This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-100 
entitled 'Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration 
Needs to Ensure Continued Availability of Tritium for the Weapons 
Stockpile' which was released on October 7, 2010. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

October 2010: 

Nuclear Weapons: 

National Nuclear Security Administration Needs to Ensure Continued 
Availability of Tritium for the Weapons Stockpile: 

GAO-11-100: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-100, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic 
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Tritium 
Readiness Program aims to establish an assured domestic source of 
tritium—a key isotope used in nuclear weapons—in order to maintain the 
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Because tritium decays at a rate of 
5.5 percent annually, it must be periodically replenished in the 
stockpile. However, since 2003, NNSA’s efforts to produce tritium have 
been hampered by technical challenges. In this context, GAO was asked 
to (1) determine the extent to which NNSA has been able to overcome 
technical challenges producing tritium, (2) determine the extent to 
which NNSA is able to meet current and future nuclear weapons 
stockpile requirements for tritium, and (3) assess the management of 
NNSA’s Tritium Readiness Program. To do this, GAO visited facilities 
involved in tritium production and reviewed tritium requirements 
established by NNSA and the Department of Defense, among other things. 

What GAO Found: 

NNSA has been unable to overcome the technical challenges it has 
experienced producing tritium. To produce tritium, stainless steel 
rods containing lithium aluminate and zirconium-—called tritium-
producing burnable absorber rods (TPBAR)-—are irradiated in the 
Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) Watts Bar 1 commercial nuclear 
power reactor. Despite redesigns of several components within the 
TPBARS, tritium is still leaking-—or “permeating”-—out of the TPBARs 
into the reactor’s coolant water at higher-than-expected rates. 
Because the quantities of tritium in the reactor coolant are 
approaching regulatory limits, TVA has been significantly restricting 
the number of TPBARs that it will allow NNSA to irradiate in each 18-
month reactor fueling cycle, and, consequently, NNSA has not been 
producing as much tritium as it planned. NNSA and TVA officials are 
continuing to develop plans to increase the number of TPBARs that will 
be irradiated, as well as, if necessary, the number of reactors 
participating in the program. However, these plans have not been 
coordinated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which 
ultimately must approve any changes to the operation of the TVA 
reactors. 

NNSA currently meets the nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for 
tritium, but its ability to do so in the future is in doubt. NNSA 
officials told us that they will be able to meet future requirements 
through a combination of harvesting tritium obtained from dismantled 
nuclear warheads and irradiating TPBARs. Although the number of 
nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile is decreasing, these reductions 
are unlikely to result in a significant decrease of tritium 
requirements and will not eliminate the need for a reliable source of 
new tritium because of the need to periodically replenish it in the 
remaining nuclear weapons stockpile due to tritium’s decay. While NNSA 
has not, to date, been required to use tritium from a reserve that it 
maintains, use of this reserve in the relatively near future may be 
necessary if NNSA is unable to increase tritium production beyond its 
current level. 

Although NNSA has attempted to ensure a reliable long-term supply of 
tritium, GAO’s review found two problems with NNSA’s management of the 
Tritium Readiness Program. First, NNSA could not provide us with 
evidence that it adhered to the appropriate contracting procedures 
when purchasing components and services for the program. Second, due 
to, among other things, the way the program’s contracts with its 
suppliers are structured, the program is spending its funds more 
slowly than planned and is accumulating large unexpended balances. The 
program is subject to thresholds established by the Department of 
Energy of acceptable levels of unexpended funds that may be carried 
over from one fiscal year to the next. However, the program exceeded 
these thresholds by more than $48 million in 2008 and by more than $39 
million in 2009. While large unexpended balances are not necessarily 
an indication that the program is being mismanaged, it does indicate 
that the program is requesting more funding than it needs on an annual 
basis—funds that could be appropriated for other purposes. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that NNSA develop a plan to manage tritium releases 
from reactors, analyze alternatives to its current tritium production 
strategy, ensure its contracting complies with appropriate contracting 
procedures, and ensure its future budget requests account for the 
program’s large unexpended balances. NNSA generally agreed with our 
recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-100] or key 
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Scope and Methodology: 

Background: 

NNSA Continues to Face Technical Challenges Producing Tritium: 

NNSA Is Currently Meeting Tritium Requirements, but Uncertainty Exists 
in Its Ability to Continue Doing So In the Future: 

NNSA Could Not Provide Us With Evidence That It Adhered to the 
Appropriate Contracting Procedures for the Tritium Readiness Program 
and is Accumulating Large Amounts of Unexpended Funding: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Tennessee Valley Authority: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Tritium Readiness Program Unexpended Funds, Fiscal Years 2006-
2009: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Diagram of a TPBAR: 

Figure 2: NNSA's Tritium Production Enterprise: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 

NRC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

SRS: Savannah River Site: 

TVA: Tennessee Valley Authority: 

TPBAR: tritium-producing burnable absorber rod: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

October 7, 2010: 

The Honorable James R. Langevin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Michael R. Turner: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately 
organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is working to 
re-establish the country's capability to produce tritium--a key 
radioactive isotope used to enhance the power of nuclear warheads and 
bombs. Because tritium has a relatively short half-life of 12 years 
and therefore decays at a rate of about 5.5 percent per year, tritium 
in existing weapons must be periodically replenished, and an assured 
source of tritium is necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile. During the Cold War, tritium was produced in nuclear 
reactors at DOE's Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina and the 
Hanford Site in Washington. However, due to safety concerns, the last 
reactor used for tritium production was shut down in 1988. Since that 
time, as the United States decreased the size of its nuclear arsenal, 
NNSA has been able to meet its tritium requirements by harvesting and 
recycling it from dismantled nuclear warheads. However, because of 
tritium's short half-life, NNSA cannot meet its tritium needs in this 
manner indefinitely and is attempting to re-establish new tritium 
production. 

Nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium are established 
jointly by the Department of Defense (DOD) and NNSA. To meet these 
requirements, the Tritium Readiness Program was established in 1996. 
It is now a subprogram of NNSA's Readiness Campaign that develops 
nuclear weapons component manufacturing technologies. The Tritium 
Readiness Program operates with an annual budget of about $70 million. 

To produce tritium, stainless steel rods containing lithium aluminate 
and zirconium--called tritium-producing burnable absorber rods 
(TPBAR)--are irradiated in the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) 
Watts Bar 1 commercial nuclear power reactor in Tennessee. Once 
inserted into the reactor core during refueling, the TPBARs are 
irradiated for approximately 18 months, after which they are 
transported to SRS, where they are processed in a specialized facility 
to extract the tritium and prepare it for nuclear warheads. However, 
since the first regular production TPBARs were irradiated in TVA's 
reactor in 2003, NNSA has experienced technical challenges. 
Specifically, tritium has been leaking--or "permeating"--out of the 
TPBARs at higher-than-expected rates into the reactor's coolant water, 
where it is eventually released to the environment under controlled 
and monitored conditions. Although tritium decays relatively quickly 
and, in small amounts, poses little risk to human health and the 
environment, large amounts of tritium released into the environment 
could expose the public to slightly higher radiation doses. To ensure 
that any releases do not exceed safe amounts, releases of radioactive 
materials, including tritium, from nuclear power plants are regulated 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) using limits established by 
the Environmental Protection Agency. 

