This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-652
entitled 'Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Improve Response to
Potential Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters Affecting Food and
Agriculture' which was released on September 13, 2011.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
August 2011:
Homeland Security:
Actions Needed to Improve Response to Potential Terrorist Attacks and
Natural Disasters Affecting Food and Agriculture:
GAO-11-652:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-652, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive
(HSPD)-9 in 2004 to establish a national policy to defend the food and
agriculture systems against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies. HSPD-9 assigns various emergency response and
recovery responsibilities to the Departments of Agriculture (USDA),
Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and others.
In addition, Emergency Support Function (ESF)-11 addresses the federal
food and agriculture response during emergencies and is coordinated by
USDA. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the extent to which there is
oversight of federal agencies’ overall progress in implementing HSPD-9;
(2) the steps USDA has taken to implement its HSPD-9 responsibilities
for response and recovery and challenges, if any; and (3) the
circumstances under which USDA has coordinated an ESF-11 response and
challenges it faces, if any. GAO reviewed key documents; surveyed
states; and interviewed agency, state, and industry officials.
What GAO Found:
There is no centralized coordination to oversee the federal government’
s overall progress implementing the nation’s food and agriculture
defense policy—HSPD-9. At one time, the White House Homeland Security
Council and DHS took steps to gather and coordinate information about
agencies’ efforts to implement HSPD-9, but no agency currently does
so. Officials from the National Security Staff—-which now supports the
Homeland Security Council—-told GAO that they will be looking for an
opportunity to conduct an interagency review of HSPD-9, and DHS
officials stated that Homeland Security Council leadership is
important to ensure the success of their coordination efforts. Federal
standards for internal control call for agencies to employ such
activities as top-level review to help ensure that management’s
directives are carried out and to determine if agencies are
effectively and efficiently using resources. Because there is no
centralized coordination to oversee agencies’ overall HSPD-9 efforts,
the nation may not be assured that these crosscutting agency efforts
are effective at reducing the vulnerability to, and impact of, major
emergencies.
USDA agencies have taken steps to implement the department’s HSPD-9
response and recovery responsibilities. However, various challenges
remain, such as critical research gaps, which could impede recovery
from high-consequence plant diseases that could devastate the nation’s
production of economically important crops. Also, USDA does not have a
department-wide strategy for setting its priorities and allocating
resources for implementing its numerous HSPD-9 responsibilities.
Without such a strategy, USDA cannot be assured that its agencies are
making progress to align with departmental priorities and that its
HSPD-9 responsibilities are met.
Since 2007, USDA has coordinated the federal ESF-11 response for about
28 natural disasters, including hurricanes and floods. Although USDA
and state officials GAO met with identified factors that contributed
to the success of USDA’s response—such as having a single USDA
coordinator to facilitate communication during ESF-11 emergencies—they
also identified some challenges. For example, federal agencies’
responsibilities for disposing of animal carcasses following an
emergency are unclear, which delayed previous disposal efforts and
could pose a public health risk. Also, USDA has not consistently
prepared after-action reports that summarize what went well and what
needed improvement during an emergency response. Without preparing
such reports for all ESF-11 responses, USDA managers may not have the
necessary information to help ensure that past mistakes are not
repeated.
Figure: Livestock Stranded, Killed, and Buried as a Result of Natural
Disasters:
[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photographs]
Sources: Clean Harbors (photo on left); USDA (photos in middle and on
right).
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO’s nine recommendations include that (1) DHS resume efforts to
coordinate agencies’ HSPD-9 implementation efforts, (2) USDA develop a
department-wide strategy for implementing its HSPD-9 responsibilities,
and (3) USDA ensure that after-action reports are completed. USDA,
HHS, and DHS generally agreed with GAO’s recommendations. The National
Security Staff stated they agree that a review of HSPD-9 is
appropriate and will look for an opportunity to do so.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-652] or key
components. For more information, contact Lisa Shames at (202) 512-
3841or shamesl@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
No Centralized Coordination Exists to Oversee Federal Agencies'
Overall Progress in Implementing the Nation's Food And Agriculture
Defense Policy:
USDA Agencies Have Taken Steps to Implement the Department's Response
and Recovery Responsibilities, but Challenges Remain:
USDA Has Coordinated the Federal Food and Agriculture Response for
Various Natural Disasters, but USDA, FEMA, and State Officials
Identified Several Challenges:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Federal Agencies Roles and Responsibilities for Food and
Agriculture Defense as Defined by HSPD-9:
Appendix II: The 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF), ESF
Coordinators, and ESF Responsibilities:
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix IV: Seventeen Most Damaging Animal Diseases Identified for
USDA's National Veterinary Stockpile:
Appendix V: Survey of State and U.S. Territory Animal Health Officials:
Appendix VI: Thirteen High-Consequence Plant Diseases with Completed
Recovery Plans for USDA's NPDRS:
Appendix VII: USDA List of 28 ESF-11 Activations between 2007 and 2011:
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services:
Appendix X: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Departments, Agencies, and Offices Interviewed:
Table 2: Organizations Interviewed:
Table 3: State Agencies Interviewed:
Abbreviations:
APHIS: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service:
ARS: Agricultural Research Service:
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
ESF: Emergency Support Function:
FDA: Food and Drug Administration:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FSIS: Food Safety and Inspection Service:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive:
NPDRS: National Plant Disease Recovery System:
NVS: National Veterinary Stockpile:
OHSEC: Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Coordination:
USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 19, 2011:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Agriculture is critical to public health and the nation's economy. It
annually produces $300 billion worth of food and other farm products,
provides a major foundation for prosperity in rural areas, and is
estimated to be responsible for 1 out of every 12 U.S. jobs. As a
result, any natural or deliberate disruption of the agriculture or
food production systems--including natural disasters, disease
outbreaks, and food contamination--can present a serious threat to the
national economy and human health and can halt or slow trade. For
example, initial estimates found that Hurricane Katrina caused $882
million in total crop, livestock, and aquaculture losses in the
Southeast and interrupted the flow of poultry, milk, and other
agricultural products to markets. The food and agriculture systems are
also vulnerable to terrorist attacks, such as the intentional
introduction of a foreign animal or plant disease or the intentional
contamination of food products. While the U.S. food and agriculture
systems have yet to experience such an attack, the congressionally
established bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism reported in 2010 that the
nation is seriously lacking in its capability to rapidly respond to a
natural or intentional biological threat and gave the nation a failing
grade in this area.[Footnote 1]
Recognizing the vulnerability of the U.S. food and agriculture
systems, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive
(HSPD)-9 in January 2004 to establish a national policy to defend the
food and agriculture systems against terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD-9 assigns federal agencies
responsibilities to enhance the nation's preparedness for food and
agriculture emergencies. For example, HSPD-9 assigns the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) responsibility for four efforts
related to emergency response and recovery, including as co-lead with
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on enhancing
recovery efforts. See appendix I for detailed information on agencies'
roles and responsibilities under HSPD-9.
Separately, in 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created
the National Response Plan--which in 2008 was replaced by the National
Response Framework. The framework outlines how the nation will
collectively respond to any emergency, natural or man-made, regardless
of its cause or size. Specifically, according to this document, during
an emergency, state and local governments typically take the lead in
response efforts, and the federal government can provide assistance if
states become overwhelmed or require additional capabilities. The
framework includes 15 emergency support functions (ESF) for a federal
response to an emergency, as well as federal support to states during
an emergency (see appendix II for a list of all 15 ESFs). DHS
activates individual ESFs when a threat or emergency necessitates a
specific type of coordinated federal response. For example, during
Tropical Storm Fay in 2008, DHS activated multiple ESFs, including ESF-
5 to support evacuations, ESF-8 to assess the health care
infrastructure, and ESF-12 to monitor fuel and traffic. ESF-11
specifically addresses the federal food and agriculture response
during emergencies, and USDA is designated as the coordinator.
In 2005, we reported that the United States faces several complex
challenges--including the inability to deploy vaccines within 24 hours
of a disease outbreak--that limit its ability to quickly and
effectively respond to a widespread attack on agriculture.[Footnote 2]
In addition, for more than a decade, we have reported on the
fragmented nature of federal food safety oversight and have found that
it results in inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and
inefficient use of resources. In 2007, we added food safety to our
list of high-risk areas that warrant attention by Congress and the
executive branch. Our biennial reviews of high-risk issues in 2009 and
2011 concluded that fragmentation of federal food safety oversight
continues to be a problem.[Footnote 3] We have made several
recommendations on this issue, including recommending that agencies
develop a government-wide performance plan for food safety that
includes results-oriented goals and performance measures, as well as
information about strategies and resources.[Footnote 4]
This report responds to your request for a review of the nation's food
and agriculture defense policy and ESF-11. Our objectives were to (1)
evaluate the extent to which there is oversight of federal agencies'
overall progress in implementing the nation's food and agriculture
defense policy; (2) evaluate the steps USDA has taken to implement its
response and recovery responsibilities outlined in this policy, and
identify challenges, if any, that the department faces in implementing
these responsibilities; and (3) identify the circumstances under which
USDA has coordinated the federal food and agriculture response for an
emergency for which ESF-11 was activated and challenges, if any, that
the parties involved experienced.
To evaluate the extent to which there is oversight of federal
agencies' overall progress in implementing HSPD-9, we reviewed
presidential directives and compared federal efforts with those
outlined in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government.[Footnote 5] We also interviewed officials from USDA, DHS,
HHS, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)--because these
agencies have the most responsibilities under HSPD-9--and analyzed
progress reports these agencies provided to the Homeland Security
Council.
To evaluate the steps USDA has taken to implement its response and
recovery responsibilities outlined in HSPD-9 and identify whether it
encountered any implementation challenges, we reviewed relevant laws,
regulations, and presidential directives, as well as federal guidance,
planning, and implementation documents. We interviewed officials from
various USDA agencies responsible for implementing the department's
response and recovery responsibilities, and we interviewed relevant
officials from DHS, HHS, and EPA regarding USDA's interagency
coordination efforts. Moreover, we conducted a survey of animal health
officials from all 50 states and 5 U.S. territories. The survey
gathered information about states' and U.S. territories' experiences
working with USDA regarding the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS),
the nation's repository of resources for responding to outbreaks of
the most damaging animal diseases. We received responses from 52 of 55
animal health officials surveyed, for an overall response rate of 95
percent. We also conducted interviews in person or via telephone with
agriculture officials from a nonprobability sample of three states
about their experiences working with USDA--Iowa, Mississippi, and
Texas--selected, in part, because USDA officials told us that these
states used resources from the NVS for animal-related emergencies. In
addition, we conducted interviews with representatives of industry
associations for the top five U.S. agricultural commodities--cattle
and calves, corn, soybeans, dairy products, and broiler chickens--
about the impact of USDA's food and agriculture emergency response and
recovery efforts on industry.
To identify the circumstances under which USDA has coordinated the
federal food and agriculture response during an emergency for which
ESF-11 was activated, and if the parties involved experienced any
challenges, we reviewed relevant agency documents, including ESF-11
and key documents from ESF-11 activations. We also interviewed
relevant officials from USDA and DHS. Moreover, we conducted
interviews in person or via telephone with agriculture officials from
Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Texas--selected largely because
(1) these states have experienced at least one emergency for which ESF-
11 was activated, (2) USDA conducted on-the-ground activities in these
states in response to these emergencies, and (3) of their geographic
locations--about their experience working with USDA and DHS during
previous ESF-11 emergencies. We also requested and reviewed
information from USDA and DHS related to the number of times ESF-11
has been activated and found that the data are not sufficiently
reliable for reporting purposes. We are making a recommendation
regarding this finding. Additional details about the objectives,
scope, and methodology of our review are presented in appendix III.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to August 2011, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Four federal agencies have most of the responsibility under the
response and recovery category of HSPD-9USDA, DHS, HHS, and EPA. Each
of these four agencies also conducts additional activities to support
and protect the food and agriculture systems as follows:
* USDA's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Coordination
(OHSEC) coordinates USDA's disaster management and emergency planning
response activities and has responsibility for coordinating the
department's HSPD-9 responsibilities. In addition, USDA's Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible for issuing
orders and regulations to prevent the introduction or dissemination of
animal and plant pests and diseases. USDA's Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS) is responsible for the safety of meat, poultry, and
processed egg products. Moreover, USDA's Agricultural Research Service
(ARS) is the department's chief research agency, conducting research
on agricultural problems of high national priority. Additionally,
USDA's Natural Resources Conservation Service administers a number of
programs that encourage conservation, development, and productive use
of the nation's land.
* DHS is responsible for coordinating the overall national effort to
protect the nation's critical infrastructure--including agriculture--
from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other large-scale
emergencies. DHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
mission is to provide response to emergencies and major disasters,
such as those arising from terrorist attacks and natural disasters,
including managing the response, coordinating federal response
resources, and aiding recovery. FEMA coordinates response support
across the federal government by activating one or more ESFs. In
addition, DHS's Office of Health Affairs provides medical, public
health, and scientific expertise to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from all hazards impacting the nation's health security. The
Office of Health Affairs has been delegated responsibility for
coordinating the department's HSPD-9 responsibilities.
* In the event of an outbreak of a zoonotic disease--a disease that
can be transmitted between humans and animals and could possibly kill
both, such as highly pathogenic avian influenza--HHS's Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) would become involved to help
control the spread of the disease and minimize the impact of the
outbreak. CDC also manages the Strategic National Stockpile, which
contains such medical supplies as antibiotics and life-support
medications to address public health emergencies affecting humans.
Another HHS agency, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), is
responsible for ensuring the safety of most other food that does not
fall under USDA's jurisdiction, such as whole shell eggs, seafood,
milk, grain products, and fruits and vegetables. FDA also approves
human drugs, biologics (which include vaccines, blood and blood
components, and tissues), and medical devices used in the Strategic
National Stockpile and new animal drugs for treating disease in
animals, including food-producing animals.
* EPA's mission is to protect human health and the environment.
Specifically for protecting the food and agriculture sector under HSPD-
9, EPA provides technical assistance and guidance on decontamination
and disposal to the public and private sectors and authorizes the use
of pesticides to prevent or mitigate crop and livestock pathogens and
other pests and bio-agents that can be a threat to crop and food
production. In addition, EPA is responsible for working with DHS, HHS,
and USDA for developing and disseminating decontamination and disposal
standards and model plans to be used during food and agriculture
emergencies.
In addition, the White House Homeland Security Council was established
by executive order in 2001 to ensure coordination of the homeland
security-related activities of executive departments and agencies, as
well as effective development and implementation of homeland security
policies, such as HSPD-9. The Homeland Security Council advises the
President and includes the Vice President and heads of some executive
branch agencies.[Footnote 6] In May 2009, the President merged the
Homeland Security Council with the National Security Council, a
council that advises the President on national security and foreign
policy matters. The White House National Security Staff now supports
both councils. The Homeland Security Council was maintained as the
principal venue for interagency deliberations on issues that affect
homeland security.
USDA coordinates a federal food and agriculture response, among other
things, when ESF-11 is activated. ESF-11 defines specific areas of
federal response, including:
* providing nutrition assistance,
* responding to animal and plant diseases and pests,
* ensuring the safety and security of the commercial food supply,
* providing for the safety and well-being of household pets during an
emergency response or evacuation, and:
* protecting natural and cultural resources and historical properties.
[Footnote 7]
During an emergency, USDA may assist with response efforts through its
normal day-to-day or statutory responsibilities. FEMA also has the
authority to ask USDA, through a mission assignment, to conduct work
outside of its general statutory authorities. A mission assignment is
a reimbursable work order to other federal agencies to complete a
specific task.
No Centralized Coordination Exists to Oversee Federal Agencies'
Overall Progress in Implementing the Nation's Food And Agriculture
Defense Policy:
There is no centralized coordination to oversee the federal
government's overall progress in implementing responsibilities
outlined in the nation's food and agriculture defense policy--HSPD-9.
Because the responsibilities outlined in HSPD-9 cut across several
different agencies, centralized oversight is important to ensure that
agencies' efforts are coordinated to avoid fragmentation, efficiently
use scarce funds, and promote the overall effectiveness of the federal
government. Moreover, in our past work, we have offered approaches for
better overseeing crosscutting programs, including improved
coordination to ensure that program efforts are mutually reinforcing.
Previously, the Homeland Security Council conducted some coordinated
activities to oversee federal agencies' HSPD-9 implementation by
gathering information from agencies about their progress, and DHS's
Office of Health Affairs supported these activities by coordinating
agencies' reporting of HSPD-9 implementation progress. However, the
Homeland Security Council and DHS's efforts are no longer ongoing.
Officials from EPA noted that although the Homeland Security Council's
and DHS's oversight roles have not been consistent for the past few
years, EPA and other agencies have used multi-agency working groups to
coordinate food and agriculture emergency activities.[Footnote 8] It
is unclear why the Homeland Security Council no longer gathers such
information, but DHS noted that interest from agencies and the
Homeland Security Council has decreased, and they no longer coordinate
agencies' reporting of their HSPD-9 implementation progress.
From 2007 to early 2009, the Homeland Security Council gathered status
updates from agencies, which were a list of efforts agencies had
undertaken to fulfill their HSPD-9 responsibilities. USDA, DHS, EPA,
and HHS officials told us that the Homeland Security Council's efforts
were valuable. For example, EPA officials told us it was valuable to
interact with other agencies regarding HSPD-9 efforts, and HHS
officials found the Homeland Security Council's consolidation of
information across multiple agencies to be useful. However, USDA and
DHS officials told us that the Homeland Security Council stopped
requesting this information some time in late 2008 or early 2009. An
official from the National Security Staff--which now supports the
Homeland Security Council--confirmed that the National Security Staff
is not currently conducting an interagency review of HSPD-9 but will
be looking for an opportunity to do so.
