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Account for Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

September 2011: 

Iraq and Afghanistan: 

DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for Contracts, Assistance 
Instruments, and Associated Personnel: 

GAO-11-886: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-886, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

DOD, State, and USAID have relied extensively on contracts and 
assistance instruments (grants and cooperative agreements) for a range 
of services in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the last 3 years, GAO has 
provided information on the agencies’ contracts, assistance 
instruments, and associated personnel in the two countries, detailing 
the agencies’ challenges tracking such information. 

Amendments from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2011 now require the agencies to provide this and other information to 
Congress through annual joint reports. They also direct GAO to review 
those reports. In response, GAO reviewed the first joint report and 
assessed (1) data and data sources to prepare the report; (2) use of 
data from the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker 
(SPOT) for management, oversight, and coordination; and (3) efforts to 
improve SPOT’s tracking of statutorily required information. GAO 
compared data in the joint report to agency data GAO previously 
obtained, reviewed supporting documentation, and interviewed agency 
officials, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan, on how the data 
were collected and used. 

What GAO Found: 

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) designated SPOT as their system in 
2010 for tracking statutorily required information on contracts, 
assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Citing limitations with SPOT’s implementation, the 
agencies generally relied on data sources other than SPOT to prepare 
their 2011 joint report. Only State used SPOT but just for its 
contractor personnel numbers. However, GAO found that regardless of 
the data source used, the agencies’ data had significant limitations, 
many of which were not fully disclosed. For example, while the 
agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 2010 
obligations, we found that they underreported the value of Iraq and 
Afghanistan contracts and assistance instruments by at least $4 
billion, the majority of which was for DOD contracts. In addition, 
data presented in the joint report on personnel, including those 
performing security functions, are of limited reliability because of 
significant over- and undercounting. For example, DOD did not disclose 
that its contractor personnel numbers for Afghanistan were 
overreported for most of the reporting period because of double 
counting. Additionally, despite the reporting requirement, State did 
not provide information on its assistance instruments or the number of 
personnel working under them. As a result of such limitations, data 
presented in the joint report should not be used to draw conclusions 
or identify trends over time. 

DOD, State, and USAID have used SPOT to a limited extent, primarily to 
manage and oversee individual contracts and personnel. Agency 
officials cited instances of using SPOT to help identify contractors 
that should be billed for the use of government services, including 
medical treatment and dining facilities. State and DOD officials also 
identified instances of using SPOT to help inform operational 
planning, such as preparing for the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. 
Officials from the three agencies indicated that shortcomings in data 
and reporting capabilities have limited their use of SPOT and, in some 
cases, led them to rely on other data systems to help manage and 
oversee contracts and assistance instruments. Further, the agencies 
cannot readily access each other’s data in SPOT, which limits 
interagency coordination opportunities. 

Recent efforts have been made to improve SPOT’s tracking of contractor 
and assistance personnel. SPOT now allows users to enter aggregate, 
rather than individual personal information into SPOT, which may 
overcome resistance to using the system based on security concerns. In 
addition, DOD and State report increased efforts to validate personnel 
data in SPOT. However, practical and technical challenges continue to 
affect SPOT’s ability to track other statutorily required data. For 
example, SPOT cannot be used to reliably distinguish personnel 
performing security functions from other contractors. Also, while SPOT 
has the capability to record when personnel have been killed or 
wounded, such information has not been regularly updated. The agencies 
have identified the need for further modifications and new guidance to 
address some but not all of these limitations. It is unclear when SPOT 
will serve as a reliable source of data to meet statutory requirements 
and be used by the agencies for management, oversight, and 
coordination. As a result, the agencies still do not have reliable 
sources and methods to report on contracts, assistance instruments, 
and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

What GAO Recommends: 

In 2009, GAO recommended that the agencies develop a plan for addressing 
SPOT’s limitations. They disagreed, citing ongoing coordination as 
sufficient. GAO continues to believe a plan is needed and is not making 
new recommendations. DOD and State provided technical comments on this 
year’s report, while USAID declined to comment.


View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-886] for key 
components. For more information, contact John P. Hutton at (202) 512-
4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Agencies Relied on Sources Other Than SPOT, but Data Used Had 
Significant Limitations: 

Use of SPOT Hindered by Data and Reporting Shortcomings: 

Recent Efforts Have Been Made to Improve SPOT, but Past Problems Have 
Not Been Fully Addressed: 

Concluding Observations: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Data Sources Used by DOD, State, and USAID and Reasons Cited 
in Joint Report for Not Relying on SPOT: 

Abbreviations: 

CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command: 

DBA: Defense Base Act: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation: 

FPDS-NG: Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation: 

MOU: memorandum of understanding: 

NDAA for FY2008: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008: 

NDAA for FY2010: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010: 

NDAA for FY2011: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2011: 

SPOT: Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 15, 2011: 

Congressional Committees: 

Over the last three years, Congress has required us to report on 
Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) contracts, grants, and 
cooperative agreements with work performed in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
[Footnote 1] In those reports, we also detailed challenges faced by 
the agencies in tracking information on these contracts and assistance 
instruments, as well as the personnel working under them in the two 
countries. Reliable, meaningful data related to contractors, grantees, 
and cooperative agreement recipients are a starting point for 
informing agency decisions and ensuring proper management and 
oversight. Our prior work has shown that the lack of complete and 
accurate information may inhibit planning, increase costs, and 
introduce unnecessary risk. The importance of such information is 
heightened given the three agencies' extensive reliance on contractors 
to provide a range of services, including security, transportation, 
and base operations, relating to practically every facet of U.S. 
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, State and USAID have 
relied on recipients of grants and cooperative agreements--two types 
of assistance instruments--to implement infrastructure, governance, 
and economic development projects in both countries. 

Congress has taken a series of actions to increase the oversight and 
availability of information on Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and 
assistance instruments. Specifically, the agencies are now required to 
produce their own report that provides much of the information that 
GAO was previously required to report. Amendments from the Ike Skelton 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (NDAA for 
FY2011) require DOD, State, and USAID to submit annual joint reports 
to Congress on their contracts and assistance instruments with work 
performed in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 2] The reports are to 
address several matters, such as the number and value of contracts and 
assistance instruments,[Footnote 3] number of contractor and 
assistance personnel, number of contractor personnel performing 
security functions,[Footnote 4] and any plans for strengthening the 
collection and coordination of contract information. In May 2011, the 
three agencies transmitted to congressional committees the first 
Annual Joint Report on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (hereafter, 
referred to as the joint report), which covers fiscal year 2010. 

The joint reporting requirement builds upon earlier requirements for 
the three agencies to track information on contracts, assistance 
instruments, and associated personnel. Specifically, the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA for FY2008) 
directed DOD, State, and USAID to sign a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) regarding contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 5] The 
law specified several matters to be covered in the MOU, including 
identifying common databases to serve as repositories of information 
on contracts and contractor personnel in the two countries. In a July 
2008 MOU, the agencies designated the Synchronized Predeployment and 
Operational Tracker (SPOT) database as their common database for the 
statutorily required contract and contractor personnel information. 
With the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2010 (NDAA for FY2010), Congress expanded the requirement to 
cover grants, cooperative agreements, and associated personnel. 
[Footnote 6] In response, the agencies revised the MOU in April 2010 
to specify that SPOT was also their system of record to track 
statutorily required assistance instrument and personnel information. 