In this context, in response to your request that we review the 
Tritium Readiness Program, we (1) determined the extent to which NNSA 
has been able to overcome technical challenges producing tritium, (2) 
determined the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and future 
nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, and (3) assessed 
the management of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program. 

Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which NNSA has been able to overcome 
technical challenges producing tritium, we visited and interviewed 
officials from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, where the 
TPBARs were designed and where work continues to overcome technical 
problems, and WesDyne Corporation, NNSA's contractor that fabricates 
the TPBARs. In addition, we reviewed TVA tritium management plans and 
reports. We examined amendments to TVA's operating license for the 
Watts Bar plant issued by NRC that approved TVA's irradiation of 
TPBARs. We also reviewed relevant NRC regulations and documents 
related to TVA tritium activities and interviewed officials from NRC 
and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, an independent agency 
established in 1988 to oversee the safety of DOE's nuclear facilities. 
We also visited and interviewed officials at TVA's Watts Bar 1 nuclear 
power plant, where TPBARs are irradiated, and SRS, where the TPBARs 
are processed to extract tritium for nuclear warheads. 

To determine the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and 
future nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, we reviewed 
NNSA's tritium production plans as well as requirements documents 
prepared by DOD and NNSA, such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. We 
also reviewed NNSA's strategic plans for the Tritium Readiness 
Program, including program execution and implementation plans; past 
and planned schedules for completing TPBAR fabrication, 
transportation, irradiation, and extraction activities; and the 
program's risk management plan. We also interviewed NNSA officials 
responsible for developing these plans. 

Finally, to assess the management of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program, 
we reviewed contracts between NNSA and WesDyne, as well as budget and 
expenditure data obtained from DOE's Office of Programming, Planning, 
Budget, and Evaluation. In addition, we examined past expenditure 
projections, contracts and subcontracts for TPBAR fabrication, and 
NNSA's planned and actual work schedules for conducting and completing 
TPBAR fabrication, transportation, irradiation, and extraction 
activities. We determined that the data used was sufficiently reliable 
for the purposes of our report. We conducted this performance audit 
from October 2009 to September 2010 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that exists naturally in 
the environment, but in amounts that are too small for practical 
recovery. Tritium is produced artificially when lithium-6 is bombarded 
with neutrons (particles within an atom that have no electrical 
charge) in the core of a nuclear reactor. When present in the center 
of a nuclear weapon at the instant of its detonation, tritium 
undergoes nuclear fusion, releasing enormous amounts of energy and 
significantly increasing the explosive power, or "yield," of the 
weapon.[Footnote 1] 

From 1954 until 1988, the United States produced the majority of its 
tritium using nuclear reactors at SRS.[Footnote 2] When the last of 
SRS's reactors ceased operations for safety reasons in 1988, the 
United States lost its capability to produce tritium for the nuclear 
weapons stockpile. In August 1993 we reported that significant 
reductions in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile as a result of, among 
other things, arms reduction treaties signed with Russia would result 
in sufficient supplies of tritium through 2012 without the need to 
produce any new tritium.[Footnote 3] We reported, however, that after 
that date a new source of tritium would be required for the stockpile. 

To re-establish the nation's tritium production capability, NNSA's 
predecessor--DOE's Office of Defense Programs--studied two different 
approaches to make tritium. The first involved building an accelerator 
to produce tritium. This device would accelerate protons (particles 
within an atom that have a positive electrical charge) to nearly the 
speed of light. The protons would be crashed into tungsten, releasing 
neutrons through a process called spallation, which can be used to 
change helium into tritium. After extensive research and development 
of accelerator-based tritium production technology, DOE abandoned this 
approach.[Footnote 4] 

The second approach DOE pursued was to produce tritium using 
commercial nuclear power reactors. In such a reactor, components 
called burnable absorber rods are used to control the reactivity of 
the core in a nuclear reactor during power production. With the 
support of Sandia National Laboratories and the Idaho National 
Laboratory using Idaho's Advanced Test Reactor, the Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory designed a new rod--called a TPBAR--that could be 
substituted for standard burnable absorber rods in the reactor. As the 
commercial reactor produces power, the TPBARs are irradiated, 
controlling the nuclear reaction while simultaneously producing 
tritium. The tritium produced within the TPBAR is stored within the 
rod by a nickel-plated component known as a "getter." (See figure 1.) 

Figure 1: Diagram of a TPBAR: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rod (TPBAR): 

Assemblies consist of 12 to 24 TPBARs suspended from a base plate. 
Each TPBAR is about 12.5 feet long and 3/8 inch in diameter: 

Lithium Aluminate Pellets; 
Zircaloy Liner; 
Aluminide Coating on Inner Surface of Cladding; 
Nickel-Plated Zircaloy Tritium Getter; 
Reactor Grade Stainless Steel Cladding. 

Source: NNSA. 

[End of figure] 

In 1999 DOE entered into an interagency agreement with TVA to 
irradiate TPBARs in TVA's Watts Bar and Sequoyah nuclear power 
reactors. DOE, and subsequently NNSA after its establishment in 2000, 
pays TVA an irradiation fee as well as reimburses TVA for any 
additional costs associated with TPBAR irradiation. The agreement 
anticipates that TVA would be paid approximately $1.5 billion for its 
costs over the agreement's 35-year term. To allow it to irradiate 
TPBARs in the reactor, TVA applied to NRC for an amendment to its 
operating license. After completing a safety evaluation, NRC issued a 
license amendment in 1997 that allowed TVA to irradiate 32 TPBARs for 
testing purposes and, following successful testing, issued another 
amendment in 2002 that allowed TVA to load up to 2,304 TPBARs in the 
Watts Bar 1 reactor per reactor operating cycle. In 2003 the first 
TPBARs intended to produce tritium for the nuclear weapons stockpile 
were loaded into the Watts Bar 1 reactor and were removed 
approximately 18 months later as part of the reactor's normal 
refueling cycle. To date, only the Watts Bar 1 reactor has been used 
to irradiate TPBARs. 

The first TPBARs were fabricated by the Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory, which designed the rods as well as the tritium production 
processes associated with them. In 2000 NNSA contracted with WesDyne 
International--a subsidiary of Westinghouse--to fabricate TPBARs. 
WesDyne procures and maintains an inventory of TPBAR components and 
assembles TPBARs at a Westinghouse facility in Columbia, South 
Carolina. This facility also supplies nuclear fuel for TVA's Watts Bar 
1 reactor. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory continues to 
serve as the TPBAR design agent, developing design changes as needed 
and supporting WesDyne's fabrication of TPBARs. The laboratory also 
maintains a backup capability to produce TPBARs in the event WesDyne 
becomes unable or unwilling to fulfill its contract with NNSA. 

Once fabricated, the TPBARs are shipped to Watts Bar where they are 
loaded into the reactor core during a normal refueling outage. After 
being irradiated for approximately 18 months, the TPBARs are removed 
from the reactor core and, after cooling for several months, are 
transported to SRS. The TPBARs, which are now highly radioactive 
because of the time spent inside the reactor, are processed at a 
specialized new Tritium Extraction Facility at SRS. This facility, 
which began operations in 2007 at a cost of nearly $500 million, cuts 
the tops off the TPBARs and processes them to extract tritium. Waste 
from the extraction process, such as scrap pieces from cut-apart 
TPBARs, is permanently disposed of as low-level radioactive waste. The 
steps involved in NNSA's tritium production enterprise are illustrated 
in figure 2. Tritium extracted from TPBARs is then loaded into 
specially designed reservoirs that are shipped to DOD for installation 
into nuclear weapons. Tritium reservoirs are periodically removed from 
each weapon in the stockpile as part of their routine maintenance and 
then shipped to SRS, where any remaining tritium that has not decayed 
is recovered. The reservoirs are then refilled with tritium and 
returned to DOD. 

