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Foreign Partners' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel' which was 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

June 2011: 

Combating Terrorism: 

Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Foreign Partners' Capacity to 
Prevent Terrorist Travel: 

GAO-11-637: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-637, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Eliminating the threat of terrorist attacks continues to be a primary 
U.S. national security focus. According to the 9/11 Commission, 
constraining the mobility of terrorists is one of the most effective 
weapons in fighting terrorism. 

This report (1) describes key gaps the U.S. government has identified 
in foreign countries’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas, 
(2) evaluates how U.S. capacity-building efforts address those gaps, 
and (3) assesses the extent to which the U.S. government is measuring 
progress in its efforts to close those gaps. 

To identify the key gaps, GAO reviewed governmentwide assessments of 
vulnerabilities in the international travel system. GAO reviewed the 
strategies and documentation of U.S. agencies funding and/or 
implementing foreign capacity-building efforts to prevent terrorist 
travel overseas, including those of the Departments of State (State)—
which coordinates U.S. efforts overseas—Defense (DOD), Homeland 
Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). GAO also interviewed officials from the National 
Security Staff, of the National Security Council (NSC), which oversees 
counterterrorism policy. GAO met with these agencies and conducted 
field work in Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. 

What GAO Found: 

The U.S. government has identified four key gaps in foreign countries’ 
capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas, as shown below: 

Table: Key Gaps in Foreign Countries’ Capacity to Prevent Terrorist 
Travel Overseas: 

Key gaps: 1. Sharing information about known and suspected terrorists; 
Illustrative examples: Lack of a database system with terrorist 
screening information (identifying or biographical information on 
people with known or suspected links to terrorism). 

Key gaps: 2. Addressing the use of fraudulent travel documents; 
Illustrative examples: Manufacture and use of fraudulent travel 
documents. 

Key gaps: 3. Ensuring passport issuance security; 
Illustrative examples: Easily counterfeited or doctored low-quality 
passports. 

Key gaps: 4. Combating corruption in passport issuance and immigration 
agencies; 
Illustrative examples: Corrupt immigration officials that allow 
terrorists to pass through checkpoints. 

Source: GAO analysis of National Counterterrorism Center and Human 
Smuggling and Trafficking Center documents. 

[End of table] 

U.S. government foreign capacity-building programs and activities 
address these gaps to varying degrees. For instance, as one of the 
U.S. efforts to enhance foreign partners’ sharing of information about 
known and suspected terrorists, State’s Terrorist Interdiction Program 
provides participating countries with hardware and software to 
develop, maintain, and use terrorist screening information. In fiscal 
year 2010, nearly 150 ports of entry overseas were using this program. 
With regard to addressing the use of fraudulent travel documents, GAO 
found the potential for overlap and duplication since seven components 
of three federal agencies are involved in providing training on 
fraudulent travel document recognition to foreign government 
officials, with no mechanism to coordinate such training. In two 
countries GAO visited, there was a lack of collaboration among 
agencies funding and implementing training on this topic. For example, 
in Pakistan, State and DHS were both planning to hold fraudulent 
travel document training for the same Pakistani agency during the same 
month without knowing of the other’s plans. Regarding helping 
countries improve the security of their passport issuance, State and 
USAID have multiple efforts, including State’s Bureau of Consular 
Affairs bringing delegations from foreign passport offices to the 
United States for briefings at passport-related agencies. Finally, the 
U.S. government has many efforts aimed at combating corruption 
overseas, such as encouraging countries to pass anticorruption laws. 
While these efforts are not aimed specifically at countries’ passport 
and immigration agencies, they are intended to improve the 
effectiveness of all government functions. 

The U.S. government lacks performance measures to assess 
governmentwide progress in closing the key gaps in foreign partners’ 
capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. None of the 
governmentwide or individual agency strategic documents GAO reviewed 
contained such measures. While components of State and DOJ have some 
performance measures related to information sharing, these measures do 
not provide decision makers with comprehensive information on 
governmentwide progress in enhancing foreign partners’ capacity. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that (1) State develop a mechanism to improve 
coordination of various agencies’ efforts to provide fraudulent travel 
document training to foreign partners, and (2) NSC develop a mechanism 
to measure, track, and report on overall progress toward the goal of 
enhancing foreign partners’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel 
overseas. State concurred with the first recommendation. NSC did not 
comment on the draft report. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-637] or key 
components. For more information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

U.S. Government Assessments Have Identified Four Key Gaps in Foreign 
Countries' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel Overseas: 

U.S. Agencies Conduct Foreign Capacity-Building Efforts Related to 
Three of the Four Key Gaps, but Coordination Could be Improved: 

No Performance Measures to Gauge Governmentwide Progress in Closing 
Key Gaps in Foreign Partners' Ability to Prevent Terrorist Travel Have 
Been Established: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: U.S. Capacity-Building Efforts Related to the 
Vulnerabilities of Aviation and Border Security: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Illustrations of Key Gaps in Foreign Partners' Capacity to 
Prevent Terrorist Travel Overseas: 

Table 2: U.S. Government Programs and Activities That Address the Key 
Gaps in Foreign Countries' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel 
Overseas: 

Table 3: U.S. Government Programs and Activities That Address Other 
Vulnerabilities Identified in Foreign Countries' Capacity to Prevent 
Terrorist Travel Overseas: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Key Agencies Providing Policy Oversight and Funding and/or 
Implementing Capacity-Building Programs Related to Preventing 
Terrorist Travel Overseas: 

Figure 2: U.S. Agencies and Bureaus Involved in Providing Fraudulent 
Travel Document Recognition Training to Foreign Immigration and Law 
Enforcement Officials: 

Figure 3: Number of Ports of Entry Supported by Terrorist Interdiction 
Program since 2006: 

Abbreviations: 

ATA: Anti-Terrorism Assistance: 

CA: Bureau of Consular Affairs: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

COCOM: Combatant Command: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

DS: Bureau of Diplomatic Security: 

DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

HSPD-6: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6: 

HSTC: Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center: 

ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization: 

ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

ICITAP: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program: 

ILEA: International Law Enforcement Academy: 

INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: 

INTERPOL: International Criminal Police Organization: 

IO: Bureau of International Organization Affairs: 

ISN: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation: 

MCC: Millennium Challenge Corporation: 

NCTC: National Counterterrorism Center: 

PISCES: Personal Identification, Secure Comparison, and Evaluation 
System: 

PM: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs: 

S/CT: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism: 

State: Department of State: 

TIP: Terrorist Interdiction Program: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

USCG: United States Coast Guard: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 30, 2011: 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United State Senate: 

The Honorable John Tierney:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign 
Operations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

Eliminating the threat of terrorist attacks continues to be a primary 
U.S. national security focus. According to the 9/11 Commission, 
constraining the mobility of terrorists overseas is one of the most 
effective weapons in fighting terrorism and constraining terrorist 
travel internationally should become a vital part of counterterrorism 
strategy. In 2006, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
[Footnote 1] released the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist 
Travel, which established governmentwide goals for preventing 
terrorist travel and identified enhancing the capacity of partner 
nations as one of two pillars supporting that strategy. The attempted 
attack on a Detroit-bound airliner on December 25, 2009, involving an 
individual allegedly affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
who had traveled from Nigeria and transited through Amsterdam, 
highlights the continued critical importance of U.S. foreign partners' 
capacity to stop terrorists before they travel to the United States. 

This report evaluates the U.S. government's efforts to close gaps 
identified in the capacity of foreign partners to stop terrorists from 
traveling across international borders. Specifically, this report (1) 
describes the key gaps the U.S. government has identified in foreign 
countries' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas, (2) 
evaluates how U.S. foreign capacity-building efforts address those 
gaps, and (3) assesses the extent to which the U.S. government is 
measuring progress in its efforts to close those gaps. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed the National Strategy to 
Combat Terrorist Travel and U.S. government assessments of 
vulnerabilities in the international travel system that could be 
exploited by terrorists. We also reviewed documentation on U.S. 
capacity-building efforts to help countries prevent terrorist travel 
overseas, from the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), 
Homeland Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ); the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID); and the NCTC. For the purposes of 
this engagement, we define terrorist travel as movements of known or 
suspected terrorists overseas, crossing international borders outside 
of the United States by land, sea, or air. We also interviewed 
knowledgeable officials in Washington D.C., including those from the 
White House National Security Staff and relevant components of the 
intelligence community. 

