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entitled 'Home Mortgages: Provisions in a 2007 Mortgage Reform Bill 
(H.R. 3915) Would Strengthen Borrower Protections, but Views on Their 
Long-term Impact Differ' which was released on July 31, 2009. 

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

July 2009: 

Home Mortgages: 

Provisions in a 2007 Mortgage Reform Bill (H.R. 3915) Would Strengthen 
Borrower Protections, but Views on Their Long-term Impact Differ: 

GAO-09-741: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-741, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

H.R. 3915 (2007), a bill introduced, but not enacted by the 110th 
Congress, was intended to reform mortgage lending practices to prevent 
a recurrence of problems in the mortgage market, particularly in the 
nonprime market segment. The bill would have set minimum standards for 
all mortgages (e.g., reasonable ability to repay) and created a “safe 
harbor” for loans that met certain requirements. Securitizers of safe 
harbor loans would be exempt from liability provisions, while 
securitizers of non-safe harbor loans would be subject to limited 
liability for loans that violated the bill’s minimum standards. In 
response to a congressional request, this report discusses (1) the 
proportions of recent nonprime loans that likely would have met and not 
met the bill’s safe harbor requirements and factors influencing the 
performance of these loans, and (2) relevant research and the views of 
mortgage industry stakeholders concerning the potential impact of key 
provisions of the bill on the availability of mortgage credit. To do 
this work, GAO analyzed a proprietary database of securitized nonprime 
loans, reviewed studies of state and local anti-predatory lending laws, 
and met with financial regulatory agencies and key mortgage industry 
stakeholders. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO estimates that almost 75 percent of securitized nonprime mortgages 
originated from 2000 through 2007 would not have met H.R. 3915’s safe 
harbor requirements, which include, among other things, full 
documentation of borrower income and assets, and a prohibition on 
mortgages for which the loan principal can increase over time. The 
extent to which mortgages met specific safe harbor requirements varied 
by origination year. For example, the percentage of nonprime mortgages 
with less than full documentation rose from 27 percent in 2000 to 
almost 60 percent in 2007. Consistent with the consumer protection 
purpose of the bill, GAO found that certain variables associated with 
the safe harbor requirements influenced the probability of a loan 
entering default (i.e., 90 or more days delinquent or in foreclosure) 
within 24 months of origination. For example, on the basis of 
statistical analysis, GAO estimates that, all other things being equal, 
less than full documentation was associated with a 5 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of default for the most common type of 
nonprime mortgage product. GAO also found that other variables—such as 
house price appreciation, borrowers’ credit scores, and the ratio of 
the loan amount to the house value—were associated with default rates. 

Research on state and local anti-predatory lending laws and the 
perspectives of mortgage industry stakeholders do not provide a 
consensus view on the bill’s potential effects on the availability of 
mortgage credit. Some research indicates that anti-predatory lending 
laws can have the intended result of reducing loans with problematic 
features without substantially affecting credit availability. However, 
it is difficult to generalize these findings to all anti-predatory 
lending laws or the potential effect of the bill, in part, because of 
differences in the design and coverage of these laws. Mortgage industry 
and consumer group representatives with whom GAO spoke disagreed on the 
bill’s potential effect on credit availability and consumer protection. 
For example, mortgage industry officials generally said that the bill’s 
safe harbor, securitizer liability, and other provisions would limit 
mortgage options and increase the cost of credit for nonprime 
borrowers. In contrast, consumer groups generally stated that these 
provisions needed to be strengthened to protect consumers from 
predatory loan products. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO makes no recommendations in this report. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-741] or key 
components. For more information, contact William B. Shear at (202) 512-
8678 or shearw@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Most Recent Nonprime Mortgages Would Not Have Been Safe Harbor Loans 
and Certain Variables Associated with the Safe Harbor Requirements and 
Other Factors Influenced Defaults: 

Relevant Research and Stakeholder Perspectives Do Not Provide a 
Consensus View on the Bill's Potential Impact: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Description of the Econometric Analysis of Safe Harbor 
Requirements: 

Appendix III: Comments from the National Credit Union Administration: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Nontraditional Mortgage Products: 

Table 2: Percentage of Nonprime Mortgages That Were Safe Harbor and Non-
safe Harbor Loans by Racial, Ethnic, and Income Groupings, 2000-2007: 

Table 3: Percentage of Nonprime Mortgages That Were Safe Harbor and Non-
Safe Harbor Loans by Credit Score Groupings, 2000-2007: 

Table 4: Estimated Probability of Nonprime Purchase Mortgages 
Defaulting within 24 months of Origination with and without Full 
Documentation, 2000-2006 Loans: 

Table 5: Estimated Probability of Nonprime Purchase Mortgages 
Defaulting within 24 months of Origination under Different Assumptions 
for the Safe Harbor Spread Requirement, 2000-2006 Loans: 

Table 6: Estimated Percentage of Nonagency Securitized Subprime and Alt-
A Loans in the LP Database, 2001-2007: 

Table 7: Safe Harbor Requirements and LP Variables Used to Duplicate 
the Requirements or Develop Proxies: 

Table 8: Variables Used in the Model: 

Table 9: Mean Values for Short-term Hybrid ARMs with DTI Information: 

Table 10: Mean Values for Fixed-rate mortgages with DTI Information: 

Table 11: Mean Values for Longer-term ARMs with DTI information: 

Table 12: Mean Values for Payment-option ARMs with DTI Information: 

Table 13: Estimation Results for Short-term Hybrid ARMs with DTI 
Information: 

Table 14: Estimation Results for Fixed-rate Mortgages with DTI 
Information: 

Table 15: Estimation Results for Longer-term ARMs with DTI Information: 

Table 16: Estimation Results for Payment-option ARMs with DTI 
Information: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: H.R. 3915 Loan Standards: 

Figure 2: Estimated Proportions of Nonprime Mortgages Meeting and Not 
Meeting the Safe Harbor Requirements, 2000-2007: 

Figure 3: Estimated Proportions of Nonprime Mortgages Not Meeting 
Documentation and Amortization Requirements, 2000-2007: 

Figure 4: Estimated Proportions of Nonprime Mortgages Not Meeting 
Interest Rate and Debt Burden Requirements, 2000-2007: 

Figure 5: Estimated Proportions of Nonprime Mortgages Not Meeting the 
Fully Indexed Rate Requirement, 2000-2007: 

Figure 6: Estimated Probability of Nonprime Purchase Mortgages 
Defaulting within 24 Months under Different House Price Appreciation, 
Credit Score, and LTV Ratio Assumptions, 2000-2006 Loans: 

Abbreviations: 

APR: annual percentage rate: 

ARM: adjustable-rate mortgage: 

DTI: debt-service-to-income: 

FHA: Federal Housing Administration: 

FTC: Federal Trade Commission: 

GSE: government-sponsored enterprises: 

HMDA: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: 

HOEPA: Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act: 

HPA: house price appreciation: 

HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development: 

LIBOR: London Interbank Offered Rate: 

LP: LoanPerformance: 

LTV: loan-to-value: 

MBS: mortgage-backed securities: 

MSA: metropolitan statistical area: 

NCUA: National Credit Union Administration: 

OCC: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency: 

OTS: Office of Thrift Supervision: 

RESPA: Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act: 

SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission: 

TILA: Truth in Lending Act: 

VA: Department of Veterans Affairs: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 31, 2009: 

The Honorable Barney Frank: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Financial Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Adam H. Putnam: 
House of Representatives: 

The U.S. housing and mortgage markets are experiencing severe stress, 
with over 3.2 million home mortgages 90 or more days delinquent or in 
the foreclosure process in the first quarter of 2009. The rise in 
delinquencies and foreclosures has been particularly acute in the 
nonprime segment of the mortgage market. Nonprime mortgages, which 
include subprime and Alt-A loans, grew dramatically in terms of dollar 
volume and share of the mortgage market from 2001 through 2006. 
[Footnote 1] In 2001, lenders originated $215 billion in nonprime 
loans, but by 2006, had increased originations to $1 trillion. 
Likewise, the share of the nonprime market as a percentage of the total 
mortgage market increased from around 10 percent in 2001 to almost 34 
percent in 2006. Further, investment banks increased the volume of 
nonprime loans they bundled into private label mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) over this period.[Footnote 2] In 2001, they bundled 46 
percent of nonprime loans into private label MBS, but by 2006, were 
bundling 81 percent of these loans. The market for nonprime mortgages 
contracted sharply in mid-2007, as the nation entered a credit crisis 
and has not rebounded. 

As we reported in October 2007, an easing of underwriting standards for 
nonprime mortgages and wider use of certain loan features associated 
with poorer loan performance contributed to increases in mortgage 
delinquencies and foreclosures.[Footnote 3] These features included 
mortgages with higher loan-to-value ratios (the amount of the loan 
divided by the value of the home), adjustable interest rates, limited 
or no documentation of borrower income or assets, and deferred payment 
of principal or interest. In some cases, lenders engaged in predatory 
practices that resulted in loans with onerous terms and conditions. 
[Footnote 4] Often, borrowers could not repay these loans and found 
themselves facing foreclosure or bankruptcy. Some of these predatory 
practices included providing the borrower with misleading information, 
manipulating the borrower through aggressive sales tactics, or taking 
unfair advantage of the borrower's lack of information about the loan 
terms and their consequences. 

To prevent a recurrence of problems in the mortgage market, the House 
of Representatives passed the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory 
Lending Act of 2007 (bill) on November 15, 2007 (H.R. 3915). The Senate 
did not pass companion legislation by the end of the 110th Congress, so 
the bill did not become law.[Footnote 5] The bill, among other things, 
would have set minimum standards for mortgages requiring that consumers 
had a "reasonable ability to repay" at the time the loan was made and 
that they received a "net tangible benefit" from mortgage refinancings. 
One of the key provisions of H.R. 3915 would have been the creation of 
a "safe harbor" from potential liability for assignees and securitizers 
of mortgages (i.e., entities that purchase or hold mortgages in the 
secondary market), provided that the loans met certain requirements. 
[Footnote 6] Assignees would have been subject to limited liability if 
they securitized loans that fell outside the bill's safe harbor. 
Language in the bill and the accompanying House report suggests that 
the safe harbor and other provisions were intended to strengthen 
consumer protections for nonprime mortgage products associated with 
higher levels of default and foreclosure. Additionally, congressional 
hearings and debate about the bill highlighted, among other things, the 
challenge of designing safe harbor requirements that protect consumers 
from nonprime mortgage products that put them at high risk of default 
and foreclosure, while maintaining broad access to mortgage credit. 

Given the serious problems facing the mortgage market, particularly 
those associated with nonprime mortgages, and congressional interest in 
protecting consumers and ensuring credit availability, you asked us to 
assess the potential impact of the bill were it to become law. 
Accordingly, this report (1) assesses the proportion of recent nonprime 
loans that would likely have met and not met the bill's safe harbor 
requirements, and how variables associated with those requirements 
affect loan performance, and (2) discusses relevant research and the 
views of mortgage industry stakeholders concerning the potential impact 
of key provisions of the bill on the mortgage market. The scope of our 
analysis was limited to nonprime mortgages. 