Amendments from the NDAA for FY2011 also direct us to report annually 
on the agencies' joint reports.[Footnote 7] Pursuant to that mandate, 
we have reviewed the agencies' 2011 joint report and are providing our 
assessments of (1) the data and data sources used by the agencies to 
develop their report; (2) the agencies' use of data from SPOT to 
manage, oversee, and coordinate their Iraq and Afghanistan contracts, 
assistance instruments, and associated personnel; and (3) progress and 
plans for improving SPOT to track statutorily required information. 

We used the following methodologies to conduct our review. 

* To assess the data and data sources used, we obtained the underlying 
data the agencies used to prepare the joint report and performed 
several analyses to identify limitations, omissions, duplicates, and 
other errors that would affect the reliability of the data. This 
included comparing data in the joint report with data we collected 
from the agencies for the first half of fiscal year 2010 to prepare 
our 2010 report, as well as a comparison to Federal Procurement Data 
System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG) data from the second half of fiscal 
year 2010. We also interviewed agency officials to discuss steps they 
took to validate and verify the data presented in the report and 
reviewed supporting documentation that the agencies provided at our 
request. For our 2010 report, we obtained multiple data sets from DOD, 
State, and USAID, including data from FPDS-NG, agency-specific 
databases, and manually compiled lists of contracts and assistance 
actions. We determined those data were sufficiently reliable to 
identify the minimum number of active or awarded contracts and 
assistance instruments, associated obligation amounts, and extent of 
competition for the first half of fiscal year 2010. For that report, 
we also obtained data on contractor and assistance personnel in the 
two countries; these data were generally obtained by the agencies 
through surveys and periodic reports submitted by contractors and 
assistance recipients. 

* We reviewed the joint report to determine the current status of and 
future plans for agencies' use of SPOT data. We conducted interviews 
with DOD, State, and USAID officials, including those in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, responsible for maintaining SPOT and other data sources 
and for managing, overseeing, and coordinating contracts to identify 
examples of how the agencies have used the data. 

* We obtained relevant documentation, including agency policies and 
guidance, and interviewed agency officials to assess the progress and 
plans for improving SPOT, particularly as they pertain to shortcomings 
identified in our prior reports. 

* We conducted this performance audit from May 2011 through September 
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The first joint report on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan required 
under amendments from the NDAA for FY2011 was to be issued by February 
1, 2011, with subsequent reports due in 2012 and 2013. In the reports, 
DOD, State, and USAID are to provide the following for each 12-month 
reporting period: 

* total number and value of contracts and assistance instruments 
awarded, 

* total number and value of active contracts and assistance 
instruments, 

* the extent to which such contracts and assistance instruments used 
competitive procedures, 

* total number of contractor and assistance personnel at the end of 
each quarter of the reporting period,[Footnote 8] 

* total number of contractor and assistance personnel performing 
security functions at the end of each quarter of the reporting period, 
and: 

* total number of contractor and assistance personnel killed or 
wounded. 

The joint reports are also to include the sources of information and 
data used to compile the required information; a description of any 
known limitations of the data reported, including known limitations of 
the methodology and data sources used; and plans for strengthening 
collection, coordination, and sharing of information on contracts and 
assistance instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan through improvements to 
common databases. The first joint report submitted by the agencies in 
May 2011 provides an overview of the reporting requirements, an 
introduction, and a section for each agency to present its data. Each 
agency was responsible for collecting its fiscal year 2010 data from 
relevant sources and compiling its section of the report. 

The reporting requirements in the NDAA for FY2011 build upon prior 
national defense authorization act requirements. Specifically, Section 
861 of the NDAA for FY2008 directed the Secretaries of Defense and 
State and the USAID Administrator to sign an MOU related to 
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The law, as amended by the NDAA 
for FY2010, specified a number of issues to be covered in the MOU. 
These include specifying each agency's roles and responsibilities in 
matters related to contracting in the two countries, determining 
responsibility for establishing procedures for and coordination of 
movement of contractor personnel in the two countries, and identifying 
common databases to serve as information repositories on contracts and 
assistance instruments with more than 30 days of performance in Iraq 
or Afghanistan and the personnel working in either country under those 
contracts and assistance instruments. The common databases are to 
include a brief description of each contract and assistance 
instrument, its total value, and whether it was awarded competitively; 
for personnel working under contracts or assistance instruments, the 
databases will include the total number employed, total number 
performing security functions, and total number killed or wounded. 
Tracking this information should provide much of the information the 
agencies are to include in the joint reports. 

In July 2008, DOD, State, and USAID agreed in an MOU that SPOT would 
serve as their common database and be the system of record for the 
statutorily required contract and personnel information. The agencies 
revised their MOU in April 2010, making SPOT their system for also 
tracking assistance instruments and associated personnel. SPOT is a 
web-based system initially developed by the U.S. Army to track 
detailed information on a limited number of contractor personnel 
deployed with U.S. forces. The 2010 MOU specified that SPOT would 
include information on DOD, State, and USAID contracts and assistance 
instruments with more than 30 days of performance in Iraq or 
Afghanistan or valued at more than $100,000, as well as information on 
the personnel working under those contracts and assistance 
instruments. SPOT is configured so that it can track individuals by 
name and unique identifier, such as Social Security number, and record 
information, including the contracts they are working under, 
deployment dates, and next of kin. The agencies agreed that contract-
related information, such as value and extent of competition, are to 
be imported into SPOT from the FPDS-NG, the federal government's 
system for tracking information on contracting actions. According to 
the MOU, DOD is responsible for all basic maintenance, upgrades, 
training, and systems operations costs, but the agencies agreed to 
negotiate funding arrangements for any agency-unique requirements. 
Within DOD, a program management office has responsibility for the 
development, integration, testing, training, and deployment of SPOT 
and as such, oversees the contractor that operates, maintains, and 
sustains the system. 

DOD, State, and USAID have phased in SPOT's implementation, with each 
developing its own policies and procedures governing the system's use. 