To obtain examples of U.S. efforts and more in-depth understanding of 
specific programs, we conducted fieldwork in four countries selected 
using criteria that included participation in U.S. capacity-building 
programs designed to prevent terrorist travel, designation as a 
terrorist safe haven, presence of key U.S. agency personnel at post, 
or coverage of key regions to counterterrorism. Based on these 
criteria, we traveled to Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, and 
Thailand.[Footnote 2] In each location, we met with U.S. government 
personnel involved in capacity building to prevent terrorist travel 
abroad to learn about the types of activities they undertake, how they 
measure progress, and their reported results. We also met with foreign 
government officials to learn about the challenges they face in 
improving their ability to prevent terrorist travel abroad and their 
perspectives on the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 to June 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I 
provides a more detailed description of our scope and methodology. 

Background: 

The vulnerability of the international travel system to terrorists 
crossing international borders to perpetrate terrorist acts against 
countries' citizens became a major concern after the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001. Subsequently, Congress passed a series of laws 
that called for various measures to address weaknesses in U.S. and 
other countries' foreign travel systems. The Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 directed the NCTC to submit to 
Congress a strategy for combating terrorist travel.[Footnote 3] In 
2006, the NCTC issued the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist 
Travel. One of the strategy's two pillars was to enhance U.S. and 
foreign partner capabilities to constrain terrorist mobility overseas. 
Among the pillar's objectives were to suppress terrorists' ability to 
cross international borders and help partner nations build capacity to 
limit terrorist travel. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
established the interagency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center 
(HSTC) to serve, in part, as a clearinghouse for all U.S. agency 
information on preventing terrorist travel, and to submit annual 
assessments of vulnerabilities in the foreign travel system that may 
be exploited by international terrorists. Later, the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 called for the HSTC 
to serve as the focal point for interagency efforts to integrate and 
disseminate intelligence and information related to terrorist travel. 
[Footnote 4] The 2007 Act directed DHS, with the cooperation of other 
relevant agencies, to ensure that HSTC have no less than 40 full-time 
positions, including, as appropriate, detailees from DHS, State, DOJ, 
DOD, NCTC, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security 
Agency, and the Department of the Treasury.[Footnote 5] Presently, 
DHS' U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) provides the 
director of the center, which includes personnel from State, DHS, and 
the U.S. intelligence community. 

NCTC and HSTC jointly issued the first terrorist travel vulnerability 
assessment in 2005, and HSTC issued additional terrorist travel 
vulnerability assessments in 2008 and 2009. The assessments synthesize 
information and analyses from key stakeholders throughout the U.S. 
government. Specifically, HSTC officials review intelligence and other 
information from all relevant agencies; attend interagency working 
groups, interagency intelligence meetings, and other coordination 
meetings related to terrorist travel; review open source information 
from banks, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational 
organizations; and consult with agencies responsible for implementing 
programs. All relevant agencies are given the opportunity to review 
and comment on the drafts. 

Various U.S. agencies and subagencies are involved in providing 
capacity building related to enhancing countries' ability to prevent 
terrorist travel abroad. As shown in figure 1, counterterrorism as a 
whole, including preventing terrorist travel, is overseen at the 
policy level by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
and by the National Security Council. The Director of NCTC reports 
both to the President regarding executive branch-wide counterterrorism 
planning, and to the Director of National Intelligence regarding 
intelligence matters. NCTC follows the policy direction of the 
President and the National Security Council. State, DHS, DOD, and DOJ 
fund and/or implement the majority of the capacity-building programs. 
Within the Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism (S/CT), in addition to funding and implementing 
capacity-building programs, has a leading role in developing 
coordinated strategies to defeat terrorists abroad and securing the 
cooperation of international partners. S/CT works with all appropriate 
elements of the U.S. government to ensure integrated and effective 
counterterrorism efforts, and coordinates and supports the development 
and implementation of all U.S. government policies and programs aimed 
at countering terrorism overseas. 

Figure 1: Key Agencies Providing Policy Oversight and Funding and/or 
Implementing Capacity-Building Programs Related to Preventing 
Terrorist Travel Overseas: 

[See PDF for image: organizational chart] 

Top level: 
White House[A]: 

Second level, reporting to White House: 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence[A]; 
National Counterterrorism Center[A]; 
National Security Council[A]. 

Third level, reporting to White House: 
Department of Defense[B]: 
- COCOM[B]; 
- DSCA[B]; 
Department of State[B]: 
* USAID[B]; 
* MCC[B]; 
- CA[B]; 
- DS[B]; 
- INL[B]; 
- IO[C]; 
- ISN[C]; 
- PM[B]; 
- Regional Bureaus[C]; 
- S/CT[B]; 
Department of Homeland Security[B]: 
- CBP[B]; 
- ICE[B]; 
- TSA[B]; 
- USCG[B]; 
Department of Justice: 
- Criminal Division[D]; 
- FBI[B]. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data and information. 

[A] Provides policy oversight. 
[B] Both funds and implements programs. 
[C] Funds programs. 
[D] Implements programs. 

Note: MCC is the Millennium Challenge Corporation; USAID is the U.S. 
Agency for International Development; CA is Bureau of Consular 
Affairs; DS is Bureau of Diplomatic Security; INL is Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; IO is Bureau of 
International Organization Affairs; ISN is Bureau of International 
Security and Nonproliferation; PM is Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs; S/CT is Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism; CBP 
is U.S. Customs and Border Protection; ICE is U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement; TSA is Transportation Security Administration; 
USCG is United States Coast Guard; FBI is Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; COCOM is Combatant Command; and DSCA is Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency. In addition, the Human Smuggling and 
Trafficking Center serves as the focal point for interagency efforts 
to integrate and disseminate intelligence and information related to 
terrorist travel. 

[End of figure] 

U.S. Government Assessments Have Identified Four Key Gaps in Foreign 
Countries' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel Overseas: 

As shown in table 1, the U.S. government has identified four key gaps 
in foreign countries' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. 
[Footnote 6] 

Table 1: Illustrations of Key Gaps in Foreign Partners' Capacity to 
Prevent Terrorist Travel Overseas: 

Key gaps: Sharing information about known and suspected terrorists; 
Illustrative examples: 
* Lack of a database system with terrorist screening information; 
* Lack of information sharing between countries, including of 
terrorist screening information; 
* Lack of access to databases with biometric information on known or 
suspected terrorists. 

Key gaps: Addressing the use of fraudulent travel documents; 
Illustrative examples: 
* Manufacture and use of fraudulent travel documents; 
* Lack of universal reporting to INTERPOL of lost or stolen passports, 
as well as some governments' limited use of this information. 

Key gaps: Ensuring passport issuance security; 
Illustrative examples: 
* Easily counterfeited or doctored low-quality passports from some 
countries; 
* Continued validity of less secure passports for up to 10 years from 
issuance. 

Key gaps: Combating corruption in passport issuance and immigration 
agencies; 
Illustrative examples: 
* Corruption in passport issuance agencies facilitates fraudulent use 
of official travel documents and access to blank passports that could 
be used to make fraudulent passports; 
* Corruption in immigration agencies allows terrorists to pass through 
checkpoints without being checked or arrested. 

Source: GAO analysis of NCTC and HSTC documents. 

Note: Terrorist screening information includes identifying or 
biographical information--such as name, date of birth, and passport 
number--on known and suspected terrorists. INTERPOL--International 
Criminal Police Organization--facilitates cross-border police co- 
operation, and supports and assists all organizations, authorities, 
and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime. 

[End of table] 

HSTC and NCTC vulnerability assessments have identified sharing 
information about known and suspected terrorists as one key gap in 
foreign partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel. For example, 
some countries do not have their own database systems with terrorist 
screening information or access to other countries' terrorist 
screening information, which contains biographical or biometric 
information about individuals who are known or suspected terrorists. 
Even when countries have terrorist screening information, they may not 
have reciprocal relationships to share such information or other 
travel-related information, such as airline passenger lists, with 
other countries, thereby limiting their ability to identify and 
prevent the travel of known and suspected terrorists. In addition, 
some countries do not have access to or fully use biometric 
information, which provides a unique identifier for each person, such 
as a fingerprint. For example, Pakistan has a centralized fingerprint 
database, but it is not shared across all law enforcement agencies, 
making the database less comprehensive and, as a result, more 
difficult for Pakistani government officials to prevent potential 
terrorists from traveling. 