To assess the proportions of recent nonprime loans that would likely 
have met and not met H.R. 3915's safe harbor requirements, we analyzed 
a proprietary database of securitized nonprime loans from 
LoanPerformance (LP).[Footnote 7] This database covered about 87 
percent of the subprime and 98 percent of the Alt-A securitized 
mortgage originations from January 2001 through July 2007. Nonprime 
mortgages that were not securitized (i.e., mortgages that lenders held 
in portfolio) may have different characteristics and performance 
histories than those that were securitized. In this report, we define 
subprime loans as mortgages in subprime securitization pools and Alt-A 
loans as mortgages in Alt-A securitization pools. Specifically, we 
analyzed loans in the LP database originated from 2000 through 2007. 
For each year, we estimated the proportion of mortgages with terms and 
underwriting characteristics that were consistent with the safe harbor 
requirements and those that were not consistent with such requirements. 
When the data did not allow us to duplicate a specific safe harbor 
requirement, we developed reasonable proxies. Additionally, 
incorporating data from the Census Bureau, we examined the proportions 
of safe harbor and non-safe harbor loans within different census tract 
and borrower groupings. Finally, to examine factors that could explain 
the performance of nonprime loans, we developed a statistical model to 
estimate the relationship between variables associated with the safe 
harbor requirements and other variables and the probability of loan 
default within 24 months of origination. 

We assessed the reliability of the data by interviewing LP 
representatives about the methods they use to collect and ensure the 
integrity of the information. We also reviewed supporting documentation 
about the database, including LP's estimates of the database's market 
coverage. In addition, we conducted reasonableness checks on the data 
to identify any missing, erroneous, or outlying figures. We found the 
data elements we used to be sufficiently reliable. 

To describe relevant research on the bill's potential effects on the 
nonprime mortgage market, we identified and reviewed empirical studies 
on the effects of state and local anti-predatory lending laws on key 
nonprime mortgage indicators. The indicators used in these studies 
included mortgage originations and the cost of credit. We reviewed the 
studies' overall conclusions concerning the impact of the laws and 
identified any limitations in the researchers' methodologies. We also 
interviewed selected authors to ensure that we interpreted their 
results correctly. To obtain the views of mortgage industry 
participants and stakeholders, we interviewed officials from 
organizations representing mortgage lenders, mortgage brokers, 
securitizers, and consumer interests. We also interviewed officials 
from a large mortgage lender and a major investment bank involved in 
the securitization of mortgages. Finally, we interviewed officials from 
the federal banking regulators, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2008 to July 2009, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I explains our 
objectives, scope, and methodology in greater detail. 

Background: 

The primary mortgage market features a variety of loan products and 
relies, in part, on the process of securitization to provide funds for 
mortgage lending. Over the years, a number of federal and state laws 
and regulations were implemented to protect mortgage borrowers. In 
2007, the bill was introduced to strengthen consumer protections and 
included provisions that would have created a safe harbor for loans 
that met certain requirements. 

Mortgage Markets and Securitization: 

The primary mortgage market has several segments and offers a range of 
loan products: 

* The prime market serves borrowers with strong credit histories and 
provides the most attractive interest rates and mortgage terms. 

* The Alt-A market generally serves borrowers whose credit histories 
are close to prime, but the loans often have one or more higher-risk 
features, such as limited documentation of income or assets. 

* The subprime market generally serves borrowers with blemished credit 
and features higher interest rates and fees than the prime market. 

* Finally, the government-insured or -guaranteed market primarily 
serves borrowers who may have difficulty qualifying for prime mortgages 
but features interest rates competitive with prime loans in return for 
payment of insurance premiums or guarantee fees. HUD's Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 
operate the two main federal programs that insure or guarantee 
mortgages. 

Across all of these market segments, two types of loans are common: 
fixed-rate mortgages, which have interest rates that do not change over 
the life of the loans and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM), which have 
interest rates that change periodically based on changes in a specified 
index. Other more unique loan products, referred to as nontraditional 
mortgage products, grew in popularity over the last decade (see table 
1). Hybrid ARMs--which are fixed for a given period and then reset to 
an adjustable rate--also became popular in recent years, especially in 
the subprime market. In particular, a significant portion of subprime 
loans originated from 2003 through 2006 were 2/28 or 3/27 hybrid ARMs-
-that is, they were fixed for the first 2 or 3 years before resetting 
to often much higher interest rates and correspondingly higher mortgage 
payments. Other nontraditional mortgage products included interest- 
only or payment-option loans, which allowed borrowers to defer 
repayment of principal and possibly part of the interest for the first 
few years of the loan.[Footnote 8] 

Table 1: Nontraditional Mortgage Products: 

Adjustable rate loans: Hybrid ARMs (2/28s, 3/27s); 
Initial period: For an initial period of usually 2 or 3 years, loan is 
fixed at an introductory rate; 
Remaining loan period: After the initial fixed period, the rate will 
eventually adjust to a "fully indexed" interest rate equal to a 
floating index, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), plus 
a fixed margin. Although reaching the fully indexed rate is often a 
gradual process because incremental increases are capped, even the 
first increases, which average approximately 2 percent, can cause 
payment shock. 

Adjustable rate loans: Interest-only mortgages; 
Initial period: For an initial period, typically the first 3 to 10 
years, borrowers can defer principal payments; 
Remaining loan period: After the initial period, the mortgage is 
"recast" to require higher monthly payments that cover principal as 
well as interest and to pay off (amortize) the outstanding balance over 
the remaining term of the loan. 

Adjustable rate loans: Payment-option mortgages; 
Initial period: For an initial period of typically 5 years or when the 
loan balance reaches a specified cap, borrowers can make minimum 
payments that do not cover principal or all accrued interest, thereby, 
in some cases, resulting in increased loan balances over time (negative 
amortization); 
Remaining loan period: After the initial period, payments are recast to 
include an amount that will fully amortize the outstanding balance over 
the remaining years of the loan. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

A number of loan features also became more common over the past decade. 
While these features potentially expanded access to mortgage credit, 
they are often associated with higher default rates. These features 
included the following: 

* Low and no-documentation loans. Originally intended for borrowers who 
had difficulty documenting income, such as the self-employed, these 
loans were made with little or no verification of a borrower's income 
or assets. 

* High loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. As homebuyers made smaller down 
payments, the ratio of loan amount to home value increased. 

* Prepayment penalties. Some loans contained built-in penalties for 
repaying part or all of a loan in advance of the regular schedule. 

Many loans were originated with a number of these features, a practice 
known as risk layering. 

The secondary mortgage market and the process of securitization play 
important roles in providing liquidity for mortgage lending. Mortgage 
lenders originate and then sell their loans to third parties, freeing 
up funds to originate more loans. Securitization, in this context, is 
the bundling of mortgage loans into investment products called 
residential MBS that are bought and sold by investors. The secondary 
market consists of (1) Ginnie Mae-guaranteed MBS, which are backed by 
cash flows from federally-insured or -guaranteed mortgages; (2) 
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) MBS, which are backed by 
mortgages that meet the criteria for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac; and (3) private label MBS, which are backed by mortgages that do 
not conform to GSE purchase requirements because they are too large or 
do not meet GSE underwriting criteria. [Footnote 9] Investment banks 
have traditionally bundled most subprime and Alt-A loans into private 
label MBS, although since 2007, the market has slowed dramatically. 

Federal Mortgage Lending Laws: 

The Truth in Lending Act (TILA), which was enacted in 1968, and the 
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), which amended 
TILA in 1994, are among the primary federal laws governing mortgage 
lending.[Footnote 10] TILA was designed to provide consumers with 
accurate information about the cost of credit. Among other things, TILA 
requires lenders to disclose information about the terms of loans-- 
including the amount financed, the finance charge, and the annual 
percentage rate (APR)--that can help borrowers understand the overall 
costs of their loans. Congress enacted HOEPA to amend TILA, in response 
to concerns about predatory lending. HOEPA regulates and restricts the 
terms and characteristics of certain kinds of high-cost mortgage loans 
that exceed certain thresholds in their APRs or fees (often referred to 
as "rate and fee triggers"). The Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (Federal Reserve) implements TILA and HOEPA through 
Regulation Z, which was amended in 2001 and 2008 with respect to high- 
cost lending. As a result of the most recent rulemaking in 2008, 
Regulation Z will restrict mortgage lending in the following ways, as 
of October 1, 2009:[Footnote 11] 

* Higher-priced loans: First-lien loans with APRs that equal or exceed 
an index of average prime offer rates by 1.5 percentage points above an 
index of average prime offer rates--a category meant to include 
virtually all loans in the subprime market, but generally exclude loans 
in the prime market--are called "higher-priced mortgage loans." 
[Footnote 12] Creditors are prohibited from making these loans without 
regard to the borrower's ability to repay from income and assets other 
than the home's value, and creditors must verify the income and assets 
they rely upon to determine a borrower's repayment ability. Also, 
prepayment penalties are prohibited for these loans if the payment can 
change in the first 4 years of the loan; for loans where the payment is 
fixed for at least the first 4 years, prepayment penalties are limited 
to 2 years. In addition, creditors must establish escrow accounts for 
this category of loans for property taxes and homeowners' insurance. 

* High-cost HOEPA loans: First-lien loans with APRs that exceed the 
yield on Treasury securities of comparable maturity by more than 8 
percentage points or with total points and fees that exceed the greater 
of 8 percent of the loan amount or $583, are called "high-cost HOEPA 
loans."[Footnote 13] For these loans, the law restricts prepayment 
penalties, prohibits balloon payments (i.e., a large balance due at 
maturity of the loan term) for loans with terms of less than 5 years, 
prohibits negative amortization, and contains certain other 
restrictions on loan terms or payments.[Footnote 14] 

* General provisions: For all loans, regardless of whether they fall 
into one of the above categories, Regulation Z includes a number of 
basic disclosure requirements and prohibits certain activities 
considered to be unfair, deceptive, misleading, abusive, or otherwise 
problematic, such as coercing a real estate appraiser to misstate a 
home's value, and abusive collection practices by loan servicers. 

Each federal banking regulator is charged with enforcing TILA and HOEPA 
with respect to the depository institutions it regulates, and the FTC 
has responsibility for enforcing the statutes for mortgage brokers and 
most financial entities other than banks, thrifts, and federal credit 
unions.[Footnote 15] The Federal Reserve has concurrent authority to 
enforce TILA and HOEPA for non-bank subsidiaries of bank holding 
companies. 

In addition to TILA and HOEPA, some other federal laws govern aspects 
of mortgage lending. For example, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act (RESPA), passed in 1974, seeks to protect consumers from 
unnecessarily high charges in the settlement of residential mortgages 
by requiring lenders to disclose details of the costs of settling a 
loan and by prohibiting kickbacks (payments made in exchange for 
referring a settlement service) and other costs. HUD has primary rule- 
writing authority and is responsible for enforcing RESPA. HUD 
coordinates on RESPA issues, as it deems appropriate, with federal 
banking regulators and other federal agencies, such as the FTC and the 
Department of Justice. In addition, the federal banking agencies, under 
section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, examine for and enforce 
compliance with RESPA's requirements with respect to the institutions 
they supervise.[Footnote 16] Finally, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
and Federal Credit Union Act allow federal banking regulators to use 
their supervisory and enforcement authorities to ensure that an 
institution's conduct with respect to consumer protection laws does not 
affect its safety and soundness or that of an affiliated institution. 
[Footnote 17] 

Banking Regulator Guidance: 

In conjunction with enforcing federal statutes, federal banking 
regulators have issued guidance to their institutions--including 
federally-regulated banks, thrifts, credit unions, holding companies 
and their subsidiaries--about nontraditional and subprime lending. 