Figure 2: NNSA's Tritium Production Enterprise: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (design agent); 
Idaho National Laboratory: Advanced test reactor. 

Manufacture TPBAR components: 
Assemble components: WesDyne: 
Irradiation at TVA: 
Transport irradiated TPBARs to Savannah River Site: 
Tritium Extraction Facility: Extract tritium from TPBARs. 

Sources: NNSA and Art Explosion (images). 

[End of figure] 

NNSA Continues to Face Technical Challenges Producing Tritium: 

Despite the fact that the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has 
redesigned several components within the TPBARs to reduce the amount 
of tritium permeating into the reactor coolant at the Watts Bar 1 
reactor, tritium is still leaking from the TPBARs at higher-than-
expected rates. As a result, significantly fewer TPBARs than planned 
are being irradiated in the reactor, which has considerably reduced 
the amount of tritium NNSA is producing. NNSA and TVA officials told 
us that they are developing plans to increase the number of TPBARs 
being irradiated and the number of reactors participating in tritium 
production, as well as plans to modify the reactors to better manage 
tritium releases to the environment. However, to date, these plans 
have not been actively coordinated with NRC, which ultimately must 
approve any modifications to reactor operations. 

Tritium is Still Permeating at Higher-Than-Expected Rates From TPBARs 
Into the Reactor Coolant at TVA's Watts Bar 1 Reactor: 

NNSA has been unable to solve the technical challenges it has been 
experiencing producing tritium. Specifically, tritium is permeating 
from the TPBARs at higher-than-expected rates into the water used to 
cool the reactor core at TVA's Watts Bar 1 nuclear plant rather than 
being captured in the TPBARs as designed. Watts Bar's operating 
license is based on the assumption that 2,304 TPBARs would be loaded 
into the reactor and that tritium would permeate from the TPBARs into 
the reactor coolant at an average rate of 1.0 curie of tritium per 
year per TPBAR.[Footnote 5] However, according to NNSA reports, 
tritium is permeating from the TPBARs at levels of up to 4.2 curies of 
tritium per year per TPBAR out of a total of 10,000 curies produced by 
one TPBAR. 

To keep the total amount of tritium released into the reactor coolant 
below regulatory limits, TVA has limited the number of TPBARs being 
irradiated in the Watts Bar 1 reactor, according to TVA officials. 
NNSA's original plans called for irradiating 1,160 TPBARs per reactor 
fueling cycle by 2010 before ramping up to nearly 2,700 TPBARs per 
fueling cycle by 2013 using both the Watts Bar 1 reactor and TVA's 
Sequoyah 1 reactor. However, as a result of the tritium permeation 
problem, TVA currently irradiates only 240 TPBARs per fueling cycle 
using only the Watts Bar 1 reactor. While the interagency agreement 
between DOE and TVA allows NNSA to use the two Sequoyah reactors to 
irradiate TPBARs, TVA officials told us that TVA is reluctant to allow 
NNSA to use these reactors because, among other things, TVA would 
prefer to meet tritium requirements using only a single reactor. 

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has redesigned several 
components within the TPBARs in an attempt to reduce the amount of 
tritium permeating into the reactor coolant. For example, national 
laboratory researchers have modified the nickel-plated "getter" in the 
TPBAR to better capture tritium within the rod. However, despite this 
redesign, no discernable improvement in TPBAR performance was made and 
tritium is still permeating from the TPBARs at higher-than-expected 
rates. NNSA, TVA, and national laboratory officials told us that the 
obvious design changes to address the tritium permeation problem have 
been made and that scientists and engineers charged with investigating 
the issue and identifying solutions have not been able to identify the 
root cause of the permeation problem. NNSA officials told us that it 
is unknown whether any technical breakthrough will be made to 
substantially correct the problem. However, scientists and engineers 
at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory are continuing to conduct 
research to identify the root cause of the permeation problem and to 
determine whether a technical solution can be found. 

Because significantly fewer TPBARs are being irradiated than NNSA 
originally called for, much less tritium is being produced than NNSA 
planned. As a result, SRS's Tritium Extraction Facility, which began 
operations in 2007 and cost nearly $500 million to build and 
approximately $30 million per year to operate, sits essentially idle 
for 9 months out of the year. During this time, equipment and systems 
must be routinely maintained while NNSA prepares for the 3 months the 
facility operates during the year. At congressional direction, NNSA 
investigated shutting down the Tritium Extraction Facility completely 
for an extended period until sufficient TPBARs had been irradiated to 
justify continuous operations. However, NNSA determined that shutting 
down the facility for an extended period would cost at least $60 
million more over 10 years than continuing to maintain it for limited 
operations. According to NNSA officials, these additional costs 
consist of, among other things, costs to replace and/or recertify the 
operational readiness of equipment that would degrade during the time 
the facility was shut down. 

NNSA and TVA Are Developing Plans to Increase Tritium Production but 
Have Not Actively Coordinated These Plans With NRC: 

Faced with significantly lower tritium production than originally 
planned due to tritium permeation, NNSA and TVA have been developing 
plans to increase the number of TPBARs being irradiated at Watts Bar 1 
during each reactor fueling cycle as well as the number of reactors 
irradiating TPBARs, according to NNSA and TVA officials. Planning 
continues to be adjusted based upon changes to tritium requirements 
that are still being determined. Although these plans have changed 
several times over the past year and are still subject to significant 
uncertainty, current plans call for the number of TPBARs being 
irradiated in the Watts Bar 1 reactor to increase from 240 per cycle 
to 544 per cycle for the next three fueling cycles beginning in 2011, 
according to NNSA officials. In addition, NNSA and TVA are developing 
plans to irradiate TPBARs, using TVA's Sequoyah 1 and Sequoyah 2 
reactors--as provided for in the interagency agreement between DOE and 
TVA--beginning in 2017 if this proves necessary to meet tritium 
requirements. NNSA and TVA officials also told us that they discussed 
the option of using the Watts Bar 2 reactor, which is currently under 
construction. However, this reactor will not be operational until 2012 
at the earliest and is not included in the interagency agreement 
between DOE and TVA. Moreover, TVA likely would not attempt to 
irradiate TPBARs in it until its second or third fueling cycle--18 to 
36 months after the reactor begins operations. Therefore, according to 
TVA officials, Watts Bar 2 is no longer being considered to irradiate 
TPBARs. 

NNSA and TVA are also discussing a number of modifications to the 
Watts Bar reactor to ensure that any tritium released from the reactor 
coolant into the environment stays below regulatory limits, according 
to NNSA and TVA officials. Specifically: 

* NNSA and TVA officials told us that they are considering the 
construction of a large holding tank at the Watts Bar 1 reactor that 
could be used to more effectively manage the presence of tritium in 
the reactor coolant. A large holding tank will enable TVA to better 
control the timing of releases of coolant containing tritium over time 
to stay within NRC and EPA limits. NNSA's initial cost estimate for 
the construction of a large holding tank is approximately $13 million 
and may increase annual operations costs by as much as $500,000. 