* DOD designated SPOT in January 2007 as its primary system for 
collecting data on contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces. At 
that time, it implemented a contract clause directing firms to enter 
data into SPOT on U.S., third country, and local nationals working 
under its contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan that meet reporting 
thresholds.[Footnote 9] 

* State issued a policy in March 2008 that included language to be 
incorporated in applicable contracts requiring contractors to enter 
data into SPOT on U.S., third country, and local nationals working in 
either Iraq or Afghanistan.[Footnote 10] State expanded this 
requirement in January 2009 to cover personnel working under certain 
assistance instruments in the two countries.[Footnote 11] As amended, 
State's assistance policy directed that U.S. and third country 
nationals working under grants must be entered into SPOT but allowed 
for discretion in determining whether local nationals were entered 
given safety and security concerns. In January 2011, State revised its 
assistance guidance and related provision to allow grantees with 
locally hired Iraqi or Afghan personnel to report aggregate numbers of 
local nationals without providing personally identifying information 
when safety concerns exist.[Footnote 12] 

* USAID issued a directive in April 2009 that required the use of 
contract clauses and assistance provisions requiring contractors and 
assistance recipients in Iraq to enter personnel data into SPOT. 
[Footnote 13] The directive explicitly excluded Iraqi entities and 
nationals from having to be entered into SPOT until a classified 
system is in place. In July 2010, USAID issued a directive 
establishing a similar requirement for Afghanistan.[Footnote 14] 
However, the policy notes that procedures will be provided separately 
for entering information on Afghan nationals, but to date, such 
procedures have not been issued. 

Agencies Relied on Sources Other Than SPOT, but Data Used Had 
Significant Limitations: 

Variety of Data Sources Used to Prepare Joint Report: 

DOD, State, and USAID's joint report cited a number of limitations 
associated with SPOT's implementation, and as a result, the agencies 
relied on a variety of other data sources to develop the report. The 
only exception was State's use of SPOT as the basis for its contractor 
personnel numbers. Whereas GAO previously collected and compiled data 
from numerous sources including manually compiled lists of contracts 
and assistance instruments and personnel data obtained through 
surveys, officials from the three agencies told us they decided to 
rely on existing databases and sources to the greatest extent 
possible. Table 1 summarizes the data sources used to prepare the 
joint report and the reasons cited by the agencies for not using SPOT. 

Table 1: Data Sources Used by DOD, State, and USAID and Reasons Cited 
in Joint Report for Not Relying on SPOT: 

Data element: Number and value of new and active contracts and 
assistance instruments and extent of competition; 

Agency: DOD; 
Data source used for joint report: FPDS-NG; 

Agency: State; 
Data source used for joint report: FPDS-NG; 

Agency: USAID; 
Data source used for joint report: USAID's Phoenix Financial 
Management System (Phoenix)[A]/FPDS-NG; 

Reasons cited for not relying on SPOT: SPOT does not yet have the 
functionality to provide financial information about contracts. 

Data element: Number of personnel working on contracts and assistance 
instruments, including personnel performing security functions; 

Agency: DOD; 
Data source used for joint report: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
Quarterly Contractor Census/SPOT-Plus[B]; 

Agency: State; 
Data source used for joint report: SPOT; 

Agency: USAID; 
Data source used for joint report: Mission-collected data, estimates; 

Reasons cited for not relying on SPOT: The full population of 
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan were not registered in SPOT. 

Data element: Number of personnel killed and wounded; 

Agency: DOD; 
Data source used for joint report: Department of Labor's Office of 
Workers' Compensation Program Defense Base Act Summary[C]; 

Agency: State; 
Data source used for joint report: Bureau-collected data; 

Agency: USAID; 
Data source used for joint report: Mission-collected data; 

Reasons cited for not relying on SPOT: While SPOT has the ability to 
reflect the number of personnel killed or wounded, contractors are not 
routinely using this function and therefore the data are unreliable. 

Source: The 2011 Annual Joint Report on Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 

[A] Phoenix is USAID's financial management system that tracks 
obligations on contracts and assistance instruments. Phoenix does not 
contain information on competition and therefore USAID used FPDS-NG to 
obtain competition information. 

[B] The CENTCOM census relies on contractor firms to report their 
personnel data to DOD components. The components then report the data 
to CENTCOM at the end of each quarter. SPOT-Plus is a SPOT-populated 
census template that is distributed to DOD contracting activities for 
quarterly review and updates and is being used as DOD transitions from 
the CENTCOM census to eventual reliance on SPOT. 

[C] The Defense Base Act Summary is a Department of Labor system that 
tracks claims for disability, medical, and death benefits for 
contractors working outside the United States or on U.S. military 
bases. 

[End of table] 

Data Presented in Joint Report Have Significant Limitations: 

The data presented in the agencies' joint report had significant 
limitations, many of which were not fully disclosed. As a result, the 
data should not be used to draw conclusions about contracts, 
assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq or 
Afghanistan for fiscal year 2010 or to identify trends over time. 

Contracts and Assistance Instruments: 

While the agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 
2010 obligations, the joint report understates the three agencies' 
obligations on contracts and assistance instruments with work 
performed in Iraq and Afghanistan by at least $4 billion, nearly all 
for DOD contracts. We identified this minimum amount by comparing the 
underlying data the agencies used to prepare the joint report with 
data we obtained from the agencies during our prior review of 
contracts and assistance instruments with work in either country 
during the first half of fiscal year 2010. The level of underreporting 
we identified does not fully account for new awards or obligations 
that the agencies made in the second half of fiscal year 2010. 

DOD and State underreported their contracts and obligations in the 
joint report because they relied solely on FPDS-NG to identify 
contracts with work performed in Iraq or Afghanistan. FPDS-NG allows 
agencies to only report one principal place of contract performance. 
However, contracts can have performance in multiple countries, and the 
reporting requirement applies to contracts with performance in Iraq or 
Afghanistan, even if neither country is the principal place of 
performance.[Footnote 15] Further, not all DOD contracts with 
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan were entered into FPDS-NG. Neither 
DOD nor State disclosed any limitations with their FPDS-NG queries or 
that there could be additional contracts with associated obligations 
with work in the two countries. 

Using FPDS-NG to identify contracts with a principal place of 
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD reported $18.4 billion in 
fiscal year 2010 obligations but underreported its contract 
obligations by at least $3.9 billion. Specifically, we identified an 
additional 20,810 contracts and orders that totaled to about $3.5 
billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations that DOD had reported to us 
last year but were not included in the joint report because the 
principal place of performance was not Iraq or Afghanistan. For 
example, DOD previously reported to us two contracts for translation 
and interpretation services with performance in Iraq and/or 
Afghanistan with $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations, but 
these contracts were not included in the joint report because FPDS-NG 
identified the principal place of performance as the United States. We 
also identified additional contracts that were previously reported to 
us but not included in the joint report because they were not in FPDS-
NG. Among those, we identified 13 contracts with $418 million in 
obligations during the first half of fiscal year 2010, including 
combat support contracts for information technology services and 
linguist support in the two countries. DOD did not report any 
assistance instruments with performance in Iraq or Afghanistan. This 
is consistent with our 2010 report for which we found DOD had no 
assistance instruments with performance in either country during 
fiscal year 2009 or the first half of fiscal year 2010. 

