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entitled 'Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and
Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa'
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Report to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2010:
Defense Management:
Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could
Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa:
GAO-10-794:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-794, a report to the Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
When the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) became fully operational in
2008, it inherited well over 100 activities, missions, programs, and
exercises from other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations.
AFRICOM initially conducted these inherited activities with little
change. However, as AFRICOM has matured, it has begun planning and
prioritizing activities with its four military service components,
special operations command, and task force. Some activities represent
a shift from traditional warfighting, requiring collaboration with the
Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and
other interagency partners.
GAO’s prior work has identified critical steps and practices that help
agencies to achieve success. For this report, GAO was asked to assess
AFRICOM in five areas with respect to activity planning and
implementation. To do so, GAO analyzed DOD and AFRICOM guidance;
observed portions of AFRICOM activities; interviewed officials in
Europe and Africa; and obtained perspectives from interagency
officials, including those at 22 U.S. embassies in Africa.
What GAO Found:
AFRICOM has made progress in developing strategies and engaging
interagency partners, and could advance DOD’s effort to strengthen the
capacity of partner nations in Africa. However, AFRICOM still faces
challenges in five areas related to activity planning and
implementation. Overcoming these challenges would help AFRICOM with
future planning, foster stability and security through improved
relationships with African nations, and maximize its effect on the
continent.
* Strategic Planning. AFRICOM has created overarching strategies and
led planning meetings, but many specific plans to guide activities
have not yet been finalized. For example, AFRICOM has developed a
theater strategy and campaign plan but has not completed detailed
plans to support its objectives. Also, some priorities of its military
service components, special operations command, and task force overlap
or differ from each other and from AFRICOM’s priorities. Completing
plans will help AFRICOM determine whether priorities are aligned
across the command and ensure that efforts are appropriate,
complementary, and comprehensive.
* Measuring Effects. AFRICOM is generally not measuring long-term
effects of activities. While some capacity-building activities appear
to support its mission, federal officials expressed concern that
others—such as sponsoring a news Web site in an African region
sensitive to the military’s presence—may have unintended effects.
Without assessing activities, AFRICOM lacks information to evaluate
their effectiveness, make informed future planning decisions, and
allocate resources.
* Applying Funds. Some AFRICOM staff have difficulty applying funding
sources to activities. DOD has stated that security assistance efforts
are constrained by a patchwork of authorities. Limited understanding
of various funding sources for activities has resulted in some delayed
activities, funds potentially not being used effectively, and African
participants being excluded from some activities.
* Interagency Collaboration. AFRICOM has been coordinating with
partners from other federal agencies. As of June 2010, AFRICOM had
embedded 27 interagency officials in its headquarters and had 17
offices at U.S. embassies in Africa. However, the command has not
fully integrated interagency perspectives early in activity planning
or leveraged some embedded interagency staff for their expertise.
* Building Expertise. AFRICOM staff have made some cultural missteps
because they do not fully understand local African customs and may
unintentionally burden embassies that must respond to AFRICOM’s
requests for assistance with activities. Without greater knowledge of
these issues, AFRICOM may continue to face difficulties maximizing
resources with embassy personnel and building relations with African
nations.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that AFRICOM complete its strategic plans, conduct long-
term activity assessments, fully integrate interagency personnel into
activity planning, and develop training to build staff expertise. DOD
agreed with the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-794] or key
components. For more information, contact John H. Pendleton at (202)
512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
AFRICOM Has Created Some Overarching Strategic Guidance, but
Activities Are Being Implemented While Many Plans Remain Unfinished:
AFRICOM Is Generally Not Measuring the Long-Term Effects of Its
Activities to Determine Whether They Fully Align with the Command's
Mission:
Some AFRICOM Staff Face Difficulties in Applying Multiple Funding
Resources to Activities:
AFRICOM Has Made Efforts to Collaborate with Interagency Partners but
Is Not Fully Engaging Them in Activity Planning Processes:
AFRICOM Faces Challenges in Building Personnel Expertise to Work in
Africa:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Africa Partnership Station:
Appendix II: Natural Fire 10:
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Africa Partnership Station USS Nashville Theater Security
Cooperation Activities, 2009 Reported Funding Sources, and Amounts:
Table 2: Reported Interagency Personnel at Africa Command Headquarters:
Table 3: Africa Partnership Station Deployments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Locations of AFRICOM Headquarters and Its Components:
Figure 2: Areas of Responsibility and Examples of Activities
Transferred to AFRICOM from Other Combatant Commands:
Figure 3: AFRICOM Strategic Guidance and Plans:
Figure 4: A Petty Officer from U.S. Naval Forces Africa Mentors
Mozambique Marines in Board, Search, and Seizure Techniques:
Figure 5: U.S. Military Personnel Help Reconstruct a High School in
Kitgum, Uganda:
Figure 6: African Partners Participate in Planning a Pandemic
Influenza Response during AFRICOM's Natural Fire 10 Exercise in
Entebbe, Uganda (October 2009):
Figure 7: U.S. and African Partners Take Part in Africa Partnership
Station Activities:
Figure 8: Natural Fire Exercise 10 in East Africa:
Abbreviations:
AFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command:
DOD: Department of Defense:
State: Department of State:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 28, 2010:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Flake:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD) created its newest combatant command,
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), to provide a more strategic, holistic
approach to U.S. military activities in Africa.[Footnote 1] Upon
becoming fully operational in fall 2008, AFRICOM inherited well over
100 activities, missions, programs, and exercises from other DOD
commands that had been managing activities on the African continent.
[Footnote 2] These activities ranged from efforts to fight HIV/AIDS in
African militaries to assisting African partners in combating
terrorism. AFRICOM's initial approach was to continue to conduct these
inherited activities with little change. However, as the command has
matured, AFRICOM--with its four military service components (Army
Africa, Naval Forces Africa, Marine Corps Africa, Air Force Africa),
special operations command, and Horn of Africa task force--has begun
planning and prioritizing activities.[Footnote 3] According to
AFRICOM's mission statement, its activities will focus on conducting
sustained security engagement and collaborating with other U.S.
government and international partners to promote a stable and secure
African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy. Because some of
AFRICOM's activities represent a shift from traditional warfighting
activities, AFRICOM's efforts to plan and implement its activities
have required increased collaboration with other federal partners such
as the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).
This report is part of a series of studies on DOD's efforts in Africa
since the establishment of AFRICOM, which have been requested by the
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. In April 2010, we issued
a report on the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, AFRICOM's
task force that it inherited from U.S. Central Command at Camp
Lemonnier, Djibouti.[Footnote 4] We recommended, and DOD generally
agreed, that the department determine whether AFRICOM should retain
the task force, and if so, whether changes were needed to the task
force's mission, structure, and resources to best support AFRICOM's
mission. Furthermore, we have previously reported and testified on
challenges that AFRICOM has faced since its establishment with regard
to its presence on the continent. We made recommendations to help
AFRICOM address the challenges it faced with respect to communicating
its mission, integrating personnel from other federal agencies
("interagency personnel") into the command, and determining the total
costs for establishing a permanent headquarters and offices in Africa.
[Footnote 5] Furthermore, our prior work has noted that critical steps
and practices that help agencies to achieve success include (1)
strategic planning; (2) measuring performance; (3) aligning resources
to support goals; (4) involving stakeholders; and (5) building
expertise.[Footnote 6] In response to your request, this report
assesses AFRICOM in each of these five areas with respect to activity
planning and implementation.
To conduct our work, we reviewed a wide range of DOD and command
documentation, including DOD strategies and guidance; AFRICOM's
theater strategy, theater campaign plan, and posture statements; and
AFRICOM components' priorities and draft strategic plans, when
available. We also reviewed non-DOD documents to determine how
AFRICOM's strategies compared or aligned with the strategies of other
federal partners, including the fiscal years 2007-2012 Department of
State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan; the USAID Strategic Framework for
Africa; and fiscal year 2008, fiscal year 2009, and fiscal year 2010
mission strategic plans of 12 U.S. embassies in Africa.[Footnote 7] We
interviewed DOD officials at many offices including AFRICOM
headquarters, its military service component commands, and special
operations command; its Horn of Africa task force headquarters; the
Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Staff; and the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency. We also interviewed officials at State,
USAID, and the Coast Guard to obtain other federal agencies'
perspectives on AFRICOM's processes for planning and implementing
activities, including the command's considerations of interagency
perspectives, and we interviewed officials associated with
nongovernmental organizations. We met with U.S. embassy officials in
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, and we contacted 20 additional
embassies involved with AFRICOM activities and geographically
dispersed throughout Africa. In addition, we met with some African
government and military officials to obtain their viewpoints on
AFRICOM's activities.
We selected two AFRICOM activities to observe in depth--(1) the Africa
Partnership Station, a maritime safety and security activity, and (2)
Natural Fire 10, a military training exercise associated with
AFRICOM's pandemic preparedness and response activity. We chose these
two activities based on several factors including their addressing of
different theater security objectives, leadership by different
military service components, considerable involvement of interagency
and international partners, size of the activities, and distinct
geographic locations. Detailed descriptions of these activities can be
found in appendixes I and II. We supplemented our examination of these
activities with information on additional activities highlighted by
officials at AFRICOM, its components, DOD, State, and USAID during our
review.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 to July 2010, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix III
provides a more detailed description of our scope and methodology.
Background:
When AFRICOM was designated fully operational on September 30, 2008,
it consolidated the responsibility for DOD activities in Africa that
had previously been shared by the U.S. Central, European, and Pacific
Commands. AFRICOM's area of responsibility includes the countries on
the African continent, with the exception of Egypt, as well as its
island nations. The command's mission is to work in concert with other
U.S. government agencies and international partners to conduct
sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs,
military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as
directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support
of U.S. foreign policy. According to AFRICOM, it received about $340
million in funding in fiscal year 2009.
In addition to AFRICOM's headquarters, the command is supported by
military service component commands, a special operations command, and
a Horn of Africa task force (see figure 1). AFRICOM's Navy Forces and
Marine Corps components were designated fully operational on October
1, 2008, and its Air Force, Army, and special operations command
components on October 1, 2009. The task force was transferred to
AFRICOM on October 1, 2008. All components have begun carrying out
activities under AFRICOM.
As of June 2010, AFRICOM reported that the command and its components
had about 4,400 assigned personnel and forces. About 2,400 of these
personnel were based at locations in Europe, and about 2,000
personnel--about 400 staff and about 1,600 forces--were assigned to
the command's Horn of Africa task force at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.
AFRICOM also stated that there could be between 3,500 to about 5,000
rotational forces deployed during a major exercise.
Figure 1: Locations of AFRICOM Headquarters and Its Components:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of AFRICOM]
The following locations are depicted on the map:
AFRICOM Headquarters: Stuttgart, Germany.
Special Operations Command, Africa: Stuttgart, Germany,
Air Force, Africa: Kaiserslautern, Germany.
Marine Corps, Africa: Boeblingen, Germany.
Army, Africa: Vicenza, Italy.
Naval Forces, Africa: Naples, Italy.
Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa: Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.
Source: GAO presentation of AFRICOM data; Copyright © Corel Corp. All
rights reserved (map).
[End of figure]
When AFRICOM was established, it inherited the activities previously
conducted by its predecessors. Many of these activities reflect DOD's
shift toward building the security capacity of partner states, a
mission area noted in the department's 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review. Building security capacity furthers the U.S. objective of
securing a peaceful and cooperative international order and includes
such activities as bilateral and multilateral training and exercises,
foreign military sales and financing, officer exchange programs,
educational opportunities at professional military schools, technical
exchanges, and efforts to assist foreign security forces in building
competency and capacity. In particular, AFRICOM's inherited activities
to build partner capacity, some of which involve coordination with
State, range from efforts to train African soldiers in conducting
peacekeeping operations to assisting African nations in combating
terrorism, and they include one of the largest U.S. military
activities in Africa, Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara. The
areas of responsibility and examples of activities transferred to
AFRICOM from the U.S. Central, European, and Pacific Commands are
presented in figure 2.
Figure 2: Areas of Responsibility and Examples of Activities
Transferred to AFRICOM from Other Combatant Commands:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of Africa]
U.S. European Command:
Number of countries involved: 42.
Examples of activities transferred:
* Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara: A series of military-to-
military exercises designed to strengthen the ability of regional
governments to police the large expanses of remote terrain in the
Trans-Sahara.
* Africa Partnership Station: A program to enhance maritime safety and
security through ship visits, training, and the provision of equipment
to African host nations.
* Africa Endeavor: Communications interoperability exercise focused on
information sharing among African states via communication network.
* Medical exercises: Exercises in which U.S. military doctors and
other medical personnel interchange medical information and techniques
with African host nation medical personnel and provide humanitarian
assistance such as immunizations to the population.
* International Military Education and Training: Program that provides
military education, training, and professional development to African
military personnel on a grant basis through funding from the
Department of State.
* Humanitarian Assistance activities: Various activities including
providing HIV/AIDS prevention education to African military personnel,
drilling wells, improving school buildings, and developing
infrastructure.
U.S. Central Command:
Number of countries involved: 7 (Egypt remains in U.S. Central
Command's area of responsibility).
Examples of activities transferred:
* Natural Fire: Multilateral, regional, disaster relief exercise.
* Civil affairs: Quick, short-term activities that engage local
communities, such as medical and veterinary care and engineering
projects.
* Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa: One of the two largest
military programs in Africa, includes operations, training, and
humanitarian activities to help nations improve their capacity to
combat terrorism and prepare for challenges such as natural disasters.
U.S. Pacific Command:
Number of countries involved: 3.
Examples of activities transferred:
* Pacific Endeavor: Workshops that bring nations together to test the
compatibility and interoperability of their communications systems and
assist in their integration.