* NNSA and TVA officials also told us that they considered 
constructing a tritium removal system at the reactors to remove excess 
tritium from reactor coolant water before it is released into the 
Tennessee River. NNSA's initial cost estimate for the construction of 
a tritium removal system is approximately $50 to $60 million per 
reactor and would add $9 to $10 million in annual operations costs. 
According to NNSA officials, NNSA and TVA are continuing to monitor 
the development of this technology. 

According to NNSA and TVA officials, NNSA, with the cooperation of 
TVA, is assessing the environmental impacts associated with 
irradiating increased numbers of TPBARs with higher-than-expected 
rates of tritium permeation. Such an increase would have to be 
approved by NRC and incorporated into an amendment to the reactors' 
operating licenses. TVA officials told us that reactor license 
amendments cost up to $5 million. In addition, NNSA officials told us 
that completing this environmental analysis could cost between $2 
million and $5 million. 

NNSA and TVA officials, however, have not been actively coordinating 
their plans with NRC, which ultimately must approve these plans and 
incorporate them into operating license amendments for the TVA 
reactors. At the time we spoke with them, NRC officials were not aware 
that fewer TPBARs than planned were being irradiated in the Watts Bar 
1 reactor. Subsequently, in a February 2010 letter from TVA, the NRC 
was officially informed of how many TPBARs were being irradiated in 
the reactor. With regard to plans that were discussed to irradiate 
TPBARs in the Watts Bar 2 reactor when it is completed, NRC officials 
pointed out that technical issues that usually accompany any new 
reactor startup may not be resolved in time for TPBARs to be 
irradiated by the reactor's second fueling cycle. NRC officials were 
also not informed of proposals being developed to install reactor 
coolant holding tanks or tritium removal systems at the reactors and 
of potential future license amendment applications to increase the 
amount of tritium the reactors would be allowed to release into the 
environment. NRC's approval of these modifications, such as the 
construction of tritium removal systems at the TVA reactors, is 
uncertain because, according to NRC officials, there is currently no 
regulatory framework for the construction and operation of tritium 
effluent management technologies in the United States. 

NNSA Is Currently Meeting Tritium Requirements, but Uncertainty Exists 
in Its Ability to Continue Doing So In the Future: 

DOD is responsible for implementing the U.S. nuclear deterrent 
strategy, which includes establishing the military requirements 
associated with planning for the nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA and 
DOD work together to produce the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. 
This memorandum outlines a proposed plan for the President to sign to 
guide U.S. nuclear stockpile activities. This plan specifies the size 
and composition of the stockpile and other information concerning 
adjustments to the stockpile for a projected multi-year period. While 
the exact requirements are classified, NNSA uses the detailed 
information included in the memorandum on the number of weapons to be 
included in the stockpile to determine the amount of tritium needed to 
maintain these weapons. In addition, NNSA maintains a reserve of 
additional tritium to meet requirements in the event of an extended 
delay in tritium production. Small quantities of tritium are also 
needed by the national laboratories and other entities for scientific 
research and development purposes. 

According to NNSA officials, NNSA is meeting current requirements 
through a combination of harvesting tritium obtained from dismantled 
nuclear warheads and producing lower-than-planned amounts of tritium 
through the irradiation of TPBARs in the Watts Bar 1 reactor. However, 
tritium in the stockpile as well as in NNSA's tritium reserve 
continues to decay, making increased production of tritium critical to 
NNSA's ability to continue meeting requirements. 

Although the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile is 
decreasing, these reductions are unlikely to result in a significant 
decrease to tritium requirements. Specifically, the New Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty signed in April 2010, if ratified by the Senate, will 
reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 30 
percent. However, it has not yet been determined whether some or all 
of these warheads will be maintained in reserve--where the warheads 
would continue to be loaded with tritium--or dismantled--where the 
tritium could be removed from the weapons. Moreover, even if some or 
all of the warheads reduced under the treaty were dismantled, tritium 
requirements are unlikely to decrease by a significant amount. While 
the specific reasons for this lack of decrease in tritium requirements 
are classified, NNSA officials we spoke with said that the additional 
tritium supply that would be available as a result of increased 
warhead dismantlements is unlikely to fill what they estimate will be 
a steady tritium demand in the future. 

To date, NNSA has not had to use tritium in the reserve it maintains. 
However, according to NNSA officials, use of some of the tritium 
reserve in the relatively near future may be necessary if NNSA is 
unable to increase tritium production beyond its current level of 240 
TPBARs being irradiated in a single reactor. In addition, if NNSA 
takes longer than expected to increase tritium production, even 
reserve quantities may be insufficient to meet requirements for an 
extended period of time. Information on the dates when NNSA will need 
to begin using the tritium reserve and when the reserve will be 
depleted is classified. Nevertheless, NNSA officials told us that they 
were confident that NNSA will be able to meet tritium requirements in 
the future without substantially reducing the nation's tritium reserve 
and are not considering alternative ways of producing tritium for the 
stockpile. 

NNSA Could Not Provide Us With Evidence That It Adhered to the 
Appropriate Contracting Procedures for the Tritium Readiness Program 
and is Accumulating Large Amounts of Unexpended Funding: 

Although NNSA has attempted to ensure a reliable long-term supply of 
tritium, our review found two problems with NNSA's management of the 
Tritium Readiness Program. First, NNSA was unable to provide us with 
evidence about its adherence to the appropriate contracting procedures 
when purchasing components and services for the Tritium Readiness 
Program. Second, because of, among other things, the contract 
structure NNSA has entered into with suppliers of components and 
services for the Tritium Readiness Program, program funds are being 
expended much more slowly than planned. As a result, the program is 
accumulating large unexpended funding balances beyond thresholds 
established by DOE. 

NNSA Could Not Provide Us With Evidence That It Adhered to the 
Appropriate Contracting Procedures When Entering Its Long-Duration 
TPBAR Procurement Contract: 

NNSA relies largely on commercial suppliers to provide TPBARs, TPBAR 
components, and other services to the program through fixed price 
contracts. Although the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
originally designed the TPBARs and fabricated initial supplies, NNSA 
believed that the commercial sector was better able to meet nuclear 
industry quality requirements at lower cost. Therefore, in 2000, NNSA 
entered into a contract with WesDyne International to manufacture 
TPBARs. WesDyne International is a subsidiary of Westinghouse which is 
owned by the Japanese company Toshiba. Because of the relatively few 
companies capable of manufacturing TPBAR components, and to minimize 
the possibility of one of these companies exiting the industry or 
losing interest in working with the program, the contract was 
structured as a 44-year fixed price contract with an approximately 4-
year initial phase and a 40-year second phase consisting of a 10-year 
base period and three 10-year options. 

According to NNSA officials, a 44-year fixed price contract with 
lengthy options was intended to assure companies that there would be 
sufficient work required far enough into the future to make a 
contractor's initial investment in new facilities and capabilities 
worthwhile. Because of the highly specialized manufacturing processes 
involved in fabricating TPBARs, the relatively low production 
quantities planned by the program, and the length of time required to 
set up facilities for manufacturing classified components, NNSA 
identified the loss of one or more component suppliers as a major 
program risk. For example, several components can only be obtained 
from a single supplier, and if any of these companies were to decide 
it was no longer profitable to continue working with NNSA or were 
acquired by foreign firms, it could take NNSA several years and 
millions of dollars to find and develop a new supplier. 