In addition, in 2008 the Homeland Security Council tasked DHS with
creating an online forum intended to enable agencies to share
information that coordinated their HSPD-9 efforts.[Footnote 9]
According to DHS officials, the forum was intended to replace the
status updates that agencies were providing to the Homeland Security
Council and would allow Homeland Security Council and department
officials to efficiently view agencies' implementation progress in a
consistent manner. DHS officials told us that agencies' initial
participation in the development of the online forum was strong, but
participation declined after the Homeland Security Council's
leadership on HSPD-9 implementation diminished in 2009. These DHS
officials also noted that the Homeland Security Council's support of
the online forum was beneficial and encouraged other agencies to
participate. USDA officials told us that the online forum would be
useful if agencies were given resources to contribute and maintain
information included in the forum. EPA and HHS officials, however,
told us that they did not find the forum to be useful and were
concerned about how DHS would use the information shared through the
forum. According to DHS officials, DHS has the authority to coordinate
HSPD-9 implementation, as HSPD-9 states that the Secretary of Homeland
Security will "lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation efforts
among Federal departments and agencies." DHS officials told us that in
2009 during the change of presidential administrations, the department
"paused" the interagency working group involved with developing the
forum. According to these DHS officials, although the department
continues to use the forum internally to monitor DHS's HSPD-9
progress, agencies have not contributed information to the forum since
that time.
Under the federal standards for internal control, federal agencies are
to employ internal control activities, such as top-level review, to
help ensure that management's directives are carried out and to
determine if agencies are effectively and efficiently using resources.
[Footnote 10] Because there is currently no centralized coordination
to oversee agencies' HSPD-9 implementation progress, it is unclear how
effectively or efficiently agencies are using resources in
implementing the nation's food and agriculture defense policy. As a
result, the nation may not be assured that crosscutting agency efforts
to protect agriculture and the food supply are well-designed and
effectively implemented in order to reduce vulnerability to, and the
impact of, terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
USDA Agencies Have Taken Steps to Implement the Department's Response
and Recovery Responsibilities, but Challenges Remain:
USDA agencies have taken steps to implement the four HSPD-9 response
and recovery efforts for which USDA has the lead responsibility, but
various challenges remain. First, APHIS has developed the NVS but
experiences complex implementation challenges. Second, ARS has taken
steps to develop the National Plant Disease Recovery System (NPDRS),
but implementation challenges remain. Third, various USDA agencies
have taken steps to enhance food and agriculture recovery efforts, but
critical challenges may affect recovery from animal disease outbreaks
or food contaminations. Fourth, USDA submitted a required report on
tools to help agriculture producers in the event of a terrorist attack
to the Homeland Security Council but has not taken steps to address
the report's recommendations. We also found that a common challenge
affecting all four of these efforts is that USDA does not have a
department-wide strategy for implementing HSPD-9.
APHIS Developed the NVS to Respond to Outbreaks of Certain Animal
Diseases but Experiences Complex Implementation Challenges:
In 2006, APHIS began operating its NVS to respond to the 17 most
damaging animal diseases, such as highly pathogenic avian influenza
(see appendix IV for a list of the 17 diseases). Under HSPD-9, the
Secretary of Agriculture is responsible for developing a stockpile
containing sufficient resources to respond to the most damaging animal
diseases affecting human health and the economy and deploying them
within 24 hours of an outbreak. This responsibility grew out of a
national concern that terrorists could simultaneously release animal
diseases of catastrophic proportions that would quickly deplete state
[Footnote 11] and industry resources and overwhelm the private sector.
USDA assigned this responsibility to APHIS because of its mission to
safeguard the health of the nation's animals against the introduction,
reemergence, or spread of animal diseases. From 2006 through 2010,
APHIS allocated approximately $33 million to develop the NVS and
acquire critical resources to combat animal disease threats, including
vaccines, diagnostic test kits, personal protective equipment, animal
handling equipment, antiviral medication, and contracts for commercial
support services--which are response companies that can quickly
provide trained personnel with equipment to support states. According
to the NVS business plan, deploying these resources within 24 hours
after an outbreak would benefit states only if they knew how to
request, manage, and use them. In light of this, APHIS has taken
several steps to help prepare states to request and use NVS resources.
For example, APHIS developed guidance and hired a full-time liaison
to, among other things, help states develop a plan to manage these
resources.
[Side bar:
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza:
[Photograph]
Source: USDA.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses are associated with high
morbidity and mortality in poultry and are considered foreign animal
diseases because they rarely occur in the United States. Clinical
signs in chickens include sudden death, lack of energy and appetite,
decreased egg production, swelling of the head and eyelids (as
depicted in photo above), nasal discharge, among others. Although
primarily an avian disease, the H5N1 strain of the virus can infect
humans and have severe economic consequences. For example, since 2003
highly pathogenic avian influenza killed millions of wild and domestic
birds worldwide and infected over 550 people, more than half of whom
died. Spread of this virus has taken a major economic toll, costing
East Asian economies an estimated $10 billion. According to the World
Health Organization, controlling the virus in animals is the principal
way to reduce opportunities for human infection and, therefore, reduce
opportunities for a pandemic to emerge. End of side bar]
Although APHIS has taken important steps to develop the NVS, complex
implementation challenges remain. For example, according to USDA
management officials, although the NVS has acquired various resources
to respond to each of the 17 most damaging animal disease threats,
resource gaps exist for some of the diseases for a variety of reasons.
Some vaccines and diagnostic test kits, for example, have not yet been
developed for certain diseases or may be too costly for the NVS to
purchase. In addition, APHIS officials told us that although they have
the capability to deploy certain resources within 24 hours--as
required by HSPD-9--it will take longer to deliver certain vaccines to
states. We previously reported that because vaccines are not stored in
a ready-to-use state, their delivery will take additional time.
[Footnote 12] Our analysis of NVS documents indicates that
manufacturers must first prepare such vaccines for use--a process that
could take an additional 7 to 14 days, depending upon the vaccine.
According to the NVS business plan, purchasing and maintaining
vaccines with methods that minimize the costs of storage, maintenance,
and expiration--such as by not storing them in a ready-to-use state--
is imperative to using existing funds wisely. In addition, more than
half of state and U.S. territory animal health officials responding to
our survey reported that they are concerned the NVS may not be able to
deploy its vaccines within 24 hours of an outbreak (see app. V for the
complete survey). In fact, state and U.S. territory animal health
officials reported more concerns about NVS vaccines than any other
resource available from the NVS.
Another challenge is that the states may not be adequately prepared to
receive and use NVS resources. Specifically, about three-quarters of
state and territory animal health officials who responded to our
survey reported that they have taken steps to create an NVS plan.
About one-third of all the states and territories responding to our
survey reported completing such a plan. According to NVS guidance,
states need a plan to manage the distribution of NVS resources to
ensure responders get what they need. Moreover, some of the states
that lack such a plan have major cattle, hog, or poultry production.
State and territory animal health officials who responded to our
survey generally reported they have not completed a NVS plan because
they lack sufficient personnel or financial resources. In addition,
only 38 percent of state and territory animal health officials who
responded to our survey reported that their state or U.S. territory
has identified a physical location to manage the NVS resources APHIS
would deploy in response to a disease outbreak. According to NVS
guidance, it is "absolutely critical" that states identify locations
from which they will manage NVS resources in advance of an outbreak;
otherwise, states will not be able to adequately support responders.
NVS officials are aware of states' progress in creating NVS plans and
are developing a 5-year training and exercise strategy to help
overcome this problem. According to APHIS officials, this strategy is
designed to enhance the preparedness of federal, state, tribe,
territory, and local governments to logistically respond to damaging
animal disease outbreaks, which will improve the NVS program's ability
to accomplish its mission and meet its goals.
Further, more than half of state and territory animal health officials
reported concerns that APHIS has not shared sufficient information
regarding the type or amount of NVS resources available. Without such
information, states may be less able to adequately plan for using NVS
resources or determine whether the resources would be sufficient or
appropriate to meet their needs during an emergency. For example, one
official reported that planning efforts are "futile" unless states
know what is available from the NVS. APHIS officials told us they did
not share this information in the past for security reasons but that
they are now developing a mechanism to securely share information
about the type, but not the amount, of resources available in the NVS
with states and territories. APHIS officials told us they will
continue to not share information regarding the quantity of resources
available for security reasons.
Moreover, APHIS and CDC have taken some steps to help the NVS leverage
the mechanisms and infrastructure of CDC's Strategic National
Stockpile. HSPD-9 states that the "NVS shall leverage where
appropriate the mechanisms and infrastructure that have been developed
for the management, storage, and distribution of the Strategic
National Stockpile." According to APHIS and CDC officials, the two
agencies have collaborated since the inception of the NVS. For
example, CDC officials told us that they provided the NVS technical
assistance and shared lessons learned, operational plans, and guidance
documents. In addition, in February 2011, APHIS and CDC officials met
to discuss collaboration between the two stockpiles, including the
possibility of sharing resources, such as transportation, warehousing,
and state and local resources used for the receipt and distribution of
Strategic National Stockpile assets. However, according to CDC
officials, no additional opportunities for resource sharing have been
identified to date. Furthermore, CDC officials told us that it is
inappropriate, and may be too costly, for the NVS to further leverage
the Strategic National Stockpile because of differences in their
missions. Specifically, they told us that the mission of the Strategic
National Stockpile is to save human life and requires a 12-hour
response time or quicker, whereas the mission of the NVS is to
minimize the economic impact of an animal disease outbreak and allows
a longer 24-hour response time.
Despite these steps to collaborate, there appears to be some confusion
about the details of each stockpile's mission and infrastructure that
may be impeding the agencies' efforts to further leverage the
stockpiles. For example, according to APHIS officials, opportunities
exist for the NVS to use the same state inventory management system
developed by the Strategic National Stockpile so that states do not
have to understand and maintain multiple systems to manage resources
they would receive from either stockpile during an emergency.
According to an APHIS official responsible for state coordination,
managing separate systems is neither cost effective nor efficient.
Having two separate systems requires additional costs for maintenance,
training, and technical support. However, according to CDC officials,
the Strategic National Stockpile does not currently provide an
inventory management system for state use. Instead, states use their
own systems to meet their particular needs for managing Strategic
National Stockpile provided inventory. Moreover, CDC officials told us
there is no need to share inventory management systems, because as
they understood it, the NVS does not send any resources to states;
instead, CDC officials said the NVS sends commercial support services
directly to farms to respond to disease outbreaks. This is counter to
NVS planning guidance, which asserts that states must have an
inventory management system in place to manage the "massive resources"
they will receive from the NVS and that their system should be
operational before the first shipment of resources arrives. When
commenting on a draft of this report, however, HHS officials stated
that the agency is in the process of developing an inventory
management system for state and federal use during an emergency. HHS
officials also told us that this system could potentially prove useful
to state officials who might receive or manage resources from the NVS
and that CDC has offered to provide NVS access to the system after it
is developed.
In addition, APHIS and CDC officials disagree about whether additional
resources from the Strategic National Stockpile can be leveraged.
Specifically, APHIS officials told us that opportunities exist to
leverage antiviral medication contained in the Strategic National
Stockpile. For example, a senior NVS official told us that both
stockpiles would use the same antiviral medication to protect humans
during an emergency and should explore opportunities to leverage
similar resources. In fact, this official told us that if the NVS's
existing inventory of antiviral medication expires or is depleted,
additional supplies are available from the Strategic National
Stockpile. CDC officials told us, however, that the vast majority of
the antiviral medications contained in the Strategic National
Stockpile are pre-allocated for states and that it is inappropriate
for the NVS to leverage antiviral medications from the Strategic
National Stockpile. CDC officials also told us that the NVS could
easily purchase the antiviral medication on the commercial market at a
lower cost than the comprehensive cost of developing an interagency
agreement. However, according to HHS's pandemic influenza plan, demand
for antivirals during an influenza pandemic is likely to "far
outstrip" supplies available in stockpiles or through usual channels
of distribution. This was observed during the 2009 H1N1 influenza
pandemic when the Strategic National Stockpile had to release
antiviral medications for young children in response to state and
local shortages. Supply and demand imbalances are not limited to
influenzas. For example, this imbalance was recently observed
following the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan that resulted
in the release of radiation from damaged nuclear reactors.
Specifically, FDA reported increased demand for potassium iodide--the
only FDA-approved medication available to treat contamination with
radioactive iodine--and media reported that manufacturers struggled to
keep up with the sudden increase in demand, and, in some cases, supply
of the product ran out. We have previously reported on challenges
associated with leveraging CDC's Strategic National Stockpile
capabilities and infrastructure for the NVS. Specifically, in 2007 we
reported that NVS officials told us that in order to prevent
duplication of efforts and limit costs, the best strategy for the NVS
to acquire antiviral medication to protect responders from highly
pathogenic avian influenza would be to gain access to antiviral
medication in the Strategic National Stockpile.[Footnote 13] Four
years later, APHIS and CDC officials continue to disagree on this
issue.
APHIS and CDC officials have collaborated since the inception of the
NVS, but as we discussed, confusion and disagreement may be impeding
efforts to further identify leveraging opportunities. With no formal
agreement regarding if and when it is appropriate for the NVS to
leverage the mechanisms and infrastructure developed for the Strategic
National Stockpile, USDA and HHS may miss opportunities to more
effectively utilize federal and state resources.
ARS Has Taken Steps to Develop a NPDRS, but Implementation Challenges
Remain:
USDA's ARS has taken steps to develop the NPDRS, which is a system
intended to help the nation recover from high-consequence plant
disease outbreaks--outbreaks that could devastate the nation's
production of economically important crops. Under HSPD-9, the
Secretary of Agriculture is responsible for developing a NPDRS capable
of, among other things, responding to high-consequence plant diseases
within a single growing season by using resistant seed varieties and
disease control measures, such as pesticides. From 2005 through 2010,
ARS allocated approximately $10.6 million to the development of the
NPDRS. According to the 2010 NPDRS draft strategic plan, which
officials expect to finalize in summer 2011, ARS's principal method
for fulfilling this responsibility is to develop an estimated 30 to 50
recovery plans for select high-consequence plant diseases that may
enter the United States. Thus, from 2005 through 2010, ARS allocated
about $1.1 million (10.8 percent) of NPDRS funds to develop recovery
plans and assigned responsibility for developing the plans to its
Office of Pest Management Policy--which integrates USDA's activities
related to pest management, among other things. As of May 2011, ARS's
Office of Pest Management Policy has completed 13 plans (see appendix
VI for a description of the plant diseases with completed recovery
plans), all of which address the use of disease control measures and
resistant seed varieties. According to NPDRS documents, each recovery
plan is intended to provide a brief primer on the plant disease and
identify research gaps and priorities, among other things. For
example, the NPDRS recovery plan for stem rust of wheat--one of the
most devastating plant diseases worldwide, which threatens wheat and
barley production--states that current understanding of the disease is
based largely on 50-year-old data that must be reexamined and
identifies 13 specific areas that require updated research. According
to ARS officials, updated research is needed to improve understanding
of stem rust in the context of contemporary cropping practices, wheat
varieties, and diseases.
[Side bar:
Stem Rust of Wheat:
[Photograph]
Source: Agricultural Research Service, USDA.
According to the NPDRS recovery plan for stem rust of wheat, the
disease occurs wherever wheat is grown and has been one of the most
devastating plant diseases worldwide. In 1999, a new strain of the
disease was reported in Uganda. The new strain is able to cause
disease on previously resistant wheat cultivars, and USDA is concerned
that it will be introduced into the United States—thereby threatening
wheat and barley production. Although stem rust has been effectively
controlled in the United States for the past 50 years, previous
outbreaks have been costly to producers. For example, according to the
NPDRS recovery plan, total production losses due to stem rust in
Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota in 1935, 1953, and 1954 were
estimated at over 250 million bushels, which represents nearly $3.7
billion (adjusted to 2009 dollars). End of side bar]
In addition to developing recovery plans, ARS uses NPDRS funds for
research purposes. ARS officials told us that the NPDRS program
provides a flexible source of funding to help ARS initiate research on
new, emerging plant disease problems as they arise. Thus, from 2005
through 2010, ARS allocated over $7 million of NPDRS funds to conduct
research on the two plant diseases that, according to ARS officials,
currently pose the greatest threat to the U.S. food and agriculture
systems soybean rust[Footnote 14] and stem rust of wheat. According to
a senior ARS official, these research funds were used to implement
national USDA action plans and conduct research that addressed the
highest priority needs included in the NPDRS recovery plans for these
two high-consequence plant disease threats.
Despite these efforts, important challenges related to the NPDRS
remain. For example, although the Office of Pest Management Policy
spent resources developing recovery plans that identified critical
research gaps, ARS officials told us the agency lacks resources and a
process to fill these gaps. According to ARS officials, they rely on a
variety of entities--including ARS, other federal agencies, state
governments, land grant universities, and the private sector--to
conduct research on high-consequence plant diseases that may fill
research gaps identified in the recovery plans. However, ARS does not
have a systematic process for tracking research conducted or under way
that may fill the gaps identified in the NPDRS recovery plans. Without
a documented, systematic process to monitor the extent to which
research gaps are filled, USDA may not have critical information
needed to help the nation recover from high-consequence plant disease
outbreaks. Moreover, NPDRS guidance states that recovery plans provide
an opportunity to indicate where research dollars need to be
concentrated in the future.
ARS also has not effectively communicated the NPDRS to key
stakeholders that need to know about these plant disease recovery
plans. The NPDRS draft strategic plan states that recovery from high-
consequence plant diseases will require coordination between USDA and
states. Moreover, according to USDA officials, several key officials
should be aware of NPDRS recovery plans, including state plant
regulatory officials and APHIS state plant health directors. However,
of the five state plant regulatory officials, the five APHIS state
plant health directors, and the two APHIS senior regional plant health
officials we met with to discuss the NPDRS, all had limited or no
knowledge about NPDRS recovery plans. ARS officials told us that they
share information about the recovery plans with federal and state
plant health officials through a variety of venues, including their
public Web site. An ARS official responsible for developing NPDRS
recovery plans acknowledged, however, that ARS needs to conduct
additional outreach to and collaborate with states, including state
department of agriculture officials. In addition, HHS officials told
us that recovery from high-consequence plant diseases should also
involve FDA because plants are a source of food and animal feed.
