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Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:

September 2009:

Secure Border Initiative:

Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing 
Has Not Been Assessed:

GAO-09-896: 

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-09-896, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Securing the nation’s borders from illegal entry of aliens and 
contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, 
continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) announced the launch of the Secure Border 
Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at 
securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Within DHS, 
U.S. Custom and Border Protection’s (CBP) SBI program is responsible 
for developing a comprehensive border protection system using 
technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure—fencing, 
roads, and lighting. GAO was asked to provide periodic updates on the 
status of the program. This report addresses (1) the extent to which 
CBP has implemented SBInet and the impact of delays that have occurred, 
and (2) the extent to which CBP has deployed tactical infrastructure 
and assessed its results. To do this work, GAO reviewed program 
schedules, status reports, and previous GAO work; interviewed DHS and 
CBP officials, among others; and visited three SBI sites where initial 
technology or fencing had been deployed at the time of GAO’s review. 

What GAO Found:

SBInet technology capabilities have not yet been deployed and delays 
require Border Patrol, a CBP component, to rely on existing technology 
for securing the border, rather than using newer technology planned to 
overcome the existing technology’s limitations. Flaws found in testing 
and concerns about the impact of placing towers and access roads in 
environmentally sensitive locations caused delays. As of September 
2006, SBInet technology deployment for the southwest border was planned 
to be complete by early fiscal year 2009. When last reported in 
February 2009, the completion date had slipped to 2016. As a result of 
such delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use existing technology 
that has limitations, such as performance shortfalls and maintenance 
issues. For example, on the southwest border, Border Patrol relies on 
existing equipment such as cameras mounted on towers that have 
intermittent problems, including signal loss. Border Patrol has 
procured and delivered some new technology to fill gaps or augment 
existing equipment. However, incorporating SBInet technology as soon as 
it is operationally available should better position CBP to identify 
and implement operational changes needed for securing the border. 

Tactical infrastructure deployments are almost complete, but their 
impact on border security has not been measured. As of June 2009, CBP 
had completed 633 of the 661 miles of fencing it committed to deploy 
along the southwest border. However, delays continue due mainly to 
challenges in acquiring the necessary property rights from landowners. 
While fencing costs increased over the course of construction, because 
all construction contracts have been awarded, costs are less likely to 
change. CBP plans to use $110 million in fiscal year 2009 funds to 
build 10 more miles of fencing, and fiscal year 2010 and 2011 funds for 
supporting infrastructure. CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, 
coupled with additional trained agents, had increased the miles of the 
southwest border under control, but despite a $2.4 billion investment, 
it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. 
CBP measures miles of tactical infrastructure constructed and has 
completed analyses intended to show where fencing is more appropriate 
than other alternatives, such as more personnel, but these analyses 
were based primarily on the judgment of senior Border Patrol agents. 
Leading practices suggest that a program evaluation would complement 
those efforts. Until CBP determines the contribution of tactical 
infrastructure to border security, it is not positioned to address the 
impact of this investment. 

Table: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of June 26, 2009: 

Infrastructure type: Pedestrian fencing; 
Miles in place before SBI: 67; 
Miles deployed through SBI as of 6/26/09: 264; 
Total miles in place as of 6/26/09: 331; 
Target: 358; 
Miles remaining to meet target: 27. 

Infrastructure type: Vehicle fencing; 
Miles in place before SBI: 76; 
Miles deployed through SBI as of 6/26/09: 226; 
Total miles in place as of 6/26/09: 302; 
Target: 303; 
Miles remaining to meet target: 1. 

Infrastructure type: Total fencing; 
Miles in place before SBI: 143; 
Miles deployed through SBI as of 6/26/09: 490; 
Total miles in place as of 6/26/09: 633; 
Target: 661; 
Miles remaining to meet target: 28. 

Source: GAO analysis of SBI data.

[End of table] 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that the Commissioner of CBP conduct a cost-effective 
evaluation of the impact of the tactical infrastructure’s contribution 
to border security. DHS agreed with this recommendation. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896] or key 
components. For more information, contact Richard Stana at (202) 512-
8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents:

Letter:

Background:

SBInet Deployment Delays Require Border Patrol to Rely on Existing 
Technology Which Has Limitations That Newer Technology Is Planned to 
Overcome:

Tactical Infrastructure Deployments Are Almost Complete, but Their 
Impact on Border Security Has Not Been Measured:

Conclusions:

Recommendation for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: The Status of SBI Program Office Staffing and the Progress 
the Office Reports in Achieving Its Human Capital Goals:

Appendix II: Task Orders Awarded to Boeing for SBI Projects as of July 
8, 2009:

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

Related GAO Products:

Tables:

Table 1: SBI Funding, Fiscal Years 2005-2009 (dollars in thousands):

Table 2: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of June 26, 
2009:

Table 3: Miles under Effective Control and Change in Apprehensions in 
Select Southwest Border Sectors from Fiscal Year 2007 through Fiscal 
Year 2008:

Table 4: Human Capital Goals, Planned Activities, and Steps Taken:

Figures:

Figure 1: Map of Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border:

Figure 2: Project 28 Mobile Sensor Tower Deployed in the Tucson Sector:

Figure 3: Examples of Fencing Styles along the Southwest Border:

Figure 4: Depiction of Changes in the SBInet Deployment Schedule from 
December 2006 through April 2009:

Figure 5: Example of an MSS Unit:

Figure 6: Examples of Repaired Breaches in Newer Fencing:

[End of section]

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548:

September 9, 2009:

Congressional Requesters:

Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and 
contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, 
continues to be a major challenge. Much of the United States' 6,000 
miles of international borders with Canada and Mexico remains 
vulnerable to illegal entry. Although the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) apprehends hundreds of thousands of people entering the 
country illegally each year, several hundreds of thousands of 
individuals also enter the United States illegally and undetected. In 
November 2005, DHS announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative 
(SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. 
borders and reducing illegal immigration. The U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) supports the initiative by providing agents and 
officers to patrol the borders, secure the ports of entry,[Footnote 1] 
and enforce immigration laws. In addition, CBP's SBI program is 
responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system 
using technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure-- 
fencing, roads, and lighting.

Our previous reports on CBP's SBI program have outlined program 
challenges and delays.[Footnote 2] Specifically, the initial segment of 
SBInet technology, Project 28, encountered performance shortfalls and 
delays, including the following: users were not involved in developing 
the requirements, contractor oversight was limited, and project scope 
and complexity were underestimated. Program uncertainties, such as a 
lack of fully defined program expectations continued to delay planned 
SBInet deployments following Project 28. In addition, the deployment of 
tactical infrastructure along the southwest border experienced 
challenges, such as increased costs, unknown life-cycle costs, and land 
acquisition issues.

You requested that we monitor CBP's SBI program and provide periodic 
updates on the status of the program. Accordingly, this report, the 
fourth in a series of reports, addresses the following questions:

* To what extent has CBP implemented the SBInet technology program and 
what has been the impact of delays that have occurred?

* To what extent has CBP deployed the SBI tactical infrastructure 
program and assessed its results?

In addition, we are providing information, in appendix I, on the status 
of SBI program office staffing and the progress the office reports in 
achieving its human capital goals.

To address these questions, we analyzed DHS documents, including 
program schedules and status reports. We reviewed criteria in the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,[Footnote 3] our prior 
work on results-oriented government and federal government best 
practices in human capital management, as well as DHS Office of 
Inspector General reports.[Footnote 4] We also interviewed DHS and CBP 
headquarters and field officials, including representatives of the SBI 
program office, the tactical infrastructure program office, Border 
Patrol (a component of CBP); and Department of Interior (DOI), 
including representatives of the Office of the Deputy Secretary and 
Office of Law Enforcement Security and Emergency Management. We visited 
the Border Patrol's Tucson, Yuma, and San Diego sectors[Footnote 5]-- 
sites where SBInet technology (Project 28) and/or fencing had been 
deployed at the time of our review. We determined that funding, 
staffing, and fencing mileage data provided by CBP were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. We based our decision on an 
assessment of each respective area by questioning cognizant DHS 
officials about the source of the data and policies and procedures used 
to maintain the integrity of these data. We conducted this performance 
audit from September 2008 through September 2009 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives.

Background:

Within CBP, the SBI Program Executive Office, referred to in this 
report as the SBI program office, has overall responsibility for 
overseeing all SBI activities for acquisition and implementation, 
including establishing and meeting program goals, objectives, and 
schedules for overseeing contractor performance; and for coordinating 
among DHS agencies. However, the tactical infrastructure portion of the 
program is managed on a day-to-day basis by CBP's Office of Finance 
Facilities Management and Engineering division.[Footnote 6] Among other 
things, CBP's Border Patrol has responsibility for detecting and 
preventing the illegal entry of aliens into the United States between 
designated ports of entry.

DHS began funding the SBI program in fiscal year 2005 at a level of $38 
million, which it increased to $325 million in fiscal year 2006. 
Starting in fiscal year 2007, DHS's annual appropriations acts have 
included specific SBI appropriations. Since fiscal year 2005, SBI's 
funding has amounted to over $3.7 billion (see table 1). DHS has 
requested $779 million in SBI funding for fiscal year 2010.

Table 1: SBI Funding, Fiscal Years 2005-2009 (dollars in thousands):

Fiscal year: 2005; 
SBI funding: $38,480.

Fiscal year: 2006; 
SBI funding: $325,000.

Fiscal year: 2007[A];
SBI funding: $1,187,565.

Fiscal year: 2008; 
SBI funding: $1,302,587[B].

Fiscal year: 2009; 
SBI funding: $875,000[C].

Fiscal year: Total; 
SBI funding: $3,728,632.

Source: CBP budget data and DHS's annual appropriations acts.

[A] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. 
No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1359-60 (2006). SBI funds from this 
appropriation act are no-year dollars, meaning they do not expire at 
the end of a given fiscal year. 