* In September 2006, banking regulators issued final guidance 
clarifying how institutions can offer nontraditional mortgage products 
in a safe and sound manner, and in a way that clearly discloses the 
risks that borrowers may assume. The guidance provides specific steps 
institutions should take to help ensure that loan terms and 
underwriting standards are consistent with prudent lending practices, 
including considering a borrower's repayment capacity; ensuring strong 
risk management standards, including capital levels; and ensuring that 
consumers have sufficient information to clearly understand loan terms 
and associated risks.[Footnote 18] 

* In June 2007, banking regulators issued a final statement on subprime 
lending, in response to concerns about certain types of loans that 
could result in payment shock to borrowers. The statement warned 
institutions about risks associated with subprime loans with adjustable 
rates with low initial payments, based on fixed introductory rates that 
expire after a short period, limited or no documentation of income, 
prepayment penalties that were very high or that extended beyond the 
initial fixed rate period, and other product features likely to result 
in frequent refinancing to maintain an affordable monthly payment. 
[Footnote 19] 

State Mortgage Lending Laws: 

In response to concerns about the growth of predatory lending over the 
past decade, many states have enacted laws to restrict the terms or 
provisions of certain types of mortgage loans. According to the 
Congressional Research Service, at least 30 states and the District of 
Columbia had enacted a wide array of such laws, as of November 2008. 
[Footnote 20] Many of these state laws are similar to HOEPA in that 
they regulate and restrict the terms and characteristics of certain 
kinds of high-cost mortgages exceeding certain interest rate or fee 
thresholds that require enhanced protections. Like HOEPA, these laws 
often restrict certain loan features that can, in certain cases, be 
abusive--such as prepayment penalties, balloon payments, negative 
amortization, and loan flipping--and many laws also require enhanced 
disclosures and credit counseling. While some laws are only minimally 
different than HOEPA, others are more comprehensive. 

Significant debate has taken place as to the advantages and 
disadvantages of state predatory lending laws. In several cases, 
regulators of federally supervised financial institutions have 
determined that federal laws preempt state predatory lending laws for 
the institutions they regulate. In making these determinations, two 
regulators--the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and 
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)--have cited federal law that 
provides for uniform regulation of federally chartered institutions and 
have noted the potential harm that state predatory lending laws can do 
to legitimate lending. Many state officials and consumer advocates are 
opposed to federal preemption of state predatory lending laws.[Footnote 
21] They maintain that federal laws related to predatory lending are 
insufficient, and that preemption, therefore, interferes with their 
ability to protect consumers in their states.[Footnote 22] 

The first state predatory lending law, the North Carolina Anti- 
Predatory Lending Law of 1999, has been the subject of particular 
attention by researchers and policymakers. The law was more restrictive 
than HOEPA was at the time. Among other things, it banned prepayment 
penalties on all home loans with a principal amount of $150,000 or 
less, and prohibited loan flipping (refinancings of consumer home loans 
that do not provide a reasonable, net tangible benefit to the 
borrower). It included more restrictions for a category of high-cost 
loans, which were defined to include lower points and fee triggers than 
HOEPA, as well as a third trigger that included any loan with a 
prepayment penalty that could be collected more than 30 months after 
closing or that was greater than 2 percent of the amount paid. 

H.R. 3915: 

The U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 3915--the Mortgage Reform 
and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007--on November 15, 2007, in 
response to significant increases in mortgage defaults and 
foreclosures, especially among subprime borrowers.[Footnote 23] 
Although the bill was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, it 
was not enacted into law before the end of the 110th Congress. The bill 
would have reformed mortgage lending by, among other things, setting 
minimum standards for residential mortgage loans (see figure 1). The 
two standards included: 

* Reasonable ability to repay. The bill would have created a 
"reasonable ability to repay" standard by prohibiting a creditor from 
making a residential mortgage loan without making a determination based 
on verified and documented information that a consumer was likely to be 
able to repay the loan, including all applicable taxes, insurance, and 
assessments. Such a determination was to be based on the consumer's 
credit history, current and expected income, obligations, debt-service- 
to-income (DTI) ratio, employment status, and financial resources other 
than any equity in the real property securing the loan. Additionally, 
the bill would have required lenders making ARMs to qualify borrowers 
at the fully indexed rate. However, the actual standard was to be 
prescribed in regulation by the federal banking agencies, in 
consultation with the FTC. 

* Net tangible benefit. The bill would have created a "net tangible 
benefit" standard by prohibiting a creditor from refinancing a loan 
without making a reasonable good faith determination that the loan 
would provide a net tangible benefit to the consumer. The bill stated 
that a loan would not meet the standard if the loan's costs exceeded 
the amount of newly advanced principal, without any corresponding 
changes in the terms of the refinanced loan that were advantageous to 
the consumer. However, the term "net tangible benefit" was to be 
defined in regulation by the federal banking agencies. 

The specific responsibilities of lenders to meet the standards, and the 
rights of consumers to take action against lenders to claim standards 
had not been met, depended on the category of the loan. Under the bill, 
loans are classified into three basic categories: 

* Qualified mortgages would have had relatively low APRs, be insured by 
FHA, or made or guaranteed by VA. This category was intended to include 
most prime loans. Specifically, a loan would have been considered a 
qualified loan if either the APR was less than 3 percent above the 
yield on comparable Treasury securities, or less than 1.75 percent 
above the most recent conventional mortgage rate (a term that would 
have been more explicitly defined in regulation). For second-lien 
loans, the limits were 5 and 3.75 percent, respectively. Qualified 
mortgages would have been presumed under the law to meet the "ability 
to repay" and "net tangible benefit" standards, and for these loans, 
the creditor's presumption could not be rebutted by borrowers. 

* Qualified safe harbor mortgages would have fallen outside of the 
definition of qualified mortgages (i.e., would not have met this 
standard), but would have met certain underwriting requirements. This 
category was intended to include subprime loans that did not contain 
certain high-risk features. Specifically, these mortgages were required 
to (1) have full documentation, (2) be underwritten to the fully 
indexed rate, (3) not negatively amortize, and (4) have a fixed rate 
for at least 5 years, have a variable rate with an APR less than 3 
percentage points over a generally accepted interest rate index, or 
meet a DTI ratio to be established in regulation.[Footnote 24] 
Qualified safe harbor mortgages, like qualified mortgages, would have 
been presumed under the law to meet the "ability to repay" and "net 
tangible benefit" standards. Unlike borrowers with qualified mortgages, 
however, borrowers with these mortgages would have had the right to 
challenge a creditor's presumption that these loans met the "ability to 
repay" and "net tangible benefit" standards. 

* Nonqualified mortgages would have fallen outside of the two 
definitions above (i.e., would not have met either standard). This 
category was intended to include subprime loans with high-risk 
features. For these loans, the law would have required lenders to meet 
the reasonable ability to repay and net tangible benefit standards, as 
well as provide borrowers with the ability to challenge such 
determinations by creditors and assignees. 

As shown in figure 1, the bill would also have imposed restrictions on 
specific loan terms, depending on the loan category. First, the bill 
would have prohibited prepayment penalties for loans that were not 
qualified mortgages and would have required the penalties on all 
qualified mortgages with an adjustable interest rate to expire 3 months 
before the initial interest rate adjustment. Second, negative 
amortization loans to first-time borrowers would have been prohibited, 
unless the creditor made certain disclosures to the consumer and the 
consumer had received homeownership counseling from a HUD-certified 
organization or counselor. Finally, single-premium credit insurance and 
mandatory arbitration on mortgage loans would have been prohibited for 
all loans.[Footnote 25] 

The bill would have established additional liability for creditors of 
qualified safe harbor and nonqualified mortgages (see figure 
1).[Footnote 26] In addition, it would have established limited 
liability for assignees of nonqualified mortgages. Borrowers would have 
been able to bring civil actions against creditors or assignees if 
loans violated the "reasonable ability to repay" or "net tangible 
benefit" standards. Creditors would have been liable for the rescission 
of a loan and the borrower's cost associated with the rescission unless 
they could make the loan conform to minimum standards within 90 days. 
In addition, assignees would have been liable for the rescission (i.e., 
cancellation) of a loan and for borrower costs associated with the 
rescission unless the loan could be made to conform to the minimum 
standards within 90 days, or unless the assignee (1) had a policy 
against buying loans that were not qualified loans or qualified safe 
harbor loans, (2) exercised reasonable due diligence, as defined in 
regulation by the federal banking agencies and the SEC, and (3) had 
agreements with the seller or assignees of loans requiring that certain 
standards be met and certain steps be taken. The bill included 
additional provisions to resolve situations in which the parties could 
not agree on loan changes and set certain time frames for addressing 
challenges to these changes. Liability would not have been extended to 
pools of loans, including the securitization vehicles, or investors in 
pools of loans. According to the House Committee Report on the bill, it 
was not intended to apply to trustees or titleholders who held loans 
solely for the benefit of the securitization vehicle.[Footnote 27] 

Figure 1: H.R. 3915 Loan Standards: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

APR requirements and underwriting standards: 
Loan categories: Qualified mortgages[A]: 
* APR less than three percent above yield on comparable Treasury 
securities or less than 1.75 percent above most recent conventional 
mortgage rate (to be defined in regulation); 
* Second lien (subordinate loan): APR less than 5 percent above yield 
on comparable Treasury securities or 3.75 percent above most recent 
conventional mortgage rate (to be defined in regulation); 
* Loan is insured by FHA; 
* Loan is made or guaranteed by VA; 
Loan categories: Qualified safe harbor mortgages[A]: 
Mortgages must meet all four underwriting standards: (1) Full 
documentation (2) No negative amortization (3) Underwritten to the 
fully indexed rate (4) Have One of the following features: 
- fixed interest rate for at least 5 years, or, 
- variable rate mortgage where the APR has a margin less than 3 percent 
over a generally-accepted interest rate index, or, 
- meet a DTI ratio to be established in regulation; 
Loan categories: Nonqualified mortgages: 
* Do not meet standards established for qualified mortgages or 
qualified safe harbor mortgages. 

Loan terms and standards: 
Loan categories: Qualified mortgages[A]: 
* Limits on prepayment penalties for first 3 years; 
* No prepayment penalties after initial fixed term expires on hybrid-
ARM; 
* Prohibits single premium credit insurance from being financed; 
* Prohibits requirement of arbitration; 
Loan categories: Qualified safe harbor mortgages[A]: 
* Prohibits prepayment penalties; 
* Prohibits single premium credit insurance from being financed; 
* Prohibits requirement of arbitration;
Loan categories: Nonqualified mortgages: 
* Prohibits prepayment penalties; 
* Prohibits single premium credit insurance from being financed; 
* Prohibits requirement of arbitration. 

Liability for creditors: 
Loan categories: Qualified mortgages[A]: 
* No liability for creditors; 
Loan categories: Qualified safe harbor mortgages[A]: 
* Potential liability for rescission or cure of loans (presumption of 
having met minimum lending standards is rebuttable if borrower can 
prove a violation of the minimum lending criteria)[A]; 
Loan categories: Nonqualified mortgages: 
* Potential liability for rescission or cure of loans if borrower can 
prove loan violation of minimum lending standards[A]. 

Liability for assignees and securitizers: 
Loan categories: Qualified mortgages[A]: 
* No liability for assignees and securitizers; 
Loan categories: Qualified safe harbor mortgages[B]: 
* No liability for assignees and securitizers; 
Loan categories: Nonqualified mortgages: 
* Potential liability for rescission or cure of loans if borrower can 
prove loan violation of minimum lending standards[B]. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] Presumed to meet minimum lending standards (i.e., “reasonable 
ability to repay” and “net tangible benefit”). 