A second key gap in foreign partners' capacity relates to their 
ability to address the use of fraudulent travel documents. For 
instance, in many countries, fraudulent travel documents, including 
fraudulent passports and visas, are easy to obtain, and could thereby 
be used by people who want to travel under a false identity. In 
addition, some countries' failure to consistently report lost or 
stolen passports to the International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL) or to access INTERPOL's database that stores information on 
lost and stolen passports, can facilitate the use of legitimate 
passports by imposters. According to U.S. embassy officials in Kenya 
we spoke with, this is a common occurrence in Kenya, where individuals 
with a similar appearance to a Somali-American with a legitimate 
travel document will fraudulently use this travel document for illicit 
travel. Another common issue related to fraudulent travel documents is 
using fraudulent "breeder documents," such as birth certificates and 
drivers' licenses issued to support a person's false identity, to 
obtain genuine passports. The issue of fraudulent documents is further 
compounded by the lack of a requirement for a visa to some countries. 
For example, according to a former Pakistani official that had 
responsibilities related to immigration enforcement, fraudulent 
British passports are the most prevalent type of fraudulent travel 
document in Pakistan. Since British citizens are not required to 
obtain visas to travel to many countries, a terrorist could use one of 
these fraudulent passports to travel to many countries without further 
background checks that would occur through a visa adjudication 
process.[Footnote 7] 

The third key gap identified in the NCTC and HSTC assessments is a 
lack in some countries' abilities to ensure the security of their 
passport issuance systems. The passports from some countries are of 
low quality and are therefore easily stolen or counterfeited. For 
example, 18 countries still use passports that are not machine 
readable and almost half of countries use passports without biometric 
information stored electronically inside the passport. Such biometric 
information can include facial and fingerprint data, and can be used 
to authenticate the identity of travelers. In addition, once countries 
convert to biometric passports, previously issued passports may be 
valid for up to 10 years from their issuance dates.[Footnote 8] 

A fourth key gap in some foreign countries' capacity to prevent 
terrorist travel is in combating corruption in passport issuance and 
immigration agencies. Corruption in government agencies relevant to 
travel can facilitate the illicit travel of terrorists or other 
criminals. For example, corruption in passport issuance agencies can 
allow potential terrorists to obtain genuine passports under a false 
identity or blank passports that can be easily manipulated. U.S. 
embassy officials in Kenya told us that such false passports can be 
obtained for just a few hundred dollars in some cases. Further, 
corruption within countries' immigration agencies, such as border 
patrol or civil aviation officials with immigration duties, leaves a 
country's immigration system vulnerable to human smugglers and 
traffickers who often have established relationships with these 
corrupt officials. For example, according to U.S. embassy officials in 
Kenya, illicit travel facilitators are known to stand outside the 
airport and indicate to corrupt immigration officials through the 
window which individuals they should let pass without checking their 
passports. In addition, according to the HSTC terrorist travel 
vulnerability assessments, countries that are known for having corrupt 
immigration officials are more likely to be used by terrorists as 
transit countries so that the terrorists can avoid interdiction. 

U.S. Agencies Conduct Foreign Capacity-Building Efforts Related to 
Three of the Four Key Gaps, but Coordination Could be Improved: 

U.S. government foreign capacity-building programs and activities 
address to some degree most of the key gaps identified by the U.S. 
government in foreign governments' ability to prevent terrorist travel 
overseas. As shown in table 2, three of the four key gaps--sharing 
information about known and suspected terrorists, addressing the use 
of fraudulent travel documents, and ensuring passport issuance 
security--have been the subject of some programs and activities. 
However, with regard to U.S. programs addressing the use of fraudulent 
travel documents, we found potential for overlap and duplication of 
effort, as multiple agencies that fund and implement numerous training 
courses do not always coordinate their activities. While the U.S. 
government has many efforts aimed at helping foreign countries to 
combat corruption, none focus on the fourth gap of corruption related 
to passport issuance and immigration agencies. 

Table 2: U.S. Government Programs and Activities That Address the Key 
Gaps in Foreign Countries' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel 
Overseas: 

Key gap: Sharing information about known and suspected terrorists: 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/S/CT; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Terrorist Interdiction Program - provides foreign immigration 
officials with a system to screen for potential terrorist travelers. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/INL; 
Related programs and activities: 
* ICITAP-funds DOJ to provide unique database systems to countries to 
help them screen for potential terrorist or criminal travelers. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/INL and State/ISN; 
Related programs and activities: 
* International Visitors Program - funds CBP to arrange briefings and 
U.S. visits by foreign officials to learn about U.S. management of 
terrorist screening information. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: DOJ/FBI and State/S/CT; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Negotiating and maintaining agreements with foreign countries to 
share terrorist screening information. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: DHS, with State/S/CT and the 
State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Negotiations to share Passenger Name Records data to prescreen 
airline passengers against terrorist screening information. 

Key gap: Addressing the use of fraudulent travel documents: 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/S/CT and State/DS; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Anti-Terrorism Assistance program - provides training in fraudulent 
travel document recognition. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/INL; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provides funding for training in fraudulent travel document 
recognition; 
* International Visitors Program - funds CBP to arrange briefings and 
U.S. visits by foreign officials to learn about fraudulent travel 
document recognition. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/DS; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provides training in fraudulent travel document recognition. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: DHS/ICE; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provides training in fraudulent travel document recognition. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: DHS/TSA; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provides training in fraudulent travel document recognition. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: DHS/CBP; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provides training in fraudulent travel document recognition. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/Consular Affairs and 
DHS/Office of Policy; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Encourages foreign countries to report lost or stolen passports to 
INTERPOL and works to enhance international standards and procedures 
for this reporting. 

Key gap: Ensuring passport issuance security: 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/Consular Affairs; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Undertakes diplomatic efforts through the International Civil 
Aviation Organization to encourage other countries to use machine-
readable and biometric passports; 
* Provides training to delegations from foreign countries on passport 
issuance security; 
* With State/INL, plans to provide passport anti-fraud training. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: USAID; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provided technical assistance to Paraguay to reform its passport 
issuance system. 

Key gap: Combating corruption in passport issuance and immigration 
agencies; 
Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: [Empty]; 
Related programs and activities: 
* No efforts are directly aimed at these agencies. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

Note: State is Department of State; S/CT is Office of the Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism; INL is Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs; ICITAP is International Criminal Investigative 
Training Assistance Program; DOJ is Department of Justice; ISN is 
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; CBP is U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection; FBI is Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
DHS is Department of Homeland Security; DS is Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security; ICE is U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; TSA is 
Transportation Security Administration; USAID is U.S. Agency for 
International Development. 

[End of table] 

U.S. Foreign Capacity-Building Efforts Address Sharing Information 
about Known and Suspected Terrorists: 

Multiple federal efforts are aimed at improving information sharing 
about known and suspected terrorists. First, State/S/CT's Terrorist 
Interdiction Program (TIP) enables immigration officials in countries 
at risk of terrorist activity to identify the attempted travel of 
known or suspected terrorists through the provision of a computerized 
system called the Personal Identification, Secure Comparison, and 
Evaluation System (PISCES). TIP provides participating countries with 
the PISCES software, hardware, and equipment to operate the software; 
any required maintenance and expansion of the system; and training on 
how to use it. During fiscal year 2010, the PISCES system processed an 
estimated 150,000 travelers per day entering or exiting 17 
participating countries through ports of entry with PISCES 
installations.[Footnote 9] In fiscal year 2010, State began to upgrade 
the PISCES software with biometric capabilities that further enhance 
host countries' capacity to interdict terrorists attempting to travel 
under a false identity. 

Second, State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs (INL) has funded at least two projects to provide different 
types of database systems to foreign law enforcement authorities to 
help them screen for potential terrorist or criminal travelers. These 
projects are implemented through the DOJ/Criminal Division's 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 
(ICITAP), a broad law enforcement development program that caters its 
program offerings to fit the host country's needs. First, in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, ICITAP has provided the State Police Information 
Network to Bosnian border officials to allow them to link to INTERPOL 
databases to identify criminals who could then be denied entry to the 
country. Second, ICITAP has provided a separate system, the Total 
Information Management System, to Albania to enhance the country's 
capacity to screen for known terrorists. According to State, the 
governments of Kosovo and Albania are discussing adapting certain 
elements of the Total Information Management System for use in Kosovo 
as well. 

Third, INL and State's Bureau of International Security and 
Nonproliferation have provided funding to DHS' U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) to arrange trips for foreign officials to come to the 
United States to learn about how CBP uses and analyzes terrorist 
screening information. These trips are organized through the 
International Visitors Program, through which CBP arranges briefings 
and visits to CBP operations in the United States by foreign high-
level customs and other law enforcement officials who perform or 
manage functions similar to those encompassed within CBP's area of 
responsibility and expertise. In fiscal year 2010, CBP organized 22 
visits by foreign officials for this purpose. 

Fourth, the United States enhances other countries' ability to prevent 
terrorist travel abroad by sharing terrorist screening information 
with other countries. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 
(HSPD-6), the Terrorist Screening Center[Footnote 10] within the DOJ's 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Terrorism Information 
Sharing Office within State/S/CT negotiate agreements with foreign 
countries to systematically share terrorist screening information, 
thereby enhancing both countries' abilities to prevent terrorist 
travel abroad through immediate and systematic access to information 
on known and suspected terrorists. Once the United States has signed 
an HSPD-6 agreement with a foreign country, the Terrorist Screening 
Center then shares the information agreed to with the foreign 
partners. As of May 2011, the Terrorist Screening Center shared 
terrorist screening information with 23 foreign countries.[Footnote 
11] In addition to the systematic information sharing on known and 
suspected terrorists that occurs through HSPD-6 agreements, the 
Terrorist Screening Center also has had approximately six one-time 
arrangements for sharing terrorist screening information with 
countries hosting special events. 