[B] Includes approximately $77.6 million of reprogrammed funds from 
other DHS accounts, plus $1,225 million appropriated through the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 
1844, 2047-49 (2007). SBI funds from this appropriations act are no- 
year dollars.

[C] Includes $100 million from the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 162, 302 (2009), which 
expires at the end of fiscal year 2010, plus $775 million appropriated 
through the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2009, 122 Stat. 3574, 3655-57 (2008), which are no-
year dollars. 

[End of table]

The primary focus of the SBI program is on the southwest border areas 
(see figure 1) between the ports of entry that CBP has designated as 
having the greatest need for enhanced border security because of 
serious vulnerabilities. Although some tactical infrastructure exists 
in all the southwest border sectors, most of what has been built 
through the SBI program is located in the San Diego, Yuma, Tucson, El 
Paso, and Rio Grande Valley sectors. SBInet technology is to be 
initially deployed in the Tucson sector.

Figure 1: Map of Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border:

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border: 
Del Rio; 
El Centro; 
El Paso; 
Laredo; 
Marfa; 
Rio Grande Valley; 
San Diego; 
Tucson; 
Yuma. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data; Map Resources (Map). 

[End of figure]

SBInet is the program for acquiring, developing, integrating, and 
deploying an appropriate mix of surveillance technologies and command, 
control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) technologies. SBInet 
surveillance technologies are to include sensors, cameras, and radars. 
Additional technologies, such as aerial assets (e.g., helicopters and 
unmanned aerial surveillance aircraft) and Mobile Surveillance Systems 
(MSS) may be added in the future, but as of August 2009, whether and to 
what extent the additional technologies would be included in the 
configuration of the long-term SBInet systems solution had not been 
determined, according to SBI officials.[Footnote 7]

The C3I technologies are to include software and hardware to produce a 
Common Operating Picture (COP)--a uniform presentation of activities 
within specific areas along the border. The sensors, radars, and 
cameras are to gather information along the border and the system is to 
transmit this information to the COP terminals located in command 
centers to provide CBP agents with border situational awareness. The 
COP technology is to allow agents to (1) view data from radars and 
sensors that detect and track movement in the border areas, (2) control 
cameras to help identify and classify illegal entries, (3) correlate 
entries with the positions of nearby agents, and (4) enhance tactical 
decision making regarding the appropriate response to apprehend an 
entry, if necessary.

In September 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract for SBInet development 
to the Boeing Company for 3 years, with three additional 1-year 
options. As of July 2009, CBP was in the process of completing action 
to extend its contract with Boeing for the first option year. As the 
prime contractor, Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and 
sustaining selected SBI technology, deploying selected tactical 
infrastructure projects, and providing supply chain management for some 
tactical infrastructure projects.[Footnote 8] In this way, Boeing has 
extensive involvement in the SBI specifications development, design, 
production, integration, testing, and maintenance and support of SBI 
projects. Moreover, Boeing is responsible for selecting and managing a 
team of subcontractors that provide individual components for Boeing to 
integrate into the SBInet system. The SBInet contract is largely 
performance-based--that is, CBP has set requirements for the project 
and Boeing and CBP coordinate and collaborate to develop solutions to 
meet these requirements--and is designed to maximize the use of 
commercial off-the-shelf technology. CBP's SBI program office oversees 
and manages the Boeing-led SBI contractor team. CBP is completing its 
part of its SBI activities through a series of task orders to Boeing 
for individual projects. As of July 8, 2009 CBP had awarded 13 task 
orders to Boeing for a total amount of approximately $1.1 billion. See 
appendix II for a summary of the task orders awarded to Boeing for SBI 
projects.

The first SBInet deployment task order was for an effort known as 
Project 28. The scope of Project 28, as described in an October 2006 
task order to Boeing, was to provide a system with the capabilities 
required to control 28 miles of border in Arizona. Project 28 was 
accepted by the government for deployment in February 2008--8 months 
behind schedule. This delay occurred because the contractor-delivered 
system did not perform as intended. For example, Boeing was unable to 
integrate components, such as towers, cameras, and radars with the COP 
software. Project 28 is currently operating along 28 miles of the 
southwest border in the Tucson sector of Arizona (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Project 28 Mobile Sensor Tower Deployed in the Tucson Sector:

[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure]

Future SBInet capabilities are to be deployed in "blocks." For example, 
Block 1 is described as the first phase of an effort to design, 
develop, integrate, test, and deploy a technology system of hardware, 
software, and communications. Each block is to include a release or 
version of the COP. According to the Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure 
Plan, Block 1 is to include the Tucson and Yuma sectors and Block 2 is 
to include the sectors of El Paso, Rio Grande Valley, Laredo, Del Rio, 
San Diego, and El Centro.

While the SBI program office is responsible for deploying SBInet 
technology, the tactical infrastructure program office, which was 
realigned to the Office of Finance, Facilities Management and 
Engineering in March 2009, is responsible for deploying tactical 
infrastructure--pedestrian and vehicular fencing, roads, and lighting--
along the southwest border to deter smugglers and aliens attempting 
illegal entry. The Secure Fence Act of 2006, as amended, required DHS 
to construct not less than 700 miles of reinforced fencing along the 
southwest border where fencing would be most practical and effective, 
and to provide for the installation of additional physical barriers, 
roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors to gain operational control of 
the southwest border.[Footnote 9] Although the act did not impose any 
statutory deadlines with respect to the deployment of SBInet 
technology, it did require DHS to complete a portion of the required 
700 miles of reinforced fencing by December 31, 2008.[Footnote 10] This 
interim construction deadline applied to 370 of the required 700 miles 
of reinforced fencing, to be located wherever the Secretary determined 
it would be most practical and effective in deterring smugglers and 
aliens attempting illegal entry.[Footnote 11]

The Secure Fence Act of 2006, as amended, provided the Secretary of 
Homeland Security with some discretion regarding its mileage 
requirements. Notwithstanding the total mileage requirement of 700 
miles, the act stated that the Secretary was not required to install 
fencing, physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors in a 
particular location "if the Secretary determines that the use or 
placement of such resources is not the most appropriate means to 
achieve and maintain operational control over the international border 
at such location."[Footnote 12] According to DHS, under this authority, 
the Secretary determined that fencing was the most appropriate means to 
achieve and maintain operational control over 670 miles, rather than 
700 miles, of the border. Furthermore, the act also gave the Secretary 
discretion, through December 31, 2008, to set an alternative mileage 
goal for the interim construction deadline of 370 miles.[Footnote 13] 
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary committed to complete all 670 
miles of fencing by December 31, 2008. Of these miles, DHS planned 
about 370 miles of pedestrian fencing--fencing that prevents people on 
foot from crossing the border, and about 300 miles of vehicle fencing-
-barriers used primarily in remote areas to prohibit vehicles engaged 
in drug trafficking and alien smuggling operations from crossing the 
border. In September 2008, DHS revised its goal of completing the full 
670 miles of fencing by December 31, 2008. As an interim step, DHS 
committed to have 661 miles either built, under construction, or under 
contract by December 31, 2008, but did not set a goal for the number of 
miles it planned to complete by December 31, 2008. As of December 31, 
2008, DHS had completed 578 miles of fencing, meeting the interim 
statutory goal to complete 370 miles of fencing by that time. (See 
figure 3 for examples of fencing.) 

Figure 3: Examples of Fencing Styles along the Southwest Border:

[Refer to PDF for image: four photographs] 

The Picket Fence (upper left), Bollard Fence (upper right) and Post & 
Rail with wire mesh (lower left) are examples of pedestrian fencing; 
the Normandy Vehicle Fence (lower right) is an example of vehicle 
fencing. 

Source: CBP. 

[End of figure]

SBInet Deployment Delays Require Border Patrol to Rely on Existing 
Technology Which Has Limitations That Newer Technology Is Planned to 
Overcome:

SBInet technology deployments continue to experience delays due to 
flaws found in testing and potential environmental impacts. User 
evaluations by Border Patrol agents found that improvements to the new 
technology that would correct inconsistent system performance needed to 
be made. SBI officials believed that some issues raised about the 
technology during user evaluation were a result of the Border Patrol 
agents' unfamiliarity with the equipment; however, Border Patrol 
officials said that they selected agents who were familiar with 
existing technology and that some training was provided to these agents 
before testing took place. Until SBInet is deployed, Border Patrol 
agents continue to rely on existing technology that has limitations 
such as performance shortfalls and maintenance issues. CBP cannot 
determine what operational changes it will need to make as a result of 
the new technology, and Border Patrol will not be able to realize the 
potential of this technology until it is deployed.

SBInet Deployment Delays Continue Due to Flaws Found in Testing and 
Environmental Considerations:

Our previous work has shown that CBP's efforts to deploy SBInet 
technology across the southwest border have fallen behind its planned 
schedule.[Footnote 14] For example, according to the Boeing contract 
signed in September 2006, an initial set of operational capabilities 
was planned to be deployed along the entire southwest border in early 
fiscal year 2009, and a full set of operational capabilities along the 
southern and northern borders was planned by later in fiscal year 2009. 
As of the December 2006, the SBInet Expenditure Plan reported that the 
schedule had changed such that all deployments in the Yuma and Tucson 
sectors were estimated to be complete by October and December 2008, 
respectively and the entire southwest border by October 2011. The 
Expenditure Plan did not provide a time frame for deployment to the 
northern border. By October 2007, SBI program officials expected to 
complete all of the first planned deployment of southwest border 
technology projects in the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors by the end 
of calendar year 2008, and deployments in Rio Grande Valley, Laredo, 
and Del Rio by the end of calendar year 2009. In February 2008, the SBI 
program office again modified its deployment plans, and reported that 
the first deployment of technology projects within Block 1 were to take 
place in two geographic areas within the Tucson sector --designated as 
Tucson-1 and Ajo-1--by the end of calendar year 2008, with the 
remainder of deployments to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors to be 
completed by the end of calendar year 2011. Other than the dates for 
the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors, no other deployment dates were 
established for the remainder of the southern or northern borders at 
that time.