* Tempest Express: Biannual workshop with multinational military
personnel aimed to increase the speed of multinational crisis response
and improve force interoperability.
Source: GAO presentation of DOD data. Copyright © Corel Corp. All
rights reserved (map).
[End of figure]
AFRICOM emphasizes that it works in concert with interagency partners,
such as USAID, to ensure that its plans and activities directly
support U.S. foreign policy objectives. On the African continent, DOD
focuses on defense, State plans and implements foreign diplomacy, and
USAID leads foreign development, including efforts to support economic
growth and humanitarian assistance. DOD issued Joint Publication 3-08
in March 2006 to provide guidance to facilitate coordination between
DOD and interagency organizations. The publication acknowledged that
the various U.S. government agencies' differing, and sometimes
conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making
techniques make unity of effort a challenge, but noted that close
coordination and cooperation can help overcome challenges. The 2008
National Defense Strategy identified AFRICOM as an example of DOD's
efforts toward collaborating with other U.S. government departments
and agencies and working to achieve a whole-of-government approach.
Additionally, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review identified the need
to continue improving DOD's cooperation with other U.S. agencies. In
particular, the report stated that DOD will work with the leadership
of civilian agencies to support those agencies' growth and their
overseas operations so that the appropriate military and civilian
resources are put forth to meet the demands of current contingencies.
In our February 2009 report on AFRICOM, we noted that after DOD
declared AFRICOM fully operational, concerns about AFRICOM's mission
and activities persisted among various stakeholders.[Footnote 8]
Concerns included areas such as humanitarian assistance and other
noncombat activities that involve non-DOD agencies and organizations.
The concerns centered on the view that AFRICOM could blur traditional
boundaries between diplomacy, development, and defense. In some cases,
the apprehensions stemmed from DOD having more resources than other
agencies and thus it could dominate U.S. activities and relationships
in Africa. Among African nations, we found that there was some concern
that AFRICOM would be used as an opportunity to increase the number of
U.S. troops and military bases in Africa.
AFRICOM Has Created Some Overarching Strategic Guidance, but
Activities Are Being Implemented While Many Plans Remain Unfinished:
AFRICOM has created overarching strategic guidance and has led
activity planning meetings with its stakeholders such as State.
However, activities are being implemented as the detailed supporting
plans for conducting many activities have not yet been finalized.
Moreover, AFRICOM has postponed time frames for completing several of
these supporting plans by about 2 years. Without supporting plans,
AFRICOM cannot ensure that the activities of its components are
appropriate, comprehensive, complementary, and supportive of its
mission.
AFRICOM Has Developed Some Overarching Strategies and Led Planning
Meetings:
AFRICOM has published command-level overarching strategic guidance and
has led activity planning meetings with its components and interagency
partners. Strategic plans are the starting point and underpinning for
a system of program goal-setting and performance measurement in the
federal government. DOD strategic planning guidance, issued in 2008,
requires each geographic combatant command to produce a theater
campaign plan and specific posture requirements for its given area of
responsibility.[Footnote 9] In September 2008, AFRICOM published its
theater strategy,[Footnote 10] a 10-year strategy describing the
strategic environment in which the command operates. In May 2009, the
Secretary of Defense approved AFRICOM's theater campaign plan,
[Footnote 11] a 5-year plan that describes the command's theater
strategic objectives, establishes priorities to guide the command's
activities, and provides guidance to the command's staff and
components. In its theater campaign plan, AFRICOM outlined priority
countries that are of strategic importance, and it identified its
theater strategic objectives, such as defeating the al-Qaeda terrorist
organization and associated networks in Africa; ensuring that capacity
exists to respond to crises; improving security-sector governance and
stability; and protecting populations from deadly contagions. AFRICOM
officials said that they worked with State and USAID officials to
incorporate their perspectives into the theater campaign plan.
However, AFRICOM officials observed that the Africa strategies for
State and USAID have different timelines from those of AFRICOM, thus
posing a challenge for alignment among the command and its interagency
partners. For example, AFRICOM's theater campaign plan covers fiscal
years 2010 through 2014, whereas the State/USAID strategic plan spans
fiscal years 2007 through 2012.
In addition to developing its theater strategy and campaign plan,
AFRICOM has also led activity planning meetings for future activities.
The command has held annual Theater Security Cooperation Conferences,
which include officials from AFRICOM, its components, U.S. embassies,
and other federal agencies. At these meetings, AFRICOM proposes
activities to conduct for the following fiscal year, and it engages
with other federal agency officials to coordinate and implement
activities. Additionally, for individual activities, AFRICOM may hold
multiple planning meetings prior to implementation. For example, for
AFRICOM's Natural Fire 10 pandemic preparedness and response activity,
four phases of planning occurred during the year prior to the
exercise. These phases included: concept development, in which
potential focuses for the exercise were discussed; initial planning,
in which the final focus of the exercise and its location were
determined; main planning, in which key partners determined the
activities that would make up the exercise; and final planning.
Similarly, in July 2009, we observed the main planning conference for
activities of the Africa Partnership Station's USS Gunston Hall, which
was deployed from March through May 2010. This conference built upon
the progress of the initial planning conference, and it was followed
by a final planning conference to identify specific details for the
activity. During our observation of the main planning conference, we
noted that AFRICOM's Navy component engaged DOD, interagency, and
African partners in the coordination of Africa Partnership Station
events.
Many Plans Remain Unfinished, Hindering Activity Planning:
Although AFRICOM has developed overarching strategic guidance and led
planning meetings, it lacks specific supporting plans on conducting
activities, which hinders planning and implementation efforts. As we
previously reported, an agency should cascade its goals and objectives
throughout the organization and should align performance measures with
the objectives from the executive level down to the operational
levels.[Footnote 12] While AFRICOM's theater campaign plan identifies
strategic objectives, it does not include detailed information on how
to plan, implement, or evaluate specific activities. Rather, the
theater campaign plan states that AFRICOM is to create specific
supporting plans--(1) component support plans, (2) regional engagement
plans, and (3) country work plans--with more detailed information.
However, AFRICOM has not yet approved its military service components,
special operations command, and task force support plans for use in
guiding their activities. Furthermore, the command has not completed
its five regional engagement plans or country work plans for Africa
(see figure 3).
Figure 3: AFRICOM Strategic Guidance and Plans:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
National strategies and guidance:
National Security Strategy and National Security Presidential
Directive-50 (Completed plan);
National Defense Strategy (Completed plan);
National Military Strategy (Completed plan);
Guidance for Employment of the Force (Completed plan);
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (Completed plan).
Command vision and strategy:
Commander’s Vision (Completed plan);
AFRICOM Theater Strategy (Completed plan);
Non-DOD documents:
- State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan (Completed plan);
- State Africa Bureau Strategic Plan (Completed plan);
- USAID Strategic Framework for Africa (Completed plan).
Campaign plan and supporting plans:
AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan (Completed plan):
- U.S. Air Force Africa Support Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
- U.S. Navy Africa Support Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
- U.S. Marine Corps Africa Support Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
- U.S. Army Africa Support Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
- Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Support Plan (Draft or
uncompleted plan);
- U.S. Special Operations Command Africa Support Plan (Draft or
uncompleted plan).
Regional engagement plans:
Southern Regional Engagement Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
Central Regional Engagement Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
North Regional Engagement Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
West Regional Engagement Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan);
East Regional Engagement Plan (Draft or uncompleted plan).
Contingency and other plans:
Country Work Plans (Draft or uncompleted plan);
Non-DOD documents:
- Embassy Mission Strategic and Resource Plans (Completed plan).
(Draft or uncompleted plan)
Source: GAO presentation of DOD data.
Note: State = Department of State; USAID = U.S. Agency for
International Development.
[End of figure]
In reviewing AFRICOM's theater campaign plan, we found that it
provides overarching guidance but does not include specific
information such as detailed activity information and the amount of
effort focused on specific countries or regions. Rather, AFRICOM's
theater campaign plan states that specific supporting plans will
provide this information. To examine how another combatant command
approaches planning, we compared AFRICOM's theater campaign plan to
that of the U.S. Southern Command, a more mature DOD geographic
combatant command that operates in the Americas and Caribbean, which,
like AFRICOM, also has a focus on building partner capacity and
collaborating with interagency partners. While this comparison was not
meant to conclude that one combatant command's approach is superior to
the other, our analysis did find differences between the two plans.
For example, we noted that AFRICOM's theater campaign plan identifies
only one activity--the African Partners Enlisted Development program--
and calls for the establishment of regional engagement plans to focus
on activities and programs. In contrast, Southern Command's theater
campaign plan includes detailed information on dozens of its
activities, and no supporting regional engagement plans are required.
Additionally, although AFRICOM's theater campaign plan identifies
priority countries or regions for each of its theater strategic
objectives, it calls for supporting regional engagement plans and
country work plans to provide additional information on regional and
country information. In contrast, Southern Command's theater campaign
plan specifically details the percentage of engagement effort that
will be directed toward each region and country. In essence, it
appears that both Southern Command and AFRICOM require that similar
types of information on regional efforts and activities be
incorporated into plans. The difference is that AFRICOM's approach
requires the completion of supporting plans while Southern Command
provides this information in its theater campaign plan.
AFRICOM's specific supporting plans--its components' support plans and
regional engagement plans--have not yet been completed. AFRICOM's
theater campaign plan required that component support plans be
completed by each AFRICOM component no later than December 1, 2009, to
address activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2012. According to
AFRICOM, as of June 2010, four of the six component support plans had
been developed and were ready to present to the AFRICOM commander for
approval. The Navy's supporting plan, for example, was developed in
November 2009, but had not yet been signed out by the AFRICOM
commander. AFRICOM's theater campaign plan also requires the
development of five regional engagement plans--North, East, Central,
West, and South--to provide more detailed regional, country, and
programmatic guidance. Specifically, AFRICOM's theater campaign plan
states that both it and the regional engagement plans provide the
command's prioritization of time, effort, and resources for all steady-
state activities that the command executes. The theater campaign plan
states that regional engagement plans should contain three elements:
(1) regional planning guidance, which highlights key objectives for
each region that must nest within the theater security objectives
outlined in the theater campaign plans; (2) a 2-year calendar that
depicts planned security cooperation engagement activities, month by
month, and country by country, for the region; and (3) country work
plans, which should be developed for each critical partner identified
in the theater campaign plan. The country work plans should include a
detailed list of activities and events designed to make progress
toward objectives for each region within a particular country, and
they are required to be aligned with U.S. embassy Mission Strategic
and Resource Plans to ensure unity of effort.[Footnote 13] At the time
we completed our audit work, the regional engagement plans had not
been approved by the command, and the country plans were still in the
process of being developed.
Furthermore, AFRICOM has postponed time frames for completing several
of its supporting plans. For example, completion of the regional
engagement plans has been repeatedly delayed throughout our review--
postponed by about 2 years--from February 2009 to October 2009 to May
2010 to the first quarter of fiscal year 2011. While AFRICOM officials
had previously told us that component support plans would be completed
by December 2009, officials later stated that they expect the plans to
be completed within 60 days of the regional engagement plans. DOD
officials told us that AFRICOM held a planners' conference in April
2010 and that draft plans, such as country work plans, were discussed
at this meeting to obtain the components' input. Moreover, in the
absence of plans, DOD stated that AFRICOM holds weekly meetings with
the components to discuss activities. However, by conducting
activities without having specific plans in place to guide activity
planning and implementation, AFRICOM risks not fully supporting its
mission or objectives.
AFRICOM's Components Identify Differing Priorities:
Without having approved component support plans and regional
engagement plans, AFRICOM and its components cannot be sure that they
are conducting activities that align with the command's priorities.
Currently, each of the military service components has established
priority countries/areas in Africa, but in some cases they overlap or
differ from each other and also differ from the priority countries
that AFRICOM has identified.[Footnote 14] Air Force component
officials told us, for example, that they used AFRICOM's designation
of priority countries to inform their initial identification of
priority countries, but they also considered where U.S. Europe
Command's Air Force component had prior engagements or existing
relationships with Africans. These officials told us that they
recently updated their priority countries based on their own
objectives. The officials explained that, because the Air Force
component has different objectives than AFRICOM's other military
service components and because certain African countries have varying
levels of Air Force capabilities, their designated priority countries
would not necessarily coincide with those of other military service
components. Marine Corps component officials said that their
designated priority countries reinforce AFRICOM's designated "willing
and capable" African nations; however, our analysis shows that the
priority countries identified by AFRICOM and those identified by its
Marine Corps component also do not fully align. Additionally,
activities currently conducted by the military service components may
overlap with AFRICOM's Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa's
operating area.[Footnote 15]
AFRICOM stated that in the absence of completed supporting plans, it
has taken some steps to coordinate activities among its components,
including the use of an information database to manage individual
activities. AFRICOM stated that use of the database helps ensure a
unified effort among the components. While component officials we
spoke with said that the database can help them determine whether
another AFRICOM component is planning an activity within a similar
time frame or with the same African country, they noted that use of
the database is preliminary within AFRICOM and that not all component
activities may be included in the database. Air Force component
officials said that they currently lack visibility and coordination
with the other components for the full range of activities, and as a
result, they may be unaware of some activities being planned or
conducted by other AFRICOM components. Similarly, officials from
AFRICOM's Army component stated that perhaps the greatest challenge to
creating positive conditions in Africa is ensuring that U.S. defense
efforts remain synchronized; if plans are not coordinated, their
efforts could have unintended consequences, such as the potential for
Africans to perceive the U.S. military as trying to influence public
opinion in a region sensitive to the military's presence. Until
AFRICOM completes specific plans to guide its activity-planning
efforts and determines whether priorities are appropriately aligned
across the command, it cannot ensure that the efforts of its
components are appropriate, complementary, and comprehensive.