Because recovery from high-consequence plant diseases will require
effective coordination with state and federal plant health officials,
without such efforts, USDA may miss opportunities to enhance the
effectiveness of NPDRS recovery plans and ensure states have the
information they need to facilitate recovery from high-consequence
plant diseases.
USDA Agencies Have Taken Steps to Enhance Recovery, but Challenges
Could Affect Recovery from Animal Disease Outbreaks or Food
Contaminations:
Various agencies within USDA have taken steps in response to HSPD-9 to
enhance recovery from food and agriculture emergencies. According to
HSPD-9, the Secretary of Agriculture--along with the Secretary of HHS--
is responsible for enhancing recovery efforts that "rapidly remove and
effectively dispose of contaminated food and agriculture products or
infected plants and animals, and decontaminate premises." The
following includes steps USDA agencies have taken, in coordination
with other agencies, to fulfill this responsibility:
* Several USDA agencies--including APHIS, FSIS, and ARS--and FDA
participated in a 2005 EPA-led effort that produced guidance on
federal roles and responsibilities for disposing of contaminated
animals, crops, and food products and decontaminating affected areas
in order to prevent the spread of disease.
* FSIS, in conjunction with FDA and EPA, prepared guidelines for the
disposal and decontamination of intentionally adulterated food
products.
* APHIS is co-leading an interagency working group for the White House
National Science and Technology Council[Footnote 15] Committee on
Homeland and National Security that, among other things, identifies
research gaps for depopulating--or slaughtering--and disposing and
decontaminating of diseased animals. In the event of a foreign animal
disease outbreak, depopulation, disposal, and decontamination services
are an essential part of the response and recovery effort because
USDA's traditional strategy to eradicate a foreign animal disease is
to depopulate all susceptible animals.
* USDA's Rural Development--an agency whose mission is to improve the
economy and quality of life in rural America--is participating in a
federal multiagency effort to draft a recovery framework that will
outline federal activities to support community recovery by, for
example, identifying resources, capabilities, and best practices for
recovering from a disaster.
* APHIS is partnering with universities, states, and industry to
develop continuity of business plans for some animal disease
emergencies. The purpose of these plans is to (1) help ensure that
certain live animals and food products can be safely moved through an
affected area to market, (2) maintain industry viability, and (3)
ensure a steady supply and source of food to consumers.
Although HHS has co-lead on this HSPD-9 responsibility to enhance
recovery, and FDA has responsibility for ensuring the safety of
roughly 80 percent of the food supply, HHS officials informed us that
FDA has a "small role in recovery efforts" in agriculture or food
emergencies. According to FDA officials, in addition to the two
efforts noted above, FDA took other steps to enhance recovery efforts;
however, they noted that these efforts were not taken in direct
response to HSPD-9. For example, in response to the draft of the
National Disaster Recovery Framework, HHS set up a HHS Recovery
Working Group, of which FDA is a member, to discuss specific actions
that would take place in a recovery effort.
However, federal, state, and industry officials we spoke with also
identified challenges related to these efforts that could affect the
nation's ability to recover from a catastrophic animal disease
outbreak, including the following challenges with depopulation of
livestock, carcass disposal, and decontamination:
Depopulation of livestock. According to APHIS and industry officials,
there may not be sufficient workforce capacity to depopulate animals
quickly in the event of a catastrophic disease outbreak. For example,
APHIS officials told us that it could take as long as 80 days to
depopulate a single feedlot--a concentrated feeding area for cattle
that typically contains about 100,000 animals. Agencies' concerns
regarding the enormity of the workforce response and the coordination
required to manage a large-scale outbreak has surfaced in our prior
work.[Footnote 16]
Carcass disposal. Carcass disposal can present multiple challenges
during a catastrophic disease outbreak, according to federal, state,
and industry officials. Specifically, a highly contagious animal
disease such as foot-and-mouth disease can result in the depopulation
of millions of animals in order to control the spread of the disease.
According to USDA guidance, effective disposal of animal carcasses and
materials is a key component of a successful foot-and-mouth disease
response. In the event of an outbreak, foot-and-mouth disease-
susceptible animals should be disposed of within 24 hours. In
addition, it must be done in a manner that does not allow the virus to
spread and minimizes negative environmental effects, among other
things. Although burial has traditionally been the preferred method
for disposal, USDA officials told us that this may not be feasible on
a large scale because, among other things, the operation is labor
intensive. A joint federal, state, and industry exercise testing
capabilities to control a widespread foot-and-mouth disease outbreak
supports this concern. During the exercise, it was determined that
burying 70,000 cattle carcasses within 4 days was not possible. In
addition, carcass burial may be limited by topography, soil type, soil
depth to bedrock, and environmental regulations at all levels of
government. Multiple methods of disposal will likely be needed to
handle the large quantity of materials in need of disposal.
Incineration, composting, and rendering may be viable alternatives.
Rendering is a process by which carcasses are converted into products
that are safe to use in animal feeds, and it is regulated by the
states and FDA. According to USDA officials, the public health
consequences of carcass burial on a large scale are unacceptable, as
recent foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks in Japan, Korea, and the
United Kingdom have shown. For example, the media reported groundwater
contaminations in Korea near some burial sites of animal carcasses--
including near several schools--making the water unfit for human use.
News reports stated that, under the pressure to respond to the
outbreak, authorities may have failed to take the necessary
precautions for safe burial, such as lining the pits with two layers
of plastic sheeting, and other reports noted that some animals were
buried alive as the supply of euthanasia drugs ran low.
[Side bar:
Foot-and-Mouth Disease:
[2 photographs]
Source: USDA.
Foot-and-mouth disease is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-
hoofed animals such as cattle, swine, and sheep. Infected animals
develop a fever and blisters on their tongue, lips, and between their
hooves. Many animals recover from a foot-and-mouth disease infection,
but the disease leaves them debilitated and causes losses in meat and
milk production. Foot-and-mouth disease does not have human health
implications. It can be spread by animals, people, or materials that
bring the virus into physical contact with susceptible animals. The
disease is also considered a potential agent for agroterrorism. There
has not been a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the United States
since 1929; however, the disease is considered widespread in parts of
Africa, Asia, Europe, and South America. According to USDA, a 2001
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the United Kingdom resulted in
the slaughter and disposal (pictured above) of millions of animals and
economic losses conservatively estimated at $14.7 billion. Moreover,
South Korea has recently been battling a major outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease, which from November 2010 through January 2011 has
resulted in the culling of 2.2 million livestock and the vaccinating
of 12 million more, an effort which has cost around $1.6 billion. End
of side bar]
According to APHIS officials, one way to mitigate the depopulation and
disposal resource concerns is to move away from the traditional
strategy of eradicating certain diseases through depopulation and
disposal. Officials said that this may be possible by increasing the
use of vaccines for at-risk animals, which could minimize the number
of animals that need to be depopulated. This would also reduce the
need for disposal. USDA and DHS are conducting research to develop
more effective vaccines that could be used against foot-and-mouth
disease. In addition, USDA's November 2010 draft foot-and-mouth
disease response plan includes options that take this vaccine policy
approach into consideration.
A potential new challenge with carcass disposal is that disposal roles
and responsibilities may be unclear if the carcasses are contaminated
with a foreign animal disease. USDA officials told us that although
APHIS traditionally has authority under the Animal Heath Protection
Act for carcass disposal when the carcasses are contaminated with a
foreign animal disease,[Footnote 17] the recently enacted FDA Food
Safety Modernization Act designates EPA as the lead agency, in
coordination with USDA, HHS, and DHS, for developing and exercising
decontamination and disposal standards and model plans to be used
during food and agriculture emergencies, including a foreign animal
disease outbreak.[Footnote 18] According to USDA officials, this issue
could lead to confusion in the event of an outbreak. EPA officials
told us that they are working with other agencies to discuss if and
how the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act changes their understanding
of the roles and responsibilities for carcass disposal.
Decontamination. According to APHIS officials and subject matter
experts, research gaps remain in the ability to decontaminate areas
infected with disease, such as feedlots and poultry houses. For
example, testing of disinfectants is generally done at room
temperature and on hard, nonporous surfaces such as stainless steel,
and not on porous surfaces commonly found on farms. APHIS officials
said, however, that it is also necessary to test on more porous
surfaces that may be found on farms--such as wood and soil--and at
different temperatures. APHIS is working with Canadian officials to
test at temperatures below freezing, and a White House interagency
working group, which the agency leads, has drafted a research plan to
address this and other gaps in decontamination and disposal. However,
USDA officials told us that funding to support research is lacking.
According to EPA officials, EPA has also done some limited testing on
decontamination measures for foreign animal diseases. For example, EPA
confirmed that a number of disinfectants assumed to be effective for
highly pathogenic avian influenza were, in fact, ineffective.
Recovery challenges are not limited to controlling animal diseases.
There is also the difficulty in tracing recalled food products through
the distribution chain during a food recall. As we have previously
reported, the food distribution chain can be complex, involving
multiple levels of processors, distributors, and retailers before the
food reaches consumers.[Footnote 19] In the event of an emergency, it
can be difficult to trace both the source of contamination and the
ultimate destination of the contaminated product.
[Side bar:
Food Recalls:
[Photograph]
Source: USDA.
This nation enjoys a plentiful and varied food supply that is
generally considered to be safe. However, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention estimates that each year roughly 1 in 6
Americans gets sick, 128,000 are hospitalized, and 3,000 die of
foodborne diseases. To protect consumers from unsafe food, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
and the Department of Health and Human Service’s Food and Drug
Administration have recall programs. For example, in 2010, FSIS
initiated recalls of over 34.5 million pounds of food, including over
6 million pounds of Salmonella-contaminated frozen chicken meals and
over 7 million pounds of E.coli-contaminated beef products. The total
figure does not include currently open recall cases. In some
instances, companies were alerted to the contaminated food when
officials found patterns of illnesses linked to the products. In other
instances, consumers called the company to complain about foreign
material—such as pieces of plastic—in the food products. FSIS also
identifies problems with products in other ways, such as through
regulatory testing, plant or third-party testing, and routine
inspection verification activities (see photo above). End of side bar]
This point was well-illustrated in a 2007 outbreak of botulism--a
serious illness caused by botulinum toxin that can lead to paralysis
and potentially death in humans. Botulinum toxin found in canned hot
dog chili sauce resulted in at least eight severe illnesses and
spurred a massive recall of tens of millions of cans of food across 49
states, causing retailers and officials to scramble to locate and
remove potentially contaminated items. Because there was potentially
dual jurisdiction over the food products, FSIS and FDA were both
involved in the recall. According to a report from the DHS National
Center for Food Protection and Defense, information on the recall
changed, and the number of recalled items expanded, creating confusion
for affected organizations and consumers and delaying recovery
efforts. Moreover, a former state-level food and drug director who
headed recall efforts in one state that conducted almost 16,000 site
visits to remove contaminated products from shelves told us that
states received very little information from FSIS and FDA about the
distribution chain during the recall, and the lists of recalled
products that the two agencies issued were inconsistent. According to
this former state official, this inconsistency delayed state efforts
and caused some retailers to continue selling contaminated products as
many as four days after the recall was announced, potentially
endangering human lives.
FSIS officials also told us that some parties affected by the recall--
including schools and senior centers--were confused by the large
number of telephone calls they received from different agencies
alerting them about the recall, as it was unclear who was in charge.
FSIS officials told us that the agencies involved have since resolved
these coordination problems. A former state-level food and drug
director involved in the recall told us, however, that a lack of
coordination may affect future recalls unless resolved. According to
HHS officials, FDA has since updated its recall procedures and
directives to improve communications between states and FDA officials.
The former state official believes that the passage of the FDA Food
Safety Modernization Act will provide the framework and process for
sharing information with states to ensure that this will not happen in
the future and, according to this official, it is critical for federal
and state agencies to work together on these types of recalls.
However, the act gives mandatory recall authority to FDA but not USDA,
which could add to fragmentation in future recalls. As we previously
mentioned, food safety has been on our list of high-risk areas since
2007 because the fragmented federal oversight of food safety has
caused inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and
inefficient use of resources.[Footnote 20]
USDA Submitted a Required Report to the Homeland Security Council but
Has Not Taken Steps to Implement Its Recommendations:
USDA submitted a July 2004 report to the Homeland Security Council
that recommended steps the department could take to help the food and
agriculture sector protect itself from financial risks resulting from
terrorism, but the department has not taken steps to address any of
the report's recommendations. Under HSPD-9, the Secretary of
Agriculture was responsible for studying and making recommendations to
the Homeland Security Council for the use of existing, and the
creation of new, financial risk management tools encouraging self-
protection for food and agriculture enterprises vulnerable to losses
due to terrorism. To fulfill this responsibility, USDA's Risk
Management Agency--whose goal is to help agriculture producers manage
their business risks--hired a contractor to investigate and develop
solutions for the financial risks associated with potential acts of
terrorism affecting agriculture. The resulting report made 19
recommendations to USDA--such as appointing an individual to
coordinate risk management policy development and implementation for
nonfarm agricultural businesses--and found "serious gaps" in the tools
and strategies that some agriculture businesses have in place to
financially protect themselves against losses resulting from a
terrorist attack. According to USDA's OHSEC officials, the department
has not taken steps to address the report's recommendations because
the Homeland Security Council provided no further direction to USDA as
to how to proceed with implementation.
Officials from USDA's Office of the General Counsel told us that
numerous USDA disaster and financial assistance programs may be
available to help producers recover from a terrorist attack. Before
providing such assistance, however, USDA must first determine which
specific programs the department is permitted to use given the
particular circumstances of the emergency. To make this determination,
USDA would review its statutory authorities for each disaster or
assistance program and assess whether the circumstances meet each
program's eligibility criteria. Officials from USDA's Office of the
General Counsel noted that the department would follow this same
process regardless of the underlying cause of the emergency--whether a
natural event or terrorist attack.
USDA Does Not Have a Department-Wide Strategy for Implementing Its
HSPD-9 Responsibilities:
Despite agencies' efforts to implement USDA's HSPD-9 response and
recovery responsibilities, USDA does not have a department-wide
strategy for implementing these responsibilities. We previously
reported that developing a strategy to accomplish national security
goals and desired outcomes helps agencies manage their programs more
effectively and is an essential mechanism to guide progress in
achieving desired results.[Footnote 21] Moreover, we have reported
that effective strategies help set priorities and allocate resources,
including staffing, to inform decision making and help ensure
accountability.[Footnote 22] Such priority setting and resource
allocation is especially important in a fiscally constrained
environment. However, USDA officials told us that the department did
not develop a department-wide strategy for implementing its HSPD-9
responsibilities. Instead, according to a senior official from OHSEC--
the USDA office responsible for coordinating HSPD-9 implementation--
USDA assigned HSPD-9 implementation responsibilities to its agencies
based on their statutory authority and expertise and allowed
individual agencies to determine their implementation and budget
priorities. In addition, senior OHSEC officials told us that although
OHSEC does not specifically oversee agencies' HSPD-9 efforts, it holds
monthly meetings where agencies have the opportunity to share
information about homeland-security activities generally. OHSEC
officials also noted that because food and agriculture defense has not
been a primary focus for the National Security Staff over the past few
years, OHSEC has been less focused on HSPD-9 oversight and has
prioritized other, more recently directed activities, such as a 2007
executive order that promotes education, training, and experience of
current and future professionals in national security positions.
According to OHSEC officials, USDA would benefit from strategic
direction from the National Security Staff with respect to HSPD-9 to
help prioritize specific activities and funding decisions, given this
time of limited resources. OHSEC officials and senior APHIS officials
responsible for emergency planning and coordination told us that USDA
would also benefit from strategic planning, but they noted that the
department lacks dedicated resources for conducting such planning and
has not determined the resources that would be needed to carry out
such an effort. Because USDA has not developed a department-wide
strategy, it may lack assurance that its agencies' efforts align with
departmental priorities and have effectively allocated resources, and
the department cannot be assured that it is fulfilling its HSPD-9
responsibilities.
USDA Has Coordinated the Federal Food and Agriculture Response for
Various Natural Disasters, but USDA, FEMA, and State Officials
Identified Several Challenges:
USDA has coordinated the federal food and agriculture capabilities
that were needed during numerous recent natural disasters. USDA, FEMA,
and state officials involved in these emergencies identified some
factors that contributed to the success of these efforts, as well as
challenges they experienced. We also found additional management
issues related to these ESF-11 coordination efforts.
[Side bar:
ESF-11 Activation in Iowa for Flooding:
[2 photographs]
Source: Clean Harbors.
In June 2008, tens of thousands of acres of crop land and swine
facilities in Iowa were flooded by heavy rains. Although more than
17,000 swine in the affected area were relocated prior to the
flooding, about 4,000 were left behind and became stranded or drowned
when levees failed. Under ESF-11, FEMA asked APHIS personnel to assist
with trapping, euthanizing, and disposing of the swine and other
livestock carcasses, many of which were found beached on the levee or
floating in flood waters (as depicted in photos above). USDA’s
contractor used flat-bottomed airboats to corral carcasses and
transport them to dry land, where they could then be moved to an
approved landfill. Despite the hot, humid weather, workers wore full
personal protective equipment because many of the carcasses were badly
decomposed, and the water was assumed to be contaminated with
chemicals and sewage. More than 3,000 swine carcasses were removed in
the cleanup efforts. End of side bar]
According to information provided by USDA's ESF-11 national
coordinator, from 2007 through May 2011, USDA coordinated the ESF-11
response for about 28 natural disasters, including hurricanes, floods,
winter storms, and other weather-related emergencies (see app. VII for
a list of the 28 emergencies for which ESF-11 was activated). In the
event of an emergency, FEMA may activate ESF-11 to coordinate the
federal response to address issues that affect agriculture and the
food supply, among other things. More specifically, FEMA may issue
mission assignments to USDA to undertake three types of activities
that are otherwise outside USDA's statutory authority(1) federal
operations support, such as providing personnel to help coordinate
state and federal response efforts at regional and national
coordinating centers; (2) technical assistance to states by sharing
subject matter expertise, for example, on the cleanup of tree debris
contaminated with an invasive beetle; and (3) direct federal
assistance to help states, such as disposing of animal carcasses that
may pose a threat to public health.