While these considerations led NNSA to use a 44-year contract to 
procure TPBARs, NNSA did not provide us evidence that it adhered to 
the appropriate contracting procedures typically involved when 
entering into a contract of this length. Federal statutes as 
implemented by the Federal Acquisition Regulation are the principal 
set of rules that govern the process through which the federal 
government acquires and purchases goods and services. NNSA officials 
did not document the legal authority used in entering into a contract 
of this length.[Footnote 6] In contrast, NNSA waived application of a 
statutory provision prohibiting contract awards under certain 
circumstances to foreign-controlled entities--by permitting a foreign-
owned company to produce TPBARs--and provided us with evidence of its 
compliance with the waiver requirements.[Footnote 7] 

In its comments on a draft of this report, NNSA stated that it 
provided documentation of a solicitation review that was conducted as 
well as its explanation of its legal authority to enter into contracts 
with periods of performance in excess of 5 years. While we agree that 
a review of the solicitation took place, the documentation NNSA 
provided contained no evidence that the long period of performance of 
this contract--a period of performance that NNSA agreed in its 
comments was unusually long--was considered as part of this 
solicitation review. NNSA asserts that it followed the appropriate 
procedures when approving a contract of this length. However, the 
procedures NNSA cited in its comments were not implemented until about 
10 years after the contract with WesDyne was initially awarded. 
Moreover, while NNSA claimed that it had the legal authority to enter 
into a contract of this length, none of the documentation NNSA 
provided to us before we sent our draft report to NNSA for its 
comments stated the specific legal authority that was used to enter 
into a contract of this length. In fact, it was not until NNSA's 
comments on our draft report that it provided us with its explanation 
of its legal authority to enter into contracts with periods of 
performance in excess of 5 years. 

NNSA is Spending Program Funds More Slowly Than Planned And Has 
Accumulated Large Amounts of Unexpended Funding: 

NNSA is spending program funds more slowly than planned and has 
accumulated large amounts of unexpended funding. NNSA receives "no- 
year" appropriations from Congress that have no limit on how long the 
agency may take to obligate and expend those funds. However, to ensure 
large amounts of unexpended funding do not accumulate that could be 
better used for other purposes, DOE has established thresholds of 
acceptable levels of unexpended funds that may be carried over from 
one fiscal year to the next. DOE also analyzes individual program 
budgets to determine a percentage of program funds which each program 
can reasonably be expected to carry over each year. For example, in 
fiscal year 2009, DOE determined that NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program 
could expect to carry over 16 percent--or approximately 2 months 
worth--of funding, or $20.7 million. However, the program has 
routinely exceeded DOE's threshold for unexpended funds. For example, 
it exceeded the threshold by $23.4 million at the end of fiscal year 
2006, $27.6 million at the end of fiscal year 2007, $48.4 million at 
the end of fiscal year 2008, and $39.1 million at the end of fiscal 
year 2009. Officials with the Tritium Readiness Program estimate that 
the program will exceed DOE's threshold by approximately $50 million 
by the end of fiscal year 2010. Table 1 outlines the Tritium Readiness 
Program's unexpended funds. 

Table 1: Tritium Readiness Program Unexpended Funds, Fiscal Years 2006-
2009: 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Unexpended funds at end of fiscal year: $38,324,160; 
DOE threshold: $14,891,346; 
Difference: $23,432,814. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Unexpended funds at end of fiscal year: $42,710,961; 
DOE threshold: $15,127,566; 
Difference: $27,583,396. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Unexpended funds at end of fiscal year: $67,963,852; 
DOE threshold: $19,554,741; 
Difference: $48,409,111. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Unexpended funds at end of fiscal year: $59,798,262; 
DOE threshold: v20,680,935; 
Difference: $39,117,327. 

Source: GAO presentation of data from NNSA. 

[End of table] 

The contract structure NNSA has entered into with suppliers of 
components and services contributes to these high unexpended funding 
balances. An agency must generally obligate the full amount of a 
contract at the time it enters into the contract. These obligated 
funds are then expended over time as components and other services are 
delivered to NNSA by the contractor. Although NNSA's TPBAR fabrication 
contract is structured as a 44-year contract with 10-year options, the 
program has been funding each option in 5-year increments. Under this 
arrangement, the program obligates sufficient funds for 5 years at the 
beginning of each increment, which NNSA officials told us should 
result in high unexpended funding balances during the first year which 
are gradually reduced over the following 5 years as the program pays 
out the funds to its contractors. NNSA also uses a number of 3-4 year 
subcontracts to procure TPBAR components, which also require funding 
at the time NNSA enters into the contract and are often awarded in 
different years than the main contract's 5-year periods. Consequently, 
NNSA's contracting strategy periodically results in high levels of 
unexpended funds as funds for different awards are obligated and 
expended at different times. 

However, the fact that fewer than expected numbers of TPBARs are being 
irradiated in the Watts Bar 1 reactor is also contributing to NNSA's 
accumulation of large unexpended funding balances. Irradiating fewer 
than expected TPBARs impacts the program's costs by lowering the total 
irradiation fees NNSA pays to TVA for each reactor cycle. 
Specifically, NNSA pays TVA an irradiation fee of $4,950 per year per 
TPBAR irradiated. Irradiating fewer than expected TPBARs has also 
lowered expenses associated with operating the Tritium Extraction 
Facility at SRS. In addition, funds under NNSA's contract for TPBAR 
fabrication are being expended much more slowly than planned. In 2008 
and 2009, the program planned to order 812 TPBARs from WesDyne, but 
due to the permeation problem at Watts Bar, the program eventually 
reduced that number to 240. Furthermore, NNSA's contract with WesDyne 
originally planned for fabricating more than 2,500 TPBARs between 2004 
and 2009, but NNSA had ordered fewer than half that many by the end of 
fiscal year 2009. Because fewer TPBARs are being ordered than 
originally planned for, the price to fabricate each TPBAR has 
increased over time from about $700 per TPBAR in 2000 to approximately 
$1,300 per TPBAR today. NNSA and WesDyne officials told us that the 
price per TPBAR is likely to increase further when the next contract 
increment is finalized later this year. 

While large unexpended funding balances do not necessarily indicate 
that the tritium program is being mismanaged, the fact that they have 
been increasing indicates that NNSA is requesting more funding than it 
needs on an annual basis--funds that could be appropriated for other 
purposes. From fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2008, NNSA's unexpended 
balances in the Tritium Readiness Program exceeding DOE's threshold 
more than doubled from $23.4 million to $48.4 million, and as a 
result, Congress reduced the program's funding by $10.4 million for 
fiscal year 2009. Although the program's unexpended funds were lower 
at the end of fiscal year 2009, this was largely due to $8.7 million 
which was deobligated at the end of the year because of an ongoing 
subcontract proposal audit. These funds were returned to the program 
in fiscal year 2010, and had they not been deobligated, the program's 
unexpended balances would have remained approximately the same from 
fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2009, even with the congressional 
reduction in funding. Finally, by the end of the second quarter of 
fiscal year 2010, NNSA had spent less than half the funds it had 
originally planned to spend by that time, and NNSA officials stated 
that the program will likely end fiscal year 2010 with even higher 
levels of unexpended funds. Thus, while NNSA's contracting approach 
does contribute to its high unexpended funds, the fact that these 
unexpended funds are increasing each year indicates that the program 
is receiving more funding than it is able to execute due to the 
reduced scope of work caused by the tritium permeation problem. 

