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Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's System of Internal 
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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

July 2010: 

Warfighter Support: 

Actions Needed to Improve the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 
Organization's System of Internal Control: 

GAO-10-660: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-660, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to lead, 
advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions to defeat improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs). Since 2007, GAO has reported on several 
issues related to JIEDDO’s management and transparency of operations. 
In response to the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act conference 
report, mandating that GAO review JIEDDO’s efforts, this report 
addresses the extent to which JIEDDO has (1) measured the 
effectiveness of its efforts and investments, (2) adhered to its 
review and approval process for developing counter-IED initiatives, 
and (3) taken action to address overall internal control weaknesses 
previously reported by GAO. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed 
relevant documents and discussed with relevant officials their 
guidance, oversight, and internal control processes to carry out 
JIEDDO operations. GAO also conducted case studies of 56 of 497 
initiatives JIEDDO’s initiative management system. 

What GAO Found: 

While JIEDDO has developed various output performance measures, it has 
not yet developed a means for reliably measuring the overall 
effectiveness of its efforts and investments to combat IEDs. Federal 
internal control standards require that organizations, such as JIEDDO, 
establish performance measures that compare the results of a program 
with its intended purpose. GAO recognizes that developing outcome 
measures that address JIEDDO’s overall effect is difficult, but JIEDDO 
has not developed or followed through with a consistent process or 
plan to gather appropriate data and evaluate the fundamental 
effectiveness of the individual initiatives it has fielded. Some other 
limiting factors, according to JIEDDO officials, are that warfighters 
operating in theater face competing priorities that interfere with 
collecting data, and available data may not be consistently recorded 
and maintained. However, in the absence of a consistent process or 
plan for evaluating and collecting data from individual initiatives, 
JIEDDO will not be well-positioned to determine robust performance 
metrics and procedures to assess whether it is achieving DOD’s counter-
IED mission. 

JIEDDO has a review and approval process for developing counter-IED 
initiatives; however, it has not fully adhered to this process. Of the 
56 initiatives GAO reviewed, JIEDDO excluded 26 from this process, and 
for the 30 that did go through the process, 22 did not show that they 
followed all of the required steps of the process. According to DOD’s 
directive, all of JIEDDO’s counter-IED initiatives are to go through 
this process, but JIEDDO’s instruction designates non-counter-IED 
initiatives as overhead, and specifies that overhead will not go 
through this process. However, neither DOD’s directive nor JIEDDO’s 
instruction specifically define what constitutes a counter-IED 
initiative and what should be considered overhead. As a result, GAO 
found some initiatives designated as overhead which at the time were 
similar to others then designated as meeting an immediate counter-IED 
need or later given that designation. With respect to the 22 
initiatives that did not follow all required process steps, some of 
their required documentation needed to confirm approval decisions was 
incomplete or missing. Without following the requirements of the 
process, DOD lacks the transparency and accountability of funds spent 
by JIEDDO. 

GAO identified several significant internal control system weaknesses 
that have been present at JIEDDO since GAO’s first review in 2007. 
Beyond those identified in this report, those weaknesses extend to 
other areas such as financial and human capital management. Although 
JIEDDO has taken some steps in the past to address these weaknesses, 
those efforts have not been successful. According to federal 
standards, internal control is a major part of managing an 
organization. Some underlying reasons for JIEDDO’s lack of progress in 
addressing these weaknesses include a lack of sustained management 
attention in following through with corrective actions; challenges 
with retention and expertise of personnel; and a lack of sufficient 
acquisition expertise with breadth and depth to understand the 
programs. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends JIEDDO take actions to improve (1) its processes for 
assessing effectiveness of counter-IED initiatives, (2) adherence to 
its initiative review and approval process, and (3) its overall 
internal control system. GAO also recommends DOD monitor JIEDDO’s 
progress in improving its internal controls. DOD concurred with these 
recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-660] or key 
components. For more information, contact William M. Solis, (202)512-
8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

JIEDDO Has Not Developed a Means for Reliably Measuring the 
Effectiveness of Its Efforts to Combat IEDs: 

JIEDDO Has Not Fully Adhered to Its Review and Approval Process for 
Managing Counter-IED Efforts: 

Lack of Sustained JIEDDO Management Attention and Ineffective DOD 
Oversight Hampered Efforts to Improve JIEDDO's Overall Internal 
Control System: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 1, 2010: 

Congressional Committees: 

Improvised explosive devices (IED) continue to be the number one 
threat to U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. To address this threat, 
a Department of Defense (DOD) directive[Footnote 1]established the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in 2006 
and directed it to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions in 
support of the Combatant Commanders and their respective Joint Task 
Forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. A 
primary role for JIEDDO is to provide funding to the military services 
and DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. 
Through fiscal year 2010, Congress has appropriated over $17 billion 
to JIEDDO to address the IED threat. In addition, other DOD 
components, including the military services, have devoted at least 
$1.5 billion to counter-IED solutions, not including $22.7 billion for 
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. Along with the escalation in 
Afghanistan, the IED threat is increasingly expanding throughout the 
globe with over 300 IED events per month worldwide outside of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, according to JIEDDO. There is widespread consensus that 
this threat will not go away and that the IED will continue to be a 
strategic weapon of influence in future conflicts. 

In response to congressional direction,[Footnote 2] GAO has issued a 
series of reports examining a broad spectrum of JIEDDO's operations 
including its ability to lead, advocate, and coordinate counter-IED 
efforts across DOD as well as establish itself as an accountable 
organization that can effectively manage billions of dollars in 
funding. As DOD looks to the future in deciding the appropriate role, 
organizational placement, and degree of Office of Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) oversight for JIEDDO, addressing these types of issues will be 
critical. For this report, we determined the extent to which JIEDDO 
has (1) measured the effectiveness of its efforts and investments, (2) 
adhered to its review and approval process for developing counter-IED 
initiatives, and (3) taken action to address overall internal control 
weaknesses previously reported by GAO. 

To assess JIEDDO's efforts to measure the effectiveness of its efforts 
and investments, we requested, reviewed, and discussed with JIEDDO 
officials current and anticipated efforts to measure and evaluate its 
operations and activities. We reviewed these efforts to determine the 
progress, breadth, and depth of JIEDDO's measurement development and 
their applicability towards JIEDDO's ability to successfully evaluate 
its operations initiatives. To assess JIEDDO's adherence to its review 
and approval process, we reviewed, analyzed, and discussed JIEDDO 
guidance with JIEDDO officials to identify key steps in its process. 
We then analyzed data from 56 case studies representing the most 
costly initiatives of the 497 initiatives in JIEDDO's initiative 
management system for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to determine whether 
JIEDDO's stated process was followed by JIEDDO managers and personnel. 
[Footnote 3] These case studies included over $4.67 billion in fiscal 
year 2009 projects and initiatives. We also identified required 
approval controls over use of funds, reviewed selected transactions 
for compliance with these controls, and assessed whether the data 
recorded in the accounting and managerial systems accurately reflected 
JIEDDO's activities. To assess JIEDDO's actions to address overall 
internal control system weaknesses previously reported by GAO, we 
interviewed and discussed with JIEDDO officials their efforts to 
improve JIEDDO's internal control system in response to prior related 
GAO findings. We collected and reviewed internal and external guidance 
[Footnote 4] and documentation of JIEDDO's internal control system. We 
reviewed and compared JIEDDO's annual statements of assurance 
regarding JIEDDO's internal controls system. We then analyzed the 
information collected and discussed the significance of conditions 
observed with JIEDDO officials. We conducted this performance audit 
from May 2008 to May 2010 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 
and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. See appendix I for a more complete discussion of GAO's 
scope and methodology. 

Background: 

JIEDDO was created by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in January 2006 
and is responsible for leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD 
efforts to defeat IEDs. Prior DOD efforts to defeat IEDs included 
various process teams and task forces. For example, DOD established 
the Joint IED Defeat Task Force in June 2005 for which the Army 
provided primary administrative support. This task force replaced the 
Army IED Task Force, the Joint IED Task Force, and the Under Secretary 
of Defense, Force Protection Working Group. To focus all of DOD's 
efforts and minimize duplication, DOD published new counter-IED policy 
in February 2006 through DOD Directive 2000.19E, which changed the 
name of the Joint IED Defeat Task Force to JIEDDO and established it 
as a joint entity and jointly manned organization within DOD, 
reporting to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The directive states 
that JIEDDO shall "focus" (i.e., lead, advocate, and coordinate) all 
Department of Defense actions in support of the Combatant Commanders 
and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as 
"weapons of strategic influence." The organization is directed to 
identify, assess, and fund initiatives that provide specific counter-
IED solutions, and its director has the authority to approve joint IED 
defeat initiatives valued up to $25 million and make recommendations 
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for initiatives valued over $25 
million. Under the directive, JIEDDO reports directly to the DOD 
Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

It is JIEDDO's role to provide funding to the military services and 
DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. 
Congress has provided JIEDDO with its own separate direct 
appropriation since 2007. JIEDDO uses its appropriation to provide 
funds to the military service that is designated to sponsor counter-
IED initiatives using Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests. 
Departmental guidance also states that the acquiring department, or 
military service, is then authorized to create obligations against the 
funding without further referral to the requiring department--JIEDDO--
and that the military service has no responsibility to determine the 
validity of a requiring-department-approved purchase request. 
Therefore, after JIEDDO provides funding authority to the military 
service and the designated program manager for a specific initiative, 
the service program manager, not JIEDDO, is responsible for managing 
the initiatives for which JIEDDO has provided funds. 

