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entitled 'Military Training: Actions Needed to Further Improve the 
Consistency of Combat Skills Training Provided to Army and Marine 
Corps Support Forces' which was released on April 16, 2010. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

April 2010: 

Military Training: 

Actions Needed to Further Improve the Consistency of Combat Skills 
Training Provided to Army and Marine Corps Support Forces: 

GAO-10-465: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-465, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In conventional warfare, support forces such as military police, 
engineers, and medical personnel normally operate behind the front 
lines of a battlefield. But in Iraq and Afghanistan—both in U.S. 
Central Command’s (CENTCOM) area of responsibility—there is no clear 
distinction between front lines and rear areas, and support forces are 
sometimes exposed to hostile fire without help from combat arms units. 
The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
year 2010 directed GAO to report on combat skills training for support 
forces. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) Army and Marine Corps 
support forces are completing required combat skills training; (2) the 
services and CENTCOM have information to validate completion of 
required training; and (3) the services have used lessons learned to 
adjust combat skills training for support forces. To do so, GAO 
analyzed current training requirements, documentation of training 
completion, and lessons learned guidance; observed support force 
training; and interviewed headquarters officials, trainers, and 
trainees between August 2009 and February 2010. 

What GAO Found: 

Army and Marine Corps support forces undergo significant combat skills 
training, but additional actions could help clarify CENTCOM’s training 
requirements, ensure the services fully incorporate those requirements 
into their training requirements, and improve the consistency of 
training that is being conducted. CENTCOM has issued a list of 
training tasks to be completed, in addition to the services’ training 
requirements, before deploying to its area of operations. However, 
there is confusion over which forces the CENTCOM requirements apply 
to, the conditions under which the tasks are to be trained, and the 
standards for successfully completing the training. As a result, 
interpretations of the requirements vary and some trainees receive 
detailed, hands-on training for a particular task while others simply 
observe a demonstration of the task. In addition, while the Army and 
Marine Corps are training their forces on most of CENTCOM’s required 
tasks, servicemembers are not being trained on some required tasks 
prior to deploying. 
 
While units collect information on the completion of training tasks, 
additional actions would help higher level decision-makers assess the 
readiness of deploying units and servicemembers. Currently, both 
CENTCOM and the services lack complete information on the extent to 
which Army and Marine Corps support forces are completing required 
combat skills training. The Army has recently designated the Digital 
Training Management System as its system of record for tracking the 
completion of required training, but guidance concerning system 
implementation is unclear and the system lacks some needed 
capabilities. As a result, support forces are not fully utilizing the 
system, and are inconsistently tracking completion of individual and 
unit training using paper records, stand-alone spreadsheets, and other 
automated systems. The Marine Corps also uses inconsistent approaches 
to document training completion. Furthermore, as GAO reported in May 
2008, CENTCOM does not have a clearly defined waiver process to 
provide visibility over the extent to which personnel are deploying to 
its area of operations without having completed its required training 
tasks. As a result, CENTCOM and the services have limited visibility 
over the extent to which servicemembers have or have not completed all 
required training. 

While trainers at Army and Marine Corps training sites have applied 
lessons learned information and made significant changes to the combat 
skills training they provide support forces, the changes to training 
have varied across sites. Army and Marine Corps doctrine requires the 
collection of after action reports, the primary formal vehicle for 
collecting lessons learned. Lessons are also shared informally, such 
as through communication between deployed forces and units training to 
replace them. While the services have these formal and informal means 
to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned information, trainers at 
the various training sites are not consistently sharing information 
about the changes they have made to their training programs. As a 
result, servicemembers are trained inconsistently and units that are 
deploying for similar missions sometimes receive different types and 
amounts of training. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is making recommendations to clarify CENTCOM’s training 
requirements, increase visibility over the completion or waiving of 
required training, and improve consistency in the application of 
lessons learned. DOD agreed or partially agreed with all of the seven 
recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-465] or key 
components. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-
9619 or PickupS@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Army and Marine Corps Support Forces Receive Significant Combat Skills 
Training, but May Not Consistently Complete All Required Tasks: 

CENTCOM and the Services Lack Complete Information on Servicemembers' 
Completion of Required Combat Skills Training: 

The Army and Marine Corps Have Made Significant Changes to Combat 
Skills Training as a Result of Lessons Learned, but Information 
Concerning These Changes Is Not Being Consistently Shared: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Organizations Interviewed During Our Review: 

Abbreviations: 

CALL: Center for Army Lessons Learned: 

CENTCOM: United States Central Command: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DTMS: Digital Training Management System: 

HMMWV: high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle: 

MCCLL: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned: 

MRAP: mine resistant ambush protected vehicle: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 16, 2010: 

Congressional Committees: 

Since 2001, the Army and Marine Corps have deployed a large number of 
support forces to U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of 
responsibility to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 
1] Support forces reside in both the active and reserve components and 
include the following: 

* Army support forces consist of: combat support units that provide 
fire support and operational assistance to combat elements and include 
military police, combat engineers, and military intelligence soldiers, 
and combat service support units that provide essential capabilities, 
functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain operating forces 
including soldiers who provide transportation, medical, and 
quartermaster support.[Footnote 2] 

* Marine Corps support forces, known as Logistics Combat Elements, 
represent one of the four elements of a deploying Marine Corps Air 
Ground Task Force and perform tasks such as medical, supply, engineer, 
and transportation.[Footnote 3] 

In conventional warfare conditions, support forces would normally 
operate in rear areas away from the front lines of a battlefield. 
However, the current combat environments in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
demonstrated that there are no clear distinctions between the front 
lines and rear support areas, and support forces are, therefore, at 
times exposed to hostile fire without support from combat arms units. 
[Footnote 4] 

The House Armed Services Committee report to the Fiscal Year 2010 
National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report on a number 
of military readiness issues, including the adequacy of combat skills 
training provided to support forces.[Footnote 5] We have previously 
reported on combat skills training for Air Force and Navy forces, 
[Footnote 6] and will report separately on other issues called for in 
the House report. This report specifically assesses the extent to 
which (1) Army and Marine Corps support forces are completing required 
combat skills training; (2) the services and Central Command have 
information to validate the completion of required combat skills 
training; and (3) the Army and Marine Corps have applied lessons 
learned from operational experiences to adjust combat skills training 
for support forces. 

To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps support forces 
are completing required combat skills training, between August 2009 
and February 2010, we reviewed U.S. Central Command, Army, and Marine 
Corps training requirements and guidance, and we interviewed combatant 
command and service officials to discuss these documents. We also 
observed support force training, interviewed Army and Marine Corps 
trainers, and active and reserve component units participating in 
predeployment training, and analyzed information from training sites. 
Specifically, we conducted discussions with trainers and members of 
four Army active component, five Army Reserve, and one Army National 
Guard support units and three active component Marine Corps combat 
logistics battalions. These units were either conducting training or 
stationed at some of the services' largest training facilities--Fort 
Hood, Fort Dix, Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Twentynine Palms. To 
assess the extent to which the services and Central Command have 
information to validate the completion of required combat skills 
training, we reviewed joint and service guidance to determine the 
requirements for documenting the completion or waiving of training 
requirements. We also interviewed combatant command and service 
headquarters and training command officials as well as members of the 
previously listed Army and Marine Corps units and reviewed service 
documentation concerning the extent to which servicemembers were 
completing required training. To assess the extent to which the Army 
and Marine Corps have applied lessons learned information to adjust 
combat skills training for support forces, we evaluated service 
policies on the collection and dissemination of this information. At 
the sites we visited, we also interviewed training command officials, 
trainers, unit officials in charge of developing training plans, and 
liaisons from the service lessons learned centers. Additionally, we 
discussed the collection and dissemination of lessons learned 
information with officials from the service lessons learned centers 
and we reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of formal lessons learned 
reports they had published. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 through February 
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional 
details on our scope and methodology are in appendix I. 

Background: 

The services and combatant commands both have responsibilities for 
ensuring servicemembers are trained to carry out their assigned 
missions. As a result, both the services and combatant commands have 
developed specific training requirements. 