AFRICOM Has Not Made Decisions Regarding Its Horn of Africa Task
Force, Which Impedes Planning:
AFRICOM has yet to make critical decisions about the future of its
Horn of Africa task force, including what changes, if any, are needed
for the task force or its activities to best support the command. In
April 2010, we reported that AFRICOM had not decided whether changes
are needed to the task force's mission, structure, and resources to
best support the command's mission of sustained security engagement in
Africa.[Footnote 16] Moreover, AFRICOM has stated that, as the
capabilities of its military service components become mature, the
command will determine the best course of action for transferring task
force activities to the other components as necessary to ensure
sustained security engagement with African countries within the task
force's operating area. Some military service component officials said
that coordination with the task force can be difficult. For example,
Air Force component officials said that it has been challenging to
coordinate with the task force because it is unclear how the task
force's roles, responsibilities, and efforts align with those of
AFRICOM and the Air Force component.
With the exception of the task force, each of AFRICOM's component
commands is located in Europe and does not have assigned forces (see
figure 1). To conduct their activities, forces for AFRICOM's military
service component activities are requested through a formal Joint
Staff process. Force planning currently occurs within the Joint Staff
2 years prior to the designated fiscal year; forces needed for
emergent requirements must typically be requested 120 days in advance.
AFRICOM officials told us that the command must request forces and
equipment for its military service components to carry out any type of
activity in Africa--whether it be a large-scale operation or
additional personnel needed to travel to the continent to plan a
future program.[Footnote 17] Moreover, they said that AFRICOM does not
always receive the forces or equipment it requests for an activity
because DOD may have higher-priority needs. From AFRICOM's and some
military service components' perspective, having to formally request
forces for all activities may affect AFRICOM's effectiveness if there
are greater DOD priorities. Furthermore, the special operations
command component stated that, without assigned forces, it cannot act
as a crisis-response force, which is the role of special operations
commands in other combatant commands. AFRICOM has occasionally used
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa personnel with appropriate
skill sets outside of its operating area and area-of-interest
countries, such as in Liberia and Swaziland, and these forces could
potentially be leveraged for other activities. Completing an
evaluation of the task force in a thorough yet expeditious manner and
clearly articulating any needed changes to the task force's mission,
structure, and resources will aid in AFRICOM's efforts to plan and
prioritize the many activities it inherited upon its establishment and
ensure that personnel and resources are applied most effectively to
enhance U.S. military efforts in Africa.
AFRICOM Is Generally Not Measuring the Long-Term Effects of Its
Activities to Determine Whether They Fully Align with the Command's
Mission:
It is unclear whether all of the activities that AFRICOM has inherited
or is planning fully align with its mission of sustained security
engagement in Africa because, in addition to unfinished strategic
plans, AFRICOM is generally not measuring the long-term effects of its
activities. Our prior work has highlighted the importance of
developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results,
[Footnote 18] and we have previously reported that U.S. agencies
cannot be fully assured that they have effectively allocated resources
without establishing an assessment process.[Footnote 19] In addition,
according to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
U.S. agencies should monitor and assess the quality of performance
over time.[Footnote 20] The lack of clear, measurable goals makes it
difficult for program managers and staff to establish linkages between
their day-to-day efforts and the agency's achievement of its intended
mission.[Footnote 21] The Government Performance and Results Act also
emphasizes that agencies should measure performance toward the
achievement of goals.[Footnote 22] Moreover, AFRICOM's theater
campaign plan requires assessments of theater security cooperation
activities.
AFRICOM has developed a tool to measure progress in meeting its
strategic objectives. The tool measures objective factors (e.g.,
number of identified al-Qaeda members in a country), subjective
factors (e.g., likelihood of an imminent terrorist attack), and
perceptive factors (e.g., the level of protection against terrorism
Africans expect their governments can provide). However, AFRICOM
officials told us that this tool is used primarily for strategic
planning purposes and not for follow-up on individual activities.
Moreover, beyond AFRICOM, our prior work has shown that DOD and State
have conducted little monitoring and evaluation of certain security
assistance programs.[Footnote 23] Specifically, DOD and State have not
carried out systematic program monitoring of funds for projects that,
among other things, train and equip partner nations' militaries to
conduct counterterrorism operations.[Footnote 24] Instead, reporting
has generally consisted of anecdotal information, although DOD has
taken initial steps to establish systematic program monitoring. For
example, DOD has hired a contractor to identify current project roles,
data sources, and ongoing assessment activities in order to develop a
framework for assessing projects. However, DOD officials stated that
they had not consistently monitored these security assistance
projects, and State officials were not involved with or aware of a
formal evaluation process. Our review of 58 proposals for security
assistance projects in African countries from fiscal years 2007 to
2009 revealed that only 15, or 26 percent, of the proposals included a
description of how the activities would be monitored over time. In
addition, only 10 of the project proposals, or 17 percent, included
information related to program objectives or anticipated outcomes.
Some Activities Appear to Support AFRICOM's Mission, but Others May
Have Unintended Consequences:
While some activities appear to support AFRICOM's mission, others may
have unintended consequences--which underscores the importance of
consistently measuring the long-term effects of the full range of the
command's activities. AFRICOM has stated that a primary purpose of its
activities is to build partner capacity. The two activities we
reviewed in depth appear to support this mission. First, the Africa
Partnership Station initiative builds maritime security capabilities
of African partners through ship-and land-based training events
focused on areas such as maritime domain awareness, leadership,
navigation, maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, civil
engineering, and logistics (see appendix I). Second, the command's
Natural Fire 10 exercise brought together participants from Burundi,
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda to build partner capacity in
responding to a pandemic influenza outbreak (see appendix II).
Moreover, State and U.S. embassy officials said that peacekeeping and
military-to-military training activities help support embassy goals
and U.S. foreign policy objectives in African nations. For example,
the U.S. embassy in Algeria stated that AFRICOM's activities directly
support the embassy's objectives of counterterrorism cooperation and
engaging with and modernizing the Algerian military. In addition, a
senior official at the U.S. embassy in Mozambique told us that AFRICOM
supports the embassy's goals pertaining to maritime security and
professionalizing Mozambique's military.
Figure 4: A Petty Officer from U.S. Naval Forces Africa Mentors
Mozambique Marines in Board, Search, and Seizure Techniques:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: AFRICOM.
[End of figure]
However, based on concerns raised by interagency officials, other
activities may not fully align with U.S. foreign policy goals or they
may not reflect the most effective use of resources. For example,
State officials expressed concern over AFRICOM's sponsorship of a news
Web site about the Maghreb, citing the potential for Africans to
perceive the U.S. military as trying to influence public opinion.
[Footnote 25] State had previously told us that countries in the
Maghreb are very sensitive to foreign military presence, and if a
program is marketed as a U.S. military activity or operation, it may
not be well received among these nations. AFRICOM officials said that
they had inherited this activity from U.S. European Command and that
they have been working closely with State in its implementation.
Moreover, DOD officials observed that, with respect to the Maghreb
news Web site sponsorship, the intent of the activity is to influence
African public sentiment--the same effect for which some State
officials have expressed concern. They said that State supports this
as a foreign policy goal in Africa, and senior State officials have
endorsed the Maghreb news Web site sponsorship activity. Similarly,
some officials questioned whether the U.S. military should conduct a
musical caravan activity in Senegal, which is intended to promote
peace by having local artists provide free concerts throughout the
country. State officials noted that the activity has overwhelmed
embassy staff, who had to spend significant time ensuring that
AFRICOM's effort was appropriately aligned with embassy goals. AFRICOM
officials acknowledged that there have been some concerns with this
activity and that it is being reviewed by both the command and State.
However, AFRICOM noted that all activities within a country are
reviewed and approved by the U.S. embassy before they are executed.
However, at the U.S. embassy level, officials also expressed concern
about some of AFRICOM's activities. For example, according to one U.S.
embassy, AFRICOM's sociocultural research and advisory teams, which
comprise one to five social scientists who conduct research and
provide cultural advice to AFRICOM, seem to duplicate other
interagency efforts. AFRICOM officials told us that they use the
information provided by the teams to help guide operations in Africa
and obtain perspectives on cultural sensitivities among the local
populations. However, the embassy expressed concern about the U.S.
military performing this type of research itself instead of
coordinating with interagency partners to gain sociocultural
information. Moreover, an internal State memo emphasized the need for
close coordination among AFRICOM's research teams and U.S. embassies.
In March 2010, the Secretary of State issued guidance to U.S.
embassies in Africa on AFRICOM's sociocultural research and advisory
activities, stating that AFRICOM's research teams will share their
findings with embassy staff and other government counterparts.
Finally, State and USAID officials we contacted at one U.S. embassy
expressed concern that some of the activities that AFRICOM's Horn of
Africa task force had previously proposed, such as building schools
for an African nation, did not appear to fit into a larger strategic
framework, and said that they did not believe the task force was
monitoring its activities as needed to enable it to demonstrate a link
between activities and mission. The embassy officials cited a past
example where the task force had proposed drilling a well without
considering how its placement could cause conflict in clan
relationships or affect pastoral routes. While concerns raised about
specific AFRICOM activities may or may not be valid, without
conducting long-term assessments of activities, AFRICOM lacks the
information needed to evaluate the effects of the full range of its
activities, to be able to respond to critics if need be, and to make
informed future planning decisions.
AFRICOM Generally Does Not Measure the Long-Term Effects of Its
Activities:
AFRICOM appears to perform some follow-up on activities shortly after
their completion, but the command is generally not measuring the
effects of activities over the long term. AFRICOM officials we met
with while observing the command's Natural Fire 10 pandemic
preparedness and response activity in Uganda told us that the command
planned to produce an "after action" report after the activity, but
they acknowledged that AFRICOM needs to develop a method to perform
longer-term assessments on activities. With respect to the Natural
Fire engineering projects, for example, the officials said that
AFRICOM does not know whether projects such as reconstructing a school
will have a sustainable effect on the community. AFRICOM's
Humanitarian Assistance Branch has developed an assessment tool for
Natural Fire that relates to the command's security objectives, but an
official told us that AFRICOM is still determining exactly what will
be assessed with respect to the activity. AFRICOM also envisions
continuing its work on pandemic response by engaging bilaterally with
each of the countries involved in the 2009 Natural Fire exercise.
Figure 5: U.S. Military Personnel Help Reconstruct a High School in
Kitgum, Uganda:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
DOD, State, and officials we contacted at several U.S. embassies in
Africa also stated that, from their perspectives, AFRICOM is not
measuring the long-term effects of its activities in Africa. State
officials told us, for example, that AFRICOM's Military Information
Support Teams, which are intended to support State and U.S. embassies
by augmenting or broadening existing public-diplomacy efforts, are not
assessing the effect of their efforts. In addition, while the Africa
Partnership Station activity has been viewed as a successful African
partner training platform, concerns were raised that it may have taken
on too many training activities--which range from maritime domain
awareness to maritime law enforcement to civil engineering to
humanitarian assistance efforts. With the potential for its mission to
become amorphous or lose its effectiveness, it was suggested that the
Africa Partnership Station might be more effective if it targeted its
resources toward fewer activities.
In our April 2010 report on AFRICOM's Horn of Africa task force, we
noted that the task force performs some short-term follow-up on
activities, but AFRICOM officials said that the task force has not
historically been focused on performing long-term assessments on
activities to determine whether the activities are having their
intended effects or whether modifications to activities need to be
made.[Footnote 26] In response to our report, the task force
acknowledged that it needed to improve its ability to evaluate the
effectiveness of its activities. The task force stated that it had
taken steps to incorporate measures of performance and effects in its
planning process so that it can determine whether its activities are
achieving foreign policy goals. The command's sociocultural research
and advisory team in the area is also being used to help assess task
force activities, and the task force is beginning to follow-up on past
activities, such as medical clinics, to determine their effects over
time. We commend the task force for these efforts, which could serve
as models for implementing long-term activity assessments across
AFRICOM.
AFRICOM's limited long-term evaluation of activities to date may
result, in part, from the differences in agency cultures among DOD,
State, and USAID. Officials from State and USAID told us that their
agencies are focused on monitoring and on long-term results, while
they viewed DOD as having a tendency to take a short-term approach
focused on immediate implementation or results. Similarly, nonprofit-
organization officials said that, from their perspective, the U.S.
military tends to view development activities on a onetime basis and
is not focused on monitoring or measuring the effects of an activity
after completion. They voiced concern that AFRICOM will not know
whether its activities are effective or be in a position to evaluate
the quality of the services its activities may be providing.
Long-term evaluation can be difficult to achieve but remains
nonetheless important for AFRICOM in meeting its mission in Africa.
While some activities may promote temporary benefits for the
participants, their short-term nature or unintended long-term effects
could potentially promote unfavorable views of the U.S. military among
partner nations. We previously reported, for example, that AFRICOM's
Horn of Africa task force had built a well for a local African
community, but it did not teach the community how to maintain it.
AFRICOM officials stated that they recognize the difficulties
associated with measuring long-term effects of activities,
particularly the ability to link an action to a desired effect. For
example, AFRICOM Navy component officials told us that it is difficult
to measure the Africa Partnership Station's return on investment
because changes in Africa can be incremental and thus it can be
difficult to determine whether the activity caused the change or
whether the effects will persist over time. The Navy has been working
with the Center for Naval Analyses to assess the Africa Partnership
Station. Center for Naval Analyses officials told us that their work
has shown that Africa Partnership Station training has been successful
in changing African participants' attitudes toward maritime safety and
security activities but that it has been more difficult to show
changes in the behavior of participating African nations. Despite the
challenges associated with measuring long-term effects, implementing
such assessments for all of its activities can help AFRICOM make
successful future planning decisions and allocate resources to
maximize its effect in Africa.