JIEDDO's efforts to counter the use of IEDs and subsequent funding for 
those efforts are organized according to three primary lines of 
operation: (1) attack the network that enables the use of IEDs, (2) 
defeat the IED itself once emplaced, and (3) train the military forces 
in counter-IED techniques. JIEDDO assigns all funds used to one of 
these lines of operation--or to a fourth line of operation called 
staff and infrastructure[Footnote 5] for miscellaneous expenditures 
not directly related to the three lines of operation. When JIEDDO 
undertakes any effort requiring funds, it assigns the funds for the 
effort to one of the lines of operations. As noted in our prior 
report,[Footnote 6] JIEDDO further breaks down its expenditures into 
more detailed subsets, which it designates as initiatives, assigning a 
name and a unique number called an initiative designation number to 
track expenditures related to each initiative. JIEDDO manages and 
reports on all funds expended by line of operation and by initiative. 

In prior GAO reviews, we reported on several issues related to 
JIEDDO's management and operations. In March 2007, we reported 
JIEDDO's lack of a strategic plan and the resulting effects on the 
development of its financial and human capital management programs. We 
made several recommendations based on this finding to the Secretary of 
Defense to improve the management of JIEDDO operations, stressing the 
development of JIEDDO's detailed strategic plan. Subsequently, we also 
reported in March 2008 on JIEDDO's internal controls and made several 
recommendations focused at improving JIEDDO's internal control system. 
JIEDDO agreed with our recommendations and undertook efforts to 
address our findings and recommended actions. In addition, we 
testified and issued a report in October 2009 regarding steps that 
JIEDDO and DOD have taken to manage counter-IED efforts. Our testimony 
also included some of the challenges we discuss in this report. 
[Footnote 7] 

In November 2007, JIEDDO published and implemented its Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Capability and Acquisition 
Management Process (JCAAMP) instruction,[Footnote 8] and updated the 
instruction in November 2009.[Footnote 9] JCAAMP is JIEDDO's process 
to respond to urgent warfighter needs; to identify counter-IED 
operational capability gaps; to aggressively seek, acquire, and assess 
potential materiel and nonmateriel solutions to these gaps through 
finding networks that include industry, academic, and service research 
labs experts; and to place approved counter-IED initiatives in the 
hands of warfighters for operational assessment and deployment. JCAAMP 
is intended to enable a smooth transition or transfer of counter-IED 
initiatives to one or more services or agencies and provides guidance 
on the disposition of those initiatives recommended for termination. 
The JCAAMP instruction defines JCAAMP's roles, responsibilities, and 
oversight requirements as applicable to all JIEDDO (subordinate 
divisions, branches) and other components. 

JIEDDO Has Not Developed a Means for Reliably Measuring the 
Effectiveness of Its Efforts to Combat IEDs: 

While JIEDDO has developed various output-focused performance 
measures, it has not yet developed a means for reliably measuring the 
effectiveness of its overall efforts and investments to combat IEDs. 
Existing metrics focus more on outputs than outcomes. Outputs describe 
the level of activity that will be provided over a period of time, 
including a description of characteristics such as timeliness or 
percentage of products or services delivered.[Footnote 10] Examples of 
JIEDDO output measures include metrics to evaluate its response time 
in satisfying urgent theater requirements, the quality and relevance 
of counter-IED proposals JIEDDO solicits and receives in response to 
its solicitations, and the ratio of initiatives for which JIEDDO 
completes operational assessments. However, these metrics do not 
inform JIEDDO or stakeholders about the effect the agency's efforts 
have on combating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence. JIEDDO has 
not developed or followed through with a consistent process or plan to 
gather appropriate data and evaluate the fundamental effectiveness of 
the individual initiatives it has fielded. JIEDDO officials stated 
they have extreme difficulty in reliably gauging the effectiveness of 
JIEDDO's efforts and investments on combating IEDs. They attributed 
this difficulty to not being able to establish a statistically based 
causal relationship between JIEDDO efforts and counter-IED trends. 
Nonetheless, federal internal control standards require that 
organizations such as JIEDDO establish internal control activities 
that help ensure the establishment and review of performance measures 
and indicators that compare the results of its program activity with 
the plans, goals, and objectives as envisioned by the Government 
Performance and Results Act, which suggests that an organization 
design its performance measures to compare the results of a program 
activity with its intended purpose.[Footnote 11] In our 2007 report on 
JIEDDO's lack of a strategic plan,[Footnote 12] we noted that JIEDDO 
lacked measurable goals and objectives. JIEDDO's Fiscal Year 2009-2010 
strategy stated that finding a set of measures that clearly reveal 
JIEDDO's overall contribution to the counter-IED fight remains an 
analytical challenge.[Footnote 13] 

Evaluating the effectiveness of individual initiatives would help to 
inform JIEDDO about its overall effectiveness in countering the IED 
threat. However, JIEDDO has not developed or followed through with a 
consistent process or plan to establish how it will evaluate the 
fundamental effectiveness of its individual initiatives it has fielded 
and to collect needed data. In addition to a lack of good outcome- 
oriented metrics, other relevant factors contributing to JIEDDO's 
difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of individual initiatives 
include: (1) data on effectiveness of initiatives are not consistently 
collected in theater, (2) initiative management data are not 
consistently recorded and maintained at JIEDDO, and (3) performance 
data regarding unexpected outcomes such as ineffectiveness of certain 
counter-IED efforts are not always evaluated as a means to highlight 
potential improvement. 

* Data on Effectiveness of Initiatives Are Not Consistently Collected 
in Theater: According to JIEDDO officials, because time is critically 
limited when counter-IED initiatives are designed for deployment in 
theater, the initiatives may not be designed or developed with 
adequate data collection procedures to provide information needed for 
statistically based assessment of initiatives' effectiveness. JIEDDO 
officials told us that data for fielded initiatives can be limited 
because collection and documentation of such data do not carry a high 
priority for units and soldiers operating in theater. JIEDDO does not 
have steps that ensure that potential feedback processes are included 
in the design phase as a firm requirement when considering investing 
in a counter-IED initiative. 

* Initiative Management Data Are Not Consistently Recorded and 
Maintained at JIEDDO Because of Availability Limitations: Data that 
officials stated should be available at JIEDDO to be used for 
measuring effectiveness sometimes are not available because 
documentation of information has not been routinely and reliably 
recorded at JIEDDO. For example, we found that the date, source, and 
initial concept for one counter-IED initiative--required by JIEDDO and 
needed to establish performance baselines--were not available, 
according to officials, either because they had not been recorded or 
because they had not been retained. While JIEDDO has established 
standards for document storage and retention and implemented a system 
for storing and managing documents, these efforts require a degree of 
compliance not yet achieved. Officials attributed the condition of 
poor data quality to JIEDDO staff perception that routine 
documentation of information is of limited value and that other higher 
value pursuits such as rapid acquisition of initiatives should take 
priority amongst their limited available time. JIEDDO officials are 
aware that improving discipline at identifying and routinely 
documenting JIEDDO-generated information is needed to conduct counter-
IED initiative evaluations. For example, JIEDDO recently formed and 
staffed a team of individuals that is expected to review all new 
funding requests to determine whether the associated counter-IED 
effort will involve an increase in staff or require development or 
expansion of JIEDDO infrastructure. The team reportedly has developed 
a routine process for reviewing, discussing, questioning, commenting, 
and most importantly, recording these actions and decisions in a 
traceable record that has begun to provide JIEDDO managers and staff 
with a reliable source of historic events and decision points for 
subsequent data analysis. According to the Internal Review Director, 
JIEDDO plans to expand this documentation process to other key teams 
managing other dimensions of counter-IED initiatives. However, it is 
too early for us to evaluate the consistent use and effectiveness of 
this new process or JIEDDO's plans to implement it across the rest of 
the organization. 

* Performance Data on Unexpected Outcomes Are Not Always Evaluated for 
Impact: JIEDDO may not be adequately evaluating the ineffectiveness of 
its counter IED initiatives, and therefore not adequately pursuing and 
presenting data that show where improvement may be necessary. For 
example, in response to a general officer request in Iraq, the 
Institute for Defense Analysis collected and analyzed IED incident 
data before and after a certain initiative to determine its effect on 
the rate of IED incidents. JIEDDO officials intended the initiative in 
question to reduce the number of IED attacks. However, the data 
collected contradicted the intended result because the number of IED 
incidents increased in areas where the initiative was implemented. 
These data could provide lessons learned to fix the initiative or to 
suggest another approach towards JIEDDO's strategic goal of reducing 
IED incidents. However, JIEDDO officials stated that JIEDDO did not 
analyze these data because they would not demonstrate effectiveness 
and consequently, JIEDDO may be overlooking data useful for 
identifying areas for improvement. 

More broadly, JIEDDO's strategic plan development efforts have not 
produced a satisfactory set of performance measures to gauge JIEDDO's 
effect on achieving DOD's counter-IED mission, nor an effective data 
collection and evaluation plan. In the absence of a commitment to this 
effort with a consistent process or plan for collecting and evaluating 
data from individual initiatives, JIEDDO will not be well-positioned 
to determine whether it is achieving DOD's counter-IED mission as 
contemplated by the Government Performance and Results Act.[Footnote 
14] 

JIEDDO Has Not Fully Adhered to Its Review and Approval Process for 
Managing Counter-IED Efforts: 

JIEDDO has a review and approval process for developing counter-IED 
initiatives--JCAAMP--however, JIEDDO has not fully adhered to this 
process. Specifically, we reviewed 56 of JIEDDO's most costly 
initiatives in its financial records for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 
and determined that 26 of the initiatives were excluded from the 
process outright because JIEDDO designated them as overhead not 
subject to JCAAMP. According to JIEDDO officials, "overhead" is a 
broad and diverse category including staff and infrastructure 
requirements, operations and plans support, developmental efforts, 
counter-IED training support efforts, and general support requirements 
for JIIEDDO. However, because JIEDDO guidance is so broad it is not 
clear which initiatives should be considered counter-IED initiatives, 
and consequently some counter-IED initiatives were excluded from 
JIEDDO's JCAAMP process.[Footnote 15] Furthermore, for those 30 
counter-IED initiatives that did go through the process, JIEDDO did 
not consistently follow required steps of the process for 22 of these 
initiatives. 

JIEDDO Has Excluded Some Counter-IED Initiatives from Its Review and 
Approval Process: 

We found that of the 56 initiatives we reviewed, JIEDDO excluded 26 of 
them from JCAAMP. Based on DOD Directive 2000.19E,[Footnote 16] all of 
JIEDDO's counter-IED initiatives are to go through JIEDDO's review and 
approval process (JCAAMP) which includes obtaining the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense's approval for all JIEDDO initiatives valued 
greater than $25 million. Additionally, JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01 
designates non-counter-IED initiatives as overhead, and specifies that 
overhead will not go through this process.[Footnote 17] JIEDDO has 
characterized the governance mechanisms of its review and approval 
process--including the Deputy Secretary of Defense's approval for 
initiatives exceeding $25 million--as perhaps the most important part 
of its process before committing funding to any initiative. DOD 
defines an initiative as a materiel or nonmaterial solution that 
addresses capability gaps in defeating IEDs.[Footnote 18] However, 
neither DOD Directive 2000.19E nor JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01 
specifically defines what constitutes a counter-IED initiative and 
what is considered overhead. To illustrate, 

* JIEDDO excluded one of two very similar training initiatives from 
its review process, both of which fund role players at the national 
training center to create a realistic war scenario. JIEDDO processed 
one initiative through JCAAMP with role players with speaking roles 
and not the other because it only involved role players as nonspeaking 
extras. According to JIEDDO officials, they classified the initiative 
with role players as extras as an overhead requirement thereby 
excluding it from JCAAMP. However, both initiatives are similar in 
purpose and objective, which is to enhance the counter-IED training 
experience by creating a realistic war scenario at the national 
training center. The excluded initiative appears to be a solution that 
addresses capability gaps in defeating IED, not overhead, and 
therefore should not have been excluded from JIEDDO's review and 
approval process. 

* In the March 2009 data we collected to conduct our case studies, 
JIEDDO designated a radar system initiative--the Vehicle Dismount 
Exploitation Radar--as an overhead requirement because according to 
JIEDDO officials it was not ready to satisfy all existing operational 
needs for which it was being developed. Therefore, it was excluded 
from the JCAAMP process. However, even though designated as overhead, 
JIEDDO officials slated the device to satisfy an immediate counter-IED 
urgent need from theater in April 2009 and said that they expected to 
field the device within fiscal year 2010. Although JIEDDO officials 
classified the initiative as overhead, because it was not ready to 
satisfy all existing operational needs and therefore not ready to be 
fielded, both the directive and instruction are unclear about whether 
maturity or counter-IED application should be the deciding factor in 
determining whether an effort should be designated as overhead or an 
initiative. Classification of the radar system as an overhead 
requirement meant that JIEDDO did not submit this initiative for 
Deputy Secretary of Defense approval, even though JIEDDO has expended 
approximately $67.4 million on the initiative--exceeding the $25 
million total life-cycle approval criteria more than twofold. This 
initiative appears to be a solution that addresses capability gaps in 
defeating IED, not overhead, and therefore should not have been 
excluded from JIEDDO's process. 

Overall, we determined that the 26 initiatives excluded from JCAAMP 
had total funding requirements of $1.5 billion as of March 31, 2009, 
and represented about one third of the total $4.67 billion 
requirements for all 56 of our case studies. In addition, when we 
requested data to be able to conduct this review, we found that JIEDDO 
does not maintain and track information identifying which initiatives 
it designates as overhead requirements and excludes from this process 
in a comprehensive, readily accessible format. When initiatives are 
excluded from JCAAMP, internal and external stakeholders do not have 
the opportunity to review, comment on, and potentially change the 
course of the initiative in coordination with competing or 
complementary efforts. 

JIEDDO Did Not Fully Apply Its Management Process to Counter-IED 
Initiatives: 

Among 30 initiatives from our 56 case studies that JIEDDO said went 
through the JCAAMP process, we found 22 examples involving 
inconsistent and inadequate compliance with steps required by 
applicable DOD guidance. JIEDDO's charter,[Footnote 19]JIEDDO's 
process instruction,[Footnote 20] and JIEDDO's standard operating 
procedures[Footnote 21] together identify a set of various decision 
points and actions, collectively intended to control JIEDDO's use of 
resources to identify, acquire, assess, and place counter-IED 
initiatives. In reviewing documentation and application of these 
criteria to counter-IED initiatives, we determined JIEDDO did not 
consistently comply with its requirements. For summary reporting 
purposes, we tallied the incidences of inconsistency and noncompliance 
and grouped them into the following three categories: 

* Incomplete or Missing Initiative Decision Memos: JIEDDO's standard 
operating procedure requires that JIEDDO (1) document each of its 
decisions to release funds for counter-IED initiatives in separate, 
detailed, written formal initiative decision memoranda approved and 
signed by the director or his deputy director; (2) complete the 
initiative decision memorandum before obligating funds for the subject 
counter-IED initiative; and (3) retain and file a copy of the 
initiative decision memorandum with each resulting funding document 
created by JIEDDO's budget and accounting directorate. However, we 
found that 19 of 30 initiative case studies had not complied with one 
or more of these requirements consistently. For example, the 
initiative decision memorandum supporting JIEDDO's release of $13.9 
million in funds on April 17, 2008, for one initiative was 
procedurally not compliant because (1) it was signed 2 days after the 
funding was issued to and accepted by the service sponsor--i.e., the 
military service JIEDDO designated to sponsor this initiative--and (2) 
it was signed by a division official, not by the director or deputy 
director as required. 

* Lack of Required Initiative Approval: JIEDDO's guidance requires 
that counter-IED initiatives that exceed $25 million in total 
acquisition cost for JIEDDO's tenure of ownership (or are reasonably 
expected to exceed $25 million) in funding requirements be (1) 
submitted to an external panel of 15 senior managers from various 
functional areas within DOD for advice, review, and recommendations 
whether to proceed with the initiative; and (2) subsequently approved 
by the Deputy Secretary of Defense--based on his judgment and 
consideration of the DOD senior managers' recommendations and 
comments--before JIEDDO creates an initiative funding memorandum or 
provides funds for the initiative.[Footnote 22] However, we found 13 
of the 30 initiatives did not comply with these requirements before 
issuing funds to the service sponsors for the initiatives. For 
example, JIEDDO created and signed an initiative decision memorandum 
on March 19, 2008, to begin one initiative project expected to cost 
$348 million, before submitting the initiative for review to the 
senior managers' external panel and obtaining Deputy Secretary of 
Defense approval. JIEDDO did not receive external approval from the 
deputy secretary of defense until April 18--about 1 month after 
funding was issued for the initiative--resulting in premature 
commitment and obligation of $28.7 million for the initiative on March 
24, 2008, without required authorization. 

* Lack of Consistent Initiative Documentation of Decisions and Events: 
JIEDDO officials told us that process decisions and events of counter- 
IED initiatives receiving funds should be physically documented and 
filed within the appropriate folders and digitally captured via its 
data management tool. The purpose of this documentation is to provide 
proof of JIEDDO actions and an audit trail for JIEDDO personnel and 
others to determine the history and progress of an initiative. JIEDDO 
is expected to secure and store the physical files at its headquarters 
for a period of 6 years with only authorized budget personnel allowed 
to remove the files using a tracking system for physical control. 
After 6 years, the documents are expected to be digitally archived and 
the physical files destroyed. However, 22 of the 30 initiatives we 
studied were not implemented consistent with the processes described 
by JIEDDO officials, even though JIEDDO financial records indicate 
that JIEDDO had issued funds to service sponsors for the initiatives 
studied. For example, in 5 cases, file folders for initiatives we 
reviewed were not available for review when requested, and JIEDDO 
officials could not determine where the files were located or who 
possessed the files at the time of our request. Available folders for 
other initiatives did not contain all required documentation for 
various specific JIEDDO decisions and actions. Some file folders did 
not have accurately dated and signed copies of purchase requests; some 
had documents that contradicted one another, and others had documents 
missing entirely. 

According to JIEDDO officials, systematic compliance with its process 
and documentation thereof has been a weakness that JIEDDO has 
attempted to correct and continues to pursue improvements in this 
regard. In response to findings discussed in this report, officials 
from JIEDDO's accounting and budgeting division, acquisition oversight 
division, and internal review division said that the discipline and 
compliance with JIEDDO's process for managing counter-IED initiatives 
have improved significantly beginning in the last quarter of fiscal 
year 2009. They point out that this period occurred after the bulk of 
our study and analysis of selected JIEDDO initiatives, and that it is 
too early to determine the full effect of these improvements. 

Nonetheless, while JIEDDO may have taken steps to address some of our 
concerns, this review's findings and the findings of prior GAO reports 
underscore that JIEDDO has not had a systematic process in place to 
adequately manage or fully document its activities and operations for 
the majority of its operating life, nor, as discussed more fully 
below, an effective internal control process to ensure consistent 
compliance with process and documentation requirements. Because, as 
JIEDDO officials state, it is too early to assess the effects of 
JIEDDO's subsequent action, it is not clear if this condition has 
improved. When JIEDDO does not adhere to its established acquisition 
process, including maintaining required documentation, transparency is 
limited and accountability of funds is in jeopardy. 

Lack of Sustained JIEDDO Management Attention and Ineffective DOD 
Oversight Hampered Efforts to Improve JIEDDO's Overall Internal 
Control System: 

Our prior and current audit work has identified a long-standing 
problem of inadequate attention to internal control weaknesses by 
JIEDDO management such as those related to strategic planning, program 
management, and financial and human capital management. At the same 
time, OSD officials, including the office of the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, to whom JIEDDO officially reports, have provided limited 
oversight of JIEDDO's overall internal control system. According to 
federal standards, internal control is a major part of managing an 
organization. It comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to 
meet missions, goals, and objectives; and, in doing so, supports 
performance-based management.[Footnote 23] Furthermore, DOD relies on 
JIEDDO's system of internal controls for assurance that JIEDDO is 
achieving its objectives. 

JIEDDO Has Not Taken Sufficient Action to Address Persistent Internal 
Control Weaknesses: 

JIEDDO has significant weaknesses in its system of internal control 
that have persisted since it was established in January 2006. 
According to federal internal control standards, monitoring of 
internal controls should be conducted to assess the quality of 
performance over time and to ensure that the findings of audits and 
other reviews are promptly resolved.[Footnote 24] However, JIEDDO has 
not taken sufficient action to monitor the quality of its system of 
internal control and correct identified control deficiencies. In our 
prior reports, we concluded that JIEDDO needed more transparency over 
its resources and needed to address specific internal control 
weaknesses.[Footnote 25] For example, in March 2008, we reported that 
JIEDDO lacked adequate controls to ensure counter-IED initiatives are 
properly approved before they are funded. As evidenced earlier in this 
current report, at the time of our review JIEDDO still lacked 
effective controls over the approval of initiatives and it is too soon 
to determine if any subsequent actions by JIEDDO have significantly 
improved this condition. We also reported in March 2008 that JIEDDO 
lacked an effective system of internal control over its financial 
processes. More recently, based on the Internal Review Director's 
assessment of our prior work regarding ongoing weaknesses in JIEDDO's 
internal control system, JIEDDO management acknowledged and reported 
to DOD in July 2009 that its internal control system was materially 
weak.[Footnote 26] JIEDDO management attributed its failure, in part, 
to not having an individual on staff with sufficient competence to 
both understand internal control system requirements and ability to 
educate and persuade management of the serious need for JIEDDO to 
formally develop, implement, test, evaluate, and adjust as needed its 
internal control program. 

JIEDDO's lack of progress in resolving its internal control problems 
is, in part, due to a lack of sustained management attention in 
following through with corrective actions. Responding to our prior 
work and concerns from within DOD and JIEDDO's congressional oversight 
committees, JIEDDO initiated several actions to improve internal 
control processes. For example, JIEDDO established an Internal Review 
office charged with developing, administering, and overseeing an 
internal control system in September 2007. It also developed and 
expanded an internal oversight division--called the Acquisition 
Oversight Division--charged with oversight of counter-IED initiatives 
funded by JIEDDO in March 2008. However, JIEDDO has not followed 
through in fully implementing these actions to improve its internal 
control system. For example, although JIEDDO intended to hire several 
internal review personnel to staff its newly established internal 
review office, it hired only one person to staff the office in 
November 2007 and that person left in February 2009 without having 
succeeded in establishing a formal internal control system. 
Furthermore, this office remained unstaffed until April 2009, when 
JIEDDO officials hired a new Internal Control Director to reestablish 
and manage its internal review office. 

Additionally, after JIEDDO established the Acquisition Oversight 
Division in May 2008, JIEDDO senior management later questioned the 
appropriateness of this division's attempt to closely review JIEDDO's 
testing activity that assesses the compatibility and effectiveness of 
its individual counter-IED initiatives before being placed in actual 
use. The acquisition oversight division was established to address 
Office of Secretary of Defense concerns regarding the need to separate 
day-to-day JIEDDO internal oversight of counter-IED initiatives from 
JIEDDO's operating division responsible for developing and 
implementing the initiatives.[Footnote 27] JIEDDO management officials 
said the testing activity had a self-monitoring component and 
therefore considered the acquisition oversight division's review 
redundant. The acquisition oversight division countered that its 
review verified that the self-monitoring component of the testing 
activity was not functioning as intended. Nonetheless, in May 2009, 
JIEDDO management removed oversight responsibility for testing 
activities from the acquisition oversight division's purview. Later, 
JIEDDO's internal review office conducted an audit which proved that 
self-monitoring by the testing activity was not sufficient and 
corroborated the need for the acquisition oversight division's audits. 
During ongoing operations reorganization, begun in November 2009, 
JIEDDO officials developed plans to eliminate the acquisition 
oversight division and disperse its manpower to other JIEDDO positions 
within its operating division, thus resulting in no longer making 
oversight their function in the organization. This action would 
effectively eliminate a process for identifying and reporting 
weaknesses with counter-IED initiatives. JIEDDO officials stated that 
its plan to eliminate the acquisition oversight division did not 
preclude JIEDDO from developing alternative oversight mechanisms. 
[Footnote 28] 

During the course of this review, the JIEDDO Internal Review Director 
said JIEDDO had taken three new actions to remedy internal control 
weaknesses present at JIEDDO. Those actions are (1) hiring the 
internal review office's first subordinate staff member--an auditor--
in August 2009 to assist the Internal Review Director in evaluating 
the effectiveness of JIEDDO's internal controls, (2) engaging a 
consulting firm to assist in its internal control implementation 
efforts in November 2009, and (3) instituting formal internal control 
education activities in February 2010. Although it is too early to 
know whether these new efforts to improve JIEDDO's system of internal 
controls will be successful, we continue to be concerned whether they 
will address internal control shortcomings given JIEDDO's past 
failures in implementing corrective actions and sustaining them over 
time. However, as of January 2010, JIEDDO was assigned a new director, 
and its management team has recently expressed its intention to 
address program internal control weaknesses. This new leadership has 
recognized the challenge JIEDDO faces in maintaining prompt delivery 
of counter-IED solutions while ensuring appropriate controls are in 
place to maintain accountability. 

In addition to concerns regarding JIEDDO management's past commitment 
to address weaknesses in its overall system of internal controls, 
improvements to JIEDDO's internal control system may also be hampered 
by challenges with the retention and expertise of personnel, ranging 
from scientists, system engineers, and operations research analysts, 
to intelligence analysts, budget analysts, accountants, and auditors. 
For example, JIEDDO is faced with challenges in retaining a 
sufficiently stable labor pool that is adequately sized to support a 
system of internal controls on an ongoing basis because employees are 
uncertain regarding the permanence of JIEDDO. In July 2009, JIEDDO 
reported to DOD that staffing supervision challenges and retaining 
trained program administrators at JIEDDO are underlying causes for its 
inadequate internal control program development and implementation. 
[Footnote 29] For example, JIEDDO's July 2009 assurance statement 
report states that its practice of satisfying large portions of its 
labor requirements through service contracts has resulted in a high 
ratio of contractors to government employees, and therefore it has too 
few government managers to oversee inherently governmental functions. 
[Footnote 30] This condition could also result in compressing the 
amount of time to carry out internal controls. JIEDDO officials have 
requested approval for adding 141 additional government employee 
positions and converting 192 positions currently for contractors to 
government employee positions to remedy the condition and received 
approval in February 2010 to begin hiring personnel to fill the new 
and converted positions. However, according to JIEDDO officials, 
successfully filling those positions with a stable, retainable 
workforce remains a challenge because the positions require a specific 
and significant set of skills that have been in short supply,[Footnote 
31] and JIEDDO anticipates difficulty filling these positions. Also, 
JIEDDO, as an organization, exists based on its relevance to combating 
the IED threat, according to JIEDDO management. Therefore, according 
to JIEDDO officials, potential employees may be concerned about 
professional advancement and job security. 

Furthermore, JIEDDO officials state that JIEDDO is challenged by a 
lack of sufficient acquisition expertise with breadth and depth of 
understanding and experience in program acquisition. Specifically, 
JIEDDO's operating divisions are devoid of positions that are either 
classified as acquisition positions, or specifically require 
acquisition expertise. Such expertise is needed to ensure that its 
acquisitions are conducted skillfully. An important part of JIEDDO's 
mission is to rapidly acquire counter-IED solutions in support of the 
warfighter, and federal control standards state that management should 
ensure that its workforce has the skills necessary to help an 
organization achieve its goals. However, in February 2010, a team of 
four independent acquisition experts conducted a brief review of 
JIEDDO's acquisition process at the request of the new director and 
observed that JIEDDO has no positions for persons with acquisition and 
program management experience.[Footnote 32] The team recommended 
creating acquisition professional positions within JIEDDO's formal 
organization and filling these positions with persons who have this 
acquisition experience. However, JIEDDO faces a challenge in filling 
these positions with qualified acquisition professionals because such 
professionals are in high demand as a result of DOD efforts to 
increase its acquisition workforce across the department. Nonetheless, 
such expertise would help JIEDDO minimize risks in acquiring equipment 
or systems because it could address issues early in the acquisition 
process and, as a result, might avoid costly fixes in later stages in 
the acquisition process. For example, according to one expert from the 
acquisition review team, this expertise would help JIEDDO know how to 
ensure that JIEDDO's rights, such as how to repair or engineer changes 
to an acquired system, are included in the contract, because if 
neglected, can result in costly or restrictive actions later in the 
system's life. 

DOD Has Not Adequately Monitored JIEDDO's Internal Control System: 

DOD has not adequately monitored JIEDDO's internal control system, 
relying too heavily on certifications from JEIDDO regarding its 
operations, which has not permitted it to identify and act to correct 
ongoing internal control weaknesses. DOD Comptroller officials said 
that oversight over JIEDDO's internal control system is maintained 
through the DOD Managers' Internal Control Program, which DOD uses to 
manage the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity 
Act and the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123. 
However, these officials stated that under this program, the 
Comptroller's office relies solely on JIEDDO to develop and implement 
an effective internal control system that addresses key program 
performance risks, monitors effectiveness and compliance, and reports 
deficiencies or material weaknesses in its internal control system 
through a report called the annual statement of assurance.[Footnote 
33] This statement is provided to the OSD Office of the Director of 
Administration and Management.[Footnote 34] DOD uses additional 
techniques in its general oversight of JIEDDO, such as the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense's review of certain high-dollar counter-IED 
initiatives. However, JIEDDO's internal control system and annual 
assurance statement are the key mechanisms DOD relies upon to 
comprehensively and uniformly summarize and monitor internal control 
system status within its organizations, including JIEDDO, and more 
importantly to report and elevate unremedied deficiencies to higher 
levels within and outside of DOD for awareness and action. 

DOD's oversight system, however, failed to detect, report, and take 
action to address the control weaknesses discussed previously in this 
report, which have been present at JIEDDO since its first year of 
operation. (Further, JIEDDO did not disclose these control weaknesses 
in either of its first two annual statements of assurance,[Footnote 
35] or fully detail all of its weaknesses in its third and most recent 
statement of assurance completed in July 2009). For example, JIEDDO 
excludes initiatives from some of the governance mechanisms of its 
review and approval process, which JIEDDO characterized as the most 
important part of its process before committing funding to any 
initiative. Moreover, JIEDDO did not disclose in its 2009 report the 
exclusion of initiatives from these important control processes. 

Given that DOD's internal control program did not result in the 
identification and reporting of these weaknesses and conditions at 
JIEDDO, the DOD Comptroller's department-level control intended to 
assure the quality of JIEDDO's annual assurance statement was not 
effective. In discussing this finding, DOD Comptroller officials 
stated that DOD reacts to findings and weaknesses reported by external 
organizations, such as GAO or the DOD IG, rather than proactively and 
systematically testing the subordinate organizations itself. However, 
without adequate oversight of its programs, DOD has inadequate 
assurance that JIEDDO operations are providing reliable data for 
evaluating progress towards mission objectives or otherwise adequately 
recognizing and disclosing existing weaknesses needing corrective 
action. 

Conclusions: 

As IEDs continue to pose a significant threat to U.S. forces in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, defeating the threat continues to be a high defense 
priority, which will likely require a continued significant investment 
in resources provided through JIEDDO. Collectively, this review's 
findings along with the findings of prior GAO reports underscore that 
JIEDDO has not had a systematic process in place to evaluate its 
results, ensure adherence to its acquisition process, and adequately 
develop and maintain an adequate internal control system. Although 
JIEDDO has taken some steps to improve its management and oversight in 
support of its mission to defeat IEDs, it is too early to know the 
results of these changes. For example, during this review, we learned 
that one JIEDDO office, the Acquisition Oversight Division, previously 
established in May 2008, was planned for elimination, therefore 
creating uncertainty regarding whether JIEDDO will maintain a process 
for identifying and reporting weaknesses with counter-IED initiatives. 
A key issue involves the need for sustained high-level management 
commitment and leadership to ensure needed changes have been 
implemented fully and correctly. Without this assurance, the 
possibility of continued exclusion of initiatives from JCAAMP 
requirements, coupled with a lack of adherence with all steps of the 
process required by applicable guidance, may significantly limit the 
transparency and accountability of JIEDDO's actions within JIEDDO, as 
well as to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the services, and other 
DOD components. 

Furthermore, the magnitude of resources required, coupled with the 
scale and span of JIEDDO's mission to focus all DOD counter-IED 
efforts, underscores the importance to achieve efficient use of 
funding made available to JIEDDO. Because of the continued absence of 
adequate internal controls, JIEDDO cannot ensure that its financial 
resources are being adequately managed or that decision makers get the 
most transparent information to make decisions if JIEDDO does not (1) 
develop a means for reliably measuring the effectiveness of its 
efforts and investments on combating IEDs; (2) fully adhere to 
processes that JIEDDO has designed to identify, assess, and acquire 
its counter-IED initiative investments; and (3) address material 
weaknesses in its internal control system. Furthermore, these 
improvements are needed to be able to assure OSD that the program is 
achieving its objectives, particularly in light of the fact that OSD 
has taken insufficient action to monitor and work closely with JIEDDO 
to improve JIEDDO's internal controls and the quality of its financial 
and personnel data necessary to assure Congress and the public that 
JIEDDO is effectively focusing all of its resources to address the 
threat of IEDs to U.S. forces. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense direct the Director of JIEDDO to take the 
following seven actions: 

To improve its processes for assessing effectiveness of counter-IED 
initiatives: 

* Include in the design for each counter-IED initiative a plan that 
includes appropriate outcome-oriented metrics and improved data 
collection and evaluation plans incorporating use of theater-level 
data as well as data capturing unexpected outcomes to gauge the 
effectiveness of initiatives, individually and collectively. 

* Ensure implementation of JIEDDO's plan to expand, across the 
organization, its process for documenting counter-IED initiative 
management actions and decisions. 

To improve adherence to JCAAMP: 

* Revise the JCAAMP instruction to more clearly define which 
initiatives are subject to JCAAMP. The revised instruction should: 

- define what constitutes a counter-IED initiative and what is 
considered overhead, and: 

- define and document JIEDDO's process for determining, identifying, 
and separately tracking other JIEDDO programs and activities that 
JIEDDO considers overhead and excludes from its JCAAMP process. 

* Ensure all steps of JCAAMP are followed and fully documented, as 
required. 

To develop an effective overall internal control system: 

* Ensure changes JIEDDO makes to its system of internal controls 
include steps to follow through on corrective actions and 
recommendations. 

* Take necessary measures to deploy sufficient staff with the needed 
skill and experience to assess, identify, address, and report to DOD 
on efforts taken to address its shortcomings. 

* Create positions or otherwise identify ways to access acquisition 
expertise to minimize risk in acquiring equipment or systems. 

To address JIEDDO's continued challenges in providing transparency and 
reasonable assurance concerning the effectiveness of its internal 
control system, we also are recommending that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Deputy Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: 

* Designate an organization in DOD, such as the DOD Comptroller, to 
monitor JIEDDO's progress in implementing its changes to address 
material weaknesses in its internal control system. 

* Develop and implement additional internal controls at the OSD level 
needed to ensure that JIEDDO is providing reliable data for evaluating 
its progress towards mission objectives or otherwise adequately 
recognizing and disclosing in management control reports any other 
existing control weaknesses needing corrective action. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred 
with all nine of our recommendations and delineated several actions 
DOD and JIEDDO are implementing or plan to implement to address our 
report findings. We believe that if fully implemented DOD's actions 
would address our recommendations. The department's written comments 
are reprinted in appendix II. 

Regarding our two recommendations related to improving processes for 
assessing effectiveness of counter-IED initiatives, DOD identified 
several actions it plans or has begun to implement. For example, 
JIEDDO stated that it has created a new planning board to verify that 
initiative assessment methodology development is concurrent with 
initiative development. JIEDDO also said it is implementing a new 
assessment methodology for all initiatives designed to provide a 
consistent evaluative framework to assess their level of readiness and 
risk when making specific decisions to continue, transition, or 
terminate initiatives. Additionally, DOD stated that additional 
controls have now been implemented to improve the documentation of all 
initiative management actions and decisions, such as publishing formal 
minutes for JCAAMP approval bodies. Lastly, JIEDDO expressed its 
expectation that its continued efforts to strengthen and validate 
control effectiveness will help to ensure that initiative management 
actions and decisions are formally documented, and that documentation 
is retained in a central location. We agree that these actions, if 
fully implemented, would satisfy our recommendations and improve the 
management of counter-IED initiatives by providing more insight into 
the effectiveness and historic expectations of each initiative. 

Regarding our two recommendations related to JCAAMP, DOD identified 
actions aimed at improving adherence to JCAAMP. Specifically, the 
department stated that JIEDDO will revise the JCAAMP to provide better 
definition of how JCAAMP applies to C-IED initiatives, developmental 
efforts, and staff and infrastructure support for initiatives. DOD 
also stated that JIEDDO will develop procedures to define and track 
programs that are funded outside of the JCAAMP and will refine its 
process of accounting for staff and infrastructure for core 
requirements and programs that support these requirements. The 
department also stated that JIEDDO conducted a detailed review of 
JCAAMP and concluded that the process is sound but that the root cause 
of our finding stemmed from inadequate documentation of JCAAMP 
actions. Consequently, DOD stated that JIEDDO plans to implement 
processes to track all JCAAMP actions to evidence that controls were 
properly executed and that justifications for any exceptions are 
appropriately documented. We agree that implementation of these 
actions are appropriate and should satisfy our findings. 

Regarding our three recommendations related to developing an effective 
overall internal control system, DOD concurred and offered several 
actions to addressing the findings. DOD stated that JIEDDO is 
implementing its manager's internal control program in accordance with 
DOD Instruction 5010.40 including JIEDDO's (1) engaging an independent 
audit and consulting firm in fiscal year 2010 to document high-risk 
processes, identify corrective actions, and implement process 
improvements, and (2) requiring its Internal Review office to monitor 
the implementation of corrective actions and report progress to JIEDDO 
leadership and all relevant oversight bodies as required. To improve 
sufficiency of JIEDDO's staff, DOD approved additional manpower 
increases at JIEDDO that will increase the ratio of government service 
employees to contractors and expand the skill sets required of its 
government service employees to include the needed skills and 
experience to address our findings including providing effective 
government oversight of JIEDDO programs, such as recruiting 
acquisition professionals against new authorizations approved in 
fiscal year 2010. We agree that these actions, if fully implemented, 
would satisfy our recommendations for improving JIEDDO's internal 
control system. 

Regarding our two recommendations focused on providing transparency 
and reasonable assurance concerning the effectiveness of its internal 
control system, DOD stated that it has actions underway to address our 
findings. Specifically, DOD said the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense, Comptroller is assigning its Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness Directorate the responsibility to monitor and report upon 
JIEDDO's progress in the development and implementation of internal 
controls. Additionally, according to DOD, the Under Secretary of 
Defense, Comptroller, Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 
Directorate is taking action to emphasize the requirement and 
proactive implementation of the department's Managers' Internal 
Control Program including (1) in June 2010 the DOD Comptroller, 
Managers' Internal Control Manager, is meeting with senior managers 
from the Department of Defense, Inspector General to make arrangements 
to develop regular communications between the two to institutionalize 
the sharing of audit-related insights and potential recommendations 
that focus upon operational, administrative, and program controls, and 
(2) in fiscal year 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, 
Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Branch will begin to conduct 
onsite validation meetings with each of the DOD Components responsible 
for submission of a Statement of Assurance to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and rate each component's internal control 
program with a score providing improved oversight through the 
validation of the DOD Component's adherence with DOD Instruction 
5010.40. We agree that these actions will not only address our 
findings, but also provide positive evidence that DOD is demonstrating 
the principles underlying the monitoring standards for an internal 
control system throughout the department. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report will be available 
at no charge on GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8365 or by e-mail at SolisW@GAO.GOV. Contact 
information for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
have made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix 
III. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's 
(JIEDDO) efforts to measure the effectiveness of its efforts and 
investments, we requested, reviewed, and discussed with JIEDDO 
officials current and anticipated efforts to measure and evaluate its 
operations and activities. We reviewed these efforts to determine the 
progress, breadth, and depth of JIEDDO's measurement development and 
their applicability towards JIEDDO's ability to successfully evaluate 
its operations initiatives. We reviewed assessments JIEDDO cited as 
examples of measuring its activities and measures and determined that 
collectively, JIEDDO's measurement development efforts were not 
followed through to completion and had not evolved beyond the planning 
stages. We reviewed the instances where JIEDDO attempted to conduct 
individual measurement exercises for counter-IED initiatives, 
including those that JIEDDO characterized as completed--successful-- 
and those that were not completed--unsuccessful. In discussion with 
JIEDDO officials and in review of the underlying information, we 
developed examples of limitations experienced during the individual 
efforts. We then categorized and summarized the limitations, 
challenges, and underlying root causes, for the exercises we reviewed, 
for JIEDDO's limited progress in its measurement efforts, and for 
potential actions to improve chances for success. 

To assess JIEDDO's adherence to its review and approval process, we 
reviewed, analyzed, and discussed JIEDDO guidance with JIEDDO 
officials to identify key steps in its process, and then collected 
corroborating data from 56 case studies of JIEDDO's most costly 
counter-IED initiatives for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to determine 
whether JIEDDO's stated process was followed by JIEDDO managers and 
personnel. These studies included over $4.67 billion in fiscal year 
2009 projects and initiatives funded with fiscal years 2008 and 2009 
appropriations. We also identified required approval controls over use 
of funds, reviewed selected transactions for compliance with these 
controls, and assessed whether the data recorded in the accounting and 
managerial systems accurately reflected JIEDDO's activities. We drew 
high-dollar initiatives to more efficiently assess the largest portion 
of JIEDDO's funds. We included representative initiatives from 
JIEDDO's three mission-related lines of operations. [Footnote 36] We 
also reviewed large-dollar initiatives approved by the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Because we 
identified weaknesses in the completeness and accuracy of JIEDDO's 
documentation and controls, we did not review the full range of 
initiatives we had originally planned because it would have added no 
further value for purposes of addressing the objectives of this 
review. Our analysis drew from a universe of the 497 initiatives 
listed in JIEDDO's initiative management system--CCARs--as of March 
30, 2009, against which JIEDDO had earmarked, committed, obligated, 
and/or expended its fiscal years 2008 and 2009 appropriations. We took 
steps to ensure that the universe data JIEDDO provided for funded-to-
date initiates were complete by comparing the sum of the total dollar 
amounts to the total appropriations/funds made available to JIEDDO for 
fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Using embedded JIEDDO codes, we separated 
the data into subsets based on categories that JIEDDO uses to 
characterize and manage its operations: (1) attack the network that 
enables the use of IEDs, (2) defeat the IED itself once emplaced, and 
(3) train the military forces in counter-IED techniques. For each 
category, we ranked all of the associated initiatives to identify the 
20 that carried the highest requirement for fiscal year 2008 and 
fiscal year 2009 combined for a total of 60 initiatives from the 
JIEDDO's lines of operations. We excluded 4 initiatives after we 
learned that the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General was 
closely scrutinizing them for mandated audits already underway, 
reducing the number of case studies conducted and completed by GAO to 
56 in total, which reflected a total of $4.67 billion in combined 
fiscal years 2008 and 2009 funding that JIEDDO had approved at the 
time we collected our data. For each initiative, we collected the 
individual documentation packages JIEDDO is supposed to file and 
maintain as proof of JIEDDO actions and to provide an audit trail for 
JIEDDO personnel and others to determine the history and progress of 
an initiative. We then compared the progress of each initiative as 
reflected in JIEDDO's accounting system with details in the individual 
documentation packages, to determine whether historic documentation 
matched the financial record and whether various decision points were 
documented and approved as required by the JIEDDO directive, 
instruction, and standard operating procedures. In cases where JEDDO's 
documentation appeared to be incomplete or incongruent, we discussed 
the gaps on a case-by-case basis with initiative program managers and 
JIEDDO managers from accounting and finance, acquisition oversight, 
internal review, and the office of the chief of staff. Through the 
progress of the audit, we shared tentative observations and concerns 
with JIEDDO management officials prior to reaching conclusions on each 
of the initiatives. Once we had concluded data gathering and analysis 
on individual initiatives, we reviewed and arrayed the data to 
identify patterns of adherence issues related to JIEDDO's directive, 
instruction, and standard operating procedures, as well as to federal 
internal control standards. We presented and discussed our findings to 
JIEDDO management, made corrections where warranted to individual 
initiatives, and have summarized these as findings in the body of this 
report. We visited and met with officials from JIEDDO's Joint Center 
of Excellence (JIEDDO's organization managing counter-IED 
initiatives), the National Training Center (site for some of JIEDDO's 
counter-IED training initiatives), JIEDDO's Technology and 
Requirements Integration Division, JIEDDO's Acquisition Oversight 
Division, JIEDDO's command group, JIEDDO's Operations Research Systems 
Analysis Division, and JIEDDO's and Resource Management Division 
(JIEDDO's organization performing budget, accounting, and finance 
functions) to gather information corroborating and explaining the 
financial activity and documentation related to JIEDDO initiatives we 
tested. 

To assess JIEDDO's actions to address overall internal control system 
weaknesses previously reported by GAO, we interviewed and discussed 
with JIEDDO officials their efforts to improve JIEDDO's internal 
control system in response to prior related GAO findings. We collected 
and reviewed internal and external guidance and documentation of 
JIEDDO's internal control system. We reviewed and compared JIEDDO's 
annual statements of assurance regarding JIEDDO's internal controls 
system. We then analyzed the information collected and discussed the 
significance of conditions observed with JIEDDO officials. 

We also examined documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E, which 
established JIEDDO, other documentation and briefings relating to 
JIEDDO's evolution, and JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, which established 
JIEDDO's rapid acquisition process, as well as other documents and 
briefings from JIEDDO, the services, and other DOD entities. We 
discussed JIEDDO's management of its internal processes, its strategic 
planning, initiative development, and internal controls. We assessed 
the reliability of JIEDDO's financial data we reviewed by (1) 
corroborating the data with supporting information and documentation 
from physical file records at JIEDDO headquarters and from initiative 
program offices, (2) reviewing existing information about the data and 
the system that produced them, and (3) interviewing agency officials 
knowledgeable about the data. Based on this work, we determined that 
the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the review of 
initiatives. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2008 to May 2010 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Joint IED Defeat Organization: 
5000 Army Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20310-5000: 

June 21, 2010: 

Mr. William Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Solis: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-10-660, 'Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's System of 
Internal Control' dated May 12. 2010 (GAO Code 351230). 

The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) 
executes its mission in support of COCOM requirements by rapidly 
responding to urgent warfighter needs. The single most relevant factor 
in JIEDDO's decision making and coordination efforts is to ensure 
these capabilities are available to a COCOM engaged in combat during a 
decisive time of need A "good enough" solution delivered rapidly in a 
dynamic war environment is more valuable than an ideal solution 
delivered much later. JIEDDO provides C-IED capabilities and both 
material and non-material solutions in a rapid manner based upon 
requirement urgency and solution maturity. JIEDDO's organizational 
value is based on this ability and flexibility to respond to COCOM 
needs as quickly as possible while accepting a higher level of program 
risk. 

JIEDDO recognizes that in accepting a higher risk profile in executing 
the mission that effective stewardship of its resources is a vital 
concern. This report highlights areas for improvement in defining 
acceptable levels of risk while maintaining effective oversight
and internal control of our processes. To this end JIEDDO is 
conducting a complete review of functions and processes and 
implementing a manager's internal control program that will provide 
assurance of effective use of JIEDDO resources. Ourendstate is to 
establish a system of internal controls that is assessable, 
accountable, and transparent for JIEDDO's decision making processes 
and program management in support of the warfighter. 

The enclosed attachment contains a detailed response to each 
recommendation. Comments on technical or factual corrections to the 
report were provided in a separate document to the GAO audit team. The 
point of contact for this response is Mr. William Rigby, JIEDDO 
internal Review, william.rigby@jieddo.dod.mil, 703-602-4807. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Michael L. Oates: 
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army: 
Director: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report — Dated May 12, 2010: 
GAO Code 351230/GAO-10-660: 

"Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization's System of Internal Control" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Deputy Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to 
include in the design for each counter-improvised explosive device 
(IED) initiative a plan that includes appropriate outcome oriented 
metrics, improved data collection and evaluation plans incorporating 
the use of theater level data as well as data capturing unexpected 
outcomes to gauge the effectiveness of initiatives, individually and 
collectively. 

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. During the conduct of this audit JIEDDO has 
taken several steps to improve initiative assessments and continues to 
refine our processes and reviews to ensure assessments are conducted 
for each initiative. JIEDDO implemented a planning board for 
initiatives that incorporates developing an assessment methodology 
concurrent with initiative development. JIEDDO is implementing an 
assessment methodology for all initiatives to provide a consistent 
evaluative framework to assess their level of readiness and risk to 
inform decision making specific to each Transition Point. This 
framework will provide transparency for incremental changes over time 
to furnish senior leaders with comprehensive information to inform 
decision making. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Deputy Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to 
ensure implementation of JIEDDO's plan to expand, across the 
organization, its process for documenting counter-improvised explosive 
device (IED) initiative management actions and decisions. 

DOD Response: Concur. JIEDDO has implemented additional controls to 
improve the documentation of all initiative management actions and 
decisions, such as publishing formal minutes for Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Capability and Acquisition Management Process 
(JCAAMP) approval bodies. In accordance with the finding, JIEDDO will 
continue to strengthen and validate control effectiveness, to ensure 
that all initiative management actions and decisions are formally 
documented, and that documentation is retained in a central location. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Deputy Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to 
revise the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Capability and 
Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) instruction to more clearly 
define which initiatives are subject to JCAAMP. The revised 
instruction should: 

* Define what constitutes a counter-improvised explosive device (IED) 
initiative and what is considered overhead. 

* Define and document JIEDDO's process for determining, identifying, 
and separately tracking other JIEDDO programs and activities that 
JIEDDO considers overhead and excludes from its JCAAMP process. 

DOD Response: Concur. JIEDDO will revise the JCAAMP to provide better 
definition of how JCAAMP applies to Counter-Improvised Explosive 
Device (CIED) initiatives, developmental efforts and staff and 
infrastructure support for initiatives. JIEDDO will develop procedures 
to define and track programs that are funded outside of the JCAAMP. 
JIEDDO will refine its process of accounting for staff and 
infrastructure for core requirements and programs that support these 
requirements. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Deputy Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to 
ensure all steps of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 
Capability and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) are followed 
and fully documented, as required. 

DOD Response: Concur. JIEDDO conducted a detailed review to determine 
the root causes of the GAO's findings, and identify opportunities to 
strengthen controls to mitigate issues cited in this report. This 
review determined that the JCAAMP process is sound but that the root 
cause stemmed from inadequate documentation of JCAAMP actions. In 
response to the GAO's concerns, JIEDDO will implement processes to 
track all JCAAMP actions to evidence that controls were properly 
executed and that justifications for any exceptions are appropriately 
documented. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Deputy Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to 
ensure changes JIEDDO makes to its system of internal controls include 
steps to follow-through on corrective actions and recommendations. 

DOD Response: Concur. JIEDDO is implementing a manager's internal 
control program in accordance with DoD Instruction 5010.40. JIEDDO 
retained an independent audit and consulting firm in FY10 to document 
high risk processes, identify corrective
actions, and implement process improvements. The JIEDDO Internal 
Review office will monitor the implementation of corrective actions 
and report progress to JIEDDO leadership and all relevant oversight 
bodies as required. 

Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Deputy Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to take 
necessary measures to deploy sufficient staff with the needed skill 
and experience to assess, identify, address, and report to DoD on 
efforts taken to address its shortcomings. 

DOD Response: Concur. In February and April 2010 the Department of the 
Army as the Executive Agent for JIEDDO manpower authorizations 
approved increases in JIEDDO authorizations that allow JIEDDO to in 
source government professional positions. JIEDDO is developing 
appropriate position descriptions and recruiting government service 
(GS) hires with the needed skills and experience to address the issues 
identified by the GAO and to provide effective government oversight of 
JIEDDO programs. 

Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Deputy Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to 
create positions or otherwise identify ways to access acquisition 
expertise to minimize risk in acquiring equipment or systems. 

DOD Response: Concur. JIEDDO recognizes the need to augment and 
supplement our existing acquisition workforce with additional staff 
trained and qualified to conduct and oversee acquisition in the DOD. 
JIEDDO is recruiting acquisition professionals against new 
authorizations approved in FY10. JIEDDO is converting several existing 
positions to align with the DoD Acquisition Corps. JIEDDO is exploring 
opportunities to have acquisition personnel from other agencies 
support JIEDDO on a rotational basis to provide short time support and 
additional training and mentorship to the existing JIEDDO acquisition 
workforce. JIEDDO is partnering with the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) to provide training to the JIEDDO workforce. The 
recent addition of a second highly experience government contracts 
attorney to the Office of General Counsel will further strengthen 
JIEDDO's acquisition expertise and help keep risk at acceptable levels. 

Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Deputy Secretary of Defense designate an organization in 
DoD, such as the DoD Comptroller to monitor the Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) progress in 
implementing its changes to address material weaknesses in its 
internal control system. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 
Comptroller will assign the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 
Directorate the responsibility to monitor and report upon the Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's progress in the 
development and implementation of internal controls. 

Recommendation 9: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Deputy Secretary of Defense develop and implement 
additional internal controls at the OSD level needed to ensure that 
the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) is 
providing reliable data for evaluating its progress towards mission 
objectives or otherwise adequately recognizing and disclosing in 
management control reports any other existing control weaknesses 
needing corrective action. 

DOD Response: Concur. This fiscal year, the Under Secretary of 
Defense, Comptroller, Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 
Directorate has met individually with the majority of the Department 
of Defense Components that are required to submit annually a Statement 
of Assurance to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The purpose of 
these meetings to: 1) emphasize the requirement and proactive 
implementation of the Department's Managers' Internal Control Program 
through adherence with the DoD Instruction 5010.40 to include ongoing 
support and active participation by Senior Management (e.g., "tone-at-
the—top"), a risk-based approach and the use of self-reporting so that 
material internal control weaknesses can be identified and remediated 
prior to their potential negative impact upon the organization's 
mission. 

During June 2010, the DoD Comptroller, Managers' Internal Control 
Manager met with Senior Managers from the Department of Defense, 
Inspector General. The purpose of the meeting was review of the DoD 
Comptroller's actions initiated this fiscal year to ensure that each 
DoD Component understands and pro-actively addresses the requirements 
of DoD Instruction 5010.40. It was agreed that the two organizations 
would initiate regular communications for the purpose to share audit 
related insights and potential recommendations that focus upon 
operational, administrative and program controls. 

Beginning in fiscal year 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense, 
Comptroller, Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Branch plans to 
conduct onsite validation meetings with each of the DoD Components 
responsible for submission of a Statement of Assurance to the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense. The purpose of these onsite visits will 
be to provide oversight through the validation of the DoD Component's 
adherence with DoD Instruction 5010.40. Scoring criteria has been 
distributed to each of the DoD Components and is also posted on the 
DoD Managers' Internal Control Program web site. Each DoD Component's 
Managers' Internal Control Program will be evaluated and the Component 
will receive a score that represents their adherence with DoD 
Instruction 5010.40. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

For further information please contact William Solis, (202) 512-8365 
or solisw@gao.gov. 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Cary B. Russell (Assistant 
Director), Grace Coleman, Ron La Due Lake, Lonnie McAllister, Tristan 
T. To, Jason Pogacnik, Jim Lloyd, and Yong Song, and John Strong made 
key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Department of Defense Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) (Feb. 14, 2006). 

[2] H.R. Rep. No. 110-477 (conference report accompanying the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008). 

[3] Joint IED Defeat Organization Instruction 5000.01, Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and 
Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) (Nov. 9, 2007). 

[4] External guidance includes federal standards as well as DOD 
regulations, directives, and guides governing internal control 
requirements and their application within DOD and JIEDDO. 

[5] Staff and infrastructure includes Non-Counter-IED Requirements 
which JIEDDO defines as typically CONUS-only costs, and JIEDDO 
Operations and Plans for typically Iraq and Afghanistan costs. JIEDDOI 
5000.01, para. E5.4.2. (Nov. 9, 2007). 

[6] GAO, Defense Management: More Transparency Needed over the 
Financial and Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-342] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 
2008). 

[7] GAO, Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD's Ability to 
Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices 
Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2009) and GAO, Warfighter Support: Actions 
Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of DOD's Counter 
Improvised Explosive Device Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95] (Washington, D.C.: October 
2009). 

[8] JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01 (Nov. 9, 2007). 

[9] The JIEDDO instruction revision occurred after the completion of 
our fieldwork and changes therein have not been fully implemented due 
to change of leadership and pending reorganization of JIEDDO. 

[10] OMB Circular No. A-11, Sec 200.3, Preparation and Submission of 
Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Program 
Performance Reports (2009). 

[11] Government Performance and Results Act, (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 
1115-1119) (2010); Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993); [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1], Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government (November 1999). 

[12] GAO, Defense Management: A Strategic Plan is Needed to Guide the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's Efforts to 
Effectively Accomplish its Mission, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-377C] (Washington D.C.: Mar. 28, 
2007). 

[13] JIEDDO, JIEDDO's Fiscal Year 2009-2010 Strategy (February 2009). 

[14] Government Performance and Results Act, Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

[15] DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 14, 2006). JIEDDOI 5000.01 (Nov. 9, 
2007). 

[16] DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 14, 2006). 

[17] JIEDDOI 5000.01, ¶ E5.4.2. 

[18] DOD Directive 2000.19E, para. 3.1. (Feb. 14, 2006). "Materiel 
solution" is defined in CJCSI 3170.01G as correction of a deficiency, 
a solution to a capability gap, or incorporation of new technology 
that involves development or acquisition of a new item or piece of 
equipment and "non-material solution" is defined as a solution to a 
capability gap that involves changes in doctrine, organization, 
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, 
or policy, the materiel portion of which is restricted to commercial 
or nondevelopmental items, which may be purchased commercially, or by 
purchasing more systems from an existing materiel program. 

[19] DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 14, 2006). 

[20] JIEDDOI 5000.01 (Nov. 9, 2007). 

[21] JIEDDO organizational elements each establish standard operating 
procedures for conducting the business of that given organizational 
element within applicable JIEDDO and DOD guidance. For example, 
Resource Management has established and documented its required 
standard operating procedures in a 276-page document. 

[22] DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 14, 2006), and JIEDDOI 5000.01 (Nov. 
9, 2007). 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1], 
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (November 
1999). 

[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(November 1999). 

[25] GAO, Defense Management: A Strategic Plan is Needed to Guide the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's Efforts to 
Effectively Accomplish its Mission, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-377C] (Washington D.C.: Mar. 28, 
2007), [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-342], and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95]. 

[26] JIEDDO Memorandum for Director of Administration and Management 
(July 9, 2009). Annual Statement Required under the Federal Managers' 
Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA). 

[27] JIEDDO's Acquisition Oversight Division, which is responsible for 
oversight of JIEDDO's counter I-ED inititiatives acquisition 
management, is separate from the internal review office, which is 
responsible for the JIEDDO-wide internal control program. 

[28] After the completion of our audit work, we provided JIEDDO 
management with a statement of facts that included the forgoing 
actions documented during our work at JIEDDO. In discussing the audit 
finding, JIEDDO management informed GAO that the new JIEDDO Director 
has since decided to retain JIEDDO's Acquisition Oversight Division as 
an organizational element at JIEDDO. However, during the same 
discussion, JIEDDO officials also acknowledged that the oversight 
division will not be maintained in its present form and that the size, 
functions, and responsibilities of the oversight division have yet to 
be determined. 

[29] JIEDDO Memorandum for Director of Administration and Management 
(July 9, 2009). Annual Statement Required under the Federal Managers' 
Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA). 

[30] Inherently governmental functions are those that are intimately 
related to the public interest as to mandate performance only by 
federal employees 

[31] These included, for example, intelligence analysis specialists 
with weapons and cultural expertise, experienced scientists--including 
chemists and physicists--with military explosives expertise, and 
program/system integrators with expertise in the differences between 
JIEDDO's system development process and standard DOD system 
development processes. 

[32] The JIEDDO director requested an assistance visit from the 
Defense Acquisition University and the Defense Contract Management 
Agency, which each provided two experienced persons to the team for a 
1-week review conducted in February 2010. The director made the 
request as part of his effort to develop an understanding of JIEDDO's 
processes and the request included assessing JIEDDO's rapid 
acquisition process. 

[33] DOD regulation defines material weaknesses as reportable 
conditions which, in management's judgment, are significant enough to 
report to the next higher level. 

[34] "The Director of Administration and Management consolidates the 
JIEDDO statement into the OSD statement which is reported to the 
Secretary of Defense. The OSD Comptroller prepares the DOD statement 
for the Secretary of Defense, using the Component Heads annual 
assurance statements as the basis for the Department's level of 
assurance." 

[35] Statement of assurance first issued in 2007, and second statement 
of assurance followed in 2008. 

[36] These include JIEDDO's operations to (1) attack the network that 
enables the use of IEDs, (2) defeat the IED itself once emplaced, and 
(3) train the military forces in counter-IED techniques. We excluded 
JIEDDO's fourth line of operations because it includes staff and 
infrastructure activities not directly related to the other three 
lines of operations, which are directly involved in the development of 
JIEDDO's counter-IED initiatives. 

[End of section] 

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