of U.S. direct-hire staff. During that time, the mission
experienced delays in planning and implementing some construction
activities. According to USAID officials, U.S. direct-hire staff are
essential in planning and establishing continuity for long-term
reconstruction activities, including infrastructure activities such as
the design of power generation facilities, which require specific
skills. Delays in staffing key positions, such as engineers,
contracting officers, and sector specialists, created particular
difficulties. For example:
Engineering: Although USAID allocated more than $300 million in
supplemental funds for infrastructure activities that would require
engineering skills, the mission's planning process was delayed due, in
part, to the lack of U.S. direct-hire engineers, according to USAID
officials. USAID was unable to reassign U.S. direct-hire engineers
from other missions around the world because USAID has few engineers
worldwide, according to mission officials. At the time of the
earthquake, the mission had two Haitian engineers on its staff, but
these individuals had experience in constructing and repairing roads
and bridges and rehabilitating small infrastructure--with no
experience in energy and ports construction. In anticipation of its
pending involvement in infrastructure activities, the mission created
a new Office of Infrastructure, Energy, and Engineering, but staff
with specialized engineering skills did not begin to arrive at the
mission until early 2011. For example, the mission's chief engineer,
who is responsible for overseeing construction activities in the
energy sector, arrived in April 2011, and an engineer overseeing the
construction of health facilities arrived in May 2011.
Mission officials in the health sector stated that initial delays in
staffing an engineer in the Office of Infrastructure, Energy, and
Engineering presented a planning challenge because in-country
engineering expertise is essential to rehabilitate a major hospital
and numerous smaller health clinics. According to mission officials,
the lack of staff and expertise made planning difficult for several
reasons. For example, some staff who were involved in developing
certain cost and planning estimates and assessing potential
constraints had limited expertise, thus requiring more review by
others. Further, some construction activities experienced delays as a
result of staff shortages. For example, on September 22, 2011, about 3
months later than initially planned, the mission awarded a feasibility
study related to its plans to invest in port development in the Cap-
Haïtien development corridor. According to USAID officials, the delay
occurred because mission staff were focused on energy-sector issues
related to the North Industrial Park. The feasibility study is needed
before the mission can determine its specific plans for port
construction and set an award date for the construction contract that
is expected to follow.
Contracting: The mission also experienced delays in awarding some
infrastructure construction contracts as originally scheduled because
it had only one U.S. direct-hire contracting officer in country with
the authority to approve contracts of more than $3 million, according
to USAID officials.[Footnote 15] The mission plans to award several
complex contracts for more than $3 million each from the more than
$300 million in supplemental funding it has allocated for
infrastructure activities. The mission currently has three other
contracting officers with lower contracting authority approval limits,
and as of September 2011, the mission had requested additional
contracting officers it anticipates will be needed to keep pace with
the planned time frames for the mission's planned infrastructure
activities.
Programming: The mission also experienced delays because, for more
than 1 year following the earthquake, it did not have several sector
directors, including a program office chief and office chiefs for
economic growth and democracy and governance offices, among other
programming positions. According to mission officials, key decisions
during the design and planning of construction activities were
delayed, in part, because the mission had not been involved in such
activities before the earthquake and there was limited expertise among
existing staff. In addition, mission staff have experienced increased
workloads and some mission staff have had to take on additional
responsibilities outside their normal areas of expertise. For example,
the deputy mission director assumed the additional role of leading
energy sector planning for about 15 months until the April 2011
arrival of the chief engineer. In addition to other staffing issues,
three of USAID's Haitian employees died in the earthquake. Further,
mission officials stated that numerous surviving Haitian employees
have been unable to contribute quickly to post-earthquake planning
efforts because some had family members who died or were injured in
the earthquake and many had residences that were damaged or destroyed.
USAID Haiti Relied Largely on Temporary Staff Following the Earthquake:
Based on our review of USAID policies and guidance, including its
Automated Directives System, and statements of mission officials,
USAID does not have an expedited process for placing U.S. direct-hire
staff to work on reconstruction efforts in an urgent post-disaster or
post-crisis situation such as Haiti.[Footnote 16] Absent such a
process, USAID Haiti used USAID's routine but lengthy staffing
process, which involves, among other things, posting job opportunities
agency-wide, receiving applications, selecting staff, and waiting
until they are released from their current assignments.
To meet the increased need for mission staff to manage the program,
the agency temporarily hired or reassigned staff, including staff from
its Haiti Task Team in Washington, D.C., to complete more than 400
temporary duty assignments for periods ranging from one week to
several months.[Footnote 17] For example, USAID used personal services
contracts to hire staff to provide financial management expertise;
assigned headquarters-based staff from its Latin America and Caribbean
Bureau to manage and oversee rubble removal and other efforts; and
provided fiscal year 2010 supplemental funding to an implementing
organization to manage people who repaired roads, cleaned drainage
canals, and performed other rehabilitation activities.
According to mission officials, planning and implementation of
reconstruction activities were delayed because the few staff remaining
in Haiti were heavily involved in recruiting, placing, and training
temporary staff in Haiti. Senior mission staff stated that, for many
temporary staff positions, the mission had to develop detailed scopes
of work for the positions and then brief and train newly arrived staff
on substantive issues. In addition, mission staff noted that the
continuity of efforts was sometimes problematic as multiple staff, who
turned over frequently, managed the efforts.
USAID Planning Is Still Under Way; Various Factors Contributed to
Delays in Infrastructure Construction:
USAID Has Finalized Six of Eight Sector-Specific Planning Documents:
[Side bar: What is in an AAD?
According to USAID policy, AADs certify that appropriate planning has
been completed. Although the policy states that there is no standard
format for AADs, at a minimum, an AAD describes the project or
activity, including its intended results, implementation methods, and
financing plans; demonstrates that all pre-obligation requirements
have been met; clarifies management responsibilities; and summarizes
environmental review requirements and gender issues. End of side bar]
USAID planning for its earthquake reconstruction activities in Haiti
is still under way.[Footnote 18] The USAID mission in Haiti, in
coordination with other U.S. government agencies and USAID in
Washington, D.C., has drafted eight Activity Approval Documents
(AADs)--detailed planning documents for each sector.[Footnote 19] As
of October 2011, six AADs had been approved: education, energy, food
security, governance and rule of law, health, and shelter (see table
5). These six AADs account for 87 percent of USAID's available
supplemental and program funds, according to USAID. The two remaining
AADs require additional work before they can be approved, according to
USAID officials. Specifically, the AAD for economic security--which
does not include any planned infrastructure construction--requires
further interagency discussion with the U.S. Department of the
Treasury (Treasury), which is the co-implementer of economic
activities in Haiti, and the AAD for ports has not been approved
because, among other things, USAID is waiting for the Haitian
government to make key decisions regarding port regulations, use of
territorial waters and the Haitian customs code.
Table 5: Status of USAID Activity Approval Documents (AADs), as of
October 2011:
AADs approved:
Education;
Energy;
Food Security;
Governance and Rule of Law;
Health;
Shelter.
AADs not approved:
Economic Security;
Ports.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Notes: USAID does not plan any infrastructure construction activities
in the governance and rule of law AAD, however, the AAD includes
State/INL infrastructure construction activities. USAID does not plan
any infrastructure construction activities in the economic security
and education AADs.
[End of table]
According to USAID officials, the AADs for Haiti are more
comprehensive and have involved a more extensive review process than
is typical. For example, USAID officials stated that the AADs for
USAID activities in Haiti have included more analytical metrics, such
as the results USAID plans to achieve in return for its investment.
These AADs incorporate a discussion of how each sector will meet
USAID's agency wide procurement reform known as USAID Forward, which
has, among other objectives, the goal of broadening the base of
USAID's implementing partners.[Footnote 20] According to USAID
officials, incorporating USAID Forward has changed the procurement
plan structure in the AADs, requiring more scrutiny by agency
officials. For example, USAID indicated for activities described in
the AAD procurement plans whether those activities will be targeted at
local firms or organizations or use traditional partners.
In addition, several factors led to a more extensive review process
for the AADs for activities in Haiti. According to USAID officials,
AADs are usually drafted at the mission and approved by the mission
director. However, due to U.S. foreign policy interests in Haiti, in
addition to the review and approval of the Haiti mission director,
these AADs have undergone high-level review by USAID and State's
Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator. Because the U.S strategy is a
whole-of-government strategy, a number of other U.S. agencies were
involved in reviewing and approving the AADs. These agencies included
the U.S. Department of Agriculture for food security, Treasury for
economic security, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
for health. According to USAID and State officials, the inclusion of
other agencies in the process added levels of review that have
extended AAD development and approval.
[Side bar: What is in the procurement plan?
The procurement plan includes a work description, USAID point of
contact, cost estimate, implementation instrument type (such as
contract, task order, or cooperative agreement), and planned contract
solicitation issuance, award, and completion dates for each
procurement needed to implement each activity. As of July 2011, it
included 82 planned procurements in 8 sectors (energy, ports, shelter,
economic security, food security, education, health, and governance
and rule of law) for both infrastructure and non-infrastructure
activities. Non-infrastructure items in the procurement plan include
vocational and teacher training, agricultural support, healthcare
delivery, and economic development programs. End of side bar]
Prior to AADs being approved in Washington, D.C., the Haiti mission
continued with other planning efforts. The mission's Office of
Acquisition and Assistance developed a procurement plan to manage
contract actions--such as the award of contracts for planning, design,
and construction services--that enable implementation of the
activities. In the shelter sector, for example, the mission has
awarded contracts for the design of the proposed residential sites;
the design includes site layout plans, environmental impact
assessments, and housing-unit design specifications. In instances
where an AAD had not been approved but where the mission deemed that
sufficient planning had been completed, the mission used activity-
specific approval memoranda to initiate procurement actions, and, in
some instances where design work was completed, award construction
contracts. For example, a contract for the construction of a 10-
megawatt power plant for the North Industrial Park in the Cap-Haïtien
development corridor with a value of approximately $15 million was
awarded while the energy AAD was in draft.