USDA, FEMA, and state officials involved in ESF-11 activations
identified factors that have contributed to the success of these
efforts. For example, USDA, FEMA, and state agriculture officials we
interviewed told us that having a single USDA point of contact at the
regional level to coordinate with FEMA staff on a state's behalf
helped ensure more effective and streamlined communication during
emergencies. In addition, USDA officials involved in previous
emergencies noted that effective working relationships, both between
USDA and FEMA and among federal and state officials, contributed to
the success of several ESF-11 activations. Following an ice storm in
New England, for example, effective working relationships between USDA
and FEMA staff helped facilitate the disposal of tree debris
contaminated with Asian long-horned beetles. Iowa officials involved
with an ESF-11 response to flooding that affected swine farms told us
that having the ESF structure in place was beneficial because it
provided a logical and consistent framework for emergency response
across states.
Side bar:
ESF-11 Activation in Massachusetts for Ice Storms:
[2 photographs]
Source: Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation.
Source: Agricultural Research Service, USDA.
In summer 2008, USDA began an eradication program in Massachusetts to
quarantine and remove trees infested with the Asian long-horned beetle
(pictured above)-—an invasive pest that grows and reproduces within
trees (such as maple, birch, willow, elm, and ash) and eventually
kills the trees. According to USDA, the beetle has the potential to
damage such industries as lumber, maple syrup, nursery, and tourism,
accumulating over $41 billion in losses. However, in December 2008,
New England—-including part of the quarantine zone established in
Massachusetts for the Asian long-horned beetle—-was impacted by a
severe winter ice storm, resulting in a significant amount of tree
debris (as depicted in photo below). FEMA activated ESF-11 to provide
updates on the removal of tree debris, some of which was contaminated
with the Asian long-horned beetle. FEMA also gave an ESF-11 mission
assignment to USDA to provide technical assistance by helping to
produce outreach and awareness materials for distribution to the
public to ensure that the beetle outbreak would not spread. End of
side bar]
However, USDA, FEMA, and state officials involved in ESF-11
activations also identified challenges they experienced, including the
following:
Lack of clarity on the type of support provided under ESF-11. USDA,
FEMA, and state officials told us that lack of clarity over the type
of support that ESF-11 provides has compromised response efforts in
Massachusetts, Texas, and Mississippi. For example, FEMA and USDA
negotiated for several weeks in the aftermath of a major ice storm
affecting New England about what types of activities FEMA could fund
through a mission assignment that were not under USDA's statutory
authority. Specifically, USDA--through APHIS's mission to control
plant pests--had been working in Massachusetts to quarantine an Asian
long-horned beetle infestation prior to the storm. However, according
to USDA officials involved with the response efforts, the ice storm
significantly increased the quantity of tree debris that was part of
the quarantine. Quarantined wood could not be sold as firewood, a
measure meant to avoid spreading the beetle to other parts of the
country. USDA was overwhelmed, and in need of assistance to maintain
the quarantine, but USDA officials told us that FEMA could not provide
reimbursement to USDA for program activities that were already
receiving resources through USDA's nondisaster emergency response
funds. FEMA ultimately issued an ESF-11 mission assignment for
technical assistance to USDA almost 4 weeks after the ice storm. This
provided USDA with additional funds to produce outreach and awareness
materials for distribution to the public and to mobilize emergency
response personnel to oversee debris removal activities associated
with the ice storm. We have previously reported that, in preparing for
a disaster, legal authorities and roles and responsibilities must be
clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood in
order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making.[Footnote 23]
In another example, Texas state officials told us that, after
Hurricane Ike in 2008, FEMA did not issue a mission assignment to USDA
to provide assistance to round up and relocate roaming cattle because
it disagreed with Texas state public safety officials' contention that
these cattle were a public safety hazard. Thousands of cattle were
stranded on roadways and needed to be moved, identified, and returned
to their owners. Officials said that one car accident occurred when a
vehicle struck a cow wandering on the road. Moreover, according to
Texas state officials, many cattle later died from saline toxicity
because of the lack of fresh drinking water, thereby adding to the
number of carcasses that needed to be disposed of. Ultimately, an
association of cattle ranchers helped to corral some of the roaming
cattle, and FEMA asked USDA to provide feed to cattle that were
stranded on the roads. According to Texas officials, the ESF-11
request process was "overly exhaustive" and potentially cost more time
and effort than the benefits of receiving the animal feed. A USDA
official expressed regret that USDA was unable to do more to assist
the live cattle because providing such assistance was not expensive.
According to this official, USDA was not able to provide more
assistance because FEMA declared the live cattle to be private
property and thus they could not receive assistance under ESF-11.
Texas state officials told us that this experience raises questions
about the extent to which FEMA will provide assistance for other
agriculture-related issues that may arise during emergencies. For
example, they questioned whether FEMA would provide generators or fuel
to poultry farmers if they were to lose power from strong storms. A
power loss could cause poultry houses to overheat, killing thousands
of birds. Texas state officials said that they recognize that FEMA
does not generally provide assistance to industry, but they also
pointed out that agriculture is recognized as critical infrastructure
by DHS and affects public safety, animal welfare, and the nation's
food supply. According to Texas state officials, this lack of clarity
on what type of support ESF-11 provides prevents states from being
able to plan accordingly.
A senior official from Mississippi expressed similar concerns related
to federal assistance for dairy farms that lose power following a
natural disaster. Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, dairy farmers
were unable to milk their cows because they did not have generators or
sufficient fuel to power their generators, which were needed to
operate milking equipment. USDA officials told us that if dairy cows
are not milked within a certain time frame, the cows will become
diseased and will need to be slaughtered after several days. According
to the Mississippi state official, the state requested generators from
FEMA; however, FEMA denied their request because Stafford Act funds--
assistance available when the President declares a major disaster--
could not be used to purchase equipment for private businesses. State
and federal officials told us that, consequently, many farmers sold
their cows below market value, causing approximately 50 percent of
dairy farms to go out of business. The Mississippi state official
added that the dairy industry supplies important food for human
nutrition and health and should be considered "public infrastructure"
and thus eligible for Stafford Act funding during emergencies.
Lack of clarity on carcass disposal responsibilities when ESFs are
activated. As we previously mentioned, disposal of livestock carcasses
infected with animal diseases can impede recovery efforts, but clarity
regarding agencies' roles and responsibilities for animal carcass
disposal presents additional challenges when ESFs are activated and
multiple agencies are involved. Specifically, federal agencies'
responsibilities for disposing of animal carcasses following an
emergency are not always clear, which has at times impeded an
effective ESF-11 response. When ESFs are activated for an emergency,
FEMA is responsible for determining which federal agency should
conduct carcass disposal as part of response efforts. According to
FEMA officials, the disposal of animal carcasses is generally the
responsibility of ESF-3, which addresses public works and engineering
and is coordinated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. ESF-3 defines
livestock or poultry carcasses and plant materials as debris. FEMA
officials also told us that, through ESF-11, USDA would coordinate the
disposal of diseased animal carcasses or carcasses with chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination. For the ESF-11
emergencies that we reviewed that involved animal carcasses, FEMA
assigned two different USDA agencies--the Natural Resources
Conservation Service and APHIS's NVS--with this responsibility. APHIS
traditionally disposes of livestock infected with a foreign animal
disease through its authority under the Animal Health Protection Act,
but none of the animals in the emergencies we reviewed were infected
with a foreign animal disease; they had died from drowning or were
otherwise impacted by natural disasters. Federal and state officials
told us that disposal responsibilities are further complicated by a
lack of agreement as to whether carcasses resulting from a natural
disaster are considered to be a public health threat. The USDA ESF-11
national coordinator told us that USDA could be asked to conduct
carcass disposal when HHS or a state declares the carcasses to be a
public health concern; otherwise, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is
generally responsible. A CDC Web page currently states that animals
killed in a natural disaster pose a low risk to human health if proper
precautions are taken. Such precautions include practicing proper hand
washing and removing animal carcasses to avoid attracting rats.
However, according to USDA officials, other federal officials believe
that decaying animal carcasses do pose a public health threat,
attracting vectors such as rodents and insects, which can carry
disease to humans.
[Side bar:
ESF-11 Activation in Texas for Hurricane Ike:
[2 photographs]
Source: Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, Photographer Earl
Nottingham.
Source: USDA.
Hurricane Ike hit the Gulf Coast of Texas in September 2008, with a
storm surge several miles inland that displaced thousands of
livestock, including cattle and horses. Under ESF-11, USDA provided
feed for living cattle that were stranded on roads—which was some of
the only dry land available for the cattle to roam. In addition,
USDA’s Natural Resources Conservation Service removed and disposed of
livestock carcasses, some of which ended up in residential and public
areas, including the grounds of a hospital. USDA officials estimated
they retrieved more than 1,300 cattle, horse, and goat carcasses.
According to Texas state officials, carcass disposal was complicated
because of the difficulty identifying cattle so their owners could be
indemnified by the federal government for their losses. Cattle are
normally identified by an ear tag or branding. This was difficult,
however, because, in some cases, the ear tags were missing or brands
could not be read because the cattle carcasses were piled up, missing
limbs, and were decaying from sitting in extreme heat (see photo
below). End of side bar]
The resulting lack of clarity has delayed response efforts during
previous emergencies for which ESF-11 was activated. For example,
Texas agriculture officials involved with response to Hurricane Ike in
2008 told us that valuable time was lost as federal officials debated
whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or USDA should assist with
disposal. Ultimately, FEMA asked USDA's Natural Resources Conservation
Service to conduct the carcass disposal; however, according to
officials from the Natural Resources Conservation Service, they did
not receive this mission assignment until several days after the
hurricane struck Texas--after the carcasses had already begun to
decompose. Officials from the Natural Resources Conservation Service
told us that they were frustrated with the time it took FEMA to
determine who would conduct carcass disposal efforts, as this delayed
their ability to seek and obtain a contractor to conduct the disposal.
The cumulative delay impeded recovery. According to Texas state
officials, the surge of water from the hurricane washed cattle,
horses, and poultry 15 to 20 miles inland, leaving dead livestock in
backyards, in front of hospitals, and on roads and highways. Texas
state officials told us that because the temperatures were over 100
degrees, the carcasses quickly filled with gas and exploded, becoming
"soupy" after a few days, further complicating disposal efforts. It
also created a negative public perception of the federal government's
disposal efforts. In light of this, Texas state officials told us
that, although they would like to continue partnering with the federal
government during major emergencies, they have concerns about how
disposal would be handled in a future emergency. Moreover, Texas
officials stated that they will maintain some level of involvement and
responsibility to respond to small, yet high-profile, disposal issues
that affect public perception and attract the attention of media and
local officials.
Side bar:
ESF-11 Activation in Mississippi for Hurricane Gustav:
[2 photographs]
Source: Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce (both
photos).
On September 1, 2008, Hurricane Gustav made landfall in the United
States, and federal emergency declarations were made for multiple
states, including Mississippi, where the storm washed approximately
2,000 animal carcasses on the beachfront and along the Jordan River.
The carcasses were primarily nutria-—an invasive semiaquatic rodent
(pictured above)-—but also included birds, hogs, and a canine. Within
several days, residents began complaining of foul odor resulting from
the decomposing carcasses, and Mississippi requested federal
assistance to help remove them. According to an APHIS after-action
report, since biological, physical, and chemical hazards were involved
in the carcass removal operations, personnel wore personal protective
equipment (pictured below) and worked in inhospitable conditions
including 90-degree heat among hundreds of venomous and nonvenomous
snakes. Personnel used pitchforks and shovels to place the carcasses
in polyethylene barrel liners, sealed the liner openings with duct
tape, and then carried them to a polyethylene-lined dumpster for
transport to landfills. End of side bar]
Similarly, following Hurricane Gustav in 2008, hundreds of nutria--a
large type of rodent--were washed onto Mississippi beaches. According
to USDA officials involved with coordinating the emergency,
negotiations among federal representatives about who was responsible
for disposal delayed and complicated the response. A Mississippi state
official told us that the impact of the carcasses was limited,
however, because another hurricane hit the area several days later,
and the related storm surge carried the remaining carcasses out to
sea. We have previously reported that a lack of clarity in leadership
roles and responsibilities can result in disjointed federal emergency
response efforts among collaborating agencies and confusion about what
resources would be provided within specific time frames[Footnote 24].
To address such a lack of clarity in leadership roles among
collaborating agencies, we have reported that a practice to enhance
and sustain collaboration is for agencies to work together to define
and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities, including
how the collaborative effort will be led.[Footnote 25]
Pet sheltering reimbursement challenges. One of USDA's
responsibilities under ESF-11 is to provide for the safety and well-
being of household pets during an emergency. However, coordinating
this activity can be problematic for USDA because, according to a USDA
official, activities to shelter animals that do not meet FEMA's
definition of a household pet are not eligible for FEMA or Stafford
Act funding. Pet sheltering is an important part of emergency response
because some people refuse to evacuate their homes in an emergency if
they cannot take their pets with them. In its disaster assistance
policy, FEMA defines a household pet as a domesticated animal, such as
a dog, cat, bird, rabbit, rodent, or turtle kept in the home, and not
intended for commercial purposes. FEMA also reimburses costs for
evacuations and sheltering of service animals, such as guide dogs for
individuals with impaired vision or hearing. However, according to
Mississippi and Texas state officials, evacuees often bring to the
shelters numerous animals that are not listed in FEMA's definition,
including horses, goats, and potbellied pigs. State officials told us
that states and volunteer organizations often still accept all animals
brought to shelters, but because FEMA does not provide reimbursement
for the care of animals not included in their definition of household
pets, states and volunteer organizations have to absorb the costs for
these animals. A Mississippi state official told us that they are not
able to estimate the additional costs associated with animals outside
of FEMA's definition, largely because they do not track costs by
animal.
We also identified additional challenges related to USDA's management
of ESF-11, including the following:
Unreliable tracking of emergencies for which ESF-11 was activated.
USDA and FEMA data are not sufficiently reliable for reporting the
number of times ESF-11 has been activated. Under government auditing
standards, management information is to be complete, accurate, and
consistent to support performance and decision making.[Footnote 26]
However, USDA and FEMA data on emergencies for which ESF-11 was
activated were incomplete, inaccurate, and inconsistent, changing
throughout the course of our review. Specifically, USDA officials
provided us with three different sets of documents that could be used
to track such emergencies (1) by mission assignments issued by FEMA,
(2) by funding received from FEMA per mission assignment, and (3) by
USDA after-action reports--documents that summarize information on
what went well and what needed improvement during an emergency
response to improve future responses. Our review of these documents
found that the information on the number of emergencies varied,
raising questions about the accuracy of the information they provided
us. When we asked USDA about these differences, a senior official
stated that the inconsistencies are, in part, a result of changes in
management. USDA ultimately provided us with a list of about 28 ESF-11
activations, which is the number we are reporting to provide some
context on the number of times these activations have occurred. In
addition, FEMA separately provided us with a list of ESF-11
activations that included some emergencies that did not appear in any
of the USDA lists we received. According to DHS officials, managing a
list of ESF-11 activations is USDA's responsibility as the coordinator
of ESF-11. FEMA officials also told us that the system they used to
generate the list they provided to us is not intended to track ESF-11
emergencies and that ESF information is not a standard field on FEMA
system's search page. Without an accurate count of ESF-11 activations
over time, USDA managers may not have the information necessary to
request and allocate resources, including staff, for ESF-11 activities.
Lack of efforts to comprehensively identify and address lessons
learned. USDA's after-action reporting process is inconsistent and
does not include key parties involved in ESF-11 emergency response.
USDA policy is to prepare after-action reports following the response
to an ESF-11 activation. However, USDA does not always complete these
reports after every emergency. USDA completed 14 after-action reports--
including one that covered the 2008 hurricane season--for various
emergencies even though USDA officials reported to us that ESF-11 has
been activated for about 28 emergencies.[Footnote 27] In addition, the
after-action reports that USDA did complete have not always contained
the perspectives of key parties involved in the response, such as FEMA
officials, relevant USDA officials involved in the emergency at the
state level, and state officials. For example, an after-action report
prepared for the 2008 hurricane season did not include the
perspectives of state officials and, therefore, did not capture the
carcass disposal problems that Texas and Mississippi experienced after
Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, respectively. Several state and USDA
officials that were involved with past emergencies for which ESF-11
was activated told us that they had not been formally asked to provide
input on lessons learned, and several state officials also stated that
they had not received a copy of a completed after-action report from
USDA.
Moreover, our analysis of USDA's after-action reports from 2007
through 2011 found common challenges, including challenges involving
communication, technology, and the need for additional training. USDA
officials responsible for ESF-11 coordination told us that they
address critical issues identified in the after-action reports
immediately and that other issues are addressed informally at national
conferences. However, these officials also told us that it could be
beneficial to have a more structured and consistent way of addressing
challenges that arose in past emergencies.
Without a more consistent and comprehensive after-action reporting
process, USDA managers may not have the necessary information to
identify gaps or challenges and address them through corrective
actions to help ensure that past mistakes are not repeated. In
addition, by not sharing after-action reports with key parties, those
parties also may not have information needed to improve coordination
and performance in future emergencies for which ESF-11 is activated.