Some AFRICOM Staff Face Difficulties in Applying Multiple Funding
Resources to Activities:
Some AFRICOM staff face difficulties in applying funding to
activities, which can pose challenges in implementing activities and
impede long-term planning efforts. AFRICOM stated that it had access
to 15 different funding sources to fund its activities in fiscal year
2009. In addition, AFRICOM reported that it influences other State and
USAID funding sources--such as funds for State's Global Peacekeeping
and Operations Initiative and International Military Education and
Training, and USAID's Pandemic Response Program--but that these
funding sources are not managed by the command. We consistently heard
from officials at AFRICOM and its components that applying funding to
activities was not well understood by staff and that they lacked
expertise to effectively carry out this task. For example, Army
component officials told us that activities must be designed to meet
specific criteria in order to be granted funds and that their staff do
not have the skills required to understand the complexities of
funding. Similarly, Navy and Air Force component officials said that
staff spend substantial amounts of time trying to determine which
funding sources can be appropriately applied to which activities. Many
different funding sources may be required for small segments of an
activity, such as transportation or lodging for participants.
Determining which specific funding sources should be used for various
activities has sometimes resulted in problems with activities.
Officials cited instances in which limited understanding resulted in
African nations having their invitations to AFRICOM-sponsored
activities rescinded or in activities having to be canceled. In two
recent instances, an official said that AFRICOM essentially disinvited
two-thirds of the intended participants for activities at the last
minute because it was discovered that certain funding sources could
not be used to support the participants. This caused much
embarrassment and frustration for the Africans who had planned to
attend the activities. Marine Corps component officials said that
difficulties in identifying the appropriate funding source prevented
them from responding to African requests for activities, causing the
cancellation of some peacekeeping exercises. AFRICOM's Navy component
has also struggled with the application of multiple funding sources to
the Africa Partnership Station activity, an official explained,
occasionally resulting in delayed submissions of funding packages to
U.S. embassies for approval. Table 1 shows eight different funding
sources required for theater security cooperation activities
associated with the Africa Partnership Station's 2009 USS Nashville
deployment.
Table 1: Africa Partnership Station USS Nashville Theater Security
Cooperation Activities, 2009 Reported Funding Sources, and Amounts:
Activity: Partner Ship Rider Program;
Funding source: Traditional Combatant Commander Activities;
Required amount: $300,000.
Activity: Humanitarian and Civic Assistance;
Funding source: Humanitarian and Civic Assistance;
Required amount: $500,000.
Activity: Training;
Funding source: Combatant Commander Initiative Fund;
Required amount: $4,100,000.
Activity: Training;
Funding source: Counter Narcoterrorism;
Required amount: $100,000.
Activity: Community Relations;
Funding source: Community Relations;
Required amount: $30,000.
Activity: Key Leader Engagement/Outreach;
Funding source: Official Representation Funds;
Required amount: $60,000.
Activity: Partner Operational Travel/Fuel/Parts;
Funding source: Developing Country Combined Exercise Program;
Required amount: $300,000.
Activity: Operational Staff Engagement and Travel;
Funding source: Global War on Terrorism[A];
Required amount: $336,000.
Activity: Total;
Required amount: $5,726,000.
Source: U.S. Naval Forces Africa.
Notes: These funding sources do not include costs associated with ship
operations such as fuel, personnel, and repair parts. Additionally,
these funding sources do not include $2.1 million for port service
requirements or funding provided by the Department of State to support
the training activities.
[A] Starting with the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request in April
2009, the administration now refers to funds for the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan as Overseas Contingency Operations funds instead of Global
War on Terrorism funds.
[End of table]
According to AFRICOM's Navy component, funding a large activity like
the Africa Partnership Station on a 1-year planning horizon has
hindered the ability to conduct persistent training efforts. Officials
said that funding sources, such as the Combatant Commander Initiative
Fund, are only available for a year and must be applied only to new
initiatives.[Footnote 27] Similarly, Global War on Terrorism funds,
now known as Overseas Contingency Operations funds, are supplemental
appropriations, which officials said do not provide permanency for the
activity. Our prior work has encouraged DOD to include known or likely
project costs of ongoing operations related to the war on terrorism in
DOD's base budget requests. Navy component officials told us that
Africa Partnership Station may get its own funding line for fiscal
years 2011 through 2015. If approved by the President, Navy component
officials believe the dedicated budget line would help facilitate
funding the activity, although AFRICOM added that the Africa
Partnership Station will still require several funding sources to
support the activity.
In its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD stated that U.S. security
assistance efforts are constrained by a complex patchwork of
authorities and unwieldy processes. Several AFRICOM and component
officials we contacted agreed, with some stating that funding
challenges hampered their ability to sustain relationships in Africa.
AFRICOM stated that the limitations of current funding sources create
a continuing challenge for the command, noting that some funding
sources were not designed for the types of activities AFRICOM carries
out and thus do not adequately support AFRICOM's mission of sustained
security engagement. Army component officials said that funding
sources available for activities tend to be short term and must be
used in a finite time frame, which limits long-term planning
capabilities and the ability to have a sustained presence in Africa.
AFRICOM's special operations command officials said that the lack of
sustainable funding sources has created a short-term, unsustainable
approach to the command's activities, describing their efforts as
sporadic connections with African countries with which they should
have enduring relationships. Marine Corps component officials
described having to ask AFRICOM for funds for activities that fall
outside of funding cycles, noting the need for streamlined funding for
effective sustained engagement in Africa.
Our prior work on security assistance activities also found that the
long-term effect of some projects may be at risk because it is
uncertain whether funds will be available to sustain the military
capabilities that the projects are intended to build.[Footnote 28]
There are limits on the use of U.S. government funds for sustainment
of certain security assistance projects,[Footnote 29] and most
participating countries have relatively low incomes and may be
unwilling or unable to provide the necessary resources to sustain the
projects. Moreover, officials told us that the process for submitting
proposals for security assistance projects is lengthy, requiring them
to begin writing the next fiscal year's plans before the last year's
are processed, and that the time frames for receiving and applying the
funding from the various funding sources needed for the project do not
necessarily align with one another. For example, AFRICOM might apply
resources from one funding source to deliver a maritime vessel to an
African country, but the resources that must be obtained from another
funding source to train the recipients on how to use the vessel may
fall within a different time frame.
DOD guidance emphasizes the need for proper training and staffing to
increase effectiveness in budgeting.[Footnote 30] AFRICOM component
officials told us that guidance or training on applying funding
sources to activities would be helpful. When we asked about funding
expertise within AFRICOM, Air Force component officials said that it
is difficult to find assistance at AFRICOM because officials must
first be able to identify the appropriate funding source in order to
ask the correct AFRICOM staff member about that source. From their
perspective, no individual at AFRICOM or its Air Force component
command has comprehensive knowledge of all available funding sources
for activities. AFRICOM officials said they provide the components
guidance on the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund and noted that
AFRICOM does not provide the actual funding to the components for many
sources they use to fund activities. Additionally, they said that the
command is researching funding sources available for activities, which
they believe will help AFRICOM better define which sources can be
applied to which activities.
Our April 2010 report on AFRICOM's Horn of Africa task force found
similar issues among the task force's budget staff.[Footnote 31]
According to task force officials, budget staff must master a steep
learning curve to understand the provisions associated with these
funding sources because the task force comptroller and deputy
comptroller are not financial specialists, generally do not work on
military comptroller issues full time, and have short tour lengths.
This steep learning curve can result in delays in conducting
activities, as task force staff described spending extra time and
resources understanding how to apply funding to activities. Moreover,
AFRICOM stated that command staffing and tour lengths contribute to
the difficulties in learning and maintaining knowledge of funding for
task force activities. For example, task force staff had intended to
continue providing training for senior enlisted Ethiopian military
members through one type of funding source, but they later found that
the source did not allow for training of foreign military members.
Consequently, the staff had to revise their program from one of
training officers to one of providing feedback to Ethiopian
instructors. While eventually task force staff may correctly identify
funding sources for their activities, their limited skills in applying
funding may result in difficulties in implementing activities. We
recommended that AFRICOM take actions to ensure that its task force
budget personnel have the expertise and knowledge necessary to make
timely and accurate funding decisions for activities. DOD concurred
with our recommendation and cited some actions it had taken or
planned--such as conducting on-the-job training and lengthening some
tours for personnel--to augment critical skills among task force
personnel. We believe the steps DOD outlined, if implemented in a
timely and comprehensive manner, could help increase understanding and
expertise associated with applying funding sources to activities
within AFRICOM's Horn of Africa task force. However, DOD's comments
were limited to AFRICOM's task force personnel and do not address the
lack of understanding of funding sources throughout the command.
Without a greater understanding of how to apply funding to activities,
AFRICOM will likely continue to face difficulties in implementing
activities--including the potential that activities may be delayed,
funds may not be effectively used, and African partner nations may be
excluded from participating--as well as institutionalizing knowledge
within the command.
AFRICOM Has Made Efforts to Collaborate with Interagency Partners but
Is Not Fully Engaging Them in Activity Planning Processes:
AFRICOM has made efforts to integrate interagency personnel into its
command and collaborate with other federal agencies on activities, but
it is not fully engaging interagency partners in planning processes.
AFRICOM Has Integrated Interagency Personnel into the Command:
According to DOD and AFRICOM officials, integrating personnel from
other U.S. government agencies into the command is essential to
achieving AFRICOM's mission because it will help AFRICOM develop plans
and activities that are more compatible with those agencies. AFRICOM
was established with two deputy commanders--a military commander that
oversees military operations and a civilian commander for civil-
military activities. The civilian commander directs the command's
activities related to areas such as health, humanitarian assistance,
disaster response, and peace support operations. According to AFRICOM,
this deputy commander--who is currently a State ambassador-level
official--also directs outreach, strategic communication, and
AFRICOM's partner-building functions.
As of June 2010, AFRICOM reported that it embedded 27 interagency
partners into its headquarters staff, which represents about 2 percent
of the total headquarters staff. These officials have been placed in
several directorates throughout the command. The interagency staff
came from several federal agencies, including the Departments of
Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury; USAID; the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and the National
Security Agency. The command also plans to integrate five foreign
policy advisors from State later this year, according to officials at
AFRICOM and State. Moreover, DOD has signed memorandums of
understanding with nine federal agencies to outline conditions on
sending interagency partners to AFRICOM. These memorandums cover such
topics as the financial reimbursement between DOD and the federal
agencies for participating employees, the length of time the
interagency partner may reside at AFRICOM, and logistical provisions
(housing, office space, etc.). Table 2 compares the reported number of
interagency personnel at AFRICOM at the time it reached unified
command status with that of June 2010.
Table 2: Reported Interagency Personnel at Africa Command Headquarters:
Agency: Department of State;
October 2008: 2;
June 2010: 5.
Agency: U.S. Agency for International Development;
October 2008: 2;
June 2010: 2.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security;
October 2008: 3;
June 2010: 6.
Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
October 2008: 3;
June 2010: 4.
Agency: Department of the Treasury;
October 2008: 2;
June 2010: 2.
Agency: Department of Commerce;
October 2008: 1;
June 2010: 0.
Agency: Department of Energy;
October 2008: 0;
June 2010: 1.
Agency: Department of Justice;
October 2008: 0;
June 2010: 3.
Agency: National Security Agency;
October 2008: 0;
June 2010: 4.
Agency: Total;
October 2008: 13;
June 2010: 27.
Agency: Percent of AFRICOM headquarters staff;
October 2008: 1;
June 2010: 2.
Source: GAO presentation of AFRICOM data.
[End of table]
AFRICOM has had difficulty obtaining interagency officials to work at
the command at the numbers desired. In February 2009, we reported that
the command initially expected to fill 52 positions with personnel
from other government agencies.[Footnote 32] However, according to DOD
and AFRICOM officials, this initial goal was notional and was not
based on an analysis of specific skill sets needed to accomplish
AFRICOM's mission. During our current review, command officials told
us that there is no target number for interagency personnel, but
rather that AFRICOM is trying to determine where in its command
organization it could benefit from employing interagency personnel or
where interagency partners would prefer to provide personnel. Command
officials said that it would be helpful to have additional interagency
staff at AFRICOM, but they understand that staffing limitations,
resource imbalances, and lack of career progression incentives for
embedded staff from other federal agencies may limit the number of
personnel who can be brought in from these agencies.
AFRICOM Has Coordinated with Other Federal Agencies, but Is Not Fully
Engaging Federal Partners in Activity Planning Processes:
AFRICOM has coordinated with other federal agencies. For example,
AFRICOM met with representatives from 16 agencies to gain interagency
input into its theater campaign plan. We spoke with officials from
State, USAID, and the Coast Guard who stated that they provided input
into several additional strategy documents, including DOD's Guidance
for Employment of the Force and AFRICOM's posture statement, as well
as participated in activity planning meetings. State officials stated
that AFRICOM has made improvements in taking their feedback and
creating an environment that is conducive to cooperation across
agencies. Similarly, USAID officials told us that AFRICOM has improved
its coordination with their agency at the USAID headquarters level.
Additionally, AFRICOM has created memorandums of understanding with
some U.S. embassies, such as between AFRICOM's Horn of Africa task
force and the U.S. embassy in Kenya. This memorandum outlines
procedures for conducting activities, actions to be taken by task
force personnel in Kenya, and communication policies between the task
force and the embassy, among other topics.
While AFRICOM has made efforts to work with interagency partners, it
is not fully engaging federal partners in activity planning processes
in two areas. Our prior work has recommended, and the department
generally agreed, that DOD provide specific implementation guidance to
combatant commanders on the mechanisms that are needed to facilitate
and encourage interagency participation in the development of military
plans, develop a process to share planning information with
interagency representatives early in the planning process, and develop
an approach to overcome differences in planning culture, training, and
capacities among the affected agencies.[Footnote 33] Some interagency
officials have stated that AFRICOM (1) is not always involving other
federal agencies in the formative stages of activity planning, and (2)
does not fully leverage expertise of interagency personnel embedded at
AFRICOM.
