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entitled 'National Airspace System: Setting On-Time Performance
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Report to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S.
Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2010:
National Airspace System:
Setting On-Time Performance Targets at Congested Airports Could Help
Focus FAA's Actions:
GAO-10-542:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-542, a report to the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Flight delays have beset the U.S. national airspace system. In 2007,
more than one-quarter of all flights either arrived late or were
canceled across the system, according to the Department of
Transportation (DOT). DOT and its operating agency, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), are making substantial investments in
transforming to a new air traffic control system—the Next Generation
Air Transportation System (NextGen)—a system that is expected to
reduce delays over the next decade. This requested report explains the
extent to which (1) flight delays in the U.S. national airspace system
have changed since 2007 and the contributing factors to these changes,
and (2) actions by DOT and FAA are expected to reduce delays in the
next 2 to 3 years. We analyzed DOT and FAA data for FAA’s Operational
Evolution Partnership (OEP) airports because they are in major
metropolitan areas, serving over 70 percent of passengers in the
system. We reviewed agency documents and interviewed DOT, FAA,
airport, and airline officials and aviation industry experts.
What GAO Found:
Flight delays have declined since 2007, largely because fewer flights
have been scheduled by airlines as a result of the economic downturn,
but some airports still experience and contribute substantial delays
to the system. The percentage of flights that were delayed—that is,
arrived at least 15 minutes after their scheduled time or were
canceled or diverted—decreased 6 percentage points from 2007 to 2009,
according to DOT data. Even with this decrease in delays, during 2009,
at least one in four U.S. passenger flights arrived late at 5 airports—
Newark Liberty International (Newark), LaGuardia, John F. Kennedy
(JFK), Atlanta Hartsfield International (Atlanta), and San Francisco
International—and these late arrivals had an average delay time of
almost an hour or more. In addition to these airports having the
highest percentage of flights with delayed arrivals, these 5 airports,
along with Chicago O’Hare International and Philadelphia International
(Philadelphia), were also the source of most of the departure delays
within FAA’s air traffic control system. FAA measures delays within
the air traffic control system to assess its performance because an
inefficient air traffic control system contributes to higher levels of
delayed flights. An FAA air traffic control tower or other facility
may delay flights departing from or destined to an airport because of
inclement weather or heavy traffic volume at that airport. In 2009, of
the 34 OEP airports in GAO’s analysis, about 80 percent of departure
delays occurring at airports across the national airspace system were
the result of conditions affecting air traffic at just these 7
airports.
DOT’s and FAA’s actions—including near-term elements of NextGen and
other air traffic management improvements—could help reduce delays
over the next 2 to 3 years and are generally being implemented at the
airports that contribute to the most delays in the system. However,
the extent to which these actions will reduce delays at individual
airports or contribute to the agency’s overall target is unclear. FAA
has an 88 percent on-time arrival performance target for the national
airspace system to measure how its actions help to improve systemwide
on-time performance. This target, however, masks the wide variation in
airport performance. For example, in fiscal year 2009, Newark had an
on-time arrival rate of 72 percent, while St. Louis International
exceeded the target with 95 percent. FAA has not established airport-
specific performance targets, making it difficult to assess whether FAA’
s actions will lead to the desired on-time performance at these
airports or whether further actions are required to improve
performance, especially at airports affecting delays systemwide. Also,
FAA’s modeling indicates that even if all ongoing and planned NextGen
and other improvements are implemented, a few airports, such as
Atlanta, Washington Dulles International, and Philadelphia, may not be
able to meet the projected increases in demand, and if market forces
do not dampen that demand, additional actions may be required at these
airports. However, without airport-specific targets, FAA cannot
determine what additional actions might be required to achieve a
targeted level of performance at these airports.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that FAA develop airport-specific on-time performance
targets to better prioritize its actions and demonstrate their
benefits. DOT and FAA provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate, and officials noted that airport-specific
targets are one of the many tools that FAA can use to manage and
measure delays.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-542] or key
components. For more information, contact Susan Fleming at (202) 512-
2834 or flemings@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Flight Delays Have Declined since 2007, Largely because of Fewer
Flights, but Some Airports Still Experience and Contribute Substantial
Delays to the System:
Actions Could Reduce Delays, but FAA Lacks Airport-Specific On-Time
Performance Targets, Limiting Its Ability to Prioritize Actions and
Demonstrate Benefits:
Conclusion:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Tarmac Delay Data:
Appendix III: GAO's Correlation Analysis of Total Arrivals and Delayed
Arrivals:
Appendix IV: Airline-Reported Sources of Delays for Delayed and
Canceled Flights Ranked by Airports with the Highest Percentage of
Flight Delays, 2009:
Appendix V: FAA's Analysis of the Capacity Limits at the Three New
York Area Airports--JFK, Newark, and LaGuardia:
Appendix VI: DOT and FAA Actions to Reduce Delays in the Next 2 to 3
Years:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: DOT and FAA Aviation Delay Databases:
Table 2: Runway Projects Completed between 2007 and 2009 and Their
Estimated Delay Reduction Benefits:
Table 3: Phase of Flight where Long Tarmac Delays Occurred, October
2008 to December 2009:
Table 4: Description of DOT and FAA Actions to Reduce Delays:
Table 5: DOT and FAA Actions to Reduce Delays in the Next 2 to 3 Years:
Figures:
Figure 1: Points where Delays Are Reported in DOT and FAA Databases:
Figure 2: Percentage of Delayed Arrivals and Canceled and Diverted
Flights and Average Delay Time for Delayed Arrivals Systemwide, 2000-
2009:
Figure 3: Percentage of Delayed Arrivals by Minutes of Delay, 2007 and
2009:
Figure 4: Change in Percentage Points of Delayed Arrivals by Airport,
2007-2009:
Figure 5: Arrivals and Percentage of Delayed Arrivals Systemwide, 2000-
2009:
Figure 6: Ten Airports with the Highest Percentage of Delayed Arrivals
and Average Delay Minutes for Delayed Arrivals, 2009:
Figure 7: Airline-Reported Delay Causes for the 10 Most Delayed
Airports, 2009:
Figure 8: Percentage of Departures That Were Delayed According to
OPSNET, 34 OEP Airports, 2009:
Figure 9: Percentage of Total Departures and Attributed-To Delays, 34
OEP Airports, 2009:
Figure 10: Total Delays within the Air Traffic Control System
Attributed to Each OEP Airport and Where the Delay Occurred, 2009:
Figure 11: FAA's Estimated Delay Benefits of NextGen:
Figure 12: Tarmac Delays Greater than 3 Hours, 2000-2009:
Figure 13: Airline-Reported Sources for Delayed Flights Ranked by
Airports with the Highest Percentage of Flight Delays, 2009:
Figure 14: Airline-Reported Sources for Canceled Flights Ranked by
Airports with the Highest Percentage of Flight Delays, 2009:
Figure 15: Daily Planned Operations at JFK by Hour, 2007-2009:
Figure 16: Daily Planned Operations at Newark by Hour, 2007-2009:
Figure 17: Daily Planned Operations at LaGuardia by Hour, 2007-2009:
Abbreviations:
ARC: Aviation Rulemaking Committee:
ASDE-X: Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X:
ASPM: Aviation System Performance Metrics:
ASQP: Airline Service Quality Performance:
ASV: annual service volume:
BTS: Bureau of Transportation Statistics:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FACT 2: Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System, 2007-2025:
JFK: John F. Kennedy International Airport:
NAS: national airspace system:
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act:
OAG: Official Airline Guide:
OEP: Operational Evolution Partnership:
OPSNET: Operations Network:
RNAV: Area Navigation:
RNP: Required Navigation Performance:
TMA: Traffic Management Advisor:
TRACON: terminal radar approach control facility:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 26, 2010:
The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
Flight delays have beset the U.S. national airspace system over the
last decade and are forecast to increase in the future. In 2007, more
than one-quarter of the flights either arrived late or were canceled
across the system, while some airports had up to one-third of their
flights delayed or canceled, according to the Department of
Transportation (DOT). Additionally, delays at one airport can also
affect other airports, causing a ripple effect across the national
airspace system and delaying passengers across the country. In
addition to inconveniencing passengers, flight delays impose economic
costs on passengers, airlines, airports, and the economy. A 2008
report by the Senate Joint Economic Committee found that collectively,
passengers were delayed 320 million hours in 2007 and estimated that
domestic flight delays that year cost as much as $41 billion to the
U.S. economy.[Footnote 1] Airlines incur increased costs for crews,
fuel, and maintenance while planes sit idling on the airfield or
circle in holding patterns. Additionally, flight delays can have
negative impacts on the environment, such as increased emissions from
aircraft.
Over the next decade, the number of flights, and accordingly delays,
in the U.S. aviation system is predicted to increase. In response, DOT
and its operating agency, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
are making substantial investments in transforming to a new air
traffic control system that will use satellite-based technologies and
new procedures to handle the increasing volume of air traffic while
further improving safety and security--referred to as the Next
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). In addition to making
airport infrastructure investments, FAA expects NextGen technologies
and procedures to help reduce congestion, improve efficiency, and meet
the projected demand.
In testimony before your committee in July 2008, we reported that the
actions that DOT and FAA took to respond to peak delays in 2007 were
expected to provide little improvement in flight delays in the summer
of 2008.[Footnote 2] Given this work, you asked us to provide an
update on trends in flight delays and DOT's and FAA's actions to
reduce flight delays. In response to your request, we examined the
extent to which (1) flight delays in the U.S. national airspace system
have changed since 2007 and the factors contributing to these changes,
and (2) DOT's and FAA's actions are expected to reduce delays in the
next 2 to 3 years.
To determine how delays have changed since 2007, we analyzed DOT and
FAA data on the number of flights and delayed flights by airport and
for the entire aviation system for 2007, 2008, and 2009. For our
airport-specific data, we focused on 34 of the 35 airports in FAA's
Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) program because they serve
major metropolitan areas located in the continental United States and
handled over 70 percent of passengers in the system in 2008;
additionally, much of the current delays to air traffic can be traced
to inadequate capacity relative to demand at these airports, according
to FAA.[Footnote 3] All data in the report are by calendar year,
unless otherwise noted. To understand the effect of each airport on
the air traffic control system, we analyzed FAA's Operations Network
(OPSNET) data on delays attributed to these 34 OEP airports. We are
also issuing an electronic supplement to this report that shows
additional flight delay data from calendar years 2000 through 2009 for
the 34 OEP airports.[Footnote 4] To determine the factors affecting
these trends, we analyzed DOT and FAA data on flights, delays, and
capacity; reviewed relevant agency documents; and interviewed DOT,
FAA, airline, and airport officials and industry experts to understand
the status of DOT's and FAA's actions and their intended effects. We
assessed the reliability of DOT and FAA data and found the data to be
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To evaluate the extent to
which DOT's and FAA's actions are expected to reduce delays in the
next 2 to 3 years, we interviewed agency, airport, and airline
officials and industry experts; reviewed related GAO reports; and
examined relevant agency reports and analyses of estimated delay
reduction benefits of DOT's and FAA's actions, when available. We
conducted this performance audit from May 2009 through May 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I
for more information on our scope and methodology.
Background:
The national airspace system is a complex, interconnected, and
interdependent network of systems, procedures, facilities, aircraft,
and people that must work together to ensure safe and efficient
operations. DOT, FAA, airlines, and airports all affect the efficiency
of national airspace system operations. DOT works with FAA to set
policy and operating standards for all aircraft and airports. As the
agency responsible for managing the air traffic control system, FAA
has the lead role in developing technological and other solutions that
increase the efficiency and capacity of the national airspace system.
FAA also provides funding to airports. The funding that airports
receive from FAA for airport improvements is conditioned on open and
nondiscriminatory access to the airlines and other users,[Footnote 5]
and the airlines are free to schedule flights at any time throughout
the day, except at airports that are subject to limits on scheduled
operations. The airlines can also affect the efficiency of the
airspace system through the number and types of aircraft that they
choose to operate.
As we previously reported, achieving the most efficient use of the
capacity of the aviation system is difficult because it depends on a
number of interrelated factors.[Footnote 6] The capacity of the
aviation system is affected not only by airports' infrastructure,
including runways and terminal gates, but at any given time, can also
be affected by such factors as weather conditions, resulting in
variation in available airport capacity. For example, some airports
have parallel runways that can operate simultaneously in good weather
but are too close together for simultaneous operations in bad weather,
a fact that reduces the number of aircraft that can take off and land.
Another factor affecting capacity, apart from the capacity of
individual airports, is the number of aircraft that can be safely
accommodated in a given portion of airspace. If too many aircraft are
trying to use the same airspace, some may be delayed on the ground
and/or en route. Achieving the most efficient use of the national
aviation system is contingent on a number of factors, among them the
procedures and equipment used by FAA, the proficiency of the
controllers to efficiently use these procedures and equipment to
manage traffic, and whether and in what ways users are charged for the
use of the airspace and airports.
DOT and FAA can address flight delays primarily through enhancing and
expanding capacity and implementing demand management measures.
* Capacity improvements: Capacity improvements can be in the form of
expanding capacity or enhancing existing capacity in the system.
Expanding capacity includes the addition of new runways, taxiways, and
other infrastructure improvements, which can reduce delays by
increasing the number of aircraft that can land and depart and provide
an airport with more flexibility during high-demand periods and
inclement weather. Enhancing capacity includes improvements in air
traffic control procedures or technologies that increase the
efficiency of existing capacity thereby reducing delays and maximizing
the number of takeoffs and landings at an airport.
* Demand management measures: Examples include using administrative
measures or economic incentives to change airline behavior.
Administrative measures include DOT issuing limits on hourly
operations at specific airports, while economic incentives include
FAA's amended policy on rates and charges that clarified the ability
of airport operators to charge airlines landing fees that differ based
on time of day.
FAA's actions to address flight delays are outlined in the agency's
strategic and annual business plans and the NextGen Implementation
Plan. FAA's 2009-2013 strategic plan, titled the Flight Plan, provides
a 5-year view of the agency's goals, related performance measures, and
actions to achieve those goals. FAA's Flight Plan and related annual
business plans include four primary goals: Increased Safety, Greater
Capacity, International Leadership, and Organizational Excellence.
FAA's goal of greater capacity is to "work with local governments and
airspace users to provide increased capacity and better operational
performance in the U.S. airspace system that reduces congestion and
meets projected demand in an environmentally sound manner."[Footnote
7] As part of this goal, FAA has outlined three objectives, one of
which is to increase the reliability and on-time performance of the
airlines.[Footnote 8] FAA's progress toward meeting this goal is
measured by its ability to achieve a national airspace system on-time
arrival rate of 88 percent at the 35 OEP airports and maintain that
level through 2013.[Footnote 9] Additionally, FAA's Flight Plan and
annual business plans assign actions across the agency--within FAA's
Air Traffic Organization and Office of Airports--to achieve this and
other Flight Plan goals.
In addition to outlining actions in FAA's Flight Plan, the agency also
issues an annual NextGen Implementation Plan that provides an overview
of FAA's ongoing transition to NextGen and lays out the agency's
vision for NextGen, now and into the midterm (defined as 2012 to
2018). The plan moreover identifies FAA's goals for NextGen technology
and program deployment and commitments made in support of NextGen.
Recognizing the importance of near-term and midterm solutions, FAA
requested that RTCA, Inc.--a private, not-for-profit corporation that
develops consensus-based recommendations on communications,
navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management system issues--
create a NextGen Midterm Implementation Task Force to reach consensus
within the aviation community on how to move forward with NextGen.
[Footnote 10] The latest version of the NextGen Implementation Plan,
issued in March 2010, incorporated the task force's recommendations,
which identified operational improvements that can be accelerated
between now and 2018.[Footnote 11] FAA's actions described in these
plans are designed not only to reduce delays, but can also improve
safety, increase capacity, and reduce aviation's environmental impact.
Although these actions might reduce delays, flight delays can also be
affected by factors generally outside FAA's control, such as airline
scheduling and business practices. For example, some airline business
models rely on tight turnaround times between flights, which could
make it more likely that flights scheduled later in the day are
delayed. Additionally, except at slot-controlled airports,[Footnote
12] airlines can schedule flights at any time throughout the day
without consideration of the extent to which the number of scheduled
flights during a particular time period might exceed the airport's
available capacity.
DOT and FAA collect information on aviation delays through three
primary databases--Airline Service Quality Performance (ASQP),
Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM), and OPSNET. As table 1
shows, these databases vary in their purposes, scope, and measurement
of delays.[Footnote 13]
Table 1: DOT and FAA Aviation Delay Databases:
Purpose:
DOT's ASQP: Serves as a source of air travel information to consumers
and helps to ensure more accurate reporting of flight schedules by the
airlines;
FAA's ASPM: Serves as a tool for FAA to track delays for all flight
phases, including gate departure, taxi-out, airport departure,
airborne, taxi-in, and gate arrival. See delay measurement section for
more information on delays in these flight phases;
FAA's OPSNET: Designed to measure the performance of FAA's air traffic
control facilities and efficiency of the air traffic control system.
This database is FAA's official system of record for traffic counts
and delays.
Scope of airlines and airports:
DOT's ASQP: Includes U.S. commercial airlines that handle 1 percent or
more of all domestic scheduled passenger services and submit data on
operations and delays for U.S. airports accounting for 1 percent of
scheduled domestic passengers, although these carriers generally
submit their entire operations;
FAA's ASPM: Includes 28 U.S. commercial and freight airlines at 77
U.S. airports and includes international traffic that departs and
arrives at these U.S. airports;
FAA's OPSNET: Includes all operations--commercial airlines, freight
airlines, air taxi, general aviation, and military--under FAA's
control, including departures, arrivals, and overflights.
Delay measurement:
DOT's ASQP: A flight is considered delayed if it departed or arrived
at the gate 15 minutes or more past its scheduled gate departure or
arrival time that is shown in the airline's reservation system. These
delays are captured as gate arrival delays, gate departure delays, and
block delays (i.e., delays occurring between gate departure and gate
arrival);
FAA's ASPM: As with ASQP, a flight is considered delayed if it
departed or arrived 15 minutes or more after its scheduled flight time
or flight plan. Additionally, arrival and departure delays of 1 minute
or more are also captured. This system captures delays in the time (1)
departing from the gate at the originating airport (gate departure),
(2) between pushback from the gate and takeoff (taxi-out), (3)
departing from the airport (airport departure), (4) airborne, (5)
between landing at the airport and arriving at the gate (taxi-in), (6)
arriving at the gate at the destination airport (gate arrival), and
(7) block delay;
FAA's OPSNET: A flight under instrument flight rules is considered
delayed if, while under FAA's control, it accumulates a delay of 15
minutes or more between the time that a pilot requests to taxi and the
time that the aircraft is cleared for takeoff or when the aircraft
exits a holding pattern en route to its destination.
Source: DOT and FAA documents and officials.
Note: In addition to importing data from ASQP and OPSNET, ASPM also
imports from several other databases, including the Enhanced Traffic
Management System, Operational Information Systems, Automated Surface
Observing System, ARINC's Out-Off-On-In, and Innovata's airline
schedule data.
[End of table]
Figure 1 illustrates FAA facilities that control and manage air
traffic over the United States and how each database captures points
where flights could be delayed. For example, ASQP and ASPM measure
delays against airlines' schedules or flight plans, while OPSNET
measures delays that occurred while an aircraft is under FAA's control.
Figure 1: Points where Delays Are Reported in DOT and FAA Databases:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Database: DOT’s Airline Service Quality Performance;
Points where delays are reported:
Gate: gate departure delay;
Gate: gate arrival delay.
Database: FAA’s Aviation System Performance Metrics;
Points where delays are reported:
Gate: gate departure delay;
Ramp area: Taxi-out delay;
Airport departure: Airport departure delay;
En route center: Airborne delay;
Taxiway and ramp area: Taxi-in delay;
Gate: gate arrival delay.
Database: FAA’s Operations Network;
Points where delays are reported:
Ramp area: gate departure delay[A];
En route center: Airborne delay;
Source: GAO analysis of DOT and FAA documents and data.
Note: Within the FAA's air traffic control system, 517 air traffic
control towers manage and control the airspace within about 5 miles of
an airport. They control departures and landings, as well as ground
operations on airport taxiways and runways. One hundred and seventy
terminal radar approach control facilities (TRACON) provide air
traffic control services for airspace within approximately 40 miles of
an airport and generally up to 10,000 feet above the airport, where en
route centers' control begins. Terminal controllers establish and
maintain the sequence and separation of aircraft. Twenty-one en route
centers control planes over the United States--in transit and during
approaches to some airports--for different regions of airspace. The
Air Traffic Control System Command Center (not shown in this graphic)
manages the flow of air traffic within the United States. This
facility regulates air traffic when weather, equipment, runway
closures, or other conditions place stress on the national airspace
system. In these instances, traffic management specialists at the
command center take action to modify traffic demands in order to keep
traffic within system capacity.
[A] Departure delays in OPSNET can include, among other things, delays
due to problems at the airport, such as volume or runway construction,
or traffic management initiatives instituted by FAA, such as ground
delay programs and ground stops, to control air traffic volume to
airports where the projected traffic demand is expected to exceed the
airport's capacity. Under these programs, FAA decreases the rate of
incoming flights into an airport by holding a set of flights destined
for that airport on the ground, resulting in additional departure
delays at other airports.
[End of figure]
The difference in how delays are measured in these data sets will
result in some flights being considered delayed in one database but
not in another, and vice versa. For example, a delay relative to an
airline's schedule can occur if a flight crew is late, causing the
flight to leave the gate 15 minutes or more behind schedule, which
would be reported as a delay in the ASQP and ASPM databases. If that
flight, once under FAA control, faces no delay in the expected time it
should take taxiing to the runway and lifting off as well as traveling
to the destination airport, it would not be reported as a delayed
flight in OPSNET, even if it reaches the gate at the destination
airport late, relative to its scheduled arrival time. Conversely, a
flight could be ready to take off on time, suffering no departure
delay in pushing back from the gate. However, if once under FAA
control, the flight is held on the ground at the departure airport by
more than 15 minutes because of an FAA facility instituting a traffic
management initiative in response to weather conditions, increased
traffic volume, or other conditions, it will be recorded as
experiencing an OPSNET delay--even if, relative to the airline's
schedule, it is actually able to reach the gate at the destination
airport within 15 minutes of its scheduled arrival time.
Flight Delays Have Declined since 2007, Largely because of Fewer
Flights, but Some Airports Still Experience and Contribute Substantial
Delays to the System:
Flight Delays Have Decreased across the National Airspace System since
2007:
The percentage of delayed arrivals has decreased systemwide since
2007, according to ASQP data.[Footnote 14] As shown in figure 2, in
2009, about 21 percent of flights were delayed systemwide--that is,
arrived at least 15 minutes late at their destination or were canceled
or diverted[Footnote 15]--representing a decrease of 6 percentage
points from 2007.
Figure 2: Percentage of Delayed Arrivals and Canceled and Diverted
Flights and Average Delay Time for Delayed Arrivals Systemwide, 2000-
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined stacked vertical bar and line graph]
Calendar year: 2000;
Percentage of arrivals delayed: 23.9%;
Percentage of flights canceled: 3.3%;
Percentage of flights diverted: 0.3%;
Delay time: 53 minutes.
Calendar year: 2001;
Percentage of arrivals delayed: 18.5%;
Percentage of flights canceled: 3.9%;
Percentage of flights diverted: 0.2%;
Delay time: 49 minutes.
Calendar year: 2002;
Percentage of arrivals delayed: 16.5%;
Percentage of flights canceled: 1.2%;
Percentage of flights diverted: 0.2%;
Delay time: 47 minutes.
Calendar year: 2003;
Percentage of arrivals delayed: 16.3%;
Percentage of flights canceled: 1.6%;
Percentage of flights diverted: 0.2%;
Delay time: 49 minutes.
Calendar year: 2004;
Percentage of arrivals delayed: 19.9%;
Percentage of flights canceled: 1.8%;
Percentage of flights diverted: 0.2%;
Delay time: 51 minutes.
Calendar year: 2005;
Percentage of arrivals delayed: 20.5%;
Percentage of flights canceled: 1.9%;
Percentage of flights diverted: 0.2%;
Delay time: 52 minutes.
Calendar year: 2006;
Percentage of arrivals delayed: 22.6%;
Percentage of flights canceled: 1.7%;
Percentage of flights diverted: 0.2%;
Delay time: 54 minutes.
Calendar year: 2007;
Percentage of arrivals delayed: 24.2%;
Percentage of flights canceled: 2.2%;
Percentage of flights diverted: 0.2%;
Delay time: 56 minutes.
Calendar year: 2008;
Percentage of arrivals delayed: 21.8%;
Percentage of flights canceled: 2.0%;
Percentage of flights diverted: 0.3%;
Delay time: 57 minutes.
Calendar year: 2009;
Percentage of arrivals delayed: 18.9%;
Percentage of flights canceled: 1.4%;
Percentage of flights diverted: 0.2%;
Delay time: 54 minutes.
Source: ASQP data.
Notes:
In 2009, 89,377 flights (1.4 percent of total flights) were canceled
and 15,463 flights (0.2 percent of total flights) were diverted, which
was a 0.8 percent decrease and 0.01 percent increase from 2007 levels,
respectively.
Average delay time in this graphic is only for delayed arrivals and
does not include the delay times for canceled or diverted flights.
[End of figure]
Arrival delay times have also decreased systemwide since 2007 (figure
2). Average delay times for delayed arrivals decreased by about 2
minutes--from 56 minutes in 2007 to 54 minutes in 2009. However, there
was a 1-minute increase in average arrival delay time from 2007 to
2008, likely because of the slight increase in the percentage of
arrivals delayed 3 hours or more from 2007 to 2008. As figure 3 shows,
in 2009, about 41 percent of delayed arrivals had delays of less than
30 minutes. Also, the percentage of arrivals delayed more than 30
minutes decreased from 2007 through 2009.
Figure 3: Percentage of Delayed Arrivals by Minutes of Delay, 2007 and
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Delay time: 15 to 29 minutes;
2007: 39.1%;
2009: 40.8%.
Delay time: 30 to 44 minutes;
2007: 19.4%;
2009: 19.4%.
Delay time: 45 to 59 minutes;
2007: 11.6%;
2009: 11.3%.
Delay time: 60 to 74 minutes;
2007: 7.8%;
2009: 7.5%.
Delay time: 75 70 89 minutes;
2007: 5.4%;
2009: 5.2%.
Delay time: 90 to 104 minutes;
2007: 4.0%;
2009: 3.8%.
Delay time: 105 to 119 minutes;
2007: 2.9%;
2009: 2.8%.
Delay time: 120 to 134 minutes;
2007: 2.2%;
2009: 2.1%.
Delay time: 135 to 149 minutes;
2007: 1.7%;
2009: 1.6%.
Delay time: 150 to 164 minutes;
2007: 1.3%;
2009: 1.2%.
Delay time: 165 to 179 minutes;
2007: 1.0%;
2009: 0.9%.
Delay time: 180 or more minutes;
2007: 3.4%;
2009: 3.2%.
Source: ASQP data.
Note: This analysis excludes over 5 million flights that arrived
early, on time, or within 15 minutes of their scheduled arrival time
and are considered on time, according to DOT.
[End of figure]
In addition to the decrease in arrivals delayed more than 30 minutes,
the number of flights experiencing tarmac delays of over 3 hours also
decreased--from 1,654 flights in 2007 (0.02 percent of total flights)
to 903 flights in 2009 (0.01 percent of total flights).[Footnote 16]
As of April 29, 2010, DOT requires airlines to, among other things,
adopt contingency plans for tarmac delays of more than 3 hours that
must include, at a minimum, making reasonable accommodations (i.e.,
offer food, water, or medical services) during such delays.[Footnote
17] Failure to comply will be considered an unfair or deceptive
practice[Footnote 18] and may subject the airline to enforcement
action and a fine of up to $27,500 per violation.[Footnote 19] See
appendix II for trends in long tarmac delays from 2000 through 2009.
The percentage of delayed arrivals also decreased across almost all of
the 34 OEP airports since 2007, according to ASPM data, although the
declines varied by airport.[Footnote 20] As shown in figure 4, such
decreases ranged from about 3 percentage points to 12 percentage
points. For example, New York's LaGuardia (LaGuardia) and John F.
Kennedy International (JFK) airports registered decreases of about 10
percentage points--to 28 percent and 26 percent in 2009, respectively.
Arrival delays at Newark Liberty International (Newark) decreased
about 5 percentage points, to about 32 percent in 2009.
Figure 4: Change in Percentage Points of Delayed Arrivals by Airport,
2007-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Airport code: ORD;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -11.73%.
Airport code: LGA;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -10.12%.
Airport code: SEA;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -10.11%.
Airport code: JFK;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -9.6%.
Airport code: CLT;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -8.97%.
Airport code: PIT;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -8.07%.
Airport code: CLE;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -7.99%.
Airport code: DCA;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -7.73%.
Airport code: PHL;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -7.64%.
Airport code: IAD;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -6.83%.
Airport code: DTW;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -6.75%.
Airport code: STL;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -6.35%.
Airport code: PDX;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -6.22%.
Airport code: LAX;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -6.11%.
Airport code: BOS;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -6.05%.
Airport code: DFW;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -5.55%.
Airport code: EWR;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -5.44%.
Airport code: MSP;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -5.29%.
Airport code: PHX;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -5.14%.
Airport code: SLC;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -5.12%.
Airport code: CVG;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -5.09%.
Airport code: LAS;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -5.08%.
Airport code: DEN;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -4.78%.
Airport code: MEM;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -4.74%.
Airport code: MDW;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -4.68%.
Airport code: TPA;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -4.37%.
Airport code: BWI;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -4.36%.
Airport code: FLL;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -4.32%.
Airport code: MCO;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -4.13%.
Airport code: SFO;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -3.2%.
Airport code: SAN;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -3.05%.
Airport code: MIA;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -2.88%.
Airport code: IAH;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: -2.83%.
Airport code: ATL;
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals: 1.89%.
Change in percentage points of delayed arrivals as an average of all
these airports: 5.5%.
Source: ASPM data.
Notes:
These data do not include canceled or diverted flights because ASPM
does not include these data.
ORD = Chicago O'Hare International,
LGA = New York LaGuardia,
SEA = Seattle-Tacoma International,
JFK = New York John F. Kennedy International,
CLT = Charlotte/Douglas International,
PIT = Greater Pittsburgh International,
CLE = Cleveland-Hopkins International,
DCA = Ronald Reagan Washington National,
PHL = Philadelphia International,
IAD = Washington Dulles International,
DTW = Detroit Metro Wayne County,
STL = Lambert St. Louis International,
PDX = Portland International,
LAX = Los Angeles International,
BOS = Boston Logan International,
DFW = Dallas-Fort Worth International,
EWR = Newark Liberty International,
MSP = Minneapolis-St. Paul International,
PHX = Phoenix Sky Harbor International,
SLC = Salt Lake City International,
CVG = Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky,
LAS = Las Vegas McCarran International,
DEN = Denver International,
MEM = Memphis International,
MDW = Chicago Midway,
TPA = Tampa International,
BWI = Baltimore-Washington International,
FLL = Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International,
MCO = Orlando International,
SFO = San Francisco International,
SAN = San Diego International Lindbergh,
MIA = Miami International,
IAH = George Bush Intercontinental, and,
ATL = Atlanta Hartsfield International.
[End of figure]
An increase in delayed arrivals at Atlanta Hartsfield International
(Atlanta) occurred between 2008 and 2009, primarily driven by an
increase in the number of scheduled flights and the extent of the
peaks in scheduled flights throughout the day. Although Atlanta
experienced a 0.6 percentage point decrease in the number of delayed
arrivals from 2007 to 2008, the percentage of delayed arrivals
increased 2.5 percentage points from 2008 through 2009--to about 27
percent. According to FAA analysis, the average number of scheduled
flights exceeded the airport's average called rate--that is, the
number of aircraft that an airport can accommodate in a quarter hour
given airport conditions--for more periods in March 2009 than in March
2008, demonstrating how changes in the airlines' schedules likely
contributed to Atlanta's increased delays.[Footnote 21]
Fewer Flights and New Runway Capacity Are Likely the Principal Reasons
for Reduced Flight Delays:
Fewer flights since 2007, because of a downturn in passenger demand
and airline cuts in capacity, have likely been the largest contributor
to the decrease in delayed arrivals. FAA, airport, and airline
officials that we spoke with attributed the majority of improvements
in delays to the systemwide reduction in the number of flights. As
shown in figure 5, trends in the percentage of delayed arrivals appear
to generally track with trends in the number of arrivals. For example,
when the number of total arrivals in the system decreased 7 percent
from 2000 through 2002, the percentage of delayed arrivals decreased
systemwide by 7 percentage points, according to DOT data. To
corroborate FAA and stakeholder views on the relationship between the
recent reductions in flights and declines in delays, we performed a
correlation analysis between the number of total arrivals and delayed
arrivals. This analysis found a significant correlation between these
two factors, confirming the various stakeholders' views that the
recent decrease in flights from 2007 through 2009, therefore, is
likely a significant driver of the decrease in delays.[Footnote 22]
Figure 5: Arrivals and Percentage of Delayed Arrivals Systemwide, 2000-
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined vertical bar and line graph]
Calendar year: 2000;
Arrivals: 5.7 million;
Delayed arrivals: 23.9%.
Calendar year: 2001;
Arrivals: 6.0 million;
Delayed arrivals: 18.5%.
Calendar year: 2002;
Arrivals: 5.3 million;
Delayed arrivals: 16.5%.
Calendar year: 2003;
Arrivals: 6.5 million;
Delayed arrivals: 16.3%.
Calendar year: 2004;
Arrivals: 7.1 million;
Delayed arrivals: 19.9%.
Calendar year: 2005;
Arrivals: 7.1 million;
Delayed arrivals: 20.5%.
Calendar year: 2006;
Arrivals: 7.1 million;
Delayed arrivals: 22.6%.
Calendar year: 2007;
Arrivals: 7.5 million;
Delayed arrivals: 24.2%.
Calendar year: 2008;
Arrivals: 7.0 million;
Delayed arrivals: 21.8%.
Calendar year: 2009;
Arrivals: 6.5 million;
Delayed arrivals: 18.9%.
Source: ASPM data.
Note: This analysis does not include flights that were canceled or
diverted.
[End of figure]
Recent runway improvements also helped reduce delays at some airports.
As shown in table 2, from 2007 through 2009, new runways at Chicago
O'Hare International (Chicago O'Hare), Seattle-Tacoma International
(Seattle), and Washington Dulles International (Washington Dulles) and
a runway extension in Philadelphia International (Philadelphia) have
opened.
Table 2: Runway Projects Completed between 2007 and 2009 and Their
Estimated Delay Reduction Benefits:
Opening date: November 2008;
Airport: Seattle-Tacoma;
Project: New runway;
Estimated increase in annual capacity (in flights): 175,000;
Estimated delay reduction benefit per flight (in minutes): 3.4.
Opening date: November 2008;
Airport: Chicago O'Hare;
Project: New runway;
Estimated increase in annual capacity (in flights): 52,300;
Estimated delay reduction benefit per flight (in minutes): 0.7.
Opening date: November 2008;
Airport: Washington Dulles;
Project: New runway;
Estimated increase in annual capacity (in flights): 100,000;
Estimated delay reduction benefit per flight (in minutes): 2.5.
Opening date: February 2009;
Airport: Philadelphia;
Project: Runway extension;
Estimated increase in annual capacity (in flights): Not intended to
increase capacity;
Estimated delay reduction benefit per flight (in minutes): 1.4.
Source: FAA Office of Airport Planning and Programming.
[End of table]
According to project estimates, the new runway projects are expected
to provide these airports with the potential to accommodate over
320,000 additional flights annually[Footnote 23] and decrease the
average delay time per operation by about 1 minute to 3.5 minutes at
these airports.[Footnote 24] For example, since 2007, Chicago O'Hare
has seen the largest decrease in the percentage of arrivals delayed
for the 34 OEP airports, according to FAA data, and some of this
improvement is likely because of the new runway. In examining Chicago
O'Hare's called rates,[Footnote 25] we found that after Chicago
O'Hare's new runway opened in the summer of 2009, the airport had the
potential to accommodate, on average, about 9 percent more flights
than it had been able to handle in the summer of 2008.[Footnote 26]
According to FAA officials, the new runway allowed Chicago O'Hare to
accommodate an additional 10 to 16 arrivals per hour because of
additional options with respect to its runway configuration. More
importantly, this increased capacity helps reduce delays the most when
an airport is constrained because of, for example, weather or runway
construction. For example, Chicago O'Hare's new runway allows it to
accommodate 84 arrivals per hour during poor weather, whereas prior to
the new runway, it could accommodate only 68 to 72 arrivals in such
weather. This increased capacity results in fewer delayed flights
during bad weather. However, not all of the reduction in delayed
arrivals can be attributed to the new runways because another key
factor--the decline in the number of flights--also helped to reduce
delays.
According to FAA officials, FAA does not analyze the extent to which
the estimated delay benefits are realized once a runway is opened
because delay reduction is expected. They also noted that measuring
the benefits of these projects is difficult because a myriad of
factors, such as the installation of new technologies or procedures or
changes in airline schedules, may also affect the number of flights
and delays at an airport, making it difficult to isolate the benefits
of the new runway. More notably, the recent drop in the number of
flights was outside the bounds of FAA's analysis of these projects'
delay estimates, making it is difficult to determine the actual
realized benefits. Despite these challenges, by not measuring the
actual benefits against estimated benefits, FAA cannot verify the
accuracy of its analysis or modeling for future runway projects.
The extent to which FAA's operational and policy actions contributed
to reduced delays since 2007 is unclear, although they likely resulted
in some limited delay reduction benefits.[Footnote 27] In 2007, the
DOT-convened New York Aviation Rulemaking Committee (New York ARC)
developed a list of operational improvements targeted at the three New
York area airports--Newark, JFK, and LaGuardia.[Footnote 28] To avoid
a repeat of 2007 delays, FAA also instituted hourly limits on the
number of scheduled flights at these airports. As we reported in July
2008, the collective benefit of DOT's and FAA's actions was expected
to be limited.[Footnote 29]
* FAA's hourly schedule limits at Newark, JFK, and LaGuardia likely
contributed to some delay reduction benefits beginning in 2008 by
reducing the level of peak operations and spreading flights throughout
the day.[Footnote 30] During the summer of 2008, each of these
airports experienced an increase in the number of arrivals and a
decrease in the percentage of arrivals delayed. For example, the
number of arrivals at JFK increased by 2 percent from the summer of
2007 through the summer of 2008, while arrival delays decreased by
about 5 percentage points. The effect of these limits in 2009 was
likely less pronounced because these three airports experienced fewer
flights as a result of the economic downturn. However, without these
limits, the number of flights and delays might have increased in 2008
given that airlines proposed to increase their schedules by 19 percent
over 2007 levels.[Footnote 31] See appendix V for more information on
how the limits were set and FAA's analysis of the effect of the limits
at the three New York area airports for 2007, 2008, and 2009.
* According to FAA, as of March 2010, 36 of the 77 operational and
procedural initiatives identified by the New York ARC have been
"completed," meaning that these procedures are in place and available
for use.[Footnote 32] However, as we reported in our July 2008
testimony, operational and procedural initiatives are designed to be
used only in certain situations. Furthermore, although some of the
procedures are available for use, they are not currently being used by
the airlines, because some of the procedures were designed to reduce
delays when the airports were handling more flights and experiencing
higher levels of delay. For example, airlines have opted not to use
one procedure that involves routing aircraft around the New York
airports, which lengthens the route and could increase the airlines'
fuel and crew costs. According to FAA officials, airlines have opted
not to use this procedure, not only because of these additional costs,
but also because delays are down with the current reduction in
flights, making it unnecessary.
* FAA has also implemented various systemwide actions that may have
had some effect in reducing delays. For example, in 2007, FAA
implemented the adaptive compression tool--which identifies unused
arrival slots at airports that are due to FAA's traffic management
initiatives, such as initiatives that delay aircraft on the ground,
and shifts new flights into these otherwise unused slots. FAA
estimated that this tool reduced delays and saved airlines $27 million
in 2007. See appendix VI for additional information on DOT's and FAA's
actions to reduce delays at locations across the national airspace
system.
Although Delays Have Decreased since 2007, Some Airports Still
Experienced Substantial Delays:
Despite fewer delayed flights since 2007, some airports still
experienced substantial delays in 2009, according to FAA's ASPM data.
For example, five airports--Newark, LaGuardia, Atlanta, JFK, and San
Francisco--had at least a quarter of their arrivals delayed in 2009
(figure 6). In addition, these delayed arrivals had average delay
times of almost an hour or more. Excluding the 10 airports with the
highest percentage of delayed flights, the remaining OEP airports had
fewer than one in five arrivals delayed, with average delay times of
about 53 minutes.
Figure 6: Ten Airports with the Highest Percentage of Delayed Arrivals
and Average Delay Minutes for Delayed Arrivals, 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map and associated data]
Airport name and code: Newark (EWK);
Delayed: 31.7%;
Average delay: 73.0 minutes.
Airport name and code: LaGuardia (LGA);
Delayed: 28.3%;
Average delay: 61.3 minutes.
Airport name and code: Atlanta (ATL);
Delayed: 26.5%;
Average delay: 57.0 minutes.
Airport name and code: John F. Kennedy (JFK);
Delayed: 25.6%;
Average delay: 62.2 minutes.
Airport name and code: San Francisco (SFO);
Delayed: 25.1%;
Average delay: 61.6 minutes.
Airport name and code: Miami (MIA);
Delayed: 24.7%;
Average delay: 57.5 minutes.
Airport name and code: Philadelphia (PHL);
Delayed: 24.4%;
Average delay: 58.7 minutes.
Airport name and code: Boston (BOS);
Delayed: 21.8%;
Average delay: 59.1 minutes.
Airport name and code: Fort Lauderdale (FLL);
Delayed: 21.4%;
Average delay: 50.4 minutes.
Airport name and code: Minneapolis (NSP);
Delayed: 20.2%;
Average delay: 53.8 minutes.
Airport name and code: Other OEP airports;
Delayed: 17.7%;
Average delay: 52.8 minutes.
Sources: GAO analysis of ASPM data; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
The 10 airports with the highest percentage of delayed flights
generally had more delays associated with the national aviation system
than other OEP airports, according to ASQP data.[Footnote 33] For
example, over 70 percent of Newark's delays were reported as national
aviation system delays, which refer to a broad set of circumstances
affecting airport operations, heavy traffic volume, and air traffic
control, including nonextreme weather conditions such as wind or fog
(figure 7). In addition, these 10 airports accounted for about half of
all the reported national airspace system delays for the 34 OEP
airports in 2009, according to DOT data. See appendix IV for airline-
reported sources of delay for delayed and canceled flights for the 34
OEP airports.
Figure 7: Airline-Reported Delay Causes for the 10 Most Delayed
Airports, 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Airport (code): Newark (EWR);
National aviation system delays: 72%;
Late arriving aircraft: 16%;
Airline delays: 9%;
Extreme weather delays: 3%.
Airport (code): LaGuardia (LGA);
National aviation system delays: 58%;
Late arriving aircraft: 19%;
Airline delays: 16%;
Extreme weather delays: 7%.
Airport (code): John F. Kennedy (JFK);
National aviation system delays: 50%;
Late arriving aircraft: 22%;
Airline delays: 23%;
Extreme weather delays: 5%.
Airport (code): San Francisco (SFO);
National aviation system delays: 50%;
Late arriving aircraft: 31%;
Airline delays: 16%;
Extreme weather delays: 3%.
Airport (code): Philadelphia (PHL);
National aviation system delays: 48.65
Late arriving aircraft: 25.84
Airline delays: 18.07
Extreme weather delays: 7.37
Airport (code): Boston (BOS);
National aviation system delays: 42%;
Late arriving aircraft: 30%;
Airline delays: 23%;
Extreme weather delays: 5%.
Airport (code): Atlanta (ATL);
National aviation system delays: 41%;
Late arriving aircraft: 37%;
Airline delays: 19%;
Extreme weather delays: 3%.
Airport (code): Minneapolis-St. Paul (MSP);
National aviation system delays: 36%;
Late arriving aircraft: 28%;
Airline delays: 29%;
Extreme weather delays: 7%.
Airport (code): Fort Lauderdale (FLL);
National aviation system delays: 26%;
Late arriving aircraft: 40%;
Airline delays: 30%;
Extreme weather delays: 4%.
Airport (code): Miami (MIA);
National aviation system delays: 25%;
Late arriving aircraft: 37%;
Airline delays: 33%;
Extreme weather delays: 5%.
Airport (code): Other OEP Airports;
National aviation system delays: 27%;
Late arriving aircraft: 39%;
Airline delays: 29%;
Extreme weather delays: 5%.
Extreme weather includes serious weather conditions that prevent the
operation of a flight. Examples of this kind of weather include
tornadoes, snowstorms, and hurricanes.
Airline delays include any delay or cancellation that was within the
control of the airlines, such as aircraft cleaning, baggage loading,
crew issues, or maintenance.
Late-arriving aircraft means a previous flight using the same aircraft
arrived late, causing the subsequent flight to depart late.
National aviation system delays and cancellations refer to a broad set
of circumstances affecting airport operations, heavy traffic volume,
and air traffic control. This includes any nonextreme weather
condition that slows the operation of the system, such as wind or fog,
but does not prevent flying.
Source: GAO analysis of ASQP data.
Note: Security delays do not show up on this graphic because they make
up less than 1 percent of the delays at these airports.
[End of figure]
The high percentage of national aviation system delays at these
airports likely reflects that these airports are more sensitive to
changes in airport capacity because they frequently operate near or
exceed their available capacity. For example, the DOT Inspector
General reported that at Newark, LaGuardia, JFK, and Philadelphia,
airlines scheduled flights above the average capacity in optimal
conditions at these airports in the summer of 2007.[Footnote 34] In
further examining the relationship between the level of delay and the
relationship of scheduled flights to an airport's available capacity,
we selected the 4 airports with the highest percentage of delayed
flights--Newark, LaGuardia, JFK, and Atlanta--along with 2 airports
that are among the 34 OEP airports with the lowest percentage of
delayed flights--Chicago Midway and Lambert-St. Louis International
(St. Louis)--and analyzed data on the number of scheduled flights and
available capacity at these 6 airports. We found that all 4 of the
delay-prone airports had flights scheduled above the airports'
capacity levels for at least 4 hours of the day, while the 2 airports
with lower levels of delay never had the number of scheduled flights
exceeding capacity.[Footnote 35] Operating close to capacity becomes
especially problematic when weather conditions temporarily diminish
the capacity at an airport. In particular, while flights to and from
an airport operating close to or exceeding capacity might become very
delayed in inclement weather conditions, flights to and from another
airport that has unused capacity may not be delayed by a similar
weather event.
Seven Airports Are the Source of about 80 Percent of All Departure
Delays Captured in FAA's OPSNET:
While the flight delay data from DOT and FAA data sources previously
discussed serve as the primary source of air travel information for
consumers, OPSNET helps the agency understand which FAA facilities are
experiencing delays, why the delays are occurring (e.g., weather or
heavy traffic volume), and uniquely, which facilities are the source
of that delay. Unlike the other databases, which measure delays
against airline schedules, OPSNET database collects data on delays
that occur solely while flights are under FAA control.[Footnote 36]
For example, a flight would be recorded as delayed in OPSNET if it is
held on the ground at the departure airport for more than 15 minutes
because of an FAA facility instituting a traffic management initiative
in response to weather conditions, increased traffic volume, or other
circumstances. FAA measures delays within the air traffic control
system to assess its performance because an inefficient air traffic
control system contributes to higher levels of delayed flights. As
figure 8 shows, many of the delay-prone airports that we identified
earlier in the report based on our analysis of arrival delays also
experience the most departure delays, according to OPSNET. In OPSNET
terminology, these delays are called occurred-at delays because they
represent delays that happened at the given airport.
Figure 8: Percentage of Departures That Were Delayed According to
OPSNET, 34 OEP Airports, 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Airport code: JFK;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 13.8%.
Airport code: EWR;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 12.7%.
Airport code: LGA;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 10.8%.
Airport code: ATL;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 10.2%.
Airport code: PHL;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 7%.
Airport code: IAH;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 6.4%.
Airport code: DCA;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 5.7%.
Airport code: CLT;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 5.4%.
Airport code: ORD;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 4.2%.
Airport code: FLL;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 4.2%.
Airport code: PIT;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 4.1%.
Airport code: IAD;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 3.9%.
Airport code: BWI;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 3.6%.
Airport code: MCO;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2.9%.
Airport code: CVG;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 3.1%.
Airport code: BOS;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 3.1%.
Airport code: DTW;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2.9%.
Airport code: CLE;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2.8%.
Airport code: PHX;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2.7%.
Airport code: LAS;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2.7%.
Airport code: STL;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2.6%.
Airport code: DFW;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2.6%.
Airport code: MSP;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2.4%.
Airport code: SAN;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2.3%.
Airport code: MDW;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2.2%.
Airport code: MIA;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2.2%.
Airport code: TPA;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 2%.
Airport code: SFO;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 1.8%.
Airport code: LAX;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 1.6%.
Airport code: MEM;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 1.4%.
Airport code: DEN;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 1.4%.
Airport code: SEA;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 1.2%.
Airport code: SLC;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 1.1%.
Airport code: PDX;
Percentage of departures that were delayed: 0.8%.
Source: GAO’s analysis of OPSNET data.
Note:
JFK = New York John F. Kennedy International,
EWR = Newark Liberty International,
LGA = New York LaGuardia,
ATL = Atlanta Hartsfield International,
PHL = Philadelphia International,
IAH = George Bush Intercontinental,
DCA = Ronald Reagan Washington National,
CLT = Charlotte/Douglas International,
ORD = Chicago O'Hare International,
FLL = Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International,
PIT = Greater Pittsburgh International,
IAD = Washington Dulles International,
BWI = Baltimore-Washington International,
MCO = Orlando International,
CVG = Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky,
BOS = Boston Logan International,
DTW = Detroit Metro Wayne County,
CLE = Cleveland-Hopkins International,
PHX = Phoenix Sky Harbor International,
LAS = Las Vegas McCarran International,
STL = Lambert St. Louis International,
DFW = Dallas-Fort Worth International,
MSP = Minneapolis-St Paul International,
SAN = San Diego International Lindbergh,
MDW = Chicago Midway,
MIA = Miami International,
TPA = Tampa International,
SFO = San Francisco International,
LAX = Los Angeles International,
MEM = Memphis International,
DEN = Denver International,
SEA = Seattle-Tacoma International,
SLC = Salt Lake City International,
PDX = Portland International.
[End of figure]
In addition to capturing where the delay occurred (as shown above),
OPSNET provides information on what facility the delay was attributed
to--that is, which facility instituted a traffic management initiative
that resulted in flights being delayed. If, for example, a flight
departing Atlanta was delayed because of weather problems in Atlanta,
Atlanta would be recorded as both the occurred-at facility and the
attributed-to facility in OPSNET. However, if fog in San Francisco
delays a flight leaving Minneapolis bound for San Francisco,
Minneapolis is the occurred-at facility, but San Francisco is the
attributed-to facility. This concept of assigning attribution for
delays is different than the notion of "propagated delay," in which a
delayed flight early in the day may cause delays to flights later in
the day because of a late-arriving aircraft or crew. Instead, delay
that is attributed to a facility in OPSNET relates only to a given
flight segment and is determined to be associated with the airport or
other air traffic control facility that had a traffic management
initiative in place that held flights at a particular location.
As figure 9 shows, almost half--49 percent--of all departure delays
occurring at the 34 OEP airports were attributed to just 3 airports--
Atlanta, Newark, and La Guardia, according our analysis of OPSNET.
[Footnote 37] However, these 3 airports accounted for only 13 percent
of departures among these 34 airports in 2009.
Figure 9: Percentage of Total Departures and Attributed-To Delays, 34
OEP Airports, 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Airport code: ATL;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 20.1%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
7.2%.
Airport code: EWR;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 17.2%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
3.1%.
Airport code: LGA;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 11.8%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2.7%.
Airport code: PHL;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 8.3%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
3.5%.
Airport code: ORD;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 7.5%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
6.2%.
Airport code: JFK;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 7.4%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
3.2%.
Airport code: SFO;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 5.5%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2.8%.
Airport code: CLT;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 4.5%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
3.8%.
Airport code: IAH;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 3.5%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
4%.
Airport code: MSP;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 2.5%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
3.2%.
Airport code: BOS;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 2.4%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2.7%.
Airport code: LAS;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 1.8%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
3.8%.
Airport code: PHX;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 1.3%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
3.4%.
Airport code: DFW;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 1.1%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
4.8%.
Airport code: DEN;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 1.1%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
4.6%.
Airport code: DTW;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 1%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
3.2%.
Airport code: IAD;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.4%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2.7%.
Airport code: SLC;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.3%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2.8%.
Airport code: FLL;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.3%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2%.
Airport code: DCA;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.3%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2%.
Airport code: MIA;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.2%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2.6%.
Airport code: MDW;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.2%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
1.8%.
Airport code: MEM;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.2%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2.5%.
Airport code: SEA;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.2%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2.4%.
Airport code: SAN;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.1%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
1.5%.
Airport code: BWI;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.1%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2%.
Airport code: LAX;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.1%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
4.1%.
Airport code: CVG;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.1%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
1.7%.
Airport code: PDX;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0.1%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
1.7%.
Airport code: CLE;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
1.5%.
Airport code: TPA;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
1.5%.
Airport code: MCO;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
2.3%.
Airport code: STL;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
1.6%.
Airport code: PIT;
Percentage of departure delays among the 34 OEP airports attributed to
this facility: 0%;
Percentage of departures at this facility among the 34 OEP airports:
1.1%.
Source: GAO analysis of OPSNET data.
Notes:
This graphic represents the percentage of total departures and delayed
departures each airport tower handled in 2009. We excluded each
airport's TRACON because TRACON operations include departures,
arrivals, and overflights.
ATL = Atlanta Hartsfield International,
EWR = Newark Liberty International,
LGA = New York LaGuardia,
PHL = Philadelphia International,
ORD = Chicago O'Hare International,
JFK = New York John F. Kennedy International,
SFO = San Francisco International,
CLT = Charlotte/Douglas International,
IAH = George Bush Intercontinental,
MSP = Minneapolis-St Paul International,
BOS = Boston Logan International,
LAS = Las Vegas McCarran International,
PHX = Phoenix Sky Harbor International,
DFW = Dallas-Fort Worth International,
DEN = Denver International,
DTW = Detroit Metro Wayne County,
IAD = Washington Dulles International,
SLC = Salt Lake City International,
FLL = Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International,
DCA = Ronald Reagan Washington National,
MIA = Miami International,
MDW = Chicago Midway,
MEM = Memphis International,
SEA = Seattle-Tacoma International,
SAN = San Diego International Lindbergh,
BWI = Baltimore-Washington International,
LAX = Los Angeles International,
CVG = Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky,
PDX = Portland International,
CLE = Cleveland-Hopkins International,
TPA = Tampa International,
MCO = Orlando International,
STL = Lambert St. Louis International,
PIT = Greater Pittsburgh International.
[End of figure]
In addition, 7 airports and their associated TRACONs were the source
of approximately 80 percent of all departure delays captured in OPSNET
in 2009 (see figure 10).[Footnote 38] Figure 10 also shows that in the
case of the combined New York airports as well as for 3 of the 4
remaining airports (the exception is Atlanta), a majority of the
departure delays that were attributed to these airports actually
occurred at--or were experienced at--other airports. For example,
Philadelphia was the source of over 26,000 delayed departures[Footnote
39] throughout the national airspace system in 2009, but fewer than
7,500 of these delays[Footnote 40] (or 28.2 percent) occurred at
Philadelphia. Further analysis (see pie chart in figure 10) shows that
for all of the departure delays among the 34 OEP airports that
occurred at an airport other than the airport that generated the
delay, 83 percent were attributed to these 7 airports. FAA has
identified these same 7 airports as among the most delayed airports in
the system in need of further monitoring for possible changes in
airline schedules and potential delays--a process that we discuss
later in this report.
Figure 10: Total Delays within the Air Traffic Control System
Attributed to Each OEP Airport and Where the Delay Occurred, 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration including tables and pie-chart]
Percentage of delayed departures attributed to each airport:
New York area (Newark, John F. Kennedy, and LaGuardia): 41.2%;
Philadelphia: 7.6%;
Chicago O’Hare: 6.9%;
San Francisco: 5.1%;
Other OEP airports: 20.7%.
Where the delay occurred:
New York (EWR, JFK, and LGA):
These airports: 26.2%;
Other airports in the system: 73.8%.
ATL:
This airport: 53.8%;
Other airports in the system: 46.2%.
PHL:
This airport: 28.2%;
Other airports in the system: 71.8%.
ORD:
This airport: 28.4%;
Other airports in the system: 71.6%.
SFO:
This airport: 10.1%;
Other airports in the system: 89.9%.
Other OEP airports:
These airports: 48.4%;
Other airports in the system: 51.6%.
Source of delays occurring at another airport:
New York area (EWR, JFK, and LGA): 47%;
Other OEP airports: 16.6%;
ATL: 13.3%;
PHL: 8.4%;
ORD: 7.7%;
SFO: 7.0%.
Source: GAO analysis of OPSNET data.
Notes:
Each airport includes data from its corresponding TRACON.
EWR = Newark Liberty International,
JFK = New York John F. Kennedy International,
LGA = New York LaGuardia,
ATL = Atlanta Hartsfield International,
PHL = Philadelphia International,
ORD = Chicago O'Hare International,
SFO = San Francisco International.
[End of figure]
Actions Could Reduce Delays, but FAA Lacks Airport-Specific On-Time
Performance Targets, Limiting Its Ability to Prioritize Actions and
Demonstrate Benefits:
FAA's Actions to Reduce Delays Are Generally Being Implemented at the
Most Congested Airports, but Many Actions Face Implementation
Challenges:
FAA's actions have the potential to reduce delays in the next 2 to 3
years and are generally being implemented at airports that experience
and contribute substantial delays to the system, including the 7
airports that are the source of a majority of the delays in the system
(Newark, LaGuardia, Atlanta, JFK, Philadelphia, Chicago O'Hare, and
San Francisco). While FAA's long-term solution to expanding capacity
and reducing delays is NextGen improvements that will not be fully
implemented until 2025, we used FAA's Flight Plan and NextGen
Implementation Plan to identify several actions that are slated to be
implemented in the next 2 to 3 years, have the potential to help meet
short-term capacity needs, and improve the operational performance of
the U.S. aviation system. These actions include implementing near-term
elements of NextGen, constructing runways, implementing a new airspace
structure for the airports serving the New York/New
Jersey/Philadelphia metropolitan area,[Footnote 41] and revising air
traffic control procedures.[Footnote 42] More detailed information on
the actions and their locations can be found in appendix VI. According
to FAA, the purpose of many of these actions is not only to reduce
delays, but just as importantly, they can also improve safety,
increase capacity, and reduce fuel burn.
Many of the actions for reducing delays over the next 2 to 3 years are
being implemented at some of the most congested airports in the
system. For example,
* Actions that FAA has in place or planned for the New York area
airports--such as the New York ARC initiatives, the New York/New
Jersey/Philadelphia airspace redesign, and hourly schedule limits--are
being implemented to help address widespread delays at the congested
New York airports. The remaining ARC initiatives and other actions to
reduce delays at the New York airports were recently incorporated into
the New York Area Delay Reduction Plan, which FAA expects to update
monthly. The agency continues to maintain the schedule limits, which
were designed to limit airline overscheduling and limit delays in the
New York area to below the levels experienced in summer 2007.
Additionally, FAA issued an order in January 2009 outlining its plans
to reduce the number of hourly scheduled flights at LaGuardia from 75
to 71 through voluntary reductions and retirements of slots by the
airlines.[Footnote 43]
* FAA has also continued to implement various air traffic management
improvements and begun implementation of NextGen procedures and
technologies, many of which are expected to be implemented at the most
congested airports. The RTCA NextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task
Force recommended that FAA target key airports when implementing
NextGen capabilities between now and 2018. FAA used these
recommendations to help develop its 2010 NextGen Implementation Plan,
which includes actions to be implemented in the next 2 to 3 years,
including additional Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation
Performance (RNP) procedures, often called performance-based
navigation procedures.[Footnote 44] In response to the RTCA
recommendations, FAA plans to focus on increasing the use of
performance-based navigation at some of the key airports identified by
the task force. According to FAA air traffic officials, an automated
metering tool used to help manage arrival aircraft--Traffic Management
Advisor (TMA)--has contributed to more efficient departure and arrival
performance at several OEP airports, including Atlanta and Newark. To
help reduce delays at San Francisco and other busy airports, FAA has
also tested tailored arrival procedures, which allow the pilot to fly
the most efficient descent into the arrival airport.
* Over the next 2 to 3 years, Chicago O' Hare, JFK, Charlotte/Douglas
International (Charlotte), and Portland International (Portland) will
continue to pursue infrastructure projects to increase the capacity of
their airports and surrounding airspace. Chicago O'Hare--one of the
airports that contributes substantial delays to the national airspace
system--is scheduled to open another new runway in 2012 that is
expected to provide the airport with the potential to accommodate as
many as 30,900 additional flights annually.[Footnote 45] At Charlotte,
a new runway opened in February 2010 that has the potential to
accommodate as many as 80,000 additional flights annually. Later this
year, Portland is expected to complete a runway extension, although
benefits for this project are not estimated. Airport infrastructure
projects such as these will help reduce delays at these airports and
should also help decrease delays elsewhere in the system.[Footnote 46]
Many delay reduction actions face implementation challenges that may
limit their ability to reduce delays in the next 2 to 3 years. For
example, according to officials, one challenge FAA faces in
implementing the remaining New York ARC initiatives is that airlines
do not have a current need for or interest in using some of the
procedures because of recent declines in air traffic. Implementation
may be difficult for other air traffic management tools--such as TMA--
because, according to the DOT Inspector General, they represent a
significant change in how air traffic controllers manage
traffic.[Footnote 47] Effective training will be required to ensure
air traffic managers and controllers become familiar with and gain
confidence in newly automated functions. However, TMA has been
deployed and is currently being used at many airports, including
Newark, LaGuardia, and JFK. Some airline officials noted that TMA
implementation has been beneficial, but there have been some
implementation challenges because of the transition to an automated
system.
While introducing new RNAV and RNP procedures could help reduce delays
in the next 2 to 3 years, as we have previously reported, developing
these procedures in a timely manner is a challenge.[Footnote 48] In
the New York area, for example, some of these procedures cannot be
implemented until the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia airspace
redesign is completed, which is currently behind schedule. FAA did not
fully account for future use of new technology such as RNAV in its
analysis, so the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia airspace redesign
has to be completed in order to implement new performance-based
navigation procedures in the study area.[Footnote 49] In addition,
most procedures that FAA has implemented are overlays of existing
routes rather than new procedures that allow more direct flights.
Overlays can be deployed more quickly and do not involve an extensive
environmental review, but they do not maximize the delay reduction
benefits of RNAV and RNP. FAA's goals for RNAV and RNP focus on the
number of procedures produced, not whether they are new routes or the
extent to which they provide benefits or are used. For example, FAA
believes that it can annually develop about 50 RNAV and RNP
procedures, 50 RNAV routes, and 50 RNP approaches.[Footnote 50] Given
that FAA plans to implement a total of 2,000 to 4,000 RNAV and RNP
arrival and departure procedures alone, it is clear that only a
limited number of new procedures--which could provide delay reduction
benefits--will be implemented in the next 2 to 3 years.
Implementation of NextGen also faces several challenges, including
operating in a mixed equipage environment, addressing environmental
issues, and changing FAA's culture. For example, it is difficult for
air traffic controllers to manage aircraft equipped with varying
NextGen capabilities, particularly in busy areas, because controllers
would have to use different procedures depending on the level of
equipage. It is also difficult for FAA to complete all the required
environmental reviews quickly because any time an airspace redesign or
new procedure changes the noise footprint around an airport, an
environmental review is initiated under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). FAA also faces cultural and organizational
challenges in integrating and coordinating activities across multiple
lines of business. Sustaining a high level of involvement and
collaboration with stakeholders--including operators, air traffic
controllers, and others--will also be necessary to ensure progress.
More recently, software and other technical issues experienced at test
sites have delayed systemwide implementation of core NextGen
functionality.
FAA Uses an On-Time Performance Target to Help Measure Performance and
Analyzes Benefits of Some Delay Reduction Actions Under Way:
FAA has various tools for measuring and analyzing how its actions
might reduce delays, including establishing an on-time performance
target, estimating delay reduction benefits for NextGen and some
individual initiatives, and regularly monitoring system performance
across the national airspace system and at individual airports.
* FAA measures improvements in delays through its NAS on-time
performance target: FAA established an 88 percent national airspace
system (NAS) on-time arrival performance target to measure how its
actions help meet its Flight Plan goal of increasing the reliability
and on-time performance of the airlines. According to FAA, this
performance target provides information on FAA's ability to provide
air traffic control services to the airlines and is set based on 3
years of historical trending data. Because DOT's ASQP data are used
for this target and contain flight delays caused by incidents outside
FAA's control--such as extreme weather or carrier-caused delay--FAA
removes such delays not attributable to the agency to provide a more
accurate method of measuring FAA's performance. [Footnote 51] Even
with these modifications to the data, FAA notes that the actual
measure can still be influenced by factors such as airline schedules
or nonextreme weather.
* FAA analyzes the delay reduction benefits of some actions: FAA has
modeled and estimated total delay reduction benefits from NextGen.
[Footnote 52] In addition to benefits from safety, fuel savings, and
increased capacity, FAA estimates that, in aggregate, planned NextGen
technologies--including the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia airspace
redesign and RNAV and RNP routes--and planned runway improvements will
reduce delays by about 21 percent by 2019 as measured against doing
nothing at all (figure 11).[Footnote 53] In particular, given the
estimated growth in traffic, FAA estimates that NextGen and other
planned efforts will keep delays from growing as fast as they would
without them, but delays are still expected to grow from today's
levels. According to FAA's model simulations, total delay minutes are
predicted to double from current levels, even when assuming all
planned NextGen and other runway improvements occur. At the airport
level, FAA provided us with additional results from its simulations
that suggest that, even after taking into consideration the benefits
of new runways and NextGen technologies, flights at several airports
may experience higher average delays per flight in 2020 than
experienced today.[Footnote 54]
Figure 11: FAA's Estimated Delay Benefits of NextGen:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Annual total delay minutes (in millions):
Fiscal year: 2009;
Baseline case: 75 million minutes;
Runways case: 75 million minutes;
NextGen case: 75 million minutes.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Baseline case: 79 million minutes;
Runways case: 78 million minutes;
NextGen case: 78 million minutes.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Baseline case: 87 million minutes;
Runways case: 85 million minutes;
NextGen case: 84 million minutes.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Baseline case: 98 million minutes;
Runways case: 96 million minutes;
NextGen case: 93 million minutes.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Baseline case: 110 million minutes;
Runways case: 108 million minutes;
NextGen case: 104 million minutes.
Fiscal year: 2014;
Baseline case: 119 million minutes;
Runways case: 116 million minutes;
NextGen case: 102 million minutes.
Fiscal year: 2015;
Baseline case: 131 million minutes;
Runways case: 129 million minutes;
NextGen case: 108 million minutes.
Fiscal year: 2016;
Baseline case: 147 million minutes;
Runways case: 143 million minutes;
NextGen case: 119 million minutes.
Fiscal year: 2017;
Baseline case: 160 million minutes;
Runways case: 150 million minutes;
NextGen case: 126 million minutes.
Fiscal year: 2018;
Baseline case: 178 million minutes;
Runways case: 167 million minutes;
NextGen case: 141 million minutes.
Fiscal year: 2019;
Baseline case: 198 million minutes;
Runways case: 187 million minutes;
NextGen case: 156 million minutes.
Source: FAA.
Note: The baseline case estimates the delays that may occur if no
improvements are made to the system. The runways case estimates the
delays that may occur if only runway improvements are made over the
next 10 years, but no NextGen air traffic management improvements. The
NextGen case estimates the delays that may occur if planned runway
improvements and NextGen technologies and procedures are implemented
over the next 10 years. FAA uses a set of rules to produce feasible
schedules for modeling NextGen benefits because without doing so, an
FAA official told us, demand projections would not realistically
reflect anticipated airport infrastructure constraints.
[End of figure]
FAA has also analyzed delay reduction benefits for elements of some
major projects and individual actions, though we did not verify or
evaluate these analyses or estimates. For example, postimplementation
analysis for the first phase of the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia
airspace redesign showed that both Newark and Philadelphia airports
experienced increases in the number of departures during times when
the new departure headings were used, resulting in an estimated
decrease of almost 1 minute of taxi time and a 2.5 percent decrease in
the time between when the aircraft pushes back from the gate to when
it takes off from the airport--which is referred to as "out to off
time"--during the morning departure push at Newark. FAA also assessed
capacity and delay reduction benefits for some air traffic management
improvements. For example, FAA estimates that the implementation of
TMA improved FAA's ability to manage aircraft, resulting in capacity
increases of 3 to 5 percent. As part of the review process for the New
York ARC initiatives, FAA officials selected some of the ongoing and
completed initiatives for further analysis based on their potential to
reduce delays. For example, FAA conducted a study of the simultaneous
instrument approaches at JFK that showed an increase in arrival
capacity of 12 flights per hour.[Footnote 55] According to FAA
officials, it is difficult to isolate the overall benefit of an
individual initiative given the complexity of assessing all the
actions in place and all of the factors affecting the system at any
given time.
* FAA monitors system performance: FAA also monitors airport and
system delays using tools, such as targeted analysis and performance
dashboards, that track operational performance on a daily basis. This
routine monitoring allows officials to try to assess how a given event
may have affected performance. FAA officials recently added data to
its dashboards to enable users to compare current performance with
that for previous days, months, or years and to provide additional
insight on performance trends. Also, FAA recently began to implement a
process for monitoring airport performance. In response to peak summer
delays in 2007, FAA officials began using airline schedules to
estimate delay trends at the OEP airports and identify airports that
may experience significant delays in the next 6 to 12 months. If an
airport is expected to experience significant delays--that is,
aircraft waiting to depart for more than 5 minutes--FAA would then
evaluate whether a congestion action team should be formed to develop
actions in response to these potential delays. However, because of the
recent decline in the number of flights systemwide, FAA has yet to
take any new actions based on this monitoring.
FAA's Use of Average On-Time Performance Masks Variations in Airport
Performance and Limits FAA's Ability to Prioritize Its Actions to
Reduce Delays:
Although FAA's target of 88 percent on-time arrival performance
provides a measure of the agency's overall goal to provide efficient
air traffic control services, it masks the wide variation in airport
performance, making it difficult to understand how individual airport
performance relates to the overall target. For example, in fiscal year
2009, Newark had an on-time arrival rate of only 72 percent, while St.
Louis easily exceeded the target with 95 percent on-time performance.
Despite this variability in performance, FAA has not established
airport-specific targets for on-time performance. FAA officials noted
that they are trying to develop airport-specific on-time performance
targets, but efforts in developing these targets are in the very early
stages, and they do not currently have plans to make these targets
publicly available or hold FAA officials at the local airport or
national level accountable for achieving these targets.
The absence of performance targets for individual airports hinders
FAA, aviation stakeholders, and the public from understanding a
desired level of on-time performance for individual airports and
results in FAA lacking a performance standard by which it can
prioritize and demonstrate how its actions reduce delays at the most
congested airports and throughout the system. For example, as
previously noted, FAA's implementation of new departure headings
resulted in performance improvements at Philadelphia and Newark,
according to the MITRE analysis.[Footnote 56] Yet those improvements
lack a performance standard against which FAA might prioritize its
actions and determine if the improvements helped meet or exceed, or
still fall short of, the overall targeted level of performance for
these airports or how they affected the overall on-time performance
goal. For example, reducing delays at the airports that currently
impose approximately 80 percent of all departure delays within the air
traffic control system could not only have a measurable benefit at
these airports, but could also improve performance of the overall
national airspace system.
Furthermore, although FAA's analyses of delay reduction benefits
demonstrate improvements at various airports, it remains unclear
whether further actions are required to achieve a targeted level of
performance at these airports since targeted levels of airport
performance have not been established. As part of its NextGen Mid-Term
Implementation Task Force recommendations, RTCA is encouraging FAA to
move away from traditional national deployments of new technologies to
an airport-centric approach that deploys solutions at key airports and
for large metropolitan areas where problems with congestion and delay
are most acute. Airport-specific performance targets could help in
measuring the extent to which FAA's airport-focused actions are
helping to improve performance or whether additional actions are
needed to address delays at the most congested airports. Moreover,
although NextGen will keep delays at many airports from getting worse
than would be expected without NextGen, FAA's NextGen modeling
indicates that even if all ongoing and planned NextGen technologies
are implemented, a few airports, such as Atlanta, Washington Dulles,
and possibly Philadelphia, may not be able to meet the projected
increases in demand, and if market forces do not dampen that demand,
additional actions may be required at these airports. However, without
airport-specific targets, FAA cannot determine what additional actions
might be required to achieve a targeted level of performance at these
airports.
Conclusion:
Over the next 2 to 3 years, FAA has numerous actions planned or under
way that are expected to increase capacity and improve the performance
of the overall aviation system. Although these actions may reduce
delays and help FAA achieve its overall on-time performance goal,
FAA's ability to prioritize these actions and communicate their
benefits is inhibited by the absence of individual airport on-time
performance targets. Identifying performance targets for individual
airports and how these targets relate to the overall agency goal will
provide a standard by which FAA can measure and prioritize its actions
to reduce delays at these airports and overall. This is particularly
important in understanding the extent to which FAA's actions are
addressing delays at the 7 airports--Newark, LaGuardia, Atlanta, JFK,
San Francisco, Chicago O'Hare, and Philadelphia--that are currently
responsible for about 80 percent of the delays across the air traffic
control system. Although airport-specific on-time performance targets
should not be the only measure of FAA's performance in reducing delays
in the system, by setting these targets, FAA may be motivated to
better focus its actions at these airports, resulting in reduced
delays not only at these airports but also at other airports in the
national airspace system. Airport-specific goals would also help FAA
better communicate how actions at the airport and national levels
contribute to the agency's overall goals, improve airport performance,
and demonstrate how its actions are affecting delays. Additionally,
even with NextGen, delays at some of the most congested airports are
expected to continue and could get worse, requiring FAA to consider
additional policy actions to maintain airport performance. Airport-
specific goals could help FAA identify and communicate what additional
actions might be required to achieve a targeted level of performance
at these airports.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the
Administrator of FAA to develop and make public airport-specific on-
time performance targets, particularly for the most congested airports
that impose delays throughout the air traffic control system, to
better prioritize FAA's actions to reduce delays and demonstrate
benefits of those actions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOT for its review and comment.
DOT and FAA officials provided technical comments that we incorporated
as appropriate. In addition, in e-mailed comments, an FAA official
reiterated that the agency has been working to develop and implement
airport-specific performance targets, but that this process remains
ongoing given the complex nature of compiling historical data and
airport-specific performance information to create baseline targets.
The official also noted that airport-specific on-time performance
targets are one of the many tools that FAA can use to manage and
measure delays at the airport level and systemwide and that the agency
continues to identify ways to improve how it measures performance. For
example, FAA plans to use new radar and airport surface detection data
to help refine its causal delay data. While we agree that these
measures could help FAA further understand delays, we continue to
believe that airport-specific on-time performance targets could help
FAA demonstrate how its actions are affecting delays at individual
airports and throughout the national airspace system, but they could
also help FAA, aviation stakeholders, and the public understand the
desired level of airport performance. Furthermore, establishing
airport-specific targets in addition to the agency's overall on-time
performance target would help FAA focus its actions on those airports
where improvements could result in the greatest impact and communicate
to stakeholders how its actions relate to its goals.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of
Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration. In addition, the report will be available at no charge
on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your
staff have any questions concerning this report, please call me at
(202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix VII.
Signed by:
Susan Fleming:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
In this report, we examined the extent to which (1) delays in the U.S.
national aviation system have changed since 2007 and the factors
contributing to these changes, and (2) actions by the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are
expected to reduce delays in the next 2 to 3 years.
To determine how delays have changed, we analyzed DOT and FAA data on
U.S. passenger airline flight delays by airport and for the entire
aviation system through 2009. Using DOT's Airline Service Quality
Performance (ASQP) data, we analyzed systemwide trends in flight
delays, including cancellations, diversions, long tarmac delays, and
average delay minutes, for calendar years 2000 through 2009. Using
FAA's Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) data, we analyzed
airport-specific trends in the number of total flights, delayed
flights, and delay time for 34 of the 35 airports in FAA's Operational
Evolution Partnership (OEP) program for calendar years 2007 through
2009.[Footnote 57] We focused on these 34 OEP airports because they
serve major metropolitan areas located in the continental United
States and handled more than 70 percent of passengers in the system in
2008; additionally, much of the current delays in air traffic can be
traced to inadequate capacity relative to demand at these airports,
according to FAA.[Footnote 58] We also analyzed DOT's ASQP data on
airline-reported sources of delayed and canceled flights for these 34
airports for calendar year 2009.
To assess the extent to which these 34 airports experienced and
contributed delays to the aviation system, we analyzed calendar year
2009 data from FAA's Operations Network (OPSNET), which measures
departure delays, airborne delays, and delays resulting from traffic
management initiatives taken by FAA in response to weather conditions,
increased traffic volume, runway conditions, equipment outages, and
other affecting conditions. Our analysis included data from the OEP
airports (excluding Honolulu) and their associated terminal radar
approach control facilities (TRACON).[Footnote 59] Since 16 location
identifiers are used for a combination of airports and TRACONs,
resulting in combined data, we worked with FAA to determine how to
identify the number of departures and departure delays to attribute to
each individual airport and TRACON in our universe. To separate out
these data, we examined the different categories of OPSNET delays:
departure delays (flights incurring a delay at the origin airport
prior to departure), airborne delays (flights held en route), and two
categories of traffic management delays--delays occurring at one
facility resulting from a traffic management initiative instituted by
another facility ("traffic management from" delays) and delays charged
to the facility instituting the traffic management initiative, which
may occur at another facility in the system ("traffic management to"
delays). Since TRACONs handle airborne flights only and airports
handle flights preparing for takeoff or landing, we allocated all
airborne delays to the TRACONs and all departure and traffic
management from delays to the airport for these combined facilities.
In separating out the traffic management to delays, we allocated all
of these delays to the OEP airport, unless the delay occurred at
another airport associated with that TRACON--in which case, we
allocated those delays to the TRACON.[Footnote 60] Our analysis
focused on departures, departure delays, and both categories of
traffic management delays because the majority of delays recorded in
OPSNET occur before an aircraft takes off from an airport and
therefore are captured in these delay categories.
Once we separated the delay for each air traffic control tower and
TRACON, we calculated the following measures for the facilities in our
universe: the number of departures at a facility as a percentage of
the total; percentage of delayed departures occurring at each
facility; and percentage of delayed departures charged, or attributed
to each facility and where that delay occurred. Our analysis of OSPNET
includes only calendar year 2009 because in recent years, FAA has made
changes in how data are collected for OPSNET, including automating the
collection of its data in fiscal year 2008 and capturing additional
delay categories in fiscal year 2009, making it difficult to do year-
over-year comparisons of these data.
To assess the reliability of ASQP, ASPM, and OPSNET data, we (1)
reviewed existing documentation related to the data sources, (2)
electronically tested the data to identify obvious problems with
completeness or accuracy, and (3) interviewed knowledgeable agency
officials about the data. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To determine the factors affecting changes in flight delays since
2007, we reviewed relevant FAA reports; interviewed DOT, FAA, airport,
and airline officials and industry experts; and examined estimated
delay reduction benefits of actions, when available. To understand the
relationship between the number of flights and delays, we performed a
simple correlation analysis between the number of monthly arrivals and
delayed arrivals from calendar years 2000 through 2009 for the OEP
airports (excluding Honolulu). See appendix III for additional
information on this analysis.[Footnote 61] To determine the extent to
which DOT's and FAA's actions reduced delays since 2007, we reviewed
FAA analysis of estimated delay reduction benefits of its actions,
including runway projects and other capacity improvements, and
interviewed agency officials about these analyses. Additionally, using
FAA data on Chicago O'Hare's called rate (a measure of capacity
reflecting the number of aircraft that an airport can accommodate
within a 15-minute period), we determined the extent to which capacity
had increased after the new runway was opened. To assess the effect of
the hourly limits on scheduled arrivals and departures at LaGuardia,
John F. Kennedy International (JFK), and Newark Liberty International
airports, we examined analysis done by the MITRE Corporation on
airline schedules before and after the schedule limits were
established.[Footnote 62] See appendix V for more information on this
analysis.
To identify DOT's and FAA's ongoing and planned actions to reduce
delays in the next 2 to 3 years, we analyzed key FAA documents,
including the agency's strategic plan (referred to as the Flight
Plan), the NextGen Implementation Plan, FAA's Response to
Recommendations of the RTCA NextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task
Force, and the New York Aviation Rulemaking Committee Report. In
assessing these documents, we identified a set of capacity
improvements and demand management policies with the potential to
reduce delays by 2013. FAA has many ongoing and planned initiatives--
such as longer-term Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen) procedures and technologies--that could also reduce delays,
but these actions are not included in our discussion because they are
not expected to realize delay reduction benefits in the next 2 to 3
years. These actions to reduce delays are available or planned at
various OEP airports, but we did not assess the extent to which they
are being used at a given location. To determine the extent to which
DOT and FAA actions are being implemented at the most congested
airports, we reviewed related reports and studies, including FAA's
2009 Performance and Accountability Report, the RTCA NextGen Mid-Term
Implementation Task Force Report, and FAA's Capacity Needs in the
National Airspace System, 2007-2025 (FACT 2), and interviewed airport
officials at some of these airports and FAA officials at both the
national and local airport levels.
To determine the status of DOT's and FAA's actions to reduce delays
and their potential to reduce delays, we interviewed officials in
FAA's Air Traffic Organization; Office of Aviation Policy, Planning
and Environment; Office of Airport Planning and Programming; and local
airport officials. To gain an understanding of aviation stakeholder
perspectives on the expected impact of DOT's and FAA's actions in the
next 2 to 3 years, we spoke with industry and academic experts,
airport and airline officials, the DOT Inspector General, the Air
Transport Association, the Airports Council International-North
America, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, the
National Business Aviation Association, the Air Carrier Association of
America, and the Regional Airline Association. To identify the extent
to which FAA has modeled or assessed the delay reduction impact of its
actions, including NextGen, we interviewed officials from MITRE, FAA's
Performance Analysis and Strategy Office, and FAA's Air Traffic
Organization NextGen offices. FAA officials also provided information
based on model simulations that examine future benefits of NextGen
technologies. In particular, we received analysis of expected delay
minutes for the OEP airports in future years under various
assumptions--a baseline scenario that estimates the delays that may
occur if no improvements are made to the system; a runway scenario
that estimates the delays that may occur if only runway improvements
are made over the next 10 years, but no NextGen air traffic management
improvements; and the NextGen case that estimates the delays that may
occur if planned runway improvements and NextGen technologies and
procedures are implemented. As part of the assumptions underlying
these analyses, FAA also provided us with the extent to which future
demand growth is "trimmed" under these scenarios as a means of
limiting future traffic projections to reflect anticipated airport
infrastructure constraints.[Footnote 63] While we reviewed some of
FAA's assumptions and analyses, we did not verify the accuracy of the
models.
To identify how FAA measures whether its actions contribute to changes
in delays, we reviewed FAA's Flight Plan and related documents to
determine how FAA measures its performance in achieving its goal of
increasing the reliability and on-time performance of the airlines. We
also interviewed FAA officials on the agency's performance targets and
any planned improvements to these targets. Finally, we reviewed
previous GAO reports, including our prior work on aviation
infrastructure, NextGen, aviation congestion, and regional airport
planning.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2009 to May 2010, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Tarmac Delay Data:
A tarmac delay occurs when a flight is away from the gate and delayed
either:
* during taxi-out: the time between when a flight departs the gate at
the origin airport and when it lifts off from that airport (i.e.,
wheels-off);
* during taxi-in: the time between a flight touching down at its
destination airport (wheels-on) and arriving at the gate;
* prior to cancellation: flight left the gate but was canceled at the
origin airport;
* during a diversion: the tarmac time experienced at an airport other
than the destination airport; or:
* as a result of a multiple gate departure: the flight left the gate,
then returned, and then left again; the tarmac time is the time before
the return to the gate.
Figure 12 shows trends in tarmac delays greater than 3 hours from
calendar years 2000 through 2009.
Figure 12: Tarmac Delays Greater than 3 Hours, 2000-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Calendar year: 2000;
Number of flights: 1,662.
Calendar year: 2001;
Number of flights: 771.
Calendar year: 2002;
Number of flights: 953.
Calendar year: 2003;
Number of flights: 1,202.
Calendar year: 2004;
Number of flights: 1,268.
Calendar year: 2005;
Number of flights: 1,089.
Calendar year: 2006;
Number of flights: 1,341.
Calendar year: 2007;
Number of flights: 1,654.
Calendar year: 2008;
Number of flights: 1,318.
Calendar year: 2009;
Number of flights: 903.
Source: ASQP data.
Note: Beginning in October 2008, DOT required carriers to submit long
tarmac delay statistics for three additional categories: flights that
are subsequently canceled or diverted or have multiple gate
departures. The reporting of these categories resulted in an
additional 299 tarmac delays captured in 2009 and represented one-
third of all long tarmac delays in 2009.
[End of figure]
Table 3 shows the breakdown of tarmac delays by month and phase of
flight since October 2008, when these more detailed data were first
collected.
Table 3: Phase of Flight where Long Tarmac Delays Occurred, October
2008 to December 2009:
Date: October 2008;
Number of scheduled flights: 556,205;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 49;
Percentage of total flights: 0.01;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 2;
Multiple gate departure: 6;
Taxi-out: 35;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 6.
Date: November 2008;
Number of scheduled flights: 523,272;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 7;
Percentage of total flights: 0;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 0;
Multiple gate departure: 1;
Taxi-out: 4;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 2.
Date: December 2008;
Number of scheduled flights: 544,956;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 187;
Percentage of total flights: 0.03;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 40;
Multiple gate departure: 14;
Taxi-out: 116;
Taxi-In: 7;
At diversion airport: 10.
Date: January 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 532,339;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 87;
Percentage of total flights: 0.02;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 7;
Multiple gate departure: 10;
Taxi-out: 70;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 0.
Date: February 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 488,410;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 43;
Percentage of total flights: 0.01;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 5;
Multiple gate departure: 4;
Taxi-out: 34;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 0.
Date: March 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 557,422;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 88;
Percentage of total flights: 0.02;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 6;
Multiple gate departure: 9;
Taxi-out: 66;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 7.
Date: April 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 537,793;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 81;
Percentage of total flights: 0.02;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 12;
Multiple gate departure: 10;
Taxi-out: 47;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 12.
Date: May 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 546,832;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 35;
Percentage of total flights: 0.01;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 7;
Multiple gate departure: 2;
Taxi-out: 25;
Taxi-In: 1;
At diversion airport: 0.
Date: June 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 557,594;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 278;
Percentage of total flights: 0.05;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 40;
Multiple gate departure: 42;
Taxi-out: 172;
Taxi-In: 1;
At diversion airport: 23.
Date: July 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 580,134;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 164;
Percentage of total flights: 0.03;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 21;
Multiple gate departure: 20;
Taxi-out: 105;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 18.
Date: August 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 568,301;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 70;
Percentage of total flights: 0.01;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 7;
Multiple gate departure: 11;
Taxi-out: 45;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 7.
Date: September 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 510,852;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 6;
Percentage of total flights: 0;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 0;
Multiple gate departure: 0;
Taxi-out: 4;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 2.
Date: October 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 531,799;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 12;
Percentage of total flights: 0;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 0;
Multiple gate departure: 0;
Taxi-out: 12;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 0.
Date: November 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 509,540;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 4;
Percentage of total flights: 0;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 0;
Multiple gate departure: 1;
Taxi-out: 2;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 1.
Date: December 2009;
Number of scheduled flights: 529,269;
Total flights with tarmac delays greater than 3 hours: 35;
Percentage of total flights: 0.01;
When or where the long tarmac delay occurred:
Prior to cancellation: 5;
Multiple gate departure: 3;
Taxi-out: 22;
Taxi-In: 0;
At diversion airport: 5.
Source: ASQP data.
Note: According to DOT, January 2009 includes one flight with two
separate 3-hour tarmac times. Northwest Flight 1491, on January 28,
2009, was on the tarmac for 188 minutes before returning to the gate.
The flight departed the gate a second time and was on the tarmac for
199 minutes before wheels-off. Details of the flight are listed as a 3-
hour multiple gate departure delay and a 3-hour taxi-out delay.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO's Correlation Analysis of Total Arrivals and Delayed
Arrivals:
To corroborate FAA and stakeholder views on the relationship between
the recent reductions in flights and declines in delays, we performed
a correlation analysis between the number of total arrivals and
delayed arrivals. Our correlation analysis yielded a correlation
coefficient that captures only the relationship between the number of
arrivals and arrival delays at the 34 OEP airports (excluding
Honolulu). Coefficient variables take a value between negative 1 and
1. A correlation coefficient of zero would indicate that there was no
relationship between the variables. A correlation coefficient close to
1 would indicate a strong positive relationship, while a correlation
coefficient close to negative 1 would indicate a strong negative
relationship. Our results showed a correlation coefficient of 0.72,
indicating a significant relationship between arrivals and arrival
delays.[Footnote 64] Although this result likely indicates that
arrival delays will rise with increases in arrivals, for several
reasons, it should not be viewed as highly predictive of the exact
pattern with which delays will track arrivals.
Many other factors--that we do not account for--also affect delays at
a given airport or set of airports and thus affect the measured
relationship between the number of flights and delays. For example,
how close the number of flights is to the airport's capacity--i.e.,
the number of flights an airport can handle in a given period of time--
is a key factor underlying the relationship between the number of
flights and delays. In particular, the relationship between the number
of flights and delays is likely not stable in the sense that as the
number of flights grows and becomes closer to the capacity of an
airport, the influence of additional flights on delays becomes
greater. For example, in addition to looking at the relationship for
all airports, we also performed a correlation for all airports that
were among the 10 airports with the highest percentage of delayed
flights in any year since 2007. In total, there were 15 airports used
for this most delayed airports analysis. Our analysis yielded a
correlation coefficient of 0.79, indicating that the most delay-prone
airports--which likely handle a number of flights closer to their
capacity than others--experience a stronger relationship between the
level of flights and delays than airports that have more available
capacity. Additionally, a host of factors--such as airport
infrastructure (e.g., available airport gates, taxiways, and runways)--
influence an airport's capacity at a given time and, therefore, how
many flights an airport can handle. Capacity can be a changing value
hour to hour or day to day, depending on such elements as weather, the
mix of aircraft used at the airport, and air traffic procedures.
Airport projects that provide greater capacity--such a new runway,
taxiway improvements, or additional gates--will enable more flights
with fewer impacts on delays and therefore also affect the
relationship between the number of flights and delays. Also, the level
of delays at one airport or throughout the national airspace system
can affect delays elsewhere. For example, FAA officials provided an
analysis to us suggesting that as the number of flights, and therefore
delays, rapidly grew at the John F. Kennedy (JFK) airport after 2007,
other airports--that did not see a significant rise in the number of
flights they handled--had measurably worse delays. Finally, how
airlines use airport infrastructure can affect the relationship
between the number of flights and delays. Notably, FAA officials told
us that airlines scheduling large numbers of flights at the same time
(e.g., airline peaking) at the busy airports is a key factor that
affects the relationship between the number of flights and delays.
That is, a given number of flights will likely result in more delays
if there are strong peaks in the number of flights scheduled that tax
the airport's capacity at certain times of the day rather than a more
evenly spaced schedule of flights across the entire day.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Airline-Reported Sources of Delays for Delayed and
Canceled Flights Ranked by Airports with the Highest Percentage of
Flight Delays, 2009:
Figure 13: Airline-Reported Sources for Delayed Flights Ranked by
Airports with the Highest Percentage of Flight Delays, 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Airport: Newark International (EWR);
National Aviation System: 72%;
Late arriving aircraft: 16%;
Carrier: 9%;
Severe weather: 3%.
Airport: New York LaGuardia (LGA);
National Aviation System: 58%;
Late arriving aircraft: 19%;
Carrier: 16%;
Severe weather: 7%.
Airport: Atlanta Hartsfield International (ATL);
National Aviation System: 41%;
Late arriving aircraft: 37%;
Carrier: 19%;
Severe weather: 3%.
Airport: New York John F. Kennedy International (JFK);
National Aviation System: 50%;
Late arriving aircraft: 22%;
Carrier: 23%;
Severe weather: 5%.
Airport: San Francisco International (SFO);
National Aviation System: 50%;
Late arriving aircraft: 31%;
Carrier: 16%;
Severe weather: 3%.
Airport: Miami International (MIA);
National Aviation System: 25%;
Late arriving aircraft: 37%;
Carrier: 33%;
Severe weather: 5%.
Airport: Philadelphia International (PHL);
National Aviation System: 49%;
Late arriving aircraft: 26%;
Carrier: 18%;
Severe weather: 7%.
Airport: Boston Logan International (BOS);
National Aviation System: 42%;
Late arriving aircraft: 30%;
Carrier: 23%;
Severe weather: 5%.
Airport: Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International (FLL);
National Aviation System: 26%;
Late arriving aircraft: 40%;
Carrier: 30%;
Severe weather: 4%.
Airport: Minneapolis-St Paul International (MSP);
National Aviation System: 36%;
Late arriving aircraft: 28%;
Carrier: 29%;
Severe weather: 7%.
Airport: Greater Pittsburgh International (PIT);
National Aviation System: 19%;
Late arriving aircraft: 40%;
Carrier: 34%;
Severe weather: 6%.
Airport: Dallas-Fort Worth International (DFW);
National Aviation System: 25%;
Late arriving aircraft: 43%;
Carrier: 26%;
Severe weather: 6%.
Airport: Charlotte/Douglas International (CLT);
National Aviation System: 38%;
Late arriving aircraft: 25%;
Carrier: 32%;
Severe weather: 5%.
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International (ORD);
National Aviation System: 39%;
Late arriving aircraft: 32%;
Carrier: 24%;
Severe weather: 4%.
Airport: Orlando International (MCO);
National Aviation System: 23%;
Late arriving aircraft: 43%;
Carrier: 30%;
Severe weather: 4%.
Airport: Tampa International (TPA);
National Aviation System: 21%;
Late arriving aircraft: 43%;
Carrier: 31%;
Severe weather: 5%.
Airport: Washington Dulles International (IAD);
National Aviation System: 26%;
Late arriving aircraft: 28%;
Carrier: 40%;
Severe weather: 6%.
Airport: Denver International (DEN);
National Aviation System: 28%;
Late arriving aircraft: 42%;
Carrier: 25%;
Severe weather: 5%.
Airport: George Bush Intercontinental (IAH);
National Aviation System: 36%;
Late arriving aircraft: 33%;
Carrier: 25%;
Severe weather: 6%.
Airport: Ronald Reagan National (DCA);
National Aviation System: 28%;
Late arriving aircraft: 35%;
Carrier: 30%;
Severe weather: 7%.
Airport: San Diego International Lindbergh (SAN);
National Aviation System: 20%;
Late arriving aircraft: 45%;
Carrier: 31%;
Severe weather: 4%.
Airport: Detroit Metro Wayne County (DTW);
National Aviation System: 23%;
Late arriving aircraft: 36%;
Carrier: 36%;
Severe weather: 5%.
Airport: Seattle-Tacoma International (SEA);
National Aviation System: 25%;
Late arriving aircraft: 38%;
Carrier: 33%;
Severe weather: 4
Airport: Lambert St. Louis International (STL);
National Aviation System: 15%;
Late arriving aircraft: 46%;
Carrier: 34%;
Severe weather: 5%.
Airport: Memphis International (MEM);
National Aviation System: 27%;
Late arriving aircraft: 33%;
Carrier: 33%;
Severe weather: 6%.
Airport: Baltimore-Washington International (BWI);
National Aviation System: 21%;
Late arriving aircraft: 48%;
Carrier: 24%;
Severe weather: 6%.
Airport: Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky (CVG);
National Aviation System: 20%;
Late arriving aircraft: 26%;
Carrier: 41%;
Severe weather: 14%.
Airport: Los Angeles International (LAX);
National Aviation System: 20%;
Late arriving aircraft: 43%;
Carrier: 32%;
Severe weather: 4%.
Airport: Portland International (PDX);
National Aviation System: 19%;
Late arriving aircraft: 46%;
Carrier: 32%;
Severe weather: 4%.
Airport: Las Vegas McCarran International (LAS);
National Aviation System: 23%;
Late arriving aircraft: 44%;
Carrier: 29%;
Severe weather: 4%.
Airport: Cleveland-Hopkins International (CLE);
National Aviation System: 18%;
Late arriving aircraft: 46%;
Carrier: 30%;
Severe weather: 5%.
Airport: Chicago Midway (MDW);
National Aviation System: 18%;
Late arriving aircraft: 53%;
Carrier: 23%;
Severe weather: 6%.
Airport: Phoenix Sky Harbor International (PHX);
National Aviation System: 23%;
Late arriving aircraft: 37%;
Carrier: 36%;
Severe weather: 4%.
Airport: Salt Lake City International (SLC);
National Aviation System: 24%;
Late arriving aircraft: 45%;
Carrier: 28%;
Severe weather: 4%.
Notes:
DOT collects delay data in one of five causal categories: national
aviation system (i.e., a broad set of circumstances affecting airline
flights, such as nonextreme weather that slows down the system, but
does not prevent flying), late-arriving aircraft (i.e., a previous
flight using the same aircraft arrived late, causing the subsequent
flight to depart late), airline (i.e., any delay that was within the
control of the airlines, such as aircraft cleaning, baggage loading,
crew issues, or maintenance), extreme weather (i.e., serious weather
conditions that prevent the operation of a flight, such as tornadoes,
snowstorms, or hurricanes), and security (i.e., evacuation of an
airport, reboarding because of a security breach, and long lines at
the passenger screening areas).
Security delays do not appear this graphic because they make up less
than 1 percent of the delays at these airports.
Source: GAO analysis of ASQP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 14: Airline-Reported Sources for Canceled Flights Ranked by
Airports with the Highest Percentage of Flight Delays, 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Airport: Newark International (EWR);
Severe weather: 41%;
National Aviation System: 45%;
Carrier: 13%.
Airport: New York LaGuardia (LGA);
Severe weather: 35%;
National Aviation System: 33%;
Carrier: 32%.
Airport: Atlanta Hartsfield International (ATL);
Severe weather: 34%;
National Aviation System: 24%;
Carrier: 42%.
Airport: New York John F. Kennedy International (JFK);
Severe weather: 76%;
National Aviation System: 11%;
Carrier: 13%.
Airport: San Francisco International (SFO);
Severe weather: 27%;
National Aviation System: 26%;
Carrier: 47%.
Airport: Miami International (MIA);
Severe weather: 35%;
National Aviation System: 8%;
Carrier: 57%.
Airport: Philadelphia International (PHL)
Severe weather: 40%;
National Aviation System: 23%;
Carrier: 37%.
Airport: Boston Logan International (BOS)
Severe weather: 42%;
National Aviation System: 24%;
Carrier: 35%.
Airport: Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International (FLL)
Severe weather: 57%;
National Aviation System: 4%;
Carrier: 39%.
Airport: Minneapolis-St Paul International (MSP)
Severe weather: 32%;
National Aviation System: 19%;
Carrier: 49%.
Airport: Greater Pittsburgh International (PIT)
Severe weather: 45%;
National Aviation System: 14%;
Carrier: 41%.
Airport: Dallas-Fort Worth International (DFW)
Severe weather: 55%;
National Aviation System: 9%;
Carrier: 36%.
Airport: Charlotte/Douglas International (CLT)
Severe weather: 32%;
National Aviation System: 16%;
Carrier: 52%.
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International (ORD)
Severe weather: 39%;
National Aviation System: 29%;
Carrier: 32%.
Airport: Orlando International (MCO)
Severe weather: 49%;
National Aviation System: 6%;
Carrier: 45%.
Airport: Tampa International (TPA)
Severe weather: 51%;
National Aviation System: 4%;
Carrier: 45%.
Airport: Washington Dulles International (IAD)
Severe weather: 49%;
National Aviation System: 16%;
Carrier: 36%.
Airport: Denver International (DEN)
Severe weather: 52%;
National Aviation System: 5%;
Carrier: 42%.
Airport: George Bush Intercontinental (IAH)
Severe weather: 75%;
National Aviation System: 6%;
Carrier: 19%.
Airport: Ronald Reagan National (DCA)
Severe weather: 42%;
National Aviation System: 20%;
Carrier: 39%.
Airport: San Diego International Lindbergh (SAN)
Severe weather: 31%;
National Aviation System: 7%;
Carrier: 63%.
Airport: Detroit Metro Wayne County (DTW)
Severe weather: 33%;
National Aviation System: 23%;
Carrier: 44%.
Airport: Seattle-Tacoma International (SEA)
Severe weather: 43%;
National Aviation System: 1%;
Carrier: 56%.
Airport: Lambert St. Louis International (STL)
Severe weather: 33%;
National Aviation System: 15%;
Carrier: 52%.
Airport: Memphis International (MEM)
Severe weather: 29%;
National Aviation System: 13%;
Carrier: 59%.
Airport: Baltimore-Washington International (BWI)
Severe weather: 61%;
National Aviation System: 12%;
Carrier: 27%.
Airport: Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky (CVG)
Severe weather: 50%;
National Aviation System: 11%;
Carrier: 39%.
Airport: Los Angeles International (LAX)
Severe weather: 20%;
National Aviation System: 6%;
Carrier: 74%.
Airport: Portland International (PDX)
Severe weather: 52%;
National Aviation System: 3%;
Carrier: 45%.
Airport: Las Vegas McCarran International (LAS)
Severe weather: 24%;
National Aviation System: 4%;
Carrier: 72%.
Airport: Cleveland-Hopkins International (CLE)
Severe weather: 48%;
National Aviation System: 19%;
Carrier: 33%.
Airport: Chicago Midway (MDW)
Severe weather: 47%;
National Aviation System: 5%;
Carrier: 48%.
Airport: Phoenix Sky Harbor International (PHX)
Severe weather: 21%;
National Aviation System: 5%;
Carrier: 74%.
Airport: Salt Lake City International (SLC)
Severe weather: 53%;
National Aviation System: 3%;
Carrier: 45%.
Source: GAO analysis of ASQP data.
Notes:
DOT collects cancellation causal data in one of four categories:
national aviation system (i.e., a broad set of circumstances affecting
airline flights, such as nonextreme weather that slows down the
system, but does not prevent flying), airline (i.e., any delay that
was within the control of the airlines, such as aircraft cleaning,
baggage loading, crew issues, or maintenance), extreme weather (i.e.,
serious weather conditions that prevent the operation of a flight,
such as tornadoes, snowstorms, or hurricanes), and security (i.e.,
evacuation of an airport, reboarding because of a security breach, and
long lines at the passenger screening areas).
Security delays do not appear on this graphic because they make up
less than 1 percent of the delays at these airports.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: FAA's Analysis of the Capacity Limits at the Three New
York Area Airports--JFK, Newark, and LaGuardia:
In 2008, FAA and its federally funded research and development center,
the MITRE Corporation's Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development, undertook an analysis to set limits on scheduled
operations (often called slots) for Newark and JFK airports in the New
York area in order to address congestion and delay at these airports.
Because the level of operations and associated delays had increased
during 2006 and 2007 at JFK, and airlines were indicating further
increases in planned operations for the summer of 2008, FAA determined
that schedule limits needed to be applied to that airport. While
LaGuardia already had a schedule cap in place, Newark airport did not,
and FAA decided to also set a cap for Newark so that a limit on
operations at JFK did not lead to increased operations and delays at
Newark. From a performance perspective, the goal in setting the level
of caps at these airports was to reduce average delays at JFK by about
15 percent compared with their 2007 level, and to keep delays at
Newark from worsening over their 2007 level.
To determine how schedule limitations would be applied, FAA and MITRE
used a model that estimated the level of delay associated with various
levels of operations at both JFK and Newark airports. The first key
model input is a level of demand on a particular busy day in August
2007. The source of that data is airlines' scheduled departure and
arrival operations at the two airports for that day according to the
Official Airline Guide (OAG). In addition to scheduled operations,
each day the airports also service nonscheduled operations (i.e.,
operations not in the OAG). To properly capture the total demand
levels at these airports, nonscheduled operations are added as part of
the demand input to the model. Thus the "demand" input is a profile of
all scheduled and nonscheduled operations across that day. The second
key model input is airport capacity--the number of operations an
airport can handle in any given time period. The level of airport
capacity is not a constant; it varies on an ongoing basis with runway
configuration, weather, and other factors. For the analysis, airport
capacities for each hour across all weekdays over many months were
determined. As an input, the model used what is called adjusted
capacities. Adjusted capacities are based upon an airport's called
rates--the projected level of operations the airport could handle
based on conditions at the airport at that time, and actual
throughput--the number of aircraft that landed and departed. With few
exceptions, the adjusted capacities in the model were set at the
maximum of actual throughput or called rate for any specific hour.
For each of the airports, multiple iterations of the demand profile
were run against the adjusted capacities, and the model provided
"predicted delays." These predicted delays were compared with actual
delays that had occurred at those airports across varied combinations
of operations and capacity. FAA and MITRE found that the model's
predicted delays followed patterns that were in line with the patterns
of actual delays. That is, the manner in which the predicted level of
delay responded to changes in operations and/or capacity in the model
paralleled the patterns of actual delay response to those factors.
These parallels helped to validate the model's structure. The results
of the model were used in part to determine the limits on scheduled
operations by evaluating the amount of delay that would be associated
with varying levels of operations at each airport. In particular,
MITRE staff provided model results that indicated, for sequentially
lower levels of hourly operations, the level of delay that could be
expected across the day at each airport. For both JFK and Newark
airports, this exercise resulted in scheduling limitations set at 81
operations per hour, with some hourly exceptions, as this level of
operations was predicted to result in the target level of delay for
each of the airports. While LaGuardia already had a schedule cap in
place, FAA and MITRE used this same approach to model estimated levels
of delay at various levels of operations. More recently, this analysis
was used in issuing a new order decreasing the limit of scheduled
hourly operations at LaGuardia from 75 to 71. Existing flights were
not affected, but slots that are returned or withdrawn by FAA will be
limited to the 71 per hour limit.
Figures 15 through 17 illustrate how the schedule limits affected
hourly operations at the three New York area airports, using a busy
day in August--typically a very busy month--to be representative of
the summer schedules. More specifically, the figures show how airlines
scheduled operations throughout the day in 2007, the schedule they
planned to submit for 2008 without caps--or the "wish list"--and the
actual operations scheduled in 2008 and 2009 with the caps in place.
The 2008 wish list data are based on the proposed schedules submitted
by the airlines during the negotiations and discussions held to
determine the limits on scheduled operations at the airports.
The JFK and Newark figures show that peak period operations have
smoothed and fallen since the caps were put in place. This change in
peak hour operations has enabled the airports to provide more
throughput with less impact on delay than a more peaked profile of
operations would have provided. Other factors may also have had an
impact on hourly operations at the three airports (i.e., the economic
downturn has led airlines to reduce their scheduled operations below
the scheduling limits during some hours at these airports). For
Newark, the decline in peak hour operations is most significant when
comparing the actual 2008 schedule with the airlines' 2008 wish list,
especially during the busy afternoon and evening period. Because
LaGuardia has capped operations for many years, and the orders have
roughly maintained the same caps, the airport has experienced
significantly less variation in hourly operations over the last 3
years. In addition, the carriers never submitted a 2008 wish list
because the airport was already capped.
Figure 15: Daily Planned Operations at JFK by Hour, 2007-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Local hour: 6;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 40;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 50;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 51;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 43.
Local hour: 7;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 73;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 92;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 76;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 70.
Local hour: 8;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 94;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 96;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 78;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 75.
Local hour: 9;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 66;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 85;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 74;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 65.
Local hour: 10;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 43;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 44;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 40;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 33.
Local hour: 11;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 48;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 59;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 56;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 54.
Local hour: 12;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 63;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 67;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 71;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 61.
Local hour: 13;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 54;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 66;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 76;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 69.
Local hour: 14;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 70;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 90;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 81;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 79.
Local hour: 15;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 84;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 103;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 75;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 68.
Local hour: 16;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 109;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 108;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 81;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 83.
Local hour: 17;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 80;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 108;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 82;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 79.
Local hour: 18;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 96;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 112;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 80;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 73.
Local hour: 19;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 86;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 100;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 84;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 87.
Local hour: 20;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 74;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 97;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 80;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 70.
Local hour: 21;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 65;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 80;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 77;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 70.
Local hour: 22;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 40;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 54;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 56;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 56.
Local hour: 23;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,275 scheduled operations): 36;
2008 airline wish list as of October 22, 2007 (1,501 scheduled
operations): 36;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,301 scheduled operations): 36;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,216 scheduled operations): 29.
Source: FAA and MITRE analysis of OAG data.
[End of figure]
Figure 16: Daily Planned Operations at Newark by Hour, 2007-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Local hour: 6;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 59;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 61;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 56;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 55.
Local hour: 7;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 67;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 71;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 76;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 71.
Local hour: 8;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 85;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 92;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 80;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 77.
Local hour: 9;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 49;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 49;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 53;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 45.
Local hour: 10;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 51;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 56;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 57;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 58.
Local hour: 11;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 67;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 65;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 67;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 64.
Local hour: 12;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 68;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 78;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 77;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 72.
Local hour: 13;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 79;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 79;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 75;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 67.
Local hour: 14;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 76;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 82;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 81;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 75.
Local hour: 15;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 83;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 85;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 86;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 74.
Local hour: 16;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 83;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 94;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 81;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 76.
Local hour: 17;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 87;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 93;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 81;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 73.
Local hour: 18;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 87;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 99;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 80;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 77.
Local hour: 19;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 85;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 89;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 78;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 69.
Local hour: 20;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 79;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 94;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 79;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 77.
Local hour: 21;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 59;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 57;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 74;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 64.
Local hour: 22;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 45;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 47;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 43;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 42.
Local hour: 23;
2008 airline wish list as of November 15, 2007 (1,350 scheduled
operations): 30;
August 30, 2007, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,268 scheduled
operations): 30;
August 28, 2008, from OAG plus FedEx and UPS data (1,284 scheduled
operations): 29;
August 27, 2009, from OAG plus Federal Express (FedEx) and United
Parcel Service (UPS) data (1,182 scheduled operations): 26.
Sources: FAA and MITRE analysis of OAG plus FedEx and UPS data.
[End of figure]
Figure 17: Daily Planned Operations at LaGuardia by Hour, 2007-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Local hour: 6;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 48;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 50;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 42.
Local hour: 7;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 73;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 74;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 67.
Local hour: 8;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 76;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 77;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 72.
Local hour: 9;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 76;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 74;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 73.
Local hour: 10;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 76;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 77;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 76.
Local hour: 11;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 73;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 71;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 71.
Local hour: 12;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 73;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 73;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 70.
Local hour: 13;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 74;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 75;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 71.
Local hour: 14;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 74;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 74;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 72.
Local hour: 15;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 72;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 71;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 66.
Local hour: 16;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 75;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 72;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 69.
Local hour: 17;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 77;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 75;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 71.
Local hour: 18;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 73;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 74;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 68.
Local hour: 19;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 77;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 75;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 76.
Local hour: 20;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 70;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 74;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 66.
Local hour: 21;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 66;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 66;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 59.
Local hour: 22;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 27;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 25;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 19.
Local hour: 23;
August 30, 2007, from OAG (1,197 scheduled operations): 16;
August 28, 2008, from OAG (1,194 scheduled operations): 16;
August 27, 2009, from OAG (1,124 scheduled operations): 15.
Sources: FAA and MITRE analysis of OAG data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: DOT and FAA Actions to Reduce Delays in the Next 2 to 3
Years:
Our report examined DOT and FAA actions to reduce delays over the next
2 to 3 years. Table 4 describes how each action could help reduce
delays and demonstrates that most of the ongoing and planned actions
are capacity improvements designed to address flight delays by
enhancing and expanding existing capacity.
Table 4: Description of DOT and FAA Actions to Reduce Delays:
Capacity improvements:
Action: New York Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) initiatives;
Description: Operational and infrastructure improvements designed to
reduce delays through more efficient airport surface movement;
departure, arrival, and airspace efficiency; and technology for the
three New York area airports.
Action: New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia airspace redesign;
Description: Designed to increase the efficiency and reliability of
the airspace structure and air traffic control system in the New York
area airspace.
Action: New runways/airfield enhancements;
Description: New runways increase capacity, allowing an airport to
handle more operations and potentially reduce delays.
Action: Holiday use of military airspace;
Description: Coordination with the Department of Defense in advance of
busy holiday periods for use of available military airspace.
Action: Performance-based navigation, including Area Navigation (RNAV)
and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) and tailored arrivals;
Description: RNAV and RNP are designed to more efficiently utilize
airspace and procedures. Improved access and flexibility for flights
help enhance reliability and reduce delays by defining more precise
terminal area procedures. Tailored arrivals allow aircraft to descend
from cruise altitude to final approach using the most efficient
profile, avoiding inefficient flight.
Action: Traffic Management Advisor;
Description: Designed to allow controllers to more efficiently manage
aircraft.
Action: Traffic flow management system programs: Airspace flow program
and adaptive compression;
Description: Airspace flow programs are designed to more efficiently
and precisely meter demand through constrained en route airspace by
developing and distributing expected departure times for flights filed
through the constrained airspace. Airspace flow programs are not
associated with specific airports, but focus on addressing traffic
flow. Adaptive compression identifies unused slots during ground delay
and airspace flow programs and moves flights into these otherwise
unused slots, allowing for more effective and efficient traffic
management initiatives.
Action: Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X);
Description: System designed to improve surface situational awareness
and allow air traffic controllers to see the location of aircraft and
vehicles on airport runways and taxiways and keep them safely
separated.
DEmand management policies:
Action: Orders limiting scheduled operations (slot caps);
Description: Intended to prevent a return to the summer 2007 peak
delays, and to prevent delays from shifting from one New York airport
to another.
Action: Rates & Charges Policy Amendment;
Description: Clarifies the ability of airport operators to charge a
two-part landing fee, giving flexibility to vary charges based on time
of day and traffic volume. While the policy is available to airports,
it is currently in litigation and has not been implemented at any
airports.
Source: GAO analysis of DOT and FAA documents.
[End of table]
As table 5 demonstrates, these actions generally are being implemented
at the most delayed airports in the country. For example, DOT convened
a special aviation rulemaking committee (New York ARC) in the fall of
2007 specifically to address delays and other airline service issues
in the New York metropolitan area, and one of the committee's working
groups assessed 77 operational improvement initiatives for the New
York area. In addition to being implemented at the most delayed
airports, many of these actions are also available at other OEP
airports across the national airspace system. These actions are
available or planned at various locations, but we did not assess the
extent to which they are being used at a given location. For example,
we did not assess the extent to which RNAV and RNP procedures are in
use at these airports.
Table 5: DOT and FAA Actions to Reduce Delays in the Next 2 to 3 Years:
Actions to reduce delays in next 2 to 3 years:
New York ARC initiatives:
Ten airports with the highest percentage of delayed flights, 2009:
EWR: [Check];
LGA: [Check];
ATL: [Empty];
JFK: [Check];
SFO: [Empty];
MIA: [Empty];
PHL: [Empty];
BOS: [Empty];
FLL: [Empty];
MSP: [Empty];
Other OEP airports: [Empty].
New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia airspace redesign:
Ten airports with the highest percentage of delayed flights, 2009:
EWR: [Check];
LGA: [Check];
ATL: [Empty];
JFK: [Check];
SFO: [Empty];
MIA: [Empty];
PHL: [Check];
BOS: [Empty];
FLL: [Empty];
MSP: [Empty];
Other OEP airports: [Empty].
New runways/airfield enhancements:
Ten airports with the highest percentage of delayed flights, 2009:
EWR: [Empty];
LGA: [Empty];
ATL: [Empty];
JFK: [Check];
SFO: [Empty];
MIA: [Empty];
PHL: [Empty];
BOS: [Empty];
FLL: [Empty];
MSP: [Empty];
Other OEP airports: [Check].
Holiday use of military airspace:
Ten airports with the highest percentage of delayed flights, 2009:
EWR: [Check];
LGA: [Check];
ATL: [Check];
JFK: [Check];
SFO: [Check];
MIA: [Check];
PHL: [Check];
BOS: [Check];
FLL: [Check];
MSP: [Check];
Other OEP airports: [Check].
Performance-based navigation including RNAV, RNP and tailored arrivals:
Ten airports with the highest percentage of delayed flights, 2009:
EWR: [Check];
LGA: [Check];
ATL: [Check];
JFK: [Check];
SFO: [Check];
MIA: [Check];
PHL: [Check];
BOS: [Check];
FLL: [Check];
MSP: [Check];
Other OEP airports: [Check].
Traffic Management Advisor:
Ten airports with the highest percentage of delayed flights, 2009:
EWR: [Check];
LGA: [Check];
ATL: [Check];
JFK: [Check];
SFO: [Check];
MIA: [Check];
PHL: [Check];
BOS: [Check];
FLL: [Check];
MSP: [Check];
Other OEP airports: [Check].
ASDE-X:
Ten airports with the highest percentage of delayed flights, 2009:
EWR: [Check];
LGA: [Check];
ATL: [Check];
JFK: [Check];
SFO: [Check];
MIA: [Check];
PHL: [Check];
BOS: [Check];
FLL: [Check];
MSP: [Check];
Other OEP airports: [Check].
Orders limiting scheduled operations (slot caps):
Ten airports with the highest percentage of delayed flights, 2009:
EWR: [Check];
LGA: [Check];
ATL: [Empty];
JFK: [Check];
SFO: [Empty];
MIA: [Empty];
PHL: [Empty];
BOS: [Empty];
FLL: [Empty];
MSP: [Empty];
Other OEP airports: [Empty].
Rates & Charges Policy Amendment[A]:
Ten airports with the highest percentage of delayed flights, 2009:
EWR: [Empty];
LGA: [Empty];
ATL: [Empty];
JFK: [Empty];
SFO: [Empty];
MIA: [Empty];
PHL: [Empty];
BOS: [Empty];
FLL: [Empty];
MSP: [Empty];
Other OEP airports: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of DOT and FAA documents.
Note:
EWR = Newark International,
LGA = New York LaGuardia,
ATL = Atlanta Hartsfield International,
JFK = New York John F. Kennedy International,
SFO = San Francisco International,
PHL = Philadelphia International,
MIA = Miami International,
BOS = Boston Logan International,
FLL = Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International,
MSP = Minneapolis-St. Paul International.
[A] The Rates & Charges Policy Amendment is available nationwide, but
is currently in litigation and according to FAA officials, has not
been implemented at any airports.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Susan Fleming (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Paul Aussendorf (Assistant
Director), Amy Abramowitz, Lauren Calhoun, Colin Fallon, Heather
Krause, John Mingus, Sara Ann Moessbauer, Josh Ormond, Melissa
Swearingen, and Maria Wallace made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Senate Joint Economic Committee, Your Flight Has Been Delayed
Again: Flight Delays Cost Passengers, Airline and the U.S. Economy
Billions. (Washington, D.C.: May 2008).
[2] GAO, National Airspace System: DOT and FAA Actions Will Likely
Have a Limited Effect on Reducing Delays during Summer 2008 Travel
Season, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-934T]
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008).
[3] According to FAA, the 35 OEP airports are commercial airports with
significant activity and were selected in 2000 on the basis of lists
from FAA and Congress as well as a study that identified the most
congested airports in the United States. For purposes of this report,
we excluded the Honolulu International airport; while it is a large
airport, it is outside the 48 contiguous states.
[4] GAO, National Airspace System: Summary of Flight Delay Trends for
34 Airports in the Continental United States, an E-supplement to GAO-
10-542, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-543SP],
(Washington, D.C.: May 2010).
[5] As a condition to receiving federal Airport Improvement Program
funds, an eligible airport is required to be available for public use
on reasonable conditions and without unjust discrimination. 49 U.S.C.
§ 47107.
[6] GAO, Air Traffic Control: Role of FAA's Modernization Program in
Reducing Delays and Congestion, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-725T] (Washington, D.C.: May 10,
2001), and National Airspace System: Long-Term Capacity Planning
Needed Despite Recent Reduction in Flight Delays, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-185] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14,
2001).
[7] FAA Flight Plan, 2009-2013.
[8] FAA's three objectives to achieve this goal include (1) to
increase the reliability and on-time performance of the airlines (as
noted above), (2) to increase capacity to meet projected demand and
reduce congestion, and (3) to address environmental concerns
associated with capacity enhancements.
[9] To measure the performance of its ability to increase capacity,
FAA uses an average daily airport capacity for the 35 OEP airports and
seven metro areas, annual service volume, and adjusted operational
availability at the facilities supporting the 35 OEP airports.
[10] The task force included representation from the four major
operating communities--airlines, business aviation, general aviation,
and the military--as well as participation from air traffic
controllers, airports, avionics and aircraft manufacturers, and other
key stakeholders.
[11] In October 2009, we testified on the NextGen challenges that
affect FAA's response to the task force's recommendations, including
(1) directing resources and addressing environmental issues, (2)
adjusting its culture and business practices, and (3) developing and
implementing options to encourage airlines and general aviation to
equip aircraft with new technologies. See GAO, Next Generation Air
Transportation System: FAA Faces Challenges in Responding to Task
Force Recommendations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-188T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28,
2009).
[12] Limitations on operations have been in place at New York's
LaGuardia airport since January 2007, John F. Kennedy International
(JFK) since March 2008, and Newark Liberty International (Newark)
since June 2008. See 71 Fed. Reg. 77854 (Dec. 27, 2006) (LaGuardia),
73 Fed. Reg. 3510 (Jan. 18, 2008) (JFK), 73 Fed. Reg. 29550 (May 21,
2008) (Newark).
[13] These databases also include information on sources of delays.
The ASQP database provides data on airline-reported sources of delays,
which we discuss later in this report. The OPSNET database includes
data on conditions affecting delays within the air traffic control
system, such as adverse weather (i.e., rain or fog), FAA equipment
failure, runway construction, or heavy traffic volumes. ASPM includes
ASQP and OPSNET delay causes for the flights recorded within ASPM.
[14] Our analysis focuses on arrival flight delays and does not
necessarily reflect the total delays experienced by passengers. For
example, ASQP data do not capture delays experienced by passengers
because of missed connections that result in delayed or overbooked
flights. Additionally, over time, airlines have been adding time to
their schedules in order to account for anticipated inefficiencies at
some of the most congested airports and maintain on-time performance,
resulting in increased average travel times. In April 2008, DOT's
Office of Inspector General examined 2,392 city pair routes between
2000 and 2007 and found that 63 percent of these routes had increases
in actual flight times ranging from 1 minute to 30 minutes.
[15] A flight is recorded as diverted if it lands at an airport other
than its scheduled destination because of severe weather or security
concerns, for example.
[16] Beginning in October 2008, DOT required carriers to submit long
tarmac delay statistics for three additional categories: flights that
are subsequently canceled or diverted or have multiple gate
departures. The reporting of these categories resulted in an
additional 299 tarmac delays captured in 2009 and represented one-
third of all long tarmac delays in 2009.
[17] Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 68983 (Dec.
2009). Among the provisions in the rule, DOT can also fine airlines
for "holding out" (advertising and/or operating) chronically delayed
flights--that is, any domestic flight that is operated at least 10
times a month and arrives more than 30 minutes late (including
canceled flights) more than 50 percent of the time during that month--
for more than four consecutive 1-month periods. The rule states that
this practice is a form of unrealistic scheduling and is,
consequently, an unfair or deceptive practice and an unfair method of
competition within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 41712. 74 Fed. Reg.
68983 (Dec. 2009). In addition, the FAA reauthorization bill, which
has in separate versions passed both the House and Senate, contains
several provisions to ensure passenger needs are met during long
tarmac delays, including a mandate requiring airlines and airports to
submit emergency contingency plans that must describe, among other
things, how they allow passengers to deplane following excessive
delays. Aviation Safety and Investment Act of 2010, H.R. 1586, § 407,
111th Cong. (2009).
[18] 49 U.S.C. § 41712.
[19] 14 C.F.R. § 383.2(A) prescribes penalties for civil violations,
including those under 49 U.S.C. § 41712.
[20] As previously noted, our analysis of the OEP airports excluded
Honolulu International airport because it is outside the 48 contiguous
states. Also, we used ASPM for the individual airport analysis because
its data include both domestic and international flights.
[21] Specifically, FAA found that the average number of scheduled
flights exceeded the airport's average called rate for 11 quarter
hours per day in March 2008; this increased to 18 quarter hours per
day in March 2009.
[22] To corroborate the views of FAA officials, stakeholders, and
experts who told us that recent reductions in delays are likely
associated with the recent declines in the number of flights, we used
ASPM data to run a simple correlation between the number of total
arrivals and delayed arrivals for each month from 2000 through 2009
for the OEP airports (excluding Honolulu). We found that the level of
arrivals and delayed arrivals had a 0.72 level of correlation.
Although this result likely indicates that arrival delays will rise
with increases in arrivals, for several reasons, it should not be
viewed as highly predictive of the exact pattern with which delays
will track arrivals. Many other factors--that we do not account for--
also affect delays at a given airport or set of airports and thus
affect the measured relationship between the number of flights and
delays. As such, we view this analysis as providing some additional
confirmation of the experts' views. For additional information on our
correlation analysis, see appendix III.
[23] FAA calculated the projected increase in capacity by examining
the capacity of the airport--as measured by the annual service volume
(ASV)--before and after the runway projects. Specifically, the ASV is
the number of flights that an airport can handle given a certain level
of delay per flight; in this case, a 7-minute average delay was used.
The increase in capacity was derived by determining the number of
flights the airport could handle before and after the new runway,
holding the average delay per flight of 7 minutes constant.
[24] Taxiway improvement projects at Boston Logan International and
Dallas-Fort Worth International may have also provided delay reduction
benefits by improving the flow of aircraft on the airfield, but delay
reduction estimates are not calculated for these projects. For
example, FAA officials in Boston said that prior to the new taxiway,
the airport's departure queue was one holding line; therefore, if the
first aircraft was being held because of problems in the air traffic
control system, all aircraft within the queue would be delayed.
According to the officials, controllers can stage delayed aircraft out
of the departure queue and onto the new taxiway, thereby reducing the
number of delayed flights.
[25] As previously noted, the airport called rate is the number of
aircraft that an airport can accommodate in a quarter hour given
airport conditions.
[26] Our analysis looked at the number of flights by hour that Chicago
O'Hare could handle in the summer of 2008 versus the summer of 2009.
However, our analysis does not account for any changes that are due to
outside factors, such as weather.
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-934T].
[28] The New York Aviation Rulemaking Committee consisted of
stakeholders representing government, airlines, airports, general
aviation users, and aviation consumers and was tasked with identifying
available options for changing current policy and assessing the
potential impacts of those changes on airlines, airports, and the
traveling public.
[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-934T].
[30] Orders limiting scheduled operations maintain an average of 81
hourly operations at JFK and Newark and 71 hourly operations at
LaGuardia. See 74 Fed. Reg. 51650 (Oct. 7, 2009) (JFK), 74 Fed. Reg.
51648 (Oct. 7, 2009) (Newark), and 74 Fed. Reg. 51653 (Oct. 7, 2009)
(LaGuardia). At all three airports, the orders have extended
limitations on operations through October 29, 2011.
[31] In determining the limits on operations at the three New York
area airports, FAA requested that the airlines provide proposed
schedules for the summer of 2008 without limits on flights. These data
show that carriers suggested that they might have operated more
flights during peak hours, which would have likely increased delays at
these airports.
[32] According to FAA, in addition to 36 initiatives being completed,
30 initiatives are considered ongoing--that is, work is under way to
complete the initiative--while 11 initiatives have been canceled
because the initiative was not clearly defined or is no longer
feasible. In the past, FAA and the DOT Inspector General have
disagreed on the number of initiatives designated as completed. For
example, in October 2009, the DOT Inspector's General report noted
that while FAA reported completing 30 of the 77 initiatives, it found
that 13 of these initiatives required more work, such as making
procedures routinely available or obtaining controller buy-in for use
of the procedure.
[33] Since 2003, airlines have reported the cause of delay to DOT in
one of five broad categories: late-arriving aircraft, airline,
national aviation system, extreme weather, and security. However, as
we reported in GAO-08-934T, these data provide an incomplete picture
of the sources of delay because the categories are too broad to
provide meaningful information on the root causes of delays. For
example, the second largest source of systemwide delay--late-arriving
aircraft--masks the original source of delay. Additionally, since
weather-related delays are captured in different delay categories,
DOT's Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) estimates these delays
by summing extreme weather delays, national aviation system delays
that FAA assigns in OPSNET as caused by weather, and an estimated
portion of weather-related delays from late-arriving aircraft delays
from DOT's ASQP data. Using this calculation, BTS estimated that in
2009, about 42 percent of delayed flights were weather-related delays.
[34] DOT Inspector General. Status Report on Actions Underway to
Address Flight Delays and Improve Airline Customer Service. CC-2008-
058. (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2008).
[35] This analysis was based on airlines' schedules and airport called
rates (i.e., the number of aircraft that an airport can accommodate in
a quarter hour given airport conditions) for 1 day in August 2009. We
considered an airport to be overscheduled in any hourly slot if either
the number of scheduled arrivals or scheduled departures in a given
hour exceeded the called arrival rate or called departure rate,
respectively.
[36] As previously noted, a flight is delayed in OPSNET if while under
FAA's control, it accumulates a delay of 15 minutes or more between
the time that a pilot requests to taxi and the time that the aircraft
takes off or anywhere en route for an aggregate of 15 minutes or more.
[37] While OPSNET captures delays experienced by and attributed to all
FAA facilities, our analysis of OPSNET includes delays attributed to
and experienced by the OEP airports (excluding Honolulu) and its
associated TRACONs. See appendix I for more information on how we
isolated departures and departure delays for our analysis.
Additionally, unless otherwise specified, we combined each airport
with its TRACON to show the total departure delay caused by each
airport and its corresponding TRACON and refer to this combination by
the airport name. These airports and TRACONs represent about 85
percent of the total departure delays within OPSNET.
[38] For our analysis, we grouped the 3 New York airports together to
show the combined contribution to delays of these airports and the New
York TRACON.
[39] Of these 26,000 departure delays, 25 delays were attributed to
Philadelphia's TRACON.
[40] These 7,500 delays do not include the other delays experienced by
Philadelphia that are attributed to other airports.
[41] GAO, FAA Airspace Redesign: An Analysis of the New York/New
Jersey/Philadelphia Project, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-786] (Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2008).
[42] FAA has many ongoing and planned initiatives--such as longer-term
NextGen procedures and technologies--that could also reduce delays,
but these actions are not included in our discussion because they are
not expected to realize delay reduction benefits in the next 2 to 3
years.
[43] 74 Fed. Reg. 2646 (Jan. 15, 2009). According to FAA officials,
the agency is currently working to reduce the number of scheduled
flights to reach its new hourly limit of 71, but still operates at
more than that level in most hours of the day. FAA officials noted
that reaching 71 scheduled hourly operations at LaGuardia may be
difficult to do voluntarily. While hourly limits on scheduled
operations were set at 81 for both JFK and Newark, FAA originally
allowed more than this level in some afternoon hours. FAA continues to
work with airlines at JFK and Newark to reduce the number of flights
where they exceed the hourly limit of 81 scheduled operations at these
airports.
[44] Opportunities to optimize throughput, improve flexibility, enable
fuel-efficient climb and descent profiles, and increase capacity at
the most congested metroplex areas should be a high-priority
initiative in the near term. RTCA NextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task
Force Report. (September 9, 2009). In addition, some elements of
NextGen require aircraft equipage before technologies can be used and
benefits realized. RNAV enables aircraft to fly on any path within
coverage of ground-or space-based navigation aids, permitting more
access and flexibility for point-to-point operations. RNP, like RNAV,
enables aircraft to fly on any path within coverage of ground-or space-
based navigation aids, but also includes an onboard performance-
monitoring capability. RNP also enables closer en route spacing
without intervention by air traffic control and permits more precise
and consistent arrivals and departures.
[45] The 2012 runway is the third project in Phase 1 of the O'Hare
Modernization Program. The first two runway projects were completed in
2008 at Chicago O'Hare.
[46] As mentioned earlier in this report, about 72 percent of delays
attributed to Chicago O'Hare occur at other airports.
[47] DOT Inspector General, Observations On Short-Term Capacity
Initiatives. AV-2008-087 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008).
[48] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Faces
Challenges in Responding to Task Force Recommendations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-188T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28,
2009).
[49] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-786].
[50] According to FAA officials, the agency is in the process of
revising key performance metrics to better track the performance and
the agency may move away from measuring RNAV and RNP procedure
development by counting the number of procedures implemented.
[51] The 2009-2013 FAA Flight Plan Performance Target: NAS On-Time
Arrival is the percentage of all flights arriving at the 35 OEP
airports equal to or less than 15 minutes late, based on the carrier
flight plan filed with FAA (not the airlines' scheduled flight times),
and excludes minutes of delay attributed by airlines to weather,
airline actions, security delays, and prorated minutes for late-
arriving flights at the departure airport.
[52] In addition to delay reduction, FAA also models NextGen program
benefits for safety, environmental, and operational improvements.
Delay reduction is not the agency's only goal, as increasing
throughput, decreasing total travel times and distances, and fuel
savings are all expected benefits of some NextGen programs.
[53] While we reviewed some of FAA's assumptions and analyses, we did
not verify the accuracy of the model. Moreover, the various modeling
efforts under way to estimate the impacts of NextGen technologies are
somewhat preliminary and still under development. At present, FAA
officials told us that the model results do not appear to simulate
current year delays well for some airports, but the focus of the
analysis is on growth rates over time.
[54] FAA officials noted that there could be some inconsistencies
between the results from this model and FAA Airports office estimates
of future capacity and delay because the NextGen modeling may not
reflect detailed information on individual airport capacity needs
developed by the Airports office. Through its report entitled Capacity
Needs in the National Airspace System, 2007-2025 (FACT 2), FAA
identified airports that are forecast to be significantly congested by
2015 and 2025, whether or not currently planned improvements are
carried out. FAA is currently in the process of updating this
analysis. FAA, Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System, 2007-
2025: An Analysis of Airports and Metropolitan Area Demand and
Operational Capacity in the Future (Washington, D.C.: May 2007), a
study prepared by the MITRE Corporation, Center for Advanced Aviation
System Development.
[55] Simultaneous runway approaches allow increased arrival rates on a
given runway configuration when weather conditions are classified as
instrument meteorological conditions.
[56] MITRE is a not-for-profit organization chartered to work in the
public interest. MITRE manages four federally funded research and
development centers, including one for FAA. MITRE has its own
independent research and development program that explores new
technologies and new uses of technologies to solve problems in the
near term and in the future.
[57] Since FAA's ASPM data are not finalized until approximately 90
days after the end of the fiscal year, the data for the last 3 months
of calendar year 2009 (October, November, and December) are current as
of February 26, 2010, and are subject to change.
[58] According to FAA, the 35 OEP airports are commercial airports
with significant activity and were selected in 2000 on the basis of
lists from FAA and Congress as well as a study that identified the
most congested airports in the United States. For purposes of this
report, we excluded the Honolulu International airport; while it is a
large airport, it is outside the 48 contiguous states.
[59] TRACONs provide air traffic control services for airspace within
approximately 40 miles of an airport and generally up to 10,000 feet
above the airport, where en route centers' control begins. For our
analysis, we used FAA's aggregated TRACON data, referred to as the 34
select TRACONs. According to FAA, this group of TRACONs covers the
terminal operations of the 34 OEP airports along with the terminal
operations for airports serving Albuquerque, New Mexico; Nashville,
Tennessee; Indianapolis, Indiana; Kansas City, Missouri; New Orleans,
Louisiana; West Palm Beach, Florida; and Raleigh/Durham, North
Carolina.
[60] This allocation was discussed with officials at FAA's Air Traffic
Control Center Command Center, who agreed that this allocation was the
most accurate way to partition the data. We excluded the traffic
management to delays allocated for the airports for the seven TRACONs
that shared a common identifier with a non-OEP airport from our data
set because these data were outside the scope of our analyses.
[61] Our analysis looked at the correlation between the log function
of arrivals and the log function of delayed arrivals under the
assumption that the relationship between arrivals and delayed arrivals
is not linear.
[62] MITRE is a not-for-profit organization chartered to work in the
public interest. MITRE manages four federally funded research and
development centers, including one for FAA. MITRE has its own
independent research and development program that explores new
technologies and new uses of technologies to solve problems in the
near term and in the future.
[63] According to FAA, using unconstrained schedules to model benefits
can be problematic because of the nonlinear relationship between
growth in flights and delay. Small changes in demand can produce large
changes in model results, which not only produce instability in the
model but also generate a large "benefit" because of delay reduction,
which would be overstated given that the number of flights and delays
would not grow to those levels. Instead, FAA develops limits on demand
based on historic demand-capacity-delay relationships and then "trims"
the schedule at individual airports to keep demand from growing to
unreasonable levels. Because flights to and from these airports start
or end at other airports included in the model, removing flights to
bring down delays at these airports to levels that were consistent
with sustainable aviation operations actually resulted in reduced
flights at nearly all airports included in the modeling. This
"feasible schedule" is used to calculate delay and other performance
statistics and a list of unaccommodated flights that may be valued.
[64] Our analysis looked at the correlation between the log function
of arrivals and the log function of delayed arrivals under the
assumption that the relationship between arrivals and delayed arrivals
is not linear.
[End of section]
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