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entitled 'Department Of State: Additional Steps Needed to Address 
Continuing Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts' which was 
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Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the 
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

September 2009: 

Department Of State: 

Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing Staffing and Experience 
Gaps at Hardship Posts: 

GAO-09-874: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-874, a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of 
Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 
Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of State (State) has designated about two-thirds of its 
268 overseas posts as hardship posts. Staff working at such posts often 
encounter harsh conditions, including inadequate medical facilities and 
high crime. Many of these posts are vital to U.S. foreign policy 
objectives and need a full complement of staff with the right skills to 
carry out the department’s priorities. As such, State offers staff at 
these posts a hardship differential—an additional adjustment to basic 
pay—to compensate officers for the conditions they encounter and as a 
recruitment and retention incentive. 

GAO was asked to assess (1) State’s progress in addressing staffing 
gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect of any remaining gaps, 
and (2) the extent to which State has used incentives to address 
staffing gaps at hardship posts. GAO analyzed State data; reviewed 
relevant documents; met with officials in Washington, D.C.; and 
conducted fieldwork in five hardship posts. 

What GAO Found: 

Despite some progress in addressing staffing shortfalls since 2006, 
State’s diplomatic readiness remains at risk due to persistent staffing 
and experience gaps at key hardship posts. Several factors contribute 
to these gaps. First, State continues to have fewer officers than 
positions, a shortage compounded by the personnel demands of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Second, while State has reduced its mid-level experience 
gap, the department does not anticipate eliminating this gap until 2012 
and continues to face difficulties attracting experienced applicants to 
hardship posts—especially posts of greatest hardship. Third, although 
State’s assignment system has prioritized the staffing of hardship 
posts, it does not explicitly address the continuing experience gap at 
such posts, many of which are strategically important, yet are often 
staffed with less experienced officers. Staffing and experience gaps 
can diminish diplomatic readiness in several ways, according to State 
officials. For example, gaps can lead to decreased reporting coverage, 
loss of institutional knowledge, and increased supervisory requirements 
for senior staff, detracting from other critical diplomatic 
responsibilities. 

Table: Examples of Overseas Posts with Various Hardship Differentials, 
as of September 2008: 

Posts: Buenos Aires, Osaka, Paris; Hardship differential (percentage of 
base pay): 0; 
Hardship: [Empty]; 
Greatest hardship: [Empty]. 

Posts: Amman, Bogotá, Windhoek; 
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 5; 
Hardship: [Empty]; 
Greatest hardship: [Empty]. 

Posts: Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur, Sao Paulo; 
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 10; 
Hardship: [Empty]; 
Greatest hardship: [Empty]. 

Posts: Lima, Mexico City, Moscow; 
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 15; 
Hardship: [Check]; 
Greatest hardship: [Empty]. 

Posts: Jeddah, Manila, Sofia; 
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 20; 
Hardship: [Check]; 
Greatest hardship: [Empty]. 

Posts: Beirut, Kathmandu, Lagos; 
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 25; 
Hardship: [Check]; 
Greatest hardship: [Check]. 

Posts: Monrovia, Nairobi, Shenyang; 
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 30; 
Hardship: [Check]; 
Greatest hardship: [Check]. 

Posts: Baghdad, Dushanbe, Kabul; 
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 35; 
Hardship: [Check]; 
Greatest hardship: [Check]. 

Source: State. 

[End of table] 

State uses a range of incentives to staff hardship posts, but their 
effectiveness remains unclear due to a lack of evaluation. Incentives 
to serve in hardship posts range from monetary benefits to changes in 
service and bidding requirements, such as reduced tour lengths at posts 
where dangerous conditions prevent some family members from 
accompanying officers. In a 2006 report on staffing gaps, GAO 
recommended that State evaluate the effectiveness of its incentive 
programs for hardship post assignments. In response, State added a 
question about hardship incentives to a recent employee survey. 
However, the survey does not fully meet GAO’s recommendation for 
several reasons, including that State did not include several 
incentives in the survey. State also did not comply with a legal 
requirement to assess the effectiveness of increasing danger and 
hardship pay in filling certain posts. Recent legislation increasing 
Foreign Service Officers’ basic pay will increase the cost of existing 
incentives, thereby heightening the importance that State evaluate its 
incentives for hardship post assignments to ensure resources are 
effectively targeted and not wasted. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends the Secretary of State (1) take steps to minimize the 
experience gap at hardship posts by making the assignment of 
experienced officers to such posts an explicit priority consideration, 
and (2) develop and implement a plan to evaluate incentives for 
hardship post assignments. State generally agreed with our findings and 
recommendations. 

View GAO-09-874 or key components. For more information, contact Jess 
T. Ford at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Persistent Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts Can 
Compromise Diplomatic Readiness: 

State Has Wide Range of Measures and Incentives to Staff Hardship Posts 
but Their Effectiveness is Unclear Due to Lack of Evaluation: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Department of State Generalist Staffing Surplus/Deficit by 
Career Track: 

Appendix III: 2009 Historically Difficult to Staff and Service Need 
Differential Posts: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Number and Percentage of Mid-Level Generalist Positions Filled 
by Officers Working above Grade, as of September 30, 2008: 

Table 2: Foreign Service Mid-Level Generalists' Surplus/(Deficit) 
across Career Tracks, as of December 31, 2008: 

Table 3: Financial and Nonfinancial Incentives and Requirements for 
Service at Hardship Posts: 

Table 4: Foreign Service Generalists' Surplus/(Deficit) across Career 
Tracks, as of December 31, 2008: 

Table 5: Historically Difficult to Staff and SND Posts for 2009 Summer 
Assignments Cycle: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Distribution of Overseas Foreign Service Posts and Positions 
by Hardship Differential, as of September 30, 2008: 

Figure 2: Average Number of Bids per Position by Hardship Differential 
for Grades 2, 3, and 4 for 2008: 

Figure 3: Average Bids per Generalist Career Track by Hardship 
Differential for 2008: 

Abbreviations: 

DRI: Diplomatic Readiness Initiative: 

FSO: Foreign Service Officer: 

GEMS: Global Employee Management System: 

HR/CDA: Office of Career Development and Assignments: 

MC: minister counselor: 

OC: counselor: 

OIG: Office of Inspector General: 

OPM: Office of Personnel Management: 

SND: Service Need Differential: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 17, 2009: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable George V. Voinovich: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Department of State (State) has designated roughly two-thirds of 
its 268 overseas posts as hardship posts.[Footnote 1] Staff working in 
such locations often encounter harsh environmental and living 
conditions that can include inadequate medical facilities, limited 
opportunities for spousal employment, poor schools, high levels of 
crime, and severe climate. In addition to the high number of hardship 
posts State must staff, the number of positions in locations too 
dangerous for some family members to accompany an officer has grown 
considerably in recent years, from more than 700 in 2006 to over 900 at 
the end of fiscal year 2008. Many hardship posts are of critical 
importance to U.S. foreign policy objectives and necessitate a full 
complement of staff with the right skills to carry out the department's 
priorities. 

In recent years we have reported on a number of human capital issues 
facing State, including staffing deficits at hardship posts that 
negatively impact diplomatic readiness.[Footnote 2] We reported in 2002 
that State's staffing shortfalls and ineffective assignment system 
compromised diplomatic readiness at hardship posts.[Footnote 3] 
Subsequently, we reported in 2006 that State had made progress in 
addressing overall staffing shortfalls since implementing its 
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), which enabled the department to 
hire and train more than 1,000 employees above attrition from 2002 to 
2004; however, the initiative did not fully meet its goals and mid- 
level vacancies remained a problem at critical posts.[Footnote 4] 
Furthermore, the department faces the continuing challenge of staffing 
embassy compounds in the conflict zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. To 
help meet these challenges, the Congress authorized additional 
positions for State in 2008--the first new positions outside the 
department's consular and worldwide security upgrade programs since 
2004, according to State. Moreover, State has requested over 700 
additional Foreign Service Officer (FSO) staff in its fiscal year 2010 
budget request. 

In response to your request, this report discusses (1) State's progress 
in addressing staffing gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect 
of any remaining gaps, and (2) the extent to which State has used 
incentives to address staffing gaps at hardship posts. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed GAO and State Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) reports and analyzed staffing, bidding, and 
position data. We also examined surveys conducted by State, analyzed 
State documents that outline incentives for hardship service, and 
collected data on participation in and funds expended on hardship 
incentive programs. Additionally, we met with officials in State's 
Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Bureau of 
Administration, six regional bureaus, and the American Foreign Service 
Association. To assess the impact of staffing gaps and State's use of 
hardship incentives firsthand, we conducted fieldwork in Lagos and 
Abuja, Nigeria; Shenyang, China; and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
We selected these posts for their level of hardship, their strategic 
importance to the United States, and the low number of staff applying 
for each position. Specifically, the locations in Nigeria and Shenyang 
are posts of greatest hardship and the locations in Saudi Arabia are 
hardship posts which, at the time of our visit, had 1-year tours. In 
addition to our fieldwork, we conducted telephone interviews with 
senior officials in several additional hardship locations, including 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Liberia, and Tajikistan. We also convened an 
expert roundtable of several retired senior State officials, all of 
whom previously served as ambassadors to hardship posts. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through September 
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

State is the lead agency responsible for implementing American foreign 
policy and representing the United States abroad. It staffs 
approximately 268 embassies, consulates, and other posts with over 
8,000 Foreign Service positions overseas.[Footnote 5] Roughly two- 
thirds of these posts are in locations that qualify for a special 
salary differential[Footnote 6] to compensate officers for the harsh 
living conditions experienced there. The differential ranges from 5 to 
35 percent of basic pay and is determined by a number of factors 
including extraordinarily difficult living conditions, excessive 
physical hardship, or notably unhealthy conditions affecting at least a 
majority of employees stationed at such a post.[Footnote 7] Figure 1 
shows the distribution of overseas posts and positions by hardship 
differential. In general, tours of duty are two years in the United 
States and at 20 percent and 25 percent hardship posts. Tours at other 
posts are generally three years, although a number of posts in 
locations too dangerous for some family members to accompany an officer 
carry 1-year tours. 

Figure 1: Distribution of Overseas Foreign Service Posts and Positions 
by Hardship Differential, as of September 30, 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Hardship differential percentage: 0-10%; 
Posts with no or low hardship differential: 149 (52%); 
Positions: 3,843 (48%); 

Hardship differential percentage: 15-20%; 
Hardship posts: 50 (19%); 
Positions: 2,008 (25%). 

Hardship differential percentage: 25-35%; 
Posts of greatest hardship: 79 (29%); 
Positions: 2,233 (28%). 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

FSOs serving abroad fall into two broad categories: generalists and 
specialists. FSO generalists help formulate and implement the foreign 
policy of the United States and are grouped into five career tracks: 
management, consular, economic, political, and public diplomacy. FSO 
specialists provide support services at overseas posts worldwide or in 
Washington, D.C., and are grouped into seven major categories: 
administration, construction engineering, information technology, 
international information and English language programs, medical and 
health, office management, and security. State requires its FSOs to be 
available for service anywhere in the world, and reserves the ability 
to direct officers to any of its posts overseas or to its Washington 
headquarters. However, directed assignments are rare. The process of 
assigning FSOs to their positions typically begins when the staff 
receive a list of upcoming vacancies for which they may compete. Staff 
then submit a list of positions for which they want to be considered, 
or "bids," to the Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) 
and consult with their career development officer. The process varies 
depending on an officer's grade and functional specialty: 

* Entry-level officers' assignments are directed by the Entry Level 
Division of HR/CDA with little input from the posts or bureaus. 

* Mid-level officers consult with bureaus and overseas posts to market 
themselves for their desired positions. Subsequently, HR/CDA convenes 
panels to finalize the assignments.[Footnote 8] 

* Senior-level officers are selected for their positions by the 
Director General,[Footnote 9] following approval of policy-level 
positions by a special committee. As with mid-level officers, HR/CDA 
convenes a panel to finalize the assignments. 

In recent years, State has taken a series of measures to address gaps 
and reallocate staff to emerging priority nations. In 2002, State 
implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) to address 
staffing and training gaps that, according to the department, 
endangered U.S. diplomatic readiness. Through the DRI--a 3-year, $197 
million program--State hired 1,069 new foreign and civil service 
employees above attrition. However, as we previously reported, most of 
this increase was absorbed by the demand for personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In 2006, State introduced the Global Repositioning 
Program, which reallocated existing positions to emerging high-priority 
countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. The primary focus of 
this program was to move political, economic, and public diplomacy 
officers from places like Washington and Europe to countries of 
increasing strategic importance such as China and India. 

Persistent Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts Can 
Compromise Diplomatic Readiness: 

Despite some progress since we last reported in 2006, State has 
continued to face staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts that 
may compromise its diplomatic readiness. Several factors contribute to 
gaps at hardship posts, including State's overall staff shortage, which 
is compounded by the significant personnel demands of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and a mid-level staffing deficit that has been reduced, 
but not eliminated. Moreover, State continues to experience difficulty 
in attracting officers to hardship posts and its assignment system does 
not explicitly address the experience gap at these posts. Staffing and 
experience gaps at hardship posts can diminish diplomatic readiness in 
a variety of ways, according to current and former State officials, 
including by reducing reporting coverage, weakening institutional 
knowledge, and increasing the supervisory burden on senior staff. 

Staffing and Experience Gaps Remain at Key Hardship Posts: 

State continues to face staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts, 
including many of significant strategic importance to the United 
States. First, State has faced difficulty in filling critical positions 
at hardship posts. In its FY 2007 Annual Performance Report, State 
identified staffing of critical positions--designated positions at the 
posts of greatest hardship (those with hardship differentials of at 
least 25 percent)--as a key priority, noting that such positions are 
often on the forefront of U.S. policy interests. As such, State 
established a target for fiscal year 2007 of filling 90 percent of such 
critical positions with qualified bidders by the end of the assignments 
cycle.[Footnote 10] However, State reported filling 75 percent of its 
critical positions, thereby missing its target. State further noted 
that it would be unable to fill more than 75 percent of critical 
positions until its resource needs were met. Subsequently, the 
department lowered its target to 75 percent for fiscal year 2008, which 
it reported it met. 

In addition to staffing gaps specific to critical positions, State 
faces its highest rate of vacancies at the posts of greatest hardship. 
[Footnote 11] As of September 2008, State had a 17 percent average 
vacancy rate at the posts of greatest hardship--nearly double the 
average rate of 9 percent at posts with no hardship 
differentials.[Footnote 12] Vacancies at posts we visited during our 
review included a mid-level public affairs position in Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia,[Footnote 13] that was vacant as of September 2008 and, at the 
time of our March 2009 visit, was not expected to be filled until June 
2009. Similarly, a section chief in Lagos, Nigeria,[Footnote 14] stated 
that prior to his arrival at post in August 2008, his position had been 
vacant for nearly a year. Although there were few vacancies in 
Shenyang, China,[Footnote 15] at the time of our visit, nearly one- 
quarter of the staffed positions had been vacant for 4 months or more 
before their current incumbents arrived. 

Beyond higher position vacancy rates, posts of greatest hardship face 
experience gaps due to a higher rate of staff filling positions above 
their own grades (see table 1).[Footnote 16] As of September 2008, 
about 34 percent of mid-level generalist positions at posts of greatest 
hardship were filled by officers in upstretch assignments[Footnote 17]--
15 percentage points higher than the upstretch rate for comparable 
positions at posts with no or low differentials. Furthermore, as of the 
same date, 25 of 34 (over 70 percent) of all overseas generalists 
working two grades above their rank were located at hardship posts. 
[Footnote 18] 

Table 1: Number and Percentage of Mid-Level Generalist Positions Filled 
by Officers Working above Grade, as of September 30, 2008: 

Posts with no or low differentials: 210 of 1,093 (19 percent); 
Hardship posts: 328 of 1,053 (31 percent); 
Posts of greatest hardship: 189 of 551 (34 percent). 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[End of table] 

At posts we visited during our review, we observed numerous officers 
working in positions above their rank. For example, in Abuja, Nigeria, 
[Footnote 19] more than 4 in every 10 positions were staffed by 
officers in upstretch assignments, including several employees working 
in positions two grades above their own. We also found multiple 
officers in upstretch assignments in Shenyang, including one mid-level 
consular position that officials stated has never been filled at grade. 

Several Factors Contribute to Gaps at Hardship Posts: 

A number of factors lead to gaps at hardship posts, including: 

* State's overall staff shortage, which is compounded by the 
significant personnel demands of Iraq and Afghanistan; 

* a persistent mid-level staffing deficit exacerbated by continued low 
bidding on hardship posts; and: 

* an assignment system that does not explicitly address the continuing 
experience gap at hardship posts. 

Overall Foreign Service Staffing Shortage Compounded by Personnel Needs 
of Iraq and Afghanistan: 

As of April 2009, State had about 1,650 vacant Foreign Service 
positions in total. Approximately 270 of these vacancies were due to 
State not having enough employees to fill all of its positions--a 
shortfall that has grown since our last report.[Footnote 20] Officers 
attending training or rotating from post to post without replacements 
to fill their positions accounted for most of the remaining 1,380 
vacancies.[Footnote 21] As we reported in 2006, State implemented DRI 
with the intention of hiring enough new employees above attrition to 
allow staff time for critical job training--also referred to as a 
"training float"--and to respond to emerging crises. However, as we 
previously reported, this goal became quickly outdated largely due to 
staffing demands for Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, due to the 
overall shortage of FSOs and the high priority of meeting Iraq and 
Afghanistan's staffing needs, bureaus have had to identify nearly 670 
positions to leave unfilled, or "frozen," since 2005. As a result, 
State has generally been able to find candidates to fill positions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan[Footnote 22]--its top priority posts--but doing so 
has created gaps elsewhere, including at other hardship posts. For 
instance, positions that bureaus decided not to fill in the 2009 
assignments cycle included several positions at hardship posts, such as 
an economic officer in Lagos, a management officer in Shenyang, and 
three or more positions each in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Mexico City, 
Mexico; and Moscow, Russia. 

State officials also noted that the pressing need to staff Iraq and 
Afghanistan has led officers serving elsewhere to interrupt or cancel 
their current tours and volunteer for service in those two countries, 
thereby leaving other posts with unexpected gaps. For example, a senior 
official stated that a key political/military officer position in 
Russia was vacant due to the incumbent volunteering for a year of 
service in Afghanistan. The senior official further stated that he 
anticipated it would be difficult to find a temporary replacement for 
the unexpected vacancy. Similarly, officials in the Bureau of East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs told us an officer who received nearly a year 
of language training in Vietnamese canceled her tour in Vietnam to 
serve in Iraq. 

Although State recently received a significant increase in resources 
and has requested more, the extent to which this influx will allow the 
department to eliminate vacancies is unclear. State received funding 
for about 140 additional Foreign Service positions in fiscal year 2008. 
Subsequently, in fiscal year 2009, State received about 720 additional 
Foreign Service positions that, according to the department, largely 
allowed it to fill vacancies created by personnel serving in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and increases in language training.[Footnote 23] The 
department has requested nearly 740 additional Foreign Service 
positions for fiscal year 2010 that, according to State's 2010 
Congressional Budget Justification, will allow it to begin expanding 
its presence according to strategic priorities. However, given that 
about 1,650 positions were vacant as of April 2009, it is unclear if 
the approximately 1,600 positions received or requested will enable 
State to both eliminate vacancies and expand its operations as stated. 
[Footnote 24] 

Despite Some Progress, Mid-Level Experience Gap Remains: 

While new resources may enable State to partially address vacancies and 
the department has reduced its mid-level deficit since 2006, the 
remaining shortage of mid-level officers represents a continuing 
experience gap. As of December 2008, State had 85 fewer mid-level 
generalist officers than positions (see table 2)--an improvement on the 
deficit of 316 that we previously reported. However, as of the same 
date, State faced a 28 percent greater deficit at the FS-02 level than 
it did in 2006, with mid-level positions in the public diplomacy and 
consular cones continuing to experience the largest shortages of staff 
overall. 

Table 2: Foreign Service Mid-Level Generalists' Surplus/(Deficit) 
across Career Tracks, as of December 31, 2008: 

Grade level: Mid level 1; 
Management: (37); 
Consular: 17; 
Economic: 44; 
Political: 57; 
Public diplomacy: (67); 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty]; 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 14. 

Grade level: Mid level 2; 
Management: (84); 
Consular: 51; 
Economic: 36; 
Political: 16; 
Public diplomacy: 
Grade level: (223); 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty]; 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): (204). 

Grade level: Mid level 3; 
Management: 87; 
Consular: (129); 
Economic: 19; 
Political: 8; 
Public diplomacy: 120; 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty]; 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 105. 

Grade level: Total; 
Management: (34); 
Consular: (61); 
Economic: 99; 
Political: 81; 
Public diplomacy: (170); 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: (85); 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[End of table] 

According to a senior State official, the department will continue to 
face a deficit at the FS-02 level until 2012. The official told us that 
the department plans to manage this experience gap by assigning 
officers in the FS-03 grade to stretch positions. However, as we 
discuss later in this report, positions filled by officers in upstretch 
assignments can compromise diplomatic readiness. State has also 
accelerated promotions of FS-03 officers to address the experience gap. 
For instance, State's Five-Year Workforce Plan for Fiscal Years 2008 
through 2012 projects that it will take about 8 years for officers 
hired in 2008 to be promoted to the FS-02 level. By contrast, officers 
promoted to the FS-02 level in 2003 had an average time-in-service of 
10.7 years. However, according to State, additional acceleration of 
promotions is unlikely given the potential risks associated with 
promoting officers with insufficient experience. 

Despite Improvements, Low Bidding on Hardship Posts Continues to 
Exacerbate Mid-Level and Other Staffing Deficits: 

Although hardship posts have experienced an increase in bidding since 
we last reported, they continue to have difficulty attracting bids from 
experienced officers. Figure 2 shows the average number of bids on FS- 
02, FS-03, and FS-04 positions at overseas posts by differential rate 
for the 2008 summer assignments cycle.[Footnote 25] 

Figure 2: Average Number of Bids per Position by Hardship Differential 
for Grades 2, 3, and 4 for 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Uncollected AD/CV Duties 	
Difference Between Estimated and Final AD/CV Duty Rate (Percentage 
Points) 

Hardship differential percentage: 0; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 18.3; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 22.0; 
Bids/Positions: 
Muscat: 2.5; 
Matamoros: 4; 
Rabat: 7.3; 
Berlin: 8.6; 
Prague: 9.5; 
Helsinki: 11; 
Osaka-Kobe: 12; 
Bridgetown: 12.8; 
Paris: 13.7; 
Gaborone: 14.8; 
Montevideo: 19; 
Wellington: 20; 
Santiago: 21; 
Nagoya: 22; 
Toulouse: 24; 
Buenos Aires: 25.2; 
Singapore: 28.7; 
Perth: 30; 
Barcelona: 31; 
Belfast: 32; 
Toronto: 34.5; 
Nicosia: 36; 
Sydney: 39. 
	
Hardship differential percentage: 5%; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 11.8; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 13.3; 
Bids/Positions: 
Amman: 5.1; 
Hermosillo; 8; 
Johannesburg: 9.4; 
Bogota: 13; 
Reykjavik: 15; 
Port Louis: 17.5; 
Windhoek: 20.3. 

Hardship differential percentage: 10%; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 12.4; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 12.4; 
Bids/Positions: 
Nuevo Laredo: 2; 
Adana: 4; 
Brasilia: 6.8; 
Kuwait: 8.2; 
Durban: 9.3; 
Sao Paulo: 14.3; 
Riga: 16.6; 
Bangkok: 18.2; 
Kuala Lumpur: 21.1; 
Istanbul: 26.4; 
Chiang Mai: 37. 

Hardship differential percentage: 15%; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 10.0; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 9.7; 
Bids/Positions: 
Kingston: 4.5; 
Ciudad Juarez: 6.4; 
Moscow: 7.8; 
Beijing: 10.7; 
Mexico City: 12.9; 
Belgrade: 14.7; 
Lima: 15.9; 
Bucharest: 17; 
Bandar Seri Begewan: 19.5; 
Suva: 26. 

Hardship differential percentage: 20%; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 7.9; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 6.0; 
Bids/Positions: 
Kolonia: 2; 
Abidjan: 3.3; 
Riyadh: 6.2; 
Jeddah: 6.4; 
Podgorica: 8.7; 
Dhahran: 9.8; 
Minsk: 10.9; 
Lusaka: 12; 
Manila: 13.7; 
Sofia: 16.3; 
Belmopan: 20. 

Hardship differential percentage: 25+%; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 4.5; 
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 3.2; 
Bids/Positions: 
Juba: 0; 
Shenyang: 1.5; 
Lagos: 2.6; 
Abuja: 3; 
Monrovia: 3.8; 
Georgetown: 4.4; 
Dushanbe: 5.3; 
Dili: 6; 
Beirut: 7.9; 
Baku: 8.8; 
Nairobe: 9.8; 
Phonm Penh: 11.6; 
Kathmandu: 12.8. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 


Note: The lines in the graph show the median of the average number of 
bids for each differential rate. Selected posts are named as examples 
of locations at each hardship differential. 

[End of figure] 

Since our 2006 report, the median average[Footnote 26] of all bids on 
hardship posts has increased by about 20 percent (from 5 to 6). 
[Footnote 27] The increase has been more pronounced for posts of 
greatest hardship, which received a median average of 4.5 bids per post 
in 2008--about 40 percent higher than the median average of 3.2 bids we 
previously reported. However, hardship posts continue to have 
difficulty attracting bids from experienced officers. Specifically, 
positions at hardship posts received a median average of 4 bids from at-
grade officers, including a median average of 2.7 at-grade bids for 
positions at the posts of greatest hardship. By contrast, posts with no 
or low hardship differentials received a median average of over 9 at- 
grade bids. Furthermore, as of September 2008, hardship posts comprised 
over 90 percent (62 of 67) of posts that State classified as 
historically difficult to staff[Footnote 28] for 2009. 

Low bidding on hardship posts exacerbates State's staffing deficits-- 
particularly its shortage of mid-level consular and public diplomacy 
officers. Figure 3 shows the average number of bids per generalist 
career track for each hardship differential in the summer 2008 
assignments cycle. While all generalist career tracks received about 3 
to 4 times fewer bids at the posts of greatest hardship than at posts 
with no differentials in 2008, consular and public diplomacy positions 
received among the fewest bids on average--3.6 and 4.3, respectively. 
Given that State faces its largest staff shortages in mid-level 
consular and public diplomacy positions, low bidding for such positions 
at hardship posts increases the difficulty of filling them. 

Figure 3: Average Bids per Generalist Career Track by Hardship 
Differential for 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Hardship differential percentage: 0%; 
Consular: 14.1; 
Economic: 17.8; 
Management: 19.7; 
Political: 15.5; 
Public diplomacy: 12.5. 

Hardship differential percentage: 5%; 
Consular: 7.6; 
Economic: 18.5; 
Management: 13; 
Political: 10.8; 
Public diplomacy: 6.3. 

Hardship differential percentage: 10%; 
Consular: 11.2; 
Economic: 12.6; 
Management: 14.8; 
Political: 15.2; 
Public diplomacy: 8.3. 

Hardship differential percentage: 15%; 
Consular: 6.4	
Economic: 14.5	
Management: 4	
Political: 8	
Public diplomacy: 7.8 

Hardship differential percentage: 20%; 
Consular: 4.5; 
Economic: 11.6; 
Management: 11.2; 
Political: 7; 
Public diplomacy: 10.1. 

Hardship differential percentage: 25+%; 
Consular: 3.6; 
Economic: 6.2; 
Management: 6.1; 
Political: 5.7; 
Public diplomacy: 4.1. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[End of figure] 

State's Assignment System Prioritizes Staffing of Key Hardship Posts, 
but Does Not Explicitly Address Continuing Experience Gap: 

State has taken steps in recent years to prioritize staffing of 
hardship posts. For example, in the 2007 assignments cycle, State 
assigned staff to hardship positions it considered critical--including 
in Iraq and Afghanistan--prior to assigning staff to positions 
elsewhere. Similarly, in the 2008 assignments cycle, State assigned 
staff to the posts of greatest hardship before assigning staff 
elsewhere. However, as we noted earlier in this report, hardship posts 
face a higher rate of upstretch assignments than posts with no or low 
differentials--an experience gap that State's assignment system does 
not explicitly address. For example, while State's instructions to 
bidders for the 2007 and 2008 assignments cycles did emphasize the 
staffing of hardship positions, the instructions did not differentiate 
between filling the positions with at-grade officers and filling them 
with officers below the positions' grades. Although State's 
instructions to bidders clearly state that employees bidding on stretch 
assignments compete against at-grade bidders, the low number of at- 
grade bids on hardship positions limits the likelihood that such 
positions will be filled by at-grade officers. Furthermore, in the 
assignments cycles for 2007 through 2009, State consistently permitted 
upstretch assignments to hardship posts 1 to 3 months prior to 
permitting upstretch assignments to posts with low or no hardship 
differentials, which may have encouraged officers with less experience 
to bid on hardship posts. According to State, upstretch assignments can 
be career-enhancing in some cases; however, the experience gap they 
represent--particularly at the mid-levels--can compromise diplomatic 
readiness. 

Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts Can Compromise 
Diplomatic Readiness: 

Current and former State officials, including recently retired 
ambassadors and former directors general who participated in a GAO 
expert roundtable, staff currently posted overseas, and officials in 
Washington told us that staffing gaps at hardship posts diminish 
diplomatic readiness in a variety of ways. According to these 
officials, gaps can lead to decreased reporting coverage, loss of 
institutional knowledge, and increased supervisory requirements for 
senior staff, which take time away from other critical diplomatic 
responsibilities. 

Senior management at selected posts had concerns that vacant positions 
caused an increased workload on officers at posts, which may detract 
from important functions. For example, the economic officer position in 
Lagos, whose responsibility is solely focused on energy, oil, and 
natural gas, was not filled in the 2009 cycle. The incumbent explained 
that, following his departure, his reporting responsibilities will be 
split up between officers in Abuja and Lagos. He said this division of 
responsibilities would diminish the position's focus on the oil 
industry and potentially lead to the loss of important contacts within 
both the government ministries and the oil industry. A 2008 Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) inspection of Freetown, Sierra Leone, noted 
concern over the effect of a sudden vacancy when the embassy's sole 
political/economic officer cut his tour short to serve in Iraq. 
[Footnote 29] This vacancy deprived the embassy of its only reporting 
officer and the resulting transition period caused officials in 
Washington to be dissatisfied with economic reporting on issues such as 
the diamond industry and its impact on political instability, money 
laundering, drug smuggling, and, perhaps, terrorism. Similarly, an 
official told us that a political/military officer position in Russia 
was vacant because of the departure of the incumbent for a tour in 
Afghanistan, and the position's portfolio of responsibilities was 
divided among other officers in the embassy. According to the official, 
this vacancy slowed negotiation of an agreement with Russia regarding 
military transit to Afghanistan. 

Another potentially adverse effect of staffing gaps is that important 
post-level duties, such as reporting and staff development, may suffer 
from inexperience when entry-level officers are staffed to mid-level 
positions. While officials at post said that some officers in stretch 
positions perform well, others told us that the inexperience of entry-
level officers serving in mid-level capacities can have a negative 
impact. For example, the economic section chief at one post we visited 
stated that reporting produced by an entry-level officer in a mid-level 
position lacked the necessary analytical rigor. The political section 
chief at the same post noted that a mid-level position responsible for 
reporting on terrorism was staffed by an officer serving two grades 
above his current grade level with no previous reporting experience. A 
2008 OIG inspection of N'Djamena, Chad, found that difficulties 
attracting staff with the requisite skills and experience contributed 
to deviations from standard operating procedures.[Footnote 30] 

Another consequence of staffing gaps is that senior-level staff at 
posts with no experienced mid-level officers are diverted from key 
responsibilities by the need to supervise inexperienced entry-level 
staff. In 2006, we found that senior staff at several posts spent more 
time on operational matters and less time on overall planning, policy, 
and coordination than should be the case. On our recent visits, we 
found that there are still inexperienced officers taking on mid-level 
responsibilities and that these officers require more supervision and 
guidance from senior post leadership than more experienced mid-level 
officers would require; as a result, the senior officers have less time 
to perform high-level planning and policy implementation. According to 
officials we met with, inexperienced officers sometimes perform 
essential tasks such as adjudicating visas, identifying political 
trends, and assisting American citizens abroad; therefore, they often 
require guidance on how to carry out such activities. When senior-level 
officials must serve as the only source of guidance, post officials 
explained, they have less ability to plan and coordinate policy. For 
example, the ambassador to Nigeria told us spending time helping 
officers in stretch positions is a burden and interferes with policy 
planning and implementation. The consular chief in Shenyang told us he 
spends too much time helping entry-level officers adjudicate visas and, 
therefore, less time managing the section. A 2008 OIG inspection of 
N'Djamena, Chad, reported that the entire front office was involved in 
mentoring entry-level officers and that this was an unfair burden on 
the ambassador and deputy chief of mission, given the challenging 
nature of the post.[Footnote 31] 

In addition to gaps in established positions, some State officials at 
overseas posts told us that there are not enough authorized positions 
to manage the heavy workload at some posts. These officials stated that 
even if the department had an adequate number of people to fill all 
current positions, there would still be a need for additional positions 
and officers to fill them because the current workload outweighs the 
workforce. For example, a senior official at one post told us that her 
embassy did not have enough authorized management positions to support 
the rapid increase in staff for all government agencies located there. 
As a result, the ambassador placed a moratorium on the addition of any 
new staff from any agency until the embassy received more management 
officer positions. The official explained that the moratorium has 
prevented some agencies from adding staff to implement important 
programs related to health, education, and counternarcotics efforts. 
During the GAO expert roundtable of former ambassadors to hardship 
posts, a former director general said that one of his former posts had 
so many visitors that four officers had to deal primarily with visits 
and not their other responsibilities. In addition, according to the 
ambassador to Liberia, the embassy in Monrovia lacks adequate staff 
positions to meet its goals. She said it is not uncommon for one 
section to work twenty hours of overtime in one week. The ambassador 
listed four new positions that she believes should be authorized but, 
according to her, will not likely be added in the next few years. The 
State OIG also commented on the need for reasonable growth in Monrovia 
in a 2008 mission inspection.[Footnote 32] A 2009 OIG inspection of 
Nouakchott, Mauritania, noted concern that without another political 
officer in the embassy, the post would not have the depth needed to 
adequately cover the rapidly evolving political situation and achieve 
department goals in the country.[Footnote 33] Similarly, officials in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, noted that the creation and filling of a 
political/economic section chief position, as they have requested in 
their Mission Strategic Plan, would alleviate the current need for 
entry-level officers to report directly to the consul general. 

State Has Wide Range of Measures and Incentives to Staff Hardship Posts 
but Their Effectiveness is Unclear Due to Lack of Evaluation: 

State uses a range of incentives to staff hardship posts, but their 
effectiveness remains unclear due to a lack of evaluation. Incentives 
to serve in hardship posts range from monetary benefits to changes in 
service and bidding requirements. In 2006, we recommended that State 
evaluate the effectiveness of its incentive programs for hardship post 
assignments, but the department has not yet done so systematically. 
Further, recent legislation will increase the cost of existing 
incentives, thereby increasing the need for State to fully evaluate its 
incentives to ensure resources are effectively targeted and not wasted. 


State Has a Wide Range of Measures and Other Incentives to Staff 
Hardship Posts: 

State has created a wide range of measures and financial and 
nonfinancial incentives to encourage mid-level officers to seek 
assignments to--and remain at--hardship posts around the world. These 
have included some measures designed for all hardship posts, as well as 
others tailored specifically to fill positions in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
posts State has declared to be the highest priority. 

In addition to hardship and danger pay, incentives to bid on--and 
remain in--hardship posts, particularly those considered historically 
difficult to staff, include: 

* The opportunity to include upstretch jobs on core bid list. Mid-level 
officers may include bids for upstretch positions in their "core bid" 
list, provided that the position is at a hardship post or the officer 
is serving at a hardship post when the bid list is due.[Footnote 34] 
State generally requires employees to maintain a list of six "core 
bids" on positions at their grade level. State often offers upstretch 
assignments as a reward for strong performance and as a career-
enhancing opportunity. 

* Eligibility to receive student loan repayments. Officers who accept 
assignments to posts with at least a 20 percent hardship differential 
or any danger pay allowance may be offered student loan repayments as a 
recruitment or retention incentive. 

* Extra pay to extend tour in certain posts. Employees who accept a 3-
year assignment at certain historically difficult to staff posts 
qualifying for the Service Need Differential (SND) program are eligible 
to receive an additional hardship differential over and above existing 
hardship differentials, equal to 15 percent of the employee's basic 
compensation.[Footnote 35] 

* One year of service at unaccompanied or certain difficult to staff 
posts. State has established a 1-year tour of duty at posts considered 
too dangerous for some family members to accompany an officer, in 
recognition of the difficulty of serving at such posts. Additionally, 
employees may negotiate shorter tours to historically difficult to 
staff posts, provided it is in the interest of the service. 

* Consideration for promotion. State instructs the selection boards who 
recommend employees for promotion to "...weigh positively creditable 
and exemplary performance at hardship and danger posts..." However, the 
instructions only identify Iraq and Afghanistan by name. 

State has taken special measures to fill positions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, including assigning officers to these two posts before 
assigning them to other posts. Incentives for officers to serve in Iraq 
and Afghanistan include: 

* Priority consideration for onward assignments. State has instituted a 
program whereby a Foreign Service employee may be selected for his/her 
assignment for 2010 at the same time as he/she is selected for a 2009 
Iraq assignment. 

* The option to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan on detail and extend 
current assignment. State allows officers to serve in Iraq or 
Afghanistan on detail from Washington or their current post of 
assignment, which provides financial and other benefits. For example, 
officers serving on detail from Washington, D.C., retain locality 
pay.[Footnote 36] Moreover, according to State officials, officers who 
leave their families at their current post of assignment to serve on 
detail avoid the disruption of moving their families and may extend 
their tour at their current post of assignment from 3 years to 4 years, 
which may be particularly attractive for officers with school age 
children as it enables more educational continuity.[Footnote 37] 

* Favorable consideration for promotion. State's selection boards that 
recommend employees for promotion are expected to look favorably on 
service in Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, State instructs the 
boards to "particularly credit performance in Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams and other regional operations in Iraq, which the President and 
Secretary of State have determined to be of the highest priority." 

In addition to incentives, State has rules requiring certain employees 
to bid on positions at hardship posts. These Fair Share rules require 
designated FSOs to bid on a minimum of three posts with a 15 percent or 
higher differential pay incentive in two geographic areas.[Footnote 38] 

Table 3 lists the various incentives and requirements across posts, 
based on hardship differential. 

Table 3: Financial and Nonfinancial Incentives and Requirements for 
Service at Hardship Posts: 

Category: Financial; 

5% & 10%: 
Hardship differential; 

15%: 
Hardship differential; 
Danger pay; 
SND; 
Student loan repayment program[A]; 

20%: 
Hardship differential; 
Danger pay; 
SND; 
Student loan repayment program; 

25% to 35%: 
Hardship differential; 
Danger pay; 
SND; 
Student loan repayment program; 

Combat Zones: 
Hardship differential; 
Danger pay; 
Student loan repayment program; 
Retain DC locality pay; 
Family stays at post if sent on 1-year TDY OR can elect separate 
maintenance allowance; 
Special differential (20% for FS-01, FS-02, FS-03, and FS-04 levels if 
serve more than 180 days). 

Category: Nonfinancial; 

5% & 10%: 
Negotiated tours[B]; 
Favorable consideration in promotion boards. 

15%: 
Meets Fair Share requirements; 
Staff eligible to bid for a position one grade higher than their 
current grade level; 
Negotiated tours; 
Favorable consideration in promotion boards. 

20%: 
Meets Fair Share requirements; 
Staff eligible to bid for a position one grade higher than their 
current grade level; 
Negotiated tours; 
Favorable consideration in promotion boards. 

25% to 35%: 
Meets Fair Share requirements; 
Staff eligible to bid for a position one grade higher than their 
current grade level; 
Negotiated tours; 
Favorable consideration in promotion boards. 

Combat Zones: 
Meets Fair Share requirements (after 6 months in Iraq, 10 months in 
Afghanistan); 
Staff eligible to bid for a position one grade higher than their 
current grade level; 
Onward assignments; 
Favorable consideration in promotion boards; 
Extension of previous assignment. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[A] Officers who accept assignments to posts with at least a 20 percent 
hardship differential or any danger pay allowance are eligible for 
student loan repayments. 

[B] Nonstandard tours of duty may be negotiated if a post is 
historically difficult to staff and the tour length is in the interest 
of the service. 

[End of table] 

Although State offers a range of incentives, it does not routinely 
track or report on their total cost. In response to our request for 
cost information, State queried its payroll system and estimated that 
it spent about $83 million on hardship pay, $30 million on danger pay, 
and about $3 million on SND in fiscal year 2008. The cost information 
indicates that the amount spent on financial incentives has increased 
in recent years. According to the State OIG, in fiscal year 2005, the 
department spent about $65 million on hardship pay, $16 million on 
danger pay, and $3 million on SND.[Footnote 39] Separately, State 
reports the amount spent on student loan repayments to the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) as part of that office's statutory 
requirement to report annually to the Congress on agencies' use of 
student loan repayments.[Footnote 40] According to our analysis of data 
from OPM's report for 2007, State repaid about $2.5 million of student 
loans to FSOs in that year. 

Although not all incentives cost money, they may present other 
tradeoffs. First, State officials report that the 1-year tour of duty 
to Iraq has been a useful recruitment tool.[Footnote 41] However, these 
and other officials told us that the 1-year tour length makes it 
difficult for FSOs to form the relationships with their counterparts in 
other governments necessary for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. For 
example, a State official told us of a recent instance where the U.S. 
government needed information on a Middle Eastern country's 
relationship with another nation in the region. However, none of the 
four political officers at the U.S. embassy in the country had 
sufficient contacts with the host government to obtain the information 
required. Consequently, the U.S. embassy needed to ask State 
headquarters to obtain the information from the host government by way 
of that country's embassy in the United States, resulting in delayed 
reporting of the information. A former Director General told us that 1- 
year tours result in a loss of institutional knowledge and program 
continuity. Second, the opportunity to bid on stretch assignments is an 
incentive because such assignments may be career-enhancing. However, as 
noted earlier in this report, senior officials may need to supervise 
and guide officers in stretch positions more than officers in positions 
at their current grade levels. 

State Has Not Systematically Evaluated Effectiveness of Incentive 
Programs for Hardship Post Assignments: 

State has not systematically evaluated the effectiveness of its 
incentive programs, despite recommendations to do so. Agency officials 
cited the difficulty of evaluating the impact of any single incentive 
because of the numerous factors involved, but State has not taken 
advantage of available tools to evaluate incentive programs. State has 
not generated sufficient data to evaluate the impact of the favorable 
consideration for promotion and the SND program in attracting employees 
to bid on, or remain in, hardship post assignments. State also did not 
comply with a congressional mandate to evaluate recent increases in 
hardship and danger pay. 

State's Effort to Evaluate Effectiveness of Incentive Programs for 
Hardship Posts is Insufficient: 

State's efforts to evaluate hardship incentives remain insufficient. We 
previously reported that State created a number of incentives to 
address the growing number of vacancies at hardship posts to achieve 
its goal of having the right people in the right place with the right 
skills.[Footnote 42] However, in 2006, we reported State had not 
measured the effectiveness of hardship incentives, and recommended 
State systematically evaluate the effectiveness of such measures, 
establishing specific indicators of progress and adjusting the use of 
the incentives based on this analysis. State responded to this 
recommendation by including a question on the impact of incentives to 
its biennial employee quality of life survey, but this step does not 
fully respond to our recommendation for three reasons. 

First, the survey's incentive question is not specific enough. State 
included the question "How important was each of the following in your 
decision to bid on overseas positions during the last assignment cycle 
in which you submitted bids?" in its most recent Quality of Life at 
Work survey. The question then listed 11 items, some of which are 
incentives (e.g., hardship pay) and others are generic aspects of 
overseas assignments (e.g., security). While the survey provides some 
limited information, the survey question does not ask about the 
influence of the incentives on officers' willingness to bid on--and 
remain in--hardship post assignments. Further, by mixing incentives and 
other aspects of hardship post assignments, the question dilutes the 
focus on the incentives. Moreover, the list of incentives included is 
incomplete. For example, it does not ask employees about the extent to 
which the opportunity to include upstretch jobs on their core bid list 
or the favorable promotion consideration by selection boards impact 
their decisions to bid on hardship post assignments. Excluding some 
incentives from the survey hampers State's ability to evaluate the 
effectiveness of programs for hardship post assignments individually 
and collectively. 

Second, the overall survey design has limitations preventing State 
officials from segregating responses by post and also does not collect 
key demographic information. For example, the survey data do not allow 
State officials to determine which responses came from posts with no 
hardship differential, such as London, United Kingdom, and which came 
from posts of greatest hardship, such as Lagos, Nigeria. The survey 
also does not ask respondents for key demographic information, such as 
age and family status. The absence of this information makes it 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of the incentives as they apply 
to posts differently. Further, the appeal of one incentive relative to 
another incentive may differ based upon an officer's personal 
circumstances. 

Third, State did not establish specific indicators of progress against 
which to measure the survey responses over time. As previously noted, 
State tracks the percentage of critical positions filled with qualified 
bidders by the end of the assignments cycle. However, State has not 
attempted to link this information to the survey results, as suggested 
by government management standards.[Footnote 43] Since the survey 
incentive question is so vague, tracking it over time would not provide 
a useful indicator of progress to assess the outcomes of its programs 
for hardship post assignments. 

While State Cites External Constraints for Evaluating Incentives, 
Proper Evaluation Design and Execution May Help Meet This Challenge: 

State has not taken advantage of available tools to evaluate incentive 
programs for hardship post assignments. State officials maintain that 
external constraints make it challenging to evaluate the department's 
incentive programs. They reported that, in their view, it is not 
possible to isolate the effectiveness of a single incentive because of 
the large number of factors staff consider when bidding on assignments. 
Specifically, the department cited the difficulties of capturing the 
personal and family preferences and values that influence bid decisions 
in a database.[Footnote 44] While acknowledging the challenges of this 
type of analysis, there are statistical methods and procedures to help 
determine the extent of association between the key variables of 
interest, while controlling for the effect of other measurable factors 
that could influence outcomes. Further, cost-effectiveness analysis-- 
which attempts to systematically quantify the costs of alternatives and 
assumes that each alternative results in achieving the same benefits-- 
can be an appropriate evaluation tool when dollar values cannot be 
ascribed to the benefits of a particular program. 

State Has Not Generated Data to Measure Key Incentives: 

While State has taken steps to improve its data collection effort, it 
does not collect sufficient information to determine whether the SND 
program or the instructions to selection boards to weigh service at 
hardship posts positively are having an impact on bidding on hardship 
posts. State has increased the amount of data it collects on the SND 
program since we last reported in 2006, but more information is needed 
to evaluate the program's effectiveness. In 2006, we reported State was 
able to provide information on the number of officers who actually 
enrolled in the program, but was not able to provide information on the 
number of eligible officers who did not. Since we last reported on this 
issue, State has begun collecting data on which officers decline SND. 
However, State has not gathered the additional information necessary to 
measure the effectiveness of the program. According to a department 
official, State has considered the calculation of the worldwide rate at 
which officers extend their tours of duty to be a lower priority than 
other human resources initiatives. The State official said that it is 
not possible to evaluate the program's effectiveness without this 
information. 

The manner in which State tracks employees serving in Iraq and 
Afghanistan makes it difficult to analyze the impact of the promotion 
consideration outlined in the instructions to selection boards. As 
previously noted, officers may serve in Iraq and Afghanistan on detail 
from Washington or another post of assignment; however, while they are 
on detail, State's personnel database continues to reflect the 
officer's current post of assignment. Furthermore, we reported in June 
2009[Footnote 45] that State does not have a mechanism for identifying 
and tracking its employees deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and 
recommended the department establish policies and procedures to do so. 
[Footnote 46] The lack of readily available data on FSOs deployed to 
Iraq and Afghanistan may make it difficult to comply with a June 2009 
congressional direction to State that it report on the promotion 
process at the department as it relates to any preferential 
consideration given for service in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as 
compared to other hardship posts.[Footnote 47] According to officials, 
State has not yet attempted to analyze the impact of the instructions 
to the selection boards on promotions. 

State Did Not Undertake Congressionally Mandated Report to Assess 
Impact of Increased Hardship and Danger Pay on Staffing Shortfalls: 

State has not complied with a congressional mandate to assess the 
effectiveness of increasing hardship and danger pay ceilings to recruit 
experienced officers to certain posts, hampering oversight of State's 
use of the authority to increase such differentials. In December 2005, 
Congress passed legislation authorizing State to raise the hardship 
differentials and danger pay allowances from 25 percent to 35 percent 
as a recruitment and retention incentive.[Footnote 48] The law required 
the department to (1) notify several congressional committees of the 
criteria to be used in adjusting the hardship and danger differentials 
and (2) study and report by 2007 on the effect of the increases in 
hardship differential and danger pay allowance ceilings in filling 
"hard to fill" positions.[Footnote 49] In response, State notified 
Congress in March 2006 that it would increase the threshold for posts 
to qualify for the 30 and 35 percent differentials and allowances under 
the present criteria it uses to calculate its hardship and danger pay 
differential calculations, rather than add new criteria.[Footnote 50] 
However, State officials confirmed that the department did not study 
the effect of these increased differentials and allowances on filling 
"hard to fill" positions and did not provide the required report to 
Congress. A State official said that, as of July 2009, the department 
had begun an effort to comply with the congressional mandate. According 
to State's comments on this report, the department expects to fulfill 
the mandate by October 2009. 

Despite the hardship and danger pay increases, these high-priority 
posts continue to have difficulties attracting bidders. Specifically, 
17 of the 26 posts with either danger or hardship pay differentials 
above 25 percent were designated historically difficult to staff as of 
May 2008. The lack of an assessment of the effectiveness of the danger 
and hardship pay increases in filling positions at these posts, coupled 
with the continuing staffing challenges in these locations, makes it 
difficult to determine whether these resources are properly targeted. 

Legislative Changes May Result in Increased Expenditures on Incentives 
for Hardship Post Assignments: 

Several measures passed by Congress this year may raise the cost of 
hardship post incentives already in place and provide additional 
incentives. Legislation enacted in 2009 authorized locality pay 
adjustments for fiscal year 2009 for members of the Foreign Service 
stationed overseas comparable to that if such member's official duty 
station were in the District of Columbia, and appropriated $41 million 
for this purpose.[Footnote 51] According to a State official, the 
legislative change will result in an approximately 8 percent increase 
in basic pay for FSOs, beginning in August 2009. Locality pay is not 
itself an incentive for hardship post assignments. However, the 
resulting increase in basic pay will lead to an increase in hardship 
pay, danger pay, and SND, all of which are calculated as percentages of 
basic pay. Officials we interviewed, both at hardship posts and in 
Washington, D.C., cited the lack of locality pay as a deterrent to bid 
on overseas positions. We have reported in the past that differences in 
the statutes governing domestic locality pay and differential pay for 
overseas service created a gap in compensation, which State officials, 
the American Foreign Service Association, and many officers have 
reported effectively penalizes overseas employees compared to employees 
based in Washington, D.C.[Footnote 52] 

Congress also recently enacted legislation authorizing State to pay 
recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses to all FSOs other than 
ambassadors and chiefs of mission who are on official duty in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.[Footnote 53] Previously, Foreign Service 
generalists were not entitled to receive recruitment, relocation, and 
retention bonuses.[Footnote 54] As of the end of fiscal year 2008, 
there were about 340 Foreign Service generalist positions in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Further, State also plans to increase the 
number of FSOs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The large--and growing-- 
number of FSOs serving at these posts represents a potentially 
significant increase in recruitment, relocation, and retention bonus 
payments.[Footnote 55] 

Conclusions: 

The conduct of U.S. diplomacy compels State to assign staff to hardship 
posts where conditions are difficult and sometimes dangerous, but that 
nonetheless are at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy priorities. 
State has made progress since 2006 in reducing its deficit of mid-level 
officers and increasing the average number of bids at hardship posts. 
Despite these advances, State continues to face persistent staffing and 
experience gaps at such posts--especially at the mid-level--which can 
compromise its diplomatic readiness. The department has generally been 
able to fill its top priority posts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but key 
positions at other hardship posts remain vacant or are filled by 
officers who may lack the necessary experience to effectively perform 
their duties, potentially compromising State's ability to advance U.S. 
international interests. Although State plans to address staffing gaps 
by hiring more officers, the department acknowledges it will take years 
for these new employees to gain the experience they need to be 
effective mid-level officers. The department plans to manage this 
experience gap in the near term by continuing to assign officers to 
positions above their current grade level. However, the frequent 
assignment of officers to stretch positions in hardship posts brings 
some risks, which will likely persist since State's assignment system 
does not explicitly address the continuing experience gap at hardship 
posts as a priority consideration in making assignments. Furthermore, 
despite State's continued difficulty attracting qualified staff to 
hardship posts, the department has not systematically evaluated the 
effectiveness of its incentives for hardship service. These incentives 
cost the department millions of dollars annually--an investment that 
will grow given recent legislative initiatives that raise FSO basic pay 
and expand the use of bonuses for recruitment, relocation, and 
retention. Without a full evaluation of State's hardship incentives, 
the department cannot obtain valuable insights that could help guide 
resource decisions to ensure it is most efficiently and effectively 
addressing gaps at these important posts. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To ensure that hardship posts are staffed commensurate with their 
stated level of strategic importance and resources are properly 
targeted, we recommend the Secretary of State take the following two 
actions: 

* Take steps to minimize the experience gap at hardship posts by making 
the assignment of at-grade, mid-level officers to such posts an 
explicit priority consideration. 

* Develop and implement a plan to evaluate incentives for hardship post 
assignments. Such a plan could include an analysis of how the hardship 
assignment incentive programs work individually and collectively to 
address the department's difficulty in recruiting staff to accept--and 
remain in--positions at hardship posts. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

State provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments 
are reprinted in Appendix IV. State generally agreed with the report's 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations. For example, the department 
acknowledged that many hardship posts may face experience gaps. State 
also provided us with a draft analysis of the impact of increased 
hardship and danger pay on staffing shortfalls and indicated that it 
plans to continue tracking employee attitudes toward hardship 
incentives through future surveys. While these are positive steps, they 
do not fully respond to our recommendation to implement a plan to 
evaluate hardship incentives. In addition, State provided technical 
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the Secretary of State and interested congressional committees. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on our Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Jess T. Ford: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To assess the Department of State's (State) progress in addressing 
staffing gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect of any 
remaining gaps, we: 

* reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports (OIG), as 
well as applicable legislation and budget documents; 

* analyzed staffing, bidding, and position data; and: 

* interviewed officials in State's Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of 
Consular Affairs, and six regional bureaus regarding staffing issues. 

To determine State staff surplus/deficit figures, we analyzed State 
staffing data and compared the number of positions in each career track 
with the number of Foreign Service Officers (FSO) in each track. For 
example, if the total number of employees in the consular career track 
is 1,055 and the total number of consular positions is 1,866, the 
deficit in officers would be 811. 

We analyzed bid data from the 2008 summer assignments cycle to 
determine the average number of bids per post, the median number of 
bids for each differential rate, and the average number of bids per 
generalist career track for each differential rate. In order to compare 
2008 data with the 2005 data from our previous report and remain 
consistent, we used FS-04, FS-03, and FS-02 bid data. The bid data 
include the number of positions to be filled at each post and the 
number of bids received for each position. We used the bid data for the 
summer assignments cycle because, according to State officials, most 
employees are transferred during this cycle, compared to the winter 
cycle. Because State staffed Iraq through a separate assignments cycle 
in 2008 that involved a different bidding process than the regular 
summer assignments cycle, we did not include Iraq positions in our 
analysis. 

We used the following methodology to obtain our results: 

* To obtain the average number of bids per post, we took the total 
number of bids received on all positions at each post and divided it by 
the total number of positions to be filled at the post. For example, in 
the 2008 summer assignments cycle, Lagos had 9 positions to be filled 
and received a total of 23 bids, resulting in an average of 2.6 bids 
for this post. 

* To obtain the median number of bids at each differential rate, we 
arranged in ascending order the average number of bids for each post at 
the corresponding differential rate and used the middle average. For 
example, assuming there are 5 posts at the 25 percent differential rate 
and their average bids are 3, 5, 7, 9, and 16, the median of the 
average bids is 7. 

* To obtain the average number of bids per generalist career track at 
each differential rate, we took the total number of bids received on 
all positions in each career track per differential and divided it by 
the total number of positions to be filled in the career track per 
differential. For example, assuming there are 3 management positions at 
the 15 percent differential rate receiving a total of 12 bids, the 
average number of bids for management positions at 15 percent 
differential posts is 4. 

We also analyzed data on all State Foreign Service positions as of the 
end of fiscal year 2008 to determine the vacancy rate for each post, 
the average vacancy rate for each differential rate, and the proportion 
of mid-level generalist positions filled by officers working above 
their grades for each differential rate. The position data include the 
number of positions at each post, the career track and grade of each 
position and, for positions that are staffed, the career track and 
grade of the incumbent. We used position data as of the end of the 
fiscal year because, according to State officials, most employees 
moving on to their next assignments have arrived at their new posts by 
that time. Due to limitations in the position data for Iraq, we did not 
include Iraq positions in our analysis. 

We used the following methodology to obtain our results: 

* To obtain the vacancy rate for each post, we took the total number of 
vacant positions at each post and divided it by the total number of 
positions to be filled at the post. For example, assuming there are 10 
total positions at a given post and 2 vacancies, the vacancy rate is 20 
percent. 

* To obtain the average vacancy rate for each differential rate, we 
took the sum of all vacancy rates for posts with a given differential 
and divided it by the total number of posts with that differential. For 
example, assuming there are 5 posts at the 25 percent differential rate 
and their vacancy rates are 10 percent, 12 percent, 15 percent, 17 
percent, and 20 percent, the average vacancy rate is 14.8 percent. 

* To obtain the proportion of mid-level generalist positions filled by 
officers working above their grades for each differential rate, we took 
the total number of generalist positions at the FS-03, FS-02, and FS-01 
levels filled with officers in upstretch assignments for each 
differential and divided it by the total number of generalist positions 
at those levels with that differential. For example, assuming there are 
only 7 mid-level generalist positions at posts with a 20 percent 
differential and 2 are filled by officers in upstretches, the upstretch 
rate is 29 percent. 

To assess the extent to which State has used incentives to address 
staffing gaps at hardship posts, we: 

* reviewed GAO and State OIG reports, as well as applicable legislative 
documents and guidance from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
and the Office of Management and Budget; 

* examined surveys conducted by State; 

* analyzed State documents that outline incentives for hardship 
service, including those available to officers serving in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; 

* collected data on participation in and funds expended on hardship 
incentive programs; and: 

* interviewed officials in State's Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of 
Administration, and six regional bureaus regarding State's use of 
incentives. 

We obtained bidding data from State's FSBID database and staffing and 
position data from State's Global Employee Management System (GEMS) 
database. Since we have previously checked the reliability of both 
these databases, we inquired if State had made any major changes to the 
databases since our 2006 report. State indicated that it had not made 
major changes to either. We also tested the data for completeness and 
interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Office of Resource 
Management and Organizational Analysis and the Office of Career 
Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) concerning the reliability of the 
data. Based on our analysis of the data and discussions with the 
officials, we determined the bidding and staffing data to be 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also determined that the 
position data for all posts but Iraq were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of this engagement. Given the limitations associated with Iraq 
positions in the position data, we obtained a separate set of Iraq- 
specific position data from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) to 
use to analyze staffing in Iraq. To assess the reliability of the Iraq 
position data provided by NEA, we asked State how the data are 
collected, entered, and checked. State indicated that the data are 
collected and maintained manually by authorized assignment personnel 
and constantly updated through coordination between NEA and human 
resources officials in Iraq, among others. Based on this assessment and 
our analysis of the data, we determined NEA's Iraq position data to be 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. 

We conducted fieldwork in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; Shenyang, China; 
and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to study the impact of staffing 
gaps at selected hardship posts and State's use of incentives for 
hardship service. In deciding where to conduct our fieldwork, we 
considered factors such as the historic difficulty of staffing a given 
post; the mix of incentives available; strategic importance; and 
recommendations from cognizant State officials. We selected the posts 
in Nigeria because of their historically low bidding, their 25 percent 
hardship differentials, and because each offers Service Need 
Differential (SND). We selected Shenyang because of the post's 30 
percent hardship differential, historically low bidding, and SND. We 
selected the posts in Saudi Arabia because, in addition to their 
historically low bidding and 20 percent hardship differentials, both 
were unaccompanied 1-year posts at the time of our review. In addition 
to our fieldwork, we conducted telephone interviews with senior 
officials in several additional hardship posts, including Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Liberia, and Tajikistan. We also convened an expert 
roundtable of several retired senior State officials. The participants 
in the roundtable had all served as ambassadors to hardship posts in 
the last 10 years. Two participants were also former directors general. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through September 
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Department of State Generalist Staffing Surplus/Deficit by 
Career Track: 

Table 4 shows staffing surpluses and deficits by career track for 
foreign service generalists as of December 31, 2008. 

Table 4: Foreign Service Generalists' Surplus/(Deficit) across Career 
Tracks, as of December 31, 2008: 

Grade level: Senior level; MC; 
Management: (8); 
Consular: 13; 
Economic: [Empty]; 
Political: 7; 
Public diplomacy: (4); 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty]; 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 8. 

Grade level: Senior level; OC; 
Management: (34); 
Consular: (14); 
Economic: 31; 
Political: 40; 
Public diplomacy: (29); 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty]; 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): (6). 

Grade level: Senior level; Subtotal; 
Management: (42); 
Consular: (1); 
Economic: 31; 
Political: 47; 
Public diplomacy: (33); 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: 2; 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): [Empty]. 

Grade level: Mid level; 1; 
Management: (37); 
Consular: 17; 
Economic: 44; 
Political: 57; 
Public diplomacy: (67); 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty]; 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 14. 

Grade level: Mid level; 2; 
Management: (84); Consular: 51; 
Economic: 36; 
Political: 16; 
Public diplomacy: (223); 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty]; 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): (204). 

Grade level: Mid level; 3; 
Management: 87; 
Consular: (129); 
Economic: 19; 
Political: 8; 
Public diplomacy: 120; 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty]; 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 105. 

Grade level: Mid level; Subtotal; 
Management: (34); 
Consular: (61); 
Economic: 99; 
Political: 81; 
Public diplomacy: (170); 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: (85); 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): [Empty]. 

Grade level: Jr. level; 4; 
Management: 165; 
Consular: (595)[A]; 
Economic: 108; 
Political: 152; 
Public diplomacy: 199; 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: 29; 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 29. 

Grade level: Total; 
Management: 89; 
Consular: (657); 
Economic: 238; 
Political: 280; 
Public diplomacy: (4); 
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: (54); 
Total Surplus/(Deficit): (54)[B]. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: Senior Foreign Service grades include minister counselor (MC) and 
counselor (OC). 

[A] Although there is a deficit of 595 entry-level officers in the 
consular cone, State does not consider this a true deficit because 
nearly all entry-level generalists serve in consular positions during 
their first or second assignment, regardless of cone. 

[B] The total deficit decreases from 54 to 42 when junior grades 05 and 
06 are included. We omitted these positions from the table to remain 
consistent with our 2006 report, in which we noted that we did not 
include these grades because we were told that they were training 
positions that are not counted against the deficit. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: 2009 Historically Difficult to Staff and Service Need 
Differential Posts: 

[End of section] 

Table 5 lists posts that State designated as historically difficult to 
staff or eligible for Service Need Differential (SND) for the 2009 
summer assignments cycle. 

Table 5: Historically Difficult to Staff and SND Posts for 2009 Summer 
Assignments Cycle: 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Angola; 
Post: Luanda; 
Historically difficult to staff [Check]: [Check]; 
SND [Check]: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Benin; 
Post: Cotonou; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Burkina Faso; 
Post: Ouagadougou; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Burundi; 
Post: Bujumbura; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Cameroon; 
Post: Douala; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Cameroon; 
Post: Yaounde; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Cape Verde; 
Post: Praia; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Central African 
Republic; 
Post: Bangui; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Chad; 
Post: N'Djamena; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the; 
Post: Kinshasa; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Congo, Republic of; 
Post: Brazzaville; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Cote d'Ivoire; 
Post: Abidjan; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Djibouti; 
Post: Djibouti; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Equatorial Guinea; 
Post: Malabo; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Eritrea; 
Post: Asmara; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Gabon; 
Post: Libreville; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Gambia, The; 
Post: Banjul; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Guinea; 
Post: Conakry; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Liberia; 
Post: Monrovia; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Malawi; 
Post: Lilongwe; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Mali; 
Post: Bamako; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Mauritania; 
Post: Nouakchott; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Niger; 
Post: Niamey; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Nigeria; 
Post: Abuja; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Nigeria; 
Post: Lagos; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Rwanda; 
Post: Kigali; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Sierra Leone; 
Post: Freetown; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Sudan; 
Post: Khartoum; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Togo; 
Post: Blome; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: 
Brunei; 
Post: Bandar Seri Begawan; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: 
China; Post: Guangzhou; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: 
Post: Shenyang; 
Historically difficult to staff: 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: 
Indonesia; 
Post: Medan; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: 
Japan; 
Post: Naha; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: 
Marshall Islands; 
Post: Majuro; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: 
Micronesia; 
Post: Kolonia; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: 
Papua New Guinea; 
Post: Port Moresby; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: 
Timor-Leste; 
Post: Dili; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: 
Armenia; 
Post: Yerevan; 
Historically difficult to staff:[Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: 
Belarus; 
Post: Minsk; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Post: Banja Luka; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: 
Kosovo; 
Post: Pristina; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: 
Moldova; 
Post: Chisinau; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: 
Montenegro; 
Post: Podgorica; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: 
Russia; 
Post: Vladivostok; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: 
Russia; 
Post: Yekaterinburg; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Iraq; 
Post: Baghdad; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Israel; 
Post: Jerusalem; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Jordan; 
Post: Amman; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Saudi Arabia; 
Post: Jeddah; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Saudi Arabia; 
Post: Riyadh; 
Historically difficult to staff: 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Yemen; 
Post: Sanaa; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs: 
Afghanistan; 
Post: Kabul; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs: 
Bangladesh; 
Post: Dhaka; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs: 
India; 
Post: Calcutta; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs: 
Kazakhstan; 
Post: Astana; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs: 
Pakistan; 
Post: Islamabad; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs: 
Pakistan; 
Post: Lahore; 
Historically difficult to staff: 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs: 
Tajikistan; 
Post: Dushanbe; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs: 
Turkmenistan; 
Post: Ashgabat; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Guyana; 
Post: Georgetown; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Haiti; 
Post: Port-au-Prince; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Jamaica; 
Post: Kingston; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Mexico; 
Post: Ciudad Juarez; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Mexico; 
Post: Hermosillo; 
Historically difficult to staff: 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Mexico; 
Post: Nogales; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Empty]. 

Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: 
Suriname; 
Post: Paramaribo; 
Historically difficult to staff: [Check]; 
SND: [Check]. 

Source: State. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State: 

Note: GAO's comment supplementing those in the report text appears at 
the end of this appendix. 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial 
Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

September 2, 2009: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Department 
Of State: Additional Steps Needed To Address Continued Staffing and 
Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts," GAO Job Code 320585. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Bert 
Curtis, HR Specialist, Bureau of Human Resources at (202) 647-2655. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Sid Kaplan (Acting): 

cc: 
GAO - Goodwin Agbara: 
DGHR - Nancy Powell: 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 
Additional Steps Needed to Address Continued Staffing and Experience 
Gaps at Hardship Posts (GAO-09-874, GAO Code 320585): 

The Department thanks GAO for its evaluation of the Department's 
challenges regarding staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts. As 
GAO has reported, we have continuously strived throughout much of this 
decade to ensure that hardship posts are filled as effectively as 
possible. Our tools have included aggressive recruitment, assignment 
rule adjustments, and a varied menu of programs including monetary, 
professional and even (for the most difficult to fill positions) family-
oriented incentives. 

As GAO acknowledges, we have been successful in staffing our highest 
priority posts at or near 100%. As GAO also recognizes, and we would 
like to emphasize, the underlying causes of staffing shortages, i.e., 
the growth of our mission without a commensurate growth in resources, 
must be addressed to ensure diplomatic readiness. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to respond to the GAO 
recommendations and looks forward to continued engagement. 

GAO Recommendations for Executive Action & DOS Response
To ensure that hardship posts are staffed commensurate with their 
stated level of strategic importance and resources are properly 
targeted, we recommend the Secretary of State take the following two 
actions: 

1. Take steps to minimize the experience gap at hardship posts by 
making the assignment of at-grade, mid-level officers to such posts an 
explicit priority consideration. 

We concur with this recommendation and would like to assure GAO that 
the staffing of hardship posts is a priority for the Department. 
However, as GAO continues to note (as in a related 2006 study), we have 
more positions than available officers. The overall shortage of Foreign 
Service officers and specialists contributes to the difficulty in 
staffing our missions and presents the Department with difficult 
choices. When there are overall service deficits at the mid-levels, 
many positions will go unfilled and/or training may be sacrificed. 

While we acknowledge that this may result in an experience gap at many 
hardship posts, we would point out that not all hardship posts are top 
policy priorities. Conversely, not all non-hardship posts are low 
policy priorities. Until staffing levels meet our needs, we will have 
to prioritize both positions and posts. 

In recent years, the Department has frozen positions around the world 
to ensure that our highest priority jobs were indeed filled globally. 
As those hired under Diplomacy 3.0 begin to enter the workforce, many 
of these positions will be filled, albeit with entry-level officers. 
Diplomacy 3.0 is our first infusion of additional positions in several 
years and the beginning of the Secretary's efforts to build the size of 
the Foreign Service by 25%. 

2. Develop and implement a plan to evaluate incentives for hardship 
post assignments. Such a plan could include an analysis of how the 
hardship assignment incentive programs work individually and 
collectively to address the department's difficulty in recruiting staff 
to accept - and remain in - positions at hardship posts. 

We concur with this recommendation and agree with GAO and the Congress 
that the question of effectiveness of incentives to staff hardship 
posts is important. In response to Public Law 109-140 Section 4(e), the 
Department has been collecting and analyzing data on differential and 
danger pay increases. This study will be completed by early October 
2009, and we have provided GAO with a preliminary draft. [See comment] 

We had expected to continue to track employee attitudes toward these 
incentives through future surveys. While we traditionally have not been 
able to add questions to OPM's biennial Human Capital Survey, we have 
done so to the similar survey we conducted in the odd-numbered years. 
OPM has advised, however, that it expects to conduct its survey 
annually, thus complicating our ability to collect needed data. We have 
expressed this concern to OPM and understand it is considering our 
request to include customized questions, at least every other year, 
within the OPM-administered Federal Human Capital survey. 

On a related matter, we found GAO statements regarding overseas pay 
comparability misleading and would like to clarify some of the basic 
facts. Comparability pay is not a function of, nor is it offered as, 
compensation for hardship posts. Rather, it applies regardless of 
overseas location to certain categories of members of the Foreign 
Service. Its purpose is to eliminate the loss in basic pay that certain 
Foreign Service members incur while serving abroad. That gap was 
created by the introduction of locality pay in 1994 and has undermined 
the value of our hardship incentives, even eliminating that value at 
certain hardship posts. We would also note that comparability pay has 
not been permanently authorized by Congress. 

The following is GAO's comment to the Department of State's letter 
dated September 2, 2009. 