[B] Liability of creditors for rescission would be in addition to other 
liabilities (e.g., damages) that currently exist in TILA. 

[End of figure] 

The bill would also have expanded the definition of "high-cost" loans 
under HOEPA. Specifically, the bill would have included home purchase 
loans in the definition, reduced the points and fees trigger from 8 to 
5 percent--the APR trigger would stay at 8--and expanded the definition 
of points and fees for high-cost mortgages. The bill would have also 
added a third high-cost trigger for loans with prepayment penalties 
that applied for more than 3 years or exceeded 2 percent of the prepaid 
amount. Further, the bill would have enhanced existing HOEPA 
restrictions on lending without repayment ability by presuming that 
creditors engaged in a pattern or practice of making high-cost 
mortgages without verifying or documenting consumers' repayment ability 
were violating HOEPA. 

Finally, the bill would have established a federal duty of care for 
mortgage originators; prohibited steering of consumers eligible for 
qualified mortgages to nonqualified mortgages; established a licensing 
and registration regime for loan originators; established an Office of 
Housing Counseling within HUD and imposed additional counseling 
requirements; made changes to mortgage servicing and appraisal 
requirements; and provided protections for renters in foreclosed 
properties. 

Most Recent Nonprime Mortgages Would Not Have Been Safe Harbor Loans 
and Certain Variables Associated with the Safe Harbor Requirements and 
Other Factors Influenced Defaults: 

We estimate that almost three-quarters of securitized nonprime 
mortgages originated from 2000 through 2007 would not have been safe 
harbor loans. The extent to which mortgages would have met the 
individual safe harbor requirements varied substantially by origination 
year, reflecting changes in market conditions and lending practices 
over the 8-year period. We also found that the proportions of safe 
harbor and non-safe harbor loans varied across different census tract 
and borrower groupings. Our statistical analysis of loan data shows 
that certain variables associated with the safe harbor requirements-- 
documentation of borrower income and assets, in particular--were 
associated with the probability of a loan default. We found that other 
variables, such as house price appreciation and borrower credit score, 
were also associated with default rates. 

Most Recent Nonprime Loans Would Not Have Met the Bill's Safe Harbor 
Requirements: 

To illustrate the potential significance of the safe harbor 
requirements under different lending environments and market 
conditions, we applied those requirements to nonprime mortgages 
originated from 2000 through 2007 and calculated the proportions of 
loans that likely would and would not have met the requirements. 
Because of data limitations and uncertainty about how federal 
regulators would have interpreted some of the safe harbor requirements, 
our analysis includes a number of assumptions discussed in this 
section. (See appendix I for details about our methodology.) 

We estimate that almost 75 percent of nonprime mortgages originated 
from 2000 through 2007 would not have met the bill's safe harbor 
requirements. More specifically, the estimated proportion of non-safe 
harbor loans ranged from a low of 58 percent for 2001 to a high of 84 
percent for 2006 (see figure 2). The non-safe harbor loans were 
primarily ARMs, while the safe harbor loans were largely fixed-rate 
mortgages. For all 8 years combined, Alt-A mortgages represented about 
37 percent of non-safe harbor loans, or slightly more than the Alt-A 
share of the nonprime market over this period (35 percent). Over this 
same period, subprime mortgages comprised about 63 percent of non-safe 
harbor loans, or slightly less that their 65 percent share of the 
nonprime market. 

Figure 3: Estimated Proportions of Nonprime Mortgages Meeting and Not 
Meeting the Safe Harbor Requirements, 2000-2007: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2000; 
Non-safe harbor loans: 65%; 
Safe harbor loans: 35%. 

Year: 2001; 
Non-safe harbor loans: 58%; 
Safe harbor loans: 42%. 

Year: 2002; 
Non-safe harbor loans: 61; 
Safe harbor loans: 39%. 

Year: 2003; 
Non-safe harbor loans: 61%; 
Safe harbor loans: 39%. 

Year: 2004; 
Non-safe harbor loans: 69%; 
Safe harbor loans: 31%. 

Year: 2005; 
Non-safe harbor loans: 80%; 
Safe harbor loans: 20%. 

Year: 2006; 
Non-safe harbor loans: 84%; 
Safe harbor loans: 16%. 

Year: 2007; 
Non-safe harbor loans: 81%; 
Safe harbor loans: 19%. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

[End of figure] 

The significance of particular safe harbor requirements varied by 
origination year. As previously noted, the safe harbor requirements 
include the following: 

* Documentation and amortization. The mortgage would have to be 
underwritten based on full documentation of the borrower's income and 
assets and could not have a negative amortization feature. 

* Interest rate and debt burden. The mortgage would be required to have 
either (1) a fixed interest rate for at least 5 years, (2) a DTI ratio 
within a level to be specified in regulation (we used the 41 percent 
ratio that serves as a guideline in underwriting FHA-insured 
mortgages), or (3) an ARM with an APR of less than 3 percentage points 
over a generally accepted interest rate index.[Footnote 28] Because the 
loan data we used did not include APRs, we instead compared the initial 
interest rate on each loan to the relevant interest rate index. 
[Footnote 29] 

* Fully indexed rate. The mortgage would have to be underwritten to the 
fully indexed interest rate (which the bill defines as the initial 
interest rate index, plus the lender's margin). We could not determine 
from the data we used whether a mortgage was underwritten to the fully 
indexed rate. We created a proxy by assuming that the mortgage 
satisfied this requirement if the fully indexed rate was 1 percentage 
point or less over the initial interest rate, indicating a reasonable 
likelihood that the borrower could have qualified for a loan 
underwritten to the fully indexed rate.[Footnote 30] 

As shown in figure 3, there was an increasing trend in the proportion 
of nonprime loans originated from 2000 through 2007 that would not have 
met the safe harbor documentation and amortization requirements. More 
specifically, the estimated percentages of nonprime loans without full 
documentation ranged from a low of 27 percent in 2000 to a high of 
almost 60 percent in 2007.[Footnote 31] Also, from 2004 through 2007, 
the proportion of nonprime loans with a negative amortization feature 
increased steadily. The growth in these percentages reflects the 
increased use of low-documentation mortgages in both the subprime and 
Alt-A markets and mortgages with negative amortization features (e.g., 
payment-option ARMs) in the Alt-A market. In both cases, these products 
were originally intended for a narrow population of borrowers but, 
ultimately, became more widespread. For example, as we reported in 
2006, payment-option ARMs were once specialized products for 
financially sophisticated borrowers who wanted to minimize mortgage 
payments to invest funds elsewhere or borrowers with irregular earnings 
who could take advantage of minimum monthly payments during periods of 
lower income and could pay down principal when they received an 
increase in income.[Footnote 32] However, according to federal banking 
regulators and a range of industry participants, as home prices 
increased rapidly in some areas of the country, lenders began marketing 
payment-option ARMs as affordability products and made them available 
to less creditworthy and lower income borrowers. 

Figure 3: Estimated Proportions of Nonprime Mortgages Not Meeting 
Documentation and Amortization Requirements, 2000-2007: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Year: 2000; 
Documentation requirement: 27%; 
Amortization requirement: 1%. 

Year: 2001; 
Documentation requirement: 31%; 
Amortization requirement: 0.2%. 

Year: 2002; 
Documentation requirement: 36%; 
Amortization requirement: 0.7%. 

Year: 2003; 
Documentation requirement: 40%; 
Amortization requirement: 0.4%. 

Year: 2004; 
Documentation requirement: 43%; 
Amortization requirement: 4.4%. 

Year: 2005; 
Documentation requirement: 49%; 
Amortization requirement: 8.1%. 

Year: 2006; 
Documentation requirement: 56%; 
Amortization requirement: 12%. 

Year: 2007; 
Documentation requirement: 59%; 
Amortization requirement: 16.3%. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

[End of figure] 

Substantial proportions of the nonprime loans made over the 8-year 
period we examined also did not meet the safe harbor interest rate and 
debt burden requirements, although the proportions varied by year: 

* The proportion of nonprime originations that did not have a fixed 
interest rate for at least 5 years rose from 52 percent in 2000 to 64 
percent in 2004 (see figure 4). This increase can be attributed 
primarily to a shift in the Alt-A market away from fixed-rate mortgage 
products to adjustable-rate products. For example, in 2000 about 88 
percent of Alt-A loans were fixed rate, but by 2004 this figure had 
dropped to about 38 percent. Beginning in 2005, the percentage of 
nonprime originations with adjustable rates began falling, reaching 37 
percent in 2007. The decline was due in large part to a trend in the 
Alt-A market toward fixed-rate mortgages. 

* As figure 4 also shows, the proportion of nonprime originations that 
did not have a DTI ratio under 41 percent grew over the 8-year period, 
rising from 43 percent in 2000 to 51 percent in 2006, although it fell 
slightly in 2007. The generally increasing trend is partly a result of 
house prices growing faster than borrowers' incomes over the period and 
of lenders allowing borrowers to take out larger mortgages relative to 
their incomes. For example, from 2000 through 2006, average home prices 
grew by 38 percent nationally, while over the same period, average 
incomes grew by just 23 percent. 

* Finally, the proportion of nonprime ARM originations with initial 
interest rates not less than 3 percentage points over a generally 
accepted interest rate index (3 percent test) ranged from a high of 96 
percent in 2002 to a low of 48 percent in 2007 (see figure 4). The 
changing proportions over time were largely due to movements in the 
interest rate indexes used to set ARM interest rates that affected the 
size of the gap between the initial rates and the index values. For 
example, when the 2-year Treasury constant maturity rate (a common 
interest rate index) dropped from 2000 through 2002, the proportion of 
nonprime ARMs that did not meet the 3 percent test rose. But when the 2-
year Treasury rate rose from 2004 through 2006, the proportion declined 
sharply. 

The bill's interest rate and debt burden requirements for safe harbor 
mortgages were structured so that a loan would only have to meet one of 
the three requirements. As a result, some loans could have met one of 
the requirements, but not one or both of the other requirements and 
still could have qualified as safe harbor loans. To illustrate, of the 
safe harbor loans that met the bill's safe harbor requirements by 
having a fixed interest rate for 5 or more years, almost one-half would 
not have met the DTI ratio requirement, assuming the 41 percent ratio 
we used for our analysis. Some of the banking regulators we interviewed 
said that the DTI ratio was an important factor in assessing a 
borrower's ability to repay a mortgage loan. They said that all 
borrowers should be required to meet some DTI ratio in order for their 
loans to be eligible for the bill's safe harbor. Consistent with this 
view, H.R. 1728, which was passed by the House earlier this year, 
requires borrowers of safe harbor loans to meet a DTI ratio to be 
established by regulation. 

Figure 4: Estimated Proportions of Nonprime Mortgages Not Meeting 
Interest Rate and Debt Burden Requirements, 2000-2007: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Year: 2000; 
DTI requirement: 43%; 
Fixed interest rate requirement: 52%; 
ARM interest rate requirement: 85%. 

Year: 2001; 
DTI requirement: 44%; 
Fixed interest rate requirement: 51%; 
ARM interest rate requirement: 95%. 

Year: 2002; 
DTI requirement: 45%; 
Fixed interest rate requirement: 55%; 
ARM interest rate requirement: 96%. 

Year: 2003; 
DTI requirement: 45%; 
Fixed interest rate requirement: 52%; 
ARM interest rate requirement: 93%. 

Year: 2004; 
DTI requirement: 46%; 
Fixed interest rate requirement: 64%; 
ARM interest rate requirement: 82%. 