We reported in September 2008 on SBInet program uncertainties, 
including that the program remained ambiguous and in a continued state 
of flux making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities 
are to be delivered, when and where they are to be delivered, and how 
they will be delivered.[Footnote 15] We recommended, among other 
things, that the CBP Commissioner establish and baseline the specific 
program commitments, including the specific system functional and 
performance capabilities, which are to be deployed to the Tucson, Yuma, 
and El Paso sectors, and establish when these capabilities are to be 
deployed and are to be operational. Partially in response to our 
recommendations, in September 2008, the DHS Acquisition Review Board-- 
a departmental executive board that reviews certain acquisitions-- 
required a re-plan of the program.[Footnote 16] The re-plan was to 
include, among other things, a revised and detailed program schedule 
with key milestones.[Footnote 17] In addition, during the re-plan, a 
portion of SBInet technology funds were reallocated to fund cost 
increases associated with the higher priority vehicle and pedestrian 
fencing. The Acquisition Review Board noted that this reallocation of 
funds and the desire to include additional field testing would result 
in a delay of the Tuscon-1 and Ajo-1 deployments. SBI program office 
officials said that the reallocation of funds was made possible because 
the program was in the middle of the re-plan which required additional 
field testing prior to the start of construction in Tucson-1. By 
December 2008, the SBI program office's revised schedule showed final 
acceptance of Tuscon-1 in September 2009, and final acceptance of Ajo- 
1 in December 2009[Footnote 18]. By February 2009, the schedule had 
slipped and final acceptance of Tucson-1 was expected in November 2009 
and Ajo-1 in March 2010. Further, our assimilation of available 
information from multiple program sources, including the Fiscal Year 
2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, indicated that deployments throughout the 
rest of the Tucson and Yuma sectors were to be completed by 2011; 
deployments in El Paso, Rio Grande Valley, Laredo, Del Rio, San Diego, 
and El Centro sectors between 2012 and 2015; and deployments in the 
Marfa sector by 2016. Nevertheless, the timing of planned SBInet 
deployments continued to slip. As of April 2009, Tuscon-1 was scheduled 
for final acceptance by December 2009 and Ajo-1 had slipped to June 
2010. Our previous work emphasizes that a key aspect of managing large 
programs like SBInet is having a schedule that defines the sequence and 
timing of key activities. In addition, our research has identified best 
practices associated with effective schedule estimating.[Footnote 19] 
We have an ongoing review to report separately on SBInet and whether 
DHS has established a comprehensive, accurate, and realistic schedule 
that reflects the scope, timing, and sequencing of the work needed to 
achieve commitments, and which provides key information to DHS and 
congressional decisionmakers. Figure 4 shows the changes in the planned 
deployment schedule over time.

Figure 4: Depiction of Changes in the SBInet Deployment Schedule from 
September 2006 through May 2009:

[Refer to PDF for image:: illustration] 

Planned SBInet technology deployment: 
All of southwest border(1993 miles)[A]: 
Estimated completion date: 
Early 2009 (as of September 2006); 
Late 2001 (as of December 2006); 
Middle 2016 (as of February 2009). 

Planned SBInet technology deployment: 
All of Tucson and Yuma (387 miles); 
Estimated completion date: 
Late 2008 (as of December 2006 and October 2007); 
Middle 2011 (as of February 2008 and February 2009). 

Planned SBInet technology deployment: 
El Paso(268 miles); 
Estimated completion date: 
Late 2008 (as of October 2007); 
Middle 2011 (as of February 2008 and February 2009); 
Middle 2012 (as of May 2009). 

Planned SBInet technology deployment: 
Tucson-1—one of two geographic sectors within Tucson sector(23.5 
miles); 
Estimated completion date: 
Late 2008 (as of February 2008); 
Late 2009 (as of December 2008, February 2009, and April 2009); 
Middle 2010 (as of February 2009 and April 2009). 

Planned SBInet technology deployment: 
Ajo-1—one of two geographic sectors within Tucson sector(29.9 miles); 
Estimated completion date: 
Late 2008 (as of February 2008); 
Late 2009 (as of December 2008); 
Early 2010 and Middle 2010 (as of February 2009 and April 2009). 

Planned SBInet technology deployment: 
Rio Grande Valley, Laredo, and Del Rio sectors (697 miles); 
Estimated completion date: 
Late 2009 (as of October 2007); 
Middle 2014 (as of February 2009: complete between 2013 and 2014). 

Planned SBInet technology deployment: 
San Diego and El Centro sectors (130 miles); 
Estimated completion date: 
Early 2009 (as of September 2006); 
Middle 2014 (as of February 2009: complete between 2014 and 2015). 

Planned SBInet technology deployment: 
Marfa sector (510 miles); 
Estimated completion date: 
Early 2009 (as of September 2006); 
Middle 2016 (as of February 2009). 

[A] Miles represent the area of responsibility of the sector(s). 

Source: CBP’s SBI program office and Border Patrol. 

[End of figure]

According to SBI program office officials, the results of testing 
activities are contributing to the recent delays of Tucson-1 and Ajo-1. 
For example, one of the changes that resulted from the re-plan was a 
requirement for additional testing of SBInet technology, which SBI 
addressed through additional testing performed at a test facility 
intended to emulate deployment conditions at project sites. SBI program 
office officials emphasized, and we agree, that testing is a necessary 
step of deployment and ensures that the technology capabilities perform 
as required.[Footnote 20] By February 2009, preliminary results of 
testing revealed problems that would limit the usefulness of the system 
for Border Patrol agents, including the instability of the camera under 
adverse weather conditions, mechanical problems with the radar at the 
tower, and issues with the sensitivity of the radar. In March 2009, 
CBP's Acting Commissioner testified on the testing activity, among 
other things, stating that although the system did not meet all testing 
objectives during the December testing, CBP did not perceive "any show- 
stopper issues."[Footnote 21] Based on the testing results, the DHS 
Acquisition Review Board deferred approval of Tucson-1 equipment 
installation and Ajo-1 site preparation and equipment installation 
until the successful resolution of testing objectives which contributed 
to an Ajo-1 schedule delay of 30 days from April to May 2009. The SBI 
program office oversaw Boeing's efforts to re-work and re-test these 
issues, but as of May 2009, the SBI program office reported that they 
were still working to address some issues such as difficulties aligning 
the radar.

Although DHS received the necessary environmental permit to begin 
construction of towers on Tucson-1 in October 2008, the need to obtain 
environmental permits was another contributing factor in the Ajo-1 
delays. DOI and DHS are coordinating their efforts to permit tower 
construction sites in Ajo-1, with the two agencies in negotiations over 
the location of towers and discussions on Border Patrol 
operations.[Footnote 22] As of May 2009, the agencies had not reached 
agreement on the amount of information Border Patrol should provide DOI 
regarding how Border Patrol operations are to change after the 
deployment of SBInet technology. However, according to DOI's National 
Borderland Coordinator, DOI and Border Patrol have made progress in 
identifying and discussing Border Patrol's operational activities as 
they pertain to the Ajo-1 site. For example, prior to Border Patrol's 
completion of an environmental assessment,[Footnote 23] Border Patrol 
and DOI engaged in discussions to address DOI questions on how Border 
Patrol activities are affected by the SBInet deployment. Border Patrol 
stated that its expectation is that SBInet technology in Ajo-1 will 
allow focused interdiction, reducing the number of personnel required 
to locate violators. On May 20, 2009, SBI submitted a draft description 
of proposed action in Ajo-1, which was followed by discussions between 
DHS and DOI officials on unresolved issues related to tower placement 
within the range of environmentally sensitive lands. On June 10, 2009, 
DOI, CBP, and SBI senior officials met to discuss these unresolved 
issues. According to DOI's National Borderland Coordinator, agreement 
was reached to proceed with completion of a final description of 
proposed action in Ajo-1. DOI officials received CBP's final 
description of proposed action on July 24, 2009, and DOI is now 
scheduled to issue a biological opinion associated with the endangered 
species in the Ajo-1 project area by September 22, 2009. Once DHS 
receives the biological opinion, it plans to issue a finding as to 
whether there will be any significant impact to the endangered species 
as a result of the project. DOI plans to issue permits for the Ajo-1 
project within 5 days of receipt of a finding of no significant impact:

Border Patrol Agents Are Providing User Feedback on Block 1 
Development, and Have Noted That Some Improvements Could Be Made:

While involvement was limited for Project 28, SBI program office 
officials recognized the need to involve intended operators--Border 
Patrol agents--in Block 1 development, including testing activities. 
For example, CBP reported using feedback and input from Border Patrol 
agents to complete detailed plans for tower locations and access roads 
to support SBInet deployment to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors. 
In addition, from March 27 to April 4, 2009, Border Patrol agents had 
an opportunity to operate Block 1 technology in a test environment and 
participate in an early assessment of the suitability and effectiveness 
of the SBInet technology. The operators' initial observations included 
insight comparing the performance capabilities of existing technology-
-Project 28 and MSS--and new technology--SBInet Block 1 (see figure 
5).[Footnote 24] For example, the operators indicated that on windy 
days the Block 1 radar had issues that resulted in an excessive number 
of false detections and that the capability was not adequate for 
optimal operational effectiveness. The operators also compared the 
Project 28, MSS, and Block 1 cameras and indicated that the features of 
the Block 1 camera were insufficient in comparison to features of the 
Project 28 and MSS cameras. Overall, the feedback from operators 
indicated "the need for a number of relatively small, but critical 
enhancements" to the COP and overall concerns about inconsistent system 
performance.

Figure 5: Example of an MSS Unit:

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: CBP. 

[End of figure]

SBI program officials explained that this assessment was an initial 
user evaluation. The officials also said that in reviewing the results, 
they determined that some of the issues raised by the Border Patrol 
operators occurred because the operators were not familiar with and had 
not been trained to use the equipment; other issues, such as those with 
the radar were likely due to incorrect settings across all radars in 
the test configuration. The Border Patrol said that it selected agents 
to participate who had experience with the MSSs and/or Project 28 and 
that the COP operators were given a 2-day course provided by agents 
familiar with the Block 1 COP prior to the assessment. However, the 
Border Patrol agreed that the lack of experience with the Block 1 
system may have led to some of the issues found during the user 
evaluation. Nonetheless, because of the agents' experience with the MSS 
and Project 28 systems, the Border Patrol said that the issues and 
concerns generated should be considered operationally relevant. SBI 
program officials said that operator training is to take place before 
all Block 1 capabilities are deployed and that additional emphasis is 
to be placed on ensuring the operators' familiarity with the equipment. 
Once all Block 1 capabilities are deployed in Tucson-1, the Border 
Patrol is to perform and complete operational testing. This testing is 
to include insights from the operators' initial evaluations of the 
system's capabilities. Provided there are no additional schedule 
changes, this testing of Tucson-1 is scheduled to begin in January 2010.

Until SBInet Technology Is in Place, Border Patrol Agents Continue to 
Use Existing Equipment and CBP Is Limited in Its Ability to Fully 
Implement the Objectives of the Border Patrol Strategy:

Until SBInet capabilities are deployed across the southwest border, 
Border Patrol agents are using existing capabilities, including Project 
28 and legacy equipment supplemented by more recently procured MSS, but 
all have limitations. As stated previously, Project 28 encountered 
performance shortfalls and delays. During our site visit to the Tucson 
sector in March 2009, Border Patrol agents told us, as they had during 
our previous visits, that the system had improved their operational 
capabilities, but that they must continue to work around ongoing 
problems, such as finding good signal strength for the wireless 
network, remotely controlling cameras, and modifying radar sensitivity. 
Furthermore, they said, and we observed, that few of the agents were 
currently using the mobile data terminals installed in 50 of the 
sector's vehicles, instead relying on agents operating the COP to relay 
information about the whereabouts of suspected illegal migrants. One 
reason agents do not use the mobile data terminals is that it can take 
up to an hour to log into the system depending on signal strength and 
because the signal, once gained, is sometimes lost multiple times 
during a shift. In all southwest border sectors, Border Patrol relies 
on legacy equipment, such as cameras mounted on towers. In the Tucson 
and San Diego sectors, Border Patrol agents rely on cameras that have 
been in place since before calendar year 2000. Border Patrol officials 
told us that in the three sectors, the cameras have intermittent 
problems, including signal loss and problems with power and weather. In 
the Tucson sector, officials noted that the legacy cameras should be 
updated to gain compatibility with SBInet. To fill gaps or augment the 
legacy equipment, the SBI program office procured and delivered a total 
of 40 MSSs. These units were delivered to the Border Patrol's Tucson 
sector (23 units), Yuma sector (7 units), and, El Paso sector (8 units) 
in fiscal year 2008. In addition, a total of 4 units are planned for 
delivery to the San Diego sector (1 unit) and the northern border (3 
units) in fiscal year 2009. During our visit to the Tucson sector in 
March 2009, we observed a Border Patrol agent using a MSS unit. The 
agent showed us the radar capabilities including the maximum range, the 
ability to minimize the range and limit the speed of the radar and 
cameras, which have a 360 degree view. According to Border Patrol 
officials, the MSS represents increased operational capabilities for 
the Border Patrol. However, SBI program officials and Border Patrol 
noted that at any given time, a unit may not be operational because of 
the need for repairs. As of April 2009, 15 of the 23 units at the 
Border Patrol's Tucson sector were operational. At that time, in the 
Yuma sector, 4 of the 7 units were operational, although during our 
visit to the Yuma sector 1 unit was operational. Border Patrol 
officials explained that in the Yuma sector these units have not worked 
well because of extreme heat issues. Despite these performance 
shortfalls, and maintenance issues, agents continue to use existing 
technology while waiting for the SBInet deployment which will 
supplement the existing technology.

The initial deployment of SBInet technology in the Tucson-1 and Ajo-1 
project sites is intended to provide CBP agents and officers a greatly 
enhanced ability to detect, identify, and classify illegal cross-border 
activity, as well as facilitate a coordinated response to the activity. 
These goals directly support the broader SBI goal and Border Patrol 
strategy to gain effective control of the nation's borders. While 
Border Patrol agents have been stakeholders in the development and 
testing of SBInet technology, Border Patrol officials said that a full 
assessment of SBInet technology's impact cannot be made until the 
technology is in use. Therefore, until technology is in place, CBP is 
limited in its ability to fully identify and implement operational 
changes in methods, tactics and approaches, and resources needed to 
address objectives of the Border Patrol Strategy, and will not be able 
to realize the potential of this technology in its efforts to secure 
the border.

Tactical Infrastructure Deployments Are Almost Complete, but Their 
Impact on Border Security Has Not Been Measured:

The deployment of 661 miles of tactical infrastructure projects along 
the southwest border is nearing completion, but delays persist, due 
mainly to property acquisition issues. In addition, per mile costs, 
which had climbed substantially, are now less likely to change because 
contracts for the 661 miles of fence have been awarded. CBP plans to 
complete 10 more miles of fencing using fiscal year 2009 funds, and 
fiscal year 2010 and 2011 funds are to be used primarily for supporting 
infrastructure. A life cycle cost study has been completed which 
estimates deployment, operations, and future maintenance for the 
tactical infrastructure will total $6.5 billion. Despite the investment 
in tactical infrastructure, its impact on securing the border has not 
been measured because DHS has not assessed the impact of the tactical 
infrastructure on gains or losses in the level of effective control.

CBP Is Close to Completing Initially Planned Tactical Infrastructure, 
but Delays Persist:

CBP is close to accomplishing its goal to build 661 miles of fencing 
along the southwest border. As of June 2009, 633 miles had been 
completed (see table 2). CBP was scheduled to complete the remaining 28 
miles by November 2009. However, fence deployment continues to face 
delays due to challenges in constructing tactical infrastructure on 
difficult terrain and acquiring the necessary property rights from 
landowners. For example, in the San Diego sector, one 3.6 mile tactical 
infrastructure project previously scheduled to be completed by December 
2008 and now due to be completed by October 2009, involves construction 
on rugged mountainous terrain that is not easily accessible. According 
to tactical infrastructure officials, they realized before December 
2008 that it would not be possible to complete this segment until 
October 2009 because of these factors. In addition, as of June 29, 
2009, fence projects totaling about 20 miles in the Rio Grande Valley 
sector with originally planned completion dates of December 2008 are 
now scheduled for completion by October 2009, with the exception of one 
segment, because of litigation related to property acquisition that was 
not resolved in time to meet the original dates. The segment that will 
not be complete by October 2009 was delayed due to difficulties 
obtaining materials for the bridge construction associated with the 
segment. As a result, this segment is anticipated to be completed in 
November 2009. As of June 29, 2009, of an estimated 96 cases where the 
government sued to acquire property through condemnation proceedings 
because the landowner would not voluntarily sell to the government, the 
property associated with 39 of those cases had yet to be acquired. 
[Footnote 25] However, of the 39 cases, 7 are required to be settled to 
complete fence construction. The remaining 32 properties are being 
sought in anticipation of future fencing needs and for other purposes, 
such as operations and maintenance of the fence. Nonetheless, the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) officials said that completion of 
fencing construction projects usually takes 90 to 120 days. Because the 
properties have yet to be acquired, the October 2009 projected 
completion date is likely to slip.

Table 2: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of June 26, 
2009:

Infrastructure type: Pedestrian fencing; 
Miles in place before SBI[A]: 67; 
Miles deployed through SBI as of 6/26/09: 264; 
Total miles in place as of 6/26/09: 331; 
Target: 358; 
Miles remaining to meet target: 27.

Infrastructure type: Vehicle fencing; 
Miles in place before SBI[A]: 76; 
Miles deployed through SBI as of 6/26/09: 226; 
Total miles in place as of 6/26/09: 302; 
Target: 303; 
Miles remaining to meet target: 1.

Infrastructure type: Total fencing; 
Miles in place before SBI[A]: 143; 
Miles deployed through SBI as of 6/26/09: 490; 
Total miles in place as of 6/26/09: 633; 
Target: 661; 
Miles remaining to meet target: 28.

Source: GAO analysis of SBI data.

[A] Seventy-eight miles of pedestrian fencing and 57 miles of vehicle 
fencing were in place before the SBI program began. However, since SBI 
began construction, some miles of fencing have been removed, replaced, 
or retrofitted resulting in mileage totals that are different from 
those we have reported in earlier reports. 

[End of table] 

While fencing costs increased over the course of construction, because 
all construction contracts have been awarded, cost estimates are less 
likely to change. Fencing miles completed as of October 31, 2008, cost 
an average of $3.9 million per mile for pedestrian fencing and $1.0 
million per mile for vehicle fencing.[Footnote 26] However, once 
contracts were awarded, the average per mile costs had increased to 
$6.5 million per mile for pedestrian fencing and $1.8 million per mile 
for vehicle fencing. Tactical infrastructure program officials said the 
per mile costs increased over time due to various factors, such as 
property acquisition costs incurred for these miles that were not a 
factor for many of the previous miles and costs for labor and materials 
increased.[Footnote 27] Also, as we reported in September 2008, as 
tactical infrastructure officials were in the process of finalizing 
construction contracts, cost estimates for pedestrian fencing in Texas 
began to increase.[Footnote 28] Tactical infrastructure program office 
officials attributed the cost increases to a short supply of labor and 
materials, as well as the compressed timeline. For example, the 
officials said that as a result of a construction boom in Texas, labor 
was in short supply and contractors reported that they needed to 
provide premium pay and overtime to attract workers. In terms of 
materials, USACE officials stated that the price of cement and steel 
had increased and in some areas within Texas obtaining cement near the 
fence construction site was difficult. Tactical infrastructure program 
office officials said that they worked to mitigate the cost increases 
where possible. For example, they said that although their decision to 
purchase steel in bulk was made to ensure its availability, the 
purchase also resulted in savings. Tactical infrastructure program 
office officials said that based on data showing that the price of 
steel products almost doubled from January 2008 through August 2008, 
they estimate that they saved over $72 million with the bulk steel 
purchase. However, due to the construction delays, the tactical 
infrastructure program office has had to extend the contract for 
storage of the steel, and is to soon begin negotiations for a long-term 
storage contract. The need to continue to store the leftover steel will 
result in increased costs. Despite these additional costs, tactical 
infrastructure program office officials said that, according to their 
estimates, they will still realize cost savings on their bulk steel 
purchase. In addition, the officials estimated that there will be 
approximately 25,000 tons of steel remaining after all fencing segments 
are built. They said it will be used if additional fencing is built and 
will be used to maintain the fencing already deployed.

Few Miles of Fencing Are to Be Built with Fiscal Year 2009 Funds and 
Fiscal Year 2010 and 2011 Funds Are to Be Used Primarily for Supporting 
Infrastructure:

Ten miles of additional fencing is scheduled to be built with fiscal 
year 2009 funds, and fiscal years 2010 and 2011 funds are planned to be 
used primarily for supporting infrastructure. For fiscal years 2009 and 
2010, $110 million has been allocated to tactical infrastructure. With 
the fiscal year 2009 funding, the tactical infrastructure program 
office plans to construct approximately 3 miles of vehicle fence in the 
Tucson sector and about 7 miles of pedestrian fence in the Marfa, Rio 
Grande Valley, and El Paso sectors. The program office also plans to 
use the funding for enhancements to existing fencing, such as gates and 
canal crossovers, and real estate planning and acquisition for fiscal 
year 2010 projects. Due to the long lead time associated with real 
estate acquisition, DHS also plans to use fiscal year 2009 funds to 
conduct real estate planning and acquisition activities for projects 
slated for completion in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. By conducting real 
estate activities 1 to 2 years in advance, CBP seeks to limit 
construction delays due to lack of real estate. Also, as of June 2009, 
the program office had obligated about $21 million of its fiscal year 
2009 funds for additional costs caused by construction delays and 
changes on projects under way. With fiscal year 2010 funds, plans as of 
June 2009 include replacing surf fencing and constructing all-weather 
roads and lighting in the San Diego sector; constructing bridges, a 
third layer of fencing and lighting in the El Centro sector; and 
clearing brush in the Yuma sector. For fiscal year 2011, plans as of 
June 2009 were to, among other things, construct all-weather roads in 
the El Paso and Del Rio sectors; and construct roads, bridges, and low- 
water crossings and to clear brush in the Laredo sector.

A Tactical Infrastructure Life-Cycle Cost Study Has Been Completed:

The summary of a life-cycle cost study prepared by a contractor for CBP 
shows that total life-cycle costs for all tactical infrastructure 
constructed to date, including pre-SBI infrastructure as well as that 
planned for fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011, are estimated at about 
$6.5 billion. The life-cycle cost estimates include deployment and 
operations and future maintenance costs for all tactical 
infrastructure, including the fence, roads, and lighting, among other 
things. Previously, CBP had reported that the fence is to have a 
lifespan of approximately 20 years, and plans to obligate $75 million 
to operations and maintenance of the fence for fiscal year 2009, and 
again requested $75 million for fiscal year 2010. A significant use of 
the operations and maintenance funding is to repair breaches in the 
fence. According to tactical infrastructure program office data, as of 
May 14, 2009, there had been 3,363 breaches in the fence, with each 
breach costing an average of $1,300 to repair. Because of its 
construction, the older pre-SBI fencing is easier to breach and most 
breaches occurred in these types of fencing. Of the newer fencing, the 
fewest breaches occurred in the bollard-style fencing, while more 
occurred in the wire mesh fence. Examples of breaches are shown in 
figure 6.

Figure 6: Examples of Repaired Breaches in Newer Fencing:

[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs] 

1) A repaired fence breach in bollard fence with honeycomb design, an 
environmental feature that allows debris and water to pass through. 

2) Steel mesh fence showing repaired fence breaches. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure]

The Number of Southwest Border Miles That CBP Reports as Being under 
Effective Control Has Increased, but the Impact of Tactical 
Infrastructure Has Not Been Measured:

CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional 
trained Border Patrol agents, had increased the miles of the southwest 
border under effective control,but despite a $2.4 billion investment, 
it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. 
DHS defines effective control of the U.S. borders as the ability to 
consistently (1) detect illegal entries into the United States between 
the port of entry, (2) identify and classify these entries to determine 
the level of threat involved, (3) effectively respond to these entries, 
and (4) bring events to a satisfactory law enforcement resolution. 
Border Patrol personnel, technology, and tactical infrastructure are 
the contributing elements to effective control. CBP measures miles 
under effective control through Border Patrol's quarterly assessments 
using information on apprehensions; vehicle drive-through traffic; and, 
intelligence, operational reports, and the experience and expertise of 
senior Border Patrol agents, among other things. CBP recognizes that 
its measure of effective control is limited in that its source relies 
partially on subjective information and it does not reflect all CBP 
efforts along the border. CBP officials report that they are working to 
create a CBP-wide border control measure to inform resource decision 
making, but are having difficulty determining appropriate data sources 
and the appropriate measure and, therefore, have not set a date for 
completion of this measure.

According to CBP's Fiscal Year 2008 Performance and Accountability 
Report, 757 of the 8,607 miles the Border Patrol is responsible for 
were under effective control, increasing the miles under effective 
control by 158 over those miles controlled in fiscal year 2007. 
According to the Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, between fiscal 
years 2007 and 2008, an additional 36 miles in the Tucson sector were 
under effective control partially as a result of added tactical 
infrastructure. In the Yuma sector where some of the early SBI fencing 
was constructed, apprehensions were down 78 percent in fiscal year 2008 
compared with fiscal year 2007. CBP reported that apprehensions 
declined partially because of the fencing and also because of non- 
fencing reasons, such as the increase in Border Patrol agents during 
fiscal year 2008. In addition, CBP reported that as a direct result of 
increased tactical infrastructure, vehicle drive-through traffic 
declined from 213 incursions in fiscal year 2007 to 2 in fiscal year 
2008. Overall, the Yuma sector's vehicle drive-through traffic declined 
by 50 percent and the number of miles under effective control for the 
sector climbed from 70 in fiscal year 2007 to 118 of the sector's 125 
miles in fiscal year 2008. In the San Diego sector, 3 miles of 
effective control were gained between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and 
apprehensions were up 7 percent. Table 3 shows the changes in effective 
control for these three sectors from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 
2008.

Table 3: Miles under Effective Control and Change in Apprehensions in 
Select Southwest Border Sectors from Fiscal Year 2007 through Fiscal 
Year 2008:

Sector: Tucson; 
Total miles: 262; 
Miles under effective control: FY2007: 67; 
Miles under effective control: FY2008: 103; 
Change in miles under effective control: 36 mile increase; 
Change in apprehensions: 16% downward.

Sector: Yuma; 
Total miles: 125; 
Miles under effective control: FY2007: 70; 
Miles under effective control: FY2008: 118; 
Change in miles under effective control: 48 mile increase; 
Change in apprehensions: 78% downward.

Sector: San Diego; 
Total miles: 60; 
Miles under effective control: FY2007: 19; 
Miles under effective control: FY2008: 22; 
Change in miles under effective control: 3 mile increase; 
Change in apprehensions: 7% upward.

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data. 

[End of table] 

However, Border Patrol data show that apprehensions for all southwest 
border sectors except San Diego also declined between fiscal years 2006 
and 2007, before the majority of the tactical infrastructure was 
deployed. Therefore, the impact of tactical infrastructure on 
apprehensions is unclear as there are other factors that could 
contribute to the decline. For example, in its Fiscal Year 2008 4TH 
Quarter Congressional Status Report on Border Security and Resources, 
CBP stated that the end of "catch and release," increases in Border 
Patrol agents, more tactical infrastructure on the border, expanded use 
of expedited removal, and support from the National Guard during 
Operation Jump Start have had a significant deterrent effect, 
contributing to the marked decline in apprehensions.[Footnote 29] Other 
factors, such as the decreasing number of migrants attempting to cross 
the border due to the economy may also have impacted apprehensions.

CBP has not systematically evaluated the impact of tactical 
infrastructure on gains or losses in the level of effective border 
control, controlling for the influences of other potential factors on 
border control efforts. The current performance measure for tactical 
infrastructure is miles constructed. While this measure provides useful 
information it does not demonstrate the program's discrete contribution 
to effective control. In addition, CBP has, as part of its Fiscal Year 
2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, completed an analysis of each tactical 
infrastructure segment to be built compared to other, alternative means 
of achieving effective control such as investments in technology and 
enforcement personnel.[Footnote 30] This analysis was intended to show 
where physical fencing was most appropriate given cost, level of 
effective control, possible unintended effects on communities, and 
other critical factors. However, these analyses were largely subjective 
because they were based primarily on the experience and expertise of 
senior border patrol agents.

Federal agencies are increasingly expected to focus on achieving 
results and to demonstrate, in annual performance reports and budget 
requests, how their activities help achieve agency or governmentwide 
goals. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) 
requires federal agencies to report annually on their achievement of 
performance goals, explain why any goals were not met, and summarize 
the findings of any program evaluations conducted during the year. 
[Footnote 31] For programs that have readily observable results or 
outcomes, performance measurement may provide sufficient information to 
demonstrate program results. In some programs, however, outcomes are 
not quickly achieved or readily observed, or their relationship to the 
program is uncertain. In such cases, program evaluations may be needed, 
in addition to performance measurement, to examine the extent to which 
a program is achieving its objectives. Our previous work identified 
program evaluations as a way for agencies to explore the benefits of a 
program as well as ways to improve program performance.[Footnote 32]

An evaluation of the tactical infrastructure already deployed along the 
southwest border would help demonstrate its contribution to effective 
control of the border and help CBP to determine whether more tactical 
infrastructure would be appropriate, given other alternatives and 
constraints. For instance, a statistical analysis could be conducted to 
show the effect of tactical infrastructure within each sector and 
throughout the southwest border, controlling for other potential 
factors.[Footnote 33] This analysis could include, among other data, 
apprehension data and data on illegal migrants' and smugglers' methods, 
routes, and modes of transportation before and after tactical 
infrastructure deployment. CBP could use the information collected 
during program evaluations to complement its performance measurement 
data and thereby more fully assess these often difficult-to-measure 
activities and to inform its efforts to improve its performance 
measures. Our work has shown that analyses such as these further 
complement performance management initiatives and are useful to inform 
resource decision making and in helping to effectively implement 
performance measures.[Footnote 34]

CBP officials said that they would like to conduct a study, but lack 
the resources. In our previous work, we found that through a number of 
strategies, agencies developed and maintained a capacity to produce and 
use evaluations. First, to leverage their evaluation resources and 
expertise, agencies engaged in collaborations or actively educated and 
solicited the support and involvement of their program partners and 
stakeholders. Second, agency managers sustained a commitment to 
accountability and to improving program performance. Third, they 
improved administrative systems or turned to special data collections 
to obtain better quality data. Finally, they sought out--through 
external sources or development of staff--whatever expertise was needed 
to ensure the credibility of analyses and conclusions.[Footnote 35] 
Furthermore, in our efforts to assist agencies' program evaluation 
efforts, we identified agencies that initiated evaluation studies 
resulting in recommendations to address program performance and a 
strategy for the future.[Footnote 36] The evaluations conducted by 
these agencies helped them improve their measurement of program 
performance or understanding of performance and how it might be 
improved, or both. Accordingly, information gained through an 
evaluation may help CBP more effectively allocate its limited 
resources, inform its future decisions about investing in tactical 
infrastructure, and ensure that existing tools are adequately supported 
and maintained. Such an evaluation would also help CBP determine 
whether the tactical infrastructure it has deployed meets the mandate 
in the Secure Fence Act of 2006, as amended, to use physical 
infrastructure enhancements to help prevent unlawful U.S. entries; 
facilitate access by CBP personnel to enable a rapid and effective 
response to illegal activities; and help DHS and CBP achieve and 
maintain operational control of U.S. borders.[Footnote 37] Until CBP 
determines the contribution of tactical infrastructure to border 
security beyond a measure of miles covered by tactical infrastructure, 
it is not positioned to address the impact this costly resource has had 
in each sector or might have if deployed in other locations across the 
southwest border.

Conclusions:

While the SBInet program continues to test and evaluate potential 
technology applications, a major part of DHS's effort to secure the 
nation's borders from the illegal entry of aliens and contraband has 
been the deployment of tactical infrastructure. Along with technology 
and additional Border Patrol personnel, CBP relies on tactical 
infrastructure to help gain and maintain effective control of the 
border. Controlling, managing, and securing the border were the 
principal purposes of the mandate to construct fencing along the 
southwest border. Deploying this infrastructure has been expensive and 
costs have risen during its construction. However, despite a $2.4 
billion investment in this infrastructure, its contribution to 
effective control of the border has not been measured because CBP has 
not evaluated the impact of tactical infrastructure on gains or losses 
in the level of effective control. Given the large investment made in 
tactical infrastructure and to help CBP more effectively allocate its 
limited resources, inform future decisions about whether to build more 
fencing, and ensure that existing tools are adequately supported and 
maintained, it is important that CBP assess the impact of tactical 
infrastructure on effective control as it examines the costs and 
benefits of different methods of deterrence.

Recommendation for Executive Action:

To improve the quality of information available to allocate resources 
and determine tactical infrastructure's contribution to effective 
control of the border, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP 
conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of tactical 
infrastructure on effective control of the border.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland 
Security for its review and comment. In an August 31, 2009, letter, the 
Department of Homeland Security provided written comments, which are 
summarized below and included in appendix III. The department stated 
that it agrees with our recommendation and generally concurred with our 
report, but said that the report does not acknowledge some of the 
significant factors that have contributed to program volatility and 
delays.

With respect to our recommendation, DHS concurred and described actions 
recently completed, underway, and planned that it said will address our 
recommendation to conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of 
tactical infrastructure on effective control of the border. DHS 
commented that its Office of Border Patrol was already committed to 
examining evaluation options, as evidenced by the Office of Border 
Patrol's completion of analyses of alternatives to guide field 
personnel through the process of considering and determining what and 
how much infrastructure would be most effective. We discuss the 
analyses of alternatives in our report, as well as the fact that they 
are largely subjective because they were based primarily on the 
experience and expertise of senior Border Patrol agents. DHS also 
commented that it is considering using independent researchers to 
conduct evaluations and using modeling and simulation technology to 
gauge the effects of resource deployments. We believe that such efforts 
would be consistent with our recommendation, further complement 
performance management initiatives, and be useful to inform resource 
decision making.

In its technical comments, DHS elaborated on some of the significant 
factors that have contributed to program volatility and delays. DHS 
stated that although SBI has experienced performance issues that have 
delayed Block 1 deployment, there have been other significant factors 
that have had an impact on the program schedule, such as their decision 
to reallocate funds to higher priority fencing projects, and external 
pressures--such as the need to obtain environmental clearances for 
tower placement. Our report included the environmental issues as a 
contributing factor to the delays. We have added information to our 
report to reflect the decision to reallocate funds. These reallocations 
and environmental issues notwithstanding, SBI program office officials 
told us that the program was not ready to use the funding that was 
reallocated in fiscal year 2008 due to the additional testing that 
needed to take place before deployment. We were unable to reprint DHS's 
technical comments in this report because they contain sensitive 
information; however, we have incorporated them into the report, as 
appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the date 
of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 
Senate and House committees and subcommittees that have authorization 
and oversight responsibilities for homeland security. We will also send 
copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Office of 
Management and Budget. In addition, this report will be available at no 
cost on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

Should your offices have any questions on matters discussed in this 
report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at stanar@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors 
to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Richard M. Stana, Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:

List of Requesters:

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Loretta Sánchez:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Mark E. Souder:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism:
Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives:

The Honorable Mike Rogers:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response:
Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives:

The Honorable Christopher P. Carney: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Gus Michael Bilirakis: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek: 
House of Representatives:

[End of section]

Appendix I: The Status of SBI Program Office Staffing and the Progress 
the Office Reports in Achieving Its Human Capital Goals:

The SBI program office has been reorganized, developed new staffing 
goals, and completed a new human capital plan for fiscal years 2009 
through 2010; however, meeting the plan's revised human capital goals 
may be difficult. Under the new organizational structure, the tactical 
infrastructure program office has moved to the CBP Office of Finance's 
Facilities Management and Engineering division and the SBI program 
office has been restructured. The restructuring of the SBI program 
office involved placing a greater emphasis on contractor oversight and 
creation of offices of operational integration, business management 
operations, and systems engineering, in addition to the SBInet program 
office. The SBI program's Executive Director's goal is to have a total 
of 236 employees--181 full-time government employees and 55 
contractors--in place by March 2010.[Footnote 38] He said that the goal 
to have 236 employees represents the number needed to move forward with 
the program based on his previous experience and the need to have 
government employees representing key procurement competencies, meaning 
an increase in the ratio of government employees to contractors. For 
example, as of May 31, 2009, SBI program office staffing consisted of a 
total of 167 employees--72 government and 95 contractors, or a ratio of 
1.3 contractors to each government employee.[Footnote 39] The new 
staffing goal calls for a ratio of 3.3 government employees to each 
contractor. The SBI Executive Director said that having more government 
employees is important because he wants more in-house expertise to 
oversee the contractors. According to the SBI Executive Director, 
increasing the ratio of government employees to contractors in the SBI 
program office may be difficult because of a shortage of some 
personnel, such as systems engineers. He said he anticipates hiring 8 
government employees a month, but acknowledges that it may take between 
4 and 6 months to bring new hires on board. In the meantime, he said 
the SBI office will continue to supplement its workforce with contract 
support staff.

In December 2008, the second version of its Strategic Human Capital 
Management Plan was provisionally certified and as of June 2009, the 
SBI program office continued to implement the plan. The new version of 
the human capital plan spans 2 fiscal years, reflecting a longer-term 
staffing vision for SBI. The SBI program office's plan outlines seven 
main goals for the office and includes planned activities to accomplish 
those goals, which align to federal government best practices.[Footnote 
40] As of May 2009, the SBI program office had taken several steps to 
implement the plan. For example, the SBI program office had completed a 
training plan which was undergoing review and had tentatively selected 
43 candidates to fill 70 vacancies. In addition, the program office had 
finalized an awards and recognition policy and had implemented the 
policy. However, the SBI program office had deferred completion of its 
succession management plan until the final quarter of fiscal year 2009.

To implement and review the human capital plan, the SBI program office 
is partnering with the DHS Chief Human Capital Officer's office as well 
as CBP's Office of Human Resources. In a December 8, 2008, letter that 
accompanied CBP's Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, the Chief 
Human Capital Officer noted that the SBI human capital plan provided 
specific initiatives to address hiring, development, and retention of 
employees, and described metrics to measure progress and results of 
these initiatives. However, the Chief Human Capital Officer also noted 
that human capital management challenges remain. For example, according 
to the letter, competition for qualified employees could present 
staffing challenges for SBI in achieving its goals to hire additional 
program managers, auditors, engineers, and environmental specialists 
and to shift the current ratio of contractors to federal employees and 
hire more federal employees and fewer contractors. Furthermore, still 
to be determined succession management plans and finalization of the 
training plan reflect unfinished human capital planning efforts. This 
gap in planning could present challenges in training employees and 
preparing for a longer-term SBI vision. The letter noted that the DHS 
Chief Human Capital Officer planned to reevaluate SBI's human capital 
plan in May 2009 to ensure that SBI was on track to achieve its 
staffing goals. According to the SBI Executive Director, this review is 
ongoing through a series of meetings and data exchanges. Table 4 
summarizes the seven human capital goals, and the SBI program office's 
planned activities and steps taken to accomplish these activities, as 
of May 2009.

Table 4: Human Capital Goals, Planned Activities, and Steps Taken:

SBI human capital goal: 
1. Develop a coherent framework of human capital policies, programs, 
and practices to achieve a shared vision integrated with SBI's 
strategic plan; 
Planned activities: 
* Update the SBI Strategic Human Capital Management Plan and ensure 
alignment to the SBI Strategic Implementation Plan and CBP Strategic 
Plan; 
* Establish a human capital leadership team; 
Steps taken as of May 2009, as reported by the SBI program office: 
* An appendix to the human capital management plan has been created to 
demonstrate alignment with the CBP strategic plan. Further updates to 
the human capital plan are not expected during fiscal year 2009; 
* A human capital leadership team has been established. 

SBI human capital goal: 
2. Prepare leaders to lead and manage the workforce; 
Planned activities: 
* Ensure continuity with required management certifications; 
* Create a learning culture that provides opportunities for continuous 
development; 
* Leverage and utilize the DHS and CBP Senior Executive Service (SES) 
candidacy development program; 
Steps taken as of May 2009, as reported by the SBI program office: 
* Six employees have received project manager certification; 
* SBI is using outside training sources to provide training courses and 
has held several brown bag training sessions; 
* SBI has not enrolled any employees in the SES candidacy development 
program.

SBI human capital goal: 
3. Create and instill within the organization a value-driven culture; 
Planned activities: 
* Leaders will maintain high standards of honesty and ethics; 
* Leadership will foster an environment of open communication and forum 
to share strategic vision; 
* SBI leadership will inspire employee commitment and integrity; 
Steps taken as of May 2009, as reported by the SBI program office: 
* SBI requires annual mandatory security and ethics training. All 
employees were to have completed the security training by June 1, 2009; 
* The SBI Executive Director holds monthly staff meetings; 
* Frequent SBI-wide e-mails highlighting accomplishments, areas of risk 
and general status updates are sent; 
* An SBI senior staff offsite was held. 

SBI human capital goal: 
4. Develop and implement a succession management plan; 
Planned activities: 
* Develop a succession strategy for mission-critical positions; 
* Systematically provide a shared knowledge management system to 
perform work and gather and share knowledge; 
Steps taken as of May 2009, as reported by the SBI program office: 
* Mission-critical positions have been identified; completion of the 
succession management plan deferred until the last quarter of fiscal 
year 2009; 
* SBI uses a shared knowledge management system to disseminate 
knowledge, share documents, and perform work. 

SBI human capital goal: 
5. Define the performance culture (reward excellence); 
Planned activities: 
* Continue to supplement the current CBP Awards and Recognition Program 
with recurring award ceremonies; 
* Continue to adhere to DHS and CBP polices on performance management; 
* Employees to develop and be responsible for meeting goals in 
Individual Development Plans; 
Steps taken as of May 2009, as reported by the SBI program office: 
* The awards and recognition policy has been finalized and approved. 
Awards are presented quarterly; 
* Employees were provided with guidance on completing their fiscal year 
2009 performance goals. 

SBI human capital goal: 
6) Hire, recruit, develop, and retain employees with the skills for 
mission accomplishment; 
Planned activities: 
* Develop and enhance relationships with professional organizations and 
colleges/universities and attend job fairs; 
* Create human capital strategies that will attract, acquire, promote, 
and retain quality talent; 
* Craft a recruiting approach that builds the public's knowledge of and 
desire to join the public sector; 
Steps taken as of May 2009, as reported by the SBI program office: 
* SBI works with CBP human capital resources on networking and 
coordination of recruiting efforts. SBI has attended several career and 
job fairs; 
* SBI updated its Web site with information on mission and goals to 
help attract job applicants and has created SBI "branded" paraphernalia 
to hand out at orientation and career fairs; 
* Recruitment efforts are underway to fill 70 open SBI positions; 43 
candidates have been tentatively selected. 

SBI human capital goal: 
7) Establish leadership accountability for human capital management; 
Planned activities: 
* Identify human capital management processes and points of contact to 
ensure accountability; 
* Incorporate periodic assessments to analyze human capital data, 
assess results, identify risk, and ensure controls are in place to 
address problems and modify strategies and activities; 
Steps taken as of May 2009, as reported by the SBI program office: 
* SBI uses a human capital scorecard to maintain accountability for 
human capital goals; 
* SBI receives workforce profiles from the CBP Human Resources 
Management Office that highlight areas of progress and risk; 
* SBI holds reoccurring meetings with representatives from the Chief 
Human Capital Office and the CBP Office of Human Resources. 

Source: CBP. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Task Orders Awarded to Boeing for SBI Projects as of July 
8, 2009:

Task Order Description: Program Management: The mission engineering, 
facilities and infrastructure, systems engineering, test and 
evaluation, and program management services to develop and deploy the 
SBInet system; 
Date awarded: 09/21/2006; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $146.9 million; 
Task order obligation: $146.9 million.

Task Order Description: Project 28: Boeing's pilot project and initial 
implementation of SBInet technology for 28 miles of the border in the 
Tucson sector; 
Date awarded: 10/20/2006; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $20.7 million; 
Task order obligation: $20.7 million.

Task Order Description: Barry M. Goldwater Range: The construction of 
32 miles of vehicle and pedestrian barriers on the southern border of 
the Barry M. Goldwater Range in the Yuma Sector; 
Date awarded: 01/12/2007; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $122.2 million; 
Task order obligation: $122.2 million.

Task Order Description: Fence Lab: The testing of potential pedestrian 
and vehicle fence and barrier solutions; 
Date awarded: 03/14/2007; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $0.7 million; 
Task order obligation: $0.7 million.

Task Order Description: Design: SBInet deployment design solution 
including design, environmental-clearance support, and locations for 
the SBInet technology solution in the Yuma, Tucson, and El Paso 
sectors; 
Date awarded: 08/01/2007; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $93.1 million; 
Task order obligation: $93.1 million.

Task Order Description: Project 28 Contractor Maintenance and Logistics 
Support: Provides Project 28 with the required maintenance and 
logistics support to operate the system; 
Date awarded: 12/07/2007; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $10.6 million; 
Task order obligation: $10.6 million.

Task Order Description: Command, Control, Communications and 
Intelligence (C3I) and Common Operating Picture: The development of the 
next version of the SBInet operating software to design, develop, and 
demonstrate a functional SBInet C3I/COP system; 
Date awarded: 12/07/2007; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $83.0 million; 
Task order obligation: $66.6 million.

Task Order Description: SBInet System: A follow-on to the program 
management task order, this task order specifies the program management 
and system engineering activities required to achieve an integrated 
program across all task orders issued under the SBI contract; 
Date awarded: 04/15/2008; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $221.4 million; 
Task order obligation: $139.5 million.

Task Order Description: Supply and Supply Chain Management: The 
development and implementation of a supply and supply chain management 
system solution to execute tactical infrastructure projects; 
Date awarded: 01/07/2008; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $318.6 million; 
Task order obligation: $318.6 million.

Task Order Description: Arizona Deployment Task Order: Boeing's 
deployment of two projects of the SBInet system along approximately 53 
miles of the southwest border in the Tucson sector; 
Date awarded: 06/25/2008; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $90.6 million; 
Task order obligation: $90.6 million.

Task Order Description: Integrated Logistics Support: Provides SBInet 
with the required maintenance and logistics support to operate the 
system; 
Date awarded: 08/16/2008; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $35.3 million; 
Task order obligation: $26.7 million.

Task Order Description: Design for Buffalo Sector: Provides for the 
design of a remote video surveillance system (RVSS) capability--a 
system of towers with cameras that transmit information to video 
monitors at a sector's headquarters--in the Buffalo sector; 
Date awarded: 02/05/2009; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $0.6 million; 
Task order obligation: $0.6 million.

Task Order Description: Northern Border Project Task Order: Provides 
for the design, installation, and deployment of surveillance technology 
capabilities in the Detroit and Buffalo Border Patrol sectors; 
Date awarded: 03/31/2009; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $22.4 million; 
Task order obligation: $20.9 million.

Task Order Description: Total; 
Ceiling of funds [A]: $1.166 billion; 
Task order obligation: $1.058 billion.

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.

[A] This is the maximum value of the task order. For example, the 
Integrated Logistics Support task order has a "ceiling" of $35.3 
million; however, at this time, obligations under the task order are 
only $26.7 million because the project is being incrementally funded to 
complete work in periods. 

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

August 31, 2009: 

Mr. Richard M. Stana: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Stana: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-09-896, Secure Border Initiative: Technology 
Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been 
Assessed (GAO Job Code 440763): 

The Department of Homeland Security (Department) appreciates the 
opportunity to review and comment on the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office's (GAO's) draft report referenced above. The Department, 
particularly U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) where the Secure 
Border initiative program is located, agrees with the recommendation 
contained therein.

GAO found that SBInet technology capabilities have not yet been 
deployed and delays require Border Patrol agents to rely on existing 
technology for securing the border, rather than using newer technology 
planned to overcome the existing technology's limitations. GAO also 
reported that tactical infrastructure deployments are almost complete, 
but their impact on border security has not been measured.

Although the Department generally concurs with the report, the draft 
does not acknowledge some of the significant factors that have 
contributed to program volatility and delays. CBP separately is 
providing technical comments requesting that several additions be 
considered.

To improve the quality of information available to allocate resources 
and determine tactical infrastructure's contribution to effective 
control of the border, GAO recommends that CBP conduct a cost-effective 
evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure on effective 
control of the border.