AFRICOM Does Not Always Involve Interagency Partners in Formative
Planning Stages:
While AFRICOM has made progress in coordinating with other federal
agencies since its establishment, interagency partners may not be
included in the formative stages of activity planning. DOD's 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review states that the department will continue to
advocate for an improved interagency strategic planning process.
However, several federal agency officials said that AFRICOM tends to
plan activities first and then engage partners, rather than including
interagency perspectives during the initial planning efforts.
Several interagency officials stated that AFRICOM has tended to
develop initial activity plans before integrating interagency
perspectives. Some U.S. embassy officials described AFRICOM's annual
activity planning meetings, the Theater Security Cooperation
Conferences, as useful for bringing together AFRICOM and federal
partners to plan for future AFRICOM activities; however, they noted
that past meetings have been limited in their effectiveness because
AFRICOM set the agenda without interagency input, which they viewed as
restricting their role. Additionally, officials said that AFRICOM gave
presentations of its planned exercises during one of its annual
activity planning conferences, but there was not meaningful discussion
with interagency partners on the most appropriate activities to
conduct. One official described the embassies' role at the conference
as telling AFRICOM which proposed activities the embassies could not
accommodate due to limited resources. Some federal officials suggested
that interagency collaboration could be improved at AFRICOM's annual
activity planning conferences if State took a lead role, although
limited State resources would make this unlikely. In general, both
State and AFRICOM told us that funding shortages prevent some State
officials from participating at AFRICOM planning events. Nonetheless,
some State officials noted that AFRICOM could better align its
activities with U.S. foreign policy goals and reduce the potential to
burden U.S. embassy staff in carrying out activities if AFRICOM would
involve interagency partners earlier in the planning process. From its
perspective, AFRICOM said that State has had significant influence in
its planning processes, noting that State's deputy chiefs of mission,
as well as USAID mission directors, were provided time to present
information on their respective countries at the November 2009 Theater
Security Cooperation Conference and that State officials are involved
in other AFRICOM activity planning events throughout the year.
Following AFRICOM's most recent Theater Security Cooperation
Conference, federal officials stated that the command's integration of
interagency perspectives had improved from previous conferences. The
officials commented that AFRICOM officials appeared genuinely
interested in learning about foreign policy and political issues in
African countries from U.S. embassy officials and that the emphasis of
many command presentations appeared to convey AFRICOM's role as
supporting U.S. embassies and furthering U.S. foreign policy goals.
During our observations of an Africa Partnership Station planning
conference in July 2009, AFRICOM and its Navy component officials
acknowledged that they needed to improve communications among AFRICOM,
its Navy component, and the U.S. embassies; since that time, we found
that AFRICOM has taken some steps to address the problems. At that
conference, an official at the U.S. embassy in Ghana stated that
details of a previous USS Nashville port visit were not provided to
the embassy prior to the ship's arrival. Rather, when the ship arrived
and the Navy component prepared to provide training, it was discovered
that the proposed training did not meet the needs of the Ghanaian
Navy. As a result, the U.S. embassy was required to work with
AFRICOM's Navy component to quickly put together a new training plan
so that the Ghanaian Navy could receive more relevant training.
According to a State official, AFRICOM should work on communicating
the Africa Partnership Station's mission in advance of its deployment
because it is too late to conduct strategic communications once a ship
is already in port. In response to concerns raised at the conference,
AFRICOM has implemented a pilot program to help embassy public affairs
offices generate public awareness of maritime security issues
regarding 2010 Africa Partnership Station activities. As of February
2010, funding for the program had been provided to U.S. embassies in
Gabon, Ghana, Senegal, and Mozambique.
Conversely, our observation of the Natural Fire 10 pandemic
preparedness and response exercise in Uganda illustrated that early
and continuous interagency involvement can lead to a successful
outcome. Prior to the initial planning for Natural Fire 10, DOD and
USAID signed an interagency agreement to streamline collaboration in
enhancing African military capacity to respond to an influenza
pandemic. When AFRICOM began planning Natural Fire 10, it included
USAID in the initial discussions to consider the feasibility of
focusing a portion of the exercise on pandemic planning and response,
as outlined in the interagency agreement. USAID also funded civilian
participation in that portion of the exercise. In addition, State and
U.S. embassy officials were included at all Natural Fire 10 planning
conferences prior to the exercise. Furthermore, an embedded USAID
official at AFRICOM told us that the pandemic focus of that portion of
the Natural Fire 10 exercise was unique because it was designed more
like a USAID activity than a DOD activity, having a longer-term focus
to allow AFRICOM to sustain and expand the program over time. By
working with interagency partners throughout the planning process,
AFRICOM was able to sponsor an activity that was well received by its
interagency partners.
Figure 6: African Partners Participate in Planning a Pandemic
Influenza Response during AFRICOM's Natural Fire 10 Exercise in
Entebbe, Uganda (October 2009):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
AFRICOM Is Not Fully Leveraging Expertise of Interagency Personnel
Embedded at Its Command:
Interagency personnel embedded into AFRICOM's organization may not be
fully leveraged for their expertise, which can make it more difficult
for some interagency personnel to contribute to the command's work.
Our prior work has noted that having a strategy for defining
organizational roles and responsibilities and coordination mechanisms
can help national security agencies clarify who will lead or
participate in activities, organize their joint and individual
efforts, and facilitate decision making.[Footnote 34] Although AFRICOM
has included information on interagency collaboration in its theater
campaign plan and created an interagency board to facilitate
collaboration, an embedded interagency official stated that AFRICOM
employs a hierarchal rather than collaborative approach to decision
making. The command's Army component echoed this sentiment, stating
that coordination and development of strategies is less collaborative
than on specific activities. This approach differs markedly from USAID
and State's planning approaches, which officials described as focusing
on brainstorming with all relevant personnel or on the long-term
results of the activities. Additionally, an embedded official from
another federal agency told us that while AFRICOM officials bring some
issues to interagency personnel at the command to obtain their
perspectives, more often interagency staff must insert themselves into
relevant meetings to affect decision making. For example, a USAID
official formerly embedded at AFRICOM said that USAID embedded
officials have to ask how they can help the command, even though he
believed that the military officials should be asking how AFRICOM can
provide support to USAID, as the command has stated that it is in a
supporting role to USAID on development activities. Furthermore, some
embedded interagency personnel said that coordination is problematic
when activity planning takes place directly at AFRICOM's military
service component commands and not at AFRICOM headquarters, as there
are few embedded interagency staff members in the military service
components.[Footnote 35] State echoed this remark, noting that from
its perspective, planning and decision making at the command's
military service components is separate from that at AFRICOM
headquarters, which creates difficulties for coordination with
interagency partners. As a result, many activities could have
undergone substantial planning at the component level before
interagency perspectives are sought.
Moreover, some interagency personnel embedded at AFRICOM have said
that they may not be fully leveraged for their expertise. AFRICOM
officials told us that it is a challenge to determine where in the
command to include the interagency personnel. For example, an official
from the Transportation Security Administration decided on his own
which directorate in which to work when he joined the command because
AFRICOM had not identified a directorate for him. Another embedded
interagency staff member stated that AFRICOM initially placed him in a
directorate unrelated to his skill set, and he initiated a transfer to
another directorate that would better enable him to share his
expertise. In addition, Coast Guard officials stated that AFRICOM does
not fully understand the roles and responsibilities of the Coast Guard
and what knowledge and expertise it could provide the command. The
officials cited an example of AFRICOM's Navy component performing law
enforcement training instead of allowing the Coast Guard to take the
lead on providing this training to African forces.
Difficulties in leveraging interagency partners are not unique to
AFRICOM. As we have previously reported, organizational differences--
including differences in agencies' structures, planning processes, and
funding sources--can hinder interagency collaboration, potentially
wasting scarce funds and limiting the effectiveness of federal
efforts.[Footnote 36] Notwithstanding these difficulties, interagency
collaboration can be successful--for example, observers have cited the
U.S. Southern Command as having mature interagency planning processes
and coordinating mechanisms. Southern Command has also identified
civilian federal agencies as leads for each of its theater security
objectives, furthering the early involvement of interagency partners.
A senior State official said that AFRICOM's understanding of the roles
of interagency partners might be improved if additional staff from
other federal agencies were embedded at the command. However, several
embedded interagency staff said that there is little incentive to take
a position at AFRICOM because it will not enhance one's career
position upon return to the original agency after the rotation.
Additionally, staffing shortages at other federal agencies reduce
agencies' abilities to send additional staff to AFRICOM. In February
2009, we reported that State officials told us that they would not
likely be able to provide active employees to fill the positions
requested by AFRICOM because they were already facing a 25 percent
shortfall in mid-level personnel[Footnote 37]--although AFRICOM and
State officials said that five State foreign policy advisors are
expected to arrive at the command later this year. Despite challenges,
AFRICOM has made some efforts that could improve interagency
collaboration within the command, such as expanding its interagency
orientation process and including opportunities for interagency input
into daily command meetings. In addition, AFRICOM said that its Deputy
to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs, a senior State official,
is in charge of outreach for the command and sometimes chairs command
staff meetings.
In fall 2009, the command conducted an assessment of the embedded
interagency process to analyze successes and identify lessons learned,
including recommendations on how to integrate interagency personnel
into command planning and operations. AFRICOM identified five key
observations based on its assessment: (1) embedded staff want to
ensure they can accomplish their own objectives and not merely perform
duties that a DOD employee could perform; (2) interagency personnel
arrive at AFRICOM with the expectation that they will help achieve not
only command goals and objectives but also U.S. government goals, yet
they feel that DOD employees do not expect embedded personnel to
develop new programs; (3) embedded interagency personnel need to
understand the function, operation, and role of a military command and
how it differs from other federal government agencies; (4) the
military planning process is more structured than the planning
approaches of other government agencies; and (5) embedded personnel
experience an overwhelming adjustment to military culture. The
assessment identified several recommendations and suggestions, such as
developing a training and orientation program for embedded interagency
personnel. In July 2010, AFRICOM stated that it had established an
interagency command collaborative forum to assess, prioritize, and
implement the recommendations from the study. Fully leveraging its
embedded interagency partners can help AFRICOM contribute to a unified
U.S. government approach to activity planning and implementation in
Africa.
AFRICOM Faces Challenges in Building Personnel Expertise to Work in
Africa:
AFRICOM emphasizes the importance of collaborating with its
interagency partners and building cultural awareness; however, the
command has sometimes experienced difficulty implementing activities
because some personnel have limited knowledge about working with U.S.
embassies and about cultural issues in Africa. The training or
guidance available to augment personnel expertise in these areas is
limited.
Some AFRICOM Personnel Have Limited Knowledge of Working with U.S.
Embassies and of African Culture:
Some AFRICOM personnel have limited knowledge of working with U.S.
embassies and of African culture, which can decrease the effectiveness
of implementing activities.
Working with U.S. Embassies:
AFRICOM emphasizes that it works closely with the U.S. embassies and
chiefs of mission to ensure that its activities are consistent with
U.S. foreign policy and contribute to unity of effort among the
interagency.[Footnote 38] While many U.S. embassies told us that the
command has made efforts to coordinate with them, some AFRICOM staff's
knowledge of how to work with U.S. embassies is limited. USAID
officials told us that while AFRICOM has made improvements
coordinating with their agency at the headquarters level, most USAID
planning efforts occur at U.S. embassies in country and that AFRICOM
has not fully integrated its staff into the planning process at the
country level. Moreover, in our prior work on AFRICOM's Horn of Africa
task force, we reported that task force personnel did not always
understand embassy procedures for interacting with African partner
nations.[Footnote 39] For example, task force personnel would, at
times, approach the Djiboutian government ministries directly with
concepts for activities rather than follow the established procedure
of having the U.S. embassy in Djibouti initiate the contact.
Additionally, in our prior work on the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership activity, we noted that disagreements about whether State
should have authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to
conduct activities affected implementation of DOD's activities in
Niger and Chad.[Footnote 40] In commenting on that report, DOD stated
that it believed sufficient guidance existed that defined the
authorities of DOD's combatant commander and State's chief of mission
but noted that issuing joint guidance reflecting the implications of
the shift to a greater DOD emphasis and support in shape and deter
operations would be helpful to both the combatant commander and chief
of mission in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership region. A
senior State official formerly stationed at AFRICOM told us that
command and control responsibilities in Africa are improving but that
issues still exist. He cited a recent example in which the U.S.
ambassador to Liberia maintained that the embassy should have
authority over DOD personnel carrying out security sector reform
activities in the country, while AFRICOM argued that it needed shared
authority over these personnel. A shared authority agreement was
eventually reached for DOD personnel who would reside in Liberia on a
semipermanent basis.
Some AFRICOM personnel's limited knowledge of working with U.S.
embassy staff can impose burdens on embassies because, as officials
stated throughout our review, the embassies are short-staffed. The
Department of State Inspector General released a report in August 2009
stating, in part, that the embassies in Africa are understaffed and
that the U.S. military is filling a void created by a lack of embassy
resources for traditional development and public diplomacy.[Footnote
41] AFRICOM's requests for information and assistance with activities
take embassy staff away from their assigned duties to focus on command
priorities. For example, a U.S. embassy official in Uganda stated that
AFRICOM personnel arrived in country with the expectations that the
embassy would take care of basic cultural and logistical issues for
them.