A Few Infrastructure Construction Activities Are Under Way; Various
Factors Contributed to Delays:
As of September 15, 2011, the mission had awarded its first two
infrastructure construction contracts--rehabilitation of five
electrical substations in Port-au-Prince and construction of a power
plant in the North Industrial Park--at a combined cost of $28.8
million; approximately 7 percent of USAID's total allocation for
infrastructure construction activities.[Footnote 21] These awards were
slightly delayed, as described below:
* Rehabilitation of five electrical substations in Port-au-Prince: On
July 28, 2011, about 1 month later than planned, USAID Haiti awarded a
$12.7 million construction contract for work to improve electrical
service in Port-au-Prince. USAID extended the time for contractors to
submit construction proposals because USAID issued new information in
response to contractors' questions, such as those concerning the
length of the contract performance period--considered by contractors
to be too short--and requests for clarification of technical documents
referenced in the original proposal solicitation.[Footnote 22]
* Construction of a power plant in the North Industrial Park: On
September 15, 2011, about 6 weeks later than planned, the mission
awarded a $15 million contract for construction of a power-generating
facility to meet the start-up electrical needs of the North Industrial
Park. Some of the delay was to allow contractors time to respond to
USAID's clarifications and new contract requirements that were the
result of contractor questions, changes to documents in the original
solicitation, and the addition of environmental mitigation
requirements. Some of the delay was also due to time spent by USAID
mission staff focusing on a bid protest of the Port-au-Prince
substation rehabilitation contract.
Some key USAID activities experienced delays in their original
schedule due to technical issues, and other activities do not yet have
a planned award date. These delays are in part related to issues such
as the length of time it takes contractors to submit construction
proposals, difficulties obtaining building sites, and incomplete
environmental assessment documents. In addition, some activities do
not yet have dates set for award of construction contracts because the
scope and location of the infrastructure have yet to be determined.
* North Industrial Park long-term power generation: The mission
delayed its planned award of a construction contract to increase the
power plant's generation capacity from November 2011 to April 2013.
According to a mission official, the dates were revised because the
number of future tenants in the industrial park and their electrical
power requirements are not yet known.[Footnote 23]
* South Industrial Park power generation: As of October 2011, a site
for the South Industrial Park had not been established. Therefore, the
mission has not yet determined the contract award date for this
activity, which will provide power to a new South Industrial Park.
* State University Hospital in Port-au-Prince (HUEH): The mission
delayed by about 5 months its plans to enter into an agreement
[Footnote 24] with the governments of France and Haiti to reconstruct,
repair, and modernize earthquake-damaged buildings on Haiti's State
University Hospital campus.[Footnote 25] The delay is due, in part, to
a USAID-funded environmental assessment of the HUEH which is taking
longer than planned.[Footnote 26] Mission officials expect that the
assessment will be completed near the middle of November 2011, and
estimate that the mission will be able to execute the HUEH agreement
by December 2011.
* Shelter demonstration project: The mission planned to break ground
on a "demonstration" settlement of 200 houses and other residential
infrastructure on January 12, 2011. According to USAID officials, the
mission has faced challenges in obtaining land titles for property on
which to build because the government of Haiti lacks a comprehensive,
functional system for recording land ownership--resulting in only 40
percent of landowners possessing documentation of title to their land
and land records which may be inaccurate--as well as overarching
shelter legislation to guide housing, land-use, and urban planning.
* Development and construction of new residential settlements: The
mission's plan to award contracts to prepare 15,000 housing plots and
build 4,000 housing units has been delayed about 7 to 10 months.
Originally planned for August 2011, the awards of most of these
contracts are now expected to occur between March and June of 2012. It
has taken longer than planned to identify the sites, negotiate
agreements with the Haitian government on the selection of
beneficiaries, and negotiate agreements with nongovernmental
organizations building some of the housing.
Haitian Government Capacity Is a Key Challenge to Sustainability of
U.S. Government Infrastructure Reconstruction Activities:
The sustainability of USAID-funded infrastructure activities depends,
in part, on improvements to Haiti's long-standing economic and
institutional weaknesses, the Haitian government's political will to
implement change, as well as the success of planned capacity-building
activities. Based on data from the UN Office of the Special Envoy for
Haiti, aid from bilateral and multilateral donors represented
approximately 57 percent of the government of Haiti's total revenue in
2009. Following the earthquake, the percentage increased
substantially, to an estimated 80 percent of total government revenue
in 2010.[Footnote 27] Additionally, more than 16,000 civil servants
died in the earthquake and, including those who left the country, the
Haitian government workforce is now reduced by 33 percent, according
to the United Nations Development Program.[Footnote 28] Further,
according to the U.S. government strategy and USAID documents and
officials, electricity laws, the structure of the health care system,
the customs code, and housing and urban development policy, among
other areas, all need reform.
As part of its required planning processes, USAID considered various
sustainability issues for its infrastructure activities.[Footnote 29]
Some activities face sustainability challenges. In planning and
assessing the sustainability of its activities in Haiti, USAID used a
variety of resources. These included relevant provisions in the
Foreign Assistance Act,[Footnote 30] guidance from the agency's
Automated Directives System (ADS),[Footnote 31] the agency's project
design guidance, and studies and assessments by USAID and other donors
such as assessments of Haitian government ministries by the Inter-
American Development Bank. In addition, for infrastructure activities,
the mission relied on general principles for estimating costs,
including projecting operations and maintenance costs and estimating
basic returns on investments.
For four activities, as of September 2011, USAID has also completed
certification required by the Foreign Assistance Act indicating that
Haiti is capable of effectively maintaining and utilizing the
projects. In addition, each AAD contains a section broadly describing
the sustainability issues of the activities planned in each sector.
The following are examples of some of the challenges identified by
USAID and its plans to address those issues.
Energy sector: The power utility, Electricité d'Haiti (EDH), faces
considerable technical and managerial challenges that have resulted in
financial losses. The utility receives an annual subsidy from the
Haitian government of approximately $100 million, which, according to
USAID's energy AAD, represents approximately 12 percent of the
government of Haiti's national budget. To assist the EDH, in April
2011 the mission awarded a 2-year contract to improve EDH management
while long-term modernization options are developed and evaluated. In
addition, USAID plans for the North Industrial Park power generation
facility to be managed independently of EDH through September 2016.
This facility is expected to generate enough revenue to cover
operations and maintenance costs, including the replacement of major
equipment. However, modernization of the energy sector is based, among
other things, on the assumption that the Haitian government will
decide on an appropriate modernization model and take necessary, but
politically challenging steps, to implement that model, according to
the energy AAD.
Health sector: The Haitian government has made efforts to decentralize
the health care system since the 1990s, but only 12 of 63 local health
networks are currently operational.[Footnote 32] To support Haitian
government efforts to decentralize the health care system, USAID is
planning to provide resources, such as repair or construction of
health facilities, to 9 to 12 local health networks in the U.S.
development corridors. USAID is also requiring business plans in this
sector so that USAID will no longer need to contribute to operations
and maintenance of new or renovated health facilities within 3 to 5
years of completion. USAID acknowledges that strengthening the Haitian
Ministry of Health and a decentralized health care system--both of
which would likely enhance sustainability--are complex undertakings
that will require long-term efforts. According to USAID, there are
also shortages of community health workers, low retention of doctors
and nurses who can earn more money in private practice or working for
nongovernmental organizations, and a low skill and knowledge base at
all levels.
Ports sector: According to USAID's draft ports AAD, the Haitian
government does not have a well-defined legal and regulatory framework
for ports, and the three Haitian government entities involved in port
operations have unclear roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 33]
Furthermore, the sector is characterized by excessively high port
charges, unreliably slow port clearance processes, inadequate human
and institutional capacities, and poor integration between
international and regional ports. To assist with port construction in
the Cap-Haïtien development corridor, according to USAID's draft ports
AAD, (1) a public-private partnership[Footnote 34] will be created and
(2) USAID will provide technical assistance to Haitian officials to
help them lower port charges in the northern port and introduce
processes to expedite port clearance and tax collection. However, the
ports sector AAD notes that port construction is a "high-risk" program
whose success depends on, among other things, the political will of
the Haitian government to make improvements in a sector controlled by
a few individuals, tens of millions of dollars in additional funding
from other donors, and sufficient demand for port use.
Shelter sector: Haiti lacks a single agency for housing and urban
development policy resulting in a sector characterized by fragmented
authorities and unenforced policies, according to the shelter sector
AAD. Among other things, Haiti does not have an effective national
land register--known as a cadastre--and system to record land
ownership; a policy framework that establishes and streamlines
building standards and other controls to promote disaster-resistant
housing; and has poor capacity to support the community organizations
needed for shelter infrastructure and service delivery. USAID plans to
provide assistance in areas such as building standards and enforcement
mechanisms; land tenure, land title, and property tax records; and
housing finance and mortgage markets. The shelter AAD notes that
sustainability depends on the ability of the Haitian government to
manage and maintain infrastructure and services over the long term.