In February 2006, a White House report on Hurricane Katrina stated
that "too often, after-action reports for exercises and real-world
incidents highlight the same problems that do not get fixed."[Footnote
28] According to the report, all departments and agencies should
translate findings of homeland security gaps and vulnerabilities into
concrete programs for corrective action that are fully implemented in
a timely fashion.
Conclusions:
The nation is vulnerable to both intentional and natural threats that
could imperil its food and agriculture systems. Since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government has taken many
steps to address this vulnerability, including developing a national
policy to defend the food and agriculture systems against terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies (HSPD-9), as well as
strategically organizing resources and capabilities to ensure a more
efficient response to such emergencies (ESF-11). However, the
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism gave the nation a failing grade for its
capabilities to rapidly respond to and recover from a biological
attack. Moreover, natural disasters and diseases also can pose a
significant threat to the food and agriculture systems, as
demonstrated by Hurricane Katrina, highly pathogenic avian influenza,
and food recalls, such as botulinum toxin found in canned hot dog
chili sauce in 2007.
Despite these threats, there is currently no centralized coordination
to oversee the federal government's overall progress in defending the
food and agriculture systems. DHS is responsible for coordinating
agencies' overall HSPD-9 implementation efforts but has not done so
since 2009. Similarly, the Homeland Security Council has in the past
gathered status updates on agency efforts to fulfill its HSPD-9
responsibilities, but the National Security Staff--which now supports
the Homeland Security Council--is no longer doing so, and it is not
conducting any other interagency process to coordinate HSPD-9
implementation efforts. Without coordinated activities to oversee
agencies' HSPD-9 implementation efforts, federal decision makers may
lack critical information they need to assess how well the nation is
prepared for major emergencies and how efficiently agencies are using
federal resources to prepare. Moreover, without encouragement from the
National Security Staff that agencies should contribute to DHS's
coordination efforts, successful coordination efforts to oversee
agencies' progress may be limited.
As a leader of our nation's food and agriculture system, USDA has
invested considerable time and resources to protect animals, plants,
and food. Specifically, APHIS and CDC have taken some steps to
leverage the mechanisms and infrastructure of HHS's Strategic National
Stockpile, as directed by HSPD-9, but confusion and disagreement may
be impeding efforts to further identify leveraging opportunities.
Unless the departments formally determine whether such opportunities
exist, they cannot be assured that they are taking advantage of all
opportunities to make efficient use of federal resources.
In addition, USDA faces two important implementation challenges that
could impact its ability to recover from a high-consequence plant
disease outbreak. First, ARS has no documented, systematic process for
tracking research gaps identified in the NPDRS recovery plans and for
monitoring whether these gaps have been filled. Without such a
process, USDA may lack critical information needed to help the nation
recover from a high-consequence plant disease. Second, key state and
federal plant health officials lack awareness of NPDRS recovery plans,
potentially leaving them without the necessary information to
facilitate recovery from high-consequence plant diseases.
More broadly, USDA does not have a department-wide strategy for
setting priorities and allocating resources, including staffing, for
implementing its numerous HSPD-9 responsibilities. Instead, USDA
assigned HSPD-9 implementation responsibilities to its agencies and
allowed them to determine their implementation and budget priorities.
Without such a strategy, USDA lacks assurance that its agencies are
making progress to align with departmental priorities, that its
efforts are adequately staffed, and that it is fulfilling its HSPD-9
responsibilities. Setting priorities is especially critical in a
fiscally constrained environment.
USDA has also faced challenges to effective coordination of ESF-11
responses to various natural disasters affecting food and agriculture,
as it did after two hurricanes in 2008 when the federal government
lost valuable time as FEMA decided which agency should take the lead
in disposing of animal carcasses. Although FEMA would be responsible
for determining which agency is responsible for carcass disposal if
ESF-11 were activated, it has not clarified the roles and
responsibilities that key agencies will have for the disposal of
animal carcasses during emergencies for which ESF-11 is activated.
Absent such clarification, agencies may not be adequately prepared to
quickly respond, and decomposing animal carcasses may threaten public
safety and health.
In addition, USDA has not consistently prepared after-action reports
for all emergencies involving ESF-11 activations and has not always
incorporated the perspectives of key parties involved in each
activation or shared the completed reports with them. These reports
are important for addressing identified gaps or challenges through
corrective actions to help ensure that past mistakes are not repeated.
For example, consistently completed after-action reports that include
the perspectives of key parties involved in each activation may help
to bring issues, such as challenges with pet sheltering, to the
attention of USDA managers. Without a more consistent and
comprehensive after-action reporting process that includes completing
a report for all ESF-11 activations, incorporating the perspectives of
key parties, and providing completed reports to key parties, USDA
managers may not have the necessary information to identify gaps or
challenges and address them through corrective actions to help ensure
that past mistakes are not repeated. Key parties may also not have all
of the information they need to improve coordination and performance
in future emergencies for which ESF-11 is activated. Moreover, USDA
did not provide a complete and accurate count of ESF-11 activations
over time. Government auditing standards call for management
information to be complete, accurate, and consistent to support
performance and decision making. However, without an accurate count of
ESF-11 activations over time, USDA managers may not have the
information and sufficiently reliable data necessary to request and
allocate resources, such as staff, for ESF-11 activities.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making the following nine recommendations:
To help ensure that the federal government is effectively implementing
the nation's food and agriculture defense policy, we recommend that:
* the Secretary of Homeland Security resume DHS's efforts to
coordinate agencies' overall HSPD-9 implementation efforts.
* the Homeland Security Council direct the National Security Staff to
establish an interagency process that would provide oversight of
agencies' implementation of HSPD-9.
* the Homeland Security Council direct the National Security Staff to
encourage agencies to participate in and contribute information to
DHS's efforts to coordinate agencies' implementation of HSPD-9.
To ensure the most effective use of resources and to resolve any
confusion, we recommend that:
* the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services jointly
determine on a periodic basis if there are appropriate opportunities
for the NVS to leverage Strategic National Stockpile mechanisms or
infrastructure as directed by HSPD-9. If such opportunities exist, the
two agencies should formally agree upon a process for the NVS to use
the identified mechanisms and infrastructure.
To help ensure that the nation is adequately prepared to recover from
high-consequence plant diseases, we recommend that:
* the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of ARS, in
coordination with relevant USDA agencies, to develop and implement a
documented, systematic process to track research gaps identified in
the NPDRS recovery plans and monitor progress in filling these gaps.
* the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of ARS, in
coordination with relevant USDA agencies, to develop and implement a
mechanism to ensure NPDRS recovery plans are shared with key state and
federal plant health officials.
To ensure that USDA is fulfilling its responsibilities to protect the
nation's food and agriculture systems, we recommend that:
* the Secretary of Agriculture develop a department-wide strategy for
implementing its HSPD-9 responsibilities. Such a strategy would
include an overarching framework for setting priorities, as well as
allocating resources.
To expedite response and recovery from major emergencies, we recommend
that:
* the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA,
in coordination with key agencies to provide guidance that clarifies
the roles and responsibilities agencies will have regarding the
disposal of animal carcasses in emergencies for which ESF-11 is
activated.
To improve USDA's performance as ESF-11 coordinator and to address
issues experienced by key parties, such as challenges with pet
sheltering, we recommend that:
* the Secretary of Agriculture develop a process for ensuring that (1)
following all ESF-11 activations, after-action reports are
consistently completed and shared with key parties involved in each
activation; (2) the perspectives of key parties are incorporated in
these reports; (3) any identified gaps or challenges are addressed
through corrective actions; and (4) the completed after-action reports
are used to provide a complete, accurate, and consistent count of ESF-
11 activations over time, in turn producing sufficiently reliable data
on ESF-11 activations.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services,
and Homeland Security; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the
National Security Staff a draft of this report for their review and
comment. USDA, HHS, and DHS generally concurred with the
recommendations and provided written comments on the draft, which are
summarized below and presented in their entirety in appendixes VIII,
IX, and X, respectively, of this report. In addition, in an e-mail
received July 22, 2011, the National Security Staff's Deputy Legal
Advisor stated that the National Security Staff agrees that a review
of HSPD-9 is appropriate and that they will look for an opportunity to
do so. USDA, HHS, DHS, EPA, and the National Security Staff provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
USDA agreed with the report's five recommendations to the department.
In commenting on our recommendation that USDA and HHS jointly
determine if there are opportunities for the NVS to leverage Strategic
National Stockpile mechanisms or infrastructure, USDA officials
confirmed that they have collaborated with CDC officials since the
inception of the NVS in 2006 and noted that they met with CDC
officials in February 2011 to discuss the possibility of resource
sharing. We modified our report to include information about this
February 2011 meeting. USDA also stated in its written comments that
the agency will continue to work with CDC to explore leveraging
opportunities between the two agencies and will document the process
for using CDC's resources or the findings if there are no such
opportunities, as appropriate. In response to our recommendation that
USDA develop and implement a mechanism to ensure NPDRS recovery plans
are shared with key state and federal plant health officials, USDA
commented that it will expand the department's efforts to share NPDRS
recovery plans more broadly. As our report states, USDA and state
plant health officials we met with all had limited or no knowledge
about NPDRS recovery plans, even though ARS officials were sharing
plans through a variety of venues. In commenting on our recommendation
that USDA take steps to enhance its after-action reporting process,
USDA officials stated that they have been meeting regularly to discuss
any identified gaps or challenges and plans for executing appropriate
corrective actions; however, they also stated that they will seek even
broader input to the after-action reports and that they will e-mail
the after-action reports directly to ESF-11 stakeholders. Moreover,
officials commented that the after-action reporting processes allow
for the compilation of complete, accurate, consistent, and reliable
data on ESF-11 activations. We agree that this could be a sufficiently
reliable source of data; however, as our report states, USDA provided
us with three different sets of documents that could be used to track
ESF-11 emergencies, which showed inconsistent information on the
number of such emergencies and raised questions about the accuracy of
the information USDA officials provided to us. We continue to believe
that if USDA consistently completes after-action reports, the agency
can provide a complete, accurate, and consistent count of ESF-11
activations over time.
HHS agreed with the report's recommendation that USDA and HHS jointly
determine if there are opportunities for the NVS to leverage Strategic
National Stockpile mechanisms or infrastructure. In commenting on our
report, HHS stated that, to date, it has not identified opportunities
for resource sharing but that if an opportunity arises in the future,
as determined by HHS and USDA, HHS will work to ensure that the
appropriate interagency agreements are in place. We view this as a
positive step, but we continue to believe that the departments have
not yet arrived at a joint determination about what resources are
appropriate for the NVS to leverage. Also in its comments, HHS stated
that the specific areas cited in the report where leveraging can occur
are incorrect. As stated in our report, the two examples we provide
are from the perspective of APHIS officials, further demonstrating
that there is not yet a joint determination about what resources are
appropriate to leverage. As a result, we modified our report to
clarify that, at this time, there appears to be some confusion about
the details of the NVS's and Strategic National Stockpile's mission
and infrastructure that may be impeding the agencies' efforts to
further leverage the stockpiles. In addition, we modified the
recommendation to clarify that it is intended to resolve any confusion
between USDA and HHS and that they should jointly determine on a
periodic basis whether there are opportunities for the NVS to leverage
Strategic National Stockpile resources.
DHS agreed with the report's recommendations that DHS resume the
department's efforts to coordinate agencies' overall HSPD-9
implementation efforts and that DHS provide guidance that clarifies
the roles and responsibilities agencies will have regarding the
disposal of animal carcasses in emergencies for which ESF-11 is
activated. In commenting on our recommendations, DHS stated that it
was pleased with GAO's characterization of DHS's role in protecting
the nation's food and agriculture systems and responding to terrorist
attacks and major disasters. DHS also commented that it will continue
to support the coordination of overall HSPD-9 implementation efforts.
Moreover, DHS stated that FEMA will work with and provide guidance to
federal partners clarifying roles and responsibilities for animal
carcass disposal and noted that, to fulfill this recommendation, its
federal partners will need to review their authorities and determine
their agencies' specific responsibilities during ESF-11 activations.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture,
Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security; the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency; the Executive Secretary for the
National Security Staff; and other interested parties. In addition,
this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or shamesl@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix XI.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Lisa Shames:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Federal Agencies Roles and Responsibilities for Food and
Agriculture Defense as Defined by HSPD-9:
Agency responsibilities:
Awareness and Warning: Develop surveillance and monitoring systems for
animal, plant, and wildlife disease, as well as food, public health,
and water quality for early detection and awareness of disease, pest,
or poisonous agents;
Department of Homeland Security: [Empty];
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Primary Responsibility for
Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of the Interior: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution.
Awareness and Warning: Develop systems to track specific animals and
plants,as well as specific commodities and food;
Department of Homeland Security: [Empty];
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Primary Responsibility for
Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of the Interior: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution.
Awareness and Warning: Develop nationwide laboratory networks for
food,veterinary, plant health, and water quality that are
interconnected and standardized;
Department of Homeland Security: [Empty];
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Primary Responsibility for
Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of the Interior: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution.
Awareness and Warning: Develop and enhance intelligence operations and
analysis capabilities for agriculture, food, and water sectors;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Support Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Support Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Support Task Execution;
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Awareness and Warning: Develop new biological threat awareness
capacity to enhance detection and characterization of an attack;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Support Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Support Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Support Task Execution;
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: Support Task Execution.
Vulnerability Assessments: Expand and continue vulnerability
assessments of the agriculture and food sectors;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Primary Responsibility for
Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: [Empty];
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Mitigation Strategies: Prioritize, develop, and implement mitigation
strategies to protect vulnerable critical production nodes from the
introduction of diseases, pests, or poisonous agents;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Support Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Support Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Support Task Execution;
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: Support Task Execution;
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: Support Task Execution.
Mitigation Strategies: Expand development of common screening
procedures for agriculture and food items entering the United States
and maximize effective domestic inspection activities for food items
within the United States;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Primary Responsibility for
Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: [Empty];
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Response and Recovery: Develop a National Veterinary Stockpile
containing sufficient amounts of animal vaccine, antiviral, or
therapeutic products to respond to the most damaging animal diseases
affecting human health and the economy;
Department of Homeland Security: Support Task Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Support Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Support Task Execution;
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Response and Recovery: Develop a National Plant Disease Recovery
System capable of responding to a high-consequence plant disease with
pest control measures and the use of resistant seed varieties;
Department of Homeland Security: Support Task Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Support Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Support Task Execution;
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Response and Recovery: Enhance recovery systems to stabilize
agriculture production, the food supply, and the economy, including
disposal and decontamination procedures;
Department of Homeland Security: Support Task Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Primary Responsibility for
Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Support Task Execution;
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Response and Recovery: Study and make recommendations to the Homeland
Security Council for the use of financial risk management tools for
self-protection of food and agriculture enterprises vulnerable to
losses due to terrorism;
Department of Homeland Security: [Empty];
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: [Empty];
Environmental Protection Agency: [Empty];
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Response and Recovery: Ensure adequate federal, state, and local
response capabilities to respond quickly and effectively to a
terrorist attack, major disease outbreak, or other disaster affecting
the national agriculture or food infrastructure;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Support Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Support Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Support Task Execution;
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: Support Task Execution;
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Response and Recovery: Develop a coordinated agriculture and food-
specific standardized response plan to be integrated into the National
Response Plan[A];
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Support Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Support Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Support Task Execution;
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: Support Task Execution;
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Outreach and Professional Development: Establish an effective
information sharing and analysis mechanism for agriculture and food in
cooperation with appropriate private sector entities;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Support Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Support Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: [Empty];
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: Support Task Execution.
Outreach and Professional Development: Develop and promote higher
education programs for the protection of animal, plant, and public
health;
Department of Homeland Security: Support Task Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Primary Responsibility for
Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: [Empty];
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: Support Task Execution;
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Outreach and Professional Development: Develop and promote higher
education programs to address protection of the food supply;
Department of Homeland Security: Support Task Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Primary Responsibility for
Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: [Empty];
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: Support Task Execution;
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Outreach and Professional Development: Establish opportunities for
professional development and specialized training in agriculture and
food protection;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Primary Responsibility for
Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: [Empty];
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Research and Development: Accelerate and expand development of
countermeasures against the intentional introduction or natural
occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant,and zoonotic diseases;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Primary Responsibility for
Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: Support Task
Execution;
Other: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution.
Research and Development: Develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and
state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories to research
and develop diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic
diseases;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: [Empty];
Environmental Protection Agency: [Empty];
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Research and Development: Establish university-based centers of
excellence in agriculture and food security;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Support Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Support Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: [Empty];
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
Budget: Submit an integrated budget plan for defense of the U.S. food
system;
Department of Homeland Security: Primary Responsibility for Task
Execution;
Department of Agriculture: Primary Responsibility for Task Execution;
Department of Health and Human Services: Primary Responsibility for
Task Execution;
Environmental Protection Agency: [Empty];
Department of the Interior: [Empty];
Department of Justice: [Empty];
Department of Education: [Empty];
Central Intelligence Agency: [Empty];
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: [Empty];
Other: [Empty].
[A] The National Response Plan was replaced by the National Response
Framework in 2008.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: The 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF), ESF
Coordinators, and ESF Responsibilities:
ESF-1: Transportation;
Coordinator: Department of Transportation;
* Aviation/airspace management and control;
* Transportation safety;
* Restoration and recovery of transportation infrastructure;
* Movement restrictions;
* Damage and impact assessment.
ESF-2: Communications;
Coordinator: Department of Homeland Security;
* Coordination with telecommunications and information technology
industries;
* Restoration and repair of telecommunications infrastructure;
* Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber and
information technology resources;
* Oversight of communications within the federal incident management
and response structures.
ESF-3: Public Works and Engineering;
Coordinator: Department of Defense (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers);
* Infrastructure protection and emergency repair;
* Infrastructure restoration;
* Engineering services and construction management;
* Emergency contracting support for lifesaving and life-sustaining
services.