Fifth, DHS leads an interagency negotiating team, on which State/S/CT 
and State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs also serve, that 
is involved in renegotiating a 2007 agreement between the United 
States and the European Union on the exchange of Passenger Name 
Records data. Once a country has the capacity to analyze this type of 
information provided by airlines on its passengers, the country is 
able to prescreen airline passengers against terrorist screening 
information, thereby helping them to prevent terrorists from traveling 
abroad. The European Union is now considering developing such a system 
and CBP has hosted officials from the European Union for briefings on 
how the United States analyzes Passenger Name Records data. 

According to State and DOJ officials, capacity-building efforts 
related to information sharing about known and suspected terrorists 
face some challenges. Some countries have expressed concerns about the 
privacy and protections related to the sharing of sensitive terrorist 
screening information.[Footnote 12] For example, European countries 
that have negotiated HSPD-6 agreements with the United States have 
been concerned about data protection, redress, and privacy policies 
and procedures in both utilizing terrorist screening information from 
the United States and sharing terrorist screening information with the 
United States because of differences between U.S. and European laws. 
According to officials from the Terrorist Screening Center, such 
differences can include the countries' statutes of limitations that 
delineate how long they can keep derogatory information. According to 
State officials, another related challenge is that providing 
information to foreign countries involves a loss of control over the 
information and creates the possibility that the information could be 
compromised through internal corruption. To address both challenges, 
the United States and the foreign governments negotiate on specific 
information-sharing mechanisms and protections that are feasible and 
acceptable to both sides. 

Several U.S. Foreign Capacity-Building Efforts Address the Use of 
Fraudulent Travel Documents but Some Efforts Lack Coordination: 

Multiple Agencies Fund and Implement Training Courses in Fraudulent 
Travel Document Recognition: 

Seven different U.S. government entities across three federal agencies 
are involved in providing fraudulent travel document training to 
foreign government officials, as shown in figure 2. In delivering the 
training, agencies have similar objectives and often provide the 
training to the same populations (e.g., immigration officials and law 
enforcement officials) to develop their skills in recognizing the 
characteristics of altered, counterfeit, or other fraudulent travel 
documents. 

Figure 2: U.S. Agencies and Bureaus Involved in Providing Fraudulent 
Travel Document Recognition Training to Foreign Immigration and Law 
Enforcement Officials: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Foreign Immigration and Law Enforcement Officials: 
Training provided by: 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security; 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; 
Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism; 
Transportation Security Administration; 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection; 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

Sources: GAO analysis of agency data and information; Corel and Art 
Explosion (clip art). 

[End of figure] 

U.S. law enforcement officials working overseas from DHS/ICE and 
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) provide the bulk of 
training in the recognition of fraudulent travel documents to foreign 
immigration and law enforcement officials. Specifically, attachés from 
DHS/ICE and in-country representatives from State/DS provide such 
training under the dual objectives of preventing terrorist travel and 
protecting U.S. interests. For example, in fiscal year 2010, ICE 
attachés provided 360 training courses, briefings, and outreach 
sessions on fraudulent travel document recognition and State/DS staff 
posted overseas provided 458 related training courses.[Footnote 13] 

In addition, State/S/CT and State/DS implement the Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance (ATA) program, which focuses on building foreign law 
enforcement officers' counterterrorism capabilities. ATA provides 
fraudulent travel document recognition training as part of achieving 
program goals related to preventing terrorist travel abroad.[Footnote 
14] In fiscal year 2010, 12 of the more than 350 courses provided by 
ATA were fraudulent travel document recognition courses. These courses 
were provided to law enforcement officials from 17 of the 
approximately 60 countries that received ATA training in fiscal year 
2010. 

Other U.S. foreign capacity-building programs have implemented 
fraudulent travel document recognition courses, although their 
missions are not directly related to preventing terrorist travel 
abroad. 

* State/INL provides funding for U.S. law enforcement agencies, 
including ICE, CBP, and the FBI, to implement the International Law 
Enforcement Academies (ILEA), which provide a general law enforcement 
training program that also includes some specialized training on how 
to combat certain criminal activities, including fraudulent travel 
documents. In fiscal year 2010, the ILEAs provided two courses 
specifically on fraudulent travel document recognition to law 
enforcement officials from 13 countries, as well as having training on 
this topic provided by ICE as part of the general law enforcement 
training offered at the ILEA in San Salvador that was delivered five 
times that fiscal year.[Footnote 15] In addition, State/INL has 
provided funding to multiple entities to provide training in 
fraudulent travel document recognition. First, State/INL provides 
funding to CBP for related training, such as for fraudulent travel 
document training provided to Moroccan officials in fiscal year 2010 
and for CBP's International Visitors Program, which, in fiscal year 
2010, arranged six trips to the United States for foreign officials to 
learn how to recognize fraudulent travel documents. Also, State/INL 
has provided funding to the Organization of American States to deliver 
training in fraudulent document recognition throughout the Western 
Hemisphere and to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to 
develop a manual on how to examine travel documents to determine their 
authenticity. 

* The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DHS funds 
Aviation Security Sustainable International Standards Teams, which 
build select countries' aviation security through related training, 
technical assistance, and overall security assessments, in cases when 
these countries are having difficulty meeting International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) aviation security standards. In fiscal 
year 2010, as part of this effort, TSA funded one fraudulent travel 
document training course in Liberia, which was taught by ICE and CBP, 
as part of fulfilling that country's needs to meet ICAO standards 
related to detecting fraudulent travel documents.[Footnote 16] 

* CBP's Office of International Affairs has funded some fraudulent 
travel document recognition training related to its mission to enhance 
international border security. In fiscal year 2010, CBP funded one 
course in fraudulent document recognition for Mexican law enforcement 
officials.[Footnote 17] 

* In addition to training provided by ICE attachés, ICE's Office of 
International Affairs funds some additional fraudulent travel document 
recognition training courses, which involve ICE officials traveling 
from Washington, D.C., to instruct the courses. In fiscal year 2010, 
ICE funded four such training sessions for representatives from at 
least nine countries. 

* Finally, the FBI has at times been involved in the provision of 
fraudulent travel document recognition training to foreign law 
enforcement officials, although it did not fund or implement any such 
training in fiscal year 2010. In March 2011, the FBI organized a 
training session for Indonesian officials in that country's police, 
state intelligence, public corruption commission, customs, 
immigration, military, and prosecutor's offices, a portion of which 
involved fraudulent travel document training that was provided by ICE 
and State/DS. 

Agencies Funding and Implementing Fraudulent Travel Document Training 
Sometimes Lack Coordination: 

Our past work on issues that cut across multiple agencies shows that 
without a coordinated approach, programs can waste scarce funds and 
limit the overall effectiveness of the U.S. government's efforts. 
[Footnote 18] GAO has found that, while collaboration among federal 
agencies can take different forms, practices that generally enhance 
collaboration include agreeing upon agency roles and responsibilities 
and identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources.[Footnote 
19] GAO has further suggested that program officials require 
sufficiently detailed information to enable them to carry out their 
duties and responsibilities effectively, while collaborating when 
necessary to increase their efficiency.[Footnote 20] 

State/S/CT officials told us they were unaware of how many agencies 
and subagencies are involved in providing fraudulent travel document 
training to foreign officials, and they had not developed any 
mechanism to encourage coordination among all the parties involved. At 
the country level, we found that agency officials at two of the posts 
we visited did not always collaborate on the delivery of fraudulent 
travel document recognition training.[Footnote 21] As a result, some 
planned training was duplicative and did not make an effective use of 
limited resources. For example, during our March 2011 visit to 
Pakistan, we identified two agencies planning to provide fraudulent 
travel document recognition training courses in April 2011 to 
Pakistani officials from the same agency without coordinating with one 
another. The ICE attaché planned one course that had a full roster of 
students but lacked funding, while ATA was simultaneously planning to 
hold two fully-funded fraudulent travel document courses in the same 
month although they had no students signed up for either course. 
Meanwhile, the ICE attaché had been certified through a train-the-
trainer course provided by ICE's Forensic Document Laboratory to be an 
instructor for fraudulent travel document recognition courses. Since 
ATA program officials were unaware of the existence of this local 
resource, the ATA program was still attempting to find two instructors 
from ICE to travel to Pakistan to teach the courses they were 
planning. In addition to potentially adding to program costs by not 
using the locally available instructor, this lack of coordination also 
could have unnecessarily increased demand on the Forensic Document 
Laboratory's resources. The Forensic Document Laboratory is one of the 
primary sources of instructors for ATA courses in fraudulent travel 
documents. Officials from the Forensic Document Laboratory in 
Washington, D.C., told us they provide train-the-trainer courses to 
make up for their lack of sufficient staff to fulfill all the training 
requests from overseas programs like ATA. 