Policy change requires the political will and dedication of the
Haitian government, as well as support from other members of the donor
community. Sustainability also depends on economic growth, governance
reform, and the ability of Haitians to pay taxes. If economic
opportunities at the planned new shelter sites in locations outside of
the capital are insufficient, people may return to Port-au-Prince. The
success of USAID plans will depend on new economic opportunities that
would enable municipalities to pay for road maintenance at the new
sites and for housing beneficiaries to pay fees for water services and
basic maintenance, according to U.S. officials.
Our past work on U.S. assistance in developing countries shows that
the U.S. government has previously encountered challenges in ensuring
the sustainability of infrastructure activities. For example,
following the 2001 earthquakes in El Salvador, we reported on
sustainability challenges to USAID-funded shelter and health clinic
construction, including residents who could not afford the cost of
connecting to the potable water and electricity systems in the new
houses.[Footnote 35] In addition, in July 2011, we reported that the
governments of Cape Verde and Honduras faced challenges sustaining
several activities funded through the Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC).[Footnote 36] For example, in Honduras, uncertainty about
government funding for maintenance and other construction activities
may jeopardize the sustainability of some major roads built with MCC
funds.
Conclusion:
The United States is providing over one billion dollars to Haiti for
reconstruction but faces an enormous task in helping the country begin
to recover from the 2010 earthquake. A number of factors have delayed
USAID's planning and implementation of projects to rebuild
infrastructure in the energy, ports, and shelter sectors--areas where
the agency has not previously worked and that require specific skills
or expertise. Haiti has always been a challenging operating
environment, and the earthquake created additional difficulties.
Further, USAID had difficulties securing staff--particularly technical
staff such as contracting officers and engineers--who were willing to
live and work in the country after the earthquake and who could bring
the expertise necessary to plan and execute large, complex
infrastructure projects. Such difficulties have contributed to delays
in U.S. efforts, with only a few contracts awarded to date. Additional
issues, such as difficulties in obtaining land title and the time
needed to conduct environmental assessments, have led to delays in
planning construction activities, and some activities do not yet have
start dates. Further, the Haitian government's long-standing economic
and institutional weaknesses are complicating U.S. efforts and could
affect the future of this assistance, and the political will of the
recently formed Haitian government to implement reforms and undertake
sustainability efforts is unknown. Even though USAID is taking some
steps to address the long-term future of U.S.-funded infrastructure,
it is unclear at this point in time if those projects will ultimately
be sustainable. U.S. activities in Haiti will continue for many years,
and USAID staff can be expected to turn over numerous times. It is
therefore critical that USAID do as much as possible to match the
number of staff with the demands placed on the mission to ensure that
the substantial amount of U.S. funding provided for reconstruction is
used efficiently and within time frames that address the pressing
needs in the country.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To facilitate USAID's progress in planning and implementing its many
post-earthquake infrastructure construction activities in Haiti over
the next several years, particularly those requiring key technical
staff such as contracting officers, engineers, and program
specialists, we recommend that the USAID Administrator ensure that
U.S. direct-hire staff are placed at the mission within time frames
that avoid future staffing gaps or delays.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are
reprinted in appendix III. State did not provide written comments.
USAID agreed with our finding that staffing difficulties were a factor
in delaying USAID infrastructure constructions activities in Haiti. In
addition, USAID described certain actions it is currently taking, such
as providing accelerated one-on-one language training and special
bidding incentives for Haiti, that, if continued, could address our
recommendation.
USAID also emphasized staffing actions that the agency took following
the earthquake to quickly deploy staff temporarily to Haiti. Our
report recognizes these actions and the contributions they made in
helping with the relief and recovery efforts in Haiti. However, we
maintain that such efforts did not include bringing on U.S. direct-
hire staff to fill permanent positions and provide the continuity
needed to manage longer-term reconstruction projects. In particular,
USAID noted that its Civilian Response Corps (CRC), part of an
interagency initiative, was used to provide a surge capability and
quickly deploy staff with specialized knowledge and skills to Haiti.
Our report notes that CRC, whose staff are deployed for an average of
90 days, provides the U.S. government with a first responder effort
and supports the implementation of longer-term reconstruction
activities.
State and USAID both provided technical comments. Those comments,
along with information contained in USAID's written response, were
incorporated into the report where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator. We
will also provide copies to others on request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or any of your staffs have any question about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contribution to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
David Gootnick:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Lindsey Graham:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Kay Granger:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We reviewed the infrastructure-related post-earthquake reconstruction
efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and
the Department of State (State) in Haiti.[Footnote 37] This report
examines, for infrastructure construction activities only, (1) the
amounts of USAID and State obligations and expenditures; (2) USAID's
staffing; (3) USAID's planning; and (4) potential sustainability
challenges USAID faces.
In response to a congressional mandate in the Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 2010 (the Act) that made funds available for GAO
to review U.S. efforts in Haiti, we focused our review on the $918
million in bilateral reconstruction funding provided to USAID and
State in the Act[Footnote 38] as well as other funding provided to
USAID and State in annual fiscal year appropriations that support
reconstruction activities, including infrastructure construction and
rehabilitation, in Haiti. Of the $918 million, $770 million was
provided through the USAID-administered Economic Support Fund (ESF)
account and $148 million through the State-administered International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account. USAID and State
have planned to allocate $356.9 million for infrastructure
construction activities from the funding appropriated in the Act. In
addition, USAID and State supported infrastructure construction
activities with almost $54.8 million from regular fiscal year
appropriations, such as, for example, fiscal year 2010 funding for the
Global Health and Child Survival account. Combined, USAID and State
have allocated almost $412 million from both supplemental and regular
fiscal year appropriations for infrastructure construction activities.
To obtain information on the appropriations, allocations, and planned
uses of U.S. reconstruction funding for Haiti,[Footnote 39] we
reviewed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010, enacted by
Congress in July 2010; the State and USAID FY 2010 Supplemental
Appropriations Spending Plan, issued by State in September 2010; the
interagency Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and
Economic Opportunity, issued by State in January 2011; and
Congressional Research Service reports on Haiti. We also reviewed the
Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti, issued by
the government of Haiti in March 2010. In addition, we reviewed the
Haiti Reconstruction Grant Agreement, signed by the U.S. and Haitian
governments in May 2011. We met in Washington, D.C., and in Port-au-
Prince, Haiti, with officials from USAID and State and other
organizations implementing U.S. government-funded activities. USAID
defines allocation as the identification and setting aside of
resources for a specific program action.
To determine the amounts of funding obligated from USAID's
supplemental ESF funding and State's supplemental INCLE funding, as
well as funding from other sources for infrastructure construction
activities, we analyzed data reported by USAID as of June 30, 2011,
and September 30, 2011, and by State as of September 30, 2011. The
amounts reported to us by USAID and State include both expenditures
and unexpended obligated balances. These data include information on
obligations of supplemental appropriation funding overall, as well as
amounts provided for particular activities.
To assess the reliability of the data on planned allocations,
obligations, and expenditures, we conducted follow-up correspondence
and interviews with cognizant officials from USAID and State both in
Washington, D.C., and in Haiti. We asked them standard data
reliability questions--including questions about the purposes for
which funding data were collected, the use of the data, how the data
were collected and generated, and how the agencies ensured that the
data were complete and accurate--and determined the data to be
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To assess USAID's staffing challenges in Haiti, we reviewed bidding
opportunity notices, staffing pattern analyses produced by the mission
Executive Office, and interviewed relevant officials at the mission in
Haiti and at USAID's headquarters in Washington, D.C.
To determine the status of USAID's planning activities, we reviewed
the agency's policies for planning as outlined in the Automated
Directives System. We also reviewed eight sector-specific Activity
Approval Documents (AADs), six of which had been finalized as of
October 2011, as well as more detailed planning documents for specific
activities with infrastructure components, which we obtained during
our visits to the USAID mission in Haiti. To determine challenges
USAID faces in implementing activities as planned, we reviewed USAID's
and State's requests for proposals, amendments, and award documents
posted at the U.S. government's Web site [hyperlink,
http://www.fedbizopps.gov]. We also reviewed USAID's AADs, award
documents provided by the mission, and USAID's activity procurement
plan. In addition we interviewed relevant officials at the mission's
Office of Acquisition and Assistance and the mission's Infrastructure,
Energy, and Engineering Office to discuss the procurement plan, bid
solicitation process, and activity delays. Due to the small amount of
INCLE funding allocated for infrastructure activities, we did not
review the State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement's planning process.
To describe issues related to the capacity of the Haitian government,
we reviewed U.S. government documents such as the U.S. government
Haiti Strategy and the AADs, and reports from the United Nations
Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti and the United Nations
Development Program. To discuss USAID's planning process for
sustainability and potential sustainability-related challenges, we
interviewed relevant officials both at the mission in Haiti and also
at USAID's headquarters in Washington, D.C., about sustainability and
reviewed agency guidance, documents, and legislation. We also reviewed
prior GAO reports with sections on sustainability challenges
experienced by the U.S. government in other countries.
We traveled to Haiti in April 2011 and August 2011 and met with U.S.
officials from USAID and State, as well as representatives of some of
USAID's international and local implementing partners for
humanitarian, development, and reconstruction programs--including the
Cooperative Housing Foundation and the American Institutes for
Research. We also met with officials from the Interim Haiti Recovery
Commission. We visited sites damaged by the earthquake where USAID and
State have ongoing or planned reconstruction efforts, such as the
State University Hospital, Haitian National Police Academy, and sites
in Port-au-Prince where rubble removal was ongoing. In addition, we
visited sites in the Cap-Haïtien development corridor that USAID has
targeted for reconstruction assistance. While there, we observed and
discussed with USAID officials the preliminary results of U.S.-funded
development programs, including a planned residential settlement site,
a planned port, and various planned agricultural and watershed
management activities.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 to November
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government audit standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our work objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Sector Fact Sheets:
Appendix II provides information on the funding, status of activities,
select challenges, and sustainability plans for the six sectors that
include infrastructure construction activities: energy, ports,
shelter, health, food security, and governance and rule of law.