CENTCOM and Service Responsibilities: 

Combatant commanders and service secretaries both have 
responsibilities related to ensuring the preparedness of forces that 
are assigned to the combatant commands. Under Title 10 of the U.S. 
Code, the commander of a combatant command is directly responsible for 
the preparedness of the command to carry out its assigned missions. In 
addition, according to Title 10 of the U.S. Code, each service 
secretary is responsible for training their forces to fulfill the 
current and future operational requirements of the combatant 
commands.[Footnote 7] In addition, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense has issued guidance for managing and developing training for 
servicemembers. Specifically, DOD issued a directive, which stated the 
services are responsible for developing service training, doctrine, 
procedures, tactics, and techniques, and another that required that 
training resemble the conditions of actual operations and be 
responsive to the needs of the combatant commanders.[Footnote 8] 

Unit Commanders' Responsibilities: 

According to Joint Publication 1, unit commanders are responsible for 
the training and readiness of their units.[Footnote 9] Army and Marine 
Corps guidance also assigns unit commanders responsibility for 
certifying that their units have completed all required training and 
are prepared to deploy. Specifically, Army Regulation 350-1 states 
that unit commanders are responsible for the training proficiency of 
their unit and, when required, for certifying that training has been 
conducted to standard and within prescribed time periods.[Footnote 10] 
In addition, a Department of the Army Executive Order states that, for 
the reserve component, unit commanders, in concert with service 
component commands, certify completion of training and the service 
component command--the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve-- 
validates units for deployment.[Footnote 11] Marine Administrative 
Message 740/07 states that coordination of predeployment training is 
the responsibility of the unit commander and all questions concerning 
the training should be vetted through the commander or his operations 
element.[Footnote 12] Further, unit commanders validate that their 
units are certified for deployment, doing so through a certification 
message that documents the extent to which deploying Marines have 
successfully completed predeployment training.[Footnote 13] 

CENTCOM Training Requirements: 

Combatant commanders have wide-reaching authority over assigned 
forces. In this capacity, CENTCOM has established baseline theater 
entry requirements that include training tasks that all individuals 
must complete before deploying to the CENTCOM area of 
operations.[Footnote 14] Specifically, these CENTCOM training 
requirements include minimum training tasks for both units and 
individuals. Required individual tasks include, but are not limited 
to, basic marksmanship and weapons qualification, high-mobility 
multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and mine resistant ambush 
protected (MRAP) vehicle egress assistance training, non-lethal 
weapons usage, first aid, counter-improvised explosive device 
training, and a number of briefings including rules of engagement. 

Service Training Requirements: 

The services have established combat training requirements that their 
servicemembers must complete at various points throughout their 
careers. During initial entry training, recruits are trained on 
service tasks and skills, including basic military tactics, weapons 
training, and marksmanship. In addition, the services have annual 
training requirements that are focused on tasks such as crew-served 
weapons training, reacting to chemical and biological attacks, and 
offensive and defensive tactics. Prior to deploying overseas, 
servicemembers must also complete a set of service directed 
predeployment training requirements. These predeployment requirements 
incorporate the combatant commander's requirements for the area where 
the forces will be deployed. U.S. Army Forces Command and the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps have both issued training requirements 
for forces deploying to the CENTCOM area of operations or in support 
of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 15] These documents 
also require that units complete a final collective event prior to 
deployment to demonstrate proficiency in collective tasks.[Footnote 16] 

Collection and Dissemination of Lessons Learned: 

Lessons learned are defined as results from an evaluation or 
observation of an implemented corrective action that produced an 
improved performance or increased capability.[Footnote 17] The primary 
vehicle for formally collecting and disseminating lessons learned 
information is the after action report. Army and Marine Corps guidance 
require that units submit after action reports to the services' 
respective lessons learned centers.[Footnote 18] Army Regulation 11-33 
established its Army Lessons Learned Program to create an information 
sharing culture and a system for collecting, analyzing, disseminating, 
integrating, and archiving new concepts, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures. The regulation further assigned the Center for Army 
Lessons Learned (CALL) primary responsibility for the Army Lessons 
Learned Program. The Marine Corps established its Marine Corps Center 
for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) to provide a relevant, responsive source 
of institutional knowledge that facilitates rapid adaptation of 
lessons into the operating forces and supporting establishments. 

The Army and Marine Corps have both formal and informal approaches to 
collect and disseminate lessons learned information. Their formal 
approaches often rely on a wide network of MCCLL and CALL liaison 
officers at training centers and in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the 
centers also publish relevant information on their Web sites to make 
it widely available. The informal networks based on personal 
relationships between unit commanders, trainers, or individual 
soldiers and marines have also facilitated the sharing of lessons 
learned information. 

Prior GAO Work: 

GAO has previously reported on combat skills training provided to 
nonstandard forces.[Footnote 19] In May 2008, we reported that the Air 
Force and Navy waived CENTCOM established training requirements 
without consistently coordinating with the command, so CENTCOM lacked 
full visibility over the extent to which all of its forces were 
meeting training requirements.[Footnote 20] We recommended that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, develop and issue a policy to guide the training and 
use of nonstandard forces, to include training waiver responsibilities 
and procedures. DOD agreed with our recommendation, stating that it 
had work underway to ensure that the necessary guidance was in place 
for effective training of nonstandard forces. However, as of February 
2010, it had not issued such guidance. 

Army and Marine Corps Support Forces Receive Significant Combat Skills 
Training, but May Not Consistently Complete All Required Tasks: 

Although Army and Marine Corps support forces undergo significant 
training, they may not consistently or successfully complete all 
required training tasks prior to deploying. Both CENTCOM and the 
services have issued predeployment training requirements. However, 
some of CENTCOM's training requirements lack associated conditions and 
standards, and confusion exists over which forces the requirements 
apply to. In addition, the Army and Marine Corps have not included 
certain CENTCOM required tasks in their predeployment training 
requirements, and unit commanders can certify their units for 
deployment even if all the required individual and collective training 
tasks have not been successfully completed. 

Army and Marine Corps Support Forces Receive Significant Combat Skills 
Training: 

The services provide combat skills training to their servicemembers, 
including support forces, at various points throughout their careers. 
During initial entry training, recruits are trained on service tasks 
and skills, including basic military tactics, weapons training, and 
marksmanship. In addition, servicemembers participate in annual 
training that is focused on tasks such as crew-served weapons 
training, reacting to chemical and biological attacks, and offensive 
and defensive tactics. Soldiers and marines also participate in combat 
skills training prior to deploying for any overseas operations. As a 
result, the predeployment combat skills training that support unit 
personnel receive should be viewed as a significant piece of their 
training to operate in an asymmetric environment, but not as their 
only training to operate in that environment. 

Some of CENTCOM's Training Requirements Do Not Clearly Define 
Conditions and Standards, and Confusion Exists over to Whom the 
Requirements Apply: 

CENTCOM has issued a list of training tasks that all individuals 
assigned to its area of responsibility, including support unit 
personnel, must complete before deploying in support of ongoing 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the CENTCOM training 
requirements outline tasks that must be trained, the command does not 
always clearly define the conditions and standards to which all of the 
tasks should be trained. Task conditions identify all equipment, 
tools, materials, references, job aids, and supporting personnel 
required to perform the task, while standards indicate the basis for 
judging effectiveness of task performance. For some training tasks, 
CENTCOM includes specific guidance. For example, weapons qualification 
requirements include a detailed discussion of when the qualification 
must take place, equipment that must be worn, and range distances. 

For some training tasks, however, CENTCOM does not provide any 
conditions or standards. For example, as noted above, CENTCOM requires 
that all deploying forces complete HMMWV rollover training, but it 
does not specify how the training should be conducted. Consequently, 
service training has varied within and among the Army and Marine 
Corps. At one Marine Corps site, training officials explained that 
HMMWV rollover training could be completed in less than a half hour. 
On the other hand, trainers at one Army training site noted that their 
HMMWV rollover training consisted of a full day of training that 
included a classroom overview and hands-on practice in a simulator 
with both day and night scenarios, pyrotechnics to simulate improvised 
explosive devices, and the incorporation of casualty evacuation 
procedures. 

For other training tasks, the CENTCOM requirements contain only 
general guidance on training conditions. For example, for some tasks 
such as first aid and improvised explosive device training, CENTCOM 
requires that classroom training be followed up with practical 
application during field training that mimics the harsh, chaotic, and 
stressful conditions servicemembers encounter in the CENTCOM area of 
operations. However, the requirements do not identify the materials or 
training aides to be used in conducting the training and they do not 
indicate the standard for successfully completing the training. While 
service officials acknowledged that, as outlined in Title 10 of the 
U.S. Code,[Footnote 21] it is their responsibility to train 
servicemembers, they stated that CENTCOM's list of minimum theater 
entry training tasks was unclear, which resulted in varying service 
interpretations of the tasks. 

Furthermore, CENTCOM training requirements are communicated to the 
services in a document that also outlines training requirements for 
joint sourced forces.[Footnote 22] Service officials have expressed 
confusion over these training requirements and the extent to which 
they apply to all forces given that the tasks are listed in a document 
that focuses primarily on unit training requirements for joint sourced 
forces. Service officials reported that changes to training 
requirements have also added to the confusion over training 
requirements and priorities. While the latest set of CENTCOM 
requirements contained in the joint sourced forces document was issued 
on May 7, 2009, ground commanders have issued several requirements 
since then.[Footnote 23] For example, in January 2010, the Commander, 
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, issued an order that contained additional 
training requirements for all forces deploying to Afghanistan. 
However, CENTCOM officials said that these Afghanistan-specific 
requirements had not yet been validated. When CENTCOM validates new 
requirements it promulgates them in several different ways, including 
in updates to the training requirements contained in the joint sourced 
forces document, in individual request for forces, or by CENTCOM 
messages. 

The Services Are Providing Training on Most of CENTCOM's Required 
Tasks, but Have Not Included Certain Tasks: 

While the Army and Marine Corps have provided most of the CENTCOM 
required training, in some cases, they have not provided training on 
the specific tasks called for by CENTCOM. For example, neither service 
has provided MRAP vehicle rollover training to all of their support 
forces. MRAP vehicle rollover training has been identified as a key 
combat skill for deploying forces. MRAP vehicles have much larger 
profiles and weights than the vehicles they replaced in theater, and 
as a result, pose a greater risk of tip or rollover when negotiating 
slopes, trenches, ditches, and other obstacles. Further, rollover 
risks are higher in Afghanistan due to uneven terrain and sub-par road 
conditions. 

A November 2009 DOD study on MRAP vehicle rollovers noted that since 
2007, 178 MRAP vehicle mishaps involved some type of rollover that 
resulted in a total of 215 injuries and 11 fatalities.[Footnote 24] 
The study recommended more practice on rollover drills, and CENTCOM 
has required this training for all deploying forces. According to 
Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps is prioritizing MRAP vehicle 
rollover training, and current Marine Corps guidance requires this 
training only for marines expected to utilize MRAP vehicles. However, 
use of these vehicles in theater has been increasing, and officials at 
I Marine Expeditionary Force explained that they are trying to train 
deploying forces to meet the MRAP vehicle rollover training 
requirement. A rollover trainer was originally scheduled to arrive at 
their training area in February 2010, but the delivery has been 
delayed and there is currently not a projected delivery date. 

Army officials explained that they have attempted to meet the CENTCOM 
requirement, but that a lack of MRAP rollover trainers at the Army's 
training bases in the United States has prevented them from fully 
training all forces on this task prior to deployment. In the meantime, 
some support forces are getting required training after they deploy, 
but Army officials were unable to confirm whether all forces were 
getting the required training. 

Moreover, neither the Army nor the Marine Corps have provided non- 
lethal weapons training to all deploying support forces. CENTCOM 
requires that all individuals deploying to its area of responsibility 
complete training in non-lethal weapons usage, planning, and 
understanding of non-lethal weapons capability sets.[Footnote 25] DOD 
reported in December 2009 that operational experience dictates the 
need for forces to be trained in non-lethal weapons and that current 
operations have highlighted the imperative for the discriminate use of 
force to minimize civilian casualties and the integral role that non- 
lethal weapons capabilities provide in achieving that objective. 
[Footnote 26] In that report, DOD noted that non-lethal weapons 
training has been mandated by CENTCOM for all deploying forces and 
that non-lethal weapons training must be further integrated into 
service training. Further, GAO has previously reported that DOD needed 
to provide clearer weapons employment guidance for non-lethal weapons 
and incorporate this guidance into training curricula.[Footnote 27] 
Due to the confusion over what forces CENTCOM's joint sourced training 
requirements apply to, Marine Corps officials explained that they do 
not believe the non-lethal weapons training requirement applies to 
them and do not require this training. The Army requires non-lethal 
weapons training only for combat arms units. Army officials explained 
that they do not have sufficient resources to train all deploying 
forces, including support forces, on non-lethal weapons, but have not 
sought formal waivers for this task. 

Unit Commanders Can Certify Units for Deployment without Successfully 
Completing All Tasks in Their Final Collective Training Event: 

According to Joint Publication 1, unit commanders are responsible to 
their respective Service Chiefs for the training and readiness of 
their unit.[Footnote 28] Service guidance emphasizes this 
responsibility, assigning unit commanders' responsibility for the 
coordination and completion of predeployment training and validating 
that servicemembers are certified for deployment.[Footnote 29] Before 
forces deploy, Army and Marine Corps guidance requires that units 
complete a final collective training event.[Footnote 30] These events 
can vary based on unit type, assigned mission, and the theater of 
operations and provide an opportunity for the unit to demonstrate 
proficiency in collective tasks. 

While service guidance requires that units undergo a final collective 
training event, the guidance does not specifically require that units 
successfully complete the training before commanders can certify their 
units for deployment. Army and Marine Corps officials explained that 
if a support unit does not demonstrate combat skills proficiency 
during the final event, when and where remediation is to occur is left 
to the discretion of the individual unit commander and can be 
completed in theater after deploying. For example, a Marine Corps 
combat logistics battalion that deployed in January 2010 was assessed 
fully trained in its logistics mission, but not proficient in basic 
warrior tasks during its final collective training event at Exercise 
Mojave Viper.[Footnote 31] Specifically, the unit was not proficient 
in fifteen of sixteen warrior tasks including reacting to ambush, 
escalation of force, individual continuing actions, and casualty 
evacuation procedures. The Marine Corps logistics training officer who 
conducts the final unit after action reviews for combat logistics 
battalions explained that poor ratings on basic warrior skills were 
not uncommon for support units during their final collective training 
event. While the unit conducted remedial training on casualty 
evacuation procedures prior to deployment, it did not conduct remedial 
training in other areas, since the unit had 15 days to complete both 
required training that they were unable to accomplish prior to 
Exercise Mojave Viper and remedial training, and the unit deployed on 
time. Service officials explained that it is the responsibility of 
unit commanders to exercise judgment in assessing whether the unit has 
the collective skills needed to accomplish its mission. However, 
without visibility over the completion of remediation, Army and Marine 
Corps support forces may not successfully complete all CENTCOM or 
service required training tasks prior to deploying. 

CENTCOM and the Services Lack Complete Information on Servicemembers' 
Completion of Required Combat Skills Training: 

The Army and Marine Corps take steps to document the completion of 
required combat skills training tasks, but face inconsistencies in the 
way the services track completion of training. While the Army has a 
service-wide system of record for tracking the completion of training 
requirements, the system is not being fully utilized. Furthermore, the 
Marine Corps lacks a service-wide system for tracking the completion 
of training requirements. Instead, both services rely on paper rosters 
and stand-alone spreadsheets and databases to track training 
completion. In addition, even though CENTCOM requires that all forces 
deploying to its area of responsibility complete a set of required 
training tasks, the command lacks a clearly defined process for 
waiving individual training requirements if they cannot be met. 

Unit Commanders Lack Full Visibility over Completion of Required 
Training Tasks Due to Inconsistent Service Tracking Systems: 

According to Joint Publication 1, unit commanders are responsible to 
their respective Service Chiefs for the training and readiness of 
their units.[Footnote 32] Service guidance emphasizes this 
responsibility, assigning unit commanders' responsibility for 
coordinating and completing predeployment training and validating that 
servicemembers are ready for deployment.[Footnote 33] Higher level 
decision-makers, including the higher headquarters elements of the 
units in training, are then responsible for validating the unit 
commanders' assessments. The Army and Marine Corps take slightly 
different approaches to validating units for deployment, particularly 
as it applies to the Army's reserve component. While the Army and 
Marine Corps active components rely heavily on unit commanders to 
validate units and higher headquarter elements, such as brigade and 
division commanders for the Army's active component and the Marine 
Logistics Groups and Marine Expeditionary Forces for the Marine Corps, 
to validate the commander's assessment, the Army's reserve component 
relies heavily on a validation board that convenes at the completion 
of a unit's training at a mobilization training center. However, 
according to Army officials, in the end, the final decision is largely 
based on individual unit commanders' assessments of the readiness of 
their units. 

While the Army issued guidance requiring tracking of training 
completion through a servicewide system, the system has not been fully 
utilized. In December 2009, the Army updated a training regulation and 
required that all individual and collective training tasks be 
documented for soldiers through the Digital Training Management System 
(DTMS) in order to better standardize training.[Footnote 34] Army 
units were required to report completion of certain requirements, such 
as suicide prevention classes and the Army physical fitness test 
tasks, in DTMS prior to the revision of this regulation.[Footnote 35] 
However, the revised regulation designates DTMS as the only authorized 
automated system for managing unit training and requires units to 
track each individual soldier's completion of all required training 
tasks, to include all predeployment individual and collective 
training. The regulation was effective as of January 18, 2010, and 
states that DTMS will be able to provide units with the ability to 
plan, resource, and manage unit and individual training. However, as 
of February 2010, the system was not fully operational, and while 
active component units were able to enter all of their data into DTMS, 
reserve component units were not yet able to do so because of a lack 
of interfaces among existing tracking systems and DTMS. The Army has 
not yet developed a detailed schedule with milestones and resource 
requirements for fully developing the capability for reserve component 
units to input data. Neither has it established milestones for active 
and reserve component units to enter data into the system. 
Furthermore, the guidance does not assign responsibility for ensuring 
compliance and does not make it clear whether previously completed 
training needs to be entered into the system or only training that is 
completed after the January 18, 2010, implementation date. 

The Army's active and reserve components have both begun using DTMS, 
but DTMS is not being fully or consistently used by either component. 
U.S. Army Forces Command officials reported that the capabilities of 
DTMS are fully operational among the active component, but that units 
have not consistently used the system. During our discussions with 
commanders from four active component battalions in February 2010, we 
found that the system, while operational, was not being fully 
utilized. We noted that the battalions used DTMS to different degrees. 
Specifically, two commanders said that their battalions relied on DTMS 
to track training schedules and some tasks, such as weapons 
qualification and physical fitness, but they said that their 
battalions did not track completion of all required tasks down to the 
individual soldier level. The other two battalion commanders noted 
that they did not use DTMS to track completion of any training tasks. 
Overall, none of the four battalions used DTMS the way the Army 
intended it to be used, but emphasized interest in incorporating the 
system into how they track training. First Army officials[Footnote 36] 
reported that DTMS is not fully operational among the reserve 
component. Army officials reported that not all of the individual 
systems the reserve component used to track completion of training 
were interchangeable with DTMS, and as such, the system was not fully 
operational. Moreover, in our discussions with unit commanders from 
five Army Reserve units and one National Guard unit in November 2009, 
we noted that the system was not being utilized. In fact, none of 
those commanders were familiar with DTMS despite the fact that the 
Army had required the entry of suicide prevention classes and the Army 
physical fitness test tasks into DTMS by September 2009. 

Instead of using DTMS, Army support units rely on tools such as paper 
rosters and stand-alone spreadsheets and databases to track completion 
of individual and unit training, and the tools used are not consistent 
among units and commands. For the reserve component, First Army has 
established an Excel spreadsheet, referred to as the Commander's 
Training Tool, to track completion of individual training tasks. 
According to officials, the tool, intended to serve as an "in-lieu-of" 
system until DTMS reached full operational capability, is used as a 
model for tracking systems at the individual mobilization training 
centers. Specifically, officials at one mobilization training center 
told us that they had developed an individualized tracking system 
based on the Commander's Training Tool, but had tailored the system to 
meet the needs of the individual command. Within the active component, 
unit commanders we spoke with noted that they also rely on tools such 
as paper rosters and stand-alone spreadsheets and databases to track 
completion of individual and unit training at the battalion level and 
below, providing regular status updates to the brigade and division 
commanders. Reliance on various inconsistent tracking mechanisms 
instead of the servicewide DTMS limits the visibility unit commanders 
have over completion of required training tasks. 

The Marine Corps also uses inconsistent approaches to track completion 
of required training and relies instead on paper rosters and stand- 
alone spreadsheets for tracking. Specifically, 2nd Marine Logistics 
Group officials said that individual units are responsible for 
tracking completion of individual training and that this tracking is 
completed through large Excel spreadsheets, but that the information 
is regularly reviewed by the Marine Logistics Group. A commander from 
a support unit within the 2nd Marine Logistics Group noted that 
training was tracked and reviewed using Excel spreadsheets. Further, 
the unit's operations officer noted that within the battalion, 
individual training is tracked at the company level, and once a week, 
the information is provided to the battalion operations officer, who 
then briefs the battalion commander on overall percentages of marines 
who have completed the required tasks. 

We also spoke with officials from the 1st Marine Logistics Group who 
noted that the individual units are responsible for tracking the 
completion of both individual and unit training requirements. While 
the 1st Marine Logistics Group provides units with a summary level 
spreadsheet to report the status of the unit training, the individual 
units are responsible for tracking the completion of individual 
training and the Marine Logistics Group does not track the completion 
of individual training. Officials from the 1st Marine Logistics Group 
noted that unit operations officers have visibility over individuals 
and their respective training, and this information is rolled up and 
provided at a high level to the Commanding Officer. 

A commander of a support unit we spoke with noted that his unit used 
the Excel spreadsheet provided by the 1st Marine Logistics Group to 
track completion of individual training requirements, with individual 
tracking being done at the company level. Further, sometimes when 
marines transfer among units, documentation of completed training 
tasks is not provided to the receiving unit. For example, a support 
battalion operations officer we spoke with noted that the battalion 
received many marines throughout the deployment process, but some 
marines arrived without documentation of the training they had 
previously completed. In the absence of a consistent approach to track 
completion of training tasks, the Marine Corps relies on inconsistent 
tracking mechanisms among individual units and commands. These 
inconsistent tools limit the visibility unit commanders have over 
completion of required training tasks, particularly when marines are 
transferred from one unit to another for deployment purposes. 

CENTCOM Lacks a Process for Waiving Training Requirements, Limiting 
the Command's Visibility over Whether Forces Are Completing Required 
Training: 

While CENTCOM has issued a consolidated list of minimum theater entry 
requirements for all individuals deploying to its area of 
responsibility, it has not issued overarching waiver guidance or 
established a formal process for waiving each of these requirements 
(e.g., basic marksmanship and weapons qualification, law of land 
warfare, and HMMWV and MRAP vehicle egress assistance training) in 
circumstances where the requirements are not going to be met. However, 
CENTCOM officials provided an example of a case where waiver 
requirements for one specific task were outlined. In September 2007, 
the command issued a message requiring HMMWV egress assistance 
training for all forces deploying to its area of 
responsibility.[Footnote 37] This requirements message included steps 
the services needed to take to waive the requirement in the event that 
the training could not be completed by 100 percent of the deploying 
personnel before deployment. However, a similar waiver process is not 
outlined for other required CENTCOM tasks. 

Officials from both the Army and Marine Corps noted that there are 
instances where servicemembers are not completing all of the required 
training. Specifically, when we spoke to unit commanders and unit 
training officers, we were told that some personnel were not meeting 
these individual training requirements and that units were not 
requesting formal waivers from CENTCOM or communicating this 
information to CENTCOM. For example, an operations officer from a 
Marine Corps' combat logistics battalion reported that some of the 
unit's deploying marines would not complete their required individual 
training tasks, such as the CENTCOM-required MRAP vehicle egress 
training.[Footnote 38] Moreover, the commander of an active component 
Army support battalion noted that in validating his unit for 
deployment, he did not focus on completion of individual tasks, 
instead assessing the unit's ability to complete tasks collectively. 
As such, the unit commander's decision was not based on whether all 
individuals completed all of the required individual training tasks. 
There is no clearly defined process for waiving these training 
requirements, and there is no clear or established method for the 
services to report to CENTCOM that some servicemembers are not 
completing CENTCOM's required training. As a result, CENTCOM cannot 
determine if additional training is required following arrival in 
theater. 

In May 2008, we reported that the Air Force and Navy implemented 
procedures for waiving CENTCOM-required training without fully 
coordinating with the CENTCOM headquarters office responsible for 
developing the training requirements.[Footnote 39] Specifically, we 
reported that Navy nonstandard forces that completed Navy combat 
skills training more than 90 days prior to their deployment would 
normally have to update their training by repeating the course, but 
that they could waive this requirement if they completed relevant 
combat skills training that significantly exceeded what they would 
have received in the Navy course. We further reported that the Air 
Force granted waivers for combat skills training on a case-by-case 
basis. At the time, CENTCOM officials noted that the services had not 
consistently coordinated these waiver policies with their command. 
Therefore, CENTCOM did not have full visibility over the extent to 
which its assigned forces had met its established training 
requirements. At the time, we recommended that the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense develop a policy to guide the training and use of 
nonstandard forces, and the policy include training waiver 
responsibilities and procedures. In February 2010, an official from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense reported that they planned to 
issue a revised policy on non-standard forces by the end of the year, 
and that the revised guidance would address the issue of granting 
waivers. Furthermore, during our review, we learned that CENTCOM's 
lack of visibility applies to a larger population of forces than just 
the Air Force and Navy nonstandard forces, instead applying to all 
forces deploying to the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 

The Army and Marine Corps Have Made Significant Changes to Combat 
Skills Training as a Result of Lessons Learned, but Information 
Concerning These Changes Is Not Being Consistently Shared: 

The Army and Marine Corps have made significant changes to their 
combat skills training for support forces as a result of lessons 
learned, but the services have not uniformly applied lessons learned. 
Both the Army and Marine Corps require the collection of lessons 
learned information, and each service relies on formal and informal 
collection methods to obtain relevant information. While it can take 
time to incorporate lessons learned into service doctrine, service 
training facilities are often able to utilize lessons learned to 
adjust their training almost immediately. However, training facilities 
do not consistently share information obtained as a result of lessons 
learned or share changes made to training as a result of lessons 
learned among other facilities, resulting in servicemembers being 
trained inconsistently. As such, support forces have been deploying 
for similar missions with different training. 

The Army and Marine Corps Have Incorporated Changes from Lessons 
Learned into Training and Deployment Preparation: 

The Army and Marine Corps collect lessons learned information through 
both formal and informal processes, and they have made significant 
changes to their training and deployment preparations as a result of 
this information. Army and Marine Corps doctrine require the formal 
collection of lessons learned and designate after action reports as 
the primary vehicle for this formal collecting of lessons learned 
information.[Footnote 40] Trainers and units noted that they prepare 
after action reports at several different times including after final 
collective training exercises and during and after deployment. 
Depending on the complexity of the deficiency that is addressed in an 
after action report and the resources required to address the 
deficiency, it can sometimes take considerable time to see actions 
that result from formal after action reports. However, after action 
reports have resulted in changes to the way the services train and 
deploy their forces, as the following examples illustrate. 

* In July 2009, the Marine Corps officially established and began 
training Female Engagement Teams, small detachments of female marines 
whose goal was to engage Afghan women. The concept of a Female 
Engagement Team was first introduced in February 2009 as part of a 
special operations mission in Afghanistan. An after action report 
emphasizing the need for forces to be organized and trained to engage 
Afghan women was submitted in response to an incident in May 2009, in 
which the enemy escaped dressed as women because male Marines were not 
allowed to engage Afghan women. As a result, the Marine Corps expanded 
the use of the Female Engagement Team concept, developing an actual 
program and implementing a training plan. In December 2009, U.S. 
Forces-Afghanistan released a memorandum that emphasized the need for 
increased training and use of Female Engagement Teams.[Footnote 41] 
Prior to that time, the use of Female Engagement Teams was primarily a 
Marine Corps effort. However, the memorandum stated that all services 
should create these teams, and since the memorandum was issued, 
officials noted that the Army has begun to assess how it can best meet 
the needs in theater for these teams with its available personnel. 

* In November 2009, the 1st Marine Logistics Group established and 
conducted a new predeployment training course for support forces that 
focused on combat logistics patrols. The course was developed in 
response to at least two different units' after action reports, one 
submitted by a unit returning from Afghanistan and another submitted 
by a unit undergoing final predeployment training, which highlighted 
the need for leaders of support units to receive additional training 
and experience with combat patrols. The redeploying unit's after 
action report identified shortcomings in how support units conducting 
convoy missions outside of forward operating bases were trained, and 
the unit undergoing final training's after action report identified 
deficiencies in the amount of time spent on training. The new 5-day 
course--the Combat Logistics Patrol Leaders Course--focuses on 
providing support units with the skills they need to conduct combat 
logistics patrols, which require support forces to leave protected 
areas where they can become the target for enemies, as opposed to 
simply convoy missions conducted inside protected forward operating 
bases. 

The services also rely on lessons collected through informal means 
when adjusting predeployment training. Informal collection methods 
include obtaining feedback from units currently deployed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan through informal discussions, observations made by 
trainers or deploying unit leaders during brief visits to theater, and 
informal conversations among personnel within service commands and 
training organizations. Army and Marine Corps officials stated that 
there is regular communication between personnel who are deployed in 
theater and the personnel who are preparing to deploy to replace them. 
Furthermore, they said that the deployed personnel often provide vital 
information regarding the current conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
which the deploying unit commander and trainers can use to make 
immediate adjustments to training. Much like changes made as a result 
of formal lessons learned, the informal collections have also resulted 
in changes to the way the services train and deploy their forces, as 
the following examples illustrate. 

* An Army installation established an Individual Replacement Training 
program to provide individual replacement soldiers with the combat 
skills needed to join their parent units in theater. Army officials 
noted that approximately 2 years ago, certain units were tasked to 
train these individual replacements on a 4-to 5-month rotating basis. 
However, the units that conducted the training were unable to keep 
pace with the flow of individual replacements because of their high 
pace of operations. Based on feedback obtained from the units and 
observations by unit leadership, Army civilians were assigned 
responsibility for the training, which resulted in the Individual 
Replacement Training program. As of 2009, the Individual Replacement 
Training program trained approximately 3,400 soldiers, and combat 
skills have been trained more consistently. 

* Since improvised explosive devices are commonly used against 
military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, training regarding the defeat 
of these devices is a CENTCOM predeployment training requirement and 
was cited as a key focus at the training facilities we visited. 
Officials we spoke with explained that improvised explosive devices 
pose a serious threat to military forces because the types of devices 
the enemies use constantly change. While training facilities have 
incorporated the most recent improvised explosive device defeat 
tactics into their training based on information provided by the Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization,[Footnote 42] they 
also obtain and immediately incorporate the tactics provided 
informally by individuals in theater. 

The Services Would Benefit from Sharing Changes Made as a Result of 
Lessons Learned: 

Trainers at the sites we visited told us that they had made 
adjustments to training based on both informal and formal lessons 
learned information that they had received. However, they also told us 
that they did not consistently share information about the adjustments 
they had made with other sites that were training forces on the same 
tasks, and even in cases where the information was shared, there were 
still some differences in the training that was being provided to 
deploying support forces. For example: 

* One site significantly enhanced its HMMWV rollover training based on 
informal feedback. Specifically, the training was enhanced to include 
hands-on practice in a simulator with both day and night and land and 
water scenarios, as well as an emphasis on new vehicle features, such 
as the dual release seatbelts, when exiting the vehicle in an 
emergency. While trainers from this site provided information about 
these enhancements to some of their counterparts at other training 
facilities, HMMWV rollover training varies significantly from site to 
site. At one of the sites we visited, HMMWV rollover training 
consisted simply of a short demonstration. 

* At one training site we visited, trainers were teaching Army Reserve 
support forces who had not been mobilized specific tactics for 
entering and clearing buildings, while other trainers at the same site 
were teaching soldiers who had been mobilized different tactics for 
the same task. Officials we spoke with stated that these differences 
in tactics are a result of a lack of sharing of information among 
trainers. Specifically, the First Army trainers who were training 
soldiers after mobilization were not consistently sharing information 
with U.S. Army Reserve trainers who were training soldiers prior to 
mobilization. Since one of the primary purposes for conducting 
repetitive training is to develop an intuitive response to certain 
circumstances, repetitive training that employs different tactics may 
not be as effective as repetitive training that uses consistent 
tactics. 

Although officials at the training facilities we visited note that 
they have made efforts to share some of the information obtained and 
subsequent changes made as a result of lessons learned with their 
counterparts at other training facilities, the sharing has been 
inconsistent. According to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction, organizations participating in the joint lessons learned 
program are to coordinate activities and collaboratively exchange 
observations, findings, and recommendations to the maximum extent 
possible.[Footnote 43] While the services have formal and informal 
means to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned information, 
trainers at the various training sites are not consistently sharing 
information about the changes they have made to their training 
programs. As a result, servicemembers are trained inconsistently and 
units that are deploying for similar missions sometimes receive 
different types and amounts of training. 

Conclusions: 

U.S. forces deployed to CENTCOM's area of responsibility, including 
support forces, are operating in an environment that lacks clear 
distinctions between the front lines and rear support areas. As a 
result, support units such as military police, engineers, and medical 
personnel may be exposed to hostile fire and other battlefield 
conditions. The Army, Marine Corps, and CENTCOM continue to emphasize 
the importance of training and have identified specific tasks to be 
accomplished as part of predeployment training that they believe will 
better prepare forces to operate in the current operational 
environment. While forces clearly undergo significant training, 
clarifying CENTCOM's training requirements, including more clearly 
defining the specific tasks to be completed by different types of 
forces and the conditions and standards for the content of training, 
would enhance the service's ability to ensure that forces are 
consistently trained on required tasks. Furthermore, in order to make 
informed decisions on deploying forces and assigning missions once 
deployed, the services and CENTCOM need information on the extent of 
training completed by forces prior to deployment. Inconsistencies in 
existing approaches for documenting the completion of training and the 
lack of a formal process for granting waivers to training and 
communicating waiver decisions hamper the services and CENTCOM in 
their ability to get a clear picture of which units or individuals 
have been fully trained for certain missions and whether any 
capability gaps might exist upon the forces' arrival in theater. Last, 
the services are making significant adjustments in training regimens 
based on captured lessons learned from actual operational experiences. 
However, additional efforts to share information on these adjustments 
among and within training facilities would provide greater assurance 
that the training is consistent. 

Recommendations: 

To improve the consistency of training, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense: 

* direct the commander, U.S. Central Command to: 

- clarify which of the command's mandatory training requirements apply 
to all forces deploying to CENTCOM's area of responsibility and which 
requirements apply only to joint sourced forces, and clearly 
communicate this information to the services. 

- clearly outline the conditions under which CENTCOM's mandatory 
training requirements are to be accomplished and the standards to 
which the tasks should be trained. 

* direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps to: 

- include all of CENTCOM's minimum training requirements in their 
service training requirements. 

To improve commanders' visibility over the extent to which support 
forces are completing required combat skills training, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to 
fully implement the service's system of record for tracking training 
completion--the Digital Training Management System by (1) developing a 
schedule for fully implementing the system, including the work to be 
performed and the resources to be used, and (2) including the actual 
start and completion dates of work activities performed so that the 
impact of deviations on future work can be proactively addressed. We 
further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commandant 
of the Marine Corps to establish and fully implement consistent 
approaches for documenting the completion or waiving of combat skills 
training requirements. We are also broadening our prior recommendation 
on waiver oversight and recommending that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the commander, U.S. Central Command, to establish a formal 
process for waiving training requirements for all deploying forces, 
not just nonstandard forces, and to communicate this process to the 
services. 

To maintain training consistency as training evolves in response to 
ongoing operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to 
develop a method for consistently sharing information concerning 
changes that are made to training programs in response to formal or 
informal lessons learned. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or 
partially concurred with our recommendations. Specifically, DOD 
concurred with our six recommendations related to the definition, 
completion, and waiver of training requirements, and sharing 
information on changes to training based on lessons learned. DOD 
stated that it has inserted draft language into its 2010 update to the 
"Guidance for the Development of the Force" and its draft DOD 
Instruction 1322.mm entitled "Implementing DOD Training" to address 
our recommendations. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to fully implement the 
Digital Training Management System (DTMS)--the service's system of 
record for tracking training completion--by (1) developing a schedule 
for fully implementing the system, including the work to be performed 
and the resources to be used, and (2) including the actual start and 
completion dates of work activities performed so that the impact of 
deviations on future work can be proactively addressed. In its 
comments, DOD stated that the Army's training management system of 
record has been directed to be implemented and that in order to fully 
leverage this capability, it will take time, training and resources to 
extend the system to the entire organization. Instead of stipulating 
DTMS, DOD requested that GAO address (in our recommendation) more 
generally the Army's training management system of record. We 
recognize that it will take time for the Army to fully implement the 
system, but also note that it has not set a specific schedule, with 
key elements, such as work to be performed, resources needed, and 
milestones for start and completion of activities, which we believe 
will add discipline to the process, help guide its efforts, and help 
the Army to plan for any schedule deviations. We recognize that the 
Army continues to refine DTMS and that changes could occur. However, 
at this point in time, Army guidance specifically characterizes DTMS 
as the Army's training management system of record; therefore, we do 
not agree that our recommendation should be adjusted. 

Furthermore, DOD stated that some findings in the draft report are 
partially accurate, but that a number of points of information and 
clarification related to DTMS provided by the Department of the Army 
do not appear in the findings. For example, DOD noted that ongoing 
efforts by the Army designed to improve DTMS will expand existing 
functionality and interfaces to enhance and broaden operational use of 
the application by Army units. It noted the Army has a review process 
that, among other things, monitors progress of DTMS implementation and 
allows for the establishment and approval of priorities for developing 
interfaces with other existing legacy systems and manual processes. In 
addition, DOD stated that the report cites that DTMS is not fully 
operational because all interfaces are not completed to the 
satisfaction of a subordinate organization, which, in DOD's view, does 
not drive the level of program functionality or define the point in 
time when the system is fully operational. DOD noted that the 
inclusion of updated interfaces enables data input from other sources 
and that the basic functionality of DTMS is in place, operational, and 
available for use by units across the Army. DOD also noted some Army 
units are still using spreadsheets and/or legacy systems to track 
individual training rather than DTMS, but that this is a function of 
compliance, not operational capability or the availability of system 
interfaces. It further stated that the Army is currently working to 
institute methods to improve compliance as outlined in AR 350-1, the 
Army's regulation that guides training.[Footnote 44] 

We recognize that the basic functionality of DTMS exists and that the 
Army is continuing to take steps to implement DTMS, improve the 
interfaces between DTMS and legacy systems and processes, and improve 
overall compliance with the requirement for units to report in DTMS. 
However, our work suggests that it is not only a lack of compliance 
preventing full utilization of the system, but also a lack of 
awareness among all of the operational units that DTMS even exists. 
For example, within the reserve component, some unit commanders we 
interviewed were unfamiliar with DTMS or that they were required, by 
Army guidance, to use the system to report training completion. 
Further, while we recognize interfaces exist, our work shows they are 
not fully mature to the point where they are compatible with existing 
tracking systems, thereby limiting the ability of the reserve 
component to fully use DTMS as intended. 

DOD further noted that the report infers that DTMS could or should be 
the source for CENTCOM and the Army to certify and/or validate unit 
training for deployments, but due to it not being fully utilized, the 
completion of combat skills training could be in question. DOD 
explained that DTMS is a training management system, and it is the 
responsibility of Commanders and Army Service Component Commands to 
certify and validate units. As stated in our report, we recognize that 
commanders and the service component commands are responsible for the 
certification and validation of units for deployment. However, in 
order to be more fully informed about the training and readiness 
status of units before making decisions about deployments, those 
making these decisions need visibility over the completion of the 
combatant command and service pre-deployment training requirements. 
Currently, DTMS does not provide unit commanders or service component 
commands with this type of visibility, and therefore, these 
individuals and commands must rely on the tracking mechanisms we 
outlined in this report when certifying and validating units, and 
these tracking mechanisms are not always complete or consistent. The 
full text of DOD's written comments is reprinted in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense. In 
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report 
are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Sharon L. Pickup, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Howard McKeon: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the extent to which Army and Marine Corps support forces are 
completing required combat skills training, we reviewed combatant 
commander and service individual and unit predeployment training 
requirements, including CENTCOM's Theater Entry Requirements, the U.S. 
Army Forces Command's Predeployment Training Guidance for Follow-on 
Forces Deploying In Support of Southwest Asia, and Marine Corps Order 
3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process. To determine if the 
services were fully addressing the CENTCOM minimum requirements, we 
compared the CENTCOM minimum training requirements to the Army and 
Marine Corps minimum requirements, making linkages where possible and 
obtaining service explanations when linkages did not appear to exist. 
We also reviewed policy documents on service training, such as the 
services' common skills manuals and training programs of instruction. 
Additionally, we interviewed and analyzed information from officials 
responsible for developing and implementing training requirements at 
CENTCOM, Department of the Army Training Directorate, U.S. Army Forces 
Command, First Army, U.S. Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve 
Command, Marine Corps Training and Education Command, and Marine 
Forces Command. Lastly, we observed support force training at four of 
the Army and Marine Corps' largest training facilities--Fort Dix, Camp 
Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Base. At 
the training sites, we interviewed and collected various training-
related documents from Army and Marine Corps active and reserve 
component units participating in predeployment training as well as 
training command officials on the implementation of service training 
guidance. We also obtained information from Army active component 
support forces stationed at Fort Hood. 

To assess the extent to which the services and Central Command have 
information to validate the completion of required combat skills 
training, we reviewed Army and Marine Corps policies on training, 
including Army Regulation 350-1, which outlines requirements for 
servicewide tracking through the Digital Training Management System, 
and Marine Corps Order 3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process. 
We also coordinated with the U.S. Army Audit Agency regarding their 
ongoing efforts in reviewing the Digital Training Management System. 
We interviewed service headquarters officials to discuss the processes 
the services use to track completion of training requirements. We 
reviewed Joint Publication 1, and other joint and service policies 
that document the role and responsibilities of unit commanders in 
tracking and reporting completion of training requirements. We 
interviewed Department of the Army Training Directorate, Marine Corps 
Training and Education Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, Marine 
Forces Command, First Army, and U.S. Army Reserve Command officials 
and reviewed documents from these commands, which are involved in the 
process of tracking the completion of combat skills training. 
Additionally, we interviewed an Army training command and the 1st, 
2nd, and 4th Marine Corps Logistics Groups to discuss the processes 
used to track completion of training requirements at the unit level. 
We reviewed the means these organizations use to document the extent 
to which servicemembers were completing required training--paper 
records, automated spreadsheets, and databases. We further interviewed 
thirteen unit commanders of units preparing to deploy or returning 
from deployment to identify individual processes being used to track 
completion of training requirements. Lastly, we interviewed and 
obtained information from officials representing CENTCOM, Army and 
Marine Corps headquarters, and the Army and Marine Corps force 
providers and training commands to discuss the processes the services 
use to waive service and combatant command training requirements. We 
also reviewed past related GAO reports regarding the tracking and 
waiving of training requirements. 

To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have applied 
lessons learned from operational experiences to adjust combat skills 
training for support forces, we reviewed service policies on the 
collection and dissemination of lessons learned, specifically Army 
Regulation 11-33 for the Army Lessons Learned Program and Marine Corps 
Order 3504.1 for the Marine Corps Lessons Learned Program and the 
Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. These policies, which 
establish the services' lessons learned centers, also require the 
collection of after action reports. Further, we reviewed joint 
guidance to determine whether requirements existed for the training 
facilities and services to collaborate and share lessons learned 
information. We interviewed and obtained information on the collection 
and implementation of lessons learned from officials representing the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Marine Corps Center for 
Lessons Learned. We also interviewed lessons learned liaisons, 
training command officials, trainers, and officials responsible for 
developing unit training plans at five of the Army and Marine Corps' 
largest training sites--Fort Hood, Fort Dix, Camp Lejeune, Camp 
Pendleton, and Twentynine Palms. While interviewing officials from the 
lessons learned centers and the training facilities, discussions 
included: the use of various lessons learned to alter and improve 
predeployment training; the types of products the centers create and 
distribute; and the extent to which trainers shared the information 
among training sites. Based on these discussions with lessons learned 
officials, we identified and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of the 
formal lessons learned reports and handbooks that applied specifically 
to training for support forces. We also reviewed past related GAO and 
DOD reports regarding lessons learned. 

To gain insight on support forces' perspectives on completion of 
combatant command and service combat skills training requirements, we 
conducted discussions with five Army Reserve and one Army National 
Guard support units--military intelligence, movement control, combat 
camera, medical, and human resources--located at the combined pre-and 
post-mobilization training center Fort Dix, New Jersey, and three 
active component Marine Corps combat logistics battalions from the two 
Marine Corps Divisions located in the continental United States that 
were preparing to deploy to either Iraq or Afghanistan, as well as 
four of Fort Hood's active component Army support battalions that have 
recently returned from deployment. To conduct these discussion 
sessions, we traveled to one Army installation and three Marine Corps 
installations in the continental United States from August 2009 
through December 2009 and conducted telephone discussions with 
representatives from one active duty Army installation in February 
2010. In selecting units to speak with, we asked the service 
headquarters and force providers to identify all support units that 
would be in pre-mobilization or predeployment training during the time 
frame of our visit. The basic criteria used in selecting these units 
was that they were an Army or Marine Corps support unit participating 
in pre-mobilization or predeployment training and preparing to deploy 
to or recently redeployed from either Iraq or Afghanistan. Thus, our 
selection was limited since the time frame was so narrow. Once units 
were identified, we spoke with the unit command elements and senior 
enlisted servicemembers from nine support units that were available at 
the individual sites we visited. Overall, we spoke with Army and 
Marine Corps support units preparing to deploy to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and within these units, some servicemembers who had 
previously deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. We also spoke with four 
available active component Army support unit representatives who had 
recently returned from Iraq. Topics of discussion during the sessions 
included development and implementation of unit training plans, 
verification of training completion, and equipment and manning 
challenges that impact training. We also administered a short 
questionnaire to participants in the senior enlisted discussion 
sessions to obtain their feedback on the combat skills training their 
unit received. Comments provided during the discussion groups, as well 
as on the questionnaire, cannot be projected across the entire 
military community because the participants were not selected using a 
generalizable probability sampling methodology. To validate 
information we heard in the discussion groups, we interviewed the 
unit's higher headquarters, where available, as well as officials from 
the training commands and service headquarters and force providers. 

Table 1 outlines all of the organizations we interviewed during the 
course of our review. 

Table 1: Organizations Interviewed During Our Review: 

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness), 
Arlington, Va. 

U.S Army: 

* Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 
Plans (G-3), Arlington, Va. 

* Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 

* Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Va. 

* U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va. 

* U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga. 

* U.S. Army Audit Agency, Alexandria, Va. 

* First Army, Fort Gillem, Ga. 

* U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Ga. 

* Army National Guard, Arlington, Va. 

* Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 

* Fort Dix, N.J. 

- 72nd Field Artillery Brigade. 

- Regional Training Center-East. 

- New Jersey National Guard. 

- Center for Army Lessons Learned Representatives. 

- Select Support Units. 

* Fort Hood, Tex. 

- Individual Replacement Training Team. 

- Centers for Army Lessons Learned Representatives. 

- Select Support Units. 

U.S. Marine Corps: 

* Headquarters Marine Corps, Arlington, Va. 

* Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Quantico, Va. 

* Marine Forces Command, Norfolk, Va. 

* Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Quantico, Va. 

* Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force Training Command and Tactical 
Training Exercise Control Group, Twentynine Palms, Calif. 

* I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, Calif. 

* II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C. 

* 1st Marine Logistics Group, Camp Pendleton, Calif. 

* 2nd Marine Logistics Group, Camp Lejeune, N.C. 

* 4th Marine Logistics Group, New Orleans, La. 

U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fl. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 through February 
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Personnel And Readiness: 
4000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-4000: 

March 24, 2010: 

Ms. Sharon L. Pickup: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Pickup: 

This is the Department of Defense Response to the Government 
Accountability Office Draft report titled: Actions Needed To Further 
Improve the Consistency of Combat Skills Training Provided for Army 
and Marine Corps Support Forces (GAO 10-465.) We thank you for the 
opportunity to comment. Regarding the recommendations, we concur with 
items 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8. We partially concur with items 4 and 5. 
Elaboration on these positions is in the enclosure appended to this 
letter. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Samuel D. Kleinman: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: 
Readiness: 

[End of letter] 

Enclosure: 

GAO Draft Report Dated March 1, 2010: 

GA0-10-465 (GAO CODE 351385): 

"Military Training: Actions Needed To Further Improve The Consistency 
Of Combat Skills Training Provided To Army And Marine Corps Support 
Forces" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Commander, U.S. Central Command to clarify which of the 
command's mandatory training requirements apply to all forces 
deploying to U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM's) area of responsibility 
and which requirements apply only to joint sourced forces, and clearly 
communicate this information to the services. (See page 28/GAO Draft 
Report.) 

DoD Response: Concur. Delineating training requirements between joint 
sourced forces and all forces deploying to CENTCOM will streamline 
minimum theatre training requirements for sourced personnel. Draft 
language to that effect has been inserted into 2010 update to 
'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' In addition, similar 
language specifying CCDRs clarify and update their requirements is 
added to the draft DoDI 1322.mm, Implementing DoD Training. Stipulated 
training requirements should be vetted through the Joint Staff with 
collaboration from CENTCOM and the Services for final disposition. 
Recommend item be closed. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Commander, U.S. Central Command to clearly outline the 
conditions under which CENTCOM's mandatory training requirements are 
to be accomplished and the standards to which the tasks should be 
trained. (See page 28/GAO Draft Report.) 

DoD Response: Concur. Draft language to that effect has been inserted 
into 2010 update to 'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' Draft 
language to that effect has been inserted to the draft DoDI 1322.mm, 
Implementing DoD Training. Stipulated training requirements should be 
vetted through the Joint Staff with collaboration from CENTCOM and the 
Services for final disposition. Recommend item be closed. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps to include all of CENTCOM's minimum training requirements in 
their training requirements. (See page 28/GAO Draft Report.) 

DoD Response: Concur. Draft language to that effect has been inserted 
into 2010 update to 'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' Draft 
language to that effect has been inserted into the draft DoDI I322.mm, 
Implementing DoD Training Stipulated training requirements should be 
vetted through the Joint Staff with collaboration from CENTCOM and the 
Services for final disposition. Recommend item be closed. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to fully implement the service's 
system of record for tracking training completion-the Digital Training 
Management System by developing a schedule for fully implementing the 
system, including the work to be performed and the resources to be 
used. (See pages 28 & 29/GAO Draft Report.) 

DoD Response: Partially concur. Army's training management system of 
record has been directed to be implemented. In order to fully leverage 
this capability, it will take time, training and resources to extend 
the system to the entire organization. Instead of stipulating Digital 
Training Management System specifically, DoD requests that GAO 
address, more generally, the Army's training management system of 
record. The Army states that the report narrative and recommendations 
#4 & #5 are not supportive of each other. The recommendations 
currently state that the Secretary of Defense needs to direct the 
Secretary of the Army to fully implement the Digital Training 
Management System (DTMS) by developing a schedule to fully implement 
the system, including the work to be performed and the resources to be 
used, and identifying the actual start and completion dates of work 
activities performed so that the impact of deviations on future work 
can be addressed. 

(1) Some of the findings in the draft report are partially accurate; 
however, a number of Digital Training Management System points of 
information/clarification provided by the Department of the Army to 
the audit team do not appear in the findings. Army requests these 
points be integrated into the final report. 

(2) Ongoing efforts by the Army designed to improve DTMS will expand 
existing functionality and interfaces to enhance and broaden 
operational use of the application by Army units LAW AR 350-1. The 
Army conducts a semi-annual DIMS Requirements Control Board (RCB) 
governed by the G-3/5/7 Training General Officer Steering Committee 
(TGOSC). This review process will continue to monitor the progress of 
DTMS implementation throughout the Army. This process allows the RCB 
and TGOSC to establish and approve priorities for developing 
interfaces with other existing legacy systems and manual processes. 
Additionally, this process supports the addition of functional modules 
to DTMS that better support the training information desires of 
individual commands. DTMS developments and improvements do compete for 
resources and operate within that constraint. DIMS is an Army 
developed Training Management System designed to support unit level 
training management, individual training records and managing unit 
level training. The application is, however, limited to the 
capabilities defined in support of Army Training Management and may 
not meet every need or desire across the spectrum of units within the 
Army. 

(3) Some Army units (not limited to support units) are still using 
spreadsheets and/or legacy systems to track individual training rather 
than using DIMS is a function of compliance, not operational 
capability or the availability of system interfaces. The Army is 
currently working to institute methods to improve compliance IAW AR 
350-1. 

(4) The report cites that DTMS is not fully operational because all 
interfaces are not completed to the satisfaction of a subordinate 
organization. This does not drive the level of program functionality 
or define the point in time when it is fully operational. The 
inclusion of updated interfaces enables data input from other sources. 
The basic functionality of the application is in place, operational, 
and is available for use by units across the Army. 

(5) The report infers that DTMS could or should be the source for 
CENTCOM and the Army to certify/validate unit training for 
deployments, but due to it not being fully utilized, the completion of 
combat skills training could be in question. DIMS is a training 
management system; Commanders and Army Service Component Commands 
certify/validate units. 

Recommend item be closed. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to fully implement the service's 
system of record for tracking training completion-the Digital Training 
Management system by including the actual start and completion dates 
of work activities performed so that the impact of deviations on 
future work can be proactively addressed. (See page 29/GAO Draft 
Report.) 

DoD Response: Partially concur. See notes in response to 
recommendation 4. Recommend item be closed. 

RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to establish and fully 
implement consistent approaches for documenting the completion or 
waiving of combat skills training requirements. (See page 29/GAO Draft 
Report.) 

DoD Response: Concur. Draft language to that effect has been inserted 
into 2010 update to 'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' Draft 
language to that effect has been inserted into the draft DoDI 1322.mm, 
Implementing DoD Training Stipulated training requirements should be 
vetted through the Joint Staff with collaboration from CENTCOM and the 
Services for final disposition. Recommend item be closed. 

Recommendation 7: The GAO is broadening their prior recommendation on 
waiver oversight and recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to establish a formal process for 
waiving training requirements for all deploying forces, not just 
nonstandard forces, and to communicate this process to the services. 
(See page 29/GAO Draft Report.) 

DoD Response: Concur. Draft language to that effect has been inserted 
into 2010 update to 'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' Draft 
language to that effect has been inserted into the draft DoDI 1322.mm, 
Implementing DoD Training. Stipulated training requirements should be 
vetted through the Joint Staff with collaboration from CENTCOM and the 
Services for final disposition. Recommend item be closed. 

Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps to develop a method for consistently sharing information 
concerning changes that are made to training programs in response to 
formal or informal lessons learned. (See page 29/GAO Draft Report.) 

DoD Response: Concur. Draft language to that effect has been inserted 
into 2010 update to 'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' Draft 
language to that effect has been inserted into the draft DoDI 1322.mm, 
Implementing DoD Training. DoD plans to review and improve, where 
appropriate, the dissemination of changes to training programs 
resulting from the analysis of lessons learned. Recommend item be 
closed. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this 
report were Michael Ferren (Assistant Director), Susan Ditto, Lonnie 
McAllister, Terry Richardson, Michael Silver, Christopher Watson, 
Natasha Wilder, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Kristy Williams. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Combat support and combat service support forces are often 
referred to as noncombat arms forces. For the purposes of this report, 
we will refer to these forces as support forces. 

[2] The function of the Quartermaster Corps is to provide support to 
the Army in the following areas: general supply--except for ammunition 
and medical supplies; mortuary affairs; subsistence; petroleum and 
water; aerial delivery; shower, laundry, fabric/light textile repair; 
and materiel and distribution management. 

[3] The other three elements of the Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force 
are the command element, the ground combat element, and the aviation 
combat element. 

[4] Combat arms forces provide direct combat power to meet operational 
requirements, performing their core missions within service deployment 
constructs, such as Army brigades or Marine Corps regiments. 

[5] H.R. Rep. No. 111-166, at 293-94 (2009). 

[6] GAO, Military Training: Navy and Air Force Need to More Fully 
Apply Best Practices to Enhance Development and Management of Combat 
Skills Training, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-220R] 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2009). 

[7] See 10 U.S.C. §164 (2010) for responsibilities of commanders of 
combatant commands and sections 3013, 5013, and 8013 of Title 10, U.S. 
Code (2010) for the responsibilities of the service secretaries. 

[8] DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and 
Its Major Components (Aug. 1, 2002) and DOD Directive 1322.18, 
Military Training (Jan. 13, 2009). 

[9] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces 
of the United States (May 14, 2007), incorporating Change 1, March 20, 
2009. 

[10] Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development (Dec. 
18, 2009). 

[11] Headquarters, Department of the Army Executive Order 150-08, 
Reserve Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre-and Post- 
Mobilization Training Strategy (March 2008). 

[12] Marine Administrative Message 740/07, The Pre-Deployment Toolkit 
(Dec. 19, 2007). 

[13] Marine Corps Order 3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process 
(Jan. 26, 2010). 

[14] U.S. Central Command FY10 Joint Sourced Training Requirement (May 
7, 2009). As outlined in CENTCOM guidance, all individuals deploying 
to its area of responsibility are required to complete the outlined 
theater entry requirements before deploying to the CENTCOM area of 
operation. 

[15] U.S. Army Forces Command Pre-deployment Training Guidance for 
Follow-on Forces Deploying In Support Of Southwest Asia (Oct. 27, 
2009) and Marine Corps Order 3502.6 (Jan. 26, 2010). 

[16] The Army commonly refers to this event as the culminating 
training event, while the Marine Corps commonly refers to this as the 
mission rehearsal exercise. 

[17] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25D, Joint 
Lessons Learned Program (Oct. 10, 2008). According to Army guidance, 
lessons learned are defined as validated knowledge and experience 
derived from observations and the historical study of military 
training, exercises and combat operations that leads to a change in 
behavior at either the tactical (standard operating procedures, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures, and so forth), operational, or 
strategic level or in one or more of the Army's doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, 
and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. Army Regulation 11-33, Army Lessons 
Learned Program (ALLP) (Oct. 17, 2006). 

[18] Army Regulation 11-33 (Oct. 17, 2006) and Marine Corps Order 
3504.1, Marine Corps Lessons Learned Program (MCLLP) and the Marine 
Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) (July 31, 2006). After action 
reports highlight best practices or areas for improvement, and service 
officials explained that these reports capture feedback at various 
points, to include during pre-deployment training, while deployed in- 
theater, and post-deployment. 

[19] Nonstandard forces are defined as joint sourced, in-lieu of, and 
ad hoc forces as well as individual augmentees. 

[20] GAO, Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the 
Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-670] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 30, 2008). 

[21] See sections 3013, 5013, and 8013 of Title 10, U.S. Code (2010) 
for the responsibilities of the service secretaries. 

[22] Joint sourced forces consist of units from one service that are 
deployed to perform their core missions in place of units from another 
service; for example, Navy or Air Force medical units deployed to fill 
requirements for Army medical units. 

[23] U.S. Central Command FY10 Joint Sourced Training Requirement (May 
7, 2009). 

[24] Department of Defense, Defense Research and Engineering. "Safety 
of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, November 2007- 
August 2009" (November 2009). 

[25] DOD defines non-lethal weapons as weapons that are explicitly 
designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or 
materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, 
and undesired damage to property and the environment. Non-lethal 
weapons include acoustic devices and non-lethal munitions. 

[26] Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics. "Department of Defense Report to Congress on 
Requirements for Non-Lethal Weapons" (December 2009). 

[27] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Improve Program Management, 
Policy, and Testing to Enhance Ability to Field Operationally Useful 
Non-lethal Weapons, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-344]. (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 
2009). 

[28] Joint Pub. 1 (May 14, 2007). 

[29] AR 350-1 (Dec. 18, 2009) and MARADMIN 740/07 (Dec. 19, 2007). 

[30] U.S. Army Forces Command Pre-deployment Training Guidance for 
Follow-on Forces Deploying In Support Of Southwest Asia (Oct. 27, 
2009) and Marine Corps Order 3502.6 (Jan. 26, 2010). 

[31] Exercise Mojave Viper is the integration of all elements of the 
Marine Air Ground Task Force into a service-level, pre-deployment 
training program assessment exercise. It consists of 29 days of 
evaluated training, with a final collective training event at the end 
of the curriculum. 

[32] Joint Pub. 1 (May 14, 2007). 

[33] AR 350-1 (Dec. 18, 2009) and MARADMIN 740/07 (Dec. 19, 2007). 

[34] AR 350-1 (Dec. 18, 2009). 

[35] ALARACT 208/2009. Army Training Records Data Integration/Digital 
Training Management System (DTMS) (July 2009). 

[36] First Army is the command responsible for mobilizing, training, 
validating, and deploying reserve component units in accordance with 
Combatant Commander, Department of the Army, and U.S. Army Forces 
Command directives. 

[37] Headquarters, U.S. Central Command, HMMWV Egress Assistance 
Trainer (HEAT) Predeployment Training Requirement (Sep. 14, 2007). 

[38] This operations officer was also designated as the unit's 
training officer. 

[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-670]. 

[40] Army Regulation 11-33 (Oct. 17, 2006) and Marine Corps Order 
3504.1 (July 31, 2006). 

[41] Headquarters, United States Forces-Afghanistan, Training 
Improvement Recommendations for US Forces Deploying to Afghanistan 
(Dec. 6, 2009). 

[42] The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization is a 
jointly manned activity of DOD established to reduce and eliminate the 
effects of all forms of improvised explosive devices used against U.S. 
and coalition forces. 

[43] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 
3150.25D, Joint Lessons Learned Program (Oct. 10, 2008). 

[44] A.R. 350-1 (Dec. 18, 2009). 

[End of section] 

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