Year: 2005; 
DTI requirement: 48%; 
Fixed interest rate requirement: 63%; 
ARM interest rate requirement: 61%. 

Year: 2006; 
DTI requirement: 51%; 
Fixed interest rate requirement: 56%; 
ARM interest rate requirement: 56%. 

Year: 2007; 
DTI requirement: 49%; 
Fixed interest rate requirement: 35%; 
ARM interest rate requirement: 48%. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

Note: About 37 percent of the loans in the LP database did not have 
information on the DTI ratio. We compared the credit score distribution 
for loans with DTI data to the distribution for loans without this 
information, and found them to be very similar. As a result, we believe 
that the DTI data we present are a reasonable reflection of trends in 
the nonprime market as a whole. 

[End of figure] 

Over the 8-year period we examined, about 38 percent of the nonprime 
loans originated would not have met the safe harbor fully indexed rate 
requirement, although the proportions varied by year (see figure 5). 
[Footnote 33] As previously noted, we assumed that if the fully indexed 
rate--that is, the index rate at origination plus the lender's margin--
was more than 1 percentage point above the initial interest rate, the 
mortgage did not meet the requirement. The variation by year largely 
reflected changes in the index used to determine the fully indexed 
rate. More specifically, during years in which a commonly used index 
such as the 6-month LIBOR was relatively high (e.g., 2000 and 2005 
through 2006), a larger proportion of the nonprime loans would not have 
met the requirement because the fully indexed rate would have been well 
above the initial interest rate of the loan. In contrast, during years 
in which the index was low (e.g., 2001 through 2004), a greater 
proportion of loans would have met the requirement because the fully 
indexed rate would have been close to the initial rate. For example, in 
2000, when the average 6-month LIBOR was 6.7 percent, the proportion of 
nonprime loans that did not meet the fully indexed rate requirement was 
47 percent. In 2003, when the average 6-month LIBOR was 1.2 percent, 
the proportion was 9 percent. A potential shortcoming of this 
requirement is that many ARMs could meet this requirement when interest 
rates were low, but the mortgages could become unaffordable if interest 
rates were to rise and the borrower's payments adjusted upward to 
reflect the higher rates. However, it may be difficult to design a more 
stringent fully indexed rate requirement to provide protection during 
low interest rate environments without possibly reducing the 
availability of ARMs during high interest rate environments. 

Figure 5: Estimated Proportions of Nonprime Mortgages Not Meeting the 
Fully Indexed Rate Requirement, 2000-2007: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Year: 2000; 
Nonprime Mortgages: 47%. 

Year: 2001; 
Nonprime Mortgages: 17%. 

Year: 2002; 
Nonprime Mortgages: 12%. 

Year: 2003; 
Nonprime Mortgages: 9%. 

Year: 2004; 
Nonprime Mortgages: 25%. 

Year: 2005; 
Nonprime Mortgages: 53%. 

Year: 2006; 
Nonprime Mortgages: 58%. 

Year: 2007; 
Nonprime Mortgages: 48%. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

[End of figure] 

The Proportions of Safe Harbor and Non-Safe Harbor Loans Differed 
across Zip Code and Borrower Groupings: 

Prior research has indicated that nonprime lending occurred 
disproportionately in areas with higher proportions of minority, low- 
income, and credit-impaired residents.[Footnote 34] Therefore, in 
contemplating the potential impact of the Bill, one consideration is 
the extent to which nonprime mortgages made to these groups of 
borrowers would have fallen inside or outside of the safe harbor. For 
groups with higher proportions of non-safe harbor mortgages, the Bill's 
impact on the availability of these loans and consumer protections for 
them may be particularly important. 

Accordingly, we examined the estimated proportions of safe harbor and 
non-safe harbor loans within various zip code and borrower groupings. 
[Footnote 35] Specifically, we looked at zip codes grouped by race, 
ethnicity, and income characteristics, as well as borrowers grouped by 
credit score.[Footnote 36] Our analysis of safe harbor and non-safe 
harbor loans by race and ethnicity groupings found that zip codes with 
higher percentages of households that Census identified as black or 
African-American had lower percentages of non-safe harbor loans than 
the nonprime borrower population as a whole. For example, in zip codes 
where black or African-American households made up 75 percent or more 
of the household population, the proportion of non-safe harbor loans 
was 68 percent, compared with 75 percent for all nonprime borrowers 
(see table 2). In contrast, in zip codes with higher percentages of 
households that Census identified as Hispanic or Latino, the 
percentages of non-safe harbor loans were higher than for nonprime 
borrowers as a whole. For example, in zip codes where Hispanic or 
Latino households comprised 75 percent or more of the household 
population, the percentage of non-safe harbor loans was 80 percent, or 
5 percentage points higher than for all nonprime borrowers.[Footnote 
37] Our analysis by income groupings found that the proportion of non- 
safe harbor loans for each grouping was essentially the same as that 
for the entire nonprime borrower population.[Footnote 38] 

Table 2: Percentage of Nonprime Mortgages That Were Safe Harbor and Non-
safe Harbor Loans by Racial, Ethnic, and Income Groupings, 2000-2007: 

Zip code population grouping: All nonprime borrowers; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 25; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 75. 

Zip code population grouping: Black or African-American; Less than 5%; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 25; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 75. 

Zip code population grouping: Black or African-American; 5% to 24%; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 26; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 74. 

Zip code population grouping: Black or African-American; 25% to 74%; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 29; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 71. 

Zip code population grouping: Black or African-American; 75% or 
greater; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 32; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 68. 

Zip code population grouping: Hispanic or Latino; Less than 5%; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 31; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 69. 

Zip code population grouping: Hispanic or Latino; 5% to 24%; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 24; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 76. 

Zip code population grouping: Hispanic or Latino; 25% to 74%; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 20; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 80. 

Zip code population grouping: Hispanic or Latino; 75% or greater; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 20; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 80. 

Zip code population grouping: Median income; Low income; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 26; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 74. 

Zip code population grouping: Median income; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 25; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 75. 

Zip code population grouping: Median income; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 24; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 76. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP and Census data. 

[End of table] 

We also analyzed safe harbor and non-safe harbor loans by credit score 
groupings. We used four groupings that ranged from the least 
creditworthy borrowers (scores of 599 and less) to the most 
creditworthy borrowers (scores of 720 and above). We found that 
borrowers with scores of 599 and less (the lowest category) had the 
smallest percentage of non-safe harbor loans (69 percent), while 
borrowers with scores of 600 to 719 (the second highest category) had 
the largest percentage of non-safe harbor loans (see table 3). 

Table 3: Percentage of Nonprime Mortgages That Were Safe Harbor and Non-
Safe Harbor Loans by Credit Score Groupings, 2000-2007: 

Credit score grouping: 599 and less; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 31; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 69. 

Credit score grouping: 600-659; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 25; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 75. 

Credit score grouping: 660-719; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 22; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 78. 

Credit score grouping: 720 and above; 
Percentage of safe harbor loans: 26; 
Percentage of non-safe harbor loans: 74. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP and Census data. 

[End of table] 

Some of the Safe Harbor Requirements and Other Factors Were Associated 
with the Likelihood of Default: 

Prior research has shown that a number of different loan, borrower, and 
economic variables influence the performance of a loan. To see if the 
bill's provisions appear to fulfill their consumer protection purpose, 
we developed a statistical model, based on the data available to us, to 
examine the relationship between safe harbor requirements, as well as a 
subset of other variables known to affect performance, and the 
probability of a loan defaulting within the first 24 months of 
origination.[Footnote 39] We defined a loan as being in default if it 
was delinquent by at least 90 days, in the foreclosure process 
(including loans identified as in real-estate-owned status), paid off 
after being 90 days delinquent or in foreclosure, or had already 
terminated with evidence of a loss. 

We focused on 24-month performance because a large proportion of 
nonprime borrowers--particularly those with hybrid ARMs--prepaid their 
loans (e.g., by refinancing) within 2 years. Using a 24-month time 
frame allowed us to include these loans in our model. The variables we 
used in the model included variables based on the individual safe 
harbor requirements, house price appreciation, borrower credit scores, 
and LTV ratios.[Footnote 40] We developed the model using data on 
nonprime mortgages originated from 2000 through 2006 (the latest year 
for which we could examine 24-month performance). We produced separate 
estimates for four types of loan products: (1) short-term hybrid ARMs 
(i.e., 2/28 or 3/27 mortgages), which accounted for 54 percent of the 
loans originated during this period; (2) longer-term ARMs (i.e., ARMs 
with interest rates that were fixed for 5, 7, or 10 years before 
adjusting), which accounted for 10 percent of originations; (3) payment-
option ARMs, which represented 6 percent of originations and (4) fixed-
rate mortgages, which represented 30 percent of originations.[Footnote 
41] Appendix II provides additional information about our model and 
estimation results. 

Consistent with the consumer protection purpose of the bill's 
provisions, we found that two safe harbor variables were associated 
with the probability of default. Across all product types, the safe 
harbor variable with the largest estimated influence on default 
probability was documentation of borrower income and assets. For 
example, less than full documentation was associated with a 5.5 
percentage point increase in the estimated probability of default for 
short-term hybrid ARMs used for home purchases, all other things being 
equal (see table 4). The corresponding increases in estimated default 
probabilities for longer-term ARMs, payment-option ARMs, and fixed-rate 
mortgages were 4.8 percent, 2.0 percent, and 4.6 percent, respectively. 
The higher default probabilities associated with no-and low- 
documentation loans may reflect use of this feature to overstate the 
financial resources of some borrowers and qualify them for larger, 
potentially unaffordable loans. Our results are generally consistent 
with prior research showing an association between a lack of 
documentation and higher default probabilities.[Footnote 42] 

Table 4: Estimated Probability of Nonprime Purchase Mortgages 
Defaulting within 24 months of Origination with and without Full 
Documentation, 2000-2006 Loans: 

Product type: Short-term hybrid ARMs; 
Estimated probability of default: Full documentation: 14.0%; 
Estimated probability of default: Less than full documentation: 19.5%. 

Product type: Longer-term ARMs; 
Estimated probability of default: Full documentation: 3.5%; 
Estimated probability of default: Less than full documentation: 8.3%. 

Product type: Payment-option ARMs[A]; 
Estimated probability of default: Full documentation: 2.1%; 
Estimated probability of default: Less than full documentation: 4.1%. 

Product type: Fixed-rate mortgages; 
Estimated probability of default: Full documentation: 4.7%; 
Estimated probability of default: Less than full documentation: 9.3%. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

Note: The estimated default probabilities we present do not necessarily 
reflect the ultimate performance of any product type. For example, many 
payment-option ARMs do not recast to higher, fully amortized payments 
until 5 years after origination. Because we focused on 24-month 
performance, our analysis does not capture defaults on payment-option 
ARMs that may occur due to future increases in monthly payments. 

[A] Includes purchase and refinance loans. 

[End of table] 

A second safe harbor variable that had a significant influence on 
default probability was the variable representing the difference 
between the loan's initial interest rate and the relevant interest rate 
index (the spread). As previously noted, ARMs with a difference of 3 
percentage points or more over a generally accepted interest rate index 
would not meet one of the bill's safe harbor interest rate and debt 
burden requirements. To examine the effect of this variable for each 
product type, we estimated the default probability assuming the spread 
was near the 25th percentile (base assumption) for that product and 
compared this with the estimated default probability assuming the 
spread was near the 75th percentile (alternative assumption) for that 
product. We estimated that for short-term hybrid ARMs used for home 
purchases, moving from the lower spread to the higher one was 
associated with a 4.0 percentage point increase in default probability, 
all other things remaining equal (see table 5). The corresponding 
increases in estimated default probabilities for longer-term ARMs and 
fixed-rate mortgages were 1.8 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively. 
These results were generally consistent with other economic research 
showing a positive relationship between higher interest rates and 
default probabilities for nonprime mortgages.[Footnote 43] This 
relationship may reflect the higher monthly payments associated with 
higher interest rates and difficulties borrowers may face in making 
these payments, particularly during times of economic hardship. 