In Kenya, we found that representatives from two U.S. agencies, State 
and DHS, deliver fraudulent travel document training but do not 
collaborate. The ATA program, which is run by a contractor hired by 
State/DS in Kenya, provided approximately one course per year from 
fiscal year 2007 to 2010 in fraudulent travel documents to police and 
security officers, customs and immigration officers, forensic 
specialists, and training officers. A representative of State/DS 
posted overseas also provides many training courses in fraudulent 
travel documents for immigration officials. The CBP attaché, who 
represents DHS at the post, has provided many training courses on this 
topic to airport and border officials, as well as speaking on the 
topics of fraudulent travel documents, imposter recognition, and human 
trafficking to students in the Kenyan Immigration Service's basic 
training. Despite these three representatives providing this similar 
training, a representative from one of the agencies stated that 
although he coordinated with other countries providing similar 
training in Kenya, he did not do so with other U.S. agencies. 

Agencies Also Address the Use of Fraudulent Travel Documents through 
Capacity-Building Efforts Related to Lost and Stolen Passports: 

State's Bureau of Consular Affairs attempts to build foreign partners' 
capacity to address the issue of fraudulent travel documents by 
encouraging countries to report lost and stolen passports to INTERPOL 
and to access INTERPOL's database to check against travelers arriving 
at ports of entry to identify and interdict people misusing passports. 
[Footnote 22] According to INTERPOL, as of June 2011, the total number 
of countries contributing lost and stolen passport information was 
158; and some of these have connected border checkpoints to INTERPOL's 
system for automated checking against its database. To facilitate the 
interdiction of people misusing lost and stolen passports, Consular 
Affairs also assisted in the drafting of a set of global standards for 
national management of lost and stolen passport data, which was 
provided to ICAO for adoption as a part of the global travel document 
standards. 

DHS' Office of Policy has also played a role in enhancing other 
countries' capacity to report information about lost and stolen 
passports. First, they have participated in ongoing efforts to revise 
INTERPOL's procedures for the reporting of lost and stolen passport 
information to enhance the capabilities and compliance of such 
reporting by INTERPOL members. Similarly, to improve foreign partners' 
ability to detect fraudulent travel documents, DHS' Office of Policy 
has provided technical assistance towards the development of a pilot 
program to enhance the sharing of information related to fraudulent 
document alert data between members of the Group of Eight[Footnote 23] 
and INTERPOL. 

State and USAID Undertake Efforts to Improve Foreign Governments' 
Passport Issuance Security: 

Two agencies, State and USAID, have undertaken foreign capacity- 
building activities to improve other countries' passport issuance 
security. State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, with its mission of 
issuing secure U.S. passports to traveling Americans, is involved in 
some efforts to enhance foreign countries' passport issuance security. 

* Consular Affairs has contributed to diplomatic efforts through ICAO 
to promote other countries' use of machine-readable passports and 
passports with biometric features. For example, it was involved in the 
development and promotion of ICAO's standards for machine-readable 
passports published in September 2006. These standards are related to 
a requirement that countries use machine-readable passports by April 
2010, and also provided specifications for biometric enhancements that 
could be made to electronic passports. 

* Consular Affairs has also, since 2009, provided briefings to 
representatives from over 50 passport issuance authorities on the 
elements of secure passports. For example, in 2010, Consular Affairs 
organized the training of a delegation from Turkey's passport office 
in Washington, D.C., which included briefings and organized tours of 
the Washington Passport Agency and the U.S. Government Printing Office. 

* State/INL is funding Consular Affairs to provide passport antifraud 
training to officials from foreign passport issuance agencies, which 
will first be piloted in fall 2011. This training is designed to 
improve the integrity of other countries' passports and passport 
issuance by helping them institute organizations, processes, and 
procedures for detecting fraudulent passport applications as part of 
their adjudication and issuance processes.[Footnote 24] 

In addition, USAID provided technical assistance to the Paraguayan 
Ministry of Interior and National Police to reform Paraguay's 
identification system, including its national identity cards and 
passports[Footnote 25]. According to USAID, the prior identification 
system in Paraguay was not in compliance with international security 
standards and was vulnerable to corruption. Implementation of the new 
integrated national identity card and passport system involved 
providing information technology improvements, as well as training on 
how to collect citizens' biometric data and on how to manage the new 
system. Entries in the new national database now include biometric 
identifiers, including fingerprints, photographs, and signatures, all 
of which are automatically verified upon entry into the database for 
their compliance with international standards. In addition, passports 
were redesigned and upgraded to ICAO requirements, resulting in more 
secure documents that are less susceptible to fraud. 

The U.S. Government Has Anticorruption Efforts Overseas although Not 
Specifically Aimed at Passport Issuance and Immigration Agencies: 

While the U.S. government, through USAID and Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) anticorruption foreign capacity-building programs 
and State-led diplomatic efforts, has many efforts aimed at helping 
foreign countries to combat corruption, no U.S. government effort 
focuses directly on combating corruption in countries' passport 
issuance and immigration agencies. 

USAID has developed a wide range of programs for fighting corruption, 
often fit to the needs and opportunities of the recipient country. 
[Footnote 26] Some USAID anticorruption programs focus on a few 
specific sectors, including tax collection, customs collection, and 
the financial sector. In addition, USAID also has programs that have a 
broader effect on combating corruption, such as civil society programs 
to increase public awareness, promote citizen involvement and 
participation, and encourage civil society oversight of government; 
programs to decentralize powers to local governments; rule of law 
programs to improve the justice sector and thereby the ability to 
prosecute corruption cases; and programs to build anticorruption 
agencies within foreign governments. While not specifically targeting 
passport and immigration agencies, these broad anticorruption programs 
may have a beneficial, indirect effect on these countries' abilities 
to combat corruption in passport issuance and immigration agencies, 
thereby indirectly helping to prevent terrorist travel abroad. 

Similarly, MCC has multiple anticorruption efforts across the 38 
countries to which the MCC provides assistance. These anticorruption 
efforts include encouraging countries to: pass stronger anticorruption 
laws, strengthen oversight institutions, open up the public policy- 
making process to greater scrutiny, and increase corruption-related 
investigations and prosecutions. Such efforts, although not directly 
focused on passport issuance and immigration agencies, also may have a 
beneficial, indirect effect on these countries' abilities to combat 
corruption in these agencies, thereby indirectly helping to prevent 
terrorist travel abroad. 

In addition, State has been involved in diplomatic efforts to 
discourage corruption in foreign countries. Multilaterally, State has 
advocated for the implementation of the UN Convention against 
Corruption, which came into force in December 2005 and provides a 
comprehensive set of standards, measures, and rules that all countries 
can apply in order to strengthen their legal and regulatory regimes to 
fight corruption. State has encouraged and provided financial support 
for the development and launch this year of a peer review process 
through which countries will show how they are complying with their 
commitments under the UN Convention. In many countries, as well as 
through regional workshops in Africa, State engages in efforts to 
encourage or support countries in combating corruption, such as 
through encouraging the investigation and prosecution of corruption 
cases. While none of these efforts focus directly on passport issuance 
or immigration agencies, their goal is to strengthen overall the laws, 
institutions, and capacity to prevent and prosecute corruption, which, 
according to State, intend to impact the integrity and effectiveness 
of all government functions and agencies. 

No Performance Measures to Gauge Governmentwide Progress in Closing 
Key Gaps in Foreign Partners' Ability to Prevent Terrorist Travel Have 
Been Established: 

The U.S. government lacks performance measures to assess 
governmentwide progress in closing the key gaps in foreign partners' 
capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. Performance measurement 
enables decision makers to make informed policy and budget decisions. 
[Footnote 27] At the national level, U.S. counterterrorism strategies 
lack performance measures related to capacity building to prevent 
terrorist travel. Similarly, neither State, DOD, DHS, DOJ nor USAID 
has established such measures to accompany their agencywide 
strategies. Components of some agencies have relevant performance 
measures at the program level, but they cover only one of the four key 
gaps. Without comprehensive measures that encompass all U.S. 
government agency efforts, the U.S. government cannot determine 
governmentwide progress in building foreign partners' capacity to 
prevent terrorist travel. 

Performance Measures Are Key Tools for Decision Makers but U.S. 
National Counterterrorism Strategies Lack Governmentwide Performance 
Measures Related to Foreign Capacity Building to Prevent Terrorist 
Travel: 

As we have previously reported, performance information is essential 
to enable decision makers to make informed decisions. Specifying 
performance metrics is one tool used in evaluating the effectiveness 
of government efforts.[Footnote 28] Agencies can also use performance 
information to make various types of management decisions to improve 
programs and results. In addition, as we have also reported, many 
federal efforts transcend more than one agency.[Footnote 29] Closing 
the gaps in foreign partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel is 
an example of such an issue, since it involves efforts funded and 
implemented by several agencies. In such situations, we have reported 
that it is important to have full information on how cross-cutting 
goals will be achieved. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
highlighted the importance of constraining terrorist travel and 
directed NCTC to submit a strategy that combined terrorist travel 
intelligence, operations, and law enforcement into a cohesive effort 
to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and 
constrain terrorist mobility domestically and internationally. The 
resulting NCTC 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel lists 
some U.S. government activities related to helping partner nations 
build capacity to limit terrorist travel but contains no performance 
measures to assess governmentwide progress. 

Similarly, the National Security Council, which coordinates national 
security and foreign policy among various U.S. government agencies, 
issued the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in September 
2006, which established the goal of disrupting terrorist travel 
internationally through various means, including building 
international capacity to secure travel and combat terrorist travel. 
[Footnote 30] In June 2011, the President issued the National Strategy 
for Counterterrorism, which again highlighted the importance of 
enhancing the capacity of foreign partners to prevent terrorist travel 
across national borders. However, these unclassified strategies lack 
performance measures related to foreign capacity building to prevent 
terrorist travel. 

Individual Agency Strategies Do Not Contain Performance Measures 
Related to Foreign Capacity Building to Prevent Terrorist Travel 
Abroad, but Some Agency Components Track Efforts Related to One Key 
Gap: 

We examined individual agency strategies for the agencies funding and/ 
or implementing foreign capacity-building programs and activities 
related to preventing terrorist travel, including for State, DHS, DOD, 
DOJ, and USAID. We found that each agency's strategy acknowledged the 
important role the agency plays in combating international terrorism. 
However, none of the agencies' strategies contained performance 
indicators to measure progress related to helping countries close the 
key gaps in their ability to prevent terrorist travel. 

Some agency components have made efforts to track the performance of 
their specific program efforts aimed at improving information sharing 
about known and suspected terrorists--one of the four key gaps. None 
of the agencies have performance measures related to the other three 
key gaps in foreign partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel. 
Related to information sharing, State's S/CT and Director of U.S. 
Foreign Assistance have performance indicators for TIP that address 
sharing information on known and suspected terrorists.[Footnote 31] In 
fiscal year 2009, S/CT created the performance indicator--the 
percentage of the highest priority countries capable of screening for 
terrorists through TIP/PISCES that receive biometric capabilities. The 
target for that performance indicator for fiscal year 2010 was that 50 
percent of the 17 countries currently supported by TIP would have 
biometric capability. No fiscal year 2010 results have yet been 
publicly reported for this measure. The Director of U.S. Foreign 
Assistance's performance measure for TIP is the number of ports of 
entry supported by TIP. Figure 3 shows the increase in the number of 
ports of entry supported by TIP, and the annual targets, from 2006 to 
the present. 

Figure 3: Number of Ports of Entry Supported by Terrorist Interdiction 
Program since 2006: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2006; 
Actual: 75; 
Target: 75. 

Year: 2007; 
Actual: 104; 
Target: 95. 

Year: 2008; 
Actual: 110; 
Target: 115. 

Year: 2009; 
Actual: 124; 
Target: 125. 

Year: 2010; 
Actual: 147; 
Target: 130. 

Year: 2011 (May); 
Actual: 163; 
Target: 155. 

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. 

[End of figure] 

State's country-level plans also sometimes contain performance 
measures for U.S. counterterrorism efforts in that country. For 
example, State has performance measures in its 2012 mission strategic 
plans for Kenya and Thailand. For Kenya, the performance measure is--
the government of Kenya should demonstrate capacity and resolve to 
prevent and respond to threats of terrorism by, among other things, 
expanding TIP/PISCES coverage to additional border crossings. For 
Thailand, the performance measure is--Thailand should develop 
effective export control and border security systems that meet 
international standards by installing new software for TIP/PISCES at 
targeted airport locations and expanding the program to new ports of 
entry. 

Finally, DOJ/FBI also has two performance measures related to the 
information sharing gap that assess the Terrorist Screening Center's 
efforts to share terrorist screening information with foreign 
partners.[Footnote 32] The FBI has not set targets for either of these 
measures. 

Overall, these relatively narrow agency-specific measures that exist 
do not provide a comprehensive basis for assessing governmentwide 
progress in building foreign partners' capacity for two reasons. 
First, they necessarily focus on specific program efforts, not 
governmentwide progress. Second, they cover only one of the four key 
gaps in the capacity of foreign countries to prevent terrorist travel 
overseas. 

Conclusions: 

Inhibiting the movement of terrorists across international borders is 
a key part of the U.S. strategy for protecting the United States and 
its interests abroad. Although agencies have implemented significant 
new domestic programs to prevent terrorists from entering the United 
States, events of the past few years illustrate that the international 
travel system is only as secure as its weakest link. As a result, the 
United States seeks to enhance the capacity of its foreign partners to 
prevent terrorist travel overseas, with agencies implementing a 
variety of programs and activities to close key gaps in our foreign 
partners' capacity. However, some of these efforts--such as improving 
foreign partners' capacity to prevent the use of fraudulent travel 
documents--are not always well coordinated and create the risk of 
duplication and overlap. In light of the limited resources available 
to address these important issues, it is critically important to 
ensure that such resources are used efficiently. Further, while more 
than 5 years have passed since the National Strategy to Combat 
Terrorist Travel linked our foreign partners' capacity to constrain 
terrorist travel to our own national security, the U.S. government 
still lacks an effective system for measuring and reporting progress 
toward the goal of enhancing our foreign partners' capacity. As 
agencies implement the new National Strategy for Counterterrorism, it 
is important to focus on measuring, tracking, and reporting on 
governmentwide progress toward the goal of enhancing foreign partners' 
capacity to prevent terrorist travel. Without such information, the 
U.S. government cannot efficiently assess the effectiveness of its 
efforts and planners and decision makers may lack information vital to 
addressing foreign policy needs and leveraging U.S. resources. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

In order to institute a coordinated approach for delivering fraudulent 
travel document recognition training overseas to ensure that U.S. 
agencies prevent overlap and duplication; and given State's role in 
working with all appropriate elements of the U.S. government to ensure 
integrated and effective international counterterrorism efforts, we 
recommend that: 

* State develop a mechanism for agencies involved in funding and 
implementing fraudulent travel document recognition training at 
overseas posts to coordinate the delivery of such training to foreign 
partners. 

To allow the U.S. government to determine the extent to which it is 
building foreign partners' ability to prevent terrorist travel abroad 
and to make adjustments to improve its programs accordingly, we 
recommend that: 

* The National Security Council, in collaboration with relevant 
agencies, develop a mechanism to measure, track, and report on U.S. 
progress across the government toward its goal of enhancing foreign 
partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to State, DHS, DOD, DOJ, the 
Department of Transportation, USAID, NCTC, and the National Security 
Staff of the National Security Council. DHS and State provided written 
comments, which are reprinted in appendixes III and IV, respectively. 
State, DHS, DOJ, and NCTC provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated where appropriate. DOD, the Department of Transportation, 
USAID, and the National Security Staff did not provide any comments on 
the draft. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, State agreed with our 
recommendation that it should develop a mechanism to enhance 
coordination among the agencies involved in funding and implementing 
fraudulent travel document training overseas. State noted that efforts 
to enhance such coordination have begun at the country level, and that 
coordination in this area is also needed in terms of strategic, 
budget, and program planning at the agencywide and interagency levels. 
In addition, DHS, in its letter commenting on our report, indicated 
its commitment to working with other relevant agencies to stop 
terrorists from traveling across international borders, including 
through contributing to coordinated efforts to prevent any overlap and 
duplication. 

Regarding our recommendation to the National Security Council to work 
with relevant agencies to develop a mechanism to measure, track, and 
report on governmentwide progress toward its goal of enhancing foreign 
partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel, the National Security 
Staff did not provide any comment. However, in previous meetings with 
us, the National Security Staff acknowledged the need for such a 
mechanism. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report 
to the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and 
Transportation; the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development; the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center; the 
National Security Staff of the National Security Council; and other 
interested parties or interested congressional committees. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff has questions about this report, please contact 
me at (202) 512-7331 or at JohnsonCM@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff members that made key 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

In this report, we (1) identified the key gaps the U.S. government has 
assessed in foreign countries' capacity to prevent terrorist travel 
overseas, (2) evaluated how U.S. foreign capacity-building efforts 
address those gaps, and (3) assessed the extent to which the U.S. 
government is measuring progress in its efforts to close those gaps. 

Our work focused on the efforts of the Departments of State (State), 
Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Justice (DOJ) to build 
foreign partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. 
Within these agencies, we met with officials from several relevant 
components that are contributing to the U.S. government goal of 
enhancing foreign partners' ability to prevent terrorist travel, 
including: State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
(S/CT), Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), and Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL); DHS's U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Office 
of International Affairs; and DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and Criminal Division. We focused on these agencies and components as 
a result of our assessment of agency efforts noted in the National 
Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel, our review of information in 
previous and ongoing GAO work in counterterrorism and aviation 
security, and discussions with U.S. agency officials regarding the 
agencies with which they collaborate. 

To obtain examples of U.S. efforts and more in-depth understanding of 
specific participation in U.S. capacity-building programs designed to 
prevent terrorist travel overseas, we selected four countries in which 
to conduct field work. We selected Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
and Thailand, based on criteria that included: designation as a 
terrorist safe haven, presence of key U.S. agency personnel at post, 
and coverage of key regions to counterterrorism.[Footnote 33] In each 
location, we met with U.S. government personnel involved in capacity 
building to prevent terrorist travel abroad to learn about the key 
gaps in those countries' abilities to prevent terrorist travel 
overseas, the types of capacity-building activities they undertake 
related to preventing terrorist travel, and how they measure progress 
and report results. We also met with foreign government officials in 
three of the four countries to learn about the challenges they face in 
improving their ability to prevent terrorist travel abroad and their 
perspectives on the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. 

To identify what the U.S. government has assessed to be the key gaps 
in foreign partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas, we 
reviewed the NCTC and Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center's (HSTC) 
terrorist travel vulnerability assessments from 2005, 2008, and 2009. 
Based on interviews with the HSTC, we learned that these are the only 
comprehensive U.S. government assessments of vulnerabilities within 
the foreign travel system. We reviewed all three documents to identify 
the key gaps because, according to HSTC officials, each assessment is 
not comprehensive. Rather, they are additive, so the assessments taken 
together represent a full picture of the vulnerabilities. We performed 
our review of these assessments by noting instances when certain gaps, 
threats, vulnerabilities, or areas for improvement to the 
international travel system generally or related to specific foreign 
countries were discussed. For the purposes of this review, we 
considered gaps to be threats, vulnerabilities, and areas for 
improvement mentioned in the assessments. The parts of the assessments 
that identify vulnerabilities limited to the U.S. travel system were 
not included within our analysis since they did not relate to the 
scope of our review. To distinguish between the key gaps identified in 
these reports and other vulnerabilities identified that were not key 
gaps, we reviewed the frequency with which each gap/vulnerability was 
mentioned in the reports. The HSTC confirmed our summary of the key 
gaps and other vulnerabilities. We also consulted with agency 
officials at headquarters, the missions in our example countries, and 
the intelligence community to identify examples of the key gaps in 
each country and corroborate our findings. 

To evaluate how U.S. foreign capacity-building programs address those 
gaps, we examined relevant documents including program descriptions, 
and agency-and program-level strategic documents, including the 2012 
Mission Strategic and Resource Plans. We conducted interviews with 
agency officials from State, DHS, DOJ, DOD, the Department of 
Transportation, and the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), in Washington, D.C., and in our example countries where 
officials were involved in relevant capacity-building programs. We 
also interviewed officials from the NCTC and National Security Staff. 
To show the level of different agencies' involvement in the delivery 
of fraudulent travel document recognition training to foreign 
officials, we requested data from all relevant agencies on the number 
of such courses that they funded and implemented in fiscal year 2010. 
We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our 
purposes. 

To assess the extent to which the U.S. government is measuring 
progress in its efforts to enhance foreign partners' ability to 
constrain terrorist travel overseas, we analyzed relevant U.S. 
planning and evaluation documents including the 2006 National Strategy 
to Combat Terrorist Travel, the 2006 National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism, the 2008 National Implementation Plan for the War on 
Terror, and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. We also 
reviewed the relevant agency strategic documents for State, DHS, DOD, 
DOJ, and USAID. The State documents included the fiscal year 2012 
strategic and resource plans of the bureaus of S/CT, DS, INL and 
Consular Affairs as well as the fiscal year 2012 Mission Strategic and 
Resource Plans of our example countries. We determined that State's 
data on performance indicators for the Terrorist Interdiction Program 
were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To identify what have been the reported results of these efforts, we 
reviewed relevant agency reports including: State's Annual Report on 
Assistance Related to International Terrorism from fiscal year 2009, 
the strategic and resource plans of the bureaus of S/CT, DS, INL and 
Consular Affairs as well as the Mission Strategic and Resource Plans 
of our example countries, DOJ performance reports, and the DHS Annual 
Performance Report for fiscal years 2008-2010. We also discussed 
progress with agency officials at headquarters and at the missions of 
our example countries. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 to June 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: U.S. Capacity-Building Efforts Related to the 
Vulnerabilities of Aviation and Border Security: 

Multiple agencies are involved in many programs and activities to 
build the capacity of foreign countries to address vulnerabilities in 
their aviation and border security, as shown in table 3. Since 
countries can have both land and water borders, we include both land 
border and maritime security programs under border security. For both 
aviation and border security programs, we include only programs that 
include elements relating to preventing illicit passenger travel. We 
have not included other aviation or border security programs that 
focus only on preventing illicit cargo shipments. 

Table 3: U.S. Government Programs and Activities That Address Other 
Vulnerabilities Identified in Foreign Countries' Capacity to Prevent 
Terrorist Travel Overseas: 

Areas of vulnerability: Aviation security: 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/DS and State/S/CT; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Antiterrorism Assistance Program - provides training in airport 
security management and related quality control procedures. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: DHS/TSA; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Aviation Security Sustainable International Standards Teams - 
provide teams of subject matter experts to conduct needs assessments 
and follow-up visits to deliver agreed-upon assistance, such as 
aviation security-related training and equipment provisions. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/Bureau of African 
Affairs; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provides funding to the Department of Transportation to administer 
the Safe Skies for Africa program, which provides funding to TSA to 
train airport security personnel in ICAO aviation security 
requirements and standards. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/INL; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provides some equipment for airport security, as well as some 
related training and technical assistance. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/ISN; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Export Control and Border Security Program - funds a CBP-implemented 
course on observing airline passengers' behavior to look for 
irregularities. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/INL and State/ISN; 
Related programs and activities: 
* International Visitors Program - funds CBP to arrange briefings and 
U.S. visits by foreign officials to learn about aviation security. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/S/CT; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Regional Strategic Initiative - funds regional workshops in airport 
security technology, passenger analysis techniques, and advanced 
passenger screening procedures. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: DOD/African Command; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provided funding for airport interdiction training and donated 
airport screening equipment in Kenya. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/Bureau of 
International Organization Affairs; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Contributes nearly $1 million each year to ICAO's technical security 
assistance programs. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/Bureau of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provides funding to support the Organization for American States' 
aviation and airport security training for personnel throughout Latin 
America. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/Bureau of East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provides funding to support Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
projects related to aviation security, including a conference in 
Vietnam in 2009. 

Areas of vulnerability: Border security: 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: DOD; 
Related programs and activities: 
* In collaboration with State/PM, DOD implements the Section 1206 
Program, which trains and equips foreign military and nonmilitary 
maritime forces, including in border and maritime security. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/DS and State/S/CT; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Antiterrorism Assistance Program - provides training in border 
control management and maritime port and harbor security management. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus:DHS/CBP; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Provides capacity building training and technical assistance in 
border control practices. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/INL; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Funds and implements maritime and border security programs that 
include training and equipment provisions. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/INL and State/ISN; 
Related programs and activities: 
* International Visitors Program - funds CBP to arrange briefings and 
U.S. visits by foreign officials to learn about border and maritime 
security. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/PM; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Along with DOD/DSCA, State/PM implements the Foreign Military 
Financing program, which has provided equipment to foreign countries 
to strengthen their border security. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: DOD/DSCA; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program - provides targeted, 
nonlethal, combating terrorism education and training, which can 
include courses in maritime or border security. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: State/PM; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Funds DOD/DSCA to implement the International Military Education and 
Training program, which provides professional military training to 
foreign militaries. This training can help improve border and maritime 
forces in countries where the military controls the border. 

Funding U.S. government agencies/bureaus: DHS/U.S. Coast Guard; 
Related programs and activities: 
* Builds the maritime capacities of foreign military and security 
services through training and technical assistance in areas such as 
law enforcement boarding and searching for stowaways. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

Note: State is Department of State; DS is Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security; S/CT is Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism; DHS 
is Department of Homeland Security; TSA is Transportation Security 
Administration; ICAO is International Civil Aviation Organization; INL 
is Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; ISN 
is Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; CBP is U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection; DOD is Department of Defense; PM is 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; DSCA is Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

June 23, 2011: 

Charles M. Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GA0-11-637, "Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps
Needed to Enhance Foreign Partners' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist 
Travel" 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. The Department is 
pleased to note the report recognizes many of the activities its 
Components, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, are involved in every day to 
prevent terrorism and enhance U.S. security. 