Conclusions: 

NNSA's inability to overcome the technical challenges and meet its 
original tritium production goals has raised serious questions about 
the agency's ability to provide a reliable source of tritium to 
maintain the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile in the future. While 
NNSA has taken steps to attempt to solve the tritium permeation 
problem, it is unlikely that anything less than a complete redesign of 
the TPBARs will solve the problem. Unfortunately, existing supplies of 
tritium in the stockpile and the tritium reserve are unlikely to 
fulfill requirements for the time a complete redesign would take. It 
is also not clear that a redesign would solve the problem since NNSA 
does not fully understand the reasons behind tritium permeation. 
Therefore, NNSA and TVA are working together to not only increase the 
number of TPBARs being irradiated in the Watts Bar 1 reactor but also 
to increase the number of reactors being used for the program. 
Increasing the number of TPBARs irradiated will also require 
substantial and costly modifications to TVA facilities to ensure that 
tritium emissions comply with applicable nuclear safety and 
environmental regulations. Because such modifications to the operation 
of TVA's reactors must be approved by NRC, it is important that NNSA 
and TVA coordinate their efforts closely with the regulatory agency. 
In addition, it is critical that DOD--the ultimate customer of NNSA's 
tritium production program--is also kept informed of the challenges 
facing the program and the impact of these challenges on current and 
future availability of tritium for the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program has taken a number of steps to ensure 
the long-term availability of critical components needed for tritium 
production. We are concerned, however, that NNSA was unable to provide 
evidence that it adhered to the appropriate contracting procedures 
when purchasing components and services for the Tritium Readiness 
Program. In addition, the contract structure NNSA has put in place for 
the program in conjunction with lower than expected rates of tritium 
production has led the program to accumulate large amounts of 
unexpended funding. These large balances make it difficult for NNSA 
management and Congress to accurately determine the amount of funding 
the program actually requires, what the program is accomplishing with 
the appropriated funding, and how much could potentially be 
appropriated for other priorities. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To increase confidence in the nation's continued ability to produce a 
reliable supply of tritium in the future and to improve the management 
of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program, we recommend that the Secretary 
of Energy direct the Administrator of NNSA to take the following four 
actions: 

* In cooperation with TVA and NRC, develop a comprehensive plan to 
manage releases of tritium from TVA's Watts Bar 1 and any other 
reactors chosen to irradiate TPBARs in the future. 

* Conduct a comprehensive analysis of alternatives to the current 
tritium production strategy in the event that NNSA continues to be 
unable to meet its tritium production goals. This alternatives 
analysis should be coordinated closely with DOD and take into account 
current and future nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium. 

* Complete an acquisition strategy that reflects the outcome of the 
analysis of alternatives and aligns the contracting structure to that 
plan and, if necessary, ensures adherence to the appropriate 
contracting procedures for long-duration contracts. 

* Ensure NNSA's future budget requests account for the large 
unexpended balances in the Tritium Readiness Program and better 
reflect the amount of funding the program is able to spend annually. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided NNSA, TVA, and NRC with a draft of this report for their 
review and comment. 

In its comments, NNSA generally agreed with the facts in the report 
and the recommendations. However, NNSA noted that, in its view, it has 
a high probability of meeting its tritium mission requirements without 
risk of using reserve inventories. In response to the draft report's 
discussion of the Tritium Readiness Program's TPBAR manufacturing 
contract with WesDyne, NNSA commented that the program's unique 
contracting structure enables the program to leverage and maintain a 
commercial supply chain over a period of more than 40 years while 
providing some assurances of cost controls for the life of the 
contracts. Finally, NNSA noted that it provides responsible financial 
stewardship of government resources by adjusting future budget 
requests for changes in the Tritium Readiness Program planning 
requirements and risks. 

With regard to meeting tritium requirements, NNSA commented that 
irradiating 544 TPBARs in the Watts Bar 1 reactor per reactor fueling 
cycle until fiscal year 2016 will provide proof of NNSA's ability to 
meet near term requirements without using reserves. Our draft report 
discussed NNSA's plans to increase the number of TPBARs being 
irradiated in the Watts Bar 1 reactor from 240 per fueling cycle to 
544 per fueling cycle. However, it is important to note that NNSA's 
plans have changed several times and are still subject to considerable 
uncertainty. In particular, NNSA's original plans called for 
irradiating 1,160 TPBARs per fueling cycle by 2010 before ramping up 
to nearly 2,700 TPBARs per fueling cycle using both the Watts Bar 1 
reactor and the Sequoyah 1 reactor. While we are encouraged that NNSA 
and TVA are working together to increase the number of TPBARs being 
irradiated, continued uncertainty about NNSA's and TVA's ability to 
irradiate additional TPBARs in a single reactor while not exceeding 
limits on the amount of tritium released into the environment raises 
doubts about the program's ability to provide a reliable supply and 
predictable quantities of tritium over time. 

Regarding its TPBAR manufacturing contract with WesDyne, NNSA stated 
that it provided documentation of a solicitation review that was 
conducted as well as its explanation of its legal authority to enter 
into contracts with periods of performance in excess of 5 years. We 
modified our draft report to clarify that, although we agree that a 
review of the solicitation took place, the documentation of the review 
that NNSA provided to us contained no evidence that the long period of 
performance in this contract--a period of performance that NNSA agreed 
in its comments was unusually long--was considered as part of this 
solicitation review. Although NNSA asserts that it followed the 
appropriate procedures when approving a contract of this length, the 
procedures NNSA cited in its comments were not implemented until about 
10 years after the contract with WesDyne was initially awarded. 

Finally, with regard to NNSA's management of the Tritium Readiness 
Program's finances, NNSA commented that it monitors its unexpended 
funding and meets quarterly with DOE to discuss and justify its 
unexpended balances. NNSA also stated that adjustments to its budget 
requests and refinements to its acquisition strategy will continue as 
part of its efforts to accommodate changes to the nuclear weapons 
stockpile. We are encouraged by NNSA's pledge to adjust its budget 
requests in response to changes in program needs and by other actions 
NNSA is taking to reduce its unexpended funding balances. However, as 
our draft report notes, unexpended funding balances in excess of DOE's 
threshold for unexpended funds increased every year since fiscal year 
2006 with the exception of fiscal year 2009 and NNSA estimates the 
program will exceed DOE's threshold by approximately $50 million by 
the end of fiscal year 2010. In our view, these increases in 
unexpended funding call into question the effectiveness of NNSA's 
monitoring of the program's financial management. 

NNSA also provided technical comments that we incorporated as 
appropriate. NNSA's comments are presented in appendix I. 

TVA commented that it shared our perspectives regarding the importance 
of NNSA's ability to assure that the nuclear weapons stockpile 
requirements for tritium will be met in the future. TVA noted that it 
has been and continues to be dedicated to working with NNSA in 
evaluating and deciding among alternative approaches to help better 
assure that future tritium production will be a the necessary levels. 
TVA also provided technical comments that we incorporated as 
appropriate. TVA's comments are presented in appendix II. 

In its comments, NRC agreed with our findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations. NRC also provided technical comments that we 
incorporated as appropriate. NRC's comments are presented in appendix 
III. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, Secretary of Energy, Administrator of NNSA, Chairman of 
NRC, President and Chief Executive Officer of TVA, Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration: 

Department of Energy: 
National Nuclear Security Administration: 
Washington, DC 20585: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

The National Nuclear Security Administration appreciates the 
opportunity to review and provide comments on the Governmental 
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report, Nuclear Weapons: National 
Nuclear Security Administration Needs to Ensure Continued Availability 
of Tritium for the Weapons Stockpile, GA0-10-817. I understand that 
this review was performed at the request of the Strategic Forces 
Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, United States House of 
Representatives. GAO was asked to: (1) determine the extent to which 
NNSA has been able to overcome technical challenges producing tritium; 
(2) determine the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and 
future nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium; and (3) 
assess the management of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program. 

NNSA generally agrees with the facts in the report and the 
recommendations. NNSA would like to clarify some of the context in 
which these facts are used and, therefore, the conclusions contained 
in this report. The recommendations are in line with actions already 
being taken by the Tritium Readiness Program to ensure that it has the 
technology and infrastructure to meet the stockpile requirements as 
they are being understood to support the post-Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) stockpile. NNSA understands GAO's concerns; however, current 
direction and actions, being taken by the program, should soon 
alleviate these concerns and provide clear indications of mission 
success. 

To address three key points from the draft report, NNSA provides the 
following comments: 

1. NNSA has a high probability of meeting its tritium mission 
requirements, without risk of using reserve inventories. 

NNSA's ability to meet the tritium requirements of the future hinges 
primarily on the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) notification to 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inserting 544 Tritium 
Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs) into the next Watts Bar 
reactor cycle. Currently, TVA is designing its reactor core for 544 
TPBARs and plans to provide the required NRC notification soon. 

Once 544 TPBARs are being irradiated at Watts Bar, NNSA will have 
proof positive of its ability to meet near term requirements. Future 
production plans call for irradiation of 544 TPBARs at Watts Bar until 
FY 2016. Continuing at this level is neither a programmatic nor 
technical challenge. However, without appropriate funding this level 
of irradiation and necessary increases in the future cannot be 
sustained. 

Looking to the future, NNSA has three reactors available under the 
Interagency Agreement with the TVA. With this available 
infrastructure, the production capacity is sufficient to provide about 
1,500 TPBARs per cycle. This production rate will meet the planned 
steady-state requirement needed in FY 2017. 

Both TVA and NNSA would experience programmatic and operational 
benefits from keeping tritium production in one reactor, and will be 
working to achieve this goal. Nevertheless, NNSA does have this backup 
plan that can meet mission requirements with existing technologies and 
assets. NNSA has sufficient inventory to support stockpile 
requirements for several more years without using reserves. Thus, 
irradiating 544 TPBARs in the next cycle will demonstrate the 
capability to support the mission and provide an assured supply in the 
future. 

The rate of permeation of tritium into the reactor coolant water, 
which is higher than expected, is a constraint, but it does not 
imperil accomplishment of the mission. Consistent data on tritium 
releases accumulated from tritium production since late 2003 provides 
a high degree of confidence that tritium production plans can be 
executed with currently available technologies and infrastructure, 
while maintaining margins to protect public safety and the environment. 

2. The Tritium Program's unique contracting structure enables the 
program to leverage and maintain a commercial supply chain - where low 
rates of production quantities are involved - over a period of more 
than 40 years while providing some assurances of cost controls for the 
life of the contracts. 

TPBARs are similar to a nuclear industry item, i.e. equivalent to 
burnable poisons used in reactors. On the other hand, TPBARs have some 
very unique specifications as well as being a classified item. During 
the original contractor solicitation, it was recognized that few 
vendors would bid on the contracts because of required initial 
investments and potential for low production rates. As the 
solicitation progressed, it was clear that the Department would be 
limited in the number of bidders willing to make these required 
investments given the low rates of production compared to similar 
commercial items. At the same time, the program was expected to 
continue for 40 years, presenting challenges to contain cost growth 
over the life of the program. As acknowledged in the GAO report, these 
considerations formed the basis for the contractor solicitation and 
are still relevant conditions today. 

At program inception, the fabrication contract for TPBARs was awarded 
as a 44 year contract, structured into ten-year option periods after 
the startup period. This is an unusually long option period, and GAO 
found what they considered to be insufficient documentation of the 
review and approval process conducted in the late 1990's. NNSA would 
politely disagree with this conclusion, having provided documentation 
of the solicitation review conducted by the then-acting Department of 
Energy (DOE) Senior Procurement Executive who is the individual 
authorized to make such determinations. In addition, the Source 
Selection Plan for the Selection of a Contractor for Tritium Producing 
Burnable Absorber Rod (TPBAR) Fabrication, RFP No. DE-RP02-99DP0029, 
indicates DOE Headquarters reviewed the solicitation on May 13, 1999. 
The Source Selection Plan also indicated the period of performance was 
a maximum of 44 years in duration. Therefore, the conditions of FAR 
7.105 and FAR 17.204e requiring programs to justify any required 
deviations from the FAR in an acquisition plan prepared prior to 
contract award have been met. Current DOE procedures for approving 
periods of performance in excess of 5 years are described in DOE 
Acquisition Letter AL 2010-05. 

Because of the attention surrounding the uncosted balances, the 
program is looking into the feasibility of partially exercising the 
remaining options in one- or two-year increments after the current 
option periods expire. If such contracting actions will
retain continuity in meeting program requirements, protect the 
viability of the commercial supply base, and provide some assurance of 
cost control over the life of the contract, the actions will be 
implemented after the current option period expires. All actions will 
continue to be made in accordance with the FAR, DEAR, and acquisition 
guidance. 

3. NNSA provides responsible financial stewardship of government 
resources by adjusting future budget requests for changes in planning 
requirements and program risks. 

As noted by the GAO report, the fixed price contract with lengthy 
options was intended to assure companies of sufficient work into the 
future to make investments in new facilities and processes worthwhile. 
That long-term contract contributes to the higher than average 
uncosted as those funds will be costed out over a longer period than 
normal. In appreciation of that fact, NNSA monitors the uncosted and 
meets quarterly with the Department to discuss and justify Tritium's 
uncosted balances. Transferring all the related TPBAR and component 
contracts from the design agent, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
(PNNL), to the commercial TPBAR fabrication contractor, WesDyne 
International, over the last several years, has resulted in these 
larger than usual unexpended funds on a number of multi-year contracts. 

In addition, earlier plans to irradiate up to 800 TPBARs in cycle 10 
at Watts Bar were changed to irradiate only 240 TPBARs currently in 
the reactor. Accordingly, the FY 2011 budget request was reduced from 
an earlier estimate of $69M to $50.2M. Adjustments to the budget 
requests and refinements to the acquisition strategy will
continue in our efforts to accommodate the post-NPR stockpile and to 
minimize unexpended funds while at the same time minimizing risks to 
the highly specialized supply chain for TPBARs and components. 

Our responses to the recommendations are: 

1. In cooperation with TVA and NRC, develop a comprehensive plan to 
manage releases of tritium from TVA's Watts Bar 1 and any other 
reactors chosen to irradiate TPBARs in the future. 

NNSA Response: NNSA has two initiatives underway that will address 
this recommendation. First, NNSA in conjunction with TVA, is beginning 
an update of the Environmental Impact Statement for tritium production 
in TVA reactors. This will document in very specific and quantitative 
terms the expected environmental releases and how they relate to 
allowable limits to maintain the safety of the public and workers at 
the plants. In addition, PNNL and TVA have collaborated on the 
development of a quantitative model of the flow of reactor cooling 
water and associated dilution, holdup, and release management process 
to enable assessment of impact of tritium permeation on a range of 
variables including numbers of TPBARs, measured permeation, and flow 
in the river that may vary throughout the year. 

With regards to the NRC, NNSA defers to TVA to submit appropriate 
documentation to NRC for licensing and regulation of its reactors. 

2. Conduct a comprehensive analysis of alternatives to the current 
tritium production strategy in the event that NNSA continues to be 
unable to meet its tritium production goals. This alternatives 
analysis should be coordinated closely with the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and take into account current and future nuclear weapons 
stockpile requirements for tritium. 

NNSA Response: NNSA has been coordinating with DOD on determining Post-
NPR Stockpile requirements and continues to provide annual updates to 
DOD on the tritium production status. NNSA interprets this 
recommendation to address contingency plans should the program not be 
successful in gaining approval for 544 TPBARs in cycle 11 at Watts 
Bar. The fuel assemblies containing the 544 TPBARs required for cycle 
11 operations are scheduled for delivery to the Watts Bar site in 
January 2011. Cycle 11 begins in the spring of 2011, so the best 
response will be to confirm that cycle 11 is irradiating 544 rods. At 
this time, TVA is designing its reactor core for 544 TPBARs and has 
approved the technical basis for notifying the NRC for this quantity. 
In the unlikely event that cycle 11 does not load 544 rods, NNSA will 
embark on development of contingency plans to ensure that mission 
requirements are met without using reserves. By spring of 2011, the 
program will conduct a comprehensive risk assessment to ensure that 
all potential program risks have been identified and that any risk 
mitigation steps have been incorporated into the program plans. 

3. Complete an acquisition strategy that reflects the outcome of the 
analysis of alternatives and aligns the contracting structure to that 
plan and, if necessary, ensures adherence to the appropriate 
contracting procedures for long-duration contracts. 

NNSA Response: NNSA is currently reviewing the acquisition strategy 
and approach for sourcing TPBARs and components to meet the post-NPR 
stockpile requirements. This review will balance minimizing uncosted 
balances together with minimizing risks to the TPBAR supply chain, as 
determined from the risk assessment. The contracts will then be 
revised, as appropriate, to implement the outcome of this review. All 
contracting modifications will continue to comply with appropriate 
contracting procedures. 

4. Ensure NNSA's future budget requests account for the large 
unexpended balances in the Tritium Readiness Program and better 
reflect the amount of funding the program is able to spend annually. 

NNSA Response: NNSA has recently reduced budget requests to account 
for the utilization of unexpended funds and will continue to do so in 
the future. However, it should be noted that production plans show 
increased numbers of TPBARs scheduled for fabrication and irradiation 
in the future to meet inventory requirements. As such, overall budget 
requirements for tritium production should be expected to increase 
over the next several years until the steady-state production rate is 
reached. 

Enclosed are more detailed comments on specific topics from the draft 
report. We believe the NNSA responses to these topics will help the 
reader appreciate that the challenges we have are being well managed, 
that the mission requirements will be met, and that the program is 
working hard to manage its contracts well and to steward financial 
resources responsibly. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
JoAnne Parker, Director, Office of Internal Controls, at 202-586-1913. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Gerald L. Talbot, Jr. 
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration: 

Enclosures: 

cc: Donald L. Cook, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs: 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Tennessee Valley Authority: 

NA
Tennessee Valley Authority: 
1101 Market Street: 
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801: 

July 23, 2010: 

Mr. Ryan T. Coles: 
Assistant Director: 
U.S. & International Nuclear Security and Cleanup: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Natural Resources & Environment: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Reference: GAO Draft Report: GAO-10-817 Tritium Production: 

Dear Mr. Coles: 

We appreciate the opportunity to provide the comments of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) on the subject draft of GAO's report entitled 
"National Nuclear Security Administration Needs to Ensure Continued 
Availability of Tritium for the Weapons Stockpile." 

Because all four of the draft report's recommendations are directed to 
the Secretary of Energy, and none are directed to TVA itself, the 
enclosed comments which we offer are made in the spirit of helping 
assure that the final version provides the audience for this report 
with clear and complete descriptions of: 

* the performance-related issues regarding the irradiation of tritium-
producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) at TVA's Watts Bar Unit 1 
that GAO has reviewed in this performance audit; and; 

* the appropriate relationship between considerations by the National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and TVA of possible options for 
increasing tritium production to expected levels and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's (NRC) regulatory responsibilities in 
connection with Watts Bar Unit 1. 

TVA shares GAO's perspectives regarding the importance of NNSA's 
ability to assure that our Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile 
requirements for tritium will be met in the future. TVA has been, and 
continues to be, dedicated to working with NNSA in evaluating and 
ultimately becoming able to decide among alternative approaches to 
help better assure that future tritium production will be at the 
necessary levels. 

With regard to our specific comments set forth in the Enclosure, TVA 
respectfully requests that GAO modify its draft report to accommodate 
those comments in order to help assure that the final report will 
provide as clear and complete descriptions as are possible when 
discussing this matter of critical importance. Further, it is our 
understanding that this letter and our enclosed comments will be set 
forth in the final report. If there are any questions, please contact 
Wayne R. Gildroy, Assistant General Counsel, at 865/632-7361. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Ashok S. Bhatnagar: 
Senior Vice President: 
Nuclear Generation Development & Construction: 

Enclosure: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

United States: 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001: 

July 23, 2010: 
Mr. Gene Aloise, Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to review and submit 
comments on the July 2010 draft of the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report, "National Nuclear Security Administration Needs 
to Ensure Continued Availability of Tritium for the Weapons Stockpile" 
(GA0-10-817). 

In general, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) agrees with 
GAO's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. However, the NRC has 
certain comments in the enclosure. 

Should you have any questions about these comments, please contact Mr. 
Jesse Arildsen of my staff at (301) 415-1785 or Jesse.Arildsen@nrc.gov. 

The NRC appreciates the opportunity to comment on GA0-10-817. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

R.W. Borchardt: 
Executive Director for Operations: 

Enclosure: 

NRC Comments Regarding GAO Draft Report GAO-10-817: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Assistant 
Director; Allison Bawden; Will Horton; Jonathan Kucskar; Alison 
O'Neill; Tim Persons; Peter Ruedel; Ron Schwenn; and Rebecca Shea made 
key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Nuclear fusion--the reaction that powers the sun--occurs when 
extreme temperatures and pressures force the nuclei of two or more 
atoms together. 

[2] Smaller amounts of tritium were also produced using nuclear 
reactors at DOE's Hanford Site in Washington. 

[3] GAO, Nuclear Materials: Nuclear Arsenal Reductions Allow 
Consideration of Tritium Production Options, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-189] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 
17, 1993). 

[4] For additional information on accelerator-based tritium 
production, see GAO, Nuclear Science: Consideration of Accelerator 
Production of Tritium Requires R&D, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-92-154] (Washington, D.C.: June 
15, 1992). 

[5] A curie is a measure of radioactivity equivalent to 37 billion 
nuclear disintegrations per second. 

[6] See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation 17.104(a) (limiting 
multi-year contracts to 5 years, unless otherwise authorized by 
statute). 

[7] 10 U.S.C. § 2536(b)(1)(A); 48 C.F.R. § 904.7102(a). 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: