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entitled 'Sudan Divestment: U.S. Investors Sold Assets but Could
Benefit from Increased Disclosure Regarding Companies' Ties to Sudan'
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2010:
Sudan Divestment:
U.S. Investors Sold Assets but Could Benefit from Increased Disclosure
Regarding Companies' Ties to Sudan:
GAO-10-742:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-742, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Recognizing the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan, Congress enacted
the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act (SADA) in 2007. This law
supports U.S. states’ and investment companies’ decisions to divest
from companies with certain business ties to Sudan. It also seeks to
prohibit federal contracting with these companies. GAO was asked to
(1) identify actions that U.S. state fund managers and investment
companies took regarding Sudan-related assets; (2) describe the
factors that these entities considered in determining whether and how
to divest; and (3) determine whether the U.S. government has
contracted with companies identified as having certain Sudan-related
business operations and assess compliance with SADA’s federal contract
prohibition provision. GAO surveyed states, analyzed data on
investment companies and companies with Sudan-related business
operations, assessed federal contracts, and reviewed documents and
interviewed officials from the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), among other federal agencies.
What GAO Found:
Since 2006, U.S. state treasurers and public pension fund managers
have divested or frozen about $3.5 billion in assets primarily related
to Sudan in response to their states’ laws and policies; U.S.
investment companies, which also sold Sudan-related assets, most
commonly cited normal business reasons for changes in their holdings.
State fund managers GAO surveyed indicated that their primary reason
for divesting or freezing Sudan-related assets was to comply with
their states’ laws or policies. Thirty-five U.S. states have enacted
legislation or adopted policies affecting their investments related to
Sudan, primarily in response to the Darfur crisis, as well as in
response to Sudan’s designation by the U.S. government as a state
sponsor of terrorism. GAO also found that the value of U.S. shares
invested in six key foreign companies with Sudan-related business
operations declined by almost 60 percent from March 2007 to December
2009. The decline cannot be accounted for solely by a reduction in
stock prices for these companies, indicating that U.S. investors, on
net, decided to sell shares in these companies. Investors indicated
that they bought and sold Sudan-related assets for normal business
reasons, such as maximizing shareholder value.
U.S. states and investment companies have often considered three
factors when determining whether and how to divest. First, they have
considered whether divesting from Sudan is consistent with fiduciary
responsibility—generally the duty to act solely and prudently in the
interest of a beneficiary or plan participant. Second, they have
considered the difficulty in identifying authoritative and consistent
information about companies with Sudan-related business operations.
GAO analyzed three available lists of these companies and found that
they differed significantly from one another. While information
directly provided by companies through public documents such as
disclosures required by the SEC is a particularly reliable source of
information on these companies, federal securities laws do not require
companies specifically to disclose business operations in state
sponsors of terrorism. The SEC has the discretionary authority to
adopt a specific disclosure requirement for this information, but has
not exercised this authority. Third, investors have considered the
effect that divestment might have on operating companies with Sudan-
related business activities, such as prompting companies interested in
promoting social responsibility to leave Sudan, creating room for
companies that do not share that interest to enter the Sudanese market.
GAO’s analysis, including a review of a non-random selection of
contracts, indicates that the U.S. government has complied with SADA’s
contract prohibition provision. Specifically, the U.S. government has
contracted with only one company identified on a widely-used list of
companies with business ties to Sudan, and the contracts awarded to
this company did not violate SADA. The U.S. government has contracted
with subsidiaries and affiliates of companies with business ties to
Sudan, as permitted under SADA.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the SEC consider issuing a rule requiring
companies that trade on U.S. exchanges to disclose their business
operations tied to Sudan, as well as possibly other state sponsors of
terrorism. The SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance agreed to present
GAO’s recommendation to the commission.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-742] or key
components. For more information, contact Thomas Melito at (202) 512-
9601 or melitot@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
U.S. State Fund Managers and Investment Companies Have Sold Sudan-
related Assets for Varying Reasons:
U.S. Investors Have Often Considered Three Factors When Determining
Whether and How to Divest from Companies Tied to Sudan:
Our Analysis Indicates That the U.S. Government Has Complied with the
Federal Contract Prohibition Provision of SADA:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Sudan-related Equities Price Index Methodology:
Appendix III: Questionnaire:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Total Sudan-related Assets Divested or Frozen by States, 2006
to January 2010:
Table 2: State Laws and Policies Regarding Sudan-related Assets
Effective as of April 2010:
Table 3: Summary Response Table:
Figures:
Figure 1: U.S. Holdings and Prices of Sudan-related Companies, March
2007 to December 2009:
Figure 2: Comparison of Three Lists Identifying Operating Companies
with Ties to Sudan:
Figure 3: Price Indices for the U.S. Sudan-related Equity Portfolio:
Abbreviations:
ERISA: Employee Retirement Income Security Act:
FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulations:
OFPP: Office of Federal Procurement Policy:
ORCA: Online Representation and Certifications Application:
PERS: Public Employee Retirement System:
SADA: Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act:
SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 22, 2010:
The Honorable Barney Frank:
Chairman:
Committee on Financial Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Michael E. Capuano:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Barbara Lee:
House of Representatives:
Since 1993, the U.S. Secretary of State has included Sudan on the
"State Sponsors of Terrorism" list for repeatedly providing support
for acts of international terrorism.[Footnote 1] In 2003, U.S.
concerns grew, as militias supported by the Sudanese government in
Khartoum began waging what the U.S. government has characterized as
genocide against the civilian population of Darfur. According to
several nongovernmental groups and experts, this campaign may be
financed, in part, by revenue collected from companies with business
operations in Sudan ("operating companies"), particularly in four key
economic sectors--power production, mineral extraction, oil-related
activities, and production of military equipment. In 2007, the U.S.
Congress enacted the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act[Footnote
2] (SADA), which supports U.S. states' voluntary decisions to divest
from foreign companies conducting certain business operations in Sudan
in these four key economic sectors.[Footnote 3] The act also contains
a "safe harbor" provision, which gives investment companies that
divest[Footnote 4] from these companies safe harbor from lawsuits
"based solely upon the investment company divesting from, or avoiding
investment in, securities issued by persons[Footnote 5] that conduct
or have direct investments in business operations" designated under
SADA, provided the investment companies file disclosure forms with the
SEC in accordance with SADA. In addition, the act seeks to prohibit
the U.S. government from contracting with companies that conduct
certain business operations in Sudan. To that end, section 6 of the
act (Prohibition on United States Government Contracts) requires all
U.S. government agencies to ensure that each contract entered into for
the procurement of goods or services includes a clause requiring the
contractor to certify that it does not conduct certain business
operations in Sudan in the four key economic sectors. The federal rule
implementing this requirement stipulates that, in most cases, the
required certification must be included in the solicitation for each
new federal contract.[Footnote 6]
At your request, we (1) identified actions that U.S. state fund
managers and U.S.-based investment companies have taken regarding
their Sudan-related assets and attempted to determine the reasons for
these actions; (2) described the factors that these entities
considered in determining whether and how to divest; and (3)
determined whether the U.S. government has contracted with companies
identified as having Sudan-related business operations and assessed
compliance with the contract prohibition provision of SADA.
To address the first two objectives regarding U.S. states' actions, we
conducted a survey of treasurers and public pension fund managers in
all 50 states and the District of Columbia.[Footnote 7] Specifically,
we surveyed (1) the 51 state treasurers or their equivalents; (2) the
51 state-run public employee retirement system funds; and (3) managers
of 50 other state-run public pension funds, such as teacher retirement
funds.[Footnote 8] (In some states, holdings are contained in several
funds managed by different individuals.) We chose the first and second
categories because they were frequently identified in state laws as
the entities responsible for implementing any divestment actions. We
chose the third category to include the funds with the largest asset
values after the funds managed by public employee retirement systems
and treasurers, since some state laws also affected these state-run
funds. For the purposes of this report, we refer to the individuals in
each of these categories as "state fund managers." We administered the
survey between February and April 2010. Ninety-one percent (or 138 of
151) of fund managers responded to our survey, with at least 1 fund
manager from each of the 51 states providing responses. We also
reviewed state laws and policies[Footnote 9] regarding investment of
their Sudan-related assets.[Footnote 10]
To identify the actions that investment companies took regarding their
Sudan-related assets, we first had to identify foreign operating
companies with business ties to Sudan as a way to isolate and track
U.S. investors' holdings in these companies. We obtained and compared
three lists of such operating companies, including those that are
widely used by states in determining whether and how to divest from
Sudan. From these lists, we selected six operating companies that
appeared on all three lists, including companies that have been
targeted through public divestment campaigns, and have operations in
Sudan's oil sector, which plays a central role in that country's
economy. To analyze U.S. investment companies' holdings in these six
key foreign operating companies, as well as the stock prices of these
companies, we used shareholder ownership and market data (purchased
from Thomson Reuters). We also interviewed investment companies
regarding Sudan-related assets. We identified these companies by
selecting those that had spoken publicly about the issue of Sudan
divestment, as well as by issuing an invitation through a large
national association of investment companies to all of its members.
[Footnote 11] Six investment companies agreed to speak with us, and
one provided written answers anonymously from 31 of its sub-advisers.
In addition, we interviewed eight foreign operating companies that
have Sudan-related business operations or had previously operated in
Sudan. We identified and contacted 22 companies that appeared on at
least one of the lists we analyzed and represented a mix of both
Western (primarily European) and Eastern (or Asian) companies. Nine
agreed to speak with us, all of them Western.[Footnote 12] Finally, we
reviewed documents and interviewed agency officials from the SEC and
the Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury. (States are required
to submit written notice of divestment to the Department of Justice;
investment companies seeking to rely upon the safe harbor provision of
SADA are required to disclose their divestment in a filing with the
SEC.) The SEC is responsible for overseeing the federal securities
laws, which require public companies to disclose information about
their operations, among other things, to investors. Through its Office
of Global Security Risk, the SEC monitors operating companies'
disclosure of material[Footnote 13] business activities in or with
ties to state sponsors of terrorism and issues comments to these
companies when appropriate. The Department of State oversees U.S.
foreign policy toward Sudan, and the Department of the Treasury
administers and enforces U.S. sanctions against Sudan.
To address the third objective, we searched the Federal Procurement
Data System--Next Generation on March 2, 2010, to determine whether
the U.S. government awarded federal contracts from June 12, 2008, to
March 1, 2010, to foreign companies identified as having business ties
to Sudan, as well as to some of their subsidiaries and affiliates. (We
determined that this data system was sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our review because we did not need to identify the
universe of contracts subject to SADA in order to complete our
analysis.)[Footnote 14] We then selected the highest dollar amount
contract or contract modification for each of the 31 companies we
identified and, if the solicitation was issued on or after June 12,
2008--when the interim implementing regulations took effect--reviewed
the solicitation or other relevant documentation for presence of the
applicable Sudan-related certification clause.[Footnote 15] We also
reviewed federal rules related to the requirement and interviewed U.S.
officials at the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of
the Treasury, and the General Services Administration.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to June 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. (Appendix I
provides a detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and
methodology.)
Results in Brief:
U.S. state fund managers reported that, since 2006, they have divested
or frozen[Footnote 16] about $3.5 billion in assets primarily related
to Sudan in response to their state laws and policies; U.S. investment
companies, which also sold Sudan-related assets, most commonly cited
normal business reasons for changes in their holdings. We found that,
from 2006 to 2010, 23 states divested their assets from a total of 67
operating companies, with New Jersey's divestment of almost $2.2
billion representing about 62 percent of the total. The fund managers
responding to our survey who had divested or frozen or planned to
divest or freeze their states' Sudan-related assets indicated that
their primary reason for doing so was to comply with their states'
laws or policies, rather than out of concern for the situation in
Darfur. Thirty-five U.S. states have enacted legislation or
implemented policies affecting investments related to Sudan, primarily
in response to the Darfur crisis, as well as in response to Sudan's
designation by the U.S. government as a state sponsor of terrorism.
They also reflect a variety of approaches, such as mandating or
encouraging divestment and prohibiting state contracts with certain
companies that have business operations related to Sudan. Data
indicate that U.S.-based investment companies have also reduced their
Sudan-related holdings. Specifically, we determined that, from March
2007 to December 2009, the total value of U.S. shares invested in six
key foreign companies with Sudan-related business operations declined
by almost 60 percent. This decline cannot be accounted for solely by a
reduction in stock prices for these companies, indicating that U.S.
investors, on net, decided to sell shares in these companies. Most
commonly, U.S. investment companies told us or reported that they
bought and sold Sudan-related assets for normal business reasons, such
as maximizing shareholder value consistent with the guidelines in each
fund's prospectus, as well as in response to specific client
instructions.
U.S. states and investment companies have often considered the
following three factors when determining whether and how to divest
from companies tied to Sudan:
* Whether divesting from Sudan is consistent with fiduciary
responsibility.[Footnote 17] For example, of the 29 state fund
managers responding to our survey who had divested or frozen their
Sudan-related assets, or planned to do so, 17 (or 59 percent) said
they were concerned to a moderate or large extent that "it would be
difficult to divest while ensuring that fiduciary trust requirements
were not breached and my office/state was not made vulnerable to law
suits." Private investment companies expressed differing views on
their fiduciary duty in the context of Sudan-related divestment. Some
expressed the view that taking social concerns into account when
making investment decisions, rather than focusing on maximizing
returns on investment, is inconsistent with fiduciary responsibility.
Other companies, particularly those identifying themselves as socially
responsible, expressed the view that divesting from Sudan is
consistent with fiduciary responsibility, provided that the divested
assets are placed in alternative investments that can compete
financially. Despite the different views expressed on fiduciary
responsibility in the context of divesting for social reasons, several
investment companies told us that SADA's safe harbor provision from
lawsuits alleging breach of fiduciary duty was not necessary, either
because they viewed divesting for social concerns as consistent with
fiduciary responsibility or because they would not characterize their
decision to sell shares related to Sudan as divestment. As of May
2010, two investment companies have taken advantage of the safe harbor
provision.
* The difficulty in identifying authoritative and consistent
information about companies with Sudan-related business operations.
Under SADA, states that divest from operating companies with business
operations in Sudan must use credible information to identify those
companies. However, there is no single, authoritative list of
operating companies with business ties to Sudan, and the three lists
we analyzed differed significantly from one another. Although
information provided directly by companies is particularly useful to
investors, companies' SEC disclosure filings do not consistently
contain all information about their operations in Sudan because
federal securities laws do not specifically require companies to
report all activities in or ties to U.S.-designated state sponsors of
terrorism, including Sudan. Although the SEC has the discretionary
authority to request additional information from companies that trade
on U.S. exchanges, it has not exercised this authority by adopting a
specific disclosure requirement and has indicated that it is committed
to the practice of relying on companies to ensure that their
disclosures contain all material information about their operations in
these countries.
* The effect that divestment might have on operating companies with
Sudan-related business activities. Some advocates and investors have
raised concerns that divestment campaigns can prompt companies
interested in promoting corporate social responsibility to leave,
creating room for companies that do not share that interest to enter
the Sudanese market. As a result of this concern about divestment,
some advocacy groups, as well as some U.S. states and investment
companies, have increasingly focused on engaging with operating
companies to improve their business practices. For example, they have
written letters to or met with companies' senior management
encouraging them to fund humanitarian programs that aid the Sudanese
people, conduct human rights assessments of their business operations
in Sudan, or pressure the Sudanese government to change its practices.
Our search of federal contract awards since June 12, 2008, as well as
our review of a selection of contracts, indicates that the U.S.
government has complied with SADA's federal contract prohibition
provision. We determined that, of 88 companies identified on a widely
used list of companies that have business ties to Sudan, only 1 has
received federal contracts since the requirement took effect. However,
because of the contract type, the Sudan-related certifications were
not required for these particular contracts, and therefore there was
no violation of SADA. The U.S. government has contracted with
subsidiaries and affiliates of companies with business ties to Sudan,
as permitted under SADA. We found that all contracts that we selected
for review complied with federal rules implementing SADA. We also
found that no contracting agency has requested a waiver from the
contract prohibition requirement. Such a waiver, if granted, would
allow a company to obtain federal contracts even while conducting
business operations in Sudan that are normally prohibited under SADA.
Finally, we determined that no companies had been included on the list
of contractors barred from federal contracting for falsely certifying
that they did not conduct prohibited business operations in Sudan.
In order to enhance the investing public's access to information it
needs to make well-informed decisions when determining whether and how
to divest Sudan-related assets, we recommend that the SEC consider
issuing a rule requiring companies that trade on U.S. exchanges to
disclose their business operations related to Sudan, as well as
possibly other state sponsors of terrorism.
The SEC's Division of Corporation Finance provided written comments on
a draft of our report, which are reprinted in appendix IV. The
Division of Corporation Finance agreed that it would present our
recommendation to the commission for its consideration. However, the
division expressed concern that adopting a disclosure requirement that
is excessively broad and beyond what GAO recommends could possibly
lead to a volume of information that would overwhelm the investor and
possibly obscure other material information.
Background:
Since gaining independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956, Sudan has
endured civil war rooted in cultural and religious divides. The North,
which has traditionally controlled the country, has sought to unify it
along the lines of Arabism and Islam, whereas non-Muslims and other
groups in the South have sought, among other things, greater autonomy.
Since 1993, the Secretary of State has included Sudan on the "State
Sponsors of Terrorism" list for harboring and supporting local and
international terrorists. In 1997, the U.S. government imposed a trade
embargo against the entire territory of Sudan and a total asset freeze
against the Government of Sudan,[Footnote 18] and in 2006 it blocked
the property and interests in property of certain persons connected
with the conflict in Darfur,[Footnote 19] where militias supported by
the Sudanese government led a "campaign of genocide" and forced
displacement. The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control administers and enforces these sanctions in part
through its Specially Designated Nationals list, which identifies
individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on
behalf of, targeted countries, including Sudan.[Footnote 20]
As awareness of the Darfur conflict and the role of the Sudanese
government in perpetuating the conflict grew, activists at U.S.
colleges and universities and political officials at city and state
levels in the United States initiated campaigns to encourage
divestment from Sudan. This Sudan divestment movement was coordinated,
in part, by the Sudan Divestment Task Force, a U.S.-based initiative
established in 2005 and incorporated in 2006 as a project of the
Genocide Intervention Network, a nonprofit organization based in
Washington, D.C. This task force developed a divestment approach
called "targeted" divestment, which aims to maximize impact on the
Sudanese government and minimize potential harm to Sudanese civilians.
It also created model legislation for use by U.S. states based on this
approach.
SADA, enacted in December 2007, appears to incorporate many of the
elements of this targeted divestment approach. For example, SADA
applies to companies operating in four key economic sectors--power
production, mineral extraction, oil-related activities, and production
of military equipment--and outlines several exceptions to operations
in these sectors. Specifically, it exempts business operations that:
* are conducted under contract directly and exclusively with the
regional government of southern Sudan [which is autonomous from the
Khartoum-based government of Sudan];
* are conducted under a license from the Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control or are expressly exempted under
federal law from the requirement to be conducted under such a license;
* consist of providing goods or services to marginalized populations
of Sudan;
* consist of providing goods or services to an internationally
recognized peacekeeping force or humanitarian organization;
* consist of providing goods or services that are used only to promote
health or education; or:
* have been voluntarily suspended.
In addition, business operations in the oil sector are exempted if the
company is involved in the retail sale of gasoline or related consumer
products in Sudan but is not involved in any other oil-related
activity, or if the company is involved in leasing, or owns, rights to
an oil block in Sudan but is not involved in any other oil-related
activity. For the purposes of this report, the term "prohibited
business operations" refers to business operations in Sudan in the
sectors of oil, power production, mineral extraction and production of
military equipment, provided that they do not qualify for one of the
exceptions listed above.
Under SADA, the SEC was directed to prescribe regulations that require
disclosure by each registered investment company that divests itself
of securities in accordance with SADA. Under the SEC's regulations,
investment companies seeking to rely upon the safe harbor provision of
SADA must disclose the divestment on their next form N-CSR or form N-
SAR[Footnote 21] that it files following the divestment.[Footnote 22]
The information disclosed must include, among other things, the
specific securities divested, the magnitude of divestment, and the
dates that the securities were divested. In addition, if the
investment company continues to hold any securities of the company
from which it divested, it will be required to disclose, among other
things, the total number of shares or, for debt securities, the
principal amount of such securities, held on the date of filing.
U.S. State Fund Managers and Investment Companies Have Sold Sudan-
related Assets for Varying Reasons:
Our survey responses show that state fund managers have divested or
frozen about $3.5 billion in assets primarily related to Sudan in
response to their states' laws and policies. The value of U.S.
investment companies' Sudan-related asset holdings has declined
considerably since March 2007, and companies told us that their
decisions regarding these shares were motivated primarily by normal
business reasons.
State Fund Managers Reported That They Have Divested or Frozen about
$3.5 Billion in Assets Primarily Related to Sudan in Response to Their
States' Laws and Policies:
Fund managers from 23 of the states responding to our survey reported
that, from 2006 to January 2010, they divested or froze almost $3.5
billion in assets held in 67 operating companies they identified as
related either to Sudan specifically or to a larger category of
divestment targets, such as state sponsors of terrorism. New Jersey
accounted for almost $2.2 billion, or about 62 percent, of this total.
(See table 1.) Illinois was 1 of the 23 states that reported divesting
or freezing its Sudan-related assets, but it did not provide the value
or dates of these actions.
Table 1: Total Sudan-related Assets Divested or Frozen by States, 2006
to January 2010:
State: New Jersey;
Total amount divested or frozen: $2,162,564,000;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: [A];
Most recent divestment or freezing action: May 2006.
State: Oregon;
Total amount divested or frozen: $362,000,000;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: 2006;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: 2009.
State: Texas;
Total amount divested or frozen: $225,990,790;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: October 2008;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: January 2009.
State: Massachusetts;
Total amount divested or frozen: $164,489,806;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: March 2008;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: March 2008.
State: Florida[B];
Total amount divested or frozen: $154,947,926;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: April 2008;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: July 2008.
State: California;
Total amount divested or frozen: $81,739,949;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: May 2006;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: September 2008.
State: Colorado;
Total amount divested or frozen: $76,066,122;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: July 2007;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: January 2010.
State: Indiana[B];
Total amount divested or frozen: $67,203,695;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: December 2008;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: December 2009.
State: Maryland[B];
Total amount divested or frozen: $35,430,790;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: September 2007;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: April 2008.
State: Michigan[B];
Total amount divested or frozen: $24,332,285;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: May 2009;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: December 2009.
State: Maine[C];
Total amount divested or frozen: $21,500,000;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: April 2006;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: June 2009.
State: Connecticut[B];
Total amount divested or frozen: $15,388,947;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: May 2007;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: September 2009.
State: Kansas;
Total amount divested or frozen: $13,378,022;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: [A];
Most recent divestment or freezing action: June 2008.
State: Hawaii;
Total amount divested or frozen: $13,288,052;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: February 2008;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: December 2008.
State: New York[B];
Total amount divested or frozen: $12,300,000;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: June 2009;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: June 2009.
State: New Mexico;
Total amount divested or frozen: $12,000,000;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: [A];
Most recent divestment or freezing action: January 2008.
State: Iowa;
Total amount divested or frozen: $10,576,749;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: October 2007;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: October 2008.
State: New Hampshire;
Total amount divested or frozen: $5,636,966;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: September 2008;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: March 2009.
State: Ohio[B];
Total amount divested or frozen: $2,341,595;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: November 2009;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: November 2009.
State: Minnesota;
Total amount divested or frozen: $1,012,038;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: January 2008;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: April 2009.
State: Pennsylvania;
Total amount divested or frozen: $945,247;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: January 2008;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: January 2008.
State: Arizona[B];
Total amount divested or frozen: $727,480;
Earliest divestment or freezing action: November 2009;
Most recent divestment or freezing action: November 2009.
State: Total[D];
Total amount divested or frozen: $3,463,860,458.
Source: GAO's survey of states and public state investment reports.
[A] States with no entry for "earliest date" did not provide us with
this information.
[B] The state has a law or policy, which either focuses on both Sudan
and Iran or targets state sponsors of terrorism.
[C] Maine's law on Sudan-related investments, enacted in 2005, expired
July 1, 2009.
[D] This total reflects the amounts divested or frozen as reported in
responses to our survey or in public documents. There may be
additional fund managers whose funds were not included in our survey
population or who divested but did not respond to our survey.
[End of table]
All of the states that reported having divested or frozen Sudan-
related assets had laws or policies regarding their Sudan-related
assets, and the state fund managers who responded to our survey cited
compliance with these laws and policies as their primary reason for
divestment. In response to our survey, 29 fund managers from 23
states[Footnote 23] reported that they had divested or frozen their
Sudan-related assets or planned to do so. Nineteen of these fund
managers said they were required to divest by their state's law or
policy; eight said they were not required to divest.[Footnote 24] When
asked in our survey to consider various possible reasons for divesting
and characterize them as major, moderate, or minor reasons, all of the
fund managers responding to these questions who indicated they were
required to divest cited their state's requirement as a major reason
for divesting. In comparison, only two of the managers who indicated
they were required to divest said they divested in order to reduce the
financial risk their fund was exposed to, and only seven said that
concerns about supporting genocide or supporting state sponsors of
terrorism were a major or moderate consideration when divesting.
35 States Have Enacted Laws or Adopted Policies Affecting Sudan-
Related Investments, Largely out of Concern Regarding Darfur:
Thirty-five U.S. states have enacted legislation, adopted policies, or
both affecting their Sudan-related investments.[Footnote 25]
Specifically, 26 states have current legislation that affects their
Sudan-related investments, and 9 states without Sudan-related
legislation have policies regarding Sudan-related investments.
[Footnote 26] In three of the states with such legislation, individual
funds not covered by the legislation also issued their own policies
affecting their Sudan-related investments. For example, Indiana's law
requires the Teachers Retirement Fund and the Public Employees
Retirement Fund (both overseen by the governor) to divest from Sudan-
related companies. In addition, the Indiana state treasurer issued a
policy statement prohibiting all state funds under the treasurer's
management (such as the State Police Pension Fund) from investing in
any debt issued by a state sponsor of terrorism.
The 35 states that enacted or adopted these laws and policies did so
often out of concern for the genocide in Darfur, as well as some
concerns about terrorism. Specifically, 29 states' laws or policies
identify the genocide in Darfur (or in Sudan) as a finding in enacting
the measure or say that the measure may expire or cease to be
effective after the genocide in Darfur has halted.[Footnote 27] For
example, California's law requiring divestment from companies with
Sudan-related business operations states that the law will remain in
effect until "the government of Sudan halts the genocide in Darfur for
12 months as determined by both the Department of State and the
Congress of the United States" or until "the United States revokes its
current sanctions against Sudan." Some states, including some that
target Sudan, have laws or policies that target countries or entities
due to terrorism concerns. For example, Colorado's law requiring Sudan
divestment by public pension plans begins with eight declarations
regarding Darfur, genocide, and human rights abuse.[Footnote 28] The
law then cites concerns about U.S. sanctions against Sudan and the
designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993, as well
as a statement regarding the "financial risk posed by investments in
companies doing business with a terrorist-sponsoring state." In
contrast, Pennsylvania's Treasurer's policy does not mention Sudan
specifically, but requires the state treasurer to "determine whether a
company in which it is considering investing, or a company in which it
already holds a position, is doing sufficient business--directly, or
through contractual or ownership interests--in or with a state sponsor
of terrorism." Six states have laws or policies that target both Sudan
and Iran. In addition, a few states have laws or policies focusing on
companies identified by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office
of Foreign Assets Control in its list related to sanctions, or the
Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
[Footnote 29]
The 35 states' laws and policies we identified vary in the specificity
with which they address the sale and purchase of Sudan-related assets.
For example, only one law explicitly defines "divestment action,"
[Footnote 30] while most of the laws describe only the actions
required to achieve divestment. In addition, two laws state that a
"public fund shall sell, redeem, divest or withdraw all publicly
traded securities of the company" on their "scrutinized companies
list," with certain exceptions. Other laws simply state that the
public fund in question "shall divest" from or "shall not be invested
in" companies with ties to Sudan. Most states with laws and policies
requiring divestment also prohibit or restrict future investments in
Sudan-related companies. However, some laws and policies only mention
prohibiting future investments but do not require divestment of Sudan-
related investments held prior to enactment of the measures.
In addition to divestment, many state laws and policies also mandate
or encourage engagement--identifying companies and leveraging power as
a shareholder or potential shareholder in an effort to change the
investment or operating behavior of that company. Notably, most states
that require or encourage divestment also require or encourage the
state funds to communicate with companies prior to divesting. Eight
laws state that if, after a certain number of days following a public
fund's first engagement with a company, the company continues to have
scrutinized active business operations a "public fund shall sell,
redeem, divest or withdraw all publicly traded securities of the
company" on their "scrutinized companies list," with certain
exceptions.[Footnote 31] Arizona's law requires the public fund to
review the list of companies it invests in directly and identify those
companies that may have both business in specific sectors and ties to
Sudan. The public fund must put the identified companies on a
"scrutinized companies" list and send a written notice informing the
company of its scrutinized status and that it may become subject to
divestment by the fund. If the company fails to respond with
information about its activities or does not cease its scrutinized
business operations within 180 days, the fund "shall sell, redeem,
divest or withdraw all publicly traded securities of the company."
Finally, a limited number of states prohibit state contracting with
companies operating in Sudan.[Footnote 32] Table 2 outlines the laws
and policies in effect with regard to Sudan-related investments in 35
states.
Table 2: State Laws and Policies Regarding Sudan-related Assets
Effective as of April 2010:
State: Arizona;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Check].
State: California;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check][A];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Check].
State: Colorado;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Connecticut;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check][B];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Check][B];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check][B];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: District of Columbia;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Florida;
Has law(s): [Check][C];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Georgia;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Empty];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Check].
State: Hawaii;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Illinois;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Indiana;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check];
Requires engagement: [Check][D];
Requires divestment: [Check][D];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check][D];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Iowa;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Kansas;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Louisiana;
Has law(s): [Check][C];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Empty];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Empty];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Maryland;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Massachusetts;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Check];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Michigan;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check];
Requires engagement: [Check][E];
Requires divestment: [Check][E];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Check][E];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check][E];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Minnesota;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: New Hampshire;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: New Jersey;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: North Carolina;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Ohio;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Empty];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Oregon;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Empty];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Check];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Rhode Island;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: South Carolina;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Check][F];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check][F];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Tennessee;
Has law(s): [Check][G];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Empty];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Empty];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Texas;
Has law(s): [Check];
Has non-legislative policy: [Empty];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Missouri;
Has law(s): [Empty];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check][H];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Empty];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Empty];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Nevada;
Has law(s): [Empty];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: New Mexico;
Has law(s): [Empty];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: New York;
Has law(s): [Empty];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check];
Requires engagement: [Check];
Requires divestment: [Empty];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Check];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Empty];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Pennsylvania;
Has law(s): [Empty];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check];
Requires engagement: [Check][I];
Requires divestment: [Empty];
Encourages engagement: [Check][I];
Encourages divestment: [Check][I];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Empty];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Vermont;
Has law(s): [Empty];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Empty];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Check];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Washington;
Has law(s): [Empty];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Empty];
Encourages engagement: [Check];
Encourages divestment: [Check];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Empty];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Wisconsin;
Has law(s): [Empty];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check][J];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Empty];
Encourages engagement: [Check][J];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Empty];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
State: Wyoming;
Has law(s): [Empty];
Has non-legislative policy: [Check];
Requires engagement: [Empty];
Requires divestment: [Check];
Encourages engagement: [Empty];
Encourages divestment: [Empty];
Prohibits future direct investment: [Check];
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: [Empty].
Total States Affected:
Has law(s): 26;
Has non-legislative policy: 12;
Requires engagement: 21;
Requires divestment: 25;
Encourages engagement: 4;
Encourages divestment: 7;
Prohibits future direct investment: 27;
Prohibits state contracts with: firms operating in Sudan: 3.
Source: GAO analysis of state legislation, policies, and survey
responses.
Notes: We believe our review of states' laws and policies and survey
responses from relevant state officials provides a reasonable basis
for the numbers in the table. The vague language in some states' laws
and policies, as well as their interpretation as indicated by some
state officials' survey responses, can impact the conclusion about
whether a law or policy contains a provision that falls within one of
the designated categories.
These laws and policies affect different funds within each state
(e.g., some affect the state treasurers' assets; others affect the
state investment boards' assets; and others affect multiple funds).
The chart summarizes the approaches taken by the various laws and
policies that are in effect in each state, since several states,
including Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
South Carolina, and Pennsylvania, have more than one law or policy.
[A] In addition, California's law regarding the University of
California system indemnifies the regents and other officials and
employees of the University of California for decisions not to invest
in the future.
[B] While Connecticut law mandates divestment from government of Sudan-
owned debt and securities and prohibits future direct investment in
these assets, it only encourages (but does not require) divestment
from Sudan-related companies and recommends avoiding future direct
investment in them.
[C] In addition, Florida's laws require that the Municipal Police
Pensions, the Public Employee Optional Retirement Plan, and the
Firefighter Pensions create a terror-free index. Louisiana's law
requires public funds to invest an unspecified portion of their assets
in a similar terror-free index.
[D] While Indiana's Public Retirement and Disabilities Benefits law
requires engagement and divestment and prohibits future direct
investment, the Indiana treasurer's policy only prohibits future
investment.
[E] While Michigan's law requires the public employee retirement
system authorities to engage and divest, the Municipal Employees
Retirement System's policy does not mention engagement, and encourages
divestment and the prohibition of future direct investment.
[F] Both South Carolina's Retirement System law and Investment
Commission policy prohibit future direct investment. While the law
requires divestment, the policy does not mention divestment.
[G] Tennessee's law requires the treasurer to monitor the state's
holdings related to state sponsors of terrorism and report them to the
Council on Pensions and Insurance, but does not mention any further
action.
[H] According to a Missouri State Employee Retirement System official,
if they receive a list of terrorist-sponsoring companies from a
federal agency, they are obligated to divest in accordance with their
policy.
[I] A Pennsylvania Public School Employees Retirement Board resolution
mandates engagement and another encourages divestment. The
Pennsylvania Treasury's policy encourages engagement first. If
engagement does not elicit an acceptable response, Treasury will
consider either making no new investments or pursuing divestment
consistent with sound investment practice.
[J] Wisconsin's Investment Board policy "opposes divestment, whether
total or targeted." The policy encourages engagement and the sale of
assets based on "risk and economic factors."
[End of table]
The Value of U.S. Investment Companies' Sudan-related Asset Holdings
Has Declined Considerably since March 2007; Investment Companies Cited
Normal Business Reasons as Their Motivation for Buying or Selling
These Assets:
Our analysis shows that U.S.-based investment companies have sold some
or all of their Sudan-related shares in six key foreign companies with
Sudan-related business operations. Specifically, we found that U.S.
holdings in these six companies fell from $14.4 billion at the end of
March 2007 to $5.9 billion at the end of December 2009, a decline of
nearly 60 percent. The number of investors holding these assets also
declined, from 303 in March 2007 to 272 in December 2009, a 10 percent
drop. While hundreds of U.S. investors have held shares in these six
companies, 80 percent of the value of these shares, on average, has
been held by the top 20 investors.[Footnote 33]
This decline of nearly 60 percent in the value of Sudan-related shares
held cannot be accounted for solely by changes in share prices,
indicating that U.S. investors, on net, chose to sell shares in these
companies. In order to determine whether the decline in value of Sudan-
related equities was due solely to fluctuations in the market value of
shares we constructed price indices for the U.S. holdings. Any decline
in the value of the Sudan-related holdings not explained by a decline
in prices indicates selling, on net, of Sudan-related equities. We
constructed three different price indices using three standard methods
to estimate changes in prices.[Footnote 34] All three price indices
indicate that U.S. investors, on net, sold shares of Sudan-related
companies. Based on the price index weighted to the U.S. portfolio of
Sudan-related equities, prices rose by roughly 7 percent from March
2007 to December 2009, while equity holdings fell by nearly 60 percent
(see fig. 1). This suggests that net selling of Sudan-related equities
explains the majority of the decline in U.S. holdings. However, it is
not certain if this selling is related to conditions specific to Sudan
or represents a more general reallocation of assets by U.S.
investors.[Footnote 35] Nevertheless, some evidence suggests that
Sudan-specific factors may have influenced investors' decisions to
sell. Specifically, from December 2007 to December 2008, U.S. holdings
in Sudan-related equities declined as a percentage of foreign oil and
gas equity holdings (the proportion fell from 3.4 percent to 2.3
percent) and as a percentage of all foreign equity holdings (the
proportion fell from 0.3 percent to 0.2 percent).
Figure 1: U.S. Holdings and Prices of Sudan-related Companies, March
2007 to December 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Index value: March 2007 = 100.
Date: March 2007;
US holdings: $14.4 billion;
Price Index: 100.
Date: June 2007;
US holdings: $16.3 billion;
Price Index: 126.45.
Date: September 2007;
US holdings: $15.4 billion;
Price Index: 152.22.
Date: December 2007;
US holdings: $15.3 billion;
Price Index: 159.87.
Date: March 2008;
US holdings: $15.9 billion;
Price Index: 105.46.
Date: June 2008; 4 billion; 387
Price Index: 107.92.
Date: September 2008;
US holdings: $7.7 billion;
Price Index: 88.58.
Date: December 2008;
US holdings: $6.2 billion;
Price Index: 73.45.
Date: March 2009;
US holdings: $4.9 billion;
Price Index: 72.44.
Date: June 2009;
US holdings: $5.5 billion;
Price Index: 94.67.
Date: September 2009;
US holdings: $5.2 billion;
Price Index: 99.24.
Date: December 2009;
US holdings: $5.9 billion;
Price Index: 106.55.
Source: GAO analysis of Thomson Reuters data.
[End of figure]
Investors said they weighed various factors in their decisions
regarding their Sudan-related assets.[Footnote 36] We interviewed or
obtained information from 37 institutional advisers on their views
regarding Sudan-related assets. Most commonly, investors stated that
they bought and sold Sudan-related assets for normal business reasons,
such as maximizing shareholder value consistent with the guidelines in
each fund's prospectus, as well as in response to specific client
instructions. In the process of assessing an investment, "normal
business reasons" could incorporate, as appropriate, information
related to the target company's environmental, social, governance, and
other practices.
Each of the investment companies we interviewed issued a corporate
statement regarding Sudan-related investing, and these corporate
statements reflect a variety of investor perspectives.[Footnote 37]
For example, one firm's corporate statement observed that "The
situation in Darfur is the most urgent human rights and humanitarian
crisis in the world right now…and we resolved to make the most
appropriate contribution we could--above and beyond ensuring that our
own funds do not invest in companies materially involved in Sudan."
Another company's statement expressed its sensitivity to the ongoing
tragedy in Darfur and respected the request by some investors to
divest holdings in companies that have Sudan-related activities as one
way to bring pressure to bear on the Sudanese government. This
company, however, explained that "when it is appropriate to remain
actively invested in a company, we will do so, thus retaining the
ability to oppose company practices that we do not condone. This, in
the long term, may have the greatest chance of ending those practices."
Only one investment company we spoke with indicated that it was
considering the sale of its Sudan-related assets for socially-
motivated reasons. Specifically, this company stated that it would
pressure companies that maintain business relations with the Sudanese
government to cease those relations or to attempt to end genocide and
ease suffering in Darfur. It would divest from these companies if they
failed to take meaningful steps to respect human rights within a
reasonable amount of time.[Footnote 38] Another investment company
issued a public statement regarding its sale of shares in a specific
company with business ties to Sudan saying that it "sold shares based
on valuation, reputational, and commodity risk." This company also
decided to exclude certain companies from future investments because
they posed high risk due to their ties to the Sudanese government and
its connection to human rights abuses. Other investment companies
similarly expressed the view that their investment processes (or
financial assessments) consider all risk factors relevant to a
company's long-term sustainability, including those related to social
and political issues, though this may or may not result in the sale of
Sudan-related assets.
U.S. Investors Have Often Considered Three Factors When Determining
Whether and How to Divest from Companies Tied to Sudan:
Investors we contacted (including both state fund managers and private
investment companies) told us they consider whether a decision to
divest Sudan-related assets is consistent with fiduciary
responsibility--generally the duty to act solely and prudently in the
best interest of the client.[Footnote 39] These investors,
particularly state fund managers, have also faced challenges in
identifying which foreign companies have business ties to Sudan and
may warrant divestment. Finally, investors we spoke with have taken
into account the effects of divestment on foreign operating companies
with business ties to Sudan.
Investors Weighing Sudan Divestment Options Have Considered Their
Fiduciary Responsibilities:
State Fund Managers Responsible for Sudan Divestment Have Been
Concerned about Fiduciary Responsibility:
Representatives from organizations that advocate for the interests of
state fund managers told us that fiduciary duty could be a
disincentive to divesting but that it depends on how each individual
state's law is written. For instance, they expressed concerns that if
the laws place emphasis on maximizing returns first and on divesting
as a secondary priority, then fiduciary responsibility can be a
disincentive to divesting.[Footnote 40] While some states make no
explicit mention of fiduciary responsibility in their divestment
policies and laws, some state constitutions describe this
responsibility and emphasize its priority above all other
responsibilities. For example, California's state constitution says
the retirement board of public pension systems must maximize benefits
and minimize employer contributions and administrative costs,
concluding that "a retirement board's duty to its participants and
their beneficiaries shall take precedence over any other duty." In
2009, the New Hampshire Retirement Plan and the New Hampshire Judicial
Retirement System sued the state, arguing that complying with the
state's Sudan divestment legislation would have been inconsistent with
their fiduciary trust obligations under the state constitution.
[Footnote 41]
State policies vary in how they characterize fund managers' fiduciary
responsibilities in divesting Sudan-related assets. For example, the
State of Wisconsin Investment Board's Sudan-related policy describes
its fiduciary responsibility as the duty to "invest in the best
financial interest of the trust funds it manages" and concludes that
"this means that the [board] may not make investments based on
political, social, or personal reasons."[Footnote 42] In contrast, the
Washington State Investment Board's policy states that its "fiduciary
responsibilities include watching for potential impacts on the
valuations of its investments that may result from reputational risks
to the companies in which the [board] invests that may flow from
companies doing business in Sudan." In addition, the Vermont Pension
Investment Committee determined that it would be prudent to refrain
from investing in certain companies identified as having prohibited
business operations in Sudan because the value of its portfolio could
suffer if it continued to hold these securities while other investors
took affirmative action to sell them.
Many state laws allow fund managers to stop divesting or to reinvest
if there is a drop in the fund's value. For example, under Hawaii law,
the board of trustees of the state employees' retirement system can
stop divesting from and reinvest in scrutinized companies if, in the
board's good faith judgment, the value of the assets managed by the
board drops 50 basis points (or 0.5 percent). Additional states that
have laws with a 50 basis point threshold for ceasing divestment and
reinvesting include Colorado, the District of Columbia, and Indiana.
Other states have similar provisions with lower thresholds. For
example, under Arizona law, the threshold is 25 basis points.[Footnote
43]
While most of the 35 states' Sudan-related measures generally require
divestment of Sudan-related assets consistent with the investing
authority's fiduciary responsibilities, laws and policies enacted or
implemented by 6 states--California, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, Ohio,
and South Carolina--include clauses explicitly stating that the
investing authority should only divest if doing so will not constitute
a breach of fiduciary trust. For example, Kansas's law states that,
"Nothing in this section shall require the board to take
action...unless the board determines, in good faith, that the
action...is consistent with the fiduciary responsibilities of the
board...." Notably, some fund managers responding to our survey
indicated that they believed their fiduciary responsibilities allowed
them not to divest, even though their laws and policies did not
include provisions specifically exempting them from divestment
requirements.
Our survey results demonstrate that state fund managers, when
expressing concerns about fiduciary responsibility, focused on the
impact that divestment might have on a fund's returns and
administrative costs. Respondents who divested and those who did not
frequently cited fiduciary responsibility as a concern. Specifically,
17 of the 29 fund managers (or 59 percent) who had divested or frozen
their Sudan-related assets, or planned to do so, said they were
concerned to a moderate or large extent that "it would be difficult to
divest while ensuring that fiduciary trust requirements were not
breached and my office/state was not made vulnerable to law suits."
This same concern was also cited as a moderate to large concern for 25
of the 41 (or 61 percent) fund mangers who did not divest. In
contrast, only 5 of the 29 (17 percent) managers who divested or
planned to divest and 3 of the 41 (7 percent) who did not divest were
concerned to a large or moderate extent that divesting might force an
operating company out of the Sudanese market, leaving room for one
with more questionable business practices.
Survey results also showed concern among state fund managers,
regardless of whether they divested, regarding the financial risk of
divesting. Specifically, 20 of the 29 managers (or 69 percent) who
divested or planned to divest and 18 of the 41 (44 percent) who did
not divest were concerned to a large or moderate extent that
divestment could cause their funds to incur high transaction costs,
earn reduced returns on investment, or both. Finally, only 4 of the 29
fund managers (14 percent) who divested or planned to divest said that
reducing the exposure of their funds' investments to financial risk
was a major reason for divestment. (Two more managers said it was a
minor or moderate reason.) Likewise, only 3 of the 29 (10 percent)
said divestment would improve returns on their offices' investments.
Although fiduciary responsibility was the primary concern for state
fund managers in considering divestment, only a few managers responded
that they took advantage of applicable state laws or policy provisions
explicitly allowing them not to divest if they determined that doing
so would conflict with their fiduciary responsibility. Specifically,
only 4 of the 41[Footnote 44] fund managers who did not divest or
freeze any of their Sudan-related assets said their state had a law or
policy containing such an explicit provision. Eleven fund managers who
divested did so even though they said their state's law or policy
contained such an explicit provision.
Investment Companies Expressed Differing Perspectives on Their
Fiduciary Responsibilities, Based on Their Institutional Focus and
Investment Approach:
Private investment companies expressed differing perspectives on
whether divesting from Sudan is consistent with their fiduciary
responsibilities. The investment companies we interviewed or obtained
information from generally explained fiduciary responsibility to mean
making investment decisions in the best interests of their clients,
consistent with the guidelines in their funds' published prospectuses.
However, investment companies' determination as to what constitutes
the best interest of the client differs, depending on their investment
approach.
According to investment companies whose primary goal is maximizing
returns, ceasing to invest in companies with Sudan-related operations
based on criteria other than financial merit is inconsistent with
their fiduciary responsibilities, unless their clients established
these restrictions. Some of these investors stated that limiting the
number of investment opportunities based on non-financial criteria can
result in lower investment returns. These firms indicated that they
may take factors, such as a company's environmental, social, and
corporate governance standards, into account in order to assess the
financial strength of that company as a possible investment. The
results of these firms' financial analyses of these risk factors vary.
For example, several investment companies cited Sudan-related risk
factors in their decisions to remove select securities from their
portfolios. Others evaluated the risks and chose to continue to hold
or increase their Sudan-related asset holdings.
Other investment companies, particularly those identifying themselves
as socially responsible, maintained that divesting from Sudan based on
non-financial criteria is consistent with fiduciary responsibility, as
long as alternative equities selected can compete on the basis of
financial criteria.[Footnote 45] According to these investment
companies, creating financially viable investment options that respond
to social concerns, such as genocide or the environment, is the
primary goal. As one firm's prospectus explains, "socially responsible
investors seek to use their investments to create a more fair and
sustainable world…and encourage greater corporate responsibility."
Another's prospectus states that it seeks to invest in companies and
other enterprises that demonstrate positive environmental, social and
governance performance as they address corporate responsibility and
sustainability challenges. The self-designated socially responsible
investment companies we interviewed typically described a two-part
process for selecting investments--screening them according to their
particular fund's social criteria and evaluating investments for their
financial soundness. These firms also expressed confidence that taking
non-financial factors into account results in an investment product
that is competitive with other investments.
As of May 2010, two companies that sold their Sudan-related assets had
relied upon SADA's "safe harbor" provision by filing disclosures of
such divestments with the SEC. Most companies told us that this
provision, which limits the civil, criminal, and administrative
actions that may be brought against firms that divest from, or avoid
investing in, companies with prohibited business operations in Sudan,
was not necessary to their decision-making regarding Sudan-related
assets.
U.S. Investors Have Faced Difficulties Identifying Operating Companies
with Ties to Sudan, including Those Monitored by the SEC:
States Have Relied Heavily on Nongovernmental and Private Lists of
Companies with Business Ties to Sudan, Which Often Conflict:
SADA requires that, before divesting from Sudan-related companies,
responsible entities must use credible, publicly available information
to identify which companies have prohibited business operations
related to Sudan. Nongovernmental organizations and private companies
have sought to create and, in some cases, sell their lists of
operating companies with business ties to Sudan to the public. Our
survey results indicate that state treasurers and public pension fund
managers have relied heavily on these sources of information to
identify companies with ties to Sudan. For example, 42 out of 61 fund
managers (or 69 percent) who attempted to identify companies with ties
to Sudan used private research firms and 48 out of 61 fund managers
(or 79 percent) used nongovernmental advocacy organizations. Thirty-
two of the 42 fund managers (or 76 percent) who used private research
firms found them to be "very useful" or "useful." Similarly, 32 of the
48 fund managers (or 67 percent) who consulted nongovernmental groups
found them to be "very useful" or "useful." However, some fund
managers, even those that considered the sources they consulted to be
sufficient or somewhat sufficient for identifying companies tied to
Sudan, also reported concerns with the lists. For example, one
treasurer stated that "Commercial sources of information are only
moderately reliable. We are never confident that we are receiving
complete and accurate information on companies in emerging markets."
Another respondent noted that "Information was dated, not current or
incomplete. Information also was often misleading as to the effect of
the company's involvement." Finally, one respondent concluded that "It
is difficult for anyone to get accurate information in this regard.
Our sources did as well as possible."
These concerns have been echoed in other public statements. For
example, in 2005, representatives from 50 public employee retirement
systems wrote to the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce, as
well as the SEC, requesting assistance in identifying any publicly
traded companies that are of concern to the U.S. government.
Specifically, they cited a need for adequate information to determine
whether companies in which their funds are invested are doing business
in Sudan so that they can make informed investment decisions.[Footnote
46] In addition, the Pennsylvania Public Employee Retirement
Commission observed in an October 2007 report that the cost of
monitoring investment in companies tied to Sudan is "compounded by the
fact that no governmental agency provides a list of such companies and
the pension systems are compelled to purchase that service from
private contractors, thereby delegating substantial administrative
discretion."
Our analysis of available lists indicates that they differ
significantly from one another. We compared three lists of companies
with business ties to Sudan--one from a widely-used nongovernmental
organization, one from a widely-used private research company, and one
from an investment company that has designated itself as socially
responsible. We found that, of the over 250 companies identified on
one or more of these lists, only 15 appeared on all three. Figure 2
illustrates the extent to which these lists differ from one another.
Figure 2: Comparison of Three Lists Identifying Operating Companies
with Ties to Sudan:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
List A Total companies = 164;
List B Total companies = 132;
List C Total companies = 38.
Companies in both List A and B = 18;
Companies in both List A and C = 4;
Companies in both List B and c = 3;
Companies in List A, List B and List C = 15.
Source: GAO analysis of three lists of companies with business ties to
Sudan.
Note: Some of the companies that appear in only one list are mentioned
in profiles of other companies identified in another list. For
example, some companies identified in List A are mentioned in profiles
of other companies included in List B.
[End of figure]
Some of these discrepancies are likely due to the lists' different
criteria for including companies. For example:
* List A focuses on public and private companies[Footnote 47] that the
list's creator has determined have material[Footnote 48] Sudan-related
business operations, primarily in the areas of oil, mineral
extraction, power, and defense.
* List B includes companies (primarily those that are publicly-traded)
that have any business ties to Sudan, regardless of the industries in
which they operate.
* List C focuses only on publicly-traded companies that the list's
creator has determined provide certain direct benefits to the
government of Sudan, particularly in the areas of oil, mining,
electricity infrastructure, and military or where the company is
otherwise complicit in human rights abuses in Sudan.
These varying criteria, however, cannot explain fully the
discrepancies in the lists, indicating that the lists' creators differ
in their judgment regarding which companies' ties to Sudan warrant
scrutiny. For example, lists B and C both include companies that,
according to list A, have ceased their Sudan-related business
operations. Five companies that do not appear on list C are companies
that, according to list A, are publicly-traded and have material Sudan-
related business operations in the same industries that list C covers
and that have been largely unresponsive to engagement by shareholders
or unwilling to alter problematic practices in Sudan. Similarly, list
C, which appears to have the narrowest criteria, includes 16 companies
that do not appear on either of the broader two lists.[Footnote 49]
Representatives from the organizations that created these lists told
us that obtaining and evaluating information on operating companies
with business ties to Sudan is difficult. Because companies do not
typically publicize details of their business dealings in state
sponsors of terrorism, researchers must comb through several different
sources of data to extract information on specific companies and then
use their judgment to evaluate that information for reliability and
accuracy. The researchers we spoke to told us that they rely on a
combination of information from company Web sites, personnel, and
documents; industry wide publications, such as oil industry
newsletters; financial databases, such as Thomson Reuters or
Bloomberg; local media reports; and advocacy group publications.
Analyzing information from these sources and determining how to use it
can be difficult. For example, one researcher told us that it is not
clear how to describe a company if it has a dormant interest in an oil
lease, but is also running a gas station. In addition, companies
change their names, create new subsidiaries or affiliates, or enter
and exit different marketplaces.
Federal Securities Laws Do Not Specifically Require Operating
Companies to Disclose Business Ties to Sudan:
Research groups we spoke to said that they find information that comes
directly from the companies they are examining to be particularly
useful. For example, they would consider an SEC disclosure filing to
be a reliable source of information. However, the federal securities
laws do not require companies specifically to disclose operations in
countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism. Nevertheless, SEC
regulations require disclosure of such operations if they constitute
"material information" that is necessary to prevent a company's SEC
statements from being misleading.[Footnote 50] The meaning of
"material information" is not explicitly defined by law, but the
Supreme Court has determined that information is material if there is
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the
information important in making an investment decision or the
information would significantly alter the total mix of available
information.[Footnote 51] This is a question of both law and fact, and
the company is ultimately responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of
the information it discloses to investors. According to SEC officials,
companies have a strong incentive to make appropriate judgments about
materiality because they may face significant federal securities law
liability for disclosure that includes material misstatements or
material omissions that make the information provided misleading.
The SEC's Office of Global Security Risk, created in 2004, monitors
whether the documents public companies file with the SEC include
disclosure of material information regarding global security risk-
related issues. According to officials from this office, they focus
their reviews on companies with business activities in U.S.-designated
state sponsors of terrorism, including Sudan. This office has
suggested to companies that any operations they have in state sponsors
of terrorism might be considered material because divestment campaigns
and legislation mandating divestment from Sudan indicate that
investors would consider this information important in making
investment decisions. For example, the office has repeatedly noted
that "various state and municipal governments, universities, and other
investors have proposed or adopted divestment or similar initiatives
regarding investment in companies that do business with U.S.-
designated state sponsors of terrorism" and has instructed companies
that their materiality analysis "should address the potential impact
of the investor sentiment evidenced by such actions directed toward
companies that have operations associated with Cuba, Iran, Syria, and
Sudan." The office also asks companies, in assessing materiality, to
take both quantitative factors (such as the amount of company revenue
associated with a state sponsor of terrorism) and qualitative factors
(such as the potential impact of corporate activities upon a company's
reputation and share value) into account.
However, in their correspondence with the SEC, companies have raised
concerns about these instructions. For example, one energy company
wrote that, "We are concerned that the SEC seems to be implying a …
disclosure obligation with respect to business dealings with Sponsor
Countries [state sponsors of terrorism] even though we are not aware
of such a rule or regulation." Furthermore, the company wrote that "it
is [the company's] view that its business dealings in the Sponsor
Countries may be of interest to certain [company] investors but are
not material to [company] investors in general or the general
investing public. As such, it remains [the company's] view that its
dealings in the Sponsor Countries do not need to be further disclosed
in its annual reports..." Another oil company wrote to the SEC that,
"We believe that any actual divestments of our securities for reasons
related to [our limited contacts with state sponsors of terrorism] are
isolated incidents and not representative of the overall investment
climate and the Company's reputation among investors." Unlike the
first company, this company agreed to revise its annual report for the
following year to include information on purchases of crude oil
sourced from Sudan and other state sponsors of terrorism.
In general, the Office of Global Security Risk's monitoring of these
companies appears limited. For example, SEC officials told us that
they have corresponded with 59 of the 74 companies that file periodic
reports with the SEC and that they have identified as having ties to
Sudan.[Footnote 52] However, many of these companies operate in
industries not covered under SADA, such as food services,
telecommunications, and pharmaceuticals. In addition, our analysis
shows that the office has only corresponded with 5 of the 15 companies
that are identified in all three of the lists we analyzed and that
file with the SEC. All 15 of these companies operate in the four key
economic sectors identified in SADA. Furthermore, the office has not
always followed up with companies concerning their correspondence,
even when it has disagreed with companies' assessments of their
operations. For example, in September 2007, the Office of Global
Security Risk requested that an oil company whose parent company has
extensive Sudan-related business operations disclose in future filings
information regarding measures it has taken to ensure that investments
in it cannot be used to fund the parent company's operations
associated with Sudan. The company replied later that month that it
had "concluded that such disclosure is not material information about
the company that its investors are entitled to know" and "respectfully
disagree[d] with the need for this disclosure." The Office of Global
Security Risk responded a little over a month later, stating that it
had completed its review of this matter and did not have any further
comments at that time. According to an SEC official, this letter does
not indicate that the staff agreed with the company's decisions, but
rather that the information presented did not appear to be materially
misleading. The office did not correspond again with the company until
February 2010, after we inquired about the status of communication
with the company. In another instance, in December 2005, the Office of
Global Security Risk asked an oil company that was reported to have
possible ties to Sudan to describe all current, historical, and
anticipated operations in, and contacts with Sudan, including through
subsidiaries, controlling shareholders, affiliates, joint ventures,
and other direct and indirect arrangements. The company did not
provide a response to the request; the office reiterated its question
to the company in December 2009.
Office of Global Security Risk officials told us that, if they believe
a company is not disclosing material information, they will exercise
their authority to extensively question the company and continue to
comment, with the goal of working with the company to produce the best
disclosure for investors. Correspondence with a company ends when the
office has no further questions and has determined that the company
has provided a reasonable argument as to why its disclosure is not
materially incomplete or misleading, even if the office does not fully
agree with the company's judgment. These officials also told us that,
in cases where the office determines that its comment process has not
resulted in full disclosure of material operations by a company, it
will refer the company to the SEC's Division of Enforcement for
possible investigation. According to SEC officials, the Office of
Global Security Risk has referred one company to this division since
the office was created in 2004.
The SEC has the discretionary authority to adopt a specific disclosure
requirement for companies that trade on U.S. exchanges (such as
requiring disclosure of any operations in state sponsors of
terrorism). Although the SEC has not done so, it could exercise this
authority by issuing an interim rule for comment and a final rule in
the Federal Register. However, the agency has indicated that it is
committed to the practice of relying on companies to ensure that their
disclosures contain all material information about their operations in
these countries.[Footnote 53]
Investors We Spoke with Have Considered the Possible Effects of
Divestment on Operating Companies and the Sudanese People:
Some Operating Companies That Ceased Operating in Sudan Warned of a
Negative Effect on the Sudanese People:
The companies we spoke with that ceased operating in Sudan expressed
concerns about the effect of their departure from the Sudanese market.
[Footnote 54] For example, one company we spoke with told us that when
it decided to leave Sudan and sell its stake in the project in which
it was involved to another company, that company refused to sign the
sales agreement until language conferring responsibility for
continuing the seller's humanitarian programs was removed from the
agreement. This same company also told us that it had worked out an
agreement with the government of Sudan to monitor planes landing on a
company air strip, which a human rights group alleged that the
Sudanese military had been using to carry out military campaigns
against the South during the civil war. Once the company left Sudan,
it could no longer monitor such flights. Another company that left the
Sudanese market stated that it had been involved in a nationwide anti-
AIDS program in Sudan, which it could no longer participate in after
leaving Sudan.[Footnote 55] A company that continues to operate in
Sudan told us that, should it decide to cease operations, its stake in
the project in which it is involved would be taken over by the
government of Sudan, which would then own 96 percent of the project.
The company indicated that this would not only result in more revenue
for the government of Sudan, but also would likely mean the end of
humanitarian programs, such as building schools and medical clinics
for the local population, in addition to its contribution to charities
working in Darfur. Another company that continues to operate in Sudan
told us that if it only considered its financial stake in Sudan, it
would have likely left Sudan. However, the company decided to stay
because it believed that it was important to continue its humanitarian
efforts there.
Some Investors Have Shifted Their Focus away from Divestment and
toward Engagement:
Because of their concerns with divestment, some investors have shifted
their approach toward engaging with companies in order to leverage
their resources as shareholders to influence companies' behavior and
promote efforts aimed at improving the lives of the Sudanese people.
Some advocacy groups that were originally at the forefront of the
divestment campaign also have shifted their focus toward engagement.
One advocacy group we spoke with stated that it believed that
divestment was too blunt of an approach because it targeted a wide
array of companies, some of which may not have had material operations
in Sudan. Instead, this group argued for an approach that targets
companies involved in the industries that are most lucrative for the
Sudanese government and that provides alternatives to divestment, such
as engaging companies to try to influence their behavior. This group
uses a three-step engagement process, which (1) reviews the potential
human rights and environmental impact of the company's operations in
Sudan, (2) encourages companies to interact outside of their normal
sphere of influence, and (3) gains support for programs aimed to help
the Sudanese population negatively affected by the Sudanese government
or the company's operations. This approach uses the leverage that
shareholders have to influence companies to make positive
contributions that help the people of Sudan, such as building
hospitals and schools, providing training and job opportunities, and
contributing to a microfinance loan program.
Like advocacy groups, some U.S. investment companies have also
embraced the idea of engagement and increasingly view divestment as a
last resort because engagement allows companies to continue operating
and provides positive incentives for them to use their resources to
help the Sudanese people. The investment companies we spoke to took a
variety of different actions to engage operating companies, such as
developing a formal engagement policy with a list of actions required
to avoid divestment and writing letters to companies. While investment
companies stated that these engagement actions did not always result
in meaningful changes in company behavior, those companies that were
open to engagement often took positive steps and implemented
humanitarian projects aimed at helping the people of Sudan. For
example, one investment company told us that nearly half of the
companies it engaged with were responsive to its outreach efforts and
made efforts to address its concerns. In cases where companies
continued to be unresponsive to engagement, investment companies had
the option to divest their holdings, which some decided to do.
U.S. states have also endorsed engagement as a viable alternative to
divestment, with a few states identifying divestment as a last resort.
Nineteen of the 25 states whose laws or policies require divestment
also encourage or require engagement. For example, Minnesota law
mandates that the State Board of Divestment identify "scrutinized
companies" with Sudan-related business operations and send written
notice to each company notifying it of possible future divestment if
the company does not cease its scrutinized operations within 90 days.
[Footnote 56] However, under the law, a company can take "substantial
action" by conducting humanitarian activities in proportion to its
Sudan-related business operations, engaging with the government of
Sudan, or formalizing and executing a plan to cease operating in Sudan
within 1 year. If a company undertakes these actions, it may no longer
be considered a scrutinized company targeted for divestment. Investing
authorities of the states with investment laws or policies that
provide for engagement believe that they gain more leverage by
pressuring companies to change their behavior than by outright
divestment, since other investors without the same concerns about
Sudan might purchase the divested shares. Twenty of the 29 managers
responding to our survey who had divested or frozen their Sudan-
related assets, or planned to do so, stated that they could retain
these investments if companies changed their behavior in Sudan.
However, according to the results of our survey, 10 of the 29 fund
managers that answered the related survey question indicated that, to
a large to moderate extent, engaging with companies was too difficult
or costly. Furthermore, representatives from state advocacy
organizations told us that, due to time and resource constraints faced
by many states, engagement with companies is a large undertaking for
them, and some states may not be able to manage engagement campaigns.
Western Foreign Operating Companies We Spoke with Said They Generally
Welcomed Engagement Efforts and Took Actions in Sudan as a Result:
The eight foreign operating companies we spoke with generally agreed
that, for them, engagement is preferable to divestment because it
allows them to continue operating in Sudan and to discuss possible
ways to improve the situation there. For example, one company we spoke
with argued that divestment ultimately separates the people who
advocate for positive change in Sudan from the companies that have the
capacity and desire to be constructive actors in Sudan. This company
told us that, after a visit to Sudan, the company's home government
issued a report arguing that the company should stay in Sudan so that
its humanitarian presence could be maintained. When the company
ultimately decided to leave Sudan, advocacy groups stated that losing
this company's presence was a missed opportunity to continue
developing and implementing humanitarian projects in Sudan. Another
company argued that the choice to engage companies does not inhibit
stakeholders from future divestment, should companies ultimately be
unwilling to take positive actions and change the way they conduct
their Sudan-related business operations.
The operating companies we spoke with generally appreciated the
opportunity to "set the record straight" and to explain their business
activities to groups with whom they engaged. These companies
consistently told us that they believe their business operations
positively impact the Sudanese people. For example, one company told
us that 90 percent of its workforce is hired in-country. The company
gives these local employees opportunities to receive an education
outside of Sudan. Many of the companies we spoke with also explained
that their presence is beneficial for the Sudanese people because they
often choose to engage in community development. For example, a mining
company told us that it built seven schools and a medical clinic,
brought water and power supplies to the area around the mine, and
started agricultural training programs for the local population. This
company said it also convinced its business partners from the Sudanese
government to contribute some of their profits from the mine to
support a humanitarian organization operating in Darfur.
Almost all of the companies we spoke with said they donated to or
became directly involved in humanitarian projects as a direct result
of their engagement with various advocacy groups and shareholders.
After engaging with an advocacy group, one operating company decided
to contribute funding to develop hospital facilities in South Sudan.
In addition, a few of the companies we spoke with also engaged with
the government of Sudan on politically sensitive issues after being
advised to by an advocacy group. For example, as a part of one
company's engagement process with a number of advocacy groups and
investors, the company launched an official protest with the
government of Sudan when members of the militia opened fire on the
local Sudanese population living in the vicinity of the company's
project site. Some companies we spoke with also underwent independent
human rights impact assessments of their business operations as a
result of engaging with advocacy groups. One company told us that its
assessment helped it identify ways to further improve its business
operations by promoting more ethnic diversity in the workplace and
offering HIV/AIDS testing for employees.
A few of the companies we spoke with decided to limit their business
activities in Sudan as a result of engagement processes. For example,
one company we spoke with committed to not pursue any new business in
Sudan until the situation in Darfur changes and United Nations
peacekeepers are allowed in the country. The company indicated that
this commitment sent a strong signal to the government of Sudan, which
depends on the company to explore and identify natural resource
deposits.
Our Analysis Indicates That the U.S. Government Has Complied with the
Federal Contract Prohibition Provision of SADA:
We found no evidence to suggest that the U.S. government has awarded
contracts to companies identified as having prohibited business
operations in Sudan. The U.S. government has, as allowed under federal
law, contracted with subsidiaries and affiliates of companies with
Sudan-related business operations. We found that for a non-random
selection of contracts awarded to these companies, the contractors
provided the necessary certification, when required. Furthermore, the
U.S. government has not waived this requirement or determined that any
contractors submitted false certifications under SADA.
Our Analysis Indicates the U.S. Government Has Not Awarded Contracts
That Violate SADA:
Section 6 of SADA requires the heads of federal agencies to ensure
that each contract for the procurement of goods or services includes a
clause requiring the contractor to certify that it does not conduct
prohibited business operations in Sudan. SADA's contract prohibition
section also contains remedies for false certifications, such as
suspending or debarring the contractor from receiving future federal
contracts, and provides for waivers in certain situations. Section 6
was implemented in subpart 25.7 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) via an interim rule on June 12, 2008,[Footnote 57] and a final
rule on August 11, 2009.[Footnote 58] The FAR rule also includes a
solicitation provision whereby parties seeking federal contracts
(offerors) certify that, by submission of an offer, they do not
conduct any restricted business operations in Sudan.[Footnote 59]
Based on our analysis of one of the most widely used lists of
companies with prohibited business ties to Sudan,[Footnote 60] we
found that only 1 of 88 companies identified in the list has received
federal contracts since the FAR requirements took effect in June 2008.
However, the contract certification provision was not required for
these particular contracts because they were purchase orders under
simplified acquisition procedures,[Footnote 61] which generally do not
require the SADA certification under the FAR.[Footnote 62] Therefore,
these contract awards were not in violation of SADA's implementing
regulations.
In addition to the purchase orders with the company that has business
ties to Sudan, we found that from June 12, 2008, to March 1, 2010, the
U.S. government awarded 756 contracts to 29 affiliates and
subsidiaries[Footnote 63] of the companies identified in the list as
having prohibited business ties to Sudan. While SADA aims to prevent
companies with prohibited business operations in Sudan from receiving
federal contracts, it does not restrict contracting with these
companies' affiliates and subsidiaries, provided that the affiliates
and subsidiaries certify that they do not have prohibited business
operations in Sudan. (Only the company directly bidding on a contract
has to certify that it does not have any restricted business
operations in Sudan.) Our review of a non-random selection of
contracts awarded to these affiliates and subsidiaries indicates that
the contractors provided the necessary certification, when required.
Therefore, for these specific contracts, the U.S. government has
complied with the contract prohibition section of SADA.[Footnote 64]
Contract actions to these subsidiaries and affiliates totaled almost
$335 million.[Footnote 65]
Some advocacy groups have disagreed with the FAR councils' decision to
apply the requirement only to the entity directly contracting with the
government because it allows companies that have certified to the
federal government that they do not conduct prohibited business
operations to continue operating in Sudan through their subsidiaries
or affiliates. One of these groups expressed particular concern that
affiliates and subsidiaries can still receive contracts, but may also
receive revenue from or contribute to the operating budget of their
parent companies, particularly if they are majority-owned. In their
comments on the interim FAR rule, they argued that SADA defines
"person" to include subsidiaries, parent companies, and other
affiliates and that the FAR councils should implement the contract
prohibition provision with this definition in mind. However, the FAR
councils concluded that the contract prohibition provision of SADA did
not use the term "person" and instead used the term "contractor."
Since these terms were not defined in SADA as being synonymous, the
FAR councils decided to stay as close as possible to the requirements
and definitions used in the statute. The FAR councils also stated that
expanding the scope of the rule would require offerors to attest to
the business operations of parent companies, subsidiaries, and other
affiliates about which they may not have information. In addition, the
FAR councils noted that the company may not have any influence over
the affairs of its related companies.
U.S. Government Has Not Granted Any Waivers to SADA or Determined That
Any Companies Submitted False Certifications under SADA:
Under section 6(c) of SADA, the certification requirement can be
waived on a case-by-case basis if the president determines that it is
in the national interest to do so and notifies the appropriate
congressional committees in writing. Under the FAR, agencies can seek
waivers by submitting requests to the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP). OFPP reported that no waivers have been issued pursuant
to SADA and no agencies have requested such waivers as of May 2010.
[Footnote 66] OFPP opened a FAR case to consider FAR revisions to
establish a process and criteria for waivers.
The U.S. government has not identified any contractors that have
submitted false certifications under SADA. Section 6(b) of SADA states
that if the agency head determines that a contractor has falsely
certified that it did not conduct prohibited business operations in
Sudan, he or she may impose a number of penalties. Specifically, the
agency head may decide to terminate the contract, suspend or debar the
contractor from being eligible for federal contracts for a period of
no more than 3 years, or pursue other remedies. In cases where the
contractor is suspended, debarred, or proposed for suspension or
debarment, SADA requires the Administrator of General Services to add
these contractors to the Excluded Parties List System, which tracks
companies barred from entering into contracts with the U.S.
government.[Footnote 67] Based on information we obtained regarding
the U.S. government's Excluded Parties List System, we determined that
no contractors have been included on the list because of a false
certification under SADA.
Conclusions:
As global awareness of the genocide in Darfur has grown, so too have
efforts to combat this humanitarian crisis. Divestment from Sudan has
been at the forefront of these efforts, with activists, students, and
politicians from throughout the United States calling on shareholders
to pull their funds from companies that directly or indirectly support
the Sudanese government. However, in deciding whether and how to
divest, stakeholders must consider how divestment affects foreign
companies operating in Sudan, particularly those that strive to make a
positive contribution to the Sudanese people. They must also ensure
that divestment is consistent with their fiduciary responsibility.
Additionally, they must identify and evaluate conflicting sources of
information about which companies have Sudan-related business
operations. Requiring companies to disclose their own operations in
Sudan (as well as other state sponsors of terrorism) would provide
more accurate and transparent information to investors carefully
weighing whether and how to divest from Sudan. Furthermore, the strong
demand for this information from states that require divestment, as
well as from other investors, indicates that this information could be
considered material--a judgment that the SEC has suggested in its
correspondence with operating companies.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
In order to enhance the investing public's access to information it
needs to make well-informed decisions when determining whether and how
to divest Sudan-related assets, we recommend that the SEC consider
issuing a rule requiring companies that trade on U.S. exchanges to
disclose their business operations related to Sudan, as well as
possibly other U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the SEC and the Office of
Management and Budget. Both provided technical comments, which we
incorporated into the report as appropriate. The Office of Management
and Budget chose not to provide written comments. The SEC's written
comments, provided by the SEC Division of Corporation Finance, as well
as our responses to these comments, are reprinted in appendix IV. The
Division of Corporation Finance agreed that it would present our
recommendation to the commission for its consideration. However, the
division expressed concern that adopting a disclosure requirement that
is excessively broad and beyond what GAO recommends could possibly
lead to a volume of information that would overwhelm the investor and
possibly obscure other material information.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 30 days from the date of this letter. The report will also be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Other contacts and major contributors
are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Thomas Melito:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
GAO Survey of U.S. States:
To identify the actions that U.S. state fund managers took regarding
their Sudan-related assets and the factors they considered when
determining whether and how to divest, we designed and administered a
Web-based survey of state treasurers and state-run pension fund
managers.
The survey asked about (1) Sudan-related state investment laws and/or
policies; (2) whether or not the fund engaged with companies that did
business in Sudan, the methods used, and the outcomes; (3) whether the
fund froze or divested its Sudan-related assets and the reasons for
the decision; (4) if the fund froze or divested assets, the names of
the companies, dates, and total U.S. dollar values of the assets; and
(5) the sources of information the fund used to identify companies
with ties to Sudan. Appendix III contains a copy of our questionnaire.
We included three populations in this survey: (1) the 51 state
treasurers or their equivalents; (2) the 51 state public employee
retirement system (PERS) funds; and (3) managers of 50 other state-run
public pension funds, such as teacher retirement funds. For the first
two populations, we sent surveys to all of the state treasuries and
PERS funds. For the third population, we selected the 50 largest funds
based on total asset values from the 2007 Annual Retirement Survey of
State Retirement Systems conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. These 50
funds included in the survey represented approximately 96 percent of
the total asset value of all funds in this group. We received
responses from 138 of the 151 treasuries and state-run pension funds
in our population (see table 3). We discovered 1 fund from our third
population of 50 state-run pension funds with the greatest amount of
assets under management to be out of our scope because it was a
municipal-run fund, not a state-run fund. The removal of this fund
reduced our third population from 50 to 49 funds and our total
population from 152 to 151 funds. The overall response rate, adjusted
for the known and estimated funds that were out of our scope, was 91
percent. Response rates varied slightly among population groups.
We included 117 fund managers in the survey and received responses
from 105 managers representing 138 state funds. During data
collection, we discovered that several of the funds we surveyed were
managed by 1 fund manager. Specifically, 23 fund managers were
responsible for more than one fund selected for the survey. Of these
23 managers, 22 completed the survey for one of their funds instead of
all of their funds. In all cases, the state fund managers later
confirmed that their survey responses would be the same for all funds
under their management. We then copied the completed survey responses
into each remaining survey that the fund manager was asked to fill
out. The copied responses were independently verified for accuracy.
Table 3: Summary Response Table:
Total number of funds:
Total number surveyed: 151;
Number of respondents: 138;
Percent responding: 91.
(1) State treasuries;
Total number surveyed: 51;
Number of respondents: 45;
Percent responding: 88.
(2) PERS funds;
Total number surveyed: 51;
Number of respondents: 49;
Percent responding: 96.
(3) Other pension funds;
Total number surveyed: 49;
Number of respondents: 44;
Percent responding: 90.
Total number of fund managers;
Total number surveyed: 117;
Number of respondents: 105;
Percent responding: 90.
States for which at least one treasurer or pension fund manager
responded;
Total number surveyed: 51;
Number of respondents: 51;
Percent responding: 100.
Source: GAO analysis of survey response data.
[End of table]
After the survey was closed, we analyzed the survey results to
determine what differences existed between the responding and the
nonresponding funds. We performed this analysis for three
characteristics--total asset holdings, state, and population group. We
found no indications of significant bias caused by unit non-response.
On the basis of the 91 percent response rate and this analysis, we
chose to include the survey results in our report and consider them
sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
The practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce
nonsampling errors, such as difficulties interpreting a particular
question, which can introduce unwanted variability into the survey
results. We took steps to minimize nonsampling errors by pretesting
the questionnaire over the telephone with two state treasurers and
five pension fund representatives in December 2009 and January 2010.
We conducted pretests to make sure that the questions were clear and
unbiased, the data and information were readily obtainable, and the
questionnaire did not place an undue burden on respondents. An
independent reviewer within GAO also reviewed a draft of the
questionnaire prior to its administration. We made appropriate
revisions to the content and format of the questionnaire after the
pretests and independent review.
We administered the Web-based survey from February 25, 2010, to April
14, 2010. Respondents were sent an e-mail invitation to complete the
survey on a GAO Web server using a unique username and password.
Throughout the data collection period, nonrespondents received a
reminder e-mail, letter, and telephone call. We also conducted follow-
up with respondents by e-mail and telephone to confirm the value and
dates of divestment or freezing of Sudan-related assets. Two survey
questions gave the respondents the option to submit documentation on
the following information instead of entering it on the Web--the list
of companies with which the fund engaged and the names of companies,
dates, and values of assets from which the fund divested. We entered
this information into a spreadsheet, which was later merged with the
survey data set for analysis. The data entered were independently
verified for accuracy. All data analysis programs were independently
verified for accuracy.
State Laws and Policies:
To identify state laws and policies enacted regarding Sudan-related
investments and state contracts with companies tied to Sudan, we
analyzed state legal codes, non-codified laws, state bills, and
policies applicable to state treasurers and state-run pension fund
managers. Our scope covered all measures (laws and policies) enacted
or implemented since 1993 and effective as of April 2010. Using two
legal databases, Lexis/Nexis and Westlaw, we searched for (1) all
states that had relevant legislation and/or non-legislative policies
in effect as of April 23, 2010; (2) states with legislation that was
enacted but no longer in effect or repealed by the report issuance
date; and (3) states with legislation that was introduced but not
passed. As one way to verify this analysis, the team compared the
search results to descriptions of state laws and policies provided by
survey respondents. To identify non-legislative policies, we used
online searches for such policies on state treasurers' and pension
funds' Web sites, as well as survey responses. (Several survey
respondents provided policies to us by e-mail.) We reviewed state laws
and policies to identify provisions that address common subject matter
or themes and did not independently interpret those laws or policies.
Instead, we relied on survey responses and interviews with the state
treasurers and other officials knowledgeable of and responsible for
implementing their respective laws and policies in carrying out their
duties to manage state employee pension funds.
U.S. Investment Companies:
To determine how U.S. investors' Sudan-related asset holdings changed
since March 2007, we analyzed volume, value, and other related data of
U.S. firms' equity holdings, as reported in the Thomson Reuters
ThomsonONE ownership database. The ThomsonONE ownership database is a
Thomson Reuters database module that provides ownership and financial
information on shares held by institutions (such as investment
companies), reflecting the latest filings from stock exchanges
worldwide. After extensive discussions with Thomson Reuters staff
about their aggregation methodology for institutions and the funds
they manage, sources and frequency of data for non-U.S. traded
equities, use of data prior to 2007, and other specific data issues,
we determined that the data obtained from Thomson Reuters provide a
reasonable basis for our findings on U.S. investors' holdings of
certain Sudan-related equities. Our scope covered U.S. investors'
holdings of 20 securities of six key foreign companies for each
quarter from March 2007 to December 2009. We chose these six key
companies with Sudan-related assets because they (1) appear on all
three lists we analyzed of companies with business ties to Sudan; (2)
include companies that have been targeted through public divestment
campaigns; and (3) have operations in Sudan's oil sector, which plays
a central role in the country's economy. Included among the 20
securities we analyzed for these six companies are the securities of
affiliates where the parent company ownership stake was identified as
being greater than 50 percent.[Footnote 68] We chose this approach
because, under the "structure of responsibility," a parent company can
use a publicly traded subsidiary in which it has a controlling
interest (i.e., greater than 50 percent), to fund other projects, such
as operations in Sudan. This relationship is relevant in additional
situations, such as:
* when the parent company has a Sudan-related business operation, but
the parent company is state owned and not publicly traded or:
* when the affiliate doing business in Sudan is a private company.
Since equities are not traded in these situations, shareholders may
try to gain influence through the publicly traded parent or, if the
parent is not publicly traded, through a publicly traded affiliate
company over which the parent has a controlling influence.
To attempt to determine the reasons behind U.S. investors' actions
regarding Sudan-related assets, we obtained information from
investment companies. We identified investment companies by selecting
those that had spoken publicly about the issue of Sudan divestment, as
well as by issuing an invitation through a large national association
of investment companies to all of its members. Six firms agreed to
speak with us, and one, which chose to remain anonymous, addressed our
questions with written responses from 31 of its 34 sub-advisers. The
views these seven investment companies expressed are not generalizable
to all investment companies. To determine if changes in the value of
investor holdings were due to price changes or buying or selling of
Sudan-related assets, we constructed price indices for U.S. holdings
of Sudan-related equities. (Further information on constructing a
control or comparison group to assess whether U.S. investor behavior
was driven by Sudan-specific conditions or a general reallocation of
assets is in appendix II.)
Factors Related to Divestment Decisions:
To describe the factors that U.S. states and investment companies
considered in determining whether and how to divest, we analyzed
relevant data, reviewed documents, and interviewed key individuals.
* For the first factor regarding fiduciary responsibility, we analyzed
the results of our state survey, reviewed state laws and policies to
identify provisions explicitly allowing fiduciaries to not divest, and
interviewed or obtained information from the seven U.S.-based
investment companies and from national associations that advocate for
the interests of state fund managers.
* For the second factor regarding the difficulty identifying
information on operating companies with business ties to Sudan, we
analyzed three available lists of these companies--one from an
advocacy group (which provided its list in October 2009, January 2010,
and February 2010), one from a private research firm (which provided
its list in February 2010), and one from a socially-responsible
investment company (which provided its list in March 2010). Each of
these three groups provided its list at no cost to GAO.[Footnote 69]
The three lists we analyzed are widely used by investors divesting
from companies tied to Sudan or seeking to avoid investing in these
companies. We compared the lists to determine which companies appeared
on any or all three lists and we interviewed the individuals who
created the lists to understand their methodologies, as well as their
criteria for including companies on their lists. To examine this
second factor, we also reviewed SEC correspondence with foreign
operating companies that have business ties to Sudan and interviewed
SEC officials about their efforts to monitor these companies. In
addition, we analyzed the results of our survey of state fund
managers, and interviewed and reviewed information from advocacy
groups that represent state investment officials.
* For the third factor regarding the effects of divestment on
operating companies in Sudan, we interviewed advocacy groups and
investment companies, analyzed the results of our survey, and reviewed
provisions of state laws and policies that address engagement with
these companies. We also interviewed representatives from eight
companies that have or used to have business operations in Sudan. (We
sent e-mails or letters to 22 companies soliciting an opportunity to
speak with them about their operations in Sudan. We non-randomly
selected companies that have appeared on at least one of the lists we
analyzed and that represented a mix of both Western and Eastern
companies. Of the 22 companies that we contacted, 9 responded that
they were willing to speak with us, all of them Western. Ultimately,
we spoke with only eight of these companies because the ninth company
did not respond to our last communication attempting to schedule the
meeting.) The views expressed by these eight operating companies are
not generalizable to all operating companies that have or used to have
business operations in Sudan. In addition, we reviewed human rights
impact assessments conducted for some of these companies.
* Contract Prohibition:
To determine whether the U.S. government had contracted with companies
identified as having business ties to Sudan and to assess compliance
with the contract prohibition provision of SADA, we searched for
federal contracts awarded to specific companies and obtained and
reviewed contract solicitations to see if they contained the
applicable Sudan-related certification as required by the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR).
* First, we used one of the most widely used lists of companies
identified by an outside research organization as having restricted
business ties to Sudan. This list identified 88 such companies and
also identified affiliates and subsidiaries of these operating
companies. While we recognize that available lists of companies with
business operations in Sudan are difficult to develop and often
conflict with each other, we chose to use this particular list because
it focuses on companies identified in the four economic sectors
targeted in SADA and identifies subsidiaries and affiliates of those
companies.
* We then searched the Federal Procurement Data System--Next
Generation on March 2, 2010, for these companies to determine if any
federal contracts had been awarded to them from June 12, 2008, when
the FAR rule regarding contract prohibition went into effect, to March
1, 2010.[Footnote 70] (We determined that this data system was
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report because we did
not need to identify the universe of contracts subject to SADA in
order to complete our analysis.) Our search identified several dozen
contractors, of which one is identified on the above-mentioned list as
having restricted business ties to Sudan. The remaining contractors
are subsidiaries and affiliates of the companies identified as having
restricted business ties to Sudan. Twenty-nine of these contractors
were awarded a new contract during the time period of June 12, 2008-
March 2, 2010. Of those 29, 7 contractors had contract solicitations--
where the certification provision would appear--dated before June 12,
2008, and therefore were not included in our selection assessing
compliance with SADA.
* For each of the remaining 22 contractors, we then identified the
highest dollar amount contract or contract modification and obtained
and reviewed the solicitation to verify that the Sudan-related
certification was either present or not required. The applicable
certification provision varied depending on whether the contract was
for commercial items or not and whether the contracting officer relied
on electronic Online Representations and Certifications Application
certifications for the particular procurement. Other procurements,
such as those conducted under simplified acquisition procedures and
those that did not use a solicitation, are not required under the FAR
to have any Sudan-related certification.
The findings related to our analysis of this selection of contracts
cannot be generalized to the entire universe of new contracts awarded
to these companies since June 12, 2008.
In addition, we interviewed agency officials who have responsibilities
related to SADA's contract prohibition provision. The agencies they
represented included the General Services Administration, the Office
of Management and Budget's Office of Federal Procurement Policy
(OFPP), and the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.
To learn about the development of the FAR rules implementing the
contract prohibition provision in SADA and the government's process
for granting waivers to SADA, we spoke with officials from OFPP. We
also spoke with Office of Foreign Assets Control officials regarding
U.S. sanctions on Sudan and the process for issuing general and
specific licenses that allow businesses to conduct specified
operations in Sudan. In addition, we obtained and reviewed
documentation of the specific licenses granted for non-humanitarian
work in Sudan. We had officials from the General Services
Administration search the Excluded Parties List System database in
order to determine whether any contractors had been included on it due
to the suspension, debarment or proposed suspension or debarment of
the contractor for submitting a false certification under SADA.
Finally, we interviewed officials from the contracting agencies
associated with the 31 contract solicitations we obtained and reviewed
in order to understand how they implement the contract prohibition
provision. These agencies included the Departments of Defense,
Interior, State, and Homeland Security; and the U.S. Agency for
International Development.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to June 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Sudan-related Equities Price Index Methodology:
This appendix describes the techniques we used to estimate three price
indices for Sudan-related equities and challenges in constructing a
control or comparison group to assess whether U.S. investor behavior
was driven by Sudan-specific conditions or a general reallocation of
assets away from foreign equity markets.
Price Index Approaches:
We estimated three price indices for select foreign companies with
Sudan-related business operations to ensure that our results were not
driven by our choice of price index. The three index types we chose
were based on standard price index methods: a capitalization weighted
index, a LasPeyres index, and a Paasche index. For six select
companies, we identified 20 equity securities in which U.S. investors
had holdings from March 2007 to December 2009. Using Thomson Reuters
Datastream (a financial database that includes global equity markets),
we were able to identify price and market value data for 18 of those
securities (corresponding to five different companies) for the full
time period we studied. The two securities for which we were unable to
find data were held by only two and seven investors, respectively.
[Footnote 71] Our price indices are based on those 18 securities.
Capitalization Weighted Index:
A capitalization weighted index is defined as:
[Refer to PDF for formula]
Where It is the level of the index at some time t, Pj,t is the price
of equity j at time t, Qi,t is the quantity (number of shares) of
equity j at time t, and D is a divisor used to scale the
index.[Footnote 72] We chose the divisor as the level of the index at
the initial time period and multiplied the result by 100, so the index
had an initial value of 100. Therefore, our capitalization weighted
index becomes:
[Refer to PDF for formula]
So changes in the value of the index are driven by changes in the
total market value (or capitalization) of the securities.
LasPeyres Index:
The LasPeyres index is defined as:
[Refer to PDF for formula]
Here the quantities (number of shares) are held constant over time,
and changes are driven by the changes in the prices in the numerator.
As with the capitalization weighted index, we multiply the result by
100, so the index has an initial value of 100.
Paasche Index:
The Paasche index is defined as:
[Refer to PDF for formula]
Unlike the LasPeyres index, the Paasche index allows the composition
of shares to fluctuate over time--capturing changes in the U.S.
portfolio--while the denominator contains base-year prices, ensuring
that changes in the index level are driven by either price changes or
changes in the composition of U.S. equity holdings (where the price
behavior of new holdings may differ from old holdings). As a result,
we believe the Paasche index is the best way to capture the price of
the U.S. Sudan-related equity portfolio. Once again, we multiply the
result by 100, so the index has an initial value of 100.
Price Index Results and Net Selling Analysis and Potential Comparison
Groups:
Our analysis is meant to answer the following questions:
* Does the drop in the value of U.S. holdings of Sudan-related
equities reflect the selling of securities, a drop in their value, or
some combination of the two?
* If U.S. investors, on net, sold shares in Sudan-related companies,
was this driven by conditions specific to Sudan (such as SADA or civil
conflict) or similar to broad selling of foreign equities or foreign
equities in the oil and gas sector?
All three price indices indicate that U.S. investors, on net, sold
shares of Sudan-related companies, though the estimated amount of
selling varies. The values of the three price indices, from March 2007
to December 2009, are in figure 3 below. Prices rose by 6 percent
(according to the LasPeyres index), 7 percent (according to the
Paasche index) or 33 percent (according to the capitalization weighted
index). In comparison, from March 2007 to December 2009, the value of
U.S. Sudan-related equity holdings fell by almost 60 percent. Despite
this variation in estimated price increases, given that the value of
holdings did not increase by more than 6 percent (the smallest
estimated price increase) and in fact fell significantly, some net
selling must have occurred. Because the composition of the U.S.
portfolio changed over time, we believe the results indicated by the
Paasche index are the most relevant.[Footnote 73] This suggests that
net selling of Sudan-related equities explains the majority of the
drop in the value of U.S. holdings. Similarly, from December 2007 to
December 2009 (a time period for which SADA was in force), the value
of U.S. Sudan-related equity holdings fell by more than 61 percent.
During that same time period, prices fell by 34 percent (according to
the LasPeyres index), 33 percent (according to the Paasche index) or
32 percent (according to the capitalization weighted index). Because
the value of holdings fell by more than any of the price indices, some
net selling must have occurred during this time period.
Figure 3: Price Indices for the U.S. Sudan-related Equity Portfolio:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Index value: March 2007 = 100.
Date: March 2007;
Laspeyres: 100;
Paasche: 100;
Capitalization Weighted: 100.
Date: June 2007;
Laspeyres: 126.11;
Paasche: 126.447;
Capitalization Weighted: 126.81.
Date: September 2007;
Laspeyres: 153.68;
Paasche: 152.222;
Capitalization Weighted: 162.228.
Date: December 2007;
Laspeyres: 160.704;
Paasche: 159.866;
Capitalization Weighted: 194.359.
Date: March 2008;
Laspeyres: 106.045;
Paasche: 105.456;
Capitalization Weighted: 119.915.
Date: June 2008;
Laspeyres: 107.721;
Paasche: 107.917;
Capitalization Weighted: 107.058.
Date: September 2008;
Laspeyres: 88.8002;
Paasche: 88.5765;
Capitalization Weighted: 104.936.
Date: December 2008;
Laspeyres: 75.0295;
Paasche: 73.4538;
Capitalization Weighted: 76.4423.
Date: March 2009;
Laspeyres: 71.0421;
Paasche: 72.4371;
Capitalization Weighted: 84.7778.
Date: June 2009;
Laspeyres: 94.8432;
Paasche: 94.6736;
Capitalization Weighted: 109.006.
Date: September 2009;
Laspeyres: 101.011;
Paasche: 99.2447;
Capitalization Weighted: 117.246.
Date: December 2009;
Laspeyres: 105.731;
Paasche: 106.547;
Capitalization Weighted: 132.867.
Source: GAO analysis of Thomson Reuters data.
[End of figure]
The question remains open as to whether this net selling of Sudan-
related equities was related to conditions specific to Sudan (such as
SADA or civil conflict) or broad selling of foreign equities or
foreign equities in the oil and gas sector. An ideal approach to this
question would involve a comparison group of foreign oil and gas
equities available at a similar frequency and time period to the data
we collected on Sudan-related equity holdings (quarterly, from March
2007 to December 2009). However, such data are available from public
data sources (Treasury International Capital U.S. Portfolio Holdings
of Foreign Securities or Bureau of Economic Analysis International
Investment Position) on only an annual basis, and data for the end of
2009 were not yet available. We were able to perform a more limited
comparison from the end of 2007 to the end of 2008, the first 12
months SADA was in force. During 2008, the value of U.S. Sudan-related
equity holdings fell about 59 percent. In comparison, the value of all
U.S. foreign oil and gas holdings (according to the 2007 and 2008
Reports on U.S. Holdings of Foreign Securities) fell by only 40
percent, indicating that U.S. investors actively or passively allowed
the weight of Sudan-related equity holdings to shrink in their foreign
oil and gas portfolio (the proportion fell from 3.4 percent to 2.3
percent). Similarly, total U.S. foreign equity holdings fell by 46
percent in 2008, indicating that U.S. investors actively or passively
allowed the weight of Sudan-related equity holdings to also shrink in
their total foreign equity portfolio (the proportion fell from 0.3
percent to 0.2 percent). This is merely suggestive that Sudan-specific
factors played a role in U.S. investor selling decisions during 2008.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Questionnaire:
Questionnaire Regarding States' Sudan Investment Policies:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Introduction:
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, non-
partisan research-arm of the legislative branch. GAO assists the U.S.
Congress in evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of federal
laws.
The goal of this survey is to describe the effect, if any, of the
Sudan divestment campaign on U.S. state-owned assets and on the assets
of state-run pension funds. In particular, we hope to identify any
challenges faced when considering or implementing divestment policies
and laws.
(This survey is part of a larger study requested by the House
Financial Services Committee regarding the federal law called the
Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act (SADA), Public Law 110-74.)
Your responses to this survey will help the GAO answer the House
Financial Services Committee's questions about policies and actions
affecting each state's assets, including your own.
it is estimated that you will require 30 to 60 minutes to complete
this questionnaire. It is divided into 5 sections and has 25 questions
and most of the questions are short and may be easily answered by
checking a box next to the appropriate response. However, you may need
to consult records if your state has divested any assets. After
receiving your responses, we may follow up with a brief telephone call
to clarify your responses.
The results of this survey will generally be provided in summary form
in our report. Individual answers may be discussed, but they will not
include any information that could be used to identify individual
respondents. For more information, click here.
We understand that there are great demands on your time, so we
appreciate your effort in completing this questionnaire. The data you
provide in this questionnaire will be a critical input in GAO's report
to Congress.
Please complete this questionnaire as soon as possible, but within the
next two weeks. Your cooperation in returning the questionnaire
promptly is appreciated. When it is issued, we will email you a copy
of the report containing these survey results. We plan on issuing the
report by summer 2010.
Instructions:
To learn more about navigation, exiting and printing the survey,
please click here.
To move from section to section: Use the menu bar on the left side of
the screen or the "Next section" button at the bottom of each page. Do
not use the "Enter' key on your keyboard to navigate through the
survey.
To exit and save: Click on the "Exit" button at the bottom of the
screen. Always use the "Exit" button to close the survey. If you do
not, you will lose all the information that you have entered on the
screen of the survey where you improperly exited the program.
To restart your survey: Log onto the survey using your username and
password. The survey will restart at the point where you exited.
Indicating You Have Completed the Questionnaire:
The final question in the last section asks you to indicate that you
have completed this questionnaire. Checking "Complete" tells us that
your answers are official and final. Your answers will not be used
unless you have done this. Please note we will not send follow-up e-
mails to those who have checked the "Complete" button.
Contact:
If you have any questions or are experiencing difficulties responding
to the questionnaire (for example, if you are unable to complete it
online), please contact one of the following persons.
Thank you for your time and assistance.
Section 1: Information on Your State's Sudan-related Investment
Policies:
Note: All questions contained in this survey only pertain to the _____.
Even if you have investment authority for additional funds, please
only provide answers that pertain to the _____.
1. To the best of your knowledge, has _____passed any laws or issued
any policies that affect investment in companies that do business in
Sudan?
Laws or policies may directly target Sudan or include Sudan among a
number of countries targeted for divestment, such as state sponsors of
terrorism.
(Check only one answer)
1. Yes, my state has passed laws and/or state investment authorities
have issued policies.
2. No, my state has neither passed any laws nor issued any policies.
(Go to question 6.)
3. I don't know if my state hat any laws or policies. (Go to question
6.)
2. Which authority issued the policy/policies? (For example: the state
legislature, the investment board, the governor, etc. If you prefer
and it is available, you may e-mail a copy of the policy to:
SudanDivestment@gao.gov).
3. To the best of your knowledge, tides the law, policy or policies
include any of the following provisions?
For the purposes of this survey, to divest is to relinquish assets
held in specified companies. This sale of assets is intended to reduce
financial and/or political support for an entity in an effort to
change that entity's behavior. The sale of assets may also be intended
to reduce the investor's exposure to financial risk. Divestment can be
implemented either in a blanket manner or a targeted manner. With
blanket divestment, all shares in a company are sold immediately upon
identification of that company's ties to the scrutinized government.
With targeted divestment, companies are contacted first and shares are
sold (sometimes in increments) only if the companies do not respond to
the concerns of the shareholder contacting them.
For the purposes of this survey, to freeze assets means withholding
additional or new investments from (one's current) investments.
3a. Requires the person(s) with investment authority to divest from
Sudan:
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
3b. Allows (but does not require) the person(s) with investment
authority to divest from Sudan:
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
3c. Requires the person(s) with investment authority to contact
companies prior to divesting:
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
3d. Allows the person(s) with investment authority to remain invested
if targeted companies change their behavior in the Sudan:
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
3c. Requires the person(s) with investment authority to report any
divestment actions taken to the state legislature on a regular basis:
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
3f. Requires the person(s) with investment authority to identify which
companies have ties with Sudan:
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
3g. Requires the person(s) with investment authority to report the
list of identified companies to the state legislature on a regular
basis:
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
3h. Allows the person(s) with investment authority to be indirectly
invested in Sudan through mutual funds or hedge funds:
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
3i. Allows the person(s) with investment authority not to divest if
she/he states that divestment would constitute a breach of fiduciary
trust:
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
3j. Prohibits state contracts with companies with ties to Sudan (as
defined by the policy/law):
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
3k. Prohibits future investment in companies with ties to Sudan (as
defined by the policy/law):
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
3l. Other provision (Please specify below):
Yes:
No:
Don't know:
Other provision:
4. Has the_____had any written correspondence with the Department
of Justice regarding its change of investment policy towards Sudan?
(Check only one answer)
1. Yes.
2. No.
3. Don't know.
4. Not applicable.
5. Has the_____had any written correspondence with the office of the
U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan regarding its change of investment policy
towards Sudan?
(Check only one answer)
1. Yes.
2. No.
3. Don't know.
4. Not applicable.
5 of 20
Section 2: Engagement:
This section specifically asks questions about the engagement of
companies. Engagement of a company is defined here as: identifying
companies and leveraging ones power as a shareholder (or potential
shareholder) in an effort to change the investment or operating
behavior of that company.
6. Did the_____, or a money manager acting on its behalf, engage with
companies who do or did business in Sudan?
(Check only one answer)
1. Yes.
2. No (Go to question 10.)
3. Don't know (Go to question 10.)
7. Which of the following methods did the_____use when engaging
companies?
(Please check one answer per method)
7a. Wrote letter(s)/e-mails to companies concerning their business
ties, to Sudan:
Used:
Did not use:
Don't know:
7b. Called or met with companies asking them for information on their
business ties to Sudan:
Used:
Did not use:
Don't know:
7c. Informed companies the_____might divest or freeze assets if they
did not cease all business ties to Sudan:
Used:
Did not use:
Don't know:
7d. Informed companies the_____might divest or freeze assets if they
did not change the nature of their operations in Sudan, such as
providing humanitarian outreach programs for Sudanese people, engaging
with the Sudanese Government, or conducting a human rights impact
assessment:
Used:
Did not use:
Don't know:
7e. Used an intermediary to communicate the targeted companies (For
example, Conflict Risk Network):
Used:
Did not use:
Don't know:
7f. Other method (Please specify below):
Used:
Did not use:
Don't know:
Other method:
8. With which operating companies did the_____"engage"?
(You may write the names below. However, if it is easier, you may copy
the names of the companies from your records and paste them in the
space below. You may also send a copy of your records listing the
companies to SudanDivestment@gao.gov.)
9. To the best of your knowledge, how many companies gave the
following responses after the_____'s engagement with them?
(Please check one answer per response from companies.)
9a. The targeted companies provided no response to our letters and/or
phone calls:
All:
More than half:
About half:
Less than half:
None:
Don't know:
9b. The targeted companies informed us that they had left/planned to
leave Sudan:
All:
More than half:
About half:
Less than half:
None:
Don't know:
9c. The targeted companies provided more information about their
business that revealed there was no need to divest:
All:
More than half:
About half:
Less than half:
None:
Don't know:
9d. The targeted companies informed us that they changed or will
change their operations (for example: limited partnerships with
companies that may have strong ties to the Government of Sudan (GOS),
committed to refuse any future contracts for work in Sudan once
current contract obligations are satisfied, increased extent of
humanitarian activities, etc.)
All:
More than half:
About half:
Less than half:
None:
Don't know:
9e. The targeted companies informed us that they did not or will not
change their practices in Sudan:
All:
More than half:
About half:
Less than half:
None:
Don't know:
9f. Other response from companies (Please specify below):
All:
More than half:
About half:
Less than half:
None:
Don't know:
Other response from companies:
Section 3: Divestment:
For the purposes of this survey, to divest is to relinquish assets
held in specified companies. This sale of assets is intended to reduce
financial and/or political support for an entity in an effort to
change that entity's behavior. The sale of assets may also be intended
to reduce the investor's exposure to financial risk. Divestment can be
implemented either in a blanket manner or a targeted manner. With
blanket divestment, all shares in a company are sold immediately upon
identification of that company's ties to the scrutinized government.
With targeted divestment, companies are contacted first and shares are
sold (sometimes in increments) only if the companies do not respond to
the concerns of the shareholder contacting them.
For the purposes of this survey, to freeze assets means withholding
additional or new investments from (one's current) investments.
10. Did the_____divest or freeze assets, or does it plan to
divest/freeze, any or all of its Sudan-related assets?
(Check only one answer)
1. Yes, the fund has divested and/or frozen some or all of its assets.
2. Yes, the fund is planning to divest and/or freeze some or all of
its assets.
3. No, the fund is not divesting or freezing any of its assets. (Go to
question 19.)
4. The fund did not have assets invested in Sudan-related business.
(Go to question 20.)
5. Don't know (Go to question 20.)
11. Which of the following methods did the_____use, or will use, when
divesting/freezing some or all of its Sudan-related assets?
(Please check one answer per method)
11a. Divested and/or froze assets without contacting companies the
_____divested from:
Used:
Did not use:
Don't know:
11b. Divested and/or froze assets after communicating with companies
and being a a unsatisfied with their response:
Used:
Did not use:
Don't know:
11c. Informed companies that the___would not invest in them in the
future unless they changed their business ties or operations in Sudan:
Used:
Did not use:
Don't know:
11d. Other method (Please specify below):
Used:
Did not use:
Don't know:
Other method:
12. What were the major, moderate, and minor reasons for the_____'s
divesting/freezing assets in Sudan?
(Please check one answer per reason.)
12a. Divesting from Sudan could reduce the financial risk my office's
investments were exposed to:
Major reason:
Moderate reason:
Minor reason:
Not a reason:
No opinion:
12b. Divesting from Sudan could improve the returns on my offices
investments:
Major reason:
Moderate reason:
Minor reason:
Not a reason:
No opinion:
12c. The_____was required to divest:
Major reason:
Moderate reason:
Minor reason:
Not a reason:
No opinion:
12d. Divesting from Sudan could alleviate concerns about indirectly
supporting a country designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism:
Major reason:
Moderate reason:
Minor reason:
Not a reason:
No opinion:
12e. Divesting from Sudan could alleviate concerns about indirectly
supporting the genocide and human rights abuses in Darfur:
Major reason:
Moderate reason:
Minor reason:
Not a reason:
No opinion:
12f. Divesting from Sudan was likely to have a positive impact (i.e.,
take revenue source away from the government of Sudan):
Major reason:
Moderate reason:
Minor reason:
Not a reason:
No opinion:
12g. Other reason (Please specify below):
Major reason:
Moderate reason:
Minor reason:
Not a reason:
No opinion:
Other reason:
13. To what extent was the_____concerned about each of the following
when divesting/freezing Sudan-related assets?
(Please check one answer per concern.)
13a. Engaging companies was too difficult and/or costly:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
13b. Divesting could cause my office to incur high transaction costs
and/or earn reduced returns on investment:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
13c. It would be difficult to divest while ensuring that fiduciary
trust requirements were not breached and my office/state was not made
vulnerable to law suits:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
13d. Despite SADA's explicit authorization, it would be difficult to
divest while ensuring that the state was not left open to law suits
alleging that divestment practice is unconstitutional:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
13e. Divesting might force an operating company out of the Sudanese
market, leaving room for one with more questionable business practices:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
13f. It would be difficult and costly to identify accurate and
authoritative information regarding companies with business ties to
Sudan:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
13g. There was concern about setting a dangerous precedent for
divesting because of other social concerns:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
13h. Other reason (Please specify below):
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Other reason:
14. Did, or will, the_____divest or freeze directly-held assets
related to Sudan?
(Check only one answer)
1. Yes, all directly-held assets have been,or will be, divested or
frozen.
2. Yes, some directly-held assets have been, or will be, divested
or frozen.
3. No, directly-held assets have not, or will not, be divested or
frozen.
4. The fund had no directly-held assets Sudan.
5. Don't know.
15. Did, or will, the_____divest or freeze indirectly-held assets (e.g.,
assets held in a commingled fund) related to Sudan?
(Check only one answer)
1. Yes, all indirectly-held assets have been, or will be, divested or
frozen. (Go to question 17.)
2. Yes, some indirectly-held assets have been, or will be, divested or
frozen. (Go to question 17.1
3. No, indirectly-held assets have not, or will not, be divested or
frozen. (Go to question 16.)
4. The fund had no indirectly-held assets in Sudan. (Go to question 17.)
5. Don't know (Go to question 17.)
16. To what extent were each of the following factors a reason why the
_____did not or will not divest its indirectly-held assets?
(Please check one answer per factor.)
16a. As one of many investors, did not have authority to divest:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
16b. It was too costly:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
16c. The law/policy only requires the divestment of directly-held
assets:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
16d. Other factor (Please specify below):
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Other factor:
If the___has not yet divested or frozen assets, click on link
below to go to question 20.
Click here to skip to question 20.
17. If the_____has already divested or frozen assets, what was the
name/names of the company/companies from which it divested or froze
assets, the date of divestment or freezing, and the value divested or
frozen from the company (in U.S. dollars)?
(You may enter the information for up to 5 companies below. If you
divested or froze assets from more than 5 companies, or if it is
easier to cut and paste information from your records, you may enter
the information in the large box at the end of question 17. You may
also send a copy of your records listing the companies to
SudanDivestment@gao.gov.)
Company #1 from which the fund divested/froze assets:
17a. Name of company:
17b. Date of divestment/date when value of frozen assets was calculated
(month/year):
17c. Value frozen/divested from the company (in US$):
Company #2 from which the fund divested/froze assets:
17d. Name of company:
17e. Date of divestment/date when value of frozen assets was calculated
(month/year):
17f. Value frozen/divested from the company (in US$):
Company #3 from which the fund divested/froze assets:
17g. Name of Company:
17h. Date of divestment/date when value of frozen assets was calculated
(month/year):
17i. Value frozen/divested from the company (in US$):
Company #4 from which the fund divested/froze assets:
I7j. Name of Company:
17k. Date of divestment/date when value of frozen assets was calculated
(month/year):
17l. Value frozen/divested from the company (in US$):
Company #5 from which the fund divested/froze assets:
17m. Name of Company:
17n. Date of divestment/date when value of frozen assets was
calculated (month/year):
17o. Value frozen/divested from the company (in US$):
Please enter information on additional companies or from your records
below. For each company, please include the company name, date of
divestment/date when value of frozen assets was calculated, and value
frozen/divested from each company.
18. If the_____has already divested or frozen assets, to the best of
your knowledge, how many companies took the following actions after
the _____'s divestment from them?
(Please check one answer per action):
18a. The targeted companies changed their operations:
All:
More than half:
Less than half:
About half:
None:
Don't know:
18b. The targeted companies left Sudan:
All:
More than half:
Less than half:
About half:
None:
Don't know:
18c. The targeted companies increased the number or extent of
humanitarian activities they fund in Sudan:
All:
More than half:
Less than half:
About half:
None:
Don't know:
18d. The targeted companies did nothing:
All:
More than half:
Less than half:
About half:
None:
Don't know:
18e. Other action (Please specify below):
All:
More than half:
Less than half:
About half:
None:
Don't know:
Other action:
After answering question 18, click on link below to go to question 20.
Click here to skip to question 20.
19. If the_____did not or will not freeze or divest any Sudan-related
assets, to what extent did each of the following factors influence the
decision not to freeze or divest Sudan-related assets?
(Please check one answer per factor.)
19a. The_____did not divest since it is not required to:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19b. The_____determined it had no directly-held assets in companies
operating in Sudan:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19c. The_____determined it had no indirectly-held assets (i.e.,
commingled funds) in companies operating in Sudan:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19d. The_____determined that it had indirectly-held assets (i.e.,
commingled funds) in companies operating in Sudan but did not have the
authority to divest:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19e. The_____did not view divesting as a positive tool to promote
change:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19f. Divesting would have caused State/name of fund to incur high
transaction costs and/or earn reduced returns on investment:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19g. Divesting would have conflicted with my fiduciary trust
requirements thereby making the_____vulnerable to law suits:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19h. It was too difficult and too costly to identify accurate and
authoritative information regarding companies with business ties to
Sudan:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19i. Engaging companies was preferable to divesting:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19j. Divesting would have forced an operating company out of the
Sudanese market, leaving room for one with more questionable business
practices:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19k. Adopting a policy encouraging divestment from Sudan would have
set a dangerous precedent for divesting because of other social
concerns:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19l. In order to divest from certain companies, the _____would have
had to sell off entire funds, such as international funds, which are
the most lucrative:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19m. Despite SADA's explicit authorization, divesting would have left
the_____open to law suits alleging that divestment practice is
unconstitutional:
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
19n. Other factor (Please specify below):
To a large extent:
To a moderate extent:
To a small extent:
To no extent:
No opinion:
Not applicable:
Other factor:
Section 4: Sources of Information:
20. Did your state, fund, or governing body attempt to identify
companies with ties to Sudan?
(Check only one answer)
1. Yes.
2. No (Go to question 24).
3. Don't know (Go to question 24).
21. Below is a list of sources commonly used to identify companies
with ties to Sudan. How useful were each of these sources to your
office as it attempted to identify companies with business operations
in Sudan?
(Please check one answer per source.)
21a. Government source: The Securities and Exchange Commission's EDGAR
database on-line (SEC):
Very useful:
Useful:
Somewhat useful:
Not at all useful:
No Opinion:
Did not use:
21b. Government source: Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset
Controls List (OFAC):
Very useful:
Useful:
Somewhat useful:
Not at all useful:
No Opinion:
Did not use:
21c. Commercial or private source: Private research companies (such as
CSAG, RiskMetrics, Bloomberg Terminal, etc.):
Very useful:
Useful:
Somewhat useful:
Not at all useful:
No Opinion:
Did not use:
21d. Commercial or private source: Socially responsible investment
firm (e.g., Calvert, Domini Investments, etc.):
Very useful:
Useful:
Somewhat useful:
Not at all useful:
No Opinion:
Did not use:
21e. NGOs/Advocacy groups (Such as: Investors Against Genocide, The
Sudan Divestment Task Force/Conflict Risk Network):
Very useful:
Useful:
Somewhat useful:
Not at all useful:
No Opinion:
Did not use:
21 f. Other source (Please specify below):
Very useful:
Useful:
Somewhat useful:
Not at all useful:
No Opinion:
Did not use:
Other source:
22. Overall, how sufficient did your office think the information
provided by the sources it consulted was in identifying companies with
business ties to Sudan as defined under the_____"s policy or law?
(Check only one answer)
1. Very sufficient.
2. Sufficient.
3. Somewhat sufficient.
4.Not at all sufficient.
5. No opinion.
6. Don't know.
7. Not applicable.
23. What are the reason(s) for your response to question 22?
Section 5: Contact information:
24. Do you have any additional comments?
25. What are the names, titles, phone number, and e-mail address of
the person(s) completing this questionnaire?
(Enter information in boxes below)
Person #1:
Name:
Title:
Phone number, including area code:
E-mail Address:
Person #2:
Name:
Title:
Phone number, including area code:
E-mail Address:
Completed:
26. If you have completed the survey, please check "Completed" below.
Clicking on "Completed" indicates that your answers are final.
Your answers will not be used unless you check Completed below.
(Check only one answer)
1. Completed.
2. Not completed.
Thank you:
Thank you for your participation!
If applicable, please remember to send a copy of your state's
divestment policy, a list of companies with which you engaged, and/or
the list of companies from which you divested or froze assets, the
date of divestment, and value divested to SudanDivestment@gao.gov.
Printing a Copy of Your Survey Responses:
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[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at
the end of this appendix.
United States:
Securities And Exchange Commission:
Division Of Corporation Finance
Washington, D.C. 20549:
June 14, 2010L
Thomas Melito:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Melito:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's draft report entitled Sudan Divestment: U.S.
Investors have Sold Assets but Could Benefit from Increased Disclosure
Regarding Companies' Ties to Sudan (GAO-10-742).
The GAO recommends that the SEC consider issuing a rule requiring
companies that trade on U.S. exchanges to disclose their business
operations tied to Sudan as well as possibly other state sponsors of
terrorism. As the report noted, the federal securities laws do not
specifically require public companies to disclose this information.
Rather, these laws require this disclosure when the information is
"material." It is important to note that companies are not free to
make their own judgments as to whether these matters are "material."
The materiality test for misstatements or omission of facts is an
objective test based on the informational needs of a reasonable
investor. In the Division of Corporation Finance's view, companies
have a strong incentive to make appropriate judgments about
materiality, in that they may face significant federal securities law
liability for disclosure that includes material misstatements or
material omissions that make the information provided misleading. The
Division reviews company filings with this materiality standard for
disclosure in mind. Through our review and comment process, the
Division questions public companies about their business operations
tied to Sudan and other state sponsors of terrorism and, where
appropriate, the Division asks companies to explain and revise their
disclosure about those ties. [See comment 1]
The decision as to whether to adopt corporate disclosure requirements
that expand beyond materiality is one which must be presented to the
Commission for its consideration, In presenting GAO's recommendation
to the Commission, the Division will note that jurisdictions
throughout the U.S. have adopted numerous divestiture-like statutes
concerning a variety of topics. While the GAO's recommendation relates
to investors' access to information about companies' activities with
respect to a specific subset of those divestiture statutes — those
relating to Sudan — the Division is concerned that if the Commission
were to adopt disclosure requirements to facilitate compliance with
the broad span of these statutes — without consideration of the
materiality of that disclosure to the overall mix of information about
a company — the volume of information could overwhelm investors and
could possibly obscure other material information. Such an outcome
would run counter to the fundamental purposes of disclosure under the
securities laws — i.e., to provide investors with meaningful
information and promote price discovery efficiency in the securities
markets. [See comment 2]
Thank you for the courtesy the GAO extended to the SEC during the
course of preparing its report, and thank you again for giving us the
opportunity to provide you with comments as you finalize it.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Meredith B. Cross:
Director:
The following are GAO's comments on the letter from the SEC's Division
of Corporation Finance, dated June 14, 2010.
GAO Comments:
1. The meaning of "material information" is not explicitly defined by
law, but the Supreme Court has determined that information is material
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider the information important in making an investment decision or
the information would significantly alter the total mix of available
information. In evaluating companies' disclosures regarding global
security-risk related issues, the SEC's Office of Global Security Risk
has asked companies to consider both quantitative and qualitative
factors, such as the potential impact of corporate activities upon a
company's reputation and share value. As we note in our report,
however, companies have generally resisted these instructions and, at
times, have refused to disclose information about their ties to Sudan.
2. As we state in our report, the SEC's Office of Global Security Risk
has suggested to companies that any operations they have in state
sponsors of terrorism might be considered material because divestment
campaigns and legislation mandating divestment from Sudan indicate
that investors would consider this information important in making
investment decisions.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Thomas Melito (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Cheryl Goodman, Assistant
Director; Elizabeth Singer; Katy Forsyth; Michael Hoffman; R.G.
Steinman; Julia Becker Vieweg; Sada Aksartova; Kay Halpern; Debbie
Chung; Ann Baker; JoAnna Berry; Noah Bleicher; Martin de Alteriis;
Patrick Dynes; Etana Finkler; Justin Fisher; Cathy Hurley; Ernie
Jackson; Debra Johnson; Julia Kennon; Jill Lacey; Andrea Miller; and
Linda Rego make key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The U.S. Secretary of State designates countries as state sponsors
of terrorism pursuant to three laws --section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act; section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act; and
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four
main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these
authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on
defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use
items (items that have commercial uses as well as military or nuclear
proliferation uses); and miscellaneous financial and other
restrictions.
[2] P.L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat. 2516-23.
[3] Under U.S. sanctions, U.S.-based companies are prohibited from
doing business in Sudan (31 C.F.R. Part 538). Certain exemptions to
this rule exist. For example, nongovernmental organizations involved
in humanitarian or religious activities in Sudan are generally allowed
to perform these activities.
[4] SADA does not define divestment. For the purposes of this report,
we use the term "divestment" to mean the relinquishment of all assets
held in specified companies in order to reduce financial or political
support for an entity and change that entity's behavior.
[5] Under SADA, the term "person" includes, among others, a
corporation, company, business association, and their successors,
subunits, parent companies, or subsidiaries.
[6] Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 25.702.
[7] Throughout this report, the term "state" refers to the 50 states
and the District of Columbia.
[8] We discovered 1 fund from our third population to be out of our
scope because it was a municipal-run fund, not a state-run fund. The
removal of this fund reduced our third population from 50 to 49 funds
and our total population from 152 to 151 funds.
[9] For the purposes of this report, we use the term "policy" to refer
to a written statement outlining actions or positions that a
government entity intends to take.
[10] For the state treasuries and pension funds, our analysis is based
primarily on equities, but also includes some debt. For the investment
companies, our analysis is based exclusively on equities.
[11] According to this association, its members represent about 98
percent of all investment companies registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
[12] Ultimately, we spoke with only eight of these companies because
the ninth company did not respond to our last communication attempting
to schedule the meeting.
[13] The meaning of "material information" is not explicitly defined
by law, but the Supreme Court has determined that information is
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would consider the information important in making an
investment decision or the information would significantly alter the
total mix of available information.
[14] GAO has identified data reliability weaknesses in the Federal
Procurement Data System. For example, see GAO, Federal Contracting:
Observations on the Government's Contracting Data Systems, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1032T] (Washington D.C.: Sept. 29,
2009).
[15] Our findings related to this analysis cannot be generalized to
the entire universe of new contracts awarded to these companies since
June 12, 2008.
[16] For the purposes of this report, freezing assets means
withholding additional or new investments from one's current
investments.
[17] State fiduciary law varies from state to state through state
constitutions, statutes, and common law. However, for the purposes of
this report, fiduciary responsibility is defined as the duty to act
solely in the interest of a participant or beneficiary and for the
exclusive purpose of providing benefits to the participant and
beneficiary.
[18] Executive Order 13067.
[19] Executive Order 13400.
[20] It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as
terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that
are not country specific. Collectively, these individuals' assets are
blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with
them.
[21] The N-CSR filing is the certified shareholder report of
registered management investment companies. The N-SAR filing is the
semi-annual report for registered management companies.
[22] 73 Fed. Reg. 23328, 23330 (Apr. 30, 2008).
[23] There are more fund managers than states because the pension
holdings in some states are contained in several funds managed by
different individuals.
[24] Two of the 29 fund managers who indicated that they had divested
or frozen their Sudan-related assets or planned to do so did not
respond to our questions about the reasons for their divestment.
[25] Some state fund managers reported having issued policy guidance
regarding how state law affects their funds. While we consulted these
policies when necessary, we focused our analysis on state laws and non-
legislative policies because the legislative policies generally
reflected the state laws.
[26] One additional state had a law that expired. Maine enacted
legislation in 2005, which expired in July 2009. Fifteen states
considered but failed to pass bills related to Sudan and Sudan-related
investments.
[27] Maryland's law states that, notwithstanding any other provisions,
the act may not be applied to certain investments or divestment
actions if the U.S. Congress or President affirmatively declare, among
other things, that the government of Sudan has ceased attacks on
civilians.
[28] Arizona targets Sudan specifically but also targets all state
sponsors of terrorism. The District of Columbia and Maryland have laws
mandating divestment from Sudan-and Iran-related companies. Florida
and Louisiana have laws requiring some of their public retirement
systems to offer a terror-free index fund option to their retirees.
Georgia targets "any corporation that is included in the terrorism
sanctions issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United
States Department of the Treasury."
[29] According to the Department of State, this list identifies
foreign organizations that the U.S. government has determined engage
in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA
(8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section
140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or that retain the capability
and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. In addition,
the organizations' terrorist activities or terrorism must threaten the
security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense,
foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.
[30] Maryland state code, Division II, Title 21, Subtitle 1, says
"divestment action" means "selling, redeeming, transferring,
exchanging, otherwise disposing of, and refraining from further
investment in certain investments."
[31] This wording is used in the state codes of Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and
Rhode Island.
[32] These states include Arizona, California, Georgia, and Utah.
Although Utah has a law that prohibits state contracts, it does not
appear in table 2 because it does not have any laws or policies
specifically regarding investment of Sudan-related assets.
[33] Many of the same investment companies have appeared frequently in
the group of top 20 investors from March 2007 to December 2009. For
example, 15 firms appeared in more than half of the 12 financial
quarters during this time period, including 4 that were in the top 20
for each of the 12 quarters.
[34] The three index types we chose were based on standard price index
methods used to aggregate many prices into a single index value: a
capitalization weighted index, a LasPeyres index, and a Paasche index.
Using Thomson Reuters Datastream (a financial database that includes
global equity markets), we were able to identify price and market
value data for 18 securities (corresponding to five different
companies) that we used to calculate our price indices. See app. II
for more information on our price index methodology.
[35] To construct a control or comparison group would require more
frequent and timely data than were readily available.
[36] Some investors we interviewed did not directly hold Sudan-related
assets because, as self-designated socially responsible investment
companies, they screen out these assets or because the nature of the
funds they managed precluded the inclusion of Sudan-related assets.
[37] One investment company's policy was not Sudan-specific, but more
generally worded regarding social concerns and investing.
[38] Data indicate that, as of April 22, 2010, this firm sold its
shares of three of the companies it identified as having business
relations with the Sudanese government. This firm decided to retain or
increase its shares in another company it had identified because it
said that this company was receptive to its efforts to encourage the
company to improve its business practices in Sudan.
[39] Managers of state investment funds are generally responsible for
meeting the duties established by applicable state law. Fiduciary
responsibilities for other investment fund managers may be established
by the underlying investment fund documents and applicable law,
including common law.
[40] State fiduciary law varies from state to state. Therefore, we did
not make any broad generalization regarding these laws.
[41] The Board of Trustees of the New Hampshire Judicial Retirement
Plan and the New Hampshire Retirement System v. Gardner, New Hampshire
Supreme Court (No. 2009-0621). This case was still pending as of May
11, 2010.
[42] While the Wisconsin Investment Board concluded that it is against
"total or targeted" divestment, it screens each investment related to
Sudan, engages with companies, and reserves the right to sell Sudan-
related investments depending on the estimated cost of the sale versus
the risk-related cost of keeping the investment.
[43] Furthermore, many state laws allow for alternative Sudan-free
investments to replace any investments in Sudan-related companies. For
example, California law allows investment of public employee
retirement funds in an "alternative fund or account" which excludes
the targeted Sudan-related companies. If the state's public employee
retirement fund's board determines that the new investment fund or
account is "financially equivalent" to the existing fund or account,
then the board may transfer its investments from the existing fund or
account to the new fund or account.
[44] This number does not include those respondents who said they had
no Sudan-related assets to divest.
[45] For example, SADA incorporates 29 C.F.R § 2509.94-1, which is the
Department of Labor's "Interpretive Bulletin relating to the fiduciary
standard under ERISA [the Employee Retirement Income Security Act] in
considering economically targeted investment." This guidance states
that the fiduciary standards applicable to economically targeted
investments, which would include Sudan divestment activities under
SADA, are no different than the standards applicable to plan
investments generally. Under this guidance, fiduciaries may generally
take social issues into account as long as the alternative investments
are not expected "to provide a plan with a lower rate of return than
available alternative investments with commensurate degrees of risk or
[to be] riskier than alternative available investments with
commensurate rates of return." The Department of Labor has issued more
recent guidance (see 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1). However, 29 C.F.R. §
2509.94-1 remains applicable to ERISA plan divestments made under SADA.
[46] In June 2007, the SEC experimented with a Web site to provide
direct access to public companies' 2006 annual report disclosures
concerning past, current, or anticipated business activities in state
sponsors of terrorism, including Sudan. The SEC indefinitely suspended
the site after 1 month, citing concerns about the timeliness of data
contained in the disclosures, as well as the possible negative
connotation that could attach to a company, even though the company's
disclosures may have concerned benign activities. See 72 Fed. Reg.
65862 (Nov. 23, 2007). Other U.S. agencies have declined to publish
lists of companies with business ties to Sudan, citing concerns that
creating such a list would impose an ongoing, burdensome requirement
on them; risk alienating U.S. allies by "blacklisting" companies based
in those countries; subject the agencies to legal challenges; and
present difficult issues in determining what type and amount of
evidence would suffice to include a company on the list.
[47] For a publicly-traded company, this list also identifies parent
and subsidiary companies (public or private), provided that ownership
stake in these vertical relationships is greater than 50 percent. In
this case, the company with Sudan-related operations is the primary
company listed. For a private company, the list also identifies its
vertical structure and its parent company's vertical structure,
provided the ownership stakes in these vertical relationships is
greater than 50 percent. In this case, the parent company is the
primary company listed.
[48] This organization assesses materiality based on four factors: (1)
whether a company has a business relationship with the government of
Sudan, is contracted on a government-created project, or is affiliated
with a government-created project or armed groups in Sudan; (2)
whether a company's industry sector has a direct relationship with the
government of Sudan or armed groups in Sudan; (3) whether a company is
complicit in acts of violence; and (4) the question of who benefits
from a company's investment in Sudan (e.g., marginalized populations
or military entities).
[49] Six of these 16 companies were removed from prior versions of
List A.
[50] 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408, 240.12b-20. The SEC discusses this issue in
Concept Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures Relating to
Business Activities in or with Countries Designated as State Sponsors
of Terrorism, 72 Fed. Reg. 65862 (Nov. 23, 2007).
[51] TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
[52] The Office of Global Security Risk contracts with a private
vendor to obtain its list of companies with ties to state sponsors of
terrorism, including Sudan. This list is the SEC's primary tool for
identifying companies that it will monitor. We contacted the private
vendor to obtain a copy of this list, but it declined to provide one
free of charge.
[53] At an April 2010 hearing before the Senate Appropriations
Committee Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government,
however, the SEC Chairman noted that the agency is considering whether
public companies should be required to disclose business conduct
without regard to materiality between them and one of the four
countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism.
[54] We spoke with eight foreign operating companies, all of them
Western.
[55] This company transferred its business operations to another
company that it said it trusted, rather than one that would engage in
"unethical" business practices.
[56] Subdivision 3, Minnesota Statute 11A.243 (2009).
[57] 73 Fed. Reg. 33636.
[58] 74 Fed. Reg. 40463.
[59] FAR § 52.225-20 and FAR § 52.212-3(m) for commercial item
acquisitions.
[60] We chose to use this list because it focuses on companies
identified in the four business sectors targeted in SADA and
identifies subsidiaries and affiliates of those companies.
[61] Simplified acquisition procedures under FAR part 13 allow
agencies to use a streamlined procurement process for certain
acquisitions under specific dollar thresholds, usually $100,000. Under
these procedures, many contractor certifications and representations
are not required.
[62] Contract certifications and representations, including the SADA
certification, are usually found in the contract solicitation.
Purchase orders do not have solicitations, and so the certifications
and representations may not be required. In certain circumstances,
agencies using simplified acquisition procedures may still require
offerors to submit and maintain their FAR certifications and
representations, including the SADA certification, via the Online
Representations and Certifications Application (ORCA)--a Web-based
application that replaces most of the representations and
certifications located directly in the solicitation, allowing
contractors to enter this information once for use on all federal
contracts.
[63] These affiliates and subsidiaries were identified by the list
that also identified the 88 companies with prohibited business ties to
Sudan. The list defines affiliates and subsidiaries as companies where
there is a 50 percent or greater ownership stake. For example, for a
publicly-traded company with Sudan-related operations, the list
identifies as subsidiaries and affiliates those companies of which the
parent company owns 50 percent or more.
[64] We identified the highest dollar amount contract or contract
modification for each of the 29 subsidiaries and affiliates. The
solicitations for 22 of these contracts were issued after June 12,
2008, and, therefore, were subject to section 6 of SADA. The
government complied with SADA by either including the required FAR
provisions in the solicitation or incorporating the Sudan
certification through other means, such as ORCA. If the contracting
officer relied on the electronic ORCA certification and representation
submissions, the SADA certification provision may not appear in the
solicitation. See FAR subpart 4.12.
[65] Contract actions include new contract awards, modification to
those contracts, and modifications to contracts with these entities
where the original contract was awarded prior to June 12, 2008.
[66] Some advocacy groups have written to OFPP requesting that certain
companies be considered for blanket waivers because these companies
have agreed to discontinue their operations in Sudan or had taken
actions in Sudan that the groups considered positive. However, OFPP
staff told us that they only consider waiver requests directly
submitted by the executive agency and would only use the letters from
advocacy groups as supplemental support for any future waiver requests
regarding the companies.
[67] The Excluded Parties List System is an electronic database
maintained and posted by the General Services Administration that
contains the list of all parties suspended, proposed for debarment,
debarred, declared ineligible, or excluded or disqualified from
federal contracting.
[68] One of the three lists we analyzed identified these affiliates.
[69] We asked another private research firm to provide a copy of its
list, but this firm would not do so free of charge.
[70] This initial search not only identified contracts awarded to
these companies from June 12, 2008, to March 1, 2010, but also any
modifications to existing contracts that were issued during the time
period. These modifications may have been associated with contracts
that were awarded before SADA was implemented and therefore would not
have contained any Sudan certification.
[71] The omission of these two securities is unlikely to have a
significant impact on our results. One security accounted for at most
$13 million in U.S. holdings (or less than 0.3 percent of Sudan-
related holdings at the time). Holdings of the other security
accounted for a notable amount (4.8 percent) of the Sudan-related
equity portfolio for only a single quarter in the time period we
studied, and were negligible for all other quarters.
[72] Index Mathematics Methodology. Standard and Poor's, February 2009.
[73] Results indicated by the Paasche and LasPeyres indices are
substantively identical. If U.S. holdings were weighted to the market
value of their respective securities (as in the equilibrium of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model) and the quantity of outstanding shares
were constant, all three indices would collapse to the same value.
[End of section]
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