Although the report does not contain any recommendations specifically 
directed at DHS, the Department remains committed to continuing its 
work with the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, and 
other relevant stakeholders, to more effectively stop terrorists from 
traveling across international borders. This includes sharing 
information about known and suspected terrorists and coordinating 
efforts to prevent overlap and duplication to obtain maximum benefit 
from the expenditure of increasingly scarce resources. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical and sensitivity comments were submitted under 
separate cover. We look forward to working with you on future Homeland 
Security issues. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

June 21, 2011: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance
Foreign Partners' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel," GAO Job Code
320781. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Judd Stitziel, Program Manager, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism at (202) 647-1515. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Barbara Retzlaff: 

cc: GAO - Charles Michael Johnson: 
S/CT - Daniel Benjamin: 
State/OIG - Evelyn Klemstine: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments to GAO Draft Report: 

Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Foreign
Partners' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel (GA0-11-637, GAO Code 
320781): 

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on 
GAO's draft report entitled "Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps 
Needed to Enhance Foreign Partners' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist 
Travel." 

The Department of State concurs with GAO's recommendation to 
strengthen mechanisms for U.S. government agencies involved in funding 
and implementing fraudulent travel document training at overseas posts 
to coordinate the delivery of such training to foreign partners. 
Fraudulent travel document training is also provided to U.S. and 
foreign airline ticket agents domestically and abroad. Each embassy's 
country team already performs such coordination and de-confliction at 
the local level in-country, and many, including Embassy Nairobi, have 
already put in place mechanisms such as regular meetings of an 
interagency law enforcement working group to ensure that even the 
occasional instances of lack of coordination do not occur in the 
future. This work also needs to be performed in terms of strategic, 
budget and program planning at Department and Agency headquarters in
Washington. 

Coordination of fraudulent travel document training is but one part of 
a much broader effort underway to create mechanisms to coordinate, 
strategically plan, and fund U.S. government efforts to build the 
border security capacities of foreign partners. The U.S. government 
must speak with one voice to our foreign partners in this area, and we 
agree that the Department should lead a whole-of-government response 
that especially includes capacity-building efforts by the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson Jr., (202) 512-7331 or Hjohnsoncm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Key contributors to this report include Jason Bair, Assistant 
Director; Nina Pfeiffer; Heather Latta; Julia Jebo; Eileen Larence; 
Eric Erdman; Kevin Copping; Amber Keyser; Martin De Alteriis; Mary 
Moutsos; and Lynn Cothern. Additional support was provided by Thomas 
Lombardi, Jan Montgomery, and Justin Schnare. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The mission of the NCTC is to lead the U.S. effort to combat 
terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that 
information with U.S. partners, and integrating all instruments of 
national power to ensure unity of effort. 

[2] We originally planned fieldwork in Yemen in March 2011 but were 
unable to travel there due to the deteriorating security situation at 
the time. 

[3] Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3809, Sec. 7201(b). 

[4] Pub. L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 346. 

[5] As of January 2011, HSTC had 18 full-time and 2 part-time staff, 
mostly detailees from DHS. 

[6] The NCTC and HSTC assessments also identified vulnerabilities in 
foreign countries' aviation security and border security, but to a 
lesser extent, so we do not include these vulnerabilities in the key 
gaps. However, we identify U.S. programs and activities that address 
vulnerabilities in aviation and border security in appendix II. 

[7] GAO, Visa Waiver Program: DHS Has Implemented the Electronic 
System for Travel Authorization, but Further Steps Needed to Address 
Potential Program Risks, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-335] (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 
2011). 

[8] GAO, Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas 
Enhanced, but More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1006] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 31, 2007). 

[9] The countries participating are: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cote 
D'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Malta, Pakistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Yemen, and Zambia. 

[10] Pursuant to HSPD-6, the Terrorist Screening Center was 
established to consolidate the U.S. government's approach to terrorist 
screening and to provide for the appropriate and lawful use of 
terrorist information in screening processes. 

[11] For more information on HSPD-6 agreements, see [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-335]. 

[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-335]. 

[13] In addition to training foreign law enforcement and immigration 
officials, some of these training sessions provided by State/DS 
officers overseas also were provided to other groups, such as travel 
agencies, and included related training on analysis and recognition of 
trends and practices used by document vendors and human smugglers, 
such as schemes used to obtain visas for large groups of applicants. 

[14] ATA is co-managed by State/S/CT and State/DS, with S/CT providing 
policy guidance and DS managing program operations. For more 
information about ATA, see GAO, Combating Terrorism: State 
Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved Guidance and More 
Systematic Assessments of Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-336] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 
2008). 

[15] There are ILEAs in San Salvador, El Salvador; Gaborone, Botswana; 
Bangkok, Thailand; Budapest, Hungary; and Roswell, New Mexico; all of 
which, according to INL officials, offer unique training programs 
catered to the needs of their regions. 

[16] ICAO is a United Nations organization that sets standards and 
recommended practices for the safety, security, environmental 
protection, and sustainable development of air transport. Included in 
ICAO's guidelines for aviation security are provisions instructing 
countries to guard against the misuse of their travel documents and to 
facilitate detection of cases where such documents have been 
unlawfully altered, replicated, or issued. 

[17] CBP, through its Carrier Liaison Program, also provides 
fraudulent travel document recognition training to civilian airport 
employees at foreign airports. In fiscal year 2010, CBP provided over 
150 such training sessions. 

[18] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). Also, see GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in 
Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP] (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011). 

[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[20] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]  
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[21] In some embassies, a Law Enforcement Working Group meets to 
coordinate law enforcement activities, which can include the 
coordination of training to foreign officials. Law Enforcement Working 
Groups had been meeting regularly in Pakistan and Kenya at the time of 
our visits to these countries in March 2011 when we learned of these 
instances of coordination lacking in the delivery of fraudulent travel 
document recognition training. 

[22] The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007 requires that countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program 
enter into an agreement with the United States to report, or make 
available to the United States through INTERPOL or other means as 
designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security information about 
lost or stolen passports. As of January 2011, all 36 Visa Waiver 
Program countries were sharing lost and stolen passport information 
with the United States. DHS regularly monitors Visa Waiver Program 
countries' compliance with this requirement. For more information, see 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-335]. 

[23] The Group of Eight (G8) refers to the group of eight highly 
industrialized nations--France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Japan, 
United States, Canada, and Russia--which hold a yearly meeting, the G8 
Summit. Meetings are intended to foster consensus on global issues 
such as economic growth and crisis management, global security, 
energy, and terrorism. 

[24] According to State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, this passport 
antifraud training will also cover topics such as how to prevent 
malfeasance and account for vulnerable items such as passport issuance 
systems and blank passport books. As a result, this future training 
may in part also help to address the key gap in combating corruption 
in passport issuance and immigration agencies discussed in the next 
section. 

[25] This assistance was provided as a part of the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation's Paraguay Threshold Program Stage I (2007-
2009). For more information on the Millennium Challenge Corporation, 
see GAO, Millennium Challenge Corporation: MCC Has Addressed a Number 
of Implementation Challenges, but Needs to Improve Financial Controls 
and Infrastructure Planning, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-52] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 
2009). 

[26] See GAO, Foreign Assistance: U.S. Anticorruption Programs in Sub- 
Saharan Africa Will Require Time and Commitment, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-506] (Washington D.C.: Apr. 26, 
2004). 

[27] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, DC: June 
1996). 

[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118]. 

[29] GAO, Government Performance: GPRA Modernization Act Provides 
Opportunities to Help Address Fiscal, Performance, and Management 
Challenges, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-466T] 
(Washington, DC: Mar. 16, 2011). 

[30] The National Security Council is the principal forum used by the 
President of the United States for considering national security and 
foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and 
cabinet officials and is part of the Executive Office of the President 
of the United States. The function of the Council is to advise and 
assist the president on national security and foreign policies. The 
Council also serves as the president's principal arm for coordinating 
these policies among various government agencies. 

[31] Performance measures related to the key gap of information 
sharing about known and suspected terrorists are found in State/S/CT's 
bureau strategic plan, and in the Director of U.S. Foreign 
Assistance's master list of standard indicators. 

[32] The FBI considers the content of these performance measures to 
contain sensitive information and therefore the exact measures cannot 
be discussed in this public report. 

[33] We originally planned also to conduct fieldwork in Yemen in March 
2011, but were unable to travel there due to the deteriorating 
security situation at the time. 

[End of section] 

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