GAO Comment: 

While State's analysis of hardship differential and danger pay 
increases and its request to OPM to include customized questions about 
hardship incentives in future surveys are positive steps, they do not 
fully respond to our recommendation to implement a plan to evaluate 
hardship incentives. State expects to fulfill the mandate to study and 
report on the effect of the increases in hardship differential and 
danger pay ceilings in filling "hard to fill" positions in October 
2009. However, as noted earlier, State offers other incentives which it 
has not evaluated. Furthermore, we also note that State's last survey 
had several limitations. For example, the survey lacked the requisite 
specificity, included an incomplete list of incentives, and did not 
collect key demographic information. Unless State addresses these 
issues, the survey's utility as an evaluation tool will remain limited. 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Key contributors to this report include Anthony Moran, Assistant 
Director; Richard Gifford Howland; Aniruddha Dasgupta; Brian Hackney; 
Joseph Carney; Martin de Alteriis; Grace Lui; Michael Courts; Zina 
Merritt; Gloria Hernandez-Saunders; and John Brummet. Technical 
assistance was provided by Robert Alarapon, Gena Evans, and Thomas 
Zingale. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S. 
government provides differential pay incentives--an additional 5 to 35 
percent of basic salary, depending on the severity or difficulty of the 
conditions--to encourage employees to bid on assignments to these posts 
and to compensate them for the hardships they encounter. For the 
purposes of this report, we refer to these differential pay incentives 
as hardship differentials. We define hardship posts as those posts 
where the hardship differential is at least 15 percent. We define posts 
of greatest hardship as those where the hardship differential is at 
least 25 percent. We define posts with low differentials as those where 
the hardship differential is 5 or 10 percent. We define posts with no 
differentials as those where the hardship differential is 0 percent. 

[2] State defines diplomatic readiness as its "ability to get the right 
people in the right place at the right time with the right skills to 
carry out America's foreign policy." 

[3] GAO, State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective 
Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-626] (Washington, D.C.: 
June 18, 2002). 

[4] GAO, Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls 
Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-894] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4, 
2006). 

[5] State's overseas workforce also includes locally employed staff. 
This report focuses on the Foreign Service. 

[6] A post differential may be granted on the basis of conditions of 
environment which differ substantially from conditions of environment 
in the continental United States and warrant additional pay as a 
recruitment and retention incentive. 5 U.S.C. § 5925. For the purposes 
of this report, we refer to State's post differential as hardship 
differential. 

[7] State pays an additional 15 percent to 35 percent of salary for 
danger pay at designated posts. The danger pay allowance is designed to 
provide additional compensation above basic compensation to all U.S. 
government civilian employees, including chiefs of mission, for service 
in foreign areas where there exist conditions--such as civil 
insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or war--that threaten physical harm 
or imminent danger to employees. 

[8] In terms of the Foreign Service grade structure, mid-level 
positions include FS-03, FS-02, and FS-01 and are equivalent to the 
civil service GS-13, GS-14, and GS-15, respectively. 

[9] The Director General is the official who heads State's Bureau of 
Human Resources. 

[10] According to State, the assignments cycle for a given year 
includes both the summer and winter assignments cycles. 

[11] We used data from State's Global Employee Management System (GEMS) 
database to calculate vacancy rates. Due to limitations in the GEMS 
data on positions in Iraq, we do not include Iraq in our vacancy rate 
calculations or figures. 

[12] As of the same date, the average vacancy rate for all hardship 
posts was 15 percent, as compared to an average rate of 10 percent for 
all posts with no or low differentials. 

[13] At the time of our visit, Jeddah had a 20 percent hardship 
differential and a 25 percent danger pay allowance. 

[14] At the time of our visit, Lagos had a 25 percent hardship 
differential. 

[15] At the time of our visit, Shenyang had a 30 percent hardship 
differential. 

[16] We used data from State's GEMS database to calculate rates of 
staff filling positions above their own grades. Due to limitations in 
the GEMS data on positions in Iraq, we do not include Iraq in these 
calculations of staff filling positions above their own grades or in 
table 1. 

[17] An upstretch assignment is an assignment to a position above one's 
current grade. 

[18] By comparison, slightly fewer than half of all overseas generalist 
positions are located at hardship posts. 

[19] At the time of our visit, Abuja had a 25 percent hardship 
differential. 

[20] In August 2006, we reported an overall staffing shortage of about 
200 employees, based on State data from September 2005. According to a 
senior State official, the current shortfall of about 270 will decline 
over the course of 2009 as several cadres of new hires are brought on 
board. 

[21] Of the approximately 1,380 additional vacant positions, about 
1,020 were due to officers serving in training or rotating from post to 
post without replacements to fill their vacated positions. The 
approximately 360 remaining vacancies were due to officers on medical 
leave, temporary duty, or short tours. 

[22] To fill positions in Iraq and Afghanistan, State has frequently 
assigned officers to positions above their grade. As of September 2008, 
over 40 percent of officers in Iraq and Afghanistan were serving in 
upstretch assignments. 

[23] A forthcoming GAO report discusses challenges State faces in 
meeting its foreign language proficiency requirements in further 
detail. See GAO, Department of State: Comprehensive Plan Needed to 
Address Persistent Foreign Language Shortfalls, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-955] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 
2009). 

[24] State has attempted to temporarily address vacancies through its 
Expanded Professional Associates Program. According to State, 105 
positions, equivalent to entry-level officer positions, were 
established through this program in 2009 and filled by eligible Foreign 
Service family members. 

[25] We analyzed bidding for these positions to remain consistent with 
our 2006 report, which included our analysis of bids on FS-02, FS-03, 
and FS-04 positions in the 2005 summer assignments cycle. Because State 
staffed Iraq through a special assignments cycle in 2008 separate from 
the regular summer assignments cycle, we did not include Iraq in our 
analysis of bidding. 

[26] We use the term median average to refer to the midpoint of the 
average number of bids per post for each differential rate. For 
example, if there are three posts with a hardship differential of 25 
percent and their average bids are 4, 5, and 7, the median average is 
5. 

[27] This calculation includes bids on all posts with hardship 
differentials of at least 15 percent. 

[28] The list of historically difficult to staff posts for a given year 
is created the prior year. A post is considered historically difficult 
to staff if it is designated most difficult to staff for 3 out of the 
last 4 years. Most difficult to staff means that over half of the jobs 
available for that post in a given bidding cycle are designated hard to 
fill. A position is considered hard to fill if it attracts fewer than 3 
at-grade, in-cone bids in a given assignments cycle. 

[29] Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy Freetown, 
Sierra Leone, ISP-I-08-18A (Washington, D.C., March 2008). As of March 
2008, Freetown had a 30 percent hardship differential. 

[30] Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy N'Djamena, 
Chad, ISP-I-09-02A (Washington, D.C., December 2008). As of December 
2008, N'Djamena had a 30 percent hardship differential. 

[31] ISP-I-09-02A. 

[32] Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy Monrovia, 
Liberia, ISP-I-08-20A (Washington, D.C., March 2008). As of March 2008, 
Monrovia had a 30 percent hardship differential. 

[33] Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy 
Nouakchott, Mauritania, ISP-I-09-23A (Washington, D.C., March 2009). As 
of March 2009, Nouakchott had a 25 percent hardship differential. 

[34] A core bid is one on a position in an employee's cone/skill code 
and grade for which the employee has either the required language 
proficiency, or time to acquire it, between his or her transfer 
eligibility date and that of the incumbent. 

[35] State regulations say that in order to qualify for SND, an 
employee must be assigned to a post that has at least a 15 percent 
differential and the combined SND and danger pay allowance do not 
exceed 35 percent. 

[36] Locality pay is a salary comparability benefit, typically 
available to domestic federal employees only to attract workers in the 
continental United States to the federal government versus the private 
sector. Historically, FSOs posted overseas have not received locality 
pay. Current locality pay for Washington, D.C., is 23.1 percent. 

[37] The standard tour of duty at posts with no differentials is three 
years. 

[38] An employee is considered Fair Share if he or she has not served 
at least (1) 20 months at a post with a combined hardship and danger 
pay differential of 15 percent or greater, or (2) 10 months at a post 
with a 1-year standard tour of duty during the 8 years prior to the 
employee's upcoming transfer eligibility date. 

[39] Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Bureau of 
Administration, Office of Allowances, ISP-I-06-51 (Washington, D.C., 
September 2006). 

[40] 5 U.S.C. § 5379. 

[41] One year is also the standard tour of duty in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 

[42] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-894] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-626]. 

[43] In conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 
GAO, OPM issued a strategic human capital framework--called the Human 
Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework--to provide a 
consistent, comprehensive representation of human capital management to 
guide federal agencies. OPM's framework provides six standards, along 
with associated indicators, or practices, for achieving success. One of 
the effectiveness indicators under the Talent Management standard is 
the reporting of appropriate metrics to senior managers and human 
resource executives to assess the outcomes from retention strategies. 

[44] At posts we visited in 2008 and 2009, we heard concerns similar to 
those we reported on in 2006, when we found that family considerations-
-child-related and spousal employment concerns, in particular--were a 
significant obstacle to attracting mid-level officers to hardship 
posts. 

[45] GAO, Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide 
Timely and Accurate Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed 
Federal Civilians, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-562] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2009). State officials compiled their list 
of civilian employees who had been deployed to and returned from Iraq 
or Afghanistan between January 1, 2006, and April 30, 2008 by querying 
GEMS. According to a responsible State official, GEMS is a human 
resources system designed to document a personnel action from its 
initial request until it is completely processed. 

[46] In response to our recommendation, State committed to consulting 
and coordinating with the Department of Defense and other executive 
agencies to determine the best way to establish policies and procedures 
to accurately identify and track standardized information on deployed 
civilians. 

[47] H.R. Rept. No. 111-151, at 123 (2009) (Conf. Rept.). 

[48] To provide certain authorities for the Department of State, and 
for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 109-140, § 4, 119 Stat. 2650, 2651 
(2005). 

[49] Id. 

[50] State uses a point system to determine the appropriate 
differential and danger pay rates for posts. State informed Congress 
that posts would need to reach higher thresholds to qualify for the 30 
and 35 percent levels. 

[51] See Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 1113; Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 4, 123 Stat. 524, 525 and Explanatory Statement, 
submitted by Mr. Obey, Chairman of the House Committee on 
Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 1105, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, 
155 Cong. Rec. H 1653, 2404 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2009). 

[52] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-894] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-626]. 

[53] See Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 1115(d). 

[54] State has had the authority to offer recruitment, retention, and 
relocation bonuses to Foreign Service specialists and civil service 
employees. 

[55] According to OPM, in calendar year 2007, State paid approximately 
$6 million in retention bonuses to 594 informational technology 
specialists, unrelated to FSO staffing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan. 

[End of section] 

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