ESF-4: Firefighting;
Coordinator: Department of Agriculture (U.S. Forest Service);
* Coordination of federal firefighting activities;
* Support to wildland, rural, and urban firefighting operations.
ESF-5: Emergency Management;
Coordinator: Department of Homeland Security (Federal Emergency
Management Agency);
* Coordination of incident management and response efforts;
* Issuance of mission assignments;
* Resource and human capital;
* Incident action planning;
* Financial management.
ESF-6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services;
Coordinator: Department of Homeland Security (Federal Emergency
Management Agency);
* Mass care;
* Emergency assistance;
* Disaster housing;
* Human services.
ESF-7: Logistics Management and Resource Support;
Coordinator: General Services Administration and Department of
Homeland Security (Federal Emergency Management Agency);
* Comprehensive, national incident logistics planning, management, and
sustainment capability;
* Resource support (facility space, office equipment and supplies,
contracting services, etc.).
ESF-8: Public Health and Medical Services;
Coordinator: Department of Health and Human Services;
* Public health;
* Medical;
* Mental health services;
* Mass fatality management.
ESF-9: Search and Rescue;
Coordinator: Department of Homeland Security (Federal Emergency
Management Agency);
* Lifesaving assistance;
* Search and rescue operations.
ESF-10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response;
Coordinator: Environmental Protection Agency;
* Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological,
etc.) response;
* Environmental short-and long-term cleanup.
ESF-11: Agriculture and Natural Resources;
Coordinator: Department of Agriculture;
* Nutrition assistance;
* Animal and plant disease and pest response;
* Food safety and security;
* Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection;
* Safety and well-being of household pets.
ESF-12: Energy;
Coordinator: Department of Energy;
* Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration;
* Energy industry utilities coordination;
* Energy forecast.
ESF-13: Public Safety and Security;
Coordinator: Department of Justice;
* Facility and resource security;
* Security planning and technical resource assistance;
* Public safety and security support;
* Support to access, traffic, and crowd control.
ESF-14: Long-Term Community Recovery;
Coordinator: Department of Homeland Security (Federal Emergency
Management Agency);
* Social and economic community impact assessment;
* Long-term community recovery assistance to states, tribes, local
governments, and the private sector;
* Analysis and review of mitigation program implementation.
ESF-15: External Affairs;
Coordinator: Department of Homeland Security;
* Emergency public information and protective action guidance;
* Media and community relations;
* Congressional and international affairs;
* Tribal and insular affairs.
Source: National Response Framework, 2008.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the extent to which there is
oversight of federal agencies' overall progress in implementing the
nation's food and agriculture defense policy; (2) evaluate the steps
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken to implement its
response and recovery responsibilities outlined in this policy, and
identify challenges, if any, that the department faces in implementing
these responsibilities; and (3) identify the circumstances under which
USDA has coordinated the federal food and agriculture response during
an emergency for which ESF-11 was activated, and challenges, if any,
that the parties involved experienced.
For our first objective regarding oversight of federal agencies'
overall progress in implementing Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD)-9, we reviewed presidential directives, including
HSPDs 1, 5, 7, 8, and 9, which define agency roles in homeland
security and food and agriculture defense. In addition, we compared
federal efforts with those outlined in the Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 29] We interviewed
officials from USDA, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)--chosen because they have the most HSPD-9
responsibilities--and received written responses from each of the four
agencies about how they view federal oversight and coordination. We
also analyzed status reports these agencies provided to the Homeland
Security Council between 2007 and early 2009. We also met with an
official from the National Security Staff--which now supports the
Homeland Security Council--to discuss any current efforts they are
coordinating to oversee agencies' HSPD-9 implementation progress.
For our second objective regarding the steps USDA has taken to
implement its HSPD-9 response and recovery responsibilities, we
reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and presidential directives,
including the Animal Health Protection Act, FDA Food Safety
Modernization Act, Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, the Biennial Review and
Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List, and HSPD-9 and HSPD-
1. We also reviewed federal guidance, planning, and implementation
documents, including the Federal Food and Agriculture Decontamination
and Disposal Roles and Responsibilities document, DHS's National
Response Framework, DHS's and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development's draft National Disaster Recovery Framework, various
National Animal Health Emergency Management System guidelines, USDA
agencies' and offices' strategic plans, various federal departments'
HSPD-9 implementation progress reports, various USDA financial
disaster assistance programs, and the National Veterinary Stockpile's
(NVS) service contracts for transportation and commercial support
services. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed various documents
including USDA's Risk Management Agency's report on Managing the
Financial Risks of Terrorist Acts against Agriculture, National Plant
Disease Recovery System (NPDRS) recovery plans, NVS state planning
documents, and the NVS's contracts for vaccines. To determine how USDA
agencies allocated and obligated funds to develop the NVS and NPDRS,
we requested and reviewed budget data provided by the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the Agricultural Research
Service (ARS).
For our second objective, we also interviewed officials from USDA
agencies responsible for implementing the department's response and
recovery responsibilities, and we interviewed relevant officials from
DHS and HHS regarding USDA's interagency coordination efforts and
received written responses from DHS, HHS, and EPA about how they view
interagency coordination (see table 1 for a complete list of agencies
and offices we interviewed). To inform this objective, we also
interviewed USDA officials from the department's two regional offices
in North Carolina and Colorado and, while in these two states, we also
spoke with state-level agriculture and emergency management officials.
In addition, we conducted interviews with officials representing
industry associations for the top five U.S. agricultural commodities,
as determined by cash receipt data available from USDA's Economic
Research Service--cattle and calves, corn, soybeans, dairy products,
and broiler chickens--about the impact of USDA's agriculture and food
emergency response and recovery efforts on industry. We also met with
officials from various relevant professional associations to learn
more about USDA's HSPD-9 implementation efforts and any challenges or
gaps related to these efforts (see table 2 for a complete list of
organizations we interviewed). In addition, we met with officials from
two DHS Centers of Excellence regarding food recalls and animal
diseases, as well as veterinary specialists from a land grant
university whom we selected for their technical expertise and previous
experience working with USDA on emergency response and recovery
issues. We also attended exercises, including a joint state-federal
exercise on plant disease and a national-level exercise, and we
reviewed lessons learned from previous key exercises.
Moreover, for our second objective, we conducted a survey of animal
health officials from all 50 states and five U.S. territories. The
survey gathered information about states' and U.S. territories'
perspectives regarding the NVS. The five territories we surveyed were
American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. We did not
survey the District of Columbia because, according to the District of
Columbia's lead veterinary medical officer, livestock are not
permitted in the District, and federal agencies are responsible for
responding to and recovering from any foreign animal disease outbreak
that affects the National Zoological Park or the National Aquarium in
the District of Columbia. We received responses from 52 of 55 animal
health officials surveyed, for an overall response rate of 95 percent.
More specifically, we received completed surveys from 49 of the 50
states and from three of the five territories. We did not receive
survey responses from one state, Georgia, and two territories, Guam
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Because we
surveyed the universe of state and U.S. territory animal health
officials from all 50 states and five territories, our survey was not
a sample survey and, therefore, had no sampling errors. However, the
practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce other
types of errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For
example, difficulties in interpreting a particular question, sources
of information available to respondents, or entering data into a
database or analyzing them can introduce unwanted variability into the
survey results. We took steps in developing the questionnaire,
collecting the data, and analyzing them to minimize such nonsampling
errors. For example, a social science survey methodologist helped
design the questionnaire in collaboration with GAO staff that had
subject-matter expertise. The questionnaire was also reviewed by an
independent GAO survey specialist. The survey asked a combination of
questions that allowed for open-ended and close-ended responses. We
pretested the content and format of the questionnaire with four animal
health officials--selected to represent both large and small
agriculture producing states, as well as states with a variety of
experience working with the NVS--to ensure that (1) the survey
questions were clear, (2) the terms we used were precise, (3) the
questionnaire did not place an undue burden on the respondents, and
(4) the questions were unbiased. We received input on the survey and
made changes to the content and format of the final questionnaire
based on our pretest results. Since there were relatively few changes
based on the pretests and we were conducting surveys with the universe
of respondents--all state and U.S. territory animal health officials--
we did not find it necessary to conduct additional pretests.
Following this work on developing a questionnaire to collect data in a
standardized and structured manner, we sent the questionnaire by e-
mail on November 16, 2010, in an attached Microsoft Word form that
respondents could return electronically after marking checkboxes or
entering narrative responses into open-answer boxes. Follow-up e-mail
messages or telephone calls were placed to respondents when answers
were unclear or questions were unanswered. We analyzed the frequency
and distribution of marked checkbox responses. We also conducted a
content analysis on the open-ended narrative responses for trends and
recurring themes. Data analysis was conducted by a GAO data analyst
working directly with GAO staff with subject-matter expertise. A
second, independent, analyst checked all of the computer programs for
accuracy.
For our third objective regarding the circumstances under which USDA
has coordinated the federal food and agriculture response during an
emergency for which ESF-11 was activated, we reviewed DHS's National
Response Framework, including ESF-11, ESF-3, and ESF-6; the Stafford
Act; and FEMA's Disaster Assistance Policy. We also reviewed and
analyzed ESF-11-related mission assignments given to USDA by FEMA and
after-action reports created by USDA for emergencies for which ESF-11
was activated. In addition, we interviewed relevant officials from
USDA--including from APHIS's office of Animal Care, the Food and
Nutrition Service, and the Food Safety Inspection Service--and FEMA
about coordination with each other and with states and regarding
challenges related to ESF-11. We also requested and reviewed documents
provided by both USDA and FEMA with the number of times ESF-11 has
been activated since 2007. We compared the ESF-11 activations from
USDA's and FEMA's lists to determine the extent to which the same
events appeared in all data sets. As we are reporting, we found that
the data are not sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes. USDA
ultimately provided us with a list of about 28 ESF-11 activations,
which is the number we are reporting to provide some context on the
number of times these activations have occurred. We are making a
recommendation regarding this finding. We did not review aspects of
ESF-11 pertaining to the protection of natural and cultural resources
and historic properties because our review focuses on emergencies
affecting agriculture and food.
For our third objective, we also conducted interviews in person or via
telephone with federal and state agriculture and emergency management
officials from a nonprobability sample of four states--Iowa,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Texas--about their experience working
with USDA and FEMA. We used a multistep process to select these four
states:
* First, we listed the states and territories that have experienced
past emergencies for which ESF-11 was activated, which were determined
by reviewing USDA-provided after-action reports.
* Second, we narrowed that list down to states in which USDA conducted
on-the-ground activities, which again was determined by reviewing USDA-
provided after-action reports.
* Third, we divided the remaining states into two groups those in
USDA's Eastern Region and those in USDA's Western Region to ensure
that the selected states represented both regions.
* Fourth, we identified the reason for each ESF-11 activation--
information that we obtained by reviewing USDA-provided after-action
reports--to ensure that the states we selected experienced different
types of emergencies.
* Finally, we considered the states that have used available resources
from the NVS, based on information provided by APHIS officials.
Within each state, we interviewed relevant federal and state officials
involved with the ESF-11 activations, such as state plant and animal
officials, emergency management officials, USDA state and regional
officials, and FEMA regional officials (see tables 1-3 for a complete
list of departments, agencies, and organizations we interviewed). To
maximize our resources and because HSPD-9 states that the Secretary of
Agriculture shall work with state governments, among others, to
develop the NVS and NPDRS, we also interviewed some of these federal
and state officials regarding issues related to our second objective.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to August 2011, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Table 1: Agencies, and Offices Interviewed:
Department: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Component/agency: Agricultural Research Service:
* Office of Pest Management Policy.
Component/agency: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS),
Animal Care:
* APHIS Animal Care Eastern Regional Office.
* APHIS Animal Care Western Regional Office.
Component/agency: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,
Emergency Management Leadership Council.
Component/agency: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, ESF-11
Coordinators:
* ESF-11 National Coordinator.
* ESF-11 Eastern Region Coordinator.
* ESF-11 Western Region Coordinator.
* ESF-11 Coordinator for FEMA Region I.
* ESF-11 Coordinator for FEMA Region IV.
* ESF-11 Coordinator for FEMA Region VI.
* ESF-11 Coordinator for FEMA Region VII.
Component/agency: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Plant
Protection and Quarantine (PPQ):
* APHIS PPQ Eastern Regional Office.
* APHIS PPQ Western Regional Office.
* APHIS PPQ state office in Colorado.
* APHIS PPQ state office in Iowa.
* APHIS PPQ state office in Massachusetts.
* APHIS PPQ state office in Mississippi.
* APHIS PPQ state office in North Carolina.
* APHIS PPQ state office in Texas.
Component/agency: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, National
Veterinary Stockpile.
Component/agency: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,
Veterinary Services (VS):
* APHIS VS Eastern Regional Office.
* APHIS VS Western Regional Office.
* APHIS VS state office in Colorado.
* APHIS VS state office in Iowa.
* APHIS VS state office in Mississippi.
* APHIS VS state office in North Carolina.
* APHIS VS state office in Texas.
Component/agency: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,
Veterinary Services, National Veterinary Services Laboratories.
Component/agency: Departmental Management, Office of Homeland Security
and Emergency Coordination.
Component/agency: Farm Service Agency.
Component/agency: Food and Nutrition Service:
* Food and Nutrition Service North East regional office.
Component/agency: Food Safety and Inspection Service
* Food Safety Inspection Service district office in North Carolina.
* Food Safety Inspection Service district office in Colorado.
* Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement, and Review.
* Office of Data Integration and Food Protection.
* Office of Field Operations.
Component/agency: National Institute of Food and Agriculture.
Component/agency: Natural Resources Conservation Service.
Component/agency: Office of the General Counsel.
Component/agency: Risk Management Agency.
Department: Department of Health and Human Services:
Component/agency: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Strategic National Stockpile.
Component/agency: Food and Drug Administration.
Department: Environmental Protection Agency:
Component/agency: Office of Homeland Security.
Component/agency: Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Management.
Component/agency: Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention.
Component/agency: Office of Research and Development.
Department: Department of Homeland Security:
Component/agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
* FEMA Region I.
* FEMA Region VI.
* Grant Programs Division.
* Recovery Directorate.
* Response Directorate.
Office of Health Affairs.
Office of General Counsel.
Source GAO.
[End of table]
Table 2: Organizations Interviewed:
* American Association of Swine Veterinarians.
* American Phytopathological Society.
* American Soybean Association.
* DHS Center of Excellence, National Center for Food Protection and
Defense.
* DHS Center of Excellence, Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense.
* Iowa Pork Producers Association.
* Iowa State University, Center for Food Security and Public Health.
* National Association of State Departments of Agriculture.
* National Cattlemen's Beef Association.
* National Chicken Council.
* National Corn Growers Association.
* National Milk Producers Federation.
* National Plant Board.
* National Pork Board.
Source GAO.
[End of table]
Table 3: Agencies Interviewed:
State: Colorado;
Department/agency:
Department of Agriculture.
State: Iowa;
Department/agency:
* Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship.
* Department of Inspections and Appeals.
* Department of Public Defense.
State: Massachusetts;
Department/agency:
* Department of Agricultural Resources.
* Department of Conservation and Recreation.
State: Mississippi;
Department/agency:
* Board of Animal Health.
* Department of Agriculture and Commerce.
State: North Carolina;
Department/agency:
* Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services.
* Department of Crime Control and Public Safety.
State: Texas;
Department/agency:
* Animal Health Commission.
* Department of Agriculture.
* Department of Public Safety.
Source GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Seventeen Most Damaging Animal Diseases Identified for
USDA's National Veterinary Stockpile:
Animal disease: Highly pathogenic avian influenza;
Animals affected: Chicken, turkey, wild birds, water fowl;
Route of transmission: Body fluids; aerosols; fomites;
Risk to human health: Yes, may be lethal.
Animal disease: Foot-and-mouth disease;
Animals affected: All cloven hoofed animals including cattle, sheep,
goats, pigs;
Route of transmission: Aerosol; direct contact; ingestion; fomites;
Risk to human health: No.
Animal disease: Rift Valley fever;
Animals affected: Cattle, sheep, goats, dogs, cats, camels, monkeys;
Route of transmission: Insect vectors (mosquitoes); direct contact
with blood or tissue;
Risk to human health: Yes, may be lethal.
Animal disease: Exotic Newcastle disease;
Animals affected: Poultry, other avian species;
Route of transmission: Direct contact with body fluids; aerosols;
feces or respiratory droplets;
Risk to human health: Yes, minor effects.
Animal disease: Nipah virus and Hendra virus;
Animals affected: For Nipah virus pigs, horses, cats, dogs;
For Hendra virus horses, cats, guinea pigs;
Route of transmission: For Nipah virus close direct contact with
contaminated tissue or body fluids. For Hendra virus direct contact;
oranasal; ingestion of contaminated material; fruit bats;
Risk to human health: Yes, may be lethal.
Animal disease: Classical swine fever;
Animals affected: Domestic pigs;
Route of transmission: Ingestion (uncooked garbage); fomites; aerosol;
direct contact;
Risk to human health: No.
Animal disease: African swine fever;
Animals affected: Domestic and wild pigs; wart hogs;
Route of transmission: Direct contact with body fluids, especially
blood; fomites; tick vectors;
Risk to human health: No.
Animal disease: Bovine spongiform encephalopathy;
Animals affected: Cattle;
Route of transmission: Ingestion of infected cattle products (meat,
bone-meal, nervous tissue);
Risk to human health: Suspected.
Animal disease: Rinderpest;
Animals affected: Cattle, sheep, goats;
Route of transmission: Direct or close contact with body fluids;
Risk to human health: No.
Animal disease: Japanese encephalitis;
Animals affected: Horses, pigs;
Route of transmission: Mosquitoes;
Risk to human health: Yes, may be lethal.
Animal disease: African horse sickness;
Animals affected: Horses, zebras, donkeys, mules, camels;
Route of transmission: Culicoides midges, mechanically by other
insects;
Risk to human health: No.
Animal disease: Venezuelan equine encephalitis;
Animals affected: All equine, bats, birds, rodents;
Route of transmission: Mosquito (vectors) infected with virus;
Risk to human health: Yes, may be lethal.
Animal disease: Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia;
Animals affected: Cattle;
Route of transmission: Close contact with respiratory droplets and
other body fluids;
Risk to human health: No.
Animal disease: Ehrlichia ruminantium (Heartwater);
Animals affected: Cattle, sheep, goats, wild ruminants;
Route of transmission: Ticks;
Risk to human health: No.
Animal disease: Eastern equine encephalitis;
Animals affected: Horses;
Route of transmission: Vectors infected with virus;
Risk to human health: Yes, may be lethal.
Animal disease: Coxiella burnetii;
Animals affected: Cattle, sheep, goats, dogs, cats, rodents, rabbits;
Route of transmission: Arthropods ticks; inhalation;
infected animal body fluids (urine, milk, blood, birthing);
Risk to human health: Yes, may be lethal.
Animal disease: Akabane virus;
Animals affected: Cattle, sheep, goats;
Route of transmission: Unknown, thought to be various species of
mosquitoes;
Risk to human health: No.
Sources: GAO analysis of materials obtained from NVS, Iowa State
University's Center for Food Security and Public Health, and federal
regulations.
Note: These diseases are also select agents. Select agents are
biological agents and toxins (1) that have the potential to pose a
severe threat to public health and safety, to animal or plant health,
or to animal or plant products, and (2) whose possession, use, and
transfer are regulated by select agent rules (7 C.F.R. pt. 331, 9
C.F.R. pt. 121, and 42 C.F.R. pt. 73). The CDC and USDA maintain a
list of select agents and toxins. Congress passed several laws--
including the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act)[Footnote 30]--that
strengthened the oversight and use of select agents.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Survey of State and U.S. Territory Animal Health Officials:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Survey of Animal Health Officials regarding the Veterinary Stockpile:
Introduction:
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, non-
partisan legislative branch agency that assists the Congress in
evaluating how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars. GAO
supports the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities
and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of
the federal government for the benefit of the American people.
In response to a congressional request, we are evaluating federal
agriculture and food response and recovery efforts, including the
National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS). The NVS is the nation's
repository of veterinary countermeasures, including supplies,
equipment, field tests, vaccines, and commercial support services. It
exists to provide States and Territories the resources they need to
respond to catastrophic animal disease outbreaks that terrorists or
nature may create.
The goal of this survey is to gain your perspective regarding the NVS.
You were selected for this survey because you were identified as the
key contact in your State (including the District of Columbia) or U.S.
Territory for the NVS.
Deadline:
To assist us, we ask that you complete and return this survey by
December 3, 2010.
Instructions for Completing This Survey:
You can answer most of the questions easily by checking boxes. A few
questions request narrative answers. Please note that the space
provided will expand to accommodate your answer. You may write
additional comments at the end of the survey. Before you start
answering the questions, simply save this file to your computer hard
drive, fill it out, resave the file, and then attach it to your return
e-mail to GAO. The return email address is SahoSurvey@gao.gov.
* Please use your mouse to navigate throughout the survey by clicking
on the field or check box you wish to fill in. Do not use the "Tab" or
"Enter" keys as doing so may cause formatting problems.
* To select or deselect a check box, simply click or double click on
the box.
Contact Information:
Thanks in advance for taking the time to complete this survey. If you
have any questions about the survey, please contact either:
Bill Colwell, GAO Analyst:
Phone:
E-mail:
or:
Amanda Krause, GAO Analyst-in-Charge:
Phone:
E-mail:
Thank you for your help.
Contact Information:
1. Several people may participate in the completion of this survey,
but we ask that you provide contact information for the person
coordinating the completion of the survey in case we need to follow-up
with additional questions.
Name:
Title:
Agency:
State or Territory:
Phone #:
E-mail:
2. How long have you been in this position? (Round up to the nearest
year.)
1-25 years = range;
6.1 years = average.
3. Are you the State Animal Health Official for your State or the
equivalent for your Territory? (Mark only one response.)
38: Yes;
14: No.
Section A. Working with USDA Regarding the NVS:
4. Did USDA work with your State or Territory to develop the NVS
before it became operational in 2006? (Mark only one response.)
11: Yes;
36: No;
5: Missing/No Response.
5. Did USDA work with your State or Territory regarding the NVS after
it became operational in 2006? (Mark only one response.)
40: Yes;
11: No;
1: Missing/No Response.
6. When working with USDA regarding the NVS, what aspects were
positive? (Note: If your State or Territory has not worked with USDA
regarding the NVS, enter 'Not Applicable.)
40 respondents made a comment to this question.
7. When working with USDA regarding the NVS, what aspects could be
improved? (Note: If your State or Territory has not worked with USDA
regarding the NVS, enter 'Not Applicable.)
30 respondents made a comment to this question.
8. In which of the following venues, if any, did USDA share
information with your State or Territory regarding the NVS? (Mark only
one response for each row.)
Venue: a. Conferences;
Yes: USDA shared information in this venue: 44;
No: USDA did not share information in this venue: 4;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 2;
Missing/No response: 2.
Venue: b. Webinars;
Yes: USDA shared information in this venue: 30;
No: USDA did not share information in this venue: 9;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 8;
Missing/No response: 5.
Venue: c. Training;
Yes: USDA shared information in this venue: 27;
No: USDA did not share information in this venue: 10;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 12;
Missing/No response: 3.
Venue: d. Exercises;
Yes: USDA shared information in this venue: 33;
No: USDA did not share information in this venue: 5;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 12;
Missing/No response: 2.
Venue: e. Individual meetings or phone calls between USDA and your
State or Territory;
Yes: USDA shared information in this venue: 34;
No: USDA did not share information in this venue: 7;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 9;
Missing/No response: 2.
Venue: f. Group meetings or phone calls with USDA and other States or
Territories;
Yes: USDA shared information in this venue: 39;
No: USDA did not share information in this venue: 5;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 6;
Missing/No response: 2.
9. In what other venues, if any, did USDA share information with your
State or Territory regarding the NVS?
31 respondents made a comment to this question.
10. If USDA shared information with your State or Territory regarding
the NVS, what information did it share?
43 respondents made a comment to this question.
11. In which of the following venues, if any, did USDA solicit input
from your State or Territory regarding the NVS? Mark only one response
for each row.)
Venue: a. Conferences;
Yes: USDA solicited input in this venue: 32;
No: USDA did not solicited input in this venue: 13;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 4;
Missing/No response: 3.
Venue: b. Webinars;
Yes: USDA solicited input in this venue: 23;
No: USDA did not solicited input in this venue: 15;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 9;
Missing/No response: 5.
Venue: c. Training;
Yes: USDA solicited input in this venue: 25;
No: USDA did not solicited input in this venue: 15;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 9;
Missing/No response: 3.
Venue: d. Exercises;
Yes: USDA solicited input in this venue: 25;
No: USDA did not solicited input in this venue: 12;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 12;
Missing/No response: 3.
Venue: e. Individual meetings or phone calls between USDA and your
State or Territory;
Yes: USDA solicited input in this venue: 28;
No: USDA did not solicited input in this venue: 13;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 10;
Missing/No response: 1.
Venue: f. Group meetings or phone calls with USDA and other States or
Territories;
Yes: USDA solicited input in this venue: 31;
No: USDA did not solicited input in this venue: 12;
State or Territory did not participate in this venue: 8;
Missing/No response: 1.
12. In what other venues, if any, did USDA solicit input from your
State or Territory regarding the NVS?
16 respondents made a comment to this question.
13. If USDA solicited input from your State or Territory regarding the
NVS, what issues did it ask about?
29 respondents made a comment to this question.
Section B. NVS-Specific Plans:
14. Has your State or Territory taken any steps to create a written
NVS-specific plan? (Mark only one response.)
40: Yes;
12: No.
15. Does your State or Territory have a written NVS-specific plan?
(Mark only one response.)
17: Yes: Please attach a copy of this plan to your e-mail: Skip To
Question #17;
35: No.
16. What barriers or challenges exist, if any, that prevent your State
or Territory from having a written NVS-specific plan?
27 respondents made a comment to this question.
Section C. Receiving NVS Resources:
17. Has your State or Territory identified specific facility locations
to receive NVS resources? (Mark only one response.)
20: Yes;
31: No 4: Skip To Question #20;
1: Don't know: 4: Skip To Question #20.
18. Are these specific facility locations to receive NVS resources
identified in your State's or Territory's written NVS-specific plan?
(Mark only one response.)
13: Yes;
1: No;
6: Not applicable since State or Territory does not have a written NVS-
specific plan.
19. Has your State or Territory identified a facility location(s)
capable of holding temperature-sensitive NVS resources such as
antiviral medications, vaccines, or diagnostic test kits? (Mark only
one response.)
17: Yes;
2: No;
1: Don't know.
20. How clear or unclear is the process for requesting NVS resources?
(Mark only one response.)
26: Very clear;
20: Somewhat clear;
2: Somewhat unclear;
1: Very unclear;
3: Don't know.
Section D. Concerns about NVS Resources:
21. Does your State or Territory have any of the following concerns
about NVS personal protective equipment (PPE)? (Mark only one response
for each row.)
Concern: a. Sufficiency of the amount of PPE contained in the NVS;
No: 40;
Yes: 12;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 0.
Concern: b. Appropriateness of NVS PPE to respond to the most damaging
animal diseases;
No: 40;
Yes: 11;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 1.
Concern: c. Capability of the NVS to deploy PPE within 24 hours of an
outbreak;
No: 35;
Yes: 15;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 2.
22. What other concerns, if any, does your State or Territory have
regarding NVS PPE?
17 respondents made a comment to this question.
23. Does your State or Territory have any of the following concerns
about NVS diagnostic test kits? (Mark only one response for each row.)
Concern: a. Sufficiency of the amount of diagnostic test kits
contained in the NVS;
No: 32;
Yes: 16;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 4.
Concern: b. Appropriateness of NVS diagnostic test kits to respond to
the most damaging animal diseases;
No: 32;
Yes: 16;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 4.
Concern: c. Capability of the NVS to deploy diagnostic test kits
within 24 hours of an outbreak;
No: 34;
Yes: 14;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 4.
24. What other concerns, if any, does your State or Territory have
regarding NVS diagnostic test kits?
25 respondents made a comment to this question.
25. Does your State or Territory have any of the following concerns
about NVS antiviral medication? (Mark only one response for each row.)
Concern: a. Sufficiency of the amount of antiviral medication
contained in the NVS;
No: 32;
Yes: 17;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 3.
Concern: b. Appropriateness of NVS antiviral medication to respond to
the most damaging animal diseases;
No: 34;
Yes: 16;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 2.
Concern: c. Capability of the NVS to deploy antiviral medication
within 24 hours of an outbreak;
No: 30;
Yes: 17;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 5.
26. What other concerns, if any, does your State or Territory have
regarding NVS antiviral medication?
26 respondents made a comment to this question.
27. Does your State or Territory have any of the following concerns
about NVS vaccines? (Mark only one response for each row.)
Concern: a. Sufficiency of the amount of vaccines contained in the NVS;
No: 20;
Yes: 30;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 2.
Concern: b. Appropriateness of NVS vaccines to respond to the most
damaging animal diseases;
No: 24;
Yes: 26;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 2.
Concern: c. Capability of the NVS to deploy vaccines within 24 hours
of an outbreak;
No: 24;
Yes: 26;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 2.
28. Does your State or Territory have any of the following concerns
about NVS animal-handling equipment? (Mark only one response for each
row.)
Concern: a. Sufficiency of the amount of animal-handling equipment
contained in the NVS;
No: 23;
Yes: 26;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 3.
Concern: b. Appropriateness of NVS animal-handling equipment to
respond to the most damaging animal diseases;
No: 29;
Yes: 19;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 4.
Concern: c. Capability of the NVS to deploy animal-handling equipment
within 24 hours of an outbreak;
No: 27;
Yes: 22;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 3.
30. What other concerns, if any, does your State or Territory have
regarding NVS animal-handling equipment?
20 respondents made a comment to this question.
31. Does your State or Territory have any of the following concerns
about NVS depopulation, disposal and decontamination (3D) commercial
support services? (Mark only one response for each row.)
Concern: a. Sufficiency of the amount of commercial support services
available from the NVS;
No: 28;
Yes: 23;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 1.
Concern: b. Appropriateness of NVS 3D commercial support services to
respond to the most damaging animal diseases;
No: 28;
Yes: 22;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 2.
Concern: c. Capability of the NVS to deploy commercial support
services within 24 hours of an outbreak;
No: 27;
Yes: 21;
If yes, please note any specific concerns:
Missing/No response: 4.
32. What other concerns, if any, does your State or Territory have
regarding NVS 3D commercial support services?
22 respondents made a comment to this question.
33. Does your State or Territory have any concerns regarding any other
specific NVS resource(s)?
10 respondents made a comment to this question.
Section E. Use of NVS Resources:
34. Has your State or Territory requested any NVS resources since 2006
to respond to an incident? (Mark only one response.)
3: Yes;
49: No.
35. Has your State or Territory received any NVS resources since 2006
to respond to an incident? (Mark only one response.)
3: Yes;
49: No: 4: Skip To Question #40.
36. Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the
assistance you received from the NVS? (Mark only one response.)
2: Very satisfied;
1: Somewhat satisfied;
0: Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied;
0: Somewhat dissatisfied;
0: Very dissatisfied.
37. Why did you rate your level of satisfaction with the NVS
assistance you received at this level?
3 respondents made a comment to this question.
38. What improvements, if any, could be made in the assistance
provided by the NVS?
3 respondents made a comment to this question.
39. Did USDA solicit feedback from your State or Territory about the
NVS assistance you received? (Mark only one response.)
2: Yes;
1: No;
0: Don't know.
Section F. Additional Information:
40. Please provide any additional comments you would like to share
regarding the NVS.
26 respondents made a comment to this question.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Thirteen High-Consequence Plant Diseases with Completed
Recovery Plans for USDA's NPDRS:
Plant disease: Citrus variegated chlorosis;
Plants affected: Sweet oranges and other citrus species;
Route of transmission: Budding using infected budwood sources, natural
root grafts, vectored by xylem-feeding insects;
Impact: The potential economic impact is high because the disease
lowers yields, makes fruit unmarketable, and there is a likely loss of
domestic and international export markets by embargo.
Plant disease: Downy mildews of corn;
Plants affected: Corn, sugarcane, some sorghum cultivars, and many
weedy grass species;
Route of transmission: Spores produced by nearby infected hosts or
soil borne over-wintering spores, spread by wind and rain;
Impact: On sweet corn, losses of 100% have been reported in the
Philippines. It was estimated that the national yield loss in the
Philippines in the 1974-1975 growing season was $23 million.
Plant disease: Huanglongbing of citrus;
Plants affected: All citrus plants, including sweet oranges, tangelos,
and mandarins;
Route of transmission: Grafting with diseased budwood, vectored by
citrus psyllids;
Impact: Severe yield losses result from infections of citrus trees,
which usually die in 3 to 8 years. Infected trees produce fruit that
is bitter and generally unsuitable for sale as fresh fruit or for
juice.
Plant disease: Late wilt of corn;
Plants affected: Corn;
Route of transmission: Spread primarily through movement of infested
soil, crop residue, or seeds;
Impact: Corn yield losses approached 40% in Egypt before the
introduction of resistant varieties. All areas in the United States
could be seriously impacted by the disease, in part, because of
favorable environmental conditions.
Plant disease: Laurel wilt of redbay;
Plants affected: Trees in the laurel family;
Route of transmission: Vectored by beetles;
Impact: The disease poses the greatest threat to the commercial
avocado industry. Other economic impact may include decreased property
values and lost revenue to nurseries.
Plant disease: Plum pox;
Plants affected: Plums, peaches, nectarines, apricots, and almonds;
Route of transmission: Graft transmission, vectored by aphids;
Impact: The disease can cause significant economic loss due to a
reduction in fruit quality and yield and due to premature tree death.
In 1999, the yearly value of production of peaches, nectarines, plums,
apricots, and almonds nationally was approximately $1.8 billion.
Plant disease: Potato wart;
Plants affected: Potatoes;
Route of transmission: Infected seed potatoes, movement of fungal
spores in soil or water, infested manure from animals that have fed on
infected tubers;
Impact: The economic impact is not from direct disease losses but from
loss of international trade markets, long-term quarantines, and
regulatory restrictions placed on infested areas and the buffer zones
surrounding infested land.
Plant disease: Ralstonia bacterial wilt of potato and geraniums;
Plants affected: Various row crops including pepper, tobacco, tomato,
and potato, as well as some ornamentals such as geraniums;
Route of transmission: Primarily a soilborne and waterborne pathogen;
Impact: The disease is one of the most damaging pathogens on potato
worldwide and has been estimated to affect 3.75 million acres in
approximately 80 countries with global damage estimates exceeding $950
million per year.
Plant disease: Rathayibacter poisoning;
Plants affected: Forage grasses, often resulting in fatal poisoning of
grazing animals;
Route of transmission: Transferred from infested soils into plants by
plant parasitic nematodes;
Impact: Thousands of sheep and cattle, as well as some horses, died
from ailments attributed to the disease in Australia, where loss of
production and cost of control has been in the millions of dollars.
Plant disease: Red leaf blotch of soybean;
Plants affected: Soybeans;
Route of transmission: Rain splashes the fungus from soil onto leaf
surfaces, where germination and infection occur;
Impact: Yield losses of up to 50% were reported in Zambia and
Zimbabwe. The disease could threaten soybean production anywhere in
the United States.