Table 5: Estimated Probability of Nonprime Purchase Mortgages 
Defaulting within 24 months of Origination under Different Assumptions 
for the Safe Harbor Spread Requirement, 2000-2006 Loans: 

Variable (base assumption): Short-term hybrid ARMs; Spread of 3 
percent; 
Estimated probability of default: 14.1%; 
Variable (alternative assumption): Spread of 5 percent; 
Estimated probability of default: 18.1%. 

Variable (base assumption): Longer-term ARMs; Spread of 1.75 percent; 
Estimated probability of default: 5.2%; 
Variable (alternative assumption): Spread of 2.5 percent; 
Estimated probability of default: 7.0%. 

Variable (base assumption): Fixed-rate mortgages; Spread of 2 percent; 
Estimated probability of default: 4.8%; 
Variable (alternative assumption): Spread of 3.75 percent; 
Estimated probability of default: 7.4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

Note: As indicated earlier, the relevant interest rate index we used 
for short-term hybrid ARMs was the Treasury 2-year constant maturity 
rate. For longer-term ARMs we used the Treasury 5-year constant 
maturity rate, and for fixed-rate mortgages we used the Treasury 10-
year constant maturity rate. 

[End of table] 

We also estimated the effect of the DTI ratio at origination and found 
that for all product types, this variable did not have a strong 
influence on the probability of default within 24 months. This 
relatively weak association may be due, in part, to changes in borrower 
income or indebtedness after loan origination. For example, a mortgage 
that is affordable to the borrower at origination may become less so if 
the borrower experiences a decline in income or takes on additional 
nonmortgage debt.[Footnote 44] 

Finally, we estimated the effect of the proxy variable we developed for 
the safe harbor requirement that loans be underwritten to the fully 
indexed rate.[Footnote 45] As previously noted, if the fully indexed 
rate was 1 percentage point or less over the initial interest rate, we 
assumed the loan met this requirement. For all product types, we found 
that this variable did not have a strong influence on the probability 
of default within 24 months (see appendix II). It is possible that 
other model specifications--such as examining default probabilities 
beyond 24 months--would have yielded different results. For example, 
the difference between the initial interest rate and the fully indexed 
rate might have been more significant using such an alternative 
specification because the initial interest rates for many short-term 
hybrid ARMs begin adjusting upward after 24 months. 

In examining the influence of safe harbor variables on the probability 
of default within 24 months, we controlled for other variables not 
associated with the safe harbor requirements, such as house price 
appreciation, borrower credit score, and the LTV ratio. Because these 
variables have been shown to influence default probabilities, it was 
important to control for their effects in order to properly analyze the 
implications of the safe harbor provisions. Consistent with other 
economic research, we found that house price appreciation, borrower 
credit score, and the LTV ratio were strongly associated with default 
probabilities.[Footnote 46] The estimated influence of these variables 
on default probabilities for each product type were as follows: 

* House price appreciation.[Footnote 47] We found that lower rates of 
house price appreciation were associated with a higher likelihood of 
default. For each product type, we estimated the default probability 
assuming house price appreciation near the 75th percentile for that 
product (base assumption) and compared this with the estimated default 
probability assuming house price appreciation near the 25th percentile 
for that product (alternative assumption). For short-term hybrid ARMs 
used for home purchases, moving from the higher rate of appreciation to 
the lower rate was associated with a 13.5 percentage point increase in 
estimated default probability (see figure 6). The corresponding figures 
for longer-term ARMs, payment-option ARMs, and fixed-rate mortgages 
were 3.7 percent, 1.3 percent, and 3.5 percent, respectively. 

* Borrower credit score. We found that lower credit scores were 
associated with a higher likelihood of default. For each product type, 
we estimated the default probability assuming a borrower credit score 
close to the 75th percentile for that product (base assumption) and 
compared this with the estimated default probability assuming a 
borrower credit score close to the 25th percentile for that product 
(alternative assumption). For short-term hybrid ARMs used for home 
purchases, moving from the higher credit score to the lower one was 
associated with a 7.3 percentage point increase in the estimated 
default probability (see figure 6). For longer-term ARMs, payment-
option ARMs, and fixed-rate mortgages, the corresponding figures were 
3.3 percent, 2.1 percent, and 5.5 percent, respectively. 

* LTV ratio. We found that higher LTV ratios were associated with 
higher probabilities of default. For each product type, we estimated 
the default probability assuming a LTV ratio close to the 25th 
percentile for that product (base assumption) and compared this with 
the estimated default probability assuming a LTV ratio close to the 
75th percentile for that product (alternative assumption). For short- 
term hybrid ARMs used for home purchases, moving from the lower ratio 
to the higher ratio was associated with a 4.4 percentage point increase 
in the estimated default: 

* probability (see figure 6). The corresponding figures for longer-term 
ARMs, payment-option ARMs, and fixed-rate mortgages were 4.7 percent, 
6.3 percent, and 3.7 percent, respectively. 

Figure 6: Estimated Probability of Nonprime Purchase Mortgages 
Defaulting within 24 Months under Different House Price Appreciation, 
Credit Score, and LTV Ratio Assumptions, 2000-2006 Loans: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Short-term hybrid ARMs: 
Variable: House price appreciation 24 months after origination; 
Assumption, Base: 25%; 
Estimated probability of default: 10.7%; 
Assumption, Alternative: 0%; 
Estimated probability of default: 24.2%. 

Short-term hybrid ARMs: 
Variable: Borrower credit score; 
Assumption, Base: 675; 
Estimated probability of default: 13.3%; 
Assumption, Alternative: 600; 
Estimated probability of default: 20.6%; 

Short-term hybrid ARMs: 
Variable: LTV ratio; 
Assumption, Base: 80%; 
Estimated probability of default: 13.6%; 
Assumption, Alternative: 100%; 
Estimated probability of default: 18.0%. 

Longer-term ARMs: 
Variable: House price appreciation 24 months after origination; 
Assumption, Base: 20%; 
Estimated probability of default: 3.3%; 
Assumption, Alternative: -10%; 
Estimated probability of default: 7.0%. 

Longer-term ARMs: 
Variable: Borrower credit score; 
Assumption, Base: 750; 
Estimated probability of default: 4.5%; 
Assumption, Alternative: 675; 
Estimated probability of default: 7.8%. 

Longer-term ARMs: 
Variable: LTV ratio; 
Assumption, Base: 90%; 
Estimated probability of default: 3.4%; 
Assumption, Alternative: 100%; 
Estimated probability of default: 8.1%. 

Payment-option ARMs[A]: 
Variable: House price appreciation 24 months after origination; 
Assumption, Base: 15%; 
Estimated probability of default: 2.3%; 
Assumption, Alternative: -10%; 
Estimated probability of default: 3.6%. 

Payment-option ARMs[A]: 
Variable: Borrower credit score; 
Assumption, Base: 750; 
Estimated probability of default: 2.5%; 
Assumption, Alternative: 675; 
Estimated probability of default: 4.6%. 

Payment-option ARMs[A]: 
Variable: LTV ratio; 
Assumption, Base: 75%; 
Estimated probability of default: 2.7%; 
Assumption, Alternative: 90%; 
Estimated probability of default: 9.0%. 

Fixed-rate mortgages: 
Variable: House price appreciation 24 months after origination; 
Assumption, Base: 25%; 
Estimated probability of default: 4.4%; 
Assumption, Alternative: 5%; 
Estimated probability of default: 7.9%. 

Fixed-rate mortgages: 
Variable: Borrower credit score; 
Assumption, Base: 725; 
Estimated probability of default: 4.1%; 
Assumption, Alternative: 625; 
Estimated probability of default: 9.6%. 

Fixed-rate mortgages: 
Variable: LTV ratio; 
Assumption, Base: 80%; 
Estimated probability of default: 4.7%; 
Assumption, Alternative: 100%; 
Estimated probability of default: 8.4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

[A] Includes purchase and refinance loans. 

[End of figure] 

Relevant Research and Stakeholder Perspectives Do Not Provide a 
Consensus View on the Bill's Potential Impact: 

While some research indicates that anti-predatory lending laws can 
reduce originations of problematic loans without overly restricting 
credit, research on state and local anti-predatory lending laws and the 
views of mortgage industry stakeholders do not provide a consensus view 
on the potential effects of the bill. The state and local anti- 
predatory lending laws we reviewed are, in some ways, similar to the 
bill, but the results of the research on these laws may have limited 
applicability to the bill for a number of reasons. Mortgage industry 
and consumer group representatives we interviewed disagreed on the 
bill's potential effect on credit availability and consumer 
protections. For example, mortgage industry representatives said that 
the safe harbor and assignee liability provisions were too stringent 
and would restrict and raise the cost of mortgage credit. In contrast, 
consumer group representatives indicated that the provisions were not 
strong enough to prevent predatory lending and, thereby, protect 
borrowers. 

Research Shows That State and Local Laws Can Affect Mortgage Lending, 
but the Findings Are Difficult to Apply to the Bill: 

Several studies have examined the impact of state and local anti- 
predatory lending laws on subprime mortgage markets. Our review of 
eight such studies found evidence that anti-predatory lending laws can 
have the intended effect of reducing loans with problematic features 
without substantially affecting credit availability, but also that it 
is difficult to generalize these findings to all anti-predatory lending 
laws or to the potential effect of the bill.[Footnote 48] The studies 
we reviewed fell into two broad categories: those that focused solely 
on the North Carolina law and those that examined laws in multiple 
states and localities. In general, the researchers measured the effect 
of the laws in terms of the volume of subprime originations, the 
probability of originating a subprime loan, or the probability of 
originating a loan with predatory characteristics. 

The three studies on the North Carolina law (which was implemented in 
phases beginning in October 1999 and ending in July 2000) concluded 
that the law had a dampening effect on subprime originations in that 
state, but one found that the drop occurred primarily in the types of 
loans targeted by the law. For example, using data from nine subprime 
lenders and controlling for a number of demographic and housing market 
variables, Elliehausen and Staten estimated that subprime originations 
fell by 14 percent after the law was first implemented.[Footnote 49] A 
second study by Quercia, Stegman, and Davis that used an LP data set 
with broader coverage and used neighboring states as a control group, 
found that subprime originations declined 3 percent after the law was 
fully implemented and that subprime originations in four neighboring 
states without similar laws rose over the same period.[Footnote 50] 
Importantly, the authors also determined that 90 percent of the decline 
in subprime originations resulted from a decrease in refinance loans 
with one or more "predatory" characteristics, such as prepayment 
penalties lasting 3 years or more, balloon payments, or LTV ratios over 
110 percent. Finally, a study by Burnett, Finkel and Kaul, which used 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data and also used neighboring 
states as a control group, found a 0.2 percent increase in subprime 
originations in North Carolina after implementation of the law. Like 
the Quercia study, the study by Burnett and others concluded that 
subprime refinance loans fell sharply in North Carolina over the period 
examined and that states neighboring North Carolina experienced higher 
percentage increases in total subprime originations.[Footnote 51] 
Additionally, the study noted that the volume of subprime originations 
in North Carolina fell in census tracts that were more than 50 percent 
minority but rose in other areas. 