Energy Sector:
Building and Rehabilitating Electrical Transmission Lines, Generation
Facilities, and Other Infrastructure:
Introduction:
Prior to the January 2010 earthquake, less than 30 percent of Haitians
had access to electricity, and many of those had access to less than
10 hours per day. This situation negatively affected economic growth
because a functioning energy sector and a dependable supply of
electricity are key to creating jobs and supporting a healthy economy
in Haiti. The earthquake compounded the lack of access to electricity
by damaging substations, distribution networks, and other components
of the sector. Currently, the country’s electrical infrastructure
cannot meet the needs of industries, businesses, or residents.
Haiti’s post-earthquake Action Plan for National Recovery and
Development of Haiti (Action Plan) states that its priorities are to
restore damaged power facilities, repair the electricity transmission
and distribution network, and expand access to electricity in regions
outside Port-au-Prince. The U.S. government’s Post-Earthquake USG
Haiti Strategy Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity (Haiti
Strategy) includes a goal to improve and modernize Haiti’s electrical
sector and bring affordable, reliable power to more households and
businesses. USAID plans to target projects that will help make the
supply of electricity more efficient and the power network more viable.
Funding for Infrastructure:
USAID allocated $98.3 million for infrastructure activities in the
energy sector, including an estimated $85.3 million from fiscal year
2010 Economic Support Fund (ESF) supplemental appropriations and $13.0
million from other sources.
Table: Funding of Energy Activities, as of September 30, 2011 (Dollars
in millions):
FY10 ESF Supplemental:
Allocated: $85.3;
Obligated[A]: $28.6;
Expended: $0.3.
Other funding:
Allocated: $13.0;
Obligated[A]: $0.2;
Expended: $0.2.
Total:
Allocated: $98.3;
Obligated[A]: $28.8;
Expended: $0.5.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Other funding includes USAID regular fiscal year 2010 and 2011
funds. Allocations are as of September 14, 2011 (approval date of the
Activity Approval Document for energy) except for the design and
supervision of the rehabilitation of 5 electrical substations in the
Port-au-Prince area, which is as of September 30, 2011.
[A] Obligated funds include both unexpended obligated balances and
expenditures.
[End of table]
Status:
USAID plans to rehabilitate five electrical substations in the Port-au-
Prince area, provide power generation for the North Industrial Park,
and construct other power generation, transmission, and distribution
facilities for residential customers. Most of these activities are
still in the planning phase.
Table: Status of USAID Energy Activities, as of September 30, 2010
(Dollars in millions):
Five electrical substations:
Activity: Design and supervise rehabilitation of 5 electrical
substations in the Port-au-Prince area
Allocation[A]: $0.2;
Obligation: $0.2;
Status:
• Award date: November 8, 2010;
• Contract end date: November 9, 2012.
Activity: Rehabilitate 5 electrical substations in Port-au-Prince area
Allocation[A]: $12.7;
Obligation: $12.7;
Status:
• Award date: July 28, 2011;
• Contract end date: July 27, 2012.
Power generation for the North Industrial Park:
Activity: Architect and engineering services for short-term power
generation
Allocation[A]: $0.8;
Obligation: $0.8;
Status:
• Award date: April 7, 2011;
• Contract end date: April 6, 2012.
Activity: Provide 10 megawatts of power generation for the North
Industrial Park’s start-up electrical needs
Allocation[A]: $19.8;
Obligation: $15.0;
Status:
Award date: September 15, 2011;
Contract end date: September 14, 2012.
Activity: Install electrical power distribution system to residential
customers in the north;
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: December 2011
Estimated end date: January 2014
Activity: Provide an additional 15 to 30 megawatts of power generation
for industrial, commercial, and residential uses
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: April 30, 2013
Estimated end date: April 1, 2014
Activity: Feasibility study to assess the ability to design and
install renewable energy power generation
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: $0;
Status:
• Estimated award date: To be determined
• Estimated end date: To be determined
Activity: Design and installation of energy solutions for South
Industrial Park
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: To be determined
Estimated end date: To be determined
Activity: Total;
Allocation[A]: $98.3;
Obligation: $28.8.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Only energy infrastructure construction activities (including
feasibility and design studies) funded with USAID fiscal year 2010
supplemental funds and fiscal years 2010 and 2011 regular funds are
included in this table. Amounts may not add to total due to rounding.
Allocations are as of September 14, 2011 (approval date of the
Activity Approval Document for energy) except for the design and
supervision of the rehabilitation of 5 electrical substations in the
Port-au-Prince area, which is as of September 30, 2011.
[A] Sustainability Plans For activities where an award has not been
made, USAID planning documents include a "procurement sensitive" cost
estimate which is not shown but is included in the table total.
[End of table]
Selected Challenges:
* Haitian government capacity: The electricity sector in Haiti, which
is largely government owned, is characterized by dramatic power
shortages and very low coverage of electricity—with only about 12.5
percent of the population having legal regular access to electricity.
According to State, the government of Haiti’s public electricity
utility suffers from inefficiencies, is poorly maintained due to lack
of resources, and relies heavily on subsidies and donor funding.
* Completing energy activities as initially scheduled: USAID awarded a
contract to construct a power plant for the new North Industrial Park
on September 15, 2011, about 6 weeks later than planned; however,
according to a USAID official the delay will not affect the opening of
the park, because site work being completed by others has already
delayed the opening.
USAID awarded a contract to rehabilitate five electrical substations
in July 2011. However, the award was protested and a “stop work” order
was issued. As of November 15, 2011, work had not started.
USAID has delayed its initial award of a contract for the expansion of
the North Industrial Park power generation facility from November 2011
until April 2013 to better determine the demand for power at the
location and the most efficient means to provide electricity when it
is needed.
Sustainability Plans:
To enhance overall sustainability, USAID awarded a $10.9 million, 2-
year contract in April 2011 to help the Haiti electrical utility
manage electricity loss reduction. USAID plans to award a 3-year
management contract in early 2012 to support the operation of the
North Industrial Park and other utility operations in northern Haiti.
However, USAID planning documents state that the sustainability of the
electrical system as a whole, and particularly after the loss
reduction management contract ends, depends on, among other things,
the achievement of important legal and regulatory reforms to improve
the commercial viability of the system and provide necessary resources
for proper operations and maintenance of the electrical
infrastructure. USAID also acknowledged that the government of Haiti
must take necessary but politically challenging steps to do so.
Figure: Damaged Transformer at an Electrical Power Plant in the Port-
au-Prince Corridor:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Trade Development Agency, 2010.
[End of figure]
[End of fact sheet]
Ports Sector:
Designing and Building a New Port:
Introduction:
As an island nation with depleted natural resources, ports are crucial
to Haiti’s economic viability and growth. However, for many years
prior to the January 2010 earthquake, Haiti’s major international port
in Port-au-Prince had deteriorated and lacked the capability to meet
the country’s cargo and shipping needs. The earthquake caused
significant damage to the Port-au-Prince port, further reducing its
capabilities.
Haiti’s post-earthquake Action Plan states that, as part of its
overall effort to deconcentrate economic activities in Port-au-Prince,
new deep water ports, including a new large-capacity port and harbor
facility, need to be constructed in Haiti’s northern region. The U.S.
government’s Haiti Strategy states that the United States is
considering investing in the design and development of a major port on
the northern coast.
Funding for Infrastructure:
USAID allocated $77.7 million in fiscal year 2010 ESF supplemental
appropriations to infrastructure activities in the ports sector.
Table: Funding of Port Activities, as of September 30, 2011 (Dollars
in millions):
FY10 ESF Supplemental:
Allocated: $77.7;
Obligated[A]: $2.8;
Expended: $0.
Other funding:
Allocated: $0;
Obligated[A]: $0;
Expended: $0.
Total:
Allocated: $98.3;
Obligated[A]: $28.8;
Expended: $0.5.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: No other funding such as USAID fiscal year 2010 or 2011 regular
funding is currently planned for ports activities.
[A] Obligated funds include both unexpended obligated balances and
expenditures.
[End of table]
Status:
USAID is conducting a feasibility study and, depending on the results
of the study, plans to construct a new port in the Cap-Haïtien
development corridor. In addition, USAID plans smaller port
rehabilitation and construction in other areas. During our review, we
visited an existing port facility in Cap-Haïtien and a potential site
in Fort-Liberte. The new port would be less than 20 miles from the
site of the North Industrial Park—a post-earthquake public-private
project scheduled to begin operation in April 2012.
Status of USAID Port Activities, as of September 30, 2011 (Dollars in
millions):
New port in northern Haiti:
Activity: Feasibility study for the design of a new port;
Allocation[A]: $2.5;
Obligation: $2.8;
Status:
Award date: September 22, 2011;
Contract end date: May 31, 2012.
Activity: Construction of a new port;
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: 0;
Status:
Estimated award date: To be determined;
Estimated end date: To be determined.
Activity: Design and oversight of a new port and the Cap-Haïtien port;
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: 0;
Status:
Estimated award date: To be determined;
Estimated end date: To be determined.
Activity: Rehabilitation of the Cap-Haïtien port;
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: 0;
Status:
Estimated award date: To be determined;
Estimated end date: To be determined.
Activity: Contribution to port construction in the Port-au-Prince
metropolitan area;
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: 0;
Status:
Estimated award date: To be determined;
Estimated end date: To be determined.
Activity: Grant to Haiti (Council for the Modernization of State-Owned
Enterprises) for port construction;
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: 0;
Status:
Estimated award date: To be determined;
Estimated end date: To be determined.
Activity: Total;
Allocation[A]: $77.7;
Obligation: $2.8.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Only infrastructure port construction activities (including
feasibility and design studies) funded with USAID fiscal year 2010
supplemental funds are included in this table. Allocations are as of
August 1, 2011 (date of the draft Activity Approval Document for
ports).
[A] For activities where an award has not been made, USAID planning
documents include a "procurement sensitive" cost estimate which is not
shown but is included in the table total.
[End of table]
Selected Challenges:
* Lack of staff with relevant technical expertise: USAID’s program in
Haiti has not previously involved port construction activities. With
no staff who have port construction expertise or experience, USAID
will rely on (1) a private firm to conduct a feasibility study and
make recommendations regarding, among other things, port design,
economic feasibility, and financial viability; and (2) a public
private partnership to construct a new port.
* Potential funding shortfall: USAID’s current estimated cost of
constructing the northern port is $105 million: Since USAID has
allocated only about $68 million, the remaining $37 million must be
obtained from other sources. According to USAID officials, the
northern port feasibility study includes an analysis of financing
options under a public-private partnership to provide the additional
required funding.
* Delayed port feasibility study: The northern port feasibility study,
originally planned to be awarded in June 2011, was awarded in
September 2011. The study is expected to take approximately 8 months
to complete.
Sustainability Plans:
According to USAID’s current plans, the new port is to be constructed
by a public-private partnership and operated by private firms when
completed. These plans assume that the government of Haiti,
particularly Haitian port officials, will efficiently collect import
duties and that sufficient port revenues will be generated to fund
recurring costs for port maintenance.
When completed, the economic viability of the port will depend on the
amount of income generated. According to USAID officials, the income
is projected to be derived from two broad sources, the growth in cargo
generated by business activity related to the planned North Industrial
Park and the increased cargo diverted from other ports to the new port
as the result of it being a modern well managed port. In addition,
they stated only one manufacturing firm is currently committed to
operating in the North Industrial Park, however discussions are
underway with other possible tenants. The economic viability of the
port is one of the issues being addressed in the feasibility study.
Figure: Wharf at an Existing Port in Cap-Haïtien:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO (august 2011).
[End of figure]
[End of fact sheet]
Shelter Sector:
Developing and Building New Residential Settlements:
Selected Challenges:
* Land tenure: According to USAID, Haiti lacks a comprehensive,
functional system for recording land ownership as well as an effective
national cadastre. Prior to the earthquake, customary arrangements and
knowledge characterized land tenure with only 40 percent of landowners
possessing documentation such as a legal title or transaction receipt.
Furthermore, a large proportion of displaced persons were renting
property prior to the earthquake—with the plots of land on which they
lived often informally settled and haphazardly delineated—and many
will have difficulty proving clear, legal tenancy due to document
discrepancies or lack of documents.
* Haitian government capacity: The government of Haiti's limited
legislative, regulatory, and institutional capacity to manage urban
development severely constrains the establishment of a viable shelter
sector. According to USAID, the absence of a single national entity
responsible for overseeing the shelter provision process is the most
important limitation. Currently, the entities involved in managing
different aspects of shelter include the Ministries of Economy and
Finance, Public Works, Planning, Interior and Social Affairs, as well
as the Central Bank and the inter-ministerial Committee for Land Use.
Funding for Infrastructure:
USAID allocated $55.1 million in fiscal year 2010 ESF supplemental
appropriations and other funding for the development and construction
of new residential settlements.
Table: Funding of Shelter Activities, as of September 30, 2011
(Dollars in millions):
FY10 ESF Supplemental:
Allocated: $5.1;
Obligated[A]: $9.6;
Expended: $0.4.
Other[B]:
Allocated: $1.6;
Obligated[A]: $0.6;
Expended: $0.6.
Total:
Allocated: $56.7;
Obligated[A]: $10.1;
Expended: $0.9.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Amounts may not add to total due to rounding.
[A] Obligated funds include both unexpended obligated balances and
expenditures.
[B] Other funding includes regular fiscal year appropriations.
Status:
USAID is planning to develop new residential settlements in the Port-
au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien development corridors that will provide
approximately 15,000 households with plots of land, permanent housing,
and access to essential services. USAID will manage construction of
4,000 houses. Nongovernmental organizations will manage construction
of 11,000 houses using a combination of USAID and other funding.
Table: Status of USAID Shelter Activities, as of September 30, 2011
(Dollars in millions):
Shelter demonstration project near Port-au-Prince:
Activity: Construction of 200 houses for internally displaced persons
in the Croix-des-Bouquets municipality;
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: December 2011;
Estimated end date: August 2012.
Up to 8 new settlements in the Cap-Haïtien development corridor
Activity: Development of 5,000 plots for 25,000-30,000 people and
construction of 2,500 core houses by USAID in up to 5 municipalities
Allocation[A]: $23.6;
Obligation: $9.8;
Status:
Award date: June 17, 2011[B];
Estimated end date: June 15, 2013.
Up to 12 new settlements in the Port-au-Prince development corridor:
Activity: Development of 10,000 plots for 50,000-60,000 people and
construction of 1,500 core houses by USAID in the Croix-des-Bouquets
and Cabaret municipalities;
Allocation[A]: $29.6;
Obligation: $0.3;
Status:
Award date: May 26, 2010[C];
Estimated end date: September 15, 2013.
Activity: Total;
Allocation[A]: $56.7;
Obligation: $10.1.
Note: Only shelter infrastructure construction activities (including
design studies) funded with USAID fiscal year 2010 supplemental funds
and fiscal year 2010 regular funds are included in this table. Amounts
may not add to total due to rounding.
[A] For activities where an award has not been made, USAID planning
documents include a “procurement sensitive” cost estimate which is not
shown but is included in this table total.
[B] Award date for engineering and design and environmental
assessment, additional contracts will be awarded for remaining site
development.
[C] Award date for engineering and design, additional contracts will
be awarded for remaining site development.
[End of table]
Sustainability Plans:
According to USAID’s plans, site locations are being selected in areas
where residents have access to jobs and/or transportation. USAID is
planning to fund technical assistance programs to improve the capacity
of the national government to improve urban management, and will seek
possible solutions to policy challenges such as the absence of
legislation to guide housing, land-use, and urban planning; lack of an
independent regulatory body for the construction sector; and lack of
institutional capacity in urban planning. At the local level, USAID
plans to provide technical assistance to municipalities in areas such
as land use planning, building standards, and enforcement mechanisms;
and to establish community management committees to guide community
development.
USAID recognizes that the sustainability of the new settlements
depends on the ability of Haitians to pay taxes and the ability of the
Haitian government to manage and maintain infrastructure and services
over the long term. This, in turn, depends on whether the Haitian
economy can provide adequate job opportunities and whether the Haitian
government can effectively govern.
Figure: Neighborhood in Port-au-Prince:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
[End of figure]
[End of fact sheet]
Health Sector:
Building and Rehabilitating Health Facilities:
Introduction:
Prior to the January 2010 earthquake, a significant portion of the
Haitian population had no access to basic health services. Currently,
only 12 of the 63 health networks created by the Haitian government in
the 1990s are operational.
The earthquake destroyed infrastructure such as hospitals, clinics,
medical schools, and Ministry of Health buildings. For example, the
State University Hospital (HUEH) was damaged during the earthquake and
services such as surgery, and pre-and post-operation work are still
being performed in temporary buildings. The earthquake also destroyed
90 percent of the State Faculty of Medicine.
Haiti’s post-earthquake Action Plan emphasizes rebuilding hospitals
and training facilities in the earthquake-affected regions and
construction of new hospitals in the department capitals. The U.S.
government’s Haiti Strategy includes a 5-year goal to rebuild and
reform management of public health infrastructure, including
earthquake-damaged structures and clinics, dispensaries, and hospitals
in 9 to 12 health networks. The Haiti Strategy also specifies that the
State University Hospital will be rebuilt and fully operational in 5
years and have clearly defined responsibility for maintenance and
operational costs.
Funding for Infrastructure:
USAID allocated $90.5 million for construction in the health sector,
of which $50.5 million is allocated from the fiscal year 2010 ESF
supplemental appropriations. An additional $40.0 million in funding
from other accounts is allocated for work on the HUEH and the National
Campus for Health Sciences.
Table: Funding of Health Activities, as of September 30, 2011 (Dollars
in millions):
FY10 ESF Supplemental:
Allocated: $50.5;
Obligated[A]: $0.4;
Expended: $0.
Other[B]:
Allocated: $40.0;
Obligated[A]: $0;
Expended: $0.
Total:
Allocated: $90.5;
Obligated[A]: $0.4;
Expended: $0.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Allocations are as of March 2011 (finalized Activity Approval
Document for health) and July 2011 (USAID procurement plan);
obligations and expenditures are as of July 2011 (the most recent data
provided by USAID).
[A] Obligated funds include both unexpended obligated balances and
expenditures.
[B] Other funding is from the fiscal year 2010 base Global Health and
Child Survival—State appropriation.
[End of table]
Status:
USAID is planning five construction activities in the health sector.
Although these activities are still in the planning stages, USAID
began needs assessments of health facilities in the Port-au-Prince,
Cap-Haitien, and Saint-Marc corridors and an environmental assessment
of the HUEH campus. The HUEH reconstruction is a joint activity
between the U.S., French, and Haitian governments. The three
governments signed a memorandum of understanding in September 2010.
Table: Status of USAID Health Activities, as of September 30, 2011
(Dollars in millions):
State University Hospital in Port-au-Prince (HUEH)— U.S. portion:
Activity: Environmental assessment of the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of the hospital
Activity: Rehabilitation and reconstruction of HUEH facilities
Allocation[A]: $0.4
Obligation: $0.4;
Status:
Environmental assessment contract award date: July 12, 2011;
Environmental assessment estimated end date: October 28, 2011;
Construction estimated award date: November/December 2011;
Construction estimated end date: June 30, 2013.
Health facilities in St. Michel de L’Attalaye:
Activity: Construction of a new community reference hospital and
dispensary
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: November 1, 2011;
Estimated end date: October 31, 2013.
Health facilities: Cap-Haitien and Saint-Marc development corridors
Activity: Construction and expansion of dispensaries, refurbishment
and upgrading of hospitals
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: March 12, 2012;
Estimated end date: April 30, 2015.
National Campus for Health Sciences in Port-au-Prince:
Activity: Reconstruction of State Faculty of Medicine buildings
destroyed in the earthquake;
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: April 1, 2012;
Estimated end date: March 31, 2014.
Facilities for persons with disabilities
Activity: Construction and equipment of facilities for the disable
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: To be determined;
Estimated end date: May 30, 2014.
Activity: Total;
Allocation[A]: $90.5
Obligation: $0.4
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Only health infrastructure construction activities funded with
USAID fiscal year 2010 supplemental funds and fiscal year 2010 base
Global Health and Child Survival—State appropriations are included in
this table. Allocations are as of March 2011 (finalized Activity
Approval Document for health) and July 2011 (USAID procurement plan);
obligations and expenditures are as of July 2011 (the most recent
available from USAID).
[A] For activities where an award has not been made, USAID planning
documents include a "procurement sensitive" cost estimate which is not
shown but is included in the table total.
[End of table]
Sustainability Plans:
USAID plans to make infrastructure investments only where there is a
business plan agreed to with the Haitian Ministry of Health in which
the USAID portion of operations and maintenance costs is reduced to
zero at the end of 3 to 5 years. USAID’s plans state that U.S.
investments in infrastructure will likely include some support for
post-construction operation and maintenance costs.
Figure: Earthquake-damaged Building at the HUEH:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
[End of figure]
[End of fact sheet]
Food Security Sector:
Building and Rehabilitating Irrigation Canals and Farm-to-Market Roads:
Introduction:
Before the earthquake, Haiti already had one of the heaviest burdens
of hunger and malnutrition in the Western Hemisphere: 40 percent of
households were undernourished (3.8 million people) and 30 percent of
children suffered from chronic malnutrition, according to the U.S.
government’s Haiti Strategy. To address this need, USAID had several
food security activities under way in Haiti.
Agriculture generates nearly 25 percent of Haiti’s gross domestic
product, employs approximately 65 percent of the population, and
serves as the primary source of income in rural areas. However, the
earthquake exacerbated the already significant challenges in the
agricultural sector by damaging distribution centers, food processing
facilities, warehouses, irrigation canals, and the Ministry of
Agriculture’s Natural Resources and Rural Development headquarters.
Haiti’s post-earthquake Action Plan includes five agriculture-related
programs, including building irrigation networks and rural roads to
open up agricultural areas. Aligned with the Haitian government’s
priorities, the U.S. government’s Haiti Strategy includes a goal of
agriculture sector growth in the U.S. development corridors through
improvements in (1) core infrastructure and management, such as
rebuilding canals; (2) on-farm productivity, such as use of
commercially produced seeds; and (3) post-harvest and market access
support, such as farm-to-market roads.
Funding for Infrastructure:
USAID allocated $42.6 million for activities with a construction
component in the food security sector.
Table: Funding of Food Security Activities, as of September 30, 2011
(Dollars in millions):
FY10 ESF Supplemental:
Allocated: $42.6;
Obligated[A]: $0.5;
Expended: $0.
Other[B]:
Allocated: $0;
Obligated[A]: $0;
Expended: $0.
Total:
Allocated: $42.6;
Obligated[A]: $0.5;
Expended: $0.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Planned allocation, obligated, and expended amounts for
infrastructure and construction components only. Allocations are as of
October 2011 data provided by USAID; obligations and expenditures are
as of June 30, 2011 (the most recent provided by USAID).
[A] Obligated funds include both unexpended balances and expenditures.
[B] Other funding is regular fiscal year appropriations. USAID plans
to provide $55.5 million during fiscal years 2011 through 2014 for
these food security activities; however, we did not include this
amount because USAID did not provide the funding data by fiscal year.
[End of table]
Status:
USAID plans two new activities with construction components. USAID has
additional activities with construction projects in the food and
economic security sectors that began implementation before the
earthquake. [Footnote 40] However, one of these activities, the
Watershed Initiative for Natural Environmental Resources (WINNER),
received fiscal year 2010 supplemental funding.
Table: Status of USAID Food Security Activities, as of September 30,
2011 (Dollars in millions):
Watershed Initiative for Natural Environmental Resources (WINNER):
Activity: Erosion prevention, irrigation restoration, and rebuilding
and repair of transportation infrastructure.
Allocation[A]: $13.7;
Obligation: $0.5;
Status:
Award date: June 1, 2009[B];
Contract end date: May 31, 2014.
Production Plus:
Activity: Erosion prevention, irrigation construction and repair, and
farm-to-market road construction and maintenance.
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: March 31, 2012;
Estimated end date: March 31, 2015.
Activity: Rural Transportation Infrastructure
Allocation[A]: [Empty];
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award: To be determined;
Estimated end date: To be determined.
Activity: Total;
Allocation[A]: $42.6;
Obligation: $0.5.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Only infrastructure and construction activities funded with
USAID fiscal year 2010 supplemental funds appropriations are included
in this table. USAID plans to provide $55.5 million during fiscal
years 2011 through 2014 for these food security activities; however,
we did not include this amount because USAID did not provide the
funding data by fiscal year. WINNER and Production Plus included
technical assistance activities that are not included in this table.
Allocations are as of October 2011 data provided by USAID; obligations
and expenditures are as of June 30, 2011 (the most recent available
from USAID). Funding amounts may not add to total due to rounding.
[A] For activities where an award has not been made, USAID planning
documents include a "procurement sensitive" cost estimate which is not
shown but is included in the table total.
[B] WINNER was awarded pre-earthquake, but received fiscal year 2010
supplemental funding; amounts are being obligated incrementally.
[End of table]
Sustainability Plans:
USAID’s plans state that the U.S. government and other donors
regularly meet with the Haitian government and private sector to
discuss progress and reforms needed to accelerate agriculture
investments in Haiti. In addition, the Haitian government has
demonstrated commitment and leadership in agriculture, food security,
and economic security program planning and coordination, according to
USAID’s planning document.
Figure: Soil Conservation Project in Bassin Zim (Central Plateau);
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
[End of figure]
[End of fact sheet]
Governance and Rule of Law Sector:
Building and Rehabilitating Correctional, Police, and Counternarcotics
Facilities:
Introduction:
Prior to the January 2010 earthquake, much of Haiti’s justice
infrastructure, including police stations, police training facilities,
and prisons, were in need of repair. Many facilities were too small to
meet the needs of Haitian law enforcement and corrections systems. The
earthquake caused additional destruction and damage, increasing the
need to rebuild many facilities.
Haiti’s post-earthquake Action Plan states the need to rebuild
correctional facilities, build and expand police stations, and
complete construction of the National Police Academy. The Department
of State (State) received fiscal year 2010 supplemental funding in the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account to
meet these reconstruction needs in Haiti. In the U.S. government’s
Haiti Strategy, State presents plans to use some INCLE funds for post-
earthquake infrastructure rehabilitation and construction activities
in the democracy and governance sector, to be managed by State’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (State/INL).
Funding for Infrastructure:
State allocated $45.7 million in fiscal year 2010 INCLE supplemental
funds for governance and rule of law construction activities.
Table: Funding of Governance and Rule of Law Activities, as of
September 30, 2011 (Dollars in millions):
FY10 ESF Supplemental:
Allocated: $45.7;
Obligated[A]: $5.6;
Expended: $1.7.
Other:
Allocated: $0.2;
Obligated[A]: $0.2;
Expended: $0.
Total:
Allocated: $45.9;
Obligated[A]: $5.8;
Expended: $1.7.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Other funding is prior fiscal year appropriations. Allocations,
obligations and expenditures are as of September 2011.
[A] Obligated funds include both unexpended obligated balances and
expenditures.
[End of table]
Status:
State is planning several construction activities in the governance and
rule of law sector. Some activities are under way and others are still
being planned.
Table: Status of State’s Governance and Rule of Law Activities, as of
September 30, 2011 (Dollars in millions):
Correctional facilities:
Allocation: $25.5.
Activity: Construction advisors;
Allocation: $0.3;
Obligation: $0.3;
Status:
Award date: Unknown;
Estimated end date: Unknown.
Activity: Rebuild of Carrefour men’s and Petionville women’s prisons;
Allocation: $1.4;
Obligation: $0.2;
Status:
Award date: Unknown;
Estimated end date: Unknown.
Activity: Construct a new women’s prison in Ganthier;
Allocation: TBD;
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: Unknown.
Activity: Repair the National Penitentiary;
Allocation: $0.2;
Obligation: $0.2;
Status:
Award date: Unknown;
Estimated end date: Unknown.
Activity: Expand inmate capacity;
Allocation: TBD;
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: Unknown.
Police facilities:
Allocation: $8.7.
Activity: Rehabilitate facilities at the Haitian National
Police Academy;
Allocation: $5.0;
Obligation: $5.0;
Status:
Award date: Unknown;
Estimated end date: Unknown.
Activity: Rehabilitate and construct police stations
and barracks;
Allocation: TBD;
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: Unknown.
Activity: Police station repair;
Allocation: $0.2;
Obligation: $0.2;
Status:
Award date: Unknown;
Estimated end date: Unknown.
Counternarcotics facilities:
Allocation: $11.7.
Activity: Renovate and construct counternarcotics outposts;
Allocation: $6.7
Obligation: 0;
Status:
Estimated award date: Unknown;
Estimated end date: Unknown.
Activity: Refurbish a maritime base;
Allocation: $5.0;
Obligation: $0;
Status:
Estimated award date: Unknown;
Estimated end date: Unknown.
Activity: Total;
Allocation: $45.9;
Obligation: $5.8.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: State provided funding data; State did not provide estimated
award dates, award dates, estimated end dates, and end dates. Only
infrastructure construction activities funded with State/INL fiscal
year 2010 supplemental funds and prior year funds are included in this
table. Amounts may not add to total due to rounding. Allocations,
obligations, and expenditures are as of September 2011.
[End of table]
Sustainability Plans:
In the January 2011 5-year Haiti Strategy, State includes plans to
provide training programs, introduce needed procurement and maintenance
systems, and establish an independent Haitian Directorate of Prisons
in an effort to achieve sustainability. However, State acknowledges
that investments in construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure
will require some degree of U.S. commitment to support operations and
maintenance costs “in the out years.”
Figure: State-Funded Rehabilitation of a Pavilion at the Haitian
National Police Academy:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
[End of figure]
[End of fact sheet]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
From The American People:
November 10, 2011:
David Gootnick:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Gootnick:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International
Development's formal response to the GAO draft report entitled "Haiti
Reconstruction: Factors Contributing to Delays in USAID Infrastructure
Construction" (GAO-12-68).
The enclosed USAID comments are provided for incorporation as an
appendix to the final report.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit
review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sean Carroll:
Chief Operating Officer:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
Enclosure: a/s:
[End of letter]
USAID's Comments On Gao Draft Report No. GAO-12-68:
Thank you for GAO's comprehensive review of the factors contributing
to delay in infrastructure construction. The report rightly identified
factors beyond the USAID Mission's control, such as institutional
weaknesses among host country counterparts, especially as 17% of
Government of Haiti (GOH) employees died from the earthquake and
almost all government buildings were rendered unusable by the quake.
The GAO also correctly cited the difficulties encountered by USAID and
other donors vis-a-vis availability of land to move persons displaced
by the quake as key factors to the delays. Such recognition of the
extremely challenging context within which USAID operates is greatly
appreciated.
We also appreciate the recommendation offered by the GAO. USAID
acknowledges that staffing difficulties were a factor in delaying
USAID infrastructure construction activities in Haiti and subsequently
has taken many steps to overcome staffing gaps and delays. USAID would
also like to point out, however, that in the aftermath of the
earthquake, USAID did rapidly deploy certain direct hire staffing
resources — in particular, the USAID Civilian Response Corps.
Recommendation 1: To facilitate USAID's progress in planning and
implementing its many post-earthquake infrastructure construction
activities in Haiti over the next several years, particularly those
requiring key technical staff such as contracting officers, engineers,
and program specialists, we recommend that the USAID Administrator
ensure that U.S. direct-hire staff are placed at the mission within
time frames that avoid staffing gaps or delays.
Management Comments:
Draw on the capabilities of the USAID Civilian Response Corps:
USAID has an expedited process for placing direct-hire staff to work
on reconstruction efforts in an urgent post-disaster or post-crisis
situation such as Haiti. Specifically, USAID has in place the Civilian
Response Corps, which is part of an interagency initiative to provide
a civilian direct-hire "surge" capability for reconstruction and
stabilization assistance overseas. It is made up of both "active," or
full time, members and "standby" members who are regular USAID staff
available to be called up in the event of a crisis. Corps members are
specially trained in conflict and crisis response and have expertise
in all skill sets needed for reconstruction and stabilization
activities, ranging from democracy specialists, to engineers, to
experts in foreign assistance programming, to urban planning
specialists.
Within three days of the earthquake, USAID had mobilized and deployed
the Corps both to fill in staffing gaps created by departure of
Mission Foreign Service staff and to handle other needs that arose in
the aftermath of the earthquake. While the Corps could not satisfy all
staffing needs, in total, USAID ended up deploying 29 USAID Corps
members to Haiti to assist in the response and staff the Office of the
Response Coordinator. Since that time and looking forward, the Corps
continues to provide ongoing direct-hire support to the Haiti Mission.
Expedite the placement of non-Foreign Service staff in the Haiti
Mission:
The USAID Haiti Mission used different mechanisms available in order
to expedite the placement of staff— not only U.S. Foreign Service
staff formally posted to the Mission, but a cadre of TDY staff from
Washington and other missions, U.S. and third country national
personal service contractors (PSCs), Civilian Response Corps staff and
funding (from which two PSCs were hired), as well as individuals hired
through a manpower contract. While waiting for U.S. direct-hire
officers to arrive, PSC and manpower contract staff members —including
three seasoned program officers with a combined USAID experience of
approximately 80 years — were hired to provide coverage throughout the
Mission.
Expedite posting of Foreign Service staff in the Haiti Mission:
To ensure that direct-hire positions in Haiti were all filled, the
Agency designated Haiti as a Priority Post for assignment purposes and
provided a special incentive to officers who completed a two year
assignment. To expedite arrival to Post, the Agency also is providing
accelerated, one-on-one language training,. The Mission has been able
to fill almost all U.S. direct-hire positions, with 88% of total
anticipated U.S. direct-hire staff in place as of October 27, 2011,
and expects to fully reach its anticipated level of 36 by February
2012.
Increase the number of direct-hire Foreign Service staff in the Agency:
The report correctly notes that "during the next four years, U.S.
direct-hire staff will have opportunities to bid for other positions
at other posts. As U.S. direct-hire staff leave Haiti, the mission
will need to replace them in order to continue the progress of
infrastructure construction activities."
Replacing direct-hire Foreign Service staff when they depart Haiti
will depend on having adequate numbers of qualified staff to assign to
these positions. Recognizing this need to build a strong workforce for
the Agency as a whole, USAID already has taken several steps to
increase the number of Foreign Service staff. Most notably, in 2008,
the Agency embarked on the Development Leadership Initiative (DLI)
with the goal of doubling the size of the Foreign Service. So far,
over 800 new Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) have been brought on
board across all skill areas, with a particular emphasis on program
specialists and contracting officers. For instance, at the time of the
earthquake in Haiti, the Agency had only two FS Engineers; since then,
the Agency has brought on 22 new Engineers.
The DLI program will continue until 2012. We believe its success at
attracting, training, and deploying staff with requisite skills will
enable USAID Haiti to fill positions of departing staff on a timely
basis.
Final Action Target Date:
* Draw on the capabilities of the USAID Civilian Response Corps: USAID's
Civilian Response Corps will continue to provide direct-hire support
for the reconstruction effort as needed to fill gaps or otherwise
support the effort in Haiti.
* Expedite the placement of non-Foreign Service staff in the Haiti
Mission: USAID will continue to utilize mechanisms to supplement
Foreign Service staff, as required.
* Expedite posting of Foreign Service staff in the Haiti Mission:
USAID expects to continue accelerated, one-on-one language training
and special bidding incentives for Haiti to ensure timely replacement
of departing staff.
* Increase the number of direct-hire Foreign Service staff in the
Agency: The DLI program is ongoing, with a target to hire a total of
1200 new FSOs by the end of 2012. This increase in Foreign Service
officers will provide an adequate depth of staff with requisite skills
within the Agency so that future Haiti staffing needs can be met in a
timely manner.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Leslie Holen (Assistant
Director), Michael Armes (Assistant Director), Sada Aksartova, Lynn
Cothern, Rachel Girshick, Leslie Locke, and George Taylor made key
contributions to this report. Ashley Alley, Douglas Cole, Martin De
Alteriis, Cheron Green, Courtney Lafountain, Jeremy Sebest, and Jena
Sinkfield provided technical assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, title
I, ch. 10, 124 Stat. 2302, 2320 (July 29, 2010).
[2] As agreed with USAID and State, for this report we used USAID's
definition of infrastructure as the stock of fixed capital equipment
in a country, including factories, roads, schools, etc. Construction
includes reconstruction, renovation, and remodeling along with new
construction. We did not include disaster response programs of a short-
term nature and programs by the Offices of Food for Peace and
Transition Initiatives, which may include longer-term infrastructure-
related components.
[3] The law directed that funds previously available to GAO pursuant
to Title I, Chapter 4 of Pub.L. No. 106-31 (to monitor provision of
assistance to address the effects of hurricanes in Central America and
the Caribbean) also be available to GAO to monitor post-earthquake
expenses related to Haiti, including relief, rehabilitation, and
reconstruction aid.
[4] GAO, Haiti Reconstruction: U.S. Efforts have Begun, Expanded
Oversight Still to Be Implemented, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-415] (Washington, D.C.: May 19,
2011).
[5] Of the $918 million, USAID and State are directly administering
$796 million in bilateral reconstruction assistance funding from the
Act, excluding $120 million in ESF funding provided to the
multilateral Haiti Reconstruction Fund and $2 million provided to the
Smithsonian Institution for a bilateral cultural preservation project.
[6] For more detailed information on the funding provided to assist
Haiti in the Fiscal Year 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act, as well
as expanded oversight actions for the increased level of funding, see
GAO-11-415.
[7] The strategy further notes that, before the earthquake, migration
toward Port-au-Prince had concentrated Haiti's social and economic
problems; over the last 10 years, poverty declined by more than 8
percent across Haiti while increasing by 13 percent in Port-au-Prince.
[8] The strategy refers to these eight sectors as "priorities," but we
are using the more common term "sector."
[9] USAID defines an allocation as the identification and setting
aside of resources for a specific program action.
[10] An obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal
liability of the U.S. government for the payment of goods and services
ordered or received (see GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal
Budget Process, GAO-05-734SP (Washington, D.C.: September 2005)). This
report defines obligations as the total amount of orders placed,
contracts awarded, services received, and similar transactions during
a given period that will require payments during the same or future
period. USAID labels these actions subobligations. Consistent with 31
U.S.C. § 1501, which defines when an agency can record an obligation,
USAID generally treats as an obligation the bilateral agreements it
makes with other countries to deliver assistance.
[11] In addition to the funding and activities described in this
report, the USAID mission in Haiti (mission) has 11 activities that
began before the earthquake--at an estimated cost, for infrastructure
and construction components, of about $172 million--that include
planning, design, and construction of infrastructure activities.
[12] For U.S. direct-hire staff, we used the workforce definition
developed by USAID's 1990 Workforce Planning Working Group: U.S.
citizen direct-hire foreign service staff, most of whom serve at
overseas missions. U.S. direct-hire staff do not include U.S. personal
services contractors (PSC) and other staff such as Haitian and third-
country nationals. At the time of the earthquake, 17 of the mission's
20 authorized U.S. direct-hire positions were filled.
[13] USAID considers these countries, as designated by the USAID
Administrator, to be its most challenging assignments.
[14] Per National Security Decision Directive 38 (NSDD-38), the Chief
of Mission (the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti) must approve any U.S.
department or agency request to increase the number of staff posted in
country.
[15] USAID requires contracting officers to be U.S. citizen direct-
hire employees of the U.S. government (see 48 CFR 701.603-70). The
authority of overseas heads of contracting is generally limited to a
$100,000 threshold for most contracts (see 48 CFR 701.601). The
mission received support from USAID headquarters, which assigned
temporary duty staff with contracting experience; however, according
to mission officials, temporary staff did not have sufficient approval
authority.
[16] In 2002, we recommended that the USAID Administrator develop and
implement procedures to allow USAID to reassign quickly key personnel,
particularly contracting officers, in post-emergency and post-crisis
situations. See GAO, Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program
Addressed Intended Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to
Improve Response Capability, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-787] (Washington, D.C.: July 24,
2002).
[17] These temporary staff included personnel from the Civilian
Response Corps (CRC), a multi-agency group of civilian federal
employees who are specially trained and equipped to deploy rapidly to
countries in crisis or emerging from conflict. CRC provides the U.S.
government with a first responder effort and supports the
implementation of longer-term reconstruction activities. Also,
according to USAID, some of the temporary staff assisted with
immediate earthquake relief and the subsequent cholera outbreak.
[18] Because USAID's planned funding level for infrastructure
activities is almost 8 times larger than State's, we focused our
review on USAID's planning efforts.
[19] State/INL, which is planning infrastructure construction
activities in the governance and rule of law sector, does not develop
an AAD-type document during its planning process, according to a State
official. The U.S. government strategy and supplemental spending plan
describe State/INL's plans for infrastructure construction activities,
such as the construction of a new women's prison, repairs to two
correctional facilities damaged in the earthquake, repairs to
facilities at the Haitian National Police Academy damaged by the
earthquake, and repairs and construction of police substations and
counternarcotics outposts. For more detail, see appendix II.
[20] USAID Forward is the USAID Administrator's reform agenda for the
agency. It outlines seven areas for reform: implementation and
procurement reform, talent management, rebuilding policy capacity,
strengthening monitoring and evaluation, rebuilding budget management,
science and technology, and innovation.
[21] The $28.8 million includes $1 million for two engineering design
contracts, one contract each for the two activities.
[22] According to mission officials, after the construction contract
was awarded on July 28, 2011, one of the unsuccessful bidders filed a
bid protest with GAO. As a result, the mission's chief contracting
officer suspended work for 3 months while the protest is under
consideration, per USAID standard operating procedure; as of November
15, a decision on the protest had not been announced. Bid protests may
be filed with GAO against procurement actions by federal government
agencies. A bid protest is a challenge to the award or proposed award
of a contract for procurement of goods and services or a challenge to
the terms of a solicitation for such a contract. Protests can also be
filed with the agency responsible for the procurement and the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims (31 U.S.C. § 3551 et. seq.)
[23] According to this official, the mission is conducting two studies
on the expansion, one to determine least-cost options and one to
evaluate renewable energy alternatives, which will be completed in
December 2011 and October 2012, respectively.
[24] According to a USAID official, the agreement will be a fixed
amount reimbursable agreement. Under terms of the agreement, USAID
will pool $25 million of its funds with $25 million provided by the
government of France and approximately $3 million from the government
of Haiti to fund construction work.
[25] The construction contract under which this work will be performed
will be administered by the technical unit of the government of
Haiti's Ministry of Finance.
[26] USAID guidelines require an environmental assessment for planned
activities. According to the mission's regional legal advisor, the
agreement cannot be completed until the environmental assessment is
completed and the results of the assessment can be included in the
agreement. According to USAID officials, the environmental assessment
for these planned activities is complex.
[27] United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, Has Aid
Changed? Channeling Assistance to Haiti Before and After the
Earthquake (New York, N.Y.: June 2011).
[28] United Nations Development Program, Haiti One Year Later (Port-au-
Prince, Haiti: December 2010).
[29] USAID defines sustainability in different ways depending on the
goals of the sector and project, such as usage for infrastructure
projects, financial stability for capacity-building projects, and
environmental stability for numerous other projects. USAID also states
that the four key principles of sustainable development are (1)
improved quality of life for current and future generations; (2)
responsible stewardship of the natural resource base; (3)
participation in political and economic life; and (4) effective
institutions that are transparent, accountable, responsive, and
capable of managing change without continued external support.
[30] Section 611(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires
that for capital assistance projects of more than $1 million, the
agency head receive a certification of the country's capability to
maintain and utilize the project, taking into account, among other
things, the maintenance and use of projects in the country previously
financed or assisted by the United States (22 U.S.C. § 2361(e)). As of
September 2011, USAID had signed 611(e) certification memos for four
activities: the North Industrial Park power generation facility, new
residential settlements in the Cap-Haïtien and Port-au-Prince
development corridors, reconstruction of the HUEH, and construction of
the Millet Bridge in Port-au-Prince.
[31] For example, USAID's ADS, Planning, 201.3.9.3 and 201.3.11.6
(Washington, D.C.: rev. Apr. 2, 2010).
[32] Local health networks consist of five to eight community health
clinics and one hospital to which the clinics refer patients that need
more specialized care.
[33] These Haitian government entities are the National Port
Authority, the General Customs Administration, and the Maritime
Security Service.
[34] For infrastructure, USAID defines a public-private partnership as
"a long-term contract signed by a public agency and a private party
for the construction, rehabilitation, operation and/or maintenance of
an infrastructure network."
[35] GAO, Foreign Assistance: USAID's Earthquake Recovery Program in
El Salvador Has Made Progress, but Key Activities Are Behind Schedule,
GAO-03-656 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003).
[36] GAO, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Compacts in Cape Verde and
Honduras Achieved Reduced Targets, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-728] (Washington, D.C.: July 25,
2011).
[37] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, title
I, ch. 10, 124 Stat. 2302, 2320 (July 29, 2010). The law mandated that
funds previously available to GAO pursuant to Title I, Chapter 4 of
Pub. L. No. 106-31 (to monitor provision of assistance to address the
effects of hurricanes in Central America and the Caribbean) also be
available to GAO to monitor post-earthquake expenses related to Haiti,
including relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction aid. In May 2011,
we issued a report that described the planned uses for U.S.
reconstruction assistance, USAID's internal controls for overseeing
U.S. reconstruction funds, and Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
governance and oversight structures. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-415].
[38] In the Act, Congress provided more than $1.14 billion in
reconstruction funds for Haiti available through the end of fiscal
year 2012, including about $918 million for USAID and State and about
$220 million for the Department of the Treasury for debt relief, a
Treasury attaché office in Port-au-Prince, and technical assistance.
We did not review the funding directed to Treasury. Additionally, we
did not review $1.64 billion in funding provided primarily to
reimburse U.S. agencies for their emergency and humanitarian efforts
in Haiti immediately following the January 2010 earthquake, nor did we
examine the approximately $144 million in U.S. embassy-related funding
included in the law.
[39] USAID and State have changed amounts allocated for infrastructure
construction activities as plans have developed. We are reporting
amounts allocated based on the most current information we received.
[40] These activities include projects such as rehabilitation of
irrigation canals and transportation infrastructure.
[End of section]
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