Plant disease: Scots pine blister rust;
Plants affected: Eurasian pine trees;
Route of transmission: Spread by windborne spores, may also be carried
on plant material;
Impact: The greatest economic impacts may be to nurseries and
Christmas tree plantations that grow Scots pine. Movement restrictions
and eradication of infected material could cause enormous economic
losses amounting to millions of dollars.
Plant disease: Stem rust of wheat;
Plants affected: Wheat and barley;
Route of transmission: Rain splash and wind-dispersal;
Impact: The disease has been one of the most important diseases of
cereal crops since the emergence of western civilization. Regional
epidemics have occurred numerous times in the United States, with
losses of over 50% recorded in Minnesota and North Dakota in 1935.
Plant disease: Phytophthora kernoviae;
Plants affected: Forest trees and shrubs such as beech and
rhododendron;
Route of transmission: Dispersed by splashes, through contaminated
runoff water, in infested soil, and through long-distance dispersal on
logs, wood products , and ornamental nursery stock;
Impact: The potential for the disease to become established in U.S.
hardwood forests is considered high, as is the likelihood of it
causing extensive mortality, therefore, the potential economic and
ecological impact to U.S. natural resources due to pathogen
establishment is potentially very high.
Source: GAO analysis of NPDRS recovery plans.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: USDA List of 28 ESF-11 Activations between 2007 and 2011:
Year: 2007;
Emergency: Tornado;
States and U.S. territories affected: Kansas.
Year: 2007;
Emergency: Wildfires;
States and U.S. territories affected: California.
Year: 2007;
Emergency: Tropical Storm Erin;
States and U.S. territories affected: Texas.
Year: 2007;
Emergency: Severe winter storms;
States and U.S. territories affected: Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska.
Year: 2007;
Emergency: Hurricane Dean;
States and U.S. territories affected: Louisiana, Texas.
Year: 2008;
Emergency: Severe storms and flooding;
States and U.S. territories affected: Indiana, Iowa.
Year: 2008;
Emergency: Hurricane Omar;
States and U.S. territories affected: U.S. Virgin Islands.
Year: 2008;
Emergency: Hurricane Dolly;
States and U.S. territories affected: Texas.
Year: 2008;
Emergency: Hurricane Gustav;
States and U.S. territories affected: Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Texas.
Year: 2008;
Emergency: Hurricane Ike;
States and U.S. territories affected: Texas.
Year: 2008;
Emergency: Hurricane Fay;
States and U.S. territories affected: Florida.
Year: 2008;
Emergency: Tropical Storm Hanna;
States and U.S. territories affected: North Carolina.
Year: 2008-2009;
Emergency: Severe winter storms;
States and U.S. territories affected: Massachusetts.
Year: 2009;
Emergency: Earthquake and tsunami;
States and U.S. territories affected: American Samoa.
Year: 2009;
Emergency: Flooding;
States and U.S. territories affected: Washington.
Year: 2009;
Emergency: Severe storm and flooding;
States and U.S. territories affected: North Dakota.
Year: 2009;
Emergency: 56th Presidential Inauguration[A];
States and U.S. territories affected: Washington, D.C-
Year: 2010;
Emergency: Flooding;
States and U.S. territories affected: North Dakota.
Year: 2010;
Emergency: Hurricane Alex;
States and U.S. territories affected: Texas.
Year: 2010;
Emergency: Hurricane Earl;
States and U.S. territories affected: Massachusetts, New York, North
Carolina.
Year: 2010;
Emergency: Severe flooding;
States and U.S. territories affected: Massachusetts.
Year: 2010;
Emergency: Haiti earthquake;
States and U.S. territories affected: Florida[B].
Year: 2011;
Emergency: Severe storms;
States and U.S. territories affected: Connecticut.
Year: 2011;
Emergency: Severe storms and flooding;
States and U.S. territories affected: Arizona.
Year: 2011;
Emergency: Honshu tsunami;
States and U.S. territories affected: California, Washington.
Year: 2011;
Emergency: Severe storms, tornadoes, and flooding;
States and U.S. territories affected: Missouri.
Year: 2011;
Emergency: Flooding;
States and U.S. territories affected: Louisiana.
Year: 2011;
Emergency: Flooding;
States and U.S. territories affected: South Dakota.
Source USDA.
[A] According to USDA officials, ESF-11 was activated as a
precautionary measure to feed and shelter individuals in the event
that an improvised explosive devise was detonated.
[B] ESF-11 was activated to assist states with planning efforts to
address agriculture concerns with U.S. citizens returning to the
United States from Haiti.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:
USDA:
United States Department of Agriculture:
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Coordination:
1400 Independence Avenue SW:
Washington, DC 20250:
To: Lisa Shames:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
From: [Signed by] Todd H. Repass, Jr.
Director:
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Coordination:
Subject: U.S. Department of Agriculture Response:
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) appreciates the
opportunity to respond to the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
Draft Report titled Homeland Security: Actions Weeded to Improve
Response to Potential Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters
Affecting Food and Agriculture (GAO-11-652).
USDA concurs with the Recommendations in this report. However as
outlined below, USDA concurs, with discussion, on two of the five
recommendations.
GAO Recommendation:
To ensure the most effective use of resources, we recommend the
Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services jointly
determine if there are opportunities, where appropriate, for the
National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) to leverage Strategic National
Stockpile mechanisms or infrastructure as directed by HSPD-9. If such
opportunities exist, the two Agencies should formally agree upon a
process for the NVS to use the identified mechanisms and
infrastructure.
USDA Response:
USDA agrees with this recommendation. The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC's) Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and USDA's
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service's (APHIS) National
Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) have collaborated since the NVS began
operations in 2006. The SNS has provided technical assistance and
shared lessons learned, planning documents, and numerous guidance
documents that were subsequently utilized by the NVS. The SNS and the
NVS met as recently as February 2011, and in this meeting the SNS
shared information with the NVS on current capabilities as well as
challenges/lessons learned. APHIS and CDC will continue to explore
opportunities for which the NVS may leverage Strategic National
Stockpile mechanisms or infrastructure as directed in HSPD-9. If there
are any opportunities, the NVS will develop a document that describes
the process on how the NVS will use the mechanisms or infrastructure.
If not, NVS will document the findings as appropriate.
GAO Recommendation:
Develop and implement a documented, systematic process to track
research gaps identified in the NPDRS recovery plans and monitor
progress in fillings these gaps.
USDA Response:
USDA concurs with this recommendation.
GAO Recommendation:
Develop and implement a mechanism to ensure NPDRS recovery plans are
shared with key state and federal plant health officials.
USDA Response:
USDA concurs with this recommendation and will expand its efforts to
share recovery plans more broadly. Currently, the Department conducts
outreach with the American Phytopathological Society (APS), which has
over 3,000 professional plant pathologists as members representing
about 90 percent of all plant pathologists in the United States. NPDRS
recovery plans are posted in the APS newsletter and on the NPDRS
webpage. Federal plant health officials are notified of recently
developed plans on a regular basis through an email network as well as
the NPDRS webpage. Officials also meet with state and federal experts
on an annual basis in a NPDRS workshop where current activities and
problems are reviewed and discussed, and future activities are planned.
GAO Recommendation:
To ensure that USDA is fulfilling its responsibilities to protect the
nation's food and agriculture systems, we recommend that the Secretary
of Agriculture develop a department-wide strategy for implementing
HSPD-9 responsibilities. Such a strategy would include an overarching
framework for setting priorities, as well as allocating resources.
USDA Response:
USDA concurs with this recommendation.
GAO Recommendation:
To improve USDA's performance as EST-11 coordinator and to address
issues experienced by key parties, such as pet sheltering, we
recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture develop a process for
ensuring that: (1) following all ESF-11 activations, after-action
reports are consistently completed and shared with key parties
involved in each activation; (2) the perspectives of key parties are
incorporated in these reports; (3) any identified gaps and/or
challenges are addressed through corrective actions; and (4) the
completed after-action reports are used to provide a complete,
accurate, and consistent count of ESF-11 activations over time, in
turn producing sufficiently reliable data on ESF-11 activations.
USDA Response:
USDA agrees with this recommendation. Since 2008, the APHIS ESF-11
coordinator has developed a consistent approach for developing After
Action Reports (AAR). The AARs are modeled after the Department of
Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency's AARs, which
include identifying successes and areas needing improvement. These ESF
#11 I AARs are posted on the ESF #11 Web site, [hyperlink,
http://www.aphis.usda.goviemergency_response/esf_11/esf11_resources.shtm
l], and are available for key parties to review. In the future, APHIS
plans to e-mail the AARs directly to ESE #11 stakeholders.
The AAR process includes the perspectives of key parties that
participate in ESF 411 responses. The ESF 411coordinator will seek
even broader input to incorporate the perspectives of all key parties
that participate in ESF 411 responses. Since 2008, APHIS and the other
ESF #11 partner Agencies have been meeting regularly to discuss any
identified gaps or challenges and to plan and execute appropriate
corrective actions. Lastly, existing ESF #11 reporting processes and
AAR reporting processes allow for the compilation of complete,
accurate, consistent, and reliable data on ESF-11 activations.
USDA again thanks GAO for its review of actions needed to improve
responses to potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters
affecting food and agriculture. If there are any additional questions,
please questions Jennifer Wendel at (202) 205-4441.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services:
Department Of Health And Human Services:
Office Of The Secretary:
Assistant Secretary for Legislation:
Washington, DC 20201:
July 7, 2011:
Lisa Shames, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Shames:
Attached are comments on the U.S. Government Accountability Office's
(GAO) draft report entitled, "Homeland Security: Actions Needed to
Improve Response to Potential Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters
Affecting Food and Agriculture" (GAO 11-652).
The Department appreciates the opportunity to review this report prior
to publication.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jim R. Esquea:
Assistant Secretary for Legislation:
Attachment:
[End of letter]
General Comments Of The Department Of Health And Human Services (HHS)
On The Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Draft Report Entitled,
"Homeland Security: Actions Needed To Improve Response To Potential
Terrorist Attacks And Natural Disasters Affecting Food And
Agriculture," (GA0-11-652):
The Department appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on
this draft report.
GAO Recommendation for HHS:
To ensure the most effective use of resources, we recommend the
Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services jointly
determine if there are opportunities, where appropriate, for the NVS
to leverage Strategic National Stockpile mechanisms or infrastructure
as directed by HSPD-9. If such opportunities exist, the two agencies
should formally agree upon a process for the NVS to use the identified
mechanisms and infrastructure.
HHS Response:
The Department concurs with the recommendation that HHS, in
collaboration with USDA, should determine whether opportunities exist
for NVS to leverage SNS mechanisms or infrastructure as directed by
HSPD-9. In February 2011, both CDC/DSNS and USDA/NVS examined possible
resource sharing in the areas of transportation, warehousing, and
state and local resources used for the receipt and distribution of SNS
assets. However, no real opportunities for resource sharing have been
identified to date. If an opportunity arises in the future, as
determined by HHS and USDA, HHS will work to ensure that the
appropriate agreements are in place to fully comply with rules and
regulations governing interagency agreements.
The specific areas the report cites where leveraging can occur are
incorrect. The SNS does not currently provide an inventory management
system for state or local use. Most states have adopted various
commercial inventory management systems to meet their particular needs
for managing SNS provided inventory. The vast majority of the
influenza antiviral medications contained in the SNS are pre-allocated
for states on a pro-rata basis based on human population. NVS
maintains its own stock of anti-virals that it believes is sufficient
for NVS purposes.
[End of section]
Appendix X: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
July 18, 2011:
Lisa Shames:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Re: Draft Report GA0-11-652, "Homeland Security: Actions Needed to
Improve Response to Potential Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters
Affecting Food and Agriculture"
Dear Ms. Shames:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and
conducting its review and issuing this report.
The Department is pleased to note the report's positive acknowledgment
of its role and that of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), related to protecting the nation's critical infrastructure —
including U.S. food and agriculture systems — and responding to
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other large-scale emergencies,
as appropriate. The Department remains committed to continuing its
work with interagency partners, such as the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to ensure effective implementation of Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD)-9.
The draft report contained two recommendations directed at DHS, with
which DHS concurs. Specifically, to help ensure that the federal
government is effectively implementing the nation's food and
agriculture defense policy, GAO recommended that the Secretary of
Homeland Security:
Recommendation 1: Resume the Department of Homeland Security's efforts
to coordinate agencies' overall HSPD-9 implementation efforts.
Response: Concur. DHS will work to coordinate overall HSPD-9
implementation efforts. Within DHS, several components have expertise
to contribute to improving the response to terrorist attacks and
natural disasters affecting food and agriculture. For example, the DHS
Office of Health Affairs (OHA) has a mechanism in place to coordinate
HSPD-9 progress with the Defense of Food and Agriculture Dashboard.
The Dashboard has always been available to the interagency to use at
their discretion. In 2008, OHA established, in coordination with the
inter-agency, the Defense of Food and Agriculture Dashboard which is
hosted on the Office of Management and Budget's MAX collaboration
portal. DHS coordinated HSPD-9 progress from the EPA, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the USDA and reported this
information publicly to the Federal community on the Dashboard. DHS
maintains its departmental progress of HSPD-9 on the Dashboard and
actively engages the interagency community on HSPD-9 activities by
establishing several working groups with HHS and USDA to effectively
coordinate and collaborative on food and agriculture defense
activities. OHA, and other DHS components, will continue to support
interagency coordination activities of HSPD-9 implementation efforts.
To expedite response and recovery from major emergencies, GAO also
recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in
coordination with key agencies, to:
Recommendation 2: Provide guidance that clarifies the roles and
responsibilities agencies will have regarding the disposal of animal
carcasses in emergencies for which ESF-11 is activated.
Response: Concur. FEMA serves as one of the support agencies and will
continue to work with and provide guidance to our federal partners to
better define the roles and responsibilities regarding the disposal of
animal carcasses. However, clarifying roles and responsibilities will
necessitate our federal partners to review their authorities and
determine their agency's specific responsibility for the action during
Emergency Support Function (ESF)-11 activations.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this
draft report. Technical comments on the report have been provided
under separate cover. We look forward to working with you on future
Homeland Security engagements.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jim H. Crumpacker:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Lisa Shames, (202) 512-3841, or shamesl@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Mary Denigan-Macauley,
Assistant Director; Kevin Bray; William Colwell; Bridget Grimes;
Amanda Krause; and Terry Richardson made key contributions to this
report.
Other important contributors included Nancy Crothers, Joyce Evans,
Diana Goody, Emily Hanawalt, Joshua Hurd, Jan Montgomery, Jeremy
Sebest, Benjamin Shouse, and Cynthia S. Taylor.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Former Senator Bob Graham and Former Senator Jim Talent,
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism, Prevention of WMD Proliferation and
Terrorism Report Card (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2010).
[2] See GAO, Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect
Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-214] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 8, 2005).
[3] See: GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,
2007); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22,
2009); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16,
2011). See also: GAO, Federal Food Safety Oversight: Food Safety
Working Group Is a Positive First Step but Governmentwide Planning Is
Needed to Address Fragmentation, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-289] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18,
2011).
[4] See: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-289]; GAO,
Oversight of Food Safety Activities: Federal Agencies Should Pursue
Opportunities to Reduce Overlap and Better Leverage Resources,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-213] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 30, 2005); GAO, Food Safety and Security: Fundamental Changes
Needed to Ensure Safe Food, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-47T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 10,
2001).
[5] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999).
[6] Members include the President and Vice President; the Attorney
General; Secretaries of Defense, Health and Human Services,
Transportation, Treasury; the Directors of FEMA, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security; and others the President may
designate. Other heads of agencies--including the Secretary of
Agriculture and the Administrator of the EPA--may also be invited to
attend meetings. The establishment of the Homeland Security Council
was codified in statute with the enactment of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002. See Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 901, 116 Stat. 2135, 2258.
[7] We did not review aspects of ESF-11 pertaining to the protection
of natural and cultural resources and historic properties because our
review focuses on emergencies affecting food and agriculture.
[8] In 2005, we reported that, since the terrorist attacks of 2001,
agencies had formed numerous working groups to protect agriculture.
For example, DHS created a Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating
Council to help the federal government and industry share ideas about
how to mitigate the risk of an attack on agriculture. See GAO-05-214.
[9] DHS refers to this online forum as the "Defense of Food and
Agriculture Dashboard."
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[11] According to the NVS Business Plan, APHIS uses the term "State"
for brevity to denote all jurisdictions, including tribes and
territories, that may request NVS assistance.
[12] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-214].
[13] GAO, Avian Influenza: USDA Has Taken Important Steps to Prepare
for Outbreaks, but Better Planning Could Improve Response, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-652] (Washington, D.C.: June 11,
2007).
[14] For more information on soybean rust, see GAO, Agriculture
Production: USDA Needs to Build on 2005 Experience to Minimize the
Effects of Asian Soybean Rust in the Future, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-337] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24,
2006).
[15] The National Science and Technology Council is the principal
means within the executive branch to coordinate science and technology
policy across the federal government.
[16] GAO, Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed to Ensure
Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-178] (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 4, 2009).
[17] Animal Health Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-171, tit. X,
subtit. E, 116 Stat. 494 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 8301-
8317).
[18] FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 208,
124 Stat. 3885, 3944.
[19] GAO, Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and
Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-51] (Washington D.C.: Oct. 6, 2004).
[20] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278].
[21] See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004); GAO, Aviation Security: A National Strategy and
Other Actions Would Strengthen TSA's Efforts to Secure Commercial
Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-399] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2009); GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy
Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2006).
[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-399].
[23] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6,
2006).
[24] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618].
[25] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[26] GAO, Government Auditing Standards (July 2007 Revision),
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-731G] (Washington,
D.C.: July 2007).
[27] Three of these 28 emergencies occurred in spring 2011 and,
therefore, would not have developed after-action reports at the time
we completed our audit work.
[28] The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2006).
[29] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[30] Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, 637-662 (June 12, 2002).
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: