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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

March 2010: 

Homeland Defense: 

DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil 
Authorities during Disasters: 

GAO-10-386: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-386, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In addition to its primary mission of warfighting, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) plays an important role in civil support. Four years 
after the poorly coordinated national response to Hurricane Katrina, 
issues remain about DOD’s progress in identifying its capability 
requirements for supporting a coordinated civilian-military response 
to a catastrophic domestic event. This report addresses the extent to 
which DOD (1) has identified and addressed its capability gaps for its 
civil support mission; (2) has clearly defined roles, 
responsibilities, and relationships and identified appropriate levels 
and types of personnel to assign to the FEMA regions; and (3) shares 
and tracks information concerning its civil support requirements 
response process with civil authorities. To do this, GAO analyzed DOD 
civil support guidance and plans and met with DOD and FEMA officials 
regarding the support that civilian authorities may request during a 
catastrophic incident. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD has identified capability gaps for its civil support mission by 
completing a capabilities-based assessment, but key DOD policies and 
guidance for the civil support mission are outdated, limiting DOD’s 
ability to fully address capability gaps. DOD’s strategic guidance 
requires that it anticipate requests for civil support by identifying 
capability gaps. However, inconsistency and misalignment across DOD’s 
policies, strategy, and doctrine for civil support make it difficult 
for DOD to address capability gaps and pre-position equipment and 
supplies. GAO found this was due to outdated key DOD policies and 
guidance that do not reflect DOD’s current organizational framework 
for providing assistance to civil authorities. If DOD updates key 
policies for civil support, it will be better able to address 
capability gaps and provide timely and appropriate support to civil 
authorities. 

DOD has increased its personnel dedicated to coordinate civilian 
requests for assistance, but it has not clearly defined their roles, 
responsibilities, and relationships, and its staffing is not based 
upon a staffing assessment by FEMA region. DOD guidance calls for 
coordination with federal and state authorities on military 
capabilities for civil support. However, while the Defense 
Coordinating Officer program has improved civil authorities’ overall 
awareness of DOD’s capabilities, roles, and responsibilities, command 
and control and coordination among the Defense Coordinating Officers 
and the military services’ liaison officers have been confusing and 
sometimes problematic because DOD’s civil support guidance is 
outdated. Further, DOD officials noted that staffing of the Defense 
Coordinating Officer program should reflect its multiservice 
environment and the unique challenges of each FEMA region. Different 
FEMA regions are prone to different disasters and have varying needs 
for DOD support, but the size and composition of the Defense 
Coordinating Officers’ staff—nearly all from the Army—were not based 
on a staffing needs assessment. Therefore, they do not necessarily 
reflect variations in the support needs of the regions. As a result, 
DOD may be missing an opportunity to optimize its ability to provide a 
coordinated response to civil authorities with appropriate 
multiservice capabilities. 

While DOD follows established processes in responding to requests for 
assistance from civil authorities, it has not established a system to 
track civilian requests that is accessible to DOD’s interagency 
partners. The National Response Framework broadly identifies how DOD 
responds to requests for assistance, and DOD guidance further 
specifies DOD’s processes. However, civil authorities are not fully 
aware of the length of this process. While DOD has several different 
tracking systems in use by different DOD components for the civil 
support mission, it lacks a formal, interoperable, and unclassified 
system for tracking all requests for assistance across DOD. Without 
such a system, gaps will remain in gaining real-time situational 
awareness and maintaining a common operational picture of DOD support 
for all federal partners in disaster-response missions including DOD. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD update its civil support guidance to reflect 
current doctrine; clearly define roles, responsibilities, and 
relationships for personnel assigned to manage civilian requests for 
assistance; conduct a staffing needs assessment for Defense 
Coordinating Officers; and establish an official system to track 
requests for assistance across DOD that is accessible to DOD’s inter-
agency partners. DOD concurred with our recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-386] or key 
components. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Has Taken Actions to Identify Capability Gaps, but Key Policies 
and Guidance Are Outdated: 

DOD Has Personnel to Coordinate DOD Capabilities for Civil Support, 
but Roles, Responsibilities, and Command Relationships Are Not Clearly 
Defined, and DOD Has Not Assessed Its Staff Needs: 

DOD Has Established Processes to Respond to Civil Authorities, but It 
Has Not Established a Comprehensive System to Track Requests-for- 
Assistance: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Examples of Commands Supporting NORTHCOM and PACOM for 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support: 

Table 2: Defense Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained 
Documentary Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to the Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities Mission: 

Table 3: Federal Civilian Departments and Agencies Where GAO Obtained 
Documentary Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to the Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities Mission: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: National Response Framework: 

Figure 2: FEMA Regions: 

Figure 3: Defense Coordinating Officer and Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officer Team: 

Figure 4: Catastrophic Risk in the United States: Earthquakes and 
Hurricanes: 

Figure 5: FEMA Regions: 

Figure 6: DOD's Internal Process for Responding to Requests-for- 
Assistance and FEMA Mission Assignments: 

Abbreviations: 

CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 
explosive: 

DCO: Defense Coordinating Officer: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

MA: mission assignment: 

NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command: 

PACOM: U.S. Pacific Command: 

RFA: request for assistance: 

RFF: request for forces: 

Stafford Act: The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 30, 2010: 

Congressional Requesters: 

The United States continues to face an uncertain, complex security 
environment with the potential for natural disasters and terrorist 
attacks. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) established the U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM)[Footnote 1] in October 2002 to provide for and manage DOD's 
homeland defense and civil support missions in the continental United 
States and Alaska.[Footnote 2] The poorly coordinated national 
response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 further highlighted the need for 
a more coordinated and integrated civilian and military response to a 
major domestic incident. Eight years after the September 11 attacks, 
nearly 4 years after Hurricane Katrina, and while engaging in two 
major overseas operations, issues remain about DOD's ability to 
provide defense support to civil authorities.[Footnote 3] 
Specifically, two issues are whether DOD has made progress in 
understanding the requirements for DOD capabilities needed to support 
civil authorities in the event of catastrophic incidents, as well as 
recognizing the capabilities of local, tribal, state, territorial, and 
federal civilian authorities--a key component in identifying any DOD 
shortfalls or capability gaps. 

While DOD is the primary federal agency for homeland defense, it is 
not the primary federal agency for civil support; rather, it serves as 
a supporting federal agency to the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and other federal civilian agencies in domestic disaster 
situations in which local, tribal, state, territorial, and other 
federal resources are overwhelmed. As the combatant commands charged 
with carrying out DOD's domestic civil support mission, NORTHCOM and 
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) face a unique challenge in planning for 
and coordinating civil support missions, because they must work with 
and respond to the needs of 56 separate and often unique state and 
territorial governments. Additionally, NORTHCOM and PACOM have to 
coordinate with numerous federal agencies that also have roles in 
planning for and responding to a wide variety of incidents in the 
homeland, as reflected in the National Response Framework.[Footnote 4] 
However, DOD operates in support of civil authorities only when 
directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense. In 
such instances, NORTHCOM (or PACOM) would command only the federal 
military[Footnote 5] portion of such operations in direct support of 
another federal agency, such as FEMA or the U.S. Secret Service. 
[Footnote 6] 

Since the establishment of NORTHCOM in 2002, we have periodically 
evaluated and reported on issues related to its ability to carry out 
its missions.[Footnote 7] Most recently, we evaluated NORTHCOM's 
exercise program, identifying the program's strengths as well as gaps 
in areas such as planning, coordination with states and interagency 
partners, and ways to improve NORTHCOM's participation in the National 
Exercise Program.[Footnote 8] We also recently reported on planning, 
resourcing, and training challenges for DOD's response to domestic 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive 
incidents (CBRNE).[Footnote 9] 

While DOD plays an important role in civil support, warfighting 
remains its primary mission. Therefore, with the exception of key 
specialized capabilities for its CBRNE consequence-management mission, 
DOD relies on its "dual-mission forces" to provide all other civil 
support capabilities in addition to existing overseas missions. 
Additionally, unlike some combatant commands such as European Command, 
NORTHCOM has few forces permanently assigned to it; therefore, like 
all commands that have few forces assigned to them, NORTHCOM must 
request forces from Joint Forces Command, through the Joint Staff, in 
order to perform its civil support mission. To plan, prepare for, and 
carry out their civil support mission, NORTHCOM and PACOM may rely on 
other DOD organizations and commands for assistance. 

Both NORTHCOM and PACOM have established, primarily under their 
respective Army component commands, Defense Coordinating Officers with 
staff known as Defense Coordinating Elements, to serve as DOD 
representatives to civilian authorities in the 10 FEMA regions. 
[Footnote 10] The Defense Coordinating Officers and Elements are 
colocated with the FEMA regional staff and they attend meetings, 
planning conferences, exercises, and other activities within their 
assigned regions and states. In that way they can develop 
relationships with civilian authorities and gain an understanding, or 
situational awareness, of civilian capabilities so that DOD will know 
what, if anything, it may be called upon to provide in the event of a 
disaster or other incident. 

You asked us to examine a broad range of planning and operational 
considerations related to DOD's and NORTHCOM's homeland defense and 
civil support missions. This report addresses the extent to which DOD 
(1) has identified and addressed its capability gaps for its civil 
support mission; (2) has clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and 
relationships and identified appropriate levels and types of personnel 
to assign to the FEMA regions; and (3) shares and tracks information 
concerning its civil support requirements response process with civil 
authorities. As agreed with your offices, this report focuses on DOD's 
support of civil authorities for natural disasters. We did not address 
issues pertaining to civil support for CBRNE consequence management, 
as these issues are addressed in other GAO work.[Footnote 11] We are 
reporting separately to you on DOD's interagency coordination efforts 
with U.S. federal agencies for its homeland defense and civil support 
missions.[Footnote 12] 

To address our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed DOD, NORTHCOM, and 
PACOM civil support guidance and plans, as well as DOD's March 2009 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based Assessment. We 
met with officials in the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, PACOM, U.S. 
Transportation Command, and their component and supporting commands to 
discuss the work and analysis that DOD has conducted in order to 
understand what support civilian authorities may ask the department to 
provide during a catastrophic incident. Additionally, we met with FEMA 
officials at both the national and regional levels to understand how 
they work with DOD both in identifying capability gaps during planning 
stages and in channeling state and federal requests-for-assistance to 
DOD during an actual incident. During our visits to 4 of the 10 FEMA 
regions, we met with the Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense 
Coordinating Elements in those regions to discuss their roles as DOD's 
representatives to FEMA, other civilian authorities, and the National 
Guard in their assigned states and regions. We conducted telephone 
interviews with all 10 NORTHCOM Defense Coordinating Officers and a 
survey with the 2 PACOM Defense Coordinating Officers, which allowed 
us to gain a broad picture of DOD's civil support activities across 
the country. We used the results of these interviews and surveys, our 
meetings with DOD and FEMA officials, and our review of documents and 
guidance to identify areas for improvement in DOD's ability to provide 
support to and respond to requests-for-assistance from civil 
authorities. Additional information on our scope and methodology 
appears in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to March 2010 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD has identified some capability gaps for its civil support mission 
by completing a capabilities-based assessment, but key DOD policies 
and guidance for the civil support mission are outdated, inconsistent, 
and unclear, which limits DOD's ability to fully identify and address 
its capability gaps. A strategic goal for NORTHCOM is to anticipate 
requests for civil support and identify capability gaps. NORTHCOM, at 
the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, conducted a 
capabilities-based assessment for DOD's homeland defense and civil 
support missions that led to the identification of 31 DOD capability 
gaps for those missions; 10 of these were for civil support missions 
related to natural disasters. However, the capabilities-based 
assessment also noted inconsistencies and a lack of alignment across 
policies, strategy, and doctrinal actions for DOD's civil support 
mission, making it difficult to determine DOD's capability 
requirements. We found this lack of alignment attributable to the fact 
that key DOD policies and guidance for civil support--specifically, 
DOD Directives 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities" (1993); 
3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities" (1997); and Manual 
3025.1-M, "Manual for Civil Emergencies" (1994)--are outdated and do 
not reflect the current organizational framework that DOD has created 
for providing assistance to civil authorities. For example, the 2008 
Unified Command Plan assigns NORTHCOM and PACOM the responsibility for 
support to civil authorities within their areas of responsibility, 
while DOD directives for civil support, which pre-date the 
establishment of NORTHCOM, designate executive agent responsibility 
for support to civil authorities to the Department of the Army. 
According to the DOD homeland defense and civil support capabilities-
based assessment, DOD strategy and doctrine recognize the department's 
civil support mission, but DOD policy prohibits its components from 
procuring or maintaining any supplies, materiel, or equipment 
exclusively for the civil support mission, unless otherwise authorized 
by the Secretary of Defense. According to U.S. Transportation Command 
officials, this policy may limit DOD's ability to pre-position forces 
and equipment for lifesaving missions, such as aeromedical evacuations 
prior to a hurricane making landfall along the coastal United States. 
Incomplete DOD policy guidance for its civil support mission may lead 
to confusion and misunderstanding among the military services and 
other DOD components regarding the proper employment of defense 
capabilities in support of civil authorities. We are recommending that 
DOD update its guidance for civil support missions to reflect current 
doctrine, terminology, funding policy, practices, and DOD's 
organizational framework for providing support to civil authorities. 
DOD agreed with our recommendation and discussed the steps it was 
taking to update its guidance for civil support missions and 
identified time frames for completion of the guidance. 

While DOD has identified and assigned personnel to coordinate civilian 
requests-for-assistance, an important DOD capability for civil 
support, DOD has not clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and 
command and control relationships for these personnel, nor has it 
conducted a formal staffing needs assessment that accounts for 
differences across the FEMA regions to which these personnel are 
assigned. DOD guidance states that the Defense Coordinating Officer 
serves as DOD's single point of contact for coordinating with federal 
and state authorities on the use of military capabilities for civil 
support. Other DOD guidance, specifically DOD Directive 3025.16, 
"Military Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program" 
(2000), creates additional military service points of contact, such as 
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, for federal and state 
coordination with the military services. DOD officials have indicated 
that the staffing of the Defense Coordinating Officer program should 
reflect the multiservice environment in which the program operates. 
Further, FEMA officials told us that DOD's Defense Coordinating 
Officer program has improved overall awareness of DOD capabilities for 
civil support. However, the ability of the Defense Coordinating 
Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers to coordinate and 
provide DOD capabilities to civil authorities may be limited, because 
DOD has not delineated the roles, responsibilities, and command and 
control relationships between the Defense Coordinating Officers and 
the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers. In part, this is due to 
the fact that DOD places the multiservice Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers under the operational command and control of their 
respective services, while the Defense Coordinating Officers are under 
the operational command and control of the combatant commands, 
NORTHCOM and PACOM. Further, the guidance does not specify how these 
command structures are to plan and function together. For example, 
these different command structures can lead to inconsistencies between 
the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officers in their training and equipping requirements, which could 
hinder their ability to provide optimal support to civil authorities 
during a real-life disaster or event. Further, DOD officials told us 
that there is friction and confusion between the military services and 
the Defense Coordinating Officers regarding the proper employment of 
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers for civil support missions. 
Moreover, while different FEMA regions are prone to different 
disasters and have varying needs for DOD support, the composition of 
the Defense Coordinating Officers' staff is not based upon a staffing 
needs assessment; they do not reflect variations in the geographic 
size and catastrophic disaster profile of the different FEMA regions. 
Based upon our interviews, some Defense Coordinating Officers may not 
have the appropriate mix of staff to meet the varying needs of the 
FEMA regions, potentially limiting DOD's ability to provide an 
optimally coordinated response to civil authorities with appropriate 
multiservice capabilities. Therefore, we are recommending that, as DOD 
updates its key policies and guidance for civil support--such as DOD 
Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities" (1993)--it 
should define roles and responsibilities for the personnel involved in 
coordinating civilian requests-for-assistance and ensure that the 
program's staffing reflects service representation and regional 
differences as appropriate. DOD concurred with the recommendation and 
discussed the steps it is planning to take in response. 

Although DOD uses an established process to respond to requests-for- 
assistance from civil authorities, it has not established a system 
that both comprehensively tracks civilian requests-for-assistance and 
is accessible to DOD's interagency partners. The National Response 
Framework broadly calls for DOD and other federal agencies to respond 
to requests-for-assistance from state and local civilian authorities, 
while DOD's doctrine and guidance specify how the department will 
review and respond to these requests. However, as DOD and FEMA 
officials told us, civil authorities have misconceptions about time 
frames for DOD's process for approving and resourcing civilian 
requests-for-assistance. For example, DOD's capabilities-based 
assessment for homeland defense and civil support identified the 
response timeliness of DOD transportation support--including 
aeromedical evacuation--as a capability shortfall. The assessment 
noted that although civil authorities have identified a need for DOD 
transportation support within 24 hours of a catastrophic incident, DOD 
has limited capability to respond sooner than 72 hours. DOD could help 
to mitigate this issue by incorporating its internal processes for 
responding to requests-for-assistance in the partner guide that we 
recommended in a recent report.[Footnote 13] Further, DOD's 
information sharing implementation plan recommends the development of 
an unclassified information sharing system providing a common 
operating picture for all the appropriate authorities in civil support 
operations. However, DOD currently lacks a single, comprehensive 
system that would accomplish this goal. For instance, NORTHCOM and 
PACOM use a Web-based system to track incoming requests-for-
assistance, but only those coming from FEMA and the National 
Interagency Fire Center appear in the system, even though other 
federal agencies such as the U.S. Secret Service also request 
assistance from DOD for disasters or National Special Security Events. 
Further, not all DOD entities involved in civil support missions--such 
as Joint Forces Command--use the Web-based system because this system 
is voluntary and not an official DOD program. Joint Forces Command 
uses a classified system that does not interact with the system used 
by NORTHCOM and PACOM. Additionally, FEMA and the other lead federal 
agencies, such as the U.S. Secret Service, do not have a common 
operating picture with DOD because DOD does not share this tracking 
system with them. Without the development of a comprehensive, 
unclassified system for tracking requests-for-assistance, gaps will 
remain in enabling real-time situational awareness and a common 
operational picture for all participants involved in disaster-response 
missions. We are recommending that DOD establish a formal DOD tracking 
system for requests-for-assistance from civil authorities that is 
accessible to all of DOD's interagency partners. DOD concurred with 
the recommendation and added that it needs access to FEMA's system for 
tracking mission assignments to provide the best potential for 
insuring accurate situational awareness of requests for DOD assistance. 

Background: 

Framework for Disaster Response: 

To assist in integrating state and federal responses to domestic 
emergencies, the Homeland Security Council developed 15 national 
planning scenarios in 2004 whose purpose was to form the basis for 
identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of 
emergencies. The scenarios focus on the consequences that federal, 
state, and local first responders may have to address, and they are 
intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, 
catastrophic emergencies for which the nation needs to be prepared. 
These include a wide range of terrorist attacks involving nuclear, 
biological, and chemical agents, as well as catastrophic natural 
disasters, such as an earthquake or hurricane. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), which was established in 2002[Footnote 14] 
to, among other purposes, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, 
is the lead federal agency responsible for preventing, preparing for, 
and responding to a wide range of major domestic disasters and other 
emergencies. Then-President George W. Bush designated DHS and its 
Secretary as the lead federal representative responsible for domestic 
incident management and coordination of all-hazards preparedness. In 
2008, DHS issued its National Response Framework, which provides a 
framework for federal, state, and local agencies to use in planning 
for emergencies and establishes standardized doctrine, terminology, 
processes, and an integrated system for federal response activities. 
Overall coordination of federal incident-management activities, other 
than those conducted for homeland defense, is generally the 
responsibility of DHS. Within DHS and as the executive agent for the 
National Preparedness System,[Footnote 15] FEMA is responsible for 
coordinating and integrating the preparedness of federal, state, 
local, tribal, and nongovernmental entities. 

Response to disasters or other catastrophic events in the United 
States is guided by the National Response Framework and is based on a 
tiered response to an incident; that is, incidents must be managed at 
the lowest jurisdictional levels and supported by additional response 
capabilities as needed (see figure 1). Local and county governments 
respond to emergencies daily using their own resources and rely on 
mutual aid agreements and other types of assistance agreements with 
neighboring governments when they need additional resources. For 
example, county and local authorities are likely to have the resources 
needed to adequately respond to a small-scale incident, such as a 
local flood, and therefore will not request additional resources. For 
larger-scale incidents, when resources are overwhelmed, local and 
county governments will request assistance from the state. States have 
capabilities, such as the National Guard,[Footnote 16] that can help 
communities respond and recover. If additional resources are required, 
the state may request assistance from other states through interstate 
mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact.[Footnote 17] If an incident surpasses community and state 
capabilities, the governor can seek federal assistance. The federal 
government has a wide array of capabilities and resources that can be 
made available to assist state and local agencies to respond to 
incidents. 

Figure 1: National Response Framework: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Incident: 

First level responders: 
Local resources are exhausted. 

Second level responders: 
State resources are exhausted (including the National Guard); 
Governor requests assistance and a Presidential Declaration is issued. 

Third level responders: 
FEMA. 

Fourth level responders: 
Emergency Support Function/Primary federal agency resources are 
exhausted. 

Fifth level responders: 
FEMA requests DOD assistance. First mission assignment is generally to 
activate the Defense Coordinating Officer & staff. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

In accordance with the National Response Framework and applicable laws 
including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (Stafford Act)[Footnote 18] various federal departments 
or agencies may play primary, coordinating, or supporting roles, based 
on their authorities and resources and the nature of the threat or 
incident. In some instances, national defense assets may be needed to 
assist FEMA or another agency in the national response to an incident. 
Defense resources are committed following approval by the Secretary of 
Defense or at the direction of the President. 

Military Mission and Organization: 

One of DOD's missions is civil support, which includes domestic 
disaster relief operations for incidents such as fires, hurricanes, 
floods, earthquakes, National Special Security Events (for example, 
the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, or the Democratic 
and Republican National Conventions), counterdrug operations, and 
consequence management for CBRNE events.[Footnote 19] As noted 
earlier, DOD is not the primary federal agency for such missions 
(unless so designated by the President) and thus it provides defense 
support of civil authorities only when (1) state, local, and other 
federal resources are overwhelmed or unique military capabilities are 
required; (2) assistance is requested by the primary federal agency; 
and (3) either NORTHCOM or PACOM, the two combatant commands with 
responsibility for civil support missions, is directed to do so by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 20] When deciding to 
commit defense resources, among other factors, defense officials 
consider military readiness, appropriateness of the circumstances, and 
whether the response is in accordance with the law.[Footnote 21] For 
example, the Posse Comitatus Act[Footnote 22] allows military forces 
to provide civil support, but these forces generally cannot become 
directly involved in law enforcement. When they are called upon to 
support civil authorities, NORTHCOM and PACOM generally operate 
through established joint task forces that are subordinate to the 
command. In most cases, support will be localized, limited, and 
specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced to the point where 
the primary federal agency can again assume full control and 
management without military assistance, NORTHCOM and PACOM will exit. 

DOD established the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs to oversee homeland 
defense and civil support activities for DOD, under the authority of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and, as appropriate, in 
coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This 
office develops policies, conducts analysis, provides advice, and 
makes recommendations on homeland defense, defense support of civil 
authorities, emergency preparedness, and domestic crisis-management 
matters within the department. The Assistant Secretary assists the 
Secretary of Defense in providing policy directions to NORTHCOM and 
other applicable combatant commands to guide the development and 
execution of homeland defense plans and activities. This direction is 
provided through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This 
office is also responsible for coordinating with DHS. While most of 
the National Guard's roles and responsibilities in the disaster-
response area are not federal ones, the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters 
involving nonfederalized National Guard forces.[Footnote 23] In this 
role, the National Guard Bureau provides NORTHCOM, PACOM, and other 
DOD organizations with information on National Guard capabilities 
available in the states for disaster response so that DOD can better 
anticipate what, if any, additional capabilities it may be asked to 
provide. 

The process whereby DOD provides capabilities to assist civil 
authorities has changed over the past 5 years. In 2004, a series of 
four hurricanes struck Florida, and DOD received a large number of 
civil requests-for-assistance that all had to be approved by the 
Secretary of Defense. DOD and others concluded that the process was 
time-consuming and complicated. To streamline the process, the Joint 
Staff developed operational guidance for DOD commands--referred to as 
an Execute Order[Footnote 24]--modeled after the Execute Order for 
Operation Noble Eagle, the North American Aerospace Defense Command's 
activities to defend American skies begun in response to the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks. A standing Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities Execute Order has been several times, but an important 
purpose has been to pre-identify forces that NORTHCOM and PACOM can 
request from the Secretary of Defense in the event of a disaster. The 
Execute Order places DOD capabilities into four categories. Category 1 
comprises capabilities assigned to the combatant command (that is, the 
Defense Coordinating Officer and staff, service component command 
staff, command and control personnel, and communication capabilities). 
Category 2 comprises pre-identified capabilities, such as helicopters 
for rapid area assessments, C-130 aircraft that can refuel 
helicopters, and capabilities for search and rescue, that NORTHCOM and 
PACOM can place on 24-hour prepare-to-deploy status after notifying 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Category 3 
comprises capabilities for DOD use (for example, combat camera, or 
public affairs). Category 4 comprises large-scale response forces 
(rarely used except for large-scale disasters such as Hurricane 
Katrina). 

Finally, local installation and unit commanders have the authority to 
respond to localized events as requested by local civilian 
authorities. These responses, conducted under immediate response 
authority, do not normally exceed 72 hours and require notification of 
the relevant service commands as well as the Secretary of Defense. 
Additionally, local installations may establish mutual aid agreements 
for things such as fire and ambulance support with the communities 
surrounding their installations. NORTHCOM and PACOM are not involved 
in either of these responses. However, depending on the nature of the 
local incident, including possibility of media involvement, NORTHCOM 
and PACOM may receive a spot report[Footnote 25] regarding the local 
incident as part of the process of informing DOD senior leadership. 

Combatant Commands: 

NORTHCOM is the unified military command responsible for planning, 
organizing, and executing DOD's homeland defense and federal military 
support to civil authorities' missions within the continental United 
States, Alaska, and U.S. territorial waters. PACOM has these 
responsibilities for the Hawaiian Islands and U.S. territories in the 
Pacific. Both combatant commands receive support from a variety of 
commands and organizations in their direct chain of command and 
throughout DOD. Table 1 shows examples of these commands. 

Table 1: Examples of Commands Supporting NORTHCOM and PACOM for 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support: 

Subordinate commands: 

NORTHCOM: 
Joint Task Force, Alaska; 
Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region; 
PACOM: 
Joint Task Force, Homeland Defense. 

Component commands: 

NORTHCOM: 
U.S. Army North; 
Air Forces North; 
U.S. Marine Forces North; 
PACOM: 
U.S. Army Pacific; 
U.S. Pacific Fleet; 
U.S. Marine Forces Pacific; 
U.S. Pacific Air Forces. 

Supporting commands: 

U.S. Fleet Forces Command; 
U.S. Joint Forces Command; 
U.S. Transportation Command. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of table] 

DOD Civil Support Personnel: 

As part of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM has 
placed a Defense Coordinating Officer with associated support staff, 
known as the Defense Coordinating Element, in each of FEMA's 10 
regional offices, placing greater emphasis on the Defense Coordinating 
Officers' mission. Figure 2 shows the 10 FEMA regions. Prior to 
October 1, 2006, the Defense Coordinating Officers had full-time jobs 
commanding training units for the First and Fifth Continental U.S. 
Armies. The Defense Coordinating Officers, along with their 40-person 
training staff, served part-time as Defense Coordinating Officers and 
only did so when requested by FEMA or another federal agency. Upon 
establishment of Fifth U.S. Army as the Army component to NORTHCOM, 10 
full-time regional Defense Coordinating Officers were established and 
located in the FEMA regional offices. Defense Coordinating Officers 
are senior-level military officers (typically Army colonels) with 
joint experience and training on the National Response Framework, 
defense support of civil authorities, and DHS's National Incident 
Management System. They are responsible for assisting the primary 
federal agency when requested by FEMA; they provide liaison support 
and requirements validation; and they serve as single points of 
contact for state, local, and other federal authorities that need DOD 
support. Defense Coordinating Officers work closely with federal, 
state, and local officials to determine what unique DOD capabilities 
can be used to assist in mitigating the effects of a natural or man-
made disaster. Since FEMA region IX is split between NORTHCOM and 
PACOM, NORTHCOM has a Defense Coordinating Officer assigned to the 
FEMA regional office in California and PACOM has established two 
Defense Coordinating Officers within its area of operations. 
Currently, there is a Navy civilian Defense Coordinating Officer for 
Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands and a part-time, Army Reserve 
Defense Coordinating Officer for Hawaii and American Samoa.[Footnote 
26] 

Figure 2: FEMA Regions: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of the U.S.] 

Depicted on the map are the geographical boundaries of the ten FEMA 
regions, as well as the following regional headquarters: 

Region 1: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Region 2: New York, New York; 
Region 3: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 
Region 4: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Region 5: Chicago, Illinois; 
Region 6: Denton, Texas; 
Region 7: Kanas City, Kansas; 
Region 8: Denver, Colorado; 
Region 9: Oakland, California; 
Region 10: Seattle, Washington. 

National Office: Washington, DC. 

Sources: FEMA; Map Resources (maps). 

[End of figure] 

Additionally, the military services have Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers. These are senior Reserve officers (typically 
colonels or Navy captains) from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
Corps who represent the federal military in each of the 10 FEMA 
regional offices and in the states and territories.[Footnote 27] While 
they have some service-specific responsibilities, Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officers' civil support responsibilities include 
assisting the Defense Coordinating Officers with service subject-
matter expertise and coordinating the provision of military personnel, 
equipment, and supplies to support the emergency relief and cleanup 
efforts of civil authorities. 

DOD Has Taken Actions to Identify Capability Gaps, but Key Policies 
and Guidance Are Outdated: 

NORTHCOM Led a Capabilities-Based Assessment That Identified DOD 
Capability Gaps for the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions: 

DOD planning documents for its civil support mission require that DOD 
maintain continuous situational awareness of its civil support 
operating environment by identifying shortfalls in capabilities, 
planning, exercising, and coordinating DOD efforts with its 
interagency partners. Further, in its Vision 2020 statement, NORTHCOM 
identifies a strategic goal of providing timely and effective civil 
support by anticipating requests for support and providing military 
capabilities at the right place and the right time.[Footnote 28] 
Accordingly, at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and 
in response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, NORTHCOM agreed to 
lead a department-wide, capabilities-based assessment for DOD's 
homeland defense and civil support missions. The strategic goals of 
the effort were to enable improvement in DOD homeland defense and 
civil support policy, evaluate existing DOD capabilities and identify 
DOD capability gaps, improve DOD's integration with interagency 
mission partners, and recommend further action to promote future 
capability development for the homeland defense and civil support 
missions. The Deputy Secretary of Defense identified the capabilities-
based assessment as one of DOD's top 25 transformational priorities to 
be completed or advanced to a major milestone by December 2008. DOD 
conducted the assessment between September 2007 and October 2008 in 
accordance with DOD processes.[Footnote 29] DOD agencies, the 
combatant commands, the military services, the National Guard Bureau, 
DHS, and other key federal interagency partners participated in the 
assessment. The assessment did not include participants from state and 
local governments. 

The recently completed capabilities-based assessment identified 31 
capability gaps for DOD's homeland defense and civil support missions. 
The 31 capability gaps were derived from an initial identification of 
2,192 capabilities, tasks, and statements of required activity that 
define and describe the homeland defense and civil support missions. 
According to our analysis, the assessment identified 14 capability 
gaps related to the civil support mission, 4 of which are CBRNE or law 
enforcement related, and 17 gaps related to the homeland defense 
mission or mission assurance function.[Footnote 30] The 10 civil 
support gaps related to natural disasters[Footnote 31] were: 

* Common Operational Picture, 

* Operational Intelligence Analysis and Dissemination, 

* Information Management and Sharing, 

* DOD Interagency Planning, 

* DOD Interagency Operations, 

* DOD Transportation Support, 

* Mass Care Support, 

* Assured Access to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 

* Logistical Health Medical Support, and: 

* Isolation and Quarantine Support. 

The capabilities-based assessment was limited in that (1) the nature 
of its assumptions may have hidden other capability gaps and (2) DOD 
has not received precise information from civil authorities on the 
capabilities it will be asked to provide. First, one of the strategic 
assumptions guiding the capabilities-based assessment is that DOD will 
provide a total force (combined active and reserve component) response 
to support civil authorities for domestic emergencies and other 
activities as directed. However, as we have reported in prior work and 
raised as a matter for congressional consideration,[Footnote 32] DOD 
has no legal authority to order Reserve personnel to involuntary 
active duty service for the purpose of providing civil support in the 
response to a natural disaster,[Footnote 33] which may limit DOD's 
ability to provide the capabilities requested by civil authorities in 
a timely manner. For example, according to U.S. Transportation Command 
officials, this lack of authority has made it difficult to access the 
personnel it needs to perform its civil support operations, especially 
since about 88 percent of DOD's capabilities for aeromedical 
evacuation operations are assigned to the reserve component. U.S. 
Transportation Command officials said they have been able to rely on 
volunteers from the service Reserves to meet their civil support 
requirements thus far, but they noted that, in the event of multiple 
disaster requirements that overwhelm state capabilities, U.S. 
Transportation Command might not be able to provide the capabilities 
requested due to the lack of authority to order service Reservists to 
active duty service to respond to disasters. DOD officials we 
interviewed told us that the department has advocated a change to this 
legislative status, but that the states have opposed the change due to 
issues involving state sovereignty. 

Second, while the assessment provided a general discussion of the 
civil support capability shortfalls it identified, it concluded that a 
precise scope of many of these shortfalls could not be determined 
because several strategic policy questions remained unanswered. There 
is a lack of interagency understanding and agreement on the extent of 
capabilities requested by civil authorities that DOD is expected to 
provide, and on how quickly DOD is expected to provide them. For 
example, Emergency Support Function #8: Public Health and Medical 
Services Annex to the National Response Framework, requests that DOD 
provide support for evacuating seriously ill or injured patients, but 
it does not provide specifics on the amount of capabilities that DOD 
should provide, or the timeliness of DOD's response for providing 
these capabilities. We previously reported that NORTHCOM has 
difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in 
part because NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from DHS 
and the states on the specific requirements needed from the military 
in the event of a disaster.[Footnote 34] For DOD's civil support 
mission, the requirements are established by the needs of the federal, 
state, and local agencies and organizations that DOD would be 
supporting in an actual event. In January 2008, the Commission on the 
National Guard and Reserves noted that DHS had not defined the 
requirements that DOD must meet to adequately perform its civil 
support mission.[Footnote 35] Several DOD officials we spoke with said 
that one of the biggest challenges in providing defense support of 
civil authorities is that civil authorities have not yet defined the 
capability requirements that DOD might be requested to provide in the 
event of a disaster. FEMA is responsible for establishing a 
comprehensive system to assess the nation's prevention capabilities 
and overall preparedness. However, our prior work has shown that FEMA 
faces methodological and coordination challenges in completing the 
system and issuing required reports on national preparedness.[Footnote 
36] 

DOD and DHS have undertaken some recent initiatives to address gaps in 
strategic planning that should assist DOD in identifying its 
capability requirements for the civil support mission. For example, 
during the course of our work, DOD and DHS were implementing the 
Integrated Planning System,[Footnote 37] which includes a process for 
fostering integration of federal, state, local, and tribal plans that 
allows for state, local, and tribal capability assessments to feed 
into federal plans. In conjunction with officials from federal, state, 
and local government as well as the private sector, DOD and DHS 
recently issued catastrophic plans for responding to and recovering 
from a category 4 hurricane in Hawaii. These plans were developed in 
accordance with the Integrated Planning System. DOD and FEMA officials 
in Hawaii with whom we spoke said that this was an important milestone 
because it represented the first time that DOD's capability 
requirements had been identified and formally agreed to by interagency 
stakeholders. As another example, DHS has also established a Task 
Force for Emergency Readiness pilot initiative that seeks to integrate 
federal and state planning efforts for catastrophic events. Five 
states are currently participating in the initiative, and officials 
from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense and Americas' Security Affairs told us that the initiative 
should assist the states in identifying their capability requirements 
for catastrophic events, which in turn should assist DOD in 
determining the capabilities it may be asked to provide. As a third 
example, the National Guard Bureau recently completed an assessment of 
National Guard capabilities for domestic missions by conducting a 
series of regional war games. A major goal of the effort was to 
identify National Guard capability gaps and provide recommendations on 
how to address these gaps. 

Key Policies and Guidance for DOD's Civil Support Mission Are 
Outdated, Inconsistent, and Unclear: 

DOD Policies Are Outdated: 

DOD's capabilities-based assessment highlighted a lack of alignment 
across DOD's policies, strategy, and doctrine for its civil support 
mission, making it difficult to determine DOD's capability 
requirements. We determined that this is due, in part, to outdated key 
policy directives. In many cases, DOD's policy guidance does not 
reflect widely accepted terminology or the organizational structure 
that DOD has developed for providing assistance to civil authorities. 
For example, DOD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil 
Authorities," which defines disaster response and outlines the 
responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Commands, and 
other DOD components and military services that respond to a civil 
emergency, was issued in January 1993--almost 10 years prior to the 
establishment of NORTHCOM. DOD's implementing guidance for this 
directive, 3025.1-M, "Manual for Civil Emergencies," was issued in 
1994 and DOD Directive 3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil 
Authorities," which establishes DOD policy for evaluating requests for 
disaster assistance, was issued in February 1997. This guidance 
further states that the Department of the Army is the DOD executive 
agent for military support to civil authorities, and is responsible 
for developing planning guidance, plans, and procedures on behalf of 
the Secretary of Defense. Since NORTHCOM's creation, the 2008 Unified 
Command Plan and the Forces for Unified Command Memorandum state that 
both NORTHCOM and PACOM, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, are responsible for providing support to civil authorities 
within their areas of responsibility. 

Moreover, a 2009 DOD directive, DOD Directive 5111.13, established the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 
Security Affairs as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense 
for DOD's civil support mission. The DOD policy directives are not 
aligned with DOD and national-level guidance in that they use outdated 
terminology. For example, the 1993 and 1997 DOD directives use the 
terms "military support" and "military assistance" to describe the 
types of support DOD provides to civil authorities, but DOD currently 
uses the term "defense support of civil authorities." The latter term 
has been widely accepted by the defense community and is part of 
current strategy, doctrine, and plans, including the Strategy for 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support, as well as interagency documents, 
such as the National Response Framework. DOD is considering a new 
draft directive for defense support of civil authorities that will 
supersede the old policy directives and provide overarching policy 
guidance for its civil support mission. However, the draft directive 
has been under review for about 4 years and has yet to be finalized. 
According to officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, the draft 
directive has taken longer to finalize than expected because of the 
evolving nature of DOD's civil support mission. These officials noted 
that defense support of civil authorities has been difficult to define 
because DOD's civil support mission has shifted from a military 
service-centric to a more unified, joint effort, as exemplified by the 
establishment of NORTHCOM. 

DOD Policies Are Inconsistent and Unclear: 

The military services' implementing guidance for DOD's civil support 
mission, DOD 3025.1-M, is based on the DOD directives that were issued 
in 1993 and 1997, but DOD joint doctrine and planning documents 
reference the draft DOD directive. While DOD recognizes that there are 
circumstances in which new doctrine would influence policy, the normal 
progression is for policy to drive doctrine and thereby influence 
training and the conduct of operations. Thus, we note that incomplete 
DOD policy guidance for its civil support mission may lead to 
confusion and misunderstanding among the military services and other 
DOD components regarding the proper employment of defense capabilities 
in support of civil authorities. 

One of the chief examples of the confusion caused by DOD's outdated 
policies and their lack of alignment with other published documents is 
the disparate perceptions of the components as to the importance of 
the civil support mission. According to the DOD homeland defense and 
civil support capabilities-based assessment, DOD strategy and joint 
doctrine recognize the department's civil support mission, but DOD 
policy prohibits the DOD components from procuring or maintaining any 
supplies, materiel, or equipment exclusively for their civil support 
mission, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. 
[Footnote 38] The capabilities-based assessment noted that some DOD 
components have interpreted this policy statement to signify that DOD 
does not program or budget for civil support capabilities. We found 
this view was prevalent among DOD officials we interviewed, even 
though DOD policy does not preclude DOD agencies from programming and 
budgeting for civil support capabilities--rather, it requires that 
they obtain direction from the Secretary of Defense to do so.[Footnote 
39] Further, strategy and joint guidance also do not provide clarity 
about funding and priority of the civil support mission. The DOD 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support states that DOD will 
maintain capabilities to assist civil authorities in responding to 
catastrophic incidents. However, while the strategy implies that DOD 
will program and budget for capabilities for responding to 
catastrophic incidents, it does not directly state this for the civil 
support mission. Additionally, Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support, 
recognizes civil support as a DOD mission but states that civil 
support capabilities are derived from DOD warfighting capabilities 
that could be applied to domestic assistance and law enforcement 
support. 

The capabilities-based assessment concluded that lack of alignment 
across a range of policy, strategy, and doctrinal actions have made it 
difficult to develop and implement coherent recommendations regarding 
capabilities for DOD's civil support mission.[Footnote 40] According 
to NORTHCOM and U.S. Transportation Command officials, these 
inconsistencies in policy, strategy, and doctrine and in DOD 
officials' interpretation of them may limit DOD's ability to pre-
position forces and equipment for life-saving missions, such as 
aeromedical evacuations prior to a hurricane making landfall along the 
coastal United States. These officials cited the importance of pre-
positioning forces, because aeromedical and patient evacuation 
operations are to be concluded no later than 18 hours before a major 
hurricane's landfall. They said that it is difficult for DOD to spend 
money to alert the personnel who are needed to perform these missions. 
According to U.S. Transportation Command officials, DOD and FEMA have 
agreed on a prescripted mission assignment that would provide DOD with 
an estimated $986,388 in "surge" funding for these operations. 
However, U.S. Transportation Command officials said that additional 
funds are still needed to alert personnel and pre-position forces, and 
thereby ensure that they can perform the life-saving mission 
successfully. 

We also found that DOD has not fully exercised available funding 
authorities to support its civil support operations. Congress has 
established a Defense Emergency Response Fund to reimburse DOD for 
providing disaster or emergency assistance to other federal agencies 
and to state and local governments in anticipation of reimbursable 
requests. However, a June 2008 report from the DOD Inspector General 
found that DOD had not used any funds from this account for domestic 
disaster or emergency relief assistance since it was established in 
November 1989.[Footnote 41] An official from DOD's Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 
Security Affairs acknowledged that the Defense Emergency Response Fund 
could be a source of funding but did not know why the fund has not 
been used for civil support operations. 

DOD Has Personnel to Coordinate DOD Capabilities for Civil Support, 
but Roles, Responsibilities, and Command Relationships Are Not Clearly 
Defined, and DOD Has Not Assessed Its Staff Needs: 

Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officers Constitute Important DOD Capabilities for Civil Support: 

DOD guidance and the National Response Framework state that the 
Defense Coordinating Officer, when requested by civil authorities and 
approved by DOD, serves as the single point of contact for DOD at the 
FEMA regions, and is responsible for coordinating with federal and 
state authorities on the use of military capabilities for defense 
support of civil authorities. DOD Directive 3025.1 (1993), and the 
implementing guidance for this directive, 3025.1-M, "Manual for Civil 
Emergencies" (1994), define the roles and responsibilities of the 
Defense Coordinating Officers. According to this guidance, Defense 
Coordinating Officer responsibilities require knowledge of military 
capabilities and of how to access military assets to support validated 
requirements. 

As of 2006, DOD permanently assigned 10 full-time Defense Coordinating 
Officers, along with a full-time supporting staff known as the Defense 
Coordinating Element, to each FEMA region,[Footnote 42] and colocated 
all of them with the FEMA regional headquarters. FEMA officials we 
interviewed said that these actions have greatly improved coordination 
among DOD, FEMA, and other civil authorities; previously, they said, 
their understanding of DOD capabilities was limited because they had 
only infrequent contact with the Defense Coordinating Officers. These 
FEMA officials said that the Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense 
Coordinating Elements, especially the Defense Coordinating Element's 
planners, have improved civilian authorities' awareness of DOD's 
capabilities by providing disaster planning expertise to civil 
authorities and by routinely participating in disaster exercises, 
planning conferences, and workshops throughout the FEMA regions. For 
example, they said, Defense Coordinating Officers have especially 
improved FEMA's awareness of DOD's logistical capabilities by 
informing FEMA about DOD installations and bases, located throughout 
the FEMA regions, that could be used as staging areas to pre-position 
commodities and supplies. Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense 
Coordinating Elements told us that having a full-time presence in the 
FEMA regions has allowed them to build effective relationships and 
establish trust with civil authorities. According to NORTHCOM 
officials, the Defense Coordinating Officers are a key means of 
gaining insight into civil authorities' capabilities, thus assisting 
NORTHCOM in better anticipating civil support requirements. 

The military services' Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers assist 
the Defense Coordinating Officers in executing their civil support 
responsibilities. DOD Directive 3025.16, "Military Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program" (2000), establishes DOD 
policy for the management of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officer program and creates additional points of contact within the 
military services for federal and state coordination of resources for 
emergency response. This policy directive states that the military 
services are responsible for ensuring that Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers are trained and equipped to meet the requirements of 
DOD's civil support mission. Additionally, DOD's 3025.1-M, "Manual for 
Civil Emergencies," establishes doctrinal procedures necessary for 
implementation of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer program 
to provide civil support under DOD Directive 3025.1. It provides for 
the establishment of Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer teams at 
the FEMA regions and states, and it defines the roles and 
responsibilities of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers. 
Defense Coordinating Officers told us that the Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers play a critical role in assisting them in day-to-day 
operations; in exercises that are designed to simulate a real-life 
disaster; and in disasters. For example, the Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers routinely provide situational awareness at both the 
state and FEMA regional levels by participating in meetings, planning 
workshops, and conferences; by establishing relationships with federal 
and state disaster-management officials, including the National Guard; 
and by reviewing state and federal agency disaster plans. Several of 
the Defense Coordinating Officers told us that the Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officers are their key source of information on 
state capabilities. During exercises and actual disasters, the 
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers will deploy to the State Joint 
Force Headquarters,[Footnote 43] state emergency operation centers, 
Joint Field Offices,[Footnote 44] or FEMA's Regional Response 
Coordination Centers and assist the Defense Coordinating Officer in 
validating requests-for-assistance. They provide the Defense 
Coordinating Officer with expertise on the capabilities that are 
available from their respective military services, and they serve as 
liaisons between the Defense Coordinating Officer and their military 
services, the federal agencies responsible for the Emergency Support 
Function activities,[Footnote 45] state emergency management 
officials, and National Guard officials. Almost all of the Defense 
Coordinating Officers indicated to us that the Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers were important to a great or moderate extent for 
gaining knowledge of gaps in state disaster capabilities. 

DOD Has Not Clearly Defined Roles, Responsibilities, or Command and 
Control Relationships for DOD's Civil Support Coordination Personnel: 

DOD has not updated or clearly defined the roles and responsibilities 
of the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers that it has assigned to the FEMA regions, due to gaps 
in policy and guidance for its civil support mission. As we have 
previously stated, DOD has not updated its key policies and guidance 
for the civil support mission, namely DOD Directive 3025.1 (1993), or 
the implementing guidance for this directive, 3025.1-M, "Manual for 
Civil Emergencies." This guidance continues to define the roles and 
responsibilities of the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officers, even though significant changes have 
occurred in DOD's command responsibilities and organizational 
structure for executing its civil support mission. Most notably, 
NORTHCOM and PACOM now have the responsibility for executing the civil 
support mission within their areas of responsibility, something not 
accounted for in the earlier guidance. Furthermore, DOD Directive 
3025.16, DOD's guidance for the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer 
program, has not been updated since 2000--about 2 years prior to the 
establishment of NORTHCOM. 

Since DOD has permanently assigned the Defense Coordinating Officers 
to the FEMA regions, their roles and responsibilities for the civil 
support mission have expanded, yet the existing guidance does not 
reflect their additional responsibilities. For example, DOD guidance 
defines the roles and responsibilities of the Defense Coordinating 
Officers only after they have been activated--even though Defense 
Coordinating Officers perform many activities prior to being 
activated, in an effort to assist NORTHCOM in anticipating civil 
support requirements. These activities may include establishing 
liaison among military, state, and other federal agencies; 
coordinating with service officials regarding the potential use of 
military service installations and bases for civil support operations; 
participating in federal, regional, state, and local disaster 
exercises, planning workshops, and conferences; and providing disaster 
planning expertise to civil authorities. In addition, according to a 
Defense Coordinating Officer we interviewed, the Defense Coordinating 
Officers will routinely provide assistance to civil authorities prior 
to being officially activated when it appears that a disaster 
declaration may be imminent. 

Command and Control Challenges: 

Further, DOD lacks guidance on how the Defense Coordinating Officers 
are to work with the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers for the 
civil support mission. DOD's Joint Staff Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities Standing Execute Order identifies the Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officers as military service assets that may be 
activated by the military service Secretaries in response to a 
disaster. It also states that the Defense Coordinating Officer has 
tactical control of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers 
requested by NORTHCOM. According to a NORTHCOM official, this 
operational framework is improvised as needed, and has not been 
included in any other DOD guidance. The command relationship between 
Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officers is therefore not clearly understood throughout the DOD 
organizations responsible for planning and executing civil support 
missions. 

These gaps in guidance that we have identified may limit the ability 
of the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers to fully and effectively coordinate and provide DOD 
capabilities to civil authorities. For example, according to several 
Defense Coordinating Officers we interviewed, service officials, and a 
DOD Inspector General September 2008 report,[Footnote 46] in some 
instances the military services have not been willing to activate 
their Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers to participate in 
training and exercises with the Defense Coordinating Officers. 
Further, some military service officials told us that their Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officers are required to meet training and 
exercise requirements established by their military services, and 
these requirements can sometimes conflict with the training and 
exercise requirements identified by the Defense Coordinating Officers. 
DOD officials also told us that there has been friction and confusion 
between the military services and the Defense Coordinating Officers 
regarding the proper employment of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officers. For example, military service officials told us that Defense 
Coordinating Officers have attempted to exert command and control over 
their military service Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers before 
they were officially activated. Although Defense Coordinating Officers 
and NORTHCOM officials said that the Defense Coordinating Officer and 
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer relationship has been generally 
cooperative, they noted that Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers 
on occasion have not provided assistance when requested by the Defense 
Coordinating Officers. DOD officials told us that the command and 
control relationship between the Defense Coordinating Officers--who 
are nearly all Army personnel[Footnote 47]--and the Army's Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officers is clearer, resulting in less friction. 
This is because the Army has delegated operational control over the 
Army Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers to the Defense 
Coordinating Officers on a day-to-day basis. However, the other 
military services have not done so; prior to activation for an event 
or exercise, the Defense Coordinating Officers have only coordinating 
relationships with the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers from 
the other services. Figure 3 shows an organizational chart of the 
Defense Coordinating Officer and Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officer team. 

Figure 3: Defense Coordinating Officer and Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officer Team: 

[Refer to PDF for image: Organization chart] 

Top level: Defense Coordinating Officer (Army colonel). 

Second level, reporting to Defense Coordinating Officer: Deputy 
Defense Coordinating Officer (Army lieutenant colonel). 

Third level, reporting to Deputy Defense Coordinating Officer: 
* Operations and planning staff[A] (4) (Army major, Army sergeant 
first class, Department of Army civilians); 
* Communications staff (2) (Army sergeant first class, Army sergeant); 
* Supply and logistics officer (Army staff sergeant). 

Defense Coordinating Officer has operational control over the 
following: 
* Army Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers[B] (Army 
colonel); 
* Army State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers[B] (Army colonel). 

Defense Coordinating Officer works in coordination with: 
* Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Regional Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers[B] (Air Force colonel, Navy captain, Marine Corps 
colonel); 
* Air Force and Navy State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers[B] 
(Air Force colonel, Navy captain). 

Source: DOD. 

[A] In May 2009, Army North allocated additional planning staff to 
four Defense Coordinating Elements. Regions III and IV each received 
one military planner, Region II received a military planner for Puerto 
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Region X received two military 
planners--one for Alaska and one for the National Interagency Fire 
Center, which is located in its region. In fiscal year 2010, the PACOM 
Defense Coordinating Officer for Hawaii became permanently assigned 
and currently has six full-time staff positions in its Defense 
Coordinating Element. A PACOM official told us that the command plans 
to increase this number to eight to accommodate the workload and to 
reflect the staffing changes NORTHCOM made. 

[B] Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers represent their 
service at the FEMA regional headquarters, where they serve as a 
liaison with the Defense Coordinating Officer and Element, FEMA 
regional staff, and other federal regional organizations and agencies. 
According to NORTHCOM, there are at least two Regional Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officers from each service in each of the 10 FEMA 
regions. State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers represent their 
service at the state level, usually at the state National Guard's 
Joint Force Headquarters, where they serve as a liaison with state 
organizations and agencies as well as the Defense Coordinating Officer 
and Element. According to military service officials we interviewed, 
the Air Force, Army, and Navy generally have at least one State 
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer in each state, while the Marine 
Corps does not have State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers. 

[End of figure] 

The command and control and coordination challenges we have described 
exist because the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers are under 
the operational command and control of their respective military 
services, while the Defense Coordinating Officers remain under the 
operational command and control of the combatant commands--NORTHCOM 
and PACOM. A 2008 report by the DOD Inspector General highlighted 
inefficiencies regarding coordination in DOD disaster training and 
exercises due, in part, to a lack of Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officer participation, and recommended that NORTHCOM determine whether 
the DOD 3025 series of directives provides adequate authority to 
Defense Coordinating Officers to ensure that DOD maintains an 
adequately trained and exercised Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officer program.[Footnote 48] In recognition of their critical role in 
planning, coordinating, and executing DOD's civil support mission, 
NORTHCOM has attempted to establish standard requirements for the 
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers in the following seven general 
areas: organization and structure; roles and responsibilities; 
qualification, selection, and administration; equipping and 
resourcing; training and professional development; operations and 
command and control; and reporting. However, the military services 
have opposed this NORTHCOM initiative, on the grounds that their 
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers have additional duties to 
their respective services aside from assisting the Defense 
Coordinating Officers. NORTHCOM officials maintain their view that, 
because of the lack of consistency in the military services' training 
and equipment requirements for their Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officers, it cannot be determined whether these personnel are 
adequately trained and equipped to perform the civil support mission. 
Without updated and clear guidance on the roles and responsibilities 
of the Defense Coordinating Officers and the Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers, friction and confusion between DOD commands and the 
services is likely to continue and potentially hamper the 
effectiveness of DOD's civil support mission planning and preparedness. 

Staff Composition of the Defense Coordinating Officer Program Is Not 
Based on a Staffing Needs Assessment: 

The size and composition of the Defense Coordinating Officer program 
is not based on a staffing needs assessment and therefore does not 
necessarily reflect the unique characteristics or disaster needs of 
the several FEMA regions. Disasters such as hurricanes, wildfires, and 
flooding occur in some regions more often than others. For instance, 
in 3 fiscal years of 2007 through 2009 there were only five disaster 
declarations throughout FEMA Region III, while there were 97 disaster 
declarations in Region VI. These events in Region VI represented 
nearly 25 percent of all disaster declarations nationwide for those 3 
years. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the combined relative risk of 
earthquakes and hurricanes across the United States. As figures 4 and 
5 show, different FEMA regions are prone to different disasters, with 
some regions facing greater risk of catastrophic disasters than 
others; therefore they may require different levels of personnel and 
types of expertise from DOD both in preparing for and responding to 
natural disasters. For example, one of the Defense Coordinating 
Officers told us that he could use more specialists, particularly in 
logistics and aviation. 

Figure 4: Catastrophic Risk in the United States: Earthquakes and 
Hurricanes: 

[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map] 

Map indicates ares of catastrophic risk in six gradients, from high to 
low. 

Source: Risk Management Solutions. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 5: FEMA Regions: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of the U.S.] 

Depicted on the map are the geographical boundaries of the ten FEMA 
regions, as well as the following regional headquarters: 

Region 1: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Region 2: New York, New York; 
Region 3: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 
Region 4: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Region 5: Chicago, Illinois; 
Region 6: Denton, Texas; 
Region 7: Kanas City, Kansas; 
Region 8: Denver, Colorado; 
Region 9: Oakland, California; 
Region 10: Seattle, Washington. 

National Office: Washington, DC. 

Sources: FEMA; Map Resources (maps). 

[End of figure] 

Although DOD recognizes that its civil support mission requires a 
joint effort from all the military services, its Defense Coordinating 
Officer program continues to be staffed only by Army personnel, except 
for PACOM's Navy Defense Coordinating Officer in Guam. Several DOD 
officials told us that the Defense Coordinating Officer program should 
be more reflective of the multiservice environment in which it 
operates. However, as we have noted above, there is a lack of DOD 
guidance that delineates the roles and responsibilities of the Defense 
Coordinating Officers prior to their activation, including how they 
are to coordinate with the military services' Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers with emergency preparedness activities. A September 
2008 DOD Inspector General report found that NORTHCOM has not obtained 
an equal and adequate level of effort from all the military services 
to jointly establish the Defense Coordinating Officer program, and 
recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop an 
implementation plan to migrate the staffing of Defense Coordinating 
Officer positions from the Army to all the military services and other 
DOD components, as appropriate. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff concurred with the recommendation, and the Joint Chiefs plan to 
implement actions to address the recommendation by fiscal year 2010. 
[Footnote 49] A NORTHCOM official acknowledged to us that a jointly 
staffed Defense Coordinating Officer program would be a good idea, and 
said that NORTHCOM has discussed the proposal with the military 
services. The DOD Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating 
Concept states that civil support operations are inherently joint 
endeavors, and that changes in DOD concepts, policies, authorities, 
and organizations may be required to ensure an effective and 
integrated DOD response. 

Although DOD has improved its support of civil authorities through 
improvements in the Defense Coordinating Officer program, its 
outdated, inconsistent, and unclear guidance on roles, 
responsibilities, and command and control relationships; and lack of a 
staffing needs assessment increase the risk that DOD may not be 
appropriately staffed to meet the varying needs of the FEMA regions, 
thus potentially limiting its ability to provide an optimally 
coordinated response to civil authorities with appropriate 
multiservice capabilities. 

DOD Has Established Processes to Respond to Civil Authorities, but It 
Has Not Established a Comprehensive System to Track Requests-for- 
Assistance: 

DOD Has Established Processes to Respond to Civil Authorities: 

The National Response Framework broadly calls for DOD and other 
federal agencies to respond to requests-for-assistance from state and 
local civilian authorities, and DOD follows an internal process to 
respond to these requests-for-assistance when both state and other 
federal civilian resources have been exhausted or are unavailable. How 
DOD handles these requests-for-assistance depends on various factors, 
such as whether the request is a Stafford Act or non-Stafford Act 
request; how much time has elapsed since the incident occurred; and 
the identity of the originator of the request. DOD's Joint Publication 
3-28, Civil Support, lays out the department's internal process for 
reviewing and sourcing--that is, providing military resources--for 
requests-for-assistance from other federal agencies. 

The process by which the requests-for-assistance are conducted is 
complex. The primary federal agency--usually FEMA, working in 
conjunction with the Defense Coordinating Officer and Defense 
Coordinating Element--will initiate the request-for-assistance. To 
validate the request, according to Joint Publication 3-28, the Defense 
Coordinating Officer should ensure that it is readily understandable 
and clearly describes the requirement or capability that is needed. If 
the Defense Coordinating Officer finds that the request-for-assistance 
calls for a specific asset rather than a capability, the response 
process will be lengthened as the officer and staff coordinate with 
the requesting agency to revise the request language. Further, the 
Defense Coordinating Officer/Element must evaluate all requests based 
on the six criteria established in DOD's Joint Publication 3-28, which 
are applied at all levels of DOD review. These criteria are as follows: 

* Cost: Who pays, and what is the effect on the DOD budget? 

* Appropriateness: Is the requested mission in the interest of DOD to 
conduct? Who normally performs this mission, and who may be better 
suited to fill the request? 

* Readiness: How does the request affect DOD's primary warfighting 
mission? 

* Risk: Does it place DOD's forces in harm's way? 

* Legality: Is the request in compliance with laws and Presidential 
directives? 

* Lethality: Is the potential use of force by or against DOD forces 
expected? 

The internal DOD request-for-assistance review and sourcing process is 
presented below in figure 6. This process takes place after local, 
state, and federal capabilities are exhausted or otherwise unavailable 
as shown in the National Response Framework in figure 1. 

Figure 6: DOD's Internal Process for Responding to Requests-for- 
Assistance and FEMA Mission Assignments: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Incident: 

The National Response Framework: Local response; State response 
(National Guard) Federal response (FEMA). 

Request process to FEMA. 

Mission assignment/request for assistance to Defense Coordinating 
Officer. 

Request process to NORTHCOM. 

Lead federal agency (DHS, Department of Transportation, Secret 
Service, etc.) makes request for assistance to Secretary of Defense. 

NORTHCOM makes request for assistance and request for forces to Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Director of Military Support. 

NORTHCOM works in coordination with: 
* Support Force provider (Joint Forces Command, PACOM, and/or U.S. 
Transportation Command); 
* Supporting services; 
* Supporting agencies; 
* Supporting components (e.g. Army North, Fleet Forces Command); 
all of which are staffed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Director 
of Military Support. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

After the Defense Coordinating Officer validates the request-for- 
assistance, it is simultaneously forwarded, along with the Defense 
Coordinating Officer's recommendation for action, to NORTHCOM's 
Operations Center. The Joint Directors of Military Support at the 
Joint Staff is copied on the request so it can initiate parallel 
coordination and planning efforts. At this point, NORTHCOM then 
coordinates with the appropriate supporting service commands, force 
provider, the National Guard Bureau, or any other federal or DOD 
stakeholder, depending on the nature of the incident and the requested 
capability. Once NORTHCOM reviews and approves the request, it goes to 
the Joint Directors for Military Support for approval before being 
sent up to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security 
Affairs for policy review. Finally, the request-for-assistance is 
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for his approval. Upon approval 
by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Directors of Military Support 
will issue an Execute Order to designate a command structure and to 
task the appropriate commands, services, and DOD agencies to provide 
support. 

NORTHCOM and DOD have developed two methods to expedite the request- 
for-assistance review and sourcing process. 

* First, NORTHCOM has worked with FEMA and DOD officials to develop 
prescripted mission assignments, which are descriptions of a set of 
the capabilities civil authorities might need from DOD. The 
prescripted mission assignments are developed so as to provide a 
common understanding of a capability, and they also serve as a 
template for drafting mission assignments. Most of the Defense 
Coordinating Officers told us that they use the prescripted mission 
assignments to a great extent to execute their civil support mission. 
For example, several of the Defense Coordinating Officers found the 
prescripted mission assignments useful for outlining cost information 
or language as they prepared to write mission assignments. However, 
one Defense Coordinating Officer said their usefulness for expediting 
requests-for-assistance is limited, because the requests still have to 
go through the regular process. 

* Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed the Defense Support 
of Civil Authorities Standing Execute Order, which pre-identifies 
forces that a supported combatant commander may use based upon 
historical requests for DOD assistance. Many of the Defense 
Coordinating Officers said this order is an important piece of 
guidance, because it identifies the DOD capabilities that are most 
readily available to assist civil authorities during an event. 
However, if the requested item is not listed in the Execute Order, the 
request must be channeled through the standard internal DOD request-
for-assistance process, so it will take longer. According to DOD 
officials, in some emergency cases, DOD allows for the immediate 
activation of certain assets on vocal orders from the Secretary of 
Defense, with the regular process to be performed later. 

Civil Authorities Are Not Fully Aware of DOD's Processes for 
Responding to Requests-for-Assistance: 

While DOD has developed a process to respond to requests-for-
assistance and has published portions of a description of its internal 
process as part of an annex to the National Response Framework, the 
lead civilian authorities may not be fully aware of the details or 
length of this process. For example, service and Defense Coordinating 
Element officials told us that their biggest challenge is responding 
to incidents when civil authorities request assistance too late for 
DOD to respond due to unrealistic expectations about DOD response 
times. An official at NORTHCOM concurred, saying that the only 
situations in which NORTHCOM cannot respond are those for which the 
request comes too late. Further, FEMA's Liaison Officer to NORTHCOM 
acknowledged that FEMA officials do not recognize how lengthy the DOD 
review and sourcing process is. According to several service and 
Defense Coordinating Element officials, civil authorities have the 
perception that DOD can respond immediately to a request; they do not 
realize that it takes time to identify, activate, and deploy military 
units in response to a request-for-assistance. This perception can be 
especially dangerous when aeromedical evacuation[Footnote 50] of 
patients is needed in advance of a hurricane's landfall. These 
patients have special medical needs, and a crew of specially trained 
nurses and physicians must be assembled to care for them. A U.S. 
Transportation Command official told us that requests for aeromedical 
evacuation assistance must be made early, as it takes at least 72 
hours to activate the personnel with the skills needed to execute this 
mission. Further, this official stated that these crews can safely 
operate no later than 18 hours before a hurricane makes landfall. 
DOD's capabilities-based assessment for homeland defense and civil 
support identified the response timeliness of DOD transportation 
support--including aeromedical evacuation--as a capability shortfall. 
The assessment noted that although civil authorities have identified a 
need for DOD transportation support within 24 hours of a catastrophic 
incident, DOD has limited capability to respond sooner than 72 hours 
after the incident. A NORTHCOM official suggested that educating state 
decision makers (i.e. governors and state emergency management 
officials) about DOD's response times and processes may help expedite 
their disaster declaration process so that NORTHCOM can respond before 
it is too late to do so. Without shared, comprehensive guidance 
outlining DOD's internal review and sourcing process, state and 
federal decision makers may overestimate the speed of DOD's response 
and therefore not request assistance in a timely manner. DOD could 
help to mitigate this issue by incorporating its internal processes 
for responding to requests-for-assistance in the partner guide that we 
recommended in a recent report.[Footnote 51] Doing so would provide 
DOD's interagency partners with information on the complexity of its 
internal review and sourcing process for civilian requests-for-
assistance. 

DOD Lacks a Comprehensive and Formal System That Tracks All Civilian 
Requests-for-Assistance: 

While DOD has developed a Web-based system to track incoming requests- 
for-assistance from civilian authorities, this system is not 
comprehensive and is not accessible to all of DOD's interagency 
partners. During Hurricane Katrina, DOD was unable to efficiently 
manage or track a large number of requests-for-assistance. Following 
Hurricane Katrina, U.S. Army North developed the DOD Defense Support 
of Civil Authorities Automated Support System (the tracking system) to 
monitor the approval, sourcing, cost, and progress of requests-for- 
assistance from FEMA. NORTHCOM approved the tracking system in March 
2007. 

According to a 2008 DOD Inspector General Report, the tracking system 
should enable DOD users to monitor the approval, sourcing, and 
progress of civilian requests-for-assistance. Some Defense 
Coordinating Officers, Defense Coordinating Elements, and service 
officials agree about the need for a tracking system, and others 
recognize benefits provided by the current system. However, we have 
identified gaps in the tracking system's ability to maintain a common 
operational picture and provide real-time situational awareness. 
Furthermore, the current system is not an official DOD program to 
track civilian requests-for-assistance. Its use is voluntary; there 
are no requirements mandating that requests-for-assistance and 
associated information be entered into the system. DOD officials 
indicated to us that the system is available to all DOD components and 
interagency partners who request and are granted access. 

While PACOM and NORTHCOM have agreed to use the system and they 
require their components to use it, the DOD force providers--Joint 
Forces Command and its components (such as Air Combat Command and 
Marine Forces Command)--are not utilizing the sourcing section of the 
system. Instead, Joint Forces Command and its components use 
classified systems, like Global Force Management and the Joint 
Capability Requirements Manager, to resource their civil support 
requirements. Those systems are not compatible with the unclassified 
tracking system. When asked about the DOD Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities Automated Support System, officials at Air Combat Command 
told us that they were unaware of its existence. Additionally, service 
and Defense Coordinating Element officials noted that information is 
not always entered into the system accurately, thus limiting the 
system's utility. Further, a Defense Coordinating Officer told us that 
the architects of the current system did not ask civil support 
stakeholders what they thought should be included in a request-for-
assistance tracking system. 

During the course of our audit work, we found that other DOD 
information technology systems have the potential to enhance 
situational awareness and provide a common operating picture for both 
DOD and the civilian authorities it is assisting. For example, Air 
Force North has developed the unclassified Defense Support for Civil 
Authorities Collaboration Suite for its Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officers. While this Air Force system can perform all of the same 
functions as the current unclassified tracking system, it ties in 
additional features to provide a single information collaboration 
system, such as a section noting available capabilities at each Base 
Support Installation; all state emergency management points of 
contact; anticipated requests-for-assistance based upon lessons 
learned and historical requests; a Google Earth section that maps 
weather and the locations of Air Force bases; and a section showing 
"shared situational awareness," including threat assessments and 
continuous updates of current operations. Similarly, PACOM's Joint 
Task Force-Homeland Defense has leveraged the All Hazards Decision 
Support System, an unclassified system developed by the Pacific 
Disaster Center. This system uses geospatial mapping and modeling 
capabilities to identify locations and critical areas of vulnerability 
for potential disasters. In addition, the Pacific Disaster Center's 
system provides a common operating picture by allowing 
interoperability among agencies, and it is accessible to all 
stakeholders in the disaster-management community. 

Further, despite recommendations in the April 2009 DOD Information 
Sharing Implementation Plan regarding the establishment of 
authentication and access standards across unclassified systems to 
allow DOD and its external mission partners to achieve an appropriate 
level of access to information concerning civil support operations, 
the DOD Defense Support of Civil Authorities Automated Support System 
does not provide a common operating picture for DOD and the lead 
civilian agencies. That is because the system is an internal NORTHCOM 
system and not a DOD-wide program, and attempts to link the system 
with those in other agencies, such as FEMA, have been unsuccessful in 
terms of interoperability. Therefore, FEMA and the other lead federal 
agencies, such as the U.S. Secret Service, do not necessarily have 
visibility into the system. According to FEMA officials, that lack of 
visibility constitutes a major shortfall in FEMA's ability to see the 
status of its requests. 

Finally, although there should be situational awareness among DOD and 
its interagency partners, DOD has acknowledged in its homeland defense 
and civil support capabilities-based assessment that such situational 
awareness is lacking. DOD's Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
Automated Support System is not comprehensive; it includes only those 
requests-for-assistance issued to DOD by FEMA and the National 
Interagency Fire Center.[Footnote 52] The system does not include all 
requests issued by the other federal agencies that have lead roles in 
specific cases. For example, the DOD Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities Automated Support System did not include requests-for- 
assistance from the U.S. Secret Service--the lead agency for pre- 
planned National Special Security Events[Footnote 53]--for the annual 
United Nations General Assembly, the 2008 Presidential Nominating 
Conventions, or the 2009 G-20 Summit. In September 2009, DOD was 
tasked to provide air support, bomb detection, search and rescue, and 
medical assistance to support the Secret Service for the G-20 Summit 
held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. However, the current tracking system 
contained no record of this request. 

Without a comprehensive, unclassified system that tracks requests-for- 
assistance from, and is shared with, all of DOD's interagency 
partners, gaps will remain in gaining real-time situational awareness 
and in maintaining a common operational picture of DOD's assistance 
for all participants involved in disaster-response missions. 

Conclusions: 

DOD, through both NORTHCOM and PACOM, has taken concrete steps to 
develop and enhance its defense support of civil authorities mission 
in such ways as conducting an assessment of the DOD capabilities 
needed to assist civil authorities and designating full-time personnel 
to coordinate with federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local 
civil authorities. These efforts improve DOD's overall ability to 
assist federal, state, and local authorities in the shared 
responsibility of responding to natural disasters in the United 
States. But this improvement has been limited by outdated and 
inconsistent DOD policies, guidance, and doctrine pertaining to the 
civil support mission. Unless and until these issues are addressed, 
challenges will remain in the ability of DOD commands and personnel, 
specifically the Defense Coordinating Officers and their staffs, to 
provide the support requested by civil authorities during disasters. 
Without clear roles, responsibilities, effective command and control 
structures, shared guidance, and an assessment of DOD staffing needs 
in the FEMA regions, DOD will be missing an opportunity to further 
enhance its ability to support civil authorities with the kind of 
coordinated and integrated civilian and military response to disasters 
that is intended by the National Response Framework. While DOD can 
address policy and guidance issues, there are obstacles over which it 
has no control, such as a statutory restriction on DOD's authority to 
order Reserve personnel to involuntary active duty service for 
catastrophic disaster relief, which we raised as matter for 
congressional consideration in 1993 and again in 2006.[Footnote 54] We 
continue to believe that this statutory restriction impedes DOD's 
ability to respond to and assist civilians during catastrophic natural 
disasters. To some degree, DOD will always face challenges and risks 
in this mission area because it has to be prepared for a wide variety 
of incidents that can range from a regional flood to a catastrophic 
tsunami or hurricane, while maintaining focus on its warfighting 
mission. However, DOD can make further improvements to mitigate these 
challenges and facilitate and strengthen its relationships with 
federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local civil authorities. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve DOD's ability to conduct its civil support missions, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five 
actions: 

* Direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Americas' Security Affairs to update DOD policy and guidance for civil 
support (i.e., DOD directive and instruction 3025 series) to reflect 
current doctrine, terminology, funding policy, practices, and DOD's 
organizational framework for providing civil support, to include 
clarifying NORTHCOM and PACOM roles and responsibilities for civil 
support missions; and establish time frames for completion. 

* Direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Americas' Security Affairs, in coordination with the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to: 

- clarify roles and responsibilities, including command and control 
relationships for the Defense Coordinating Officers, Defense 
Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers; 

- identify the extent to which NORTHCOM and PACOM should set training 
and equipping requirements for the Defense Coordinating Officers, 
Defense Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officers; and: 

- conduct a review of staffing requirements for the Defense 
Coordinating Officers, Defense Coordinating Elements, and Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officers in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of 
responsibility that includes but is not limited to an assessment of 
staff size, subject-matter expertise, and military service composition 
by FEMA region. 

* Direct the Joint Staff in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information 
Officer to identify and establish an official, DOD-wide, unclassified 
tracking system for all incoming requests-for-assistance from federal 
agencies regarding civil support missions. This system should at a 
minimum include: 

- requirements and guidance to ensure that the system is comprehensive 
and captures request-for-assistance data that can be used to 
anticipate civil support requirements; 

- access for FEMA and other lead federal agencies, to provide them 
with real-time situational awareness; and: 

- time frames for the system's development and implementation. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our 
recommendations and discussed some of the steps it is taking and 
planning to take to address these recommendations. DOD also provided 
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where 
appropriate. DHS and FEMA did not provide comments on this report. 

In response to our recommendation that DOD clarify roles and 
responsibilities, including command and control relationships, and 
identify the extent to which NORTHCOM and PACOM should set training 
and equipping requirements for the Defense Coordinating Officers, 
Defense Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officers, DOD said that new guidance is in coordination to describe 
roles and responsibilities for DOD entities for homeland defense and 
civil support. Further, DOD said that NORTHCOM is reviewing the 
staffing, training, and equipment requirements for the Defense 
Coordinating Elements in each FEMA region. However, it was unclear 
from DOD's comments whether and how the Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officers' roles, responsibilities, training and equipment requirements 
will be addressed in the new issuance or in the NORTHCOM review. We 
continue to believe the inclusion of the Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officers in these efforts is important to enhance DOD's 
ability to support civil authorities with the kind of coordinated and 
integrated civilian and military response to disasters that is 
intended by the National Response Framework. 

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its 
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 
30 days after its date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contacts points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report 
are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Jeff Miller:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Christopher S. Bond:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Adam Smith:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To address the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) (1) has 
identified and addressed its capability gaps for its civil support 
mission, (2) has clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and 
relationships and identified appropriate levels and types of personnel 
to assign to the FEMA regions, and (3) shares and tracks information 
concerning its civil support requirements response process with civil 
authorities, we reviewed and analyzed available DOD, U.S. Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) civil support 
guidance and 4 of the 20 civil support operational plans, as well as 
DOD's March 2009 Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based 
Assessment. 

To address all of our objectives, we compared the DOD civil support 
guidance and policies currently in place to the relevant DOD doctrine, 
which, when compared with anecdotal evidence provided by DOD and 
civilian officials, allowed us to identify the various policy and 
guidance issues raised in the report and their associated operational 
effects. To examine the extent to which DOD has identified and 
addressed its civil support capability gaps, we reviewed DOD's March 
2009 Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based Assessment 
and held discussions with NORTHCOM and other DOD officials about how 
the assessment was conducted, how NORTHCOM identified relevant 
capabilities, and how NORTHCOM and DOD plan to use the assessment in 
the future. 

We met with knowledgeable officials across a range of DOD offices and 
commands, as illustrated in table 2. At these meetings, we held 
discussions about the work and analysis that DOD has conducted in 
order to understand what forms of support civilian authorities may ask 
the department to provide during a catastrophic incident. We also held 
discussions with these officials about the policies and guidance that 
exist to provide structure to DOD's civil support mission set. 
Further, officials in these offices provided us with information on 
the day-to-day roles and responsibilities that are a part of the civil 
support mission as they work to prepare to support civil authorities 
with a wide range of potential disasters. 

Table 2: Defense Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained 
Documentary Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to the Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities Mission: 

Organization: DOD Headquarters: 

Installation or office: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, Arlington, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Reserve Affairs, Arlington, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Readiness, Arlington, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation (CAPE), Arlington, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Director of 
Military Support, Arlington, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Plans and 
Policy Directorate, Arlington, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, 
Resources, and Assessment Directorate, Arlington, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Office of the Inspector General, Arlington, 
Virginia. 

Organization: U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM): 

Installation or office: Headquarters, Petersen Air Force Base, 
Colorado Springs, Colorado. 

Installation or office: U.S. Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San 
Antonio, Texas. 

Installation or office: Marine Forces Northern Command, New Orleans, 
Louisiana. 

Installation or office: Air Force North, Tyndall Air Force Base, 
Panama City, Florida. 

Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, FEMA Region III, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, FEMA Region IV, 
Atlanta, Georgia. 

Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, FEMA Region VII, 
Kansas City, Missouri. 

Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, FEMA Region IX, 
Oakland, California. 

Organization: U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM): 

Installation or office: Headquarters, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. 

Installation or office: U.S. Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. 

Installation or office: Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense, Fort 
Shafter, Hawaii. 

Installation or office: U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 

Installation or office: Marine Forces Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. 

Installation or office: Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, 
Hawaii. 

Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, Hawaii and 
American Samoa, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. 

Installation or office: Defense Coordinating Officer, Andersen Air 
Force Base, Guam. 

Organization: U.S. Joint Forces Command: 

Installation or office: Headquarters, Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia. 

Organization: U.S. Transportation Command: 

Installation or office: Headquarters, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. 

Installation or office: Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, 
Illinois. 

Installation or office: Military Sealift Command, U.S. Navy Yard, 
Washington, District of Columbia. 

Organization: National Guard Bureau: 

Installation or office: Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia. 

Organization: U.S. Army: 

Installation or office: Office of Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Arlington, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy 
Chief of Staff G-3/5/7, Arlington, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Army Medical Command, Office of the U.S. Army 
Surgeon General, Falls Church, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia. 

Organization: U.S. Navy: 

Installation or office: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Infrastructure, Strategy and Analysis, Arlington, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Naval Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk Naval 
Station, Virginia. 

Organization: U.S. Marine Corps: 

Installation or office: Headquarters Marine Corps, Homeland Defense 
Branch, Security Division--Plans, Policies and Operations, Arlington, 
Virginia. 

Installation or office: Marine Forces Command, Norfolk Naval Station, 
Virginia. 

Organization: U.S. Air Force: 
Installation or office: Headquarters Air Force Operational Plans and 
Requirements, Director of Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy, 
Rosslyn, Virginia. 

Installation or office: Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, 
Virginia. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

We met with FEMA officials at both the national and regional levels to 
understand how they work with DOD both in identifying capability gaps 
during planning stages and how they channel state and federal requests-
for-assistance to DOD during an actual incident. They discussed with 
us the evolution of the FEMA-DOD relationship, as well as 
relationships between DOD officials and state and local civil 
authorities. Table 3 shows the federal civilian offices and agencies 
with whom we met. 

Table 3: Federal Civilian Departments and Agencies Where GAO Obtained 
Documentary Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to the Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities Mission: 

Department or agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): 

Office: Headquarters, Disaster Operations Directorate, Washington, 
District of Columbia. 

Office: Headquarters, National Preparedness Directorate, Washington, 
District of Columbia. 

Office: FEMA Region III, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

Office: FEMA Region IV, Atlanta, Georgia. 

Office: FEMA Region VII, Kansas City, Missouri. 

Office: FEMA Region IX, Oakland, California. 

Office: FEMA Liaison Officer to NORTHCOM, Petersen Air Force Base, 
Colorado Springs, Colorado. 

Office: FEMA Pacific Area Office, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. 

Department or agency: Department of Health and Human Services: 

Office: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response, Washington, District of Columbia. 

Department or agency: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: 

Office: Headquarters, Atlanta, Georgia. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

In the course of our audit work we visited four FEMA regions (FEMA 
regions III, IV, VII, and IX) that were selected because they deal 
with a range of National Special Security Events such as the Olympics, 
political conventions, and the Super Bowl, as well as a variety of 
natural disasters including hurricanes, earthquakes, wildland fires, 
and floods. During our visits to these FEMA regions we not only met 
with FEMA officials, but with the Defense Coordinating Officers and 
their staff in those regions to discuss their role as DOD's 
representatives to FEMA, other civilian authorities, and other 
military officials (including the National Guard) in their assigned 
states and regions. They provided us with anecdotal and documentary 
evidence on their roles, responsibilities, and relationships in their 
respective regions. When they were available, we also met with some of 
the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, who are military service 
representatives. Specifically, we met with an Army Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officer in Region III, one Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officer from the Army, one from the Air Force, and one from 
the Navy in Region IV, and one Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer 
from each of the four services in Region IX. 

Subsequent to our meetings with DOD, FEMA, and other federal civilian 
officials, we reviewed the guidance, policies, and other documentation 
we obtained from them and compared it with the anecdotal information 
that those officials shared with us during our meetings in support of 
all of our objectives. We noted discrepancies and areas of concern, 
then followed up with military and civilian officials as appropriate. 
Additionally, we reviewed previous GAO and DOD Inspector General 
reports to identify what, if any, progress and changes had occurred in 
the area of defense support of civil authorities over the last several 
years, specifically since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 

Following our visits to Defense Coordinating Officers in four of the 
FEMA regions, we decided to contact the Defense Coordinating Officers 
in all 10 FEMA regions to obtain a nationwide perspective of our 
objectives. In order to obtain detailed information about the extent 
to which DOD has identified and addressed its capability gaps for its 
civil support mission; identified and defined roles, responsibilities, 
and relationships of personnel assigned to the FEMA regions; and 
shares and tracks information concerning its civil support 
requirements response process with civil authorities, we developed a 
structured questionnaire and sent it to all 12 Defense Coordinating 
Officers assigned to the PACOM and NORTHCOM areas of responsibility. 
The questionnaire included a variety of questions, covering issues 
ranging from the guidance the Defense Coordinating Officers use to 
execute their civil support mission to the methods and mediums (such 
as regional exercises or planning conferences) they use to identify 
capability gaps in their region. The questionnaire also asked what 
challenges, if any, the Defense Coordinating Officers face when 
anticipating and responding to requests-for-assistance and in 
identifying capability gaps at both the federal and state levels. 

Since we intended to survey the universe of Defense Coordinating 
Officers at PACOM and NORTHCOM, our survey was not a sample survey and 
therefore had no sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties 
of conducting any survey may introduce other types of errors, commonly 
referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in 
interpreting a particular question, sources of information available 
to respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing them can 
introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps 
in developing the questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing 
them to minimize such nonsampling errors. For example, a social 
science survey methodologist helped design the questionnaire in 
collaboration with GAO staff that had subject-matter expertise. The 
questionnaire was also reviewed by an independent GAO survey 
specialist. The survey asked a combination of questions that allowed 
for open-ended and close-ended responses. We pretested the content and 
format of the questionnaire with two Defense Coordinating Officers to 
ensure that the questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to 
understand. During the pretests, we asked questions to determine 
whether (1) the survey questions were clear, (2) the terms we used 
were precise, (3) the questionnaire did not place an undue burden on 
the respondents, and (4) the questions were unbiased. We received 
input on the survey and made changes to the content and format of the 
final questionnaire based on our pretest results. Since there were 
relatively few changes based on the pretests and we were conducting 
surveys with the universe of respondents--all PACOM and NORTHCOM 
Defense Coordinating Officers--we did not find it necessary to conduct 
additional pretests. 

Data analysis was conducted by a GAO data analyst working directly 
with GAO staff with subject-matter expertise. A second independent 
analyst checked all of the computer programs for accuracy. 

Following this extensive work on developing a questionnaire to collect 
data in a standardized and structured manner, we sent the 
questionnaire by e-mail on October 8, 2009, in an attached Microsoft 
Word form that respondents could return electronically after marking 
checkboxes or entering narrative responses into open-answer boxes. 
Alternatively, respondents could return the survey by mail after 
printing the form and completing it by hand. Both PACOM Defense 
Coordinating Officers returned the completed surveys to GAO 
electronically. However, NORTHCOM Defense Coordinating Officers were 
told by their command leadership not to send the completed surveys to 
GAO, but instead route them through the NORTHCOM headquarters 
Inspector General. Since this position posed both considerable 
methodological problems for the integrity of the data we wanted to 
analyze and would not allow for anonymity and transparency in 
responses, we instead elected to conduct structured interviews with 
all 10 NORTHCOM Defense Coordinating Officers individually over the 
phone using the same questionnaire to promote candid discussions that 
may not have been obtained through a NORTHCOM screening process. 

We combined the information gathered from the telephonic interviews 
and analyzed the frequency and distribution of marked checkbox 
responses. We also analyzed the open-ended narrative responses for 
trends and recurring themes. For instance, although we did not 
directly ask about the extent to which personnel coordinating DOD's 
civil support mission are joint, several Defense Coordinating Officers 
said that the Defense Coordinating Officer and Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officer programs were not joint and that this made their work 
more challenging than it needed to be. When the Defense Coordinating 
Officers were not in agreement or had different perspectives on 
issues, we summarized conflicting responses to illustrate the 
complexity of the Defense Coordinating Officers' mission and the 
unique challenges found in each region. For example, some Defense 
Coordinating Officers told us they were sufficiently staffed with 
their current personnel, when others said they badly need more staff 
to assist them with their mission and to engage with the states within 
their regions. We compiled this information and used it in conjunction 
with the interviews from the four FEMA region visits, our meetings 
with DOD and FEMA officials, and our review of documents and guidance 
to identify areas for improvement in DOD's ability to provide support 
to civil authorities and respond to requests-for-assistance. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to March 2010 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Homeland Defense & Americas' Security Affairs: 
2600 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-2600: 

March 10, 2010: 

Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. D'Agostino: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO 10-386, "Homeland Defense: DoD Can Enhance Efforts to 
Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities During Disasters" 
dated February 3, 2010 (Job Code 351317). DoD concurs with all three 
recommendations. Responses to the recommendations are enclosed.
Our point of contact for this action is Mr. Andrew Kuepper, Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 
Security Affairs (OASD (HD&ASA)), (703) 614-8618 or 
andrew.kuepper@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Christine E. Wormuth: 
Principal Deputy: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

Enclosure: 

GAO Draft Report — Dated February 3, 2010: 
GAO Code 351317/GA0-10-386: 

"Homeland Defense: DoD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to
Support Civil Authorities During Disasters" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) to update DoD policy and 
guidance for civil support (i.e., DoD directive and instruction 3025 
series) to reflect current doctrine, terminology, funding, policy, 
practices, and DoD's organizational framework for providing civil 
support, to include clarifying U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and 
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) roles and responsibilities for civil 
support missions; and establish timeframes for completion. 

DoD Response: Concur. Several draft issuances are in coordination; DoD 
Directive 3025.dd, Defense Support of Civil Authorities with estimated 
completion date (ECD) June 2010; DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3025.ff, 
Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, ECD August 2010; 
DoDI 3025.gg, Defense Support of Special Events, ECD September 2010. 
Corresponding Joint Publications will be updated by September 2011. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) in coordination with the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to: 

* Clarify roles and responsibilities, including command and control 
relationships for the Defense Coordinating Officers, Defense 
Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers; 

* Identify the extent to Which U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and 
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) should set training and equipping 
requirements for the Defense Coordinating Officers, Defense 
Coordinating Elements, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers; 
and; 

* Conduct a review of staffing requirements for the Defense 
Coordinating Officers, Defense Coordinating Elements, and Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officers in both the OSNORTHCOM and USPACOM areas 
of responsibility that includes, but is not limited to, an assessment 
of staff size, subject matter expertise, and military service 
composition by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region. 

DoD Response: Concur. A new issuance is in coordination to describe 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant command, 
Service, and Defense Agency roles and responsibilities to include 
coordination and control for homeland defense and civil support. The 
Defense Coordinating Officers and Elements are combatant command 
representatives in the FEMA regions. USNORTHCOM is reviewing the 
staffing, training, and equipment requirements for the Defense 
Coordinating Elements in each FEMA region. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information 
Officer (ASD(NII)), to identify and establish an official, DoD-wide, 
unclassified tracking system for all incoming requests for
assistance from Federal agencies regarding civil support missions. 
This system should at minimum include: 

* Requirements and guidance to ensure that the system is comprehensive 
and captures request-for-assistance data that can be used to 
anticipate civil support requirements; 

* Access for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other lead
Federal agencies, to provide them with real-time situational 
awareness; and; 

* Timeframes for the system's development and implementation. 

DoD Response: Concur. DoD also needs access to the FEMA mission 
tracking system in order to maintain visibility of the Mission 
Assignments FEMA has asked DoD to support. Allowing DoD and FEMA to 
have access to each other's tracking system will provide the best 
potential for insuring accurate situational awareness on mission 
assignments between DoD and the Primary Agency in accordance with the 
National Response Framework. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, William O. Jenkins, Jr., 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice; Lorelei St. James, Acting 
Director; Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Assistant Director; Nicholas Benne; 
Grace Coleman; Michael Hanson; David Lysy; Lonnie J. McAllister; Eric 
E. Petersen; Terry Richardson; Bethann E. Ritter; Wesley Sholtes; 
Cheryl Weissman; and Jena Whitley made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] NORTHCOM was created in April 2002 as part of a revised Unified 
Command Plan, which outlines the areas of responsibility for the 
combatant commands. It became officially operational on October 1, 
2002. 

[2] NORTHCOM differs from other combatant commands in that, in 
addition to Canada and Mexico, its area of responsibility includes the 
49 North American U.S. states and the District of Columbia, as well as 
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. U.S. Pacific Command has 
homeland defense and civil support responsibilities for the state of 
Hawaii and the U.S.'s Pacific territories of Guam, American Samoa, and 
the Northern Mariana Islands. These responsibilities are outlined in 
DOD's Unified Command Plan, most recently in 2008. 

[3] For the purposes of this report, we will refer to defense support 
of civil authorities, known in most of DOD as "DSCA," as "civil 
support." We are not including DOD support of civilian law enforcement 
or for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 
explosives (CBRNE) incidents in the scope of this report. 

[4] The National Response Framework--formerly called the National 
Response Plan--is a national-level guide to how local, state, and 
federal governments respond to incidents resulting from all kinds of 
hazards. The framework is based on the principal of tiered response, 
starting from local communities and working up to include support from 
the other levels of government and the private sector. Department of 
Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2008). 

[5] This does not include U.S. Coast Guard forces, which are under the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or the National Guard, which, 
unless federalized by the President, would remain under the authority 
of the respective state and territory governors. 

[6] See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, vii 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2007). 

[7] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but 
Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness, Tracking Gaps, and Other 
Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008); Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been 
Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command's Coordination with the States 
and the National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-252] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 
2008); Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness 
Efforts Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and 
Risk Mitigation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-696] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007); Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to 
Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-60] (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 26, 2007); Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions 
Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness 
and Stated National Priorities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-143] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 
2007); Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 
2006); Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide 
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-643] (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 
2006); and Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. 
Forces for Domestic Military Missions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-670] (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2003). 

[8] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise 
Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be 
Improved, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-849] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009). 

[9] GAO, Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues 
Challenge DOD's Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Incidents, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-123] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 
2009). 

[10] NORTHCOM has designated 10 Defense Coordinating Officers and 
Defense Coordinating Elements, one in each of the 10 FEMA regions. 
However, since FEMA Region IX is located in both NORTHCOM and PACOM, 
PACOM has established two Defense Coordinating Officers of its own, 
one under the Army for the state of Hawaii and the territory of 
American Samoa, and one under the Navy for the territories of Guam and 
the Northern Marianas. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are 
part of FEMA Region II and are covered by the NORTHCOM Defense 
Coordinating Officer and Element for Region II. 

[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-123]. 

[12] GAO, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance 
Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support 
Missions, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-364] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010). 

[13] In GAO-10-364, we state that "to facilitate and institutionalize 
a unified approach between DOD and its federal partners for 
interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support 
missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, to establish a time line to develop and issue a partner 
guide that identifies the roles and responsibilities of DOD entities, 
processes, and agreed-upon approaches for interagency coordination for 
homeland defense and civil support efforts." 

[14] The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101 
(2002). 

[15] The National Preparedness System is intended to provide a tool to 
assist jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations at all levels to 
plan for, assess, and track capabilities in a shared environment. 

[16] The National Guard holds a unique dual status in that it performs 
federal missions under the command of the President and state missions 
under the command of the state's Governor. Currently, DOD funding for 
the National Guard's federal warfighting mission provides for the vast 
majority of the National Guard's personnel, training, and equipment. 
The National Guard can use the capabilities provided by DOD--such as 
transportation, engineering, medical, and communications units and 
equipment--when available to respond to domestic emergencies while 
operating under the command of the Governors and generally paid for 
with state funding. However, under certain circumstances such as large-
scale, multistate events, homeland security-related activities, or 
federally declared disasters, federal funding has been provided for 
missions carried out by the states' National Guard. 

[17] The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a mutual aid 
agreement among member states and is administered by the National 
Emergency Management Association. States affected by disasters have 
increasingly relied on the Emergency Management Assistance Compact as 
a means to access resources from other states, including emergency 
managers, National Guard assets, and first responders. GAO, Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's Collaborative and 
Administrative Capacity Should Improve National Disaster Response, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-854] (Washington, D.C.: 
June 29, 2007). 

[18] The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707 (1988), amended the Disaster Relief Act of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288 (1974). The Stafford Act constitutes the 
statutory authority for most federal disaster response activities, 
especially as they pertain to FEMA and FEMA programs. 

[19] As we noted earlier, for the purposes of this report, we have 
scoped out other civil support activities such as counterdrug 
operations and management of the consequences of a terrorist incident 
employing a weapon of mass destruction. 

[20] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework 
(Washington, D.C.: January 2008), and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 
Pub. 3-28, Civil Support. 

[21] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, II-4. 

[22] 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2007). 

[23] A recent change due to the 2008 National Defense Authorization 
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-181, §§1811, 1812, and 1813 (2008). 

[24] An Execute Order is a directive to implement an approved military 
course of action. 

[25] A spot report is a concise narrative report of essential 
information covering events or conditions that may have an immediate 
and significant effect on current planning and operations. 

[26] At the time of our review, PACOM was in the process of converting 
the part-time Army Reserve Defense Coordinating Officer for Hawaii and 
American Samoa to a full-time, active duty position like the NORTHCOM 
Defense Coordinating Officers. 

[27] At the time of our review, the Marine Corps only provided 
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers to the 10 FEMA regions and did 
not have any in individual states. The other three military services 
informed us that they generally have at least one Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officer in each of the states and territories. 

[28] North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States 
Northern Command, Vision 2020, (Oct. 1, 2007). 

[29] The assessment was in accordance with DOD's Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System, which sets forth an integrated, 
collaborative process to identify and guide the development of new 
capability requirements that address the current and emerging security 
environment. 

[30] According to the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities- 
Based Assessment, mission assurance is defined as a process to ensure 
that assigned tasks or duties can be performed in accordance with the 
intended purpose or plan. It is a summation of the activities and 
measures taken to ensure that required capabilities and all supporting 
infrastructures are available to DOD to carry out the National 
Military Strategy. 

[31] Under the civil support heading, NORTHCOM included CBRNE 
Decontamination Support, CBRNE Urban Search and Rescue, and Biological 
Incident Support. We have not included them because they are outside 
the focus of this review. Additionally, DOD included Riverine Presence 
and U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security Levels as a capability gap 
relevant to the civil support mission. However, this capability 
primarily involves DOD maritime support to civil authorities for 
activities such as combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, and 
law enforcement activities. 

[32] GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to 
Catastrophic Disasters, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-186] (Washington, D.C.: July 
23, 1993) and GAO-06-643. 

[33] 10 U.S.C. § 12304 (c) (1) (2010). 

[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251]. 

[35] The Commission on National Guard and the Reserves, Transforming 
the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, 
Final Report (Arlington, VA: Jan. 31, 2008). 

[36] GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to 
Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 30, 2009). 

[37] In January 2010, DOD officials stated that the Integrated 
Planning System is currently under reconsideration by the National 
Security Council. 

[38] DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, 
para. 4.4.8.2 (Jan. 15, 1993). 

[39] DOD Directive 3025.1, para. 4.4.8.2 (1993). 

[40] The capabilities-based assessment also noted that DOD is in the 
process of implementing Section 1815 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-181, §1815 (2008)), which 
requires DOD to work with DHS to determine the military-unique 
capabilities DOD needs to provide for civil support operations and to 
prepare a plan to provide funds and resources to maintain existing 
military-unique civil support capabilities or any additional 
capabilities required for homeland defense and civil support missions. 
According to the capabilities-based assessment, these efforts will 
ultimately inform the fiscal year 2012 programming and budget cycles 
with military-unique or other civil support capabilities required for 
DOD to respond to catastrophic or other incidents of national 
significance. 

[41] DOD, Office of the Inspector General, Defense Emergency Response 
Fund. Report Number D-2008-105, (Arlington, VA: June 20, 2008). 

[42] Prior to this time, the Defense Coordinating Officers provided 
disaster assistance to civil authorities on a part-time basis because 
they also served as Army training brigade commanders. In this role, 
they were primarily responsible for training Army reserve component 
personnel for warfighting missions. 

[43] State Joint Force Headquarters provides command and control of 
all National Guard forces in a state or territory for the governor. 

[44] Joint Field Offices are temporary federal multi-agency 
coordination centers established locally to facilitate field-level 
domestic incident management activities. 

[45] The Emergency Support Function structure of the National Response 
Framework provides the mechanism for coordinating federal interagency 
support for a federal response to an incident, and groups functions 
most frequently used to provide federal support to states and federal- 
to-federal support during a disaster. The National Response Framework 
includes 15 Emergency Support Functions ranging from transportation to 
external affairs issues, with federal agencies designated as a 
coordinator, primary agency, or supporting agency (e.g., Department of 
Transportation is the coordinator and primary agency for Emergency 
Support Function #1 Transportation). 

[46] DOD, Office of the Inspector General, Approval Process, Tracking, 
and Financial Management of DOD Disaster Relief Efforts. Report Number 
D-2008-130, (Arlington, VA: Sept. 17, 2008). 

[47] NORTHCOM's 10 Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense 
Coordinating Elements are all staffed by Army personnel. However, in 
PACOM, the Defense Coordinating Officer for the state of Hawaii and 
the territory of American Samoa is under the Army, and the one for the 
territories of Guam and the Northern Marianas is under the Navy. 

[48] DOD Office of the Inspector General, Report Number D-2008-130. 
Because the recommendation had been redirected to NORTHCOM from the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 
Security Affairs, NORTHCOM had not provided an official comment on 
this recommendation at the time the DOD Inspector General report was 
published. 

[49] According to the DOD Inspector General's office as of February 
2010, the Joint Staff has coordinated a follow-up inquiry with 
NORTHCOM, the military services, and the National Guard Bureau. There 
is general support for the concept of developing an implementation 
plan to migrate the staffing of Defense Coordinating Officer positions 
from the Army to all of the services and other DOD components, as 
appropriate. NORTHCOM will establish a working group to determine 
whether to pursue the idea of sourcing the Defense Coordinating 
Officers from the other services, to include developing a migration 
plan, if applicable. 

[50] Aeromedical evacuation involves the movement of patients to and 
between medical facilities by air transportation. 

[51] In GAO-10-364, we state that "to facilitate and institutionalize 
a unified approach between DOD and its federal partners for 
interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support 
missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, to establish a time line to develop and issue a partner 
guide that identifies the roles and responsibilities of DOD entities, 
processes, and agreed-upon approaches for interagency coordination for 
homeland defense and civil support efforts." 

[52] As we were drafting our report in December 2009, three requests- 
for-assistance from the Department of Transportation for the August 
2007 Minnesota bridge collapse were added to the DOD Defense Support 
of Civil Authorities Automated Support System. Since they were added 
to the system over 2 years after the event, we are not including the 
Department of Transportation as a federal agency with information in 
the system. 

[53] National Special Security Events are events of national 
significance, by virtue of their profile or status, that represent a 
significant target and, therefore, warrant additional preparation, 
planning, and mitigation efforts. 

[54] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-186] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-643]. 

[End of section] 

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