For the joint report, State relied on FPDS-NG and reported $1.8 
billion in contract obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal 
year 2010. We found, however, that State underreported its fiscal year 
2010 contract obligations by at least $62 million by not including 49 
contracts and orders that were reported to us last year. Specifically, 
we identified a State delivery order for facility management with 
about $54.3 million in obligations in fiscal year 2010 that was not in 
the joint report because the United States was identified as the 
principal place of performance in FPDS-NG, as opposed to either Iraq 
or Afghanistan. We also identified another 48 contracts and orders 
that State reported to us last year as having performance in either 
country that were not identified through State's FPDS-NG query. These 
include 23 contracts and orders awarded by the embassies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan with about $1 million in obligations in the first half of 
fiscal year 2010, even though the joint report states that it includes 
all procurement activities contracted for by State's missions in the 
two countries. 

While the reporting requirement applies to both contracts and 
assistance instruments, State did not report any assistance 
instruments with performance in Iraq or Afghanistan or provide any 
explanation in the joint report as to why such information was not 
included. Based on data provided by State last year, we identified 155 
assistance instruments with work performed in Iraq and/or Afghanistan 
with $120 million obligated during the first half of fiscal year 2010. 
These assistance instruments covered a wide range of activities, such 
as media workshops, small business development, and capacity building 
for nongovernmental organizations. State officials informed us that 
they did not include information on assistance instruments as they 
were not including information on personnel working under assistance 
instruments because of limitations, as discussed below. They told us, 
however, that they plan to include assistance instrument information 
in next year's joint report. 

Unlike DOD and State, USAID did not rely on FPDS-NG as its data source 
for the number and value of contracts. As explained in the joint 
report, USAID knew gaps existed in its FPDS-NG data, particularly for 
Afghanistan, so it used data from its financial management system, 
which contains information on the number and value of both contracts 
and assistance instruments. USAID reported $2.6 billion in contract 
and assistance instrument obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan for 
fiscal year 2010. However, by comparing the data from the financial 
management system to data USAID provided us last year, we found that 
the agency underreported its obligations by about $3.9 million. These 
obligations were for 16 contracts and 8 assistance instruments in the 
first half of fiscal year 2010 that were not included in the joint 
report. Almost all of the contracts that were not reported were 
personal services contracts.[Footnote 16] USAID officials told us they 
did not report personal services contracts because they consider such 
contractor personnel to be USAID employees, but this was not disclosed 
in the joint report. Further, unlike DOD and State, which provided 
competition information for nearly all contracts included in the joint 
report, USAID provided competition data on fewer than half the active 
contracts and assistance instruments included in the joint report. 
Other than acknowledging FPDS-NG data gaps, USAID provided no specific 
explanation for why the competition data presented in the report are 
incomplete. 

Contractor and Assistance Personnel: 

We identified a number of limitations and methodological challenges 
that resulted in both over-and underreporting of contractor and 
assistance personnel and call into question the overall reliability of 
the data in the joint report. However, we were not able to determine 
the full magnitude of the discrepancies. 

For the joint report, DOD relied on quarterly censuses as its source 
of data on contractor personnel, including personnel performing 
security functions. DOD provided the numbers of contractor personnel, 
broken out by nationality, in Iraq and Afghanistan at the end of each 
quarter. However, the numbers for local nationals working under 
contracts in Afghanistan were generally overreported. According to the 
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) official who oversees the compilation 
of the census, a methodological error resulted in double counting of 
local nationals in Afghanistan for the first three fiscal year 2010 
quarters. The error was discovered as the fourth quarter census was 
being compiled, which resulted in a significant reduction in the number 
of local national contractor personnel in Afghanistan for that 
quarter. To illustrate the magnitude of the double counting, DOD 
reported 73,392 local national contractor personnel in Afghanistan for 
the third quarter of fiscal year 2010 and only 34,222 in the fourth 
quarter--a difference of 39,170 personnel. No adjustments were made to 
the prior three quarters to correct for the double counting. 
Furthermore, this error and an explanation as to what occurred are not 
provided in the joint report, except to note that there are challenges 
associated with counting local national personnel in Afghanistan. 
Officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Program Support and CENTCOM told us they have a high level of 
confidence in the census numbers for all contractor personnel except 
local nationals in Afghanistan.[Footnote 17] However, as we noted in 
October 2010, DOD officials overseeing the census characterized the 
census as providing rough approximations of the actual numbers of 
contractor personnel in either country. They explained that several 
challenges pertaining to counting local nationals and validating 
contractor-reported data have hindered their ability to collect 
accurate and reliable personnel data. 

State relied on SPOT as its source for data on contractor personnel, 
which led to several omissions and discrepancies. Based on our 
analysis of State's reported personnel data and the contract data 
reported from FPDS-NG, we identified 50 contracts that met SPOT 
reporting requirements but were not in the system. Therefore, 
personnel working on those contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan were not 
included in the joint report. For example, we identified 5 contracts 
for construction with about $525 million in fiscal year 2010 
obligations with no contractor personnel reported in SPOT. Further, at 
the end of the second quarter of fiscal year 2010, there were 1,336 
fewer contractor personnel in SPOT than were reported to us last year 
from State's surveys of contractor personnel in the two countries. 
Such omissions are consistent with what State officials told us in 
2010--that manually compiled surveys of contractor personnel in either 
country have some limitations but provide more accurate information 
than SPOT. Additionally, while the joint report presents the numbers 
as "contractor personnel," and we confirmed with State officials that 
the numbers were only to include contractor personnel, we found that 
about 13 percent of the personnel State reported as contractor 
personnel were actually working under assistance instruments. 

In addition, State did not include in the joint report the number of 
personnel working under assistance instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan 
or explain why assistance personnel were not included. State officials 
informed us that although State's policy required assistance personnel 
to be entered into SPOT since January 2009, assistance recipients had 
been reluctant to enter information into the system. As a result, for 
fiscal year 2010, officials told us that little information regarding 
personnel working under assistance instruments had been entered into 
the system. However, State could have relied on other data sources to 
provide the required personnel information. Last year, based on 
surveys State conducted of its assistance recipients, we reported that 
there were at least 8,074 personnel working under State's assistance 
instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan at the end of the second quarter 
of fiscal year 2010. We cautioned that the number was likely 
understated because of several factors. State officials informed us 
that response rates to their requests for personnel numbers from 
assistance instrument recipients were low; they also stated that local 
nationals were not always captured in personnel counts because it was 
not feasible or it was too difficult to obtain accurate information. 

In reporting the number of personnel performing security functions, 
State relied exclusively on SPOT and did not disclose any limitations 
with that source. As we reported last year, SPOT cannot be used to 
reliably distinguish personnel performing security functions from 
other contractor personnel, as each of the three available methods has 
limitations.[Footnote 18] State officials responsible for compiling 
the joint report told us they queried SPOT based on security-related 
job titles.[Footnote 19] Upon review of the data, officials from the 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security noticed that the numbers appeared low. 
An analyst from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security identified five 
large security contracts with numerous personnel who did not have the 
word "security" in their job titles and as a result were not included 
in the query results, a risk we noted in our prior report. The SPOT 
query indicated that there were 3,924 State contractor personnel 
performing security functions in Iraq and Afghanistan at the end of 
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010. State revised this number and 
reported 8,034 personnel performing security functions for that 
quarter. Despite the fact that the SPOT data were incomplete and had 
to be manually adjusted, the joint report provides no explanation and 
does not identify limitations with the SPOT data for determining the 
number of personnel providing security functions. 