Effective control of the border is gained by applying the proper mix of 
tactical infrastructure, personnel, technology, and consequences for 
illegal entry in the targeted area. In addition, there are other 
contributing factors that influence where, when and how illegal cross-
border activity occurs including but not limited to terrain, population 
centers, and egress routes from the immediate border area. Any study of 
the effects of tactical infrastructure on border control will 
necessarily have to take into consideration these other factors. Any 
attempt to measure the efficacy of tactical infrastructure in isolation 
from these other factors will not produce an accurate or useful 
product. 

In many locations along the border, CBP has applied the personnel and 
tactical infrastructure required, but as stated in the report, the 
technology to he provided by SBInet has been delayed. The situational 
awareness provided by this technology is an important component of the 
enforcement model, and the full benefit of the tactical infrastructure 
cannot be realized until this technology is deployed.

The Office of Border Patrol (OBP) within CBP was already committed to 
investigating several evaluation options when GAO made its 
recommendation. In May 2008, OBP created the analysis of alternatives 
(AOA) to guide field personnel through the process of considering and 
determining what and how much infrastructure would be most effective in 
gaining effective control in a given area. To further augment the AOA 
process, OBP is considering the use of independent researchers to 
conduct evaluations and propose objective recommendations to form 
future decisions.

One option is to have the SBI Operations Integration Division evaluate 
proposals from various companies to purchase rudimentary modeling and 
simulation technology. Currently, this technology is not being 
developed as a tool to gauge effective control, but rather as a tool 
that can help to identify capability gaps, provide insights, and 
develop operational strategies that might be required to handle various 
threats along the international border. Although a pilot program and 
not initially designed to address levels of control, this modeling 
technology will have an architectural platform that can be expanded to 
gauge the effects of resource deployments. Other options that are 
already being pursued include the use of specialized services from the 
Department's Office of Immigration Services, the University of Texas at 
El Paso, and the University of Arizona Centers, for Excellence, or an 
outside contractor. During this fiscal year, CBP will meet with these 
research organizations to initiate discussions. If they elect to award 
this project to an academic institution or a contractor, the action 
should be completed by the end of calendar year 2010. The intent is for 
a comprehensive assessment to be completed by the end of calendar year 
2011 subject to available funding.

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Michael E. McPoland, for: 

Jerald E. Levine: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section]

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.com:

Acknowledgments:

In addition to the contact named above, Susan Quinlan, Assistant 
Director, and Jeanette Espinola, Assistant Director, managed this 
assignment. Sylvia Bascopé, Claudia Becker, Frances Cook, Christine 
Davis, Katherine Davis, Jeremy Rothgerber, Erin Smith, and Meghan 
Squires made significant contributions to the work.

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products:

U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Secure Border Initiative Fiscal 
Year 2009 Expenditure Plan. GAO-09-274R. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
2009.

Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs. GAO-09-244R. 
Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2009.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in 
Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1086. Washington, D.C.: 
September 22, 2008.

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges. GAO-08-
1141T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in 
Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1148T. Washington, D.C.: 
September 10, 2008.

Secure Border Initiative: Fiscal Year 2008 Expenditure Plan Shows 
Improvement, but Deficiencies Limit Congressional Oversight and DHS 
Accountability. GAO-08-739R. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2008.

Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Oversight Needed 
to Improve Complex Service Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-08-765T. 
Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2008.

Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Assessment Needed 
to Improve Outcomes for Complex Service Acquisitions GAO-08-263. 
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2008.

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying 
Lessons Learned to Future Projects. GAO-08-508T. Washington, D.C.: 
February 27, 2008.

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet 
Program Implementation. GAO-08-131T. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2007.

Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Planning and Management Improvements 
Needed to Control Risks. GAO-07-504T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 
2007.

Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better 
Support Oversight and Accountability. GAO-07-309. Washington, D.C.: 
February 15, 2007.

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] At a port of entry location, CBP officers secure the flow of people 
and cargo into and out of the country, while facilitating legitimate 
travel and trade.

[2] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of 
SBInet Program Implementation, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 
2007); Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of 
Applying Lessons Learned to Future Projects, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-508T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 
2008); Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008); Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address 
Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1148T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 
2008); and, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant 
Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 
2008).

[3] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). Among other things, the 
act requires agencies to develop strategic plans that include 
comprehensive mission statements, a set of goals and objectives for the 
agency's major functions and operations, and a description of how the 
agency intends to achieve these goals and objectives.

[4] See for example, GAO, Agency Performance Plans: Examples of 
Practices That Can Improve Usefulness to Decisionmakers, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GGD/AIMD-99-69 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 
1999), Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996), Program Evaluation: Studies Helped Agencies Measure or Explain 
Program Performance, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-00-
204 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2000), Human Capital: Key Principles for 
Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 
2003), and DHS-OIG, Progress in Addressing the Secure Border Initiative 
Operational Requirements and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence, 
OIG-09-56 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.15, 2009).

[5] The U.S. Border Patrol has 20 sectors responsible for detecting, 
interdicting, and apprehending those who engage in illegal activity 
across U.S. borders between official ports of entry. In addition to 
illegal entry, examples of illegal activity include smuggling of 
people, including terrorists, and contraband, including weapons of mass 
destruction.

[6] We refer to the Office of Finance Facilities Management and 
Engineering division's Tactical Infrastructure program office as the 
tactical infrastructure program office in this report. 

[7] MSSs are truck-mounted systems that use cameras, radar, lasers, and 
global positioning systems.

[8] The objective of the supply and supply chain management support 
system is to ensure that sufficient quantities of construction 
materials are readily available to meet the fence construction needs 
and schedules along the southwest border.

[9] Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, § 564(a)(2)(B)(ii), 121 Stat. 1844, 
2090-91 (2007) (amending section 102(b)(1) of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-554, as amended by section 3(2) of the 
Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638, 2639). 
The provisions, as amended, are codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note.

[10] 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note. 

[11] 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note. 

[12] 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note.

[13] 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note. 

[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T], 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-508T], 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T], 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1148T], and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].

[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086]. We have 
ongoing work to assess actions taken by DHS to address the 
recommendations made in this report.

[16] A re-plan refers to an adjustment to SBInet's initial development, 
test, and deployment plan.

[17] The Acquisition Review Board was formerly known as the Investment 
Review Board. As part of the DHS investment process, the Acquisition 
Review Board reviews all acquisition investments with an annual 
expenditure level or acquisition cost greater than $100 million. 

[18] The SBI program office defines final acceptance as the SBI program 
office taking ownership of the SBInet technology system from the 
contractor and comes before handing the technology over to Border 
Patrol.

[19] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].

[21] Statement of the Acting Commissioner of CBP before the House 
Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Secure 
Border Initiative (SBI), Control of the Land Border, and DHS Response 
to Violence on the Border with Mexico (Mar. 10, 2009). 

[22] The Secretary of Homeland Security is required to consult with 
numerous entities, including the Secretary of the Interior, to minimize 
the impact to the environment, culture, commerce, and quality of life 
resulting from the installation of required fencing and border security 
infrastructure along the southwest border. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note. 

[23] The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 
83 Stat. 852 (1970), requires federal agencies to evaluate the likely 
environmental effects of projects they are proposing using an 
environmental assessment or, if the projects likely would significantly 
affect the environment, a more detailed environmental impact statement. 

[24] According to the Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, the use of 
integrated SBInet technology allows CBP agents and officers to 
efficiently detect, identify, classify, track, and resolve illegal 
incursions. The radars detect persons and vehicles moving in the border 
areas. Once detected, operators use cameras to help identify and 
classify the entry.

[25] In cases where the property owner does not agree to a right of 
entry for the government or does not accept an offer to sell, the 
Department of Justice files a lawsuit against the landowner on behalf 
of the United States of America at the request of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security for the condemnation and taking of the property. 

[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-244R].

[27] The land where this fencing was built has been publicly owned 
since 1907 when President Theodore Roosevelt reserved a 60-foot strip 
along the international boundary with Mexico for the United States to 
maintain the area free from obstructions as a protection against the 
smuggling of goods between the United States and Mexico. In effect, the 
Roosevelt easement provided the federal government with a 60-foot 
border right-of-way on which it could build the fence. 

[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T].

[29] "Catch and release" refers to the practice of apprehending 
removable aliens from countries other than Mexico and then releasing 
them on their own recognizance pending removal proceedings. Expedited 
removal refers to returning non-Mexican removable aliens to their 
country of origin as soon as circumstances will allow, generally 
without formal removal proceedings in an immigration court. Operation 
Jump Start refers to the deployment of United States National Guard 
troops along the U.S.-Mexico border to support enforcement of border 
security. 

[30] CBP submitted its Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan pursuant 
to a requirement in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and 
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 
3574, 3655-57 (2008). The act required that the expenditure plan be 
submitted within 90 days after the enactment of the act. Condition 11 
of the expenditure plan required an analysis by the Secretary for each 
segment--defined as no more than 15 miles, of fencing or tactical 
infrastructure--of the selected approach compared to other, alternative 
means of achieving operational control, including cost, level of 
operational control, possible unintended effects on communities, and 
other factors critical to the decision-making process. 

[31] Pub. L. No. 103-62, § 4, 107 Stat. 285, 288-289 (1993).

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-00-204].

[33] In impact evaluation, scientific research methods are used to 
establish a causal connection between program activities and outcomes 
and to isolate the program's contributions to them. GAO/GGD-00-204

[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-99-69]. 

[35] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-454].

[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-00-204].

[37] Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 2, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006)(codified at 8 
U.S.C. 1701 note).

[38] This goal includes staff in the tactical infrastructure program 
office.

[39] These totals do not include 18 detailed personnel or 27 staff--10 
government employees and 17 contractors --who were transferred to the 
Office of Finance. 

[40] These best practices are contained in the governmentwide Human 
Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework which was developed by 
the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Personnel 
Management, and GAO. 

[End of section] 

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