The five studies that examined multiple state and local anti-predatory 
lending laws found mixed results but provide insights into the 
importance of the specific attributes of the laws. For example, using 
HMDA data, Ho and Pennington-Cross calculated the percentage change in 
subprime originations in 10 states with anti-predatory lending laws 
over periods that captured each state's experience before and after the 
laws were passed.[Footnote 52] They compared the changes they found 
with the corresponding changes during the same periods in a control 
group of neighboring states without such laws. They found that in 5 of 
the 10 states (including North Carolina) with anti-predatory lending 
laws, subprime originations increased less than in the control group, 
but that in the other 5 states, subprime originations increased more. 
In another study, Ho and Pennington-Cross developed a legal index to 
measure the coverage and restrictions of anti-predatory lending laws, 
and examined how laws in 25 states and 3 localities affected the 
probability of originating a subprime loan.[Footnote 53] They found 
that, controlling for other factors, anti-predatory lending laws can 
increase, decrease, or have no effect on the flow of mortgage credit. 
Specifically, they found that: 

* laws with broader coverage (i.e., those affecting a larger portion of 
the market) increased the estimated likelihood of subprime 
originations; 

* those with greater restrictions (i.e., those with stricter limits on 
high-risk loan features) decreased the estimated likelihood of subprime 
originations; and: 

* in some instances, these two effects appeared to cancel each other 
out. 

As a result, they noted that the design of the law can have an 
important impact on the availability of credit in the subprime market. 
For example, the authors hypothesized that the effect of broader 
coverage may result from borrowers being more comfortable applying for 
a mortgage where there is a law to protect them from predatory loans. 

A study by Bostic and others built on this research by refining the 
legal index previously discussed, adding an enforcement dimension to 
the index, and examining a larger set of laws.[Footnote 54] The study 
confirmed the earlier findings regarding the impact of the coverage and 
restriction provisions of anti-predatory lending laws on the subprime 
market. Additionally, this study found that the strength of a law's 
enforcement provisions (e.g., the extent of potential liability for 
assignees) was not associated with changes in the estimated likelihood 
of subprime originations. 

Li and Ernst examined anti-predatory lending laws in 33 states and used 
LP data on subprime mortgages made from January 1998 through March 2005 
to examine the impact of these laws on the origination of loans with 
predatory features and the cost of subprime credit.[Footnote 55] They 
concluded that state anti-predatory lending laws that provided greater 
consumer protections than HOEPA had the intended effect of reducing 
subprime mortgages with predatory features. They also concluded that 
such laws did not lead to any systematic increase in costs to 
consumers. Pennington-Cross and Ho also examined the impact of 
predatory lending laws on the cost of subprime credit by reviewing anti-
predatory lending laws in 24 states and analyzing HMDA and LP data from 
1998 through 2005.[Footnote 56] They concluded that these laws resulted 
in, at most, a modest increase to consumers' cost of borrowing. 

Although the bill is, in some ways, similar to the state and local laws 
analyzed in these studies, the results of these studies may have 
limited applicability to it, for a number of reasons. First, the legal 
indexes used by some researchers to assess the impact of state and 
local laws are based on an older set of laws that are similar to HOEPA. 
According to one of these researchers, the indexes do not take into 
account a newer generation of laws that, like the bill, have different 
thresholds and restrictions and cover products that were previously not 
common in the marketplace (e.g., low-and no-documentation loans). As a 
result, evaluating the bill, using these analytical tools, could be 
problematic. Additionally, the impact of a federal law could be 
different than the effects of state and local laws. For example, 
lenders or assignees may choose to exit a state or local market rather 
than comply with that jurisdiction's anti-predatory lending law but 
still conduct business in other markets. However, under a federal law, 
these entities would not have that option. Finally, prior studies 
examined the impact of laws during a relatively active period in the 
subprime lending market. If a law similar to the bill were to be passed 
in the near future, it would be implemented in the wake of a major 
contraction in the mortgage market that would likely affect the 
response of both the mortgage industry and consumers to new lending 
standards. 

Views Differed Regarding the Bill's Long-Term Effect on the Mortgage 
Market: 

Mortgage industry representatives and consumer groups we interviewed 
generally agreed that the bill would have little short-term impact on 
the mortgage market because of existing market conditions. However, 
they held different views on the long-term impact that key provisions 
in the bill would have on consumer access to affordable credit and 
protection from predatory lending practices. 

Recent Market Conditions and Regulatory Initiatives: 

Representatives from both groups generally agreed that the bill would 
have very little impact on mortgage originations in the current 
financial environment because the overall primary market was highly 
constrained, with lenders tightening qualifications for all borrowers 
and the market for private label MBS virtually nonexistent. In 
addition, representatives from mortgage industry groups expected that 
the Federal Reserve's revisions to Regulation Z could lessen the impact 
of the bill.[Footnote 57] Specifically, the groups stated that the 
revisions to Regulation Z would place lender requirements on nonprime 
loans that were similar to the bill's safe harbor requirements. For 
example, both the Regulation Z revisions and the bill's safe harbor 
require that borrowers obtaining loans with APRs over certain 
thresholds provide full documentation of income and assets and qualify 
for ARMs based on a monthly payment that takes into account scheduled 
interest rate increases.[Footnote 58] 

Safe Harbor Requirements: 

Mortgage industry representatives we interviewed generally viewed the 
bill's safe harbor requirements as overly restrictive and said that 
these requirements would reduce mortgage options and increase the cost 
of credit for certain borrowers. Some of these representatives said 
that lenders would be unwilling to make loans that did not meet the 
safe harbor requirements. They cited the experience with HOEPA as an 
example of what might take place if the safe harbor requirements were 
put in place. Specifically, they noted that since the implementation of 
HOEPA, very few lenders have been willing to make mortgages considered 
"high cost" loans under HOEPA's provisions because they cannot sell 
them to the secondary market. For example, in 2006, less than 1 percent 
of mortgages were high cost loans, as defined by HOEPA regulations. 

The industry representatives also said that specific safe harbor 
requirements would reduce access to credit for certain types of 
borrowers. For example, they said that the safe harbor requirement that 
would prohibit loans with less than full documentation of income and 
assets could restrict access to credit for borrowers with irregular 
income streams, such as some small business owners. Some industry 
representatives acknowledged that many low-and no-documentation 
mortgages should not have been made, but said that some flexibility 
should be allowed under this requirement to account for borrowers with 
nontraditional sources of income. 

In addition, industry representatives said that borrowers who had 
responsibly used negative amortization loans in the past could face 
limited mortgage options under the bill, as the safe harbor requirement 
would prohibit these loans. Some industry representatives acknowledged 
that negative amortization products had been used inappropriately in 
recent years to allow some borrowers to buy homes that they might not 
have been able to afford, but added that prohibiting this feature would 
adversely impact borrowers who had used this product responsibly. For 
example, some borrowers with irregular income have taken out negative 
amortization loans in order to pay minimum amounts when their income 
was low and higher amounts when their income increased. One mortgage 
industry participant suggested that one way to address concerns that 
these loans subject borrowers to payment shock would be to limit the 
amount by which the mortgage payments could reset. 

In contrast, representatives from consumer groups that we interviewed 
generally indicated that the safe harbor requirements would need to be 
strengthened and applied to a broader range of loans in order to 
prevent predatory lending practices to protect borrowers. For example, 
some representatives supported adding more consumer protection features 
to the bill, such as prohibiting prepayment penalties, balloon 
payments, and yield spread premiums.[Footnote 59] They also said that 
the bill's safe harbor requirements should be applied to all mortgages, 
including FHA-insured mortgages and loans with relatively low APRs, 
because these loans could also contain predatory features. 

Most of the consumer group representatives said that strengthening safe 
harbor requirements and applying them more broadly would not 
significantly affect the cost or availability of credit. For example, 
in response to industry concerns that requiring full documentation 
would restrict some borrowers' access to credit, consumer group 
representatives noted that full documentation had already become a 
marketplace standard. They generally believed that the majority of 
borrowers, including self-employed consumers, could provide sufficient 
documentation using their income tax records, but some groups supported 
limited flexibility in the types of documents that would be accepted. 
In addition, while industry groups were concerned that prohibiting 
loans with a negative amortization feature under the bill's safe harbor 
provisions could restrict credit to some borrowers, consumer groups 
supported prohibiting this feature in order to protect consumers from 
potential payment shock. Some of these representatives acknowledged 
that negative amortization loans could be suitable for certain 
borrowers, but they viewed these cases as exceptional and did not think 
the potential benefits to a small segment outweighed the potential 
costs to the larger portion of the market. 

Assignee Liability Provisions: 

Mortgage industry representatives we interviewed generally said that 
the bill's assignee liability provisions would increase the cost of 
credit for borrowers and deter secondary market participants from 
reentering the nonprime market. Specifically, these representatives 
said that the cost of complying with the bill's assignee liability 
provisions, including secondary market participants' cost of due 
diligence procedures, would increase the cost of credit and cause some 
secondary market participants to stop securitizing loans. Some industry 
representatives stated that mortgage originators were better positioned 
to conduct due diligence to ensure that loans were responsibly 
underwritten and argued that mortgage reform legislation should focus 
on enhancing the primary market's underwriting standards. 

Mortgage industry representatives also said that lack of certainty in 
what assignees could be held liable for under the bill would deter 
participants from reentering the secondary market. For example, some 
representatives noted that the bill did not clearly define the 
standards that assignees would be held to, such as "ability to repay" 
and "net tangible benefit." They cited Georgia's 2002 anti-predatory 
lending law as an example of how the lack of clarity concerning 
assignee liability could adversely impact the market. As we have 
reported, because of the uncertainty surrounding potential liability 
under the Georgia law, secondary market participants withdrew from the 
mortgage market in Georgia until the provisions were repealed.[Footnote 
60] 

In contrast, consumer group representatives generally believed that 
enhanced regulation and accountability in the secondary market would 
provide consumers with greater protections against predatory lending 
practices. These representatives generally supported strengthening the 
bill's assignee liability provisions. For example, some consumer group 
representatives said that the bill's assignee liability provisions 
should not allow for any exemptions from liability, such as allowing 
assignees to cure a loan (i.e., modify or refinance the loan so that it 
meets the bill's minimum lending standards) to avoid liability. They 
noted that some assignees might choose to cure the relatively few loans 
that violate the bill's minimum lending standards, rather than invest 
the resources in due diligence policies and procedures that would help 
prevent predatory lending practices. 

Further, consumer groups said that the bill should not preempt state 
assignee liability laws because these laws could potentially provide 
consumers with an ability to seek redress if they obtain a predatory 
loan. Finally, representatives of consumer groups also said that 
applying the assignee liability provisions more broadly, beyond the 
bill's nonqualified mortgages, could also help prevent predatory 
lending on a wider variety of mortgages. They contended that stronger 
and broader assignee liability provisions would not significantly 
impact the cost of or access to credit and would set a standard to 
which secondary market participants would eventually adapt. 

Federal Preemption of State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: 

Mortgage industry representatives preferred that any federal 
legislation on mortgage lending preempt all state anti-predatory 
lending laws, not just assignee liability laws, in order to reduce the 
cost of and increase the availability of credit. They stated that a 
uniform set of mortgage standards for lenders would significantly 
reduce the cost of doing business and that these savings could be 
passed on to consumers. According to one mortgage industry participant, 
under the current legal and regulatory environment, lenders' costs are 
higher because lenders are required to develop systems to track laws 
and regulations in up to 50 states, monitor these laws and regulations, 
and ensure they are in compliance with them. Some industry 
representatives stated that federal preemption could also lower 
consumer costs by applying uniform standards and supporting competition 
between state-and federally licensed mortgage originators. Mortgage 
industry representatives also said that full federal preemption would 
provide a uniform set of standards that would renew activity in the 
secondary market, thereby, allowing lenders to make more credit 
available to consumers. 

In contrast, consumer group representatives generally believed that 
federal legislation should not preempt state laws, because consumers 
benefited from states' abilities to enact stronger consumer protection 
laws. For example, some consumer groups said that in the past, states 
had responded faster to predatory lending abuses than federal 
regulators in enacting anti-predatory lending laws, and expected this 
to continue if a federal bill did not preempt state laws. Further, some 
of these representatives said that state and federal regulations 
existed in a complementary framework in other areas, such as civil 
rights and the environment, and generally did not think that compliance 
costs would be significant in light of the benefits to consumers and 
the long-term sustainability of the mortgage market. They viewed 
states' experimentation with mortgage reform as an important source of 
useful information on changes in market conditions and industry 
responses to different approaches. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, 
National Credit Union Administration, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Federal Trade Commission, and Securities and Exchange 
Commission. We received written comments from NCUA, which are 
summarized below. Appendix III contains a reprint of NCUA's letter. The 
Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, HUD, and FTC provided technical comments, 
which we incorporated into this report, where appropriate. 

In its written comments, NCUA reiterated several of our findings and 
noted that the findings supported its view that ensuring borrowers have 
a reasonable ability to repay is in the best interest of credit unions 
and their members. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Member, House 
Financial Services Committee and other interested parties. We will also 
send copies to the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, OTS, NCUA, HUD, FTC, and 
SEC. The report also will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact 
me at (202) 512-8678 or shearw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs are on the last page of 
this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 
listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

William B. Shear: 
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to (1) assess the proportion of recent nonprime 
loans that would likely have met and not met the Mortgage Reform and 
Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007's (bill) safe harbor requirements, 
and how variables associated with those requirements affect loan 
performance; and (2) discuss relevant research and the views of 
mortgage industry stakeholders concerning the potential impact of key 
provisions of the bill on the mortgage market. The scope of our 
analysis was limited to the nonprime mortgages. 

Nonprime Loans and the Safe Harbor Requirements: 

To assess the proportions of nonprime loans originated from 2000 
through 2007 that would likely have met and not met the bill's safe 
harbor requirements, we analyzed data on subprime and Alt-A (nonprime) 
mortgages from that period. Specifically, we analyzed information from 
LoanPerformance's (LP) Asset-backed Securities database, which contains 
loan-level data on nonagency securitized mortgages in subprime and Alt-
A pools.[Footnote 61] About three-quarters of subprime mortgages were 
securitized in recent years. For purposes of this report, we defined 
subprime loans as mortgages in subprime pools and Alt-A loans as 
mortgages in Alt-A pools.[Footnote 62] The LP database covers the vast 
majority of mortgages in nonagency subprime and Alt-A securitizations. 
For example, for the period 2001 through July 2007, the LP database 
contains information covering (in dollar terms) an estimated 87 percent 
of securitized subprime loans and 98 percent of securitized Alt-A loans 
(see table 6). Nonprime mortgages that were not securitized (i.e., 
mortgages that lenders held in portfolio) may have different 
characteristics and performance histories than those that were 
securitized. 

Table 6: Estimated Percentage of Nonagency Securitized Subprime and Alt-
A Loans in the LP Database, 2001-2007: 

Subprime: 
Year: 2001: 83%; 
Year: 2002: 77%; 
Year: 2003: 87%; 
Year: 2004: 87%; 
Year: 2005: 88%; 
Year: 2006: 91%; 
Year: 2007[A]: 85%. 

Alt-A: 
Year: 2001: 97%; 
Year: 2002: 99%; 
Year: 2003: 99%; 
Year: 2004: 97%; 
Year: 2005: 98%; 
Year: 2006: 98%; 
Year: 2007[A]: 96%. 

Source: LP. 

Note: Percentages are in terms of dollar volume. 

[A] Percentages reflect loans securitized as of the end of July 2007. 

[End of table] 

For our analysis, we used a random 2 percent sample of the database 
that amounted to almost 300,000 loans for the 2000 through 2007 period. 
Our sample included purchase and refinance mortgages and loans to owner-
occupants and investors, and excluded second-lien mortgages. 

We assessed the reliability of the data by interviewing LP 
representatives about the methods they use to collect and ensure the 
integrity of the information. We also reviewed supporting documentation 
about the database, including LP's estimates of the database's market 
coverage. In addition, we conducted reasonableness checks on the data 
to identify any missing, erroneous, or outlying figures. We found the 
data elements we used to be sufficiently reliable. 

To estimate the proportion of loans that likely would have met and not 
met the safe harbor requirements, we used variables in the LP database 
that directly corresponded with the requirements and developed proxies 
when the database did not contain such variables (see table 7). 

Table 7: Safe Harbor Requirements and LP Variables Used to Duplicate 
the Requirements or Develop Proxies: 

Safe harbor requirement: Loan must have full documentation of income 
and financial resources of borrower; 
LP variable used: DOCUMENT: Specifies whether the loan has full, low, 
or no documentation; 
Comments: Loans with full documentation met the requirement. Loans with 
low or no documentation did not meet the requirement. 

Safe harbor requirement: Loan must be underwritten to the fully indexed 
rate. (This requirement only applies to adjustable rate mortgages 
(ARM)); 
LP variable used: INDEX_ID: Specifies the type of interest rate index 
to which an ARM is tied (e.g., London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)); 
MARGIN: Specifies the margin for ARMs; INIT_RATE: Specifies the initial 
interest rate as of the loan's first payment; 
Comments: The LP data set did not have information on this safe harbor 
requirement. As a result, we developed a proxy by assuming that the 
mortgage met the requirement if the fully indexed rate (the index plus 
the margin) was 1 percentage point or less over the initial interest 
rate, indicating a reasonable likelihood that the borrower could have 
qualified at the fully indexed rate. 

Safe harbor requirement: Loan must not negatively amortize; 
LP variable used: NEGAM: Specifies whether the loan had a negative 
amortization feature; 
Comments: Loans with a negative amortization feature did not meet the 
requirement. Loans without this feature met the requirement. 

Loans must meet one of the following three requirements: 

Safe harbor requirement: Loan must have a fixed interest rate for at 
least 5 years; 
LP variable used: PROD_TYPE: Contains an indicator for fixed-rate 
mortgages; FIRST_RATE: Indicates the length of the initial fixed-rate 
period (in months) for ARMs; 
Comments: For ARMs, if the length of the initial fixed-rate period was 
shorter than 60 months, the loan did not meet the requirement. All 
other ARMs and fixed-rate mortgages met the requirement. 

Safe harbor requirement: Loan meets a debt-service-to-income (DTI) 
ratio to be established in regulation; 
LP variable used: UNDER_RAT 1: Represents the borrower's total monthly 
debt service payments divided by monthly gross income; 
Comments: For purposes of our analysis, we assumed that if the DTI 
ratio was 41 percent or less, the loan met the requirement. The 41 
percent ratio serves as a guideline in underwriting mortgages insured 
by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Our analysis of this 
requirement only included loans for which DTI information was 
available. About 37 percent of the loans in the LP data did not have 
information on the DTI ratio. 

Safe harbor requirement: Variable rate loans must have an Annual 
Percentage Rate (APR) less than 3 percentage points over a generally 
accepted interest rate index; 
LP variable used: INIT_RATE: Initial or original interest rate as of 
the loan's first payment date; 
Comments: The LP data did not include APRs, so we developed a proxy 
that compared the initial interest rate on the loan to the relevant 
interest rate index. For short-term hybrid ARMs (e.g., 2/28 and 3/27 
mortgages), we used the Treasury 2-year constant maturity rate. For 
longer-term ARMs, we used the Treasury 5-year constant maturity rate. 
When the difference between the initial interest rate and the relevant 
interest rate index was less than 3 percentage points, we assumed that 
the loan met the requirement. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

To compare the demographic characteristics (e.g., race, ethnicity, and 
income level) of safe harbor and nonsafe harbor loans, we incorporated 
data from the Census Bureau. More specifically, whenever possible, we 
linked the zip code for each loan reported in the LP data to an 
associated census tract in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). 
[Footnote 63] We grouped the zip codes according to the percentage of 
households that Census identified as black or African-American and 
Hispanic or Latino. The groupings in our analysis were: (1) less than 5 
percent, (2) 5 to 24 percent, (3) 25 to 74 percent, and (4) 75 percent 
or greater of household populations. We also grouped zip codes 
according to the median income of the MSA of a given zip code. The 
specific groupings in our analysis were low-, moderate-, and upper- 
income zip codes, defined as those with median incomes that were less 
than 80 percent, at least 80 percent but less than 120 percent, and 120 
percent and above, respectively, of the median income for the 
associated MSA. 

To analyze nonsafe harbor loans by borrower credit score, we used the 
FICO scores in the LP database. FICO scores, generally based on 
software developed Fair, Isaac and Company, are a numerical indicator 
of a borrower's creditworthiness. The scores range from 300 to 850, 
with higher scores indicating a better credit history. For our 
analysis, we used 4 ranges of scores: 599 and below, 600 to 659, 660 to 
719, and 720 and above. 

To examine factors affecting the performance of nonprime loans, we 
developed an econometric model to estimate the relationship between 
variables associated with the safe harbor requirements, as well as 
other variables, and the probability of a loan defaulting within 24 
months of origination. We developed the model using data on mortgages 
originated from 2000 through 2006 (the latest year for which we could 
examine 24-month performance). Detailed information about our model and 
our estimation results are presented in appendix II. 

Research on State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws and Views of 
Mortgage Industry Stakeholders: 

To describe relevant research on the bill's potential effect on the 
mortgage market, we identified and reviewed empirical studies on the 
impact of state and local anti-predatory lending laws on key nonprime 
mortgage indicators, such as subprime mortgage originations and the 
cost of credit. While we identified a number of such studies, we 
narrowed our scope to eight studies that used control groups (e.g., 
comparison states without anti-predatory lending laws) or statistical 
techniques that controlled for factors other than the laws that could 
affect lending patterns. The studies we reviewed fell into two broad 
categories: three studies that focused solely on North Carolina's 1999 
anti-predatory lending law and five that examined laws in multiple 
states and localities. In general, the researchers measured the effects 
of the laws in terms of the volume of subprime originations, the 
probability of originating a subprime loan, or the probability of 
originating a loan with predatory characteristics. Our review of these 
eight studies included an examination of the methodologies used, the 
data and time periods used, the limitations of the studies, and the 
conclusions. We also interviewed selected authors to ensure that we 
interpreted their results correctly and to obtain their views on 
whether the results from their studies might apply to the potential 
impact of the bill on the mortgage market. 

To obtain the views of mortgage industry stakeholders, we reviewed 
written statements and congressional testimony about the bill by 
officials from the federal banking regulatory agencies and 
organizations representing mortgage lenders, mortgage brokers, 
securitizers, and consumer interests. We also interviewed officials 
from a number of these organizations, including the Mortgage Bankers 
Association, American Securitization Forum, American Financial