In presenting personnel numbers in the joint report, USAID was the 
only agency that used estimates as opposed to actual counts for the 
total number of contractor and assistance personnel, as allowed by the 
reporting requirement. USAID also used estimates for the number of 
personnel performing security functions, which is not provided for in 
the reporting requirement. Specifically, USAID estimated the number of 
personnel for Afghanistan. However, the full extent to which estimates 
were used is not disclosed in the joint report. Further, the estimates 
are based on unreliable data. USAID officials explained to us that the 
estimates were based on data from several sources including databases 
used to track aid effectiveness metrics, quarterly reports submitted 
by its contractors and grantees, and data submitted to us for last 
year's report. All of these sources have limitations. For example, 

* while contractors and assistance recipients in Iraq report their 
personnel numbers on a regular basis, a USAID official informed us 
that only about 70 percent of their contractors and assistance 
recipients in Afghanistan provide personnel information; 

* a USAID official told us they have a limited ability to verify the 
accuracy or completeness of the data that are reported, especially for 
Afghanistan where they operate far more projects than in Iraq; 

* the USAID official responsible for preparing the joint report raised 
concerns about possible inconsistent reporting of security personnel 
that could result in double counting; and: 

* the data provided to us by USAID for our 2010 report did not include 
personnel working under several contracts and assistance instruments, 
such as four cooperative agreements for food security programs in 
Afghanistan. 

USAID officials also told us that the numbers in the joint report do 
not include the number of personnel working under certain support 
service contracts, such as facilities maintenance, or personal 
services contractors. For example, a USAID official told us that at 
least 109 contractor personnel supporting the Iraq mission were not 
counted in the joint report because a decision was made not to include 
support services and personal services contractors. 

Personnel Killed and Wounded: 

Although all three agencies are required to track the number of 
personnel killed or wounded while working on contracts and assistance 
instruments in Iraq or Afghanistan, DOD still does not have a system 
that reliably tracks killed and wounded contractor personnel. For the 
joint report, DOD relied on claims data maintained by the Department of 
Labor (Labor) regarding Defense Base Act (DBA) claims.[Footnote 20] 
While DOD acknowledged in the joint report that claims data from this 
workers compensation program do not provide a true reflection of how 
many DOD contractor personnel were killed or wounded while working in 
either country, DOD did not fully disclose the limitations associated 
with DBA claims data. First, the claims data presented in the joint 
report are for death and injury claims filed in fiscal year 2010 for 
all U.S. government contractors and civilians--including those employed 
by State and USAID--and not just DOD contractors. Further, as we 
concluded in 2009, DBA claims data do not provide an appropriate basis 
for determining the number of contractor personnel killed or wounded 
in either country. Most notably, not all deaths and injuries for which 
claims are filed under DBA would be regarded as contractors killed or 
wounded within the context of the NDAA for FY2011 reporting 
requirement. For example, we previously identified DBA claims filed 
for occupational injuries and medical conditions such as sprains and 
appendicitis. Also, Labor officials previously explained to us that 
injuries to local and third country contractor personnel, in 
particular, may be underreported. 

To provide their data on personnel killed and wounded, State and USAID 
relied on data collected by State bureaus and USAID missions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. These data were based on reports submitted to State 
by contractors and to USAID by contractors and assistance recipients. 
Without alternative sources of data, we could not verify whether 
State's and USAID's data were complete, except to note that State did 
not include assistance personnel who were killed or wounded. However, 
there are indications of underreporting by contractors and assistance 
recipients. For example, a May 2010 report from the USAID Inspector 
General indicated that not all contractors and assistance recipients 
in Afghanistan were reporting incidents that result in personnel being 
injured or killed.[Footnote 21] In addition, a USAID official in 
Afghanistan acknowledged that for fiscal year 2010, it was voluntary 
for contractors and assistance recipients to file serious incident 
reports, which would provide information on personnel killed or 
wounded. Earlier this year, USAID began modifying contracts in 
Afghanistan to require its contractors to file serious incident 
reports. 

Use of SPOT Hindered by Data and Reporting Shortcomings: 

Agencies Have Used SPOT to a Limited Extent: 

Officials from the three agencies told us they have used SPOT in some 
instances to obtain information on individual contracts and contractor 
employees. For example, an official from State's Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security said they have used SPOT during investigations to verify 
whether the individuals involved were deployed in theater at the time 
of the incidents being investigated. A USAID contracting officer in 
Iraq told us that when a security incident involving a contractor 
employee occurs, she uses SPOT to determine if the individual involved 
has a letter of authorization, which should provide personal 
information including whether the individual is authorized to carry a 
weapon. A senior official with DOD's CENTCOM Contracting Command in 
Iraq explained that he used SPOT to obtain information on specific 
contracts, such as the name of the contracting officer or contracting 
officer's representative, in response to questions about contracts 
that were not awarded or managed by his office. State and DOD 
officials have also reported using SPOT to better manage contractor 
personnel. For example, DOD officials from the SPOT program management 
office told us that SPOT has been used in conjunction with information 
from other systems to identify contractors that should be billed for 
the use of government services, including medical treatment and dining 
facilities. Additionally, State Diplomatic Security officials told us 
they have used SPOT to confirm that contractor personnel are 
authorized to be in Iraq and determine to what government services those 
personnel are entitled. 

DOD and State officials also identified instances of using SPOT data 
to inform operational planning for contractor support. Officials from 
the SPOT program management office told us they have received requests 
from U.S. Forces-Iraq commanders to identify the universe of 
contractors and contractor capabilities in Iraq to assist with the 
drawdown of U.S. forces. They also stated that base commanders in Iraq 
are receiving contractor population reports to obtain insight into 
which contractors are on their bases. Additionally, officials in the 
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program 
Support told us that data from SPOT are being used to help prepare 
future operational plans. For example, SPOT data have been analyzed to 
help determine what services contractors have provided and what level 
of life support the U.S. government has provided to them, which can 
aid combatant commanders in developing operational plans. State 
officials also told us that the U.S. Embassy in Iraq has requested 
SPOT data to help it determine the number of contractors in country 
and to assist with planning for the future U.S. presence in Iraq once 
the U.S. military withdraws at the end of this year. However, USAID 
officials including those we spoke with in Iraq and Afghanistan told 
us that they do not use SPOT data to manage, oversee, or coordinate 
contracts aside from obtaining information on specific contractor 
employees. 

Data and Reporting Limitations Affect Opportunities for Using SPOT to 
Manage, Oversee, and Coordinate: 

DOD, State, and USAID officials informed us that shortcomings in SPOT 
data and reporting capabilities limit their ability to use the system 
in managing, overseeing, and coordinating contracts with work 
performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In some cases, officials have 
relied on other data sources for such purposes. For example, DOD 
officials with the Contracting Fusion Cell in Iraq told us that 
because SPOT is designed to track contractor personnel on an 
individual basis rather than to support the operational management of 
contractors, they developed a new, separate database containing 
aggregate-level data on contractor personnel at each base to help 
manage the drawdown of personnel and equipment from the country. 
[Footnote 22] While the new database includes information not 
available from SPOT, such as information on contractor equipment, some 
of the basic contract information overlaps with SPOT and was added to 
the database from sources other than SPOT. Similarly, officials from 
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security told us that SPOT does not 
provide the level of detail needed to manage their security contractor 
employees and that they rely on their own data system for the day-to-
day management of their contractors. 

Officials from all three agencies also raised concerns about the 
reports that can be generated from SPOT. USAID officials in Iraq 
explained that one reason they do not rely on SPOT to help manage 
contractors and assistance recipients is that the types of reports 
they need are not easily available from the system. State officials 
also indicated that the standard reports available through SPOT do not 
meet their needs and they have to request ad hoc reports from the SPOT 
program management office's help desk. CENTCOM Contracting Command 
officials in Iraq also told us that for a large data run they cannot 
obtain data from SPOT in a timely manner, with it taking up to a week 
to receive the data. SPOT program management officials acknowledged 
that agency personnel are not fully aware of SPOT's reporting 
capabilities and may not have confidence in the system given its data 
reliability challenges. As a result, the program management officials 
are seeking to expand their outreach to potential users of the data, 
focusing on improving customer service, and exploring the development 
of training on how SPOT data could be used for management and 
operations, as opposed to the current training that has been focused 
on entering data into the system. Also, the SPOT program management 
office told us that they have taken steps to facilitate agency 
officials' ability to query SPOT for contracts awarded by their 
agencies, a process they described as cumbersome, to allow for better 
coordination and leveraging of existing contracts within an agency. 
Staff from the Office of the Senior Contracting Official in 
Afghanistan told us that they recently began using this query 
functionality and they expect it to better enable their use of SPOT in 
responding to future data requests. 

The agencies' ability to use SPOT for interagency coordination 
purposes has been limited by the fact that they cannot easily access 
each other's data. SPOT program management officials told us that SPOT 
could be used by the agencies to identify and leverage contracts being 
performed for common services so that agencies could minimize 
duplication, share price information, and obtain cost savings. 
However, agency officials are currently not able to access information 
on other agencies' contracts unless DOD grants them permission to have 
full access to the information in SPOT. SPOT program management 
officials informed us that they are developing a separate reporting 
and analysis functionality to allow users to more easily share, 
analyze, and use data available in SPOT. However, this functionality 
is currently being tested and there are no time frames for when it 
will be available to all users. While USAID officials agreed that 
coordination among the agencies is important, they did not share the 
perspective that the agencies needed access to each others' 
information in SPOT. They explained that this is partly due to the 
fact that interagency coordination before the award of a contract or 
assistance instrument is occurring without using SPOT. 

Recent Efforts Have Been Made to Improve SPOT, but Past Problems Have 
Not Been Fully Addressed: 

Recent Efforts to Improve Tracking of Personnel in SPOT: 

We previously reported that a significant challenge associated with 
SPOT's implementation was ensuring that Iraqi and Afghan nationals 
working under contracts and assistance instruments were consistently 
and accurately entered in SPOT. Last year we reported that local 
nationals were not always entered into the system because of agency 
policies as well as practical and technical limitations. For example, 
many local nationals work at remote locations, which limits agencies' 
ability to track these personnel and verify the completeness of 
reported information. Also, DOD, State, and USAID officials have told 
us that some local national contractors refuse to submit information 
on their personnel because of safety concerns. Additionally, some 
information required for SPOT data fields, such as first and last 
names and dates of birth, may not be known due, in part, to cultural 
norms specific to each country. 

The agencies have taken some steps to improve the reliability of the 
personnel data in SPOT. DOD and State officials informed us that they 
have increased efforts to validate SPOT data. In DOD's case, this is 
done, in part, through the SPOT-Plus process, which began in January 
2010. This process is used to reconcile contractor personnel numbers 
in SPOT with the quarterly contractor census and identify information 
that needs to be updated or entered into SPOT. DOD officials informed 
us that they will continue comparing SPOT and census data until there 
is confidence that 85 percent of the personnel reported through the 
census are reported in SPOT, at which point the plan is to discontinue 
the census and fully rely on SPOT. According to DOD officials, their 
analyses indicate that for some categories of contractor personnel 
they may have achieved the 85 percent confidence level, but that for 
other categories--particularly local nationals in Afghanistan--they 
are still below that level. The officials could not provide an 
estimate as to when they will discontinue the census. However, they 
noted that once the 85 percent confidence level is achieved, DOD plans 
to conduct random samplings to ensure it is maintained. Similarly, 
State officials informed us that program and contracting officials 
have begun reviewing SPOT data on a quarterly or even monthly basis in 
an effort to improve SPOT data entry. Given this emphasis, State 
officials told us that they are increasingly confident in the 
reliability of personnel data in SPOT. However, a USAID official 
responsible for preparing the joint report told us that the agency 
does not validate SPOT data and does not intend to do so, noting it 
has experienced high staff turnover in Iraq and Afghanistan and has 
other reporting priorities. 

In April 2011, SPOT was modified to address concerns cited by State 
and USAID officials, as well as by contractors and assistance 
recipients, that the safety of local nationals could be at risk should 
SPOT, with its detailed personal information, be compromised. The 
system now allows users to enter the aggregate number of personnel 
working under a contract or assistance instrument, rather than 
requiring personnel to be entered individually with personally 
identifiable information. This provides a means of counting local 
nationals working under contracts and assistance instruments who 
previously were not entered into the system. USAID officials said that 
while guidance on the use of the aggregate count function has not yet 
been issued, they have begun entering aggregate data on local 
nationals in Afghanistan into SPOT. In January 2011, State revised its 
assistance policy to allow grantees with locally hired Iraqi or Afghan 
personnel to report their aggregate numbers of local nationals into 
SPOT. State officials told us the modification appears to have 
satisfied assistance recipients' concerns, as they are now providing 
State officials with aggregate numbers for inclusion in SPOT. DOD 
officials informed us that they will not be issuing guidance regarding 
the aggregate count function, as DOD's policy continues to require 
contractor personnel working under contracts that meet reporting 
thresholds to be individually entered into SPOT. 

Additional measures have been undertaken to help address the challenge 
of tracking local nationals in SPOT. For example, the SPOT program 
management office developed procedures for establishing unique 
identification numbers for local nationals who are entered into the 
system by name but whose personal identifying information does not 
conform to the required SPOT data fields. Similarly, DOD officials 
told us they have developed work-arounds for Iraqi and Afghan firms 
that lack reliable Internet connections to submit their personnel 
information via templates, which are then uploaded by DOD personnel 
into SPOT. In an effort to improve the collection of data on personnel 
working at remote locations, DOD officials informed us that the 
department is also piloting a handheld device that does not require an 
Internet connection and can be used to collect information on 
personnel that is then uploaded into SPOT. 

Practical and Technical Challenges Continue to Affect SPOT's Ability 
to Track Statutorily Required Data: 

In 2009, we recommended that the three agencies develop a joint plan 
with associated time frames to address SPOT's limitations, but 
agencies responded that a plan was not needed as their ongoing 
coordination efforts were sufficient. However, we concluded last year 
and our work continues to demonstrate that coordination alone is not 
sufficient to ensure that statutory requirements are met. 
Specifically, SPOT still cannot be used to reliably track statutorily 
required contract, assistance instrument, and personnel data as agreed 
to in the agencies' MOU because of a number of longstanding practical 
and technical limitations. SPOT program management officials and the 
agencies have identified plans for further modifications and new 
guidance needed to address some but not all of these limitations. 

SPOT still is not linked with FPDS-NG or other agency systems for 
obtaining information on contracts and assistance instruments. 
Consequently, SPOT cannot be used to obtain financial and competition 
information on contracts and assistance instruments as agreed to in 
the MOUs. According to the joint report, the link to FPDS-NG to obtain 
contract information is scheduled to occur in early fiscal year 2012-- 
this functionality was previously planned to be available in 2010. As 
we reported in 2009, one reason for this delay is that contract 
numbers, which are the unique identifiers that would be used to match 
records in SPOT to those in FPDS-NG, are entered into SPOT using 
different formats. To help resolve this, the SPOT program management 
office modified SPOT earlier this year to require DOD users to enter 
contract numbers in a standardized manner that can be matched with 
FPDS-NG information. SPOT program management officials told us that a 
similar modification has not been made for State or USAID contracts. 
Once the link is made between SPOT and FPDS-NG, information from the 
two systems can only be merged if the contract number has been entered 
into SPOT. If the contract is not in SPOT, because, for example, no 
contractor personnel working on that particular contract have been 
entered, its information cannot be linked with the information in FPDS-
NG. Conversely, current information on the contract has to be in FPDS-
NG, which does not always occur as we found in our analyses of the 
information presented in the joint report. Most notably, officials 
told us that information on USAID contracts awarded in Afghanistan 
must still be manually entered into FPDS-NG, which has resulted in 
known information gaps. USAID is planning to deploy a new system to 
Afghanistan--already in place in Iraq and other countries--that will 
automatically upload contract information into FPDS-NG by the end of 
2011. Once the link between SPOT and FPDS-NG is established and the 
necessary data are in both systems, then SPOT could be relied on to 
provide more complete information on contracts with performance in 
either country, as opposed to relying only on the FPDS-NG principal 
place of performance. SPOT program management officials informed us 
that there are currently no plans to establish links with the State or 
USAID systems that contain assistance instrument information. 
Officials stated that, therefore, information on those instruments 
needs to be manually entered into SPOT. 

SPOT does not provide a reliable means of obtaining information on 
orders and subawards. The statutory requirement to track information 
on contracts and assistance instruments includes a requirement to 
track comparable information on task and delivery orders as well as 
subcontracts and subgrants. However, SPOT does not have a specific 
data field for this information. Instead, contractors and assistance 
recipients are instructed by the agencies to enter information on 
their subawards into a data field designed to track information on 
task orders. As a result, it has not been possible to obtain accurate 
counts of orders and subawards using SPOT. SPOT program management 
officials told us that they expect to address this issue by creating a 
new subaward data field in a September 2011 SPOT upgrade. 

SPOT does not reliably distinguish personnel performing security 
functions. As discussed in our 2010 report, there are three methods to 
distinguish personnel performing security functions from others in 
SPOT. Each method has limitations and yields different results, none 
of which are fully consistent with the statutory definition of 
contractor personnel performing security functions. SPOT program 
officials acknowledge this limitation but informed us that they have 
not yet developed a corrective action to ensure that security 
personnel are consistently and reliably distinguished for statutory 
tracking and reporting purposes. 

SPOT is not being used to track the number of personnel killed and 
wounded. As we reported last year and as noted in the joint report, 
contractors and assistance recipients generally have not been 
recording information on killed or wounded personnel in SPOT. 
According to the joint report, the SPOT program management office is 
working with users to explore ways of improving compliance by 
clarifying the terminology and expanding data fields. For example, 
there have been questions about whether deaths or injuries resulting 
from car accidents should be recorded in SPOT or if SPOT should only 
be used to track those killed or wounded while performing their 
contractual duties. SPOT program officials informed us that there has 
been some discussion of expanding the data fields in SPOT to include 
information like the date of injury or death and details surrounding 
the incident. However, officials told us these actions are still being 
discussed internally and no plans are in place to include such changes 
in upcoming versions of SPOT. Instead, DOD and State officials said 
they are helping contractors and assistance instrument recipients gain 
a better understanding of the requirement to report killed or wounded 
personnel using SPOT. Additionally, State officials told us that they 
have begun entering information into SPOT on killed and wounded 
personnel based on information provided by contractors and assistance 
recipients and anticipate using the data in SPOT to prepare future 
joint reports. 

Concluding Observations: 

In 2008, DOD, State, and USAID designated SPOT as their system of 
record for tracking statutorily required information on contracts and 
contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, a designation they 
reaffirmed in 2010 when the requirement was expanded to include 
assistance instruments and personnel. Yet the agencies still do not 
have reliable sources and methods to report on contracts, assistance 
instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the agencies could not reliably use data 
from SPOT to prepare their first joint report and instead relied on 
other data sources and methods that had significant limitations. Over 
the years, we have reported on the limitations associated with SPOT's 
implementation and the agencies' resulting decisions to rely on other 
methods of collecting and reporting data that have their own 
shortcomings. We recommended in 2009 that the agencies develop a joint 
plan with associated time frames to address limitations and ensure 
SPOT's implementation to fulfill statutory requirements. The agencies 
disagreed with the need for the plan, citing ongoing coordination 
efforts as sufficient. 

While the agencies' recent modifications to SPOT help address some 
limitations, such as those related to tracking local nationals, other 
limitations persist that undermine SPOT's ability to fulfill statutory 
reporting requirements. Further, while agency officials have 
recognized some benefits of using SPOT to help manage, oversee, and 
coordinate contracts, assistance instruments, and associated 
personnel, their ability to do so has been hindered by SPOT's 
shortcomings. Our prior recommendation for a joint plan was intended 
to provide an opportunity for the agencies to work with potential 
users of the data to better understand their information needs and 
determine how best to proceed with defined roles, responsibilities, 
and associated time frames that could help hold the agencies 
accountable and ensure timely implementation. We were concerned that 
without such a plan, SPOT's implementation would continue to languish 
with the agencies not collecting statutorily required information in a 
reliable manner, either using SPOT or other sources. Based on our 
review of the agencies' joint report, we continue to have this concern 
and are uncertain when SPOT will be fully implemented and will serve 
as a reliable source of data for management, oversight, and 
coordination. We have, therefore, concluded that the recommendation 
from our 2009 report still applies, and we are not making any new 
recommendations. 

Agency Comments: 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOD, State, and 
USAID. The three agencies informed us that they had no comments on the 
draft's findings or concluding observations. DOD and State provided us 
with technical comments that we incorporated into the final report, as 
appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, as well as interested congressional 
committees. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO 
website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix I. 

Signed by: 

John P. Hutton: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John F. Kerry: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Saxby Chambliss: 
Vice Chairman: 
Select Committee on Intelligence: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Darrell Issa: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Elijah Cummings: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Michael Rogers: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger: 
Ranking Member: 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John P. Hutton, (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Johana R. Ayers, Assistant 
Director; E. Brandon Booth; Virginia Chanley; Julia Kennon; Gilbert 
Kim; Angie Nichols-Friedman; Anne McDonough-Hughes; Margaret McKenna; 
Robert Swierczek; Michael Rohrback; and Alyssa Weir made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-181, § 863 (as amended) (NDAA for FY2008). See GAO, Iraq and 
Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges in 
Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-1] (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 1, 2010); Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue 
to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 
2009); and Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts 
and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 
2008). 

[2] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 835 (amending Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 863). 

[3] For the purposes of the agencies' joint reporting requirement, 
Section 864(a)(2) of the NDAA for FY 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 as 
amended by section 813(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009) (NDAA for FY2010), 
defines a "contract in Iraq or Afghanistan" as "a contract with the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the United States 
Agency for International Development, a subcontract at any tier issued 
under such a contract, a task order or delivery order at any tier 
issued under such a contract, a grant, or a cooperative agreement 
(including a contract, subcontract, task order, delivery order, grant, 
or cooperative agreement issued by another Government agency for the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the United States 
Agency for International Development) if the contract, subcontract, 
task order, delivery order, grant, or cooperative agreement involves 
worked [sic] performed in Iraq or Afghanistan for a period longer than 
30 days." The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a 
"subcontract" as a contract entered into by a subcontractor to furnish 
supplies or services for performance of a prime contract or a 
subcontract. The FAR defines a "task order" as an order for services 
placed against an established contract or with government sources. 
Throughout this report, when we use the term contract, we intend it to 
refer to a contract, task order, or delivery order with work in Iraq 
or Afghanistan, while the term assistance instrument refers to a grant 
or cooperative agreement with work in Iraq or Afghanistan, within the 
parameters established by the NDAA for FY2008 and the NDAA for FY2010. 

[4] For the purposes of the agencies' joint reporting requirement, the 
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 854(d) (2008) amended section 864 of the NDAA 
for FY2008 to define "contractor personnel" as "any person performing 
work under contract for the Department of Defense, the Department of 
State, or the United States Agency for International Development, in 
Iraq or Afghanistan, including individuals and subcontractors at any 
tier." Section 813 of the NDAA for FY2010 expanded the NDAA for FY2008 
definition of "contract" to include grants and cooperative agreements 
and, therefore, personnel working under grants or cooperative 
agreements in Iraq and Afghanistan fall within the definition of 
"contractor personnel." Section 864 of the NDAA for FY2008 defines 
private security functions as the "guarding of personnel, facilities 
or property of a Federal agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a 
third party" and "any other activity for which personnel are required 
to carry weapons in the performance of their duties." 

[5] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 861. 

[6] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 813 (2009). 

[7] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 835 (amending Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 863). 

[8] The NDAA for FY2011 amendments to the NDAA for FY2008 permit the 
use of estimates in determining the total number of personnel working 
on contracts for any category of contractor personnel for which the 
agencies determine it is not feasible to provide an actual count. 
However, the agencies are to fully disclose in the joint report the 
extent to which estimates are used in lieu of an actual count. 

[9] This guidance was implemented in Department of Defense FAR 
Supplement clause 252.225-7040(g), Class Deviation 2007-O0010, and 
Class Deviation 2011-O0004, which set SPOT reporting thresholds. 

[10] Department of State Office of the Procurement Executive, 
Procurement Information Bulletin No. 2008-15, Use of Synchronized 
Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) for Contractors 
Supporting and Diplomatic or Consular Mission Outside the United 
States, March 25, 2008. Under this policy, applicable contracts are 
defined as those required to include FAR clause 52.225-19. 

[11] Department of State Grants Policy Directive Number 33, Recipient 
Performance in a Designated Area of Combat Operations, January 6, 
2009, as amended on August 13, 2009. 

[12] Department of State Grants Policy Directive Number 33, Recipient 
Performance in a Designated Area of Combat Operations, as amended on 
January 10, 2011. In addition, certain locally hired personnel, for 
example, those performing a private security function or performing 
duties as translators, must be individually entered into SPOT. 

[13] USAID Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive 09-01, Contract 
Clause and Assistance Provision for Awards in Iraq, April 1, 2009. 

[14] USAID Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive 10-04, Contract 
Clause and Assistance Provision for Awards in Afghanistan, July 20, 
2010. 

[15] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 863 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 
835). 

[16] The FAR defines "personal services contracts" as contracts that, 
by their express terms or as administered, make the contractor 
personnel appear to be, in effect, government employees. FAR 2.101. 
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, authorizes USAID to 
enter into personal services contracts with individuals for services 
abroad; these individuals are not regarded as employees of the U.S. 
government for the purpose of civil service laws. 22 U.S.C. § 
2396(a)(3). 

[17] The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Program Support is responsible for oversight and program management 
for the orchestration, synchronization, and integration of contingency 
acquisition planning and its operational execution in the Department 
of Defense. This office was responsible for compiling DOD's 
contribution to the joint report. 

[18] The three different methods that can be used are sorting by (1) 
job titles, (2) common industry classification system code that 
identifies contracts based on the type of service provided, or (3) the 
weapon authorization data field that identifies personnel authorized 
to carry firearms. 

[19] The following job titles have been identified by the SPOT program 
office to determine the number of security contractors under this 
method: Security Advisor; Private Security Contractor; Security 
Specialist; Site Security Advisor; and Security Supervisor. 

[20] Congress enacted the DBA in 1941. The insurance required under 
DBA provides employees with uniform levels of disability and medical 
benefits or, in the event of death, provides benefits to eligible 
dependents. Contractors, including subcontractors, are required to 
provide DBA insurance coverage for all of their employees, regardless 
of their nationality, working outside the United States on U.S. 
military bases or under a contract with the U.S. government for public 
works or national defense. 

[21] USAID, Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Oversight of Private Security 
Contractors in Afghanistan, Audit Report Number 5-306-10-009-P (May 
21, 2010). 

[22] The Contracting Fusion Cell is responsible for monitoring and 
assessing the contractor demobilization mission and compliance with 
mission requirements for U.S. Forces-Iraq. 

[End of section] 

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