AFRICOM is trying to increase its presence in U.S. embassies and send
planning teams prior to activity implementation in order to alleviate
the burden it has placed on U.S. embassies. According to command
officials, AFRICOM inherited 12 offices at U.S. embassies in Africa,
and as of June 2010, it had added 5 additional offices, bringing its
total U.S. embassy presence to 17. Command officials told us that they
plan to have a total of 28 offices in U.S. embassies, which would give
AFRICOM a presence in just over half of the 53 countries in its area
of responsibility. Additionally, at an Africa Partnership Station
planning conference, we observed Navy component officials request
guidance from and offer suggestions on how to ease the administrative
burden the activity may place on U.S. embassy personnel. AFRICOM has
also begun to send reservists to African countries to help with
coordination prior to an Africa Partnership Station ship visit. By
providing more assistance to the embassies, AFRICOM can potentially
ease the burden placed on them as command staff work to increase their
understanding of engaging with the embassies and partner nations.
African Cultural Awareness:
Cultural awareness is a core competency for AFRICOM, but the limited
knowledge of some AFRICOM and its military service component staff on
Africa cultural issues occasionally leads to difficulties in building
relationships with African nations. For example, as we reported in our
prior work on AFRICOM's Horn of Africa task force, task force
personnel did not always understand cultural issues, such as the time
required to conduct activities in African villages or local religious
customs.[Footnote 42] In one case, the task force distributed used
clothing to local Djibouti villagers during Ramadan, which offended
the Muslim population. In another case, according to a U.S. embassy
official, AFRICOM's task force provided 3 days notice that it would
conduct a medical clinic in a remote village in Djibouti. However,
because the villagers are nomads, it was difficult to get participants
with that short amount of notice. Moreover, a Ghanaian military
participant involved with the Africa Partnership Station said that
AFRICOM's tendency to generalize its programs across Africa is not
effective, as each country is different and requires an individualized
approach.
A better understanding of African cultural issues would likely help
AFRICOM improve relationships with African nations. For example, as we
previously reported, a U.S. embassy official in Tanzania said that
AFRICOM's task force team members had become proficient in Swahili,
thus helping them to develop relationships. Getting to know the
language, culture, and the people in the region, the embassy official
said, has contributed to the success in developing a Tanzanian-
American partnership in a region where extremists are known to
operate.[Footnote 43] In addition, an internal State memo described
AFRICOM's sociocultural research and advisory teams as intending to
provide personnel with the necessary background to work more
effectively on the ground and to interact in a more respectful and
collaborative manner with local populations. While a U.S. embassy had
voiced concern about the teams appearing to duplicate interagency
efforts, the State memo stressed the need for coordination with
embassy and USAID personnel, including the sharing of information
obtained in the field. In general, more widespread and robust
understanding of African culture could help personnel avoid
potentially unfavorable views of AFRICOM among the Africans and risk
straining relations between African nations and the U.S. government.
Limited Training and Guidance Is Provided to AFRICOM Personnel:
We found that AFRICOM personnel and forces deploying for activities
receive some training on working with interagency partners and on
African cultural awareness--and that efforts are under way to increase
training for some personnel--but our review of training presentations
indicated that they were insufficient to adequately build the skills
of its staff. Moreover, AFRICOM does not monitor training or require
that it be completed. We have previously reported that collaborative
approaches to national security require a well-trained workforce with
the skills and experience to integrate the government's diverse
capabilities and resources, and that increased training opportunities
and strategic workforce planning efforts could facilitate federal
agencies' ability to fully participate in interagency collaboration
activities.[Footnote 44]
AFRICOM officials told us that current training for personnel includes
Web courses, seminars led by DOD's Africa Center for Strategic
Studies, and guest-speaker programs. In addition, there are theater
entry training requirements for personnel deploying to Africa such as
medical and cultural awareness Web-based training. Officials said,
however, that while training is encouraged, it is not required, and
that the command does not currently monitor the completion of training
courses. We requested to review training presentations provided to
incoming AFRICOM staff. Our review of the 10 training presentations
that were provided to us by the command found that they did not
contain cultural awareness information. However, AFRICOM stated that
there are 2 hours on Africa cultural awareness provided to new command
staff during the first day of training, though we were not given
documentation of this training. Additionally, our review found that 7
of the 10 training presentations that we were provided did not contain
interagency information. The remaining 3 presentations provided an
overview of AFRICOM partners, including international government
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other federal
government agencies; identified the interagency partners at the
command; and provided more detailed information on one specific
federal agency. While these training presentations offered some
suggestions for planning and cooperative opportunities with other
federal agencies, we found that they were brief and lacked specific
guidance on how to involve interagency partners. Furthermore, because
the presentations are provided during the beginning of tours, when
personnel are also learning about their new assignments and daily
operations, it is unlikely that they provide for comprehensive,
effective training.
AFRICOM issued joint training guidance in December 2009[Footnote 45]
that included as a training goal the need to work with other federal
agencies, but the guidance lacks specific actions to reach this goal
as well as measures to evaluate progress and effects. Moreover, the
guidance states that AFRICOM will develop predeployment guidance for
personnel, but we noted that no time frames were provided for when the
guidance will be issued. In our prior work on AFRICOM's Horn of Africa
task force, we reported that the task force's training on working with
U.S. embassies was not shared with all staff, and cultural awareness
training was limited. We recommended, and DOD agreed, that AFRICOM
develop comprehensive training guidance or a program that augments
assigned personnel's understanding of African cultural awareness and
working with interagency partners.[Footnote 46] Since our report,
AFRICOM has taken some steps to increase training opportunities for
task force personnel. For example, we reviewed an extensive briefing
on East African culture that the task force said is now being provided
to all incoming task force personnel. In addition, the task force
stated that its sociocultural research and advisory teams provide some
task force personnel with cultural and political training when needed,
including training for some personnel prior to deployment. Finally,
the task force said that online training on cultural awareness is now
available to all task force personnel, and that it intends to make
this training mandatory in the future.
Formal training is important because it would help institutionalize
practices in the command. Officials from AFRICOM's Army, Marine Corps,
and Air Force components and task force all voiced a preference for
more cultural training and capabilities, with Army officials noting
that staff do not have sufficient understanding of the size,
diversity, and unique problems confronting the different regions of
Africa. In addition, during our observation of Natural Fire 10, an Air
Force official told us that his team received no training on Ugandan
culture prior to its deployment. An AFRICOM official told us it would
be beneficial to have increased sociocultural training at the
command's headquarters as well as a database to monitor training
completion. AFRICOM's Air Force component officials told us that they
have begun working with the Air Force Cultural Language Center to
develop a Web-based, African cultural awareness training for Air Force
personnel deploying on AFRICOM activities, but officials noted that
AFRICOM had not provided any cultural awareness training to the Air
Force. Several officials from other federal agencies suggested
possible courses that might be cost-effective or easy for AFRICOM to
implement, such as a State online course focused on working with U.S.
embassies, curricula at the Foreign Service Institute that prepare
U.S. embassy personnel, or training similar to that provided to Peace
Corps volunteers. State also recommended that AFRICOM develop best
practices for working more effectively and efficiently with other
agencies to ensure that any lessons learned are institutionalized
within the command. In June 2010, AFRICOM held a symposium to discuss
how to augment language, regional expertise, and cultural competence
capabilities. The command identified some options under consideration
to improve capabilities, including possibly establishing an office to
develop training initiatives, holding an annual symposium, and
developing a newsletter with articles by personnel about their
deployment experiences. These considerations reflect the command's
recognition that it needs to improve its personnel's expertise.
However, until AFRICOM develops, requires, and monitors training for
all of its personnel on working with interagency partners and
understanding African cultural issues, it continues to risk being
unable to fully leverage resources with U.S. embassy personnel, build
relationships with African nations, and effectively carry out
activities.
Conclusions:
Building the capacity of partner nations to secure and defend
themselves has become a key focus of DOD, and AFRICOM's focus on
supporting security and stability in Africa has the potential to
advance this effort. Despite initial concerns among stakeholders about
the potential U.S. militarization of foreign policy or increasing the
U.S. military footprint on the continent, AFRICOM has made progress in
developing overarching strategies and trying to engage interagency
partners. Moreover, since our April 2010 report on AFRICOM's task
force, efforts have been made to begin to evaluate some task force
activities in the Horn of Africa. However, AFRICOM still faces
challenges that could limit its effectiveness. Until the command
completes supporting plans to guide activity planning and
implementation and begins consistently conducting long-term
assessments of activities, it cannot ensure that the actions it is
taking on the continent best support DOD and U.S. foreign policy
objectives. On a broader level, without plans and assessments, AFRICOM
lacks the critical information it needs to make successful future
planning decisions and to allocate resources to maximize its effect in
Africa. Moreover, while many U.S. embassies and federal partners now
believe that AFRICOM has the potential to make positive contributions
in Africa, until the command more fully incorporates interagency
partners into its activity planning process, AFRICOM continues to risk
the perception--or worse, the possibility--of conducting activities
that may counter U.S. foreign policy interests or lead to unintended
consequences. Finally, assigning more than 4,000 personnel and forces
to AFRICOM and its components illustrates DOD's commitment to
conducting activities in Africa. Developing a well-trained workforce
that understands the complexities associated with working on the
continent can advance the department's efforts to foster stability and
security through improved relationships with African nations.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To more effectively plan, prioritize, and implement activities in a
collaborative interagency environment that aligns with both the
command's mission of sustained security engagement and U.S. foreign
policy goals; make effective use of resources in a fiscally
constrained environment; and take steps to institutionalize its
processes and procedures, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, AFRICOM, to take the following five actions:
* Synchronize activities among AFRICOM's components by expediting the
completion of its regional engagement plans, country work plans, and
component support plans; and develop a process whereby plans are
reviewed on a recurring basis to ensure that efforts across the
command are complementary, comprehensive, and supportive of AFRICOM's
mission.
* Conduct long-term assessments of the full range of its activities to
determine whether the activities are having their intended effects and
supporting AFRICOM's mission.
* Take actions to ensure that budget staff within its military service
components, special operations command, task force, and Offices of
Security Cooperation within U.S. embassies in Africa have the
expertise and knowledge necessary to make timely and accurate funding
decisions for activities. These actions could include some combination
of training, staffing changes, and/or comprehensive guidance on
applying funding sources to activities.
* Fully integrate interagency personnel and partners into the
formative stages of the command's activity planning processes to
better leverage interagency expertise.
* In consultation with State and USAID, develop a comprehensive
training program, with a means to monitor completion, for staff and
forces involved in AFRICOM activities on:
- working with interagency partners and U.S. embassies on activities
and:
- cultural issues related to Africa.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
all of our recommendations and cited some actions that it was taking
to address the issues we identified in this report. DOD's comments are
reprinted in appendix IV. Technical comments were provided separately
from DOD, State, and the U.S. Coast Guard and incorporated as
appropriate. USAID chose not to provide any comments.
DOD concurred with our first recommendation that AFRICOM synchronize
activities among AFRICOM's components by expediting the completion of
its supporting plans and developing a process whereby plans are
reviewed on a recurring basis. In its response, the department stated
that, in the absence of supporting plans, AFRICOM conducts weekly
meetings at which its components and the Horn of Africa task force
discuss the status of current activities and future events. The
department added that AFRICOM uses an information database to manage
events conducted by the command and its components. We noted these
efforts in our report, and we agree that it is a good practice for
AFRICOM to coordinate with its components through weekly meetings and
an information database. However, as our report states, component
officials have noted that within AFRICOM the use of the database is
preliminary, that the database may not include all component
activities, and that coordinating defense efforts in Africa remains a
challenge. Furthermore, DOD stated in its response that regional
engagement plans and component support plans are in the final stages
of review and approval by AFRICOM's leadership, and will be used by
the staff and components to guide and synchronize activities even
though the plans have not been formally approved. The department added
that country work plans are being developed for the command's critical
partners as identified in the theater campaign plan. However, the
department's response did not include a specific time frame for
completion of AFRICOM's plans. Such a time frame is critical, given
that AFRICOM has repeatedly postponed the completion of several of its
supporting plans. Until AFRICOM finalizes and approves its plans,
AFRICOM risks conducting activities that do not fully support its
mission and may hinder a unity of effort among its components.
DOD also concurred with our second recommendation that AFRICOM conduct
long-term assessments of the full range of its activities. The
department stated that its Horn of Africa task force is now required
to report on the effectiveness of its activities--which we note in our
report. Moreover, the department stated that all AFRICOM operations
and planning orders now include tasks to staff and components to
develop metrics and indicators and to conduct assessments; however, we
were not provided copies of these documents during our review. If
these actions are implemented in a comprehensive manner such that they
require long-term evaluation of all AFRICOM activities, they have the
potential to provide the command with valuable information on whether
its activities are having their intended effects or whether
modifications are needed. Completing thorough long-term assessments of
its activities will aid in the command's efforts to make successful
future planning decisions and allocate resources to maximize its
effect in Africa.
DOD also concurred with our third recommendation that AFRICOM take
actions to ensure that its components' and Offices of Security
Cooperation's budget personnel have the appropriate expertise and
knowledge to make timely and accurate funding decisions for
activities. DOD fully agreed with us regarding with the need to
improve the use of security cooperation tools through training, staff
changes, and better guidance. DOD further stated that while AFRICOM
has Title 10 authorities to conduct traditional military activities
and operations, the activities that are most important to the
department in Africa center around building institutional and
operational security capacity and that most of the authorities and
funding for these activities belong to State Department programs under
Title 22 authorities. In our report, we acknowledge AFRICOM's reports
of having access to several funding sources, as well as influence over
some State and USAID funding sources, and that many different funding
sources may be required for an activity. We also note in our report
that DOD, in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, stated that U.S.
security assistance efforts are constrained by a complex patchwork of
authorities. We maintain that, given the challenges associated with
applying various funding sources to activities in Africa, AFRICOM
should identify and complete specific actions--such as training,
staffing changes, and/or comprehensive guidance--to increase
understanding among its budget staff and institutionalize knowledge
throughout the command.
DOD also concurred with our fourth recommendation that AFRICOM fully
integrate interagency personnel and partners into the formative stages
of the command's activity planning processes to better leverage
interagency expertise. The department noted that AFRICOM is unique in
that, in addition to a military deputy commander, it has a Deputy
Commander for Civil-Military Activities--a senior Foreign Service
Officer of ambassadorial level who helps ensure that policy/program
development and implementation include interagency partners and are
consistent with U.S. foreign policy. In our report, we highlighted the
civilian deputy as a positive example of AFRICOM's efforts to
integrate interagency personnel into the command. DOD also noted that
it continues to pursue qualified interagency representatives to work
in management and staff positions at AFRICOM, will work with its
partners to prepare personnel for assignment in a military
organization, and encourages interagency partners to fill vacant
positions and reward their detailees for taking assignments at
AFRICOM. Our review highlights some efforts AFRICOM has taken to
integrate its interagency partners into command planning and
operations--such as developing a training and orientation program for
embedded interagency personnel. We also state in our report that
staffing shortages at other federal agencies reduce those agencies'
ability to send additional staff to AFRICOM. DOD's response does not
indicate how AFRICOM intends to better integrate interagency personnel
into the formative stages of activity planning, which would help
AFRICOM better leverage interagency expertise and promote a U.S.
government unity of effort in Africa.
Finally, DOD concurred with our fifth recommendation that AFRICOM
develop a comprehensive training program on working with interagency
partners and African cultural issues. DOD noted that AFRICOM has
developed cultural awareness training for all incoming headquarters
personnel, which is mandatory and tracked. We include in our report
that AFRICOM told us it allots 2 hours to Africa cultural awareness
during the first day of training for new command staff. However, since
presentations are given at the beginning of tours, when personnel are
also learning about their new assignments and daily operations, we
believe that it is unlikely that this constitutes comprehensive,
effective training. The department also stated that AFRICOM's Horn of
Africa task force personnel receive Web-based and in-country training
as part of newcomers' orientation. As we note in our report, we
reviewed the task force's briefing on East African culture and found
it to be extensive and a positive step toward training personnel.
Furthermore, DOD stated that key personnel attend training for working
with embassies; however, the department did not identify which
personnel attend the training and what opportunities are available for
those who do not attend it. Additionally, DOD did not address how
AFRICOM would mandate staff participation in any training it develops.
Until AFRICOM provides training or guidance to its staff on working
with interagency partners and cultural issues in Africa, the command
risks being unable to fully leverage resources with U.S. embassy
personnel, build relationships with African nations, and effectively
carry out activities.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of Homeland Security; the Secretary of State; and the
Administrator, United States Agency for International Development. The
report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Africa Partnership Station:
Led by Africa Command's (AFRICOM) Navy component, the mission of the
Africa Partnership Station is to build maritime safety and security
capabilities with African nations. Training is typically conducted
aboard a ship, moving between ports to offer training at sea and
ashore with African partners. Africa Partnership Station training
events focus on a broad range of areas, including maritime domain
awareness, leadership, navigation, maritime law enforcement, search
and rescue, civil engineering, and logistics. Crew members also
participate in humanitarian assistance efforts focusing on health
care, education, and other projects in local communities, which may
involve participation by other federal agencies including the
Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). AFRICOM's Navy component coordinates with other
AFRICOM components to conduct Africa Partnership Station activities,
including the Marine Corps component and the Combined Joint Task Force-
Horn of Africa; interagency partners such as the U.S. Coast Guard,
State, and USAID; and participants from over 22 countries from Europe,
Africa, and South America. Figure 7 shows a few of the Africa
Partnership Station activities.
Figure 7: U.S. and African Partners Take Part in Africa Partnership
Station Activities:
[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photographs]
Source: U.S. Naval Forces Africa.
[End of figure]
The Africa Partnership Station activity began under U.S. European
Command and was transferred to AFRICOM upon reaching full operational
capacity. As of May 2010, there have been 14 Africa Partnership
Station deployments, including a deployment of vessels from the
Netherlands and Belgium. Table 3 identifies Africa Partnership Station
ships, deployment dates, and countries visited.
Table 3: Africa Partnership Station Deployments:
Ship: USS Fort McHenry;
Time frame: November 2007-April 2008;
Countries visited: 10 countries in West and Central Africa.
Ship: HSV-2 SWIFT;
Time frame: January-April 2008;
Countries visited: Togo, Ghana, Gabon, Nigeria, Benin, Liberia, Angola.
Ship: USS Nashville;
Time frame: January-May 2009;
Countries visited: Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon,
Sao Tome and Principe.
Ship: USS Robert G. Bradley (FFG 49);
Time frame: February-April 2009;
Countries visited: East Africa: Mozambique, Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania.
Ship: USS Arleigh Burke;
Time frame: June-August 2009;
Countries visited: Djibouti, Kenya, Mauritius, Reunion, Seychelles,
South Africa, Tanzania, Reunion (French Island).
Ship: USCGC Legare;
Time frame: July-September 2009;
Countries visited: Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Senegal.
Ship: HSV Swift;
Time frame: July-September 2009;
Countries visited: Senegal, Gambia, Liberia, Ghana, Togo, Nigeria,
Cameroon, Gabon.
Ship: HNLMS Johan de Witt (Netherlands);
Time frame: October-November 2009;
Countries visited: Senegal, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Liberia, Ghana.
Ship: HSV Swift and USS Nicholas;
Time frame: November 2009-March 2010;
Countries visited: Comoros, Djibouti, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Reunion (French Island), Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania.
Ship: USS Samuel B. Roberts;
Time frame: November 2009-March 2010;
Countries visited: Cape Verde, Senegal, Ghana, Congo, Angola, Sao Tome
and Principe, Gabon.
Ship: USNS Grapple;
Time frame: December 2009;
Countries visited: Tanzania, Kenya, Seychelles.
Ship: USS Gunston Hall;
Time frame: March-May 2010;
Countries visited: Senegal, Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde,
Equatorial Guinea, Togo.
Ship: BNS Godetia (Belgium);
Time frame: March 2010;
Countries visited: Democratic Republic of Congo, Benin.
Ship: USCGC Dallas;
Time frame: May-September 2010;
Countries visited: To be determined.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Naval Forces Africa data.
Note: USCGC = U.S. Coast Guard Cutter.
[End of table]
In July 2009, we observed the main planning conference for the USS
Gunston Hall, which was scheduled to conduct Africa Partnership
Station activities from February through May 2010. After an initial
diversion to Haiti for disaster relief support, the USS Gunston Hall
arrived in West and Central Africa in March 2010. The Africa
Partnership Station deployment used a "hub" approach, such that the
USS Gunston Hall conducted operations out of ports in two countries--
Ghana and Senegal. Members from various African nations were brought
to these two hubs to receive training. Specific Africa Partnership
Station activities on the USS Gunston Hall included maritime workshops
and seminars on small boat operations, maritime law enforcement
boarding, maritime domain awareness, and fisheries management and
maritime meteorology. Additional activities included a maritime safety
and security forum with key maritime stakeholders; military-to-
military training led by AFRICOM's Marine Corps component; a strategic
communications forum; medical outreach to local clinics conducted by a
20-person medical team, which reported seeing over 3,000 patients;
several performances by the U.S. Sixth Fleet's five piece brass band;
delivery of humanitarian assistance supplies; and several
construction/refurbishing projects at local schools and clinics.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Natural Fire 10:
Natural Fire 10 was an exercise led by U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM)
Army component to train U.S. forces and build the capacity of East
African forces to provide humanitarian aid and disaster response.
Natural Fire began under U.S. Central Command and was transferred to
AFRICOM upon its establishment. Prior to 2009, three previous Natural
Fire exercises had been carried out. Natural Fire 10, which was
conducted in October 2009 at various sites in Uganda, focused on
disaster response to an outbreak of pandemic influenza. AFRICOM
officials told us that Natural Fire 10 included approximately 550 U.S.
personnel and 650 participants from five East African countries:
Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda.
Figure 8: Natural Fire Exercise 10 in East Africa:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: U.S. Army Africa (left) and GAO (right).
[End of figure]
The exercise consisted of three parts:
* Field exercises: a 7-day military-to-military activity which
included exercising forces on convoy and humanitarian civic assistance
operations; weapons handling and helicopter familiarization; weapons
fire; hand-to-hand combat; crowd and riot control; and entry control
point and vehicle checkpoints.
* Tabletop: focused on strengthening the capacity of five East African
militaries to prepare and respond to a potential pandemic outbreak in
their countries. The exercise consisted of 2 days of academic
sessions, during which officials from various organizations gave
presentations about pandemic preparedness and response. The academic
sessions were followed by 2 days of pandemic scenarios for which
participants were divided into three groups--civil authorities,
military, and international community--to develop and act out their
responses.
* Humanitarian civic assistance: included medical assistance events,
dental assistance events, and engineering projects such as a school
and hospital reconstruction.
In addition to the efforts by AFRICOM's Army component, other
components also contributed to Natural Fire 10. Specifically, the Navy
component oversaw construction of the camp hosting the field exercise
and led humanitarian civic assistance engineering projects. The Air
Force component led the medical programs. The Marine Corps component
supported weapons training during the field exercise. AFRICOM's Horn
of Africa task force oversaw photography and public affairs.
Additionally, interagency partners and international organizations
were involved in the tabletop portion of the exercise. For example,
the U.S. Agency for International Development partnered with AFRICOM
in developing the pandemic influenza focus for the tabletop activity,
and international organizations such as the United Nations, World
Health Organization, and International Red Cross led academic training
sessions.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
In conducting our work, we reviewed a wide range of Department of
Defense (DOD) and command guidance and other guidance including DOD
strategies; U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) theater strategy, theater
campaign plan, and 2009 and 2010 posture statements; and AFRICOM's
military service component and task force's priorities, draft
strategic plans (if available), and engagement plans. We met with
AFRICOM officials in Stuttgart, Germany, in June 2009 and held follow-
up meetings in December 2009. We also met with officials at the
European headquarters of AFRICOM's military service components (Army
Africa, Naval Forces Africa, Air Force Africa, and Marine Corps
Africa) and special operations command in June and July 2009. In July
2009 we also observed the main planning conference for the Africa
Partnership Station, a maritime safety and security activity led by
Navy Africa and sponsored by AFRICOM. We traveled to Uganda, Ethiopia,
and Djibouti in October 2009 to observe U.S. military operations,
interview officials at the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa,
and meet with U.S. embassy officials. We chose to visit Uganda to
observe the AFRICOM-sponsored, U.S. Army Africa-led Natural Fire 10
exercise, AFRICOM's largest exercise in Africa for 2009; Ethiopia, due
to its proximity to Djibouti and large amount of task force civil-
affairs team activity proposals; and Djibouti, due to the location of
the task force at Camp Lemonnier. As part of our review of AFRICOM's
task force, in January 2010 we observed and obtained documentation
from an academic training and mission rehearsal exercise for incoming
task force staff in Suffolk, Virginia. Additionally, we interviewed
DOD officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff,
and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
We also reviewed non-DOD documents to determine how AFRICOM's
strategies compared or aligned with the strategies of other government
partners, including the fiscal years 2007-2012 Department of
State/U.S. Agency for International Development Joint Strategic Plan;
USAID Strategic Framework for Africa; and fiscal year 2008, fiscal
year 2009, and fiscal year 2010 mission strategic plans of 12 U.S.
embassies in Africa.[Footnote 47] We interviewed officials at the
Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and the Coast Guard to obtain other federal
agencies' perspectives on AFRICOM's process of planning and
implementing activities, including the command's considerations of
interagency perspectives. We spoke with officials from State and USAID
due to their relationship with DOD in supporting U.S. foreign policy
objectives, and we met with officials from the Coast Guard due to
their relationship with AFRICOM in its maritime activities. We met
with U.S. embassy officials in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, and we
contacted 20 additional embassies throughout Africa: Algeria,
Botswana, Burundi,[Footnote 48] Chad, Comoros/Madagascar, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia,
Mauritius/Seychelles, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal,
South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Yemen. We chose to contact these
specific embassies based on several factors including that they were
in countries that coordinate with AFRICOM's task force; their
involvement with the two activities we observed in detail, Africa
Partnership Station and Natural Fire 10 (see below); and their
geographical dispersion to ensure that various regions were
represented across Africa. When multiple countries met our criteria,
we gave preference to U.S. embassies located in countries that were
identified by DOD officials or in documents as important countries for
AFRICOM. In addition, we met with an organization that represents U.S.-
based international nongovernmental organizations that conduct work in
Africa, as well as some African government and African military
officials, to obtain their viewpoints on AFRICOM's activities.
We observed two AFRICOM activities in depth to complement our broader
review of the command's activities at the interagency and command
levels. These two activities were: Africa Partnership Station (a
maritime safety and security activity) and Natural Fire 10 (part of
AFRICOM's pandemic preparedness and response initiative). In choosing
which of AFRICOM's over 100 activities to review as illustrative
examples, we first narrowed the activities to 30 main activities that
support AFRICOM in achieving its theater strategic objectives, as
identified by AFRICOM officials. We then chose to review the Africa
Partnership Station and Natural Fire 10 activities due to factors such
as their addressing of different theater security objectives,
timeliness to our review, leadership by different military service
components, considerable involvement of interagency and international
partners, size of the activities, and distinct geographic locations.
To review the Africa Partnership Station, we observed the activity's
main planning conference in New York, New York, in July 2009; reviewed
documentation including reports and assessments; and spoke to
officials at DOD, AFRICOM, U.S. Navy Africa, Coast Guard, State, and
USAID, as well as nongovernmental organizations and African military
officials. To review Natural Fire 10, we observed the Natural Fire 10
exercise in Uganda in October 2009; reviewed documentation including
guidance, plans, reports, and assessments; and spoke to officials at
DOD, AFRICOM, U.S. Army Africa, State, and USAID, as well as African
military officials, about the activity. These two activities serve as
examples, and information about them is not meant to be generalized to
all AFRICOM activities. We supplemented our examination of the Africa
Partnership Station and Natural Fire 10 with information on additional
activities highlighted by AFRICOM, AFRICOM's military service
components and task force, DOD, State, and USAID officials during our
review, as well as by two GAO reports that addressed AFRICOM
activities: one that examined the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership, Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara,[Footnote 49] and
related AFRICOM activities to combat terrorism;[Footnote 50] and one
that partially reviewed the Global Peace Operations Initiative and
Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance activities.
[Footnote 51]
To assess AFRICOM's activity planning and implementation, we
considered successful organizational practices, as identified in prior
GAO work. Because AFRICOM is still maturing as a combatant command, we
decided it was important to consider in our review critical steps and
practices that help agencies to achieve success, including strategic
planning; measuring performance; aligning resources to support goals;
involving stakeholders; and building expertise. Specifically, in
examining strategic planning, we reviewed DOD national strategies and
guidance including the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Defense
Strategy, National Security Strategy, and Guidance for Employment of
the Force. We analyzed AFRICOM's theater strategy, theater campaign
plan, and posture statements--as well as AFRICOM's military service
components', special operation command's, and task force's priority
areas, draft strategic plans (if available), and engagement plans--for
guidance on implementing activities. We also reviewed DOD's Theater
Security Cooperation Management Information System; Joint Staff Global
Force Management portal; Force Allocation Decision Framework;
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 7401.01E on the Combatant
Commander's Initiative Fund; and AFRICOM training presentations. We
spoke with officials at AFRICOM, its military service components,
special operations command, and task force about their respective
strategic planning efforts. To examine AFRICOM's assessment of
activities, we reviewed a presentation of AFRICOM's strategic
assessment tool as well as activity assessment requirements in the
command's theater campaign plan and the task force's draft regional
engagement plan. We spoke with officials at DOD, AFRICOM, AFRICOM's
components, U.S. embassies, and other federal agencies to assess
whether the command's activities support AFRICOM's mission and reflect
the most effective use of resources. In examining funding for
activities, we reviewed AFRICOM's funding sources as well as the
available funding for the Africa Partnership Station and Natural Fire
10 activities. We also reviewed a GAO report that examined the use of
funds under the programs authorized in Sections 1206 and 1207 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.[Footnote 52]
AFRICOM provided data on the funding amounts for its activities in
fiscal year 2009, which were drawn from the Standard Army Finance
Information System. We assessed the reliability of the finance
information system through interviews with personnel responsible for
maintaining and overseeing these data systems. Additionally, we
assessed the quality control measures in place to ensure that the data
are reliable for reporting purposes. We found the funding amount data
reported by AFRICOM to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this review. To review efforts at interagency collaboration and
building expertise, we examined agreements between AFRICOM and
interagency partners, training guidance, and training programs. We
spoke with interagency partners embedded at AFRICOM, at U.S. embassies
in Africa, and at other federal agency offices.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 through July 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
International Security Affairs:
Washington, DC 20301-2400:
Mr. John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO 10-794, "Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training,
and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DoD's Efforts in
Africa." DoD concurs with the five recommendations with additional
comments. Our response to the recommendations is enclosed.
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was designed as an innovative command
structure that relies on the active participation of other government
departments and agencies in order for it to successfully achieve
objectives focused on developing African security capacity. We are
still learning from our experiments in the creation of AFRICOM and
GAO's active interest in the command is welcome as we refine the way
we do business in this new organization.
The GAO highlights areas where we need to improve and we are pleased
to note that AFRICOM has taken a number of steps to address the
shortcomings identified in this report. DoD and AFRICOM, in close
cooperation with our interagency partners, will continue to pursue
improvements to the way the organization operates.
Our point of contact for this action is Mr. Mark Swayne, Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, commercial
phone (703) 571-9420 or electronic mail address: mark.swayne@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Vicki J. Huddleston:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs:
Enclosure: Tab A: DoD Response:
[End of letter]
Tab A:
Unclassified:
GAO Draft Report 10-794 – Dated July 2010:
GAO EC351340:
"Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency
Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa"
GAO Recommendation 1: Synchronize activities among AFRICOM's
components by expediting the completion of its regional engagement
plans, country work plans, campaign support plans, and develop a
process whereby plans are reviewed on a recurring basis to ensure that
efforts across the command are complementary, comprehensive, and
supportive of AFRICOM's mission.
DOD Response: DoD concurs with comment. In the absence of support
plans, AFRICOM conducts weekly Command and Staff Updates (CSU) where
components and CJTF-HOA brief the status of each current activity and
the status of key future events. Additionally, AFRICOM utilizes an
information database, the Theater Security Cooperation Management
Information System (TSCMIS), to manage each individual event conducted
by AFRICOM staff and subordinate commands from initial planning to
final assessment. TSCMIS links events to the AFRICOM Theater Campaign
Plan's Theater Security Objectives in order to guide subordinate
command activities for unified effort.
Additionally, Regional Plans and Component Support Plans are in the
final stages of review and approval by AFRICOM's leadership. These
final draft plans—although not formally approved—will be used by the
staff and components to guide and synchronize activities. Country Work
Plans are also being developed for the command's critical partners as
identified in the Theater Campaign Plan.
GAO Recommendation 2: Conduct long-term assessments of the full range
of its activities to determine whether the activities are having their
intended effects and supporting AFRICOM's mission.
DOD Response: DoD concurs with comment. AFRICOM has taken steps to
improve the assessment of its activities. A CJTF-HOA Fragmentary Order
(FRAGO) directs units to report measures of effectiveness on
activities and projects based on CJTF-HOA objectives and desired
effects. Since the release of the FRAGO, CJTF-HOA has seen a
remarkable improvement in the reporting of qualitative evidence of
positive results. All AFRICOM operations and planning orders now
include tasks to staff and service components to develop metrics and
indicators and to conduct assessments.
GAO Recommendation 3: Take actions to ensure that budget staff within
its military service components, Special Operations Command, Task
Force, and Offices of Security Cooperation within U.S. Embassies in
Africa have the expertise and knowledge necessary to make timely and
accurate funding decisions for activities. These actions could include
some combination of training, staffing changes, and comprehensive
guidance on applying funding sources to activities.
DOD Response: DoD concurs with comment. DoD fully agrees with the need
to improve the use of security cooperation tools through training,
staff changes, and better guidance. AFRICOM has Title 10 authorities
to conduct traditional military activities and operations. However,
the activities that are most important to DoD in Africa center around
building institutional and operational security capabilities and
capacity among our African partners. Most of the authorities and
funding to provide this capacity building fall within State Department
programs under Title 22 authorities. Even so, the innovative command
structure is enabling creative solutions to be developed between
AFRICOM military and State Department staff to address these
challenges.
GAO Recommendation 4: Fully integrate Interagency personnel and
partners into the formative stages of the command's activity planning
processes to better leverage Interagency expertise.
DOD Response: DoD concurs with comment. DoD continues to pursue
qualified interagency representatives to work in management and staff
positions at AFRICOM and will work with our partners to prepare
personnel for assignment in a military organization. DoD encourages
interagency partners to fill vacant positions and to reward their
detailees for assignments at AFRICOM.
U.S. Africa Command is unique in that it houses two Deputy Commanders.
The Deputy Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) is a General or
Flag officer of a three star rank while the Deputy Commander for
Civil — Military Activities (DCMA) is a senior Foreign Service Officer
of ambassadorial level. The deputies serve to keep military command
authorities distinct while recognizing the value added to civil-
military activities by incorporating Interagency expertise at the
right levels and locations in the command. The DCMA helps to ensure
the command integrates interagency personnel at all levels of planning.
The DCMA directs the command's plans and programs associated with
health, humanitarian assistance and de-mining action, disaster
response, security sector reform, and Peace Support Operations. He
also directs Outreach, Strategic Communication, AFRICOM's partner-
building functions and ensures that policy/program development and
implementation include the interagency and are consistent with U.S.
Foreign Policy.
GAO Recommendation 5: In consultation with State and USAID, develop a
comprehensive training program, with a means to monitor completion,
for staff and forces involved in AFRICOM activities on:
* Working with Interagency partners and U.S. Embassies on activities
and;
* Cultural issues related to Africa.
DOD Response: DoD concurs with comment. As of February 2010, Cultural
Awareness Training for HQ staff personnel was incorporated into the
newcomer's orientation course and is mandatory for all incoming
personnel. During the initial in processing, attendance is monitored,
tracked and recorded by the Joint Force Development and Readiness
Directorate to ensure compliance. Additionally, personnel deploying to
CJTF-HOA receive web based Cultural Awareness training via Joint
Knowledge Online and are also given additional training in-country as
part of the CJTF-HOA newcomer's orientation.
As for working within Embassies, key personnel attend training at the
Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM) once they
have been selected for an assignment. AFRICOM will continue to develop
and conduct training to improve the command's ability to work with
Embassies and other agencies.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director;
Kathryn Bolduc; Alissa Czyz; Robert Heilman; Lonnie McAllister; James
Michels; Steven Putansu; Jodie Sandel; Erin Smith; and Cheryl Weissman
made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In February 2007, then-President George W. Bush directed DOD to
establish AFRICOM. DOD designated AFRICOM fully operational on
September 30, 2008.
[2] In this report, we use the term "activities" broadly to include
military missions, activities, programs, and exercises.
[3] For the purposes of this report, we use the term "components" to
refer collectively to AFRICOM's military service components, special
operations command, and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.
[4] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its
Horn of Africa Task Force, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15,
2010).
[5] GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder
Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs
Associated with the U.S. Africa Command, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20,
2009); and Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress
and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-947T] (Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2008).
[6] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[7] Beginning with the fiscal year 2012 cycle, State changed the name
of its mission strategic plans to mission strategic and resource plans.
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181].
[9] According to the Guidance for Employment of the Force and the
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 2008, CJCSI 3110.01G (Mar. 1,
2008), each of the geographic combatant commanders is required to
produce a theater campaign plan. Furthermore, each geographic
combatant commander except U.S. Northern Command is also required to
develop theater posture plans as annexes to the theater campaign plan.
[10] A theater strategy outlines concepts and courses of action for
achieving the objectives established in national policies and
strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of
military forces and other instruments of national power.
[11] A theater campaign plan encompasses the activities of a supported
geographic combatant commander, which accomplish strategic or
operational objectives within a theater of war or theater of
operations, and translates national or theater strategy into
operational concepts and those concepts into unified action.
[12] GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-927] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2005).
[13] State's Mission Strategic and Resource Plan, formerly the Mission
Strategic Plan, is a strategic document created by each U.S. embassy
and consulate detailing (1) the mission's highest foreign policy and
management priorities; (2) the goals it wants to achieve; (3)
resources required to achieve those goals; and (4) how it plans to
measure progress and results.
[14] These priorities are contained in classified documents.
[15] The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa's "combined joint
operational area" consists of 7 countries: Djibouti, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan. In addition, it has
named another 11 countries as "areas of interest": Burundi, Chad,
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen.
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504].
[17] When forces are not provided, AFRICOM may have to delay or cancel
activities or take military service component staff away from other
duties to travel to Africa.
[18] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[19] GAO, The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Systematic Assessment
Is Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward U.S. Policy
Objectives, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-188]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2007).
[20] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[21] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid
Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-38] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10,
2004).
[22] Pub. L. No. 103-62, Sec. 4(b) (1993).
[23] GAO, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve
Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206
and 1207 Assistance Programs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-431] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15,
2010).
[24] Section 1206 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense
Authorization Act authorizes the Secretary of Defense, upon the
direction of the President, to conduct or support a program to build
the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces in order
for that country to conduct counterterrorist operations or to
participate in or support military and stability operations in which
the U.S. Armed Forces are a participant. Pub. L. No. 109-163 (2006).
[25] The Maghreb is the Arabic name for the northwest part of Africa,
generally including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and sometimes Libya.
[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504].
[27] Combatant Commander Initiative funds enable the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to act quickly to support the combatant
commanders when they lack the flexibility and resources to solve
emergent challenges and unforeseen contingency requirements critical
to joint warfighting readiness and national security interests.
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-431].
[29] Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1206 (2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-
364, § 1206 (2006) and Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 1206 (2008).
[30] Joint Publication 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations
(Mar. 1, 2007).
[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504].
[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181].
[33] GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's
Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-549] (Washington, D.C.:
May 31, 2007).
[34] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce,
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2009).
[35] AFRICOM's Marine Corps and Air Force components have a political
advisor from State.
[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP].
[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181].
[38] Chiefs of mission are the principal officers (usually
ambassadors) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States
and serve as the personal representative of the President in the
country of accreditation.
[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504].
[40] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance
Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860] (Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2008).
[41] United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors Office of Inspector General, Report of Inspection: The
Bureau of African Affairs, Report Number ISP-I-09-63 (Arlington, Va.:
August 2009).
[42] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504].
[43] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504].
[44] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP].
[45] U.S. Africa Command Guide 3500.01, Commander's Joint Training
Guidance FY 2010 through FY 2015, (Dec. 18, 2009).
[46] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504].
[47] Beginning with the fiscal year 2012 cycle, State changed the name
of its Mission Strategic Plans to Mission Strategic and Resource Plans.
[48] We did not receive a response from the U.S. Embassy in Burundi.
[49] Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara is designed to strengthen
the ability of regional governments to police large expanses of remote
terrain in the Trans-Sahara.
[50] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance
Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860] (Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2008).
[51] GAO, Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States Is
Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are
Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-754]
(Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2008).
[52] GAO, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve
Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206
and 1207 Assistance Programs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-431] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15,
2010).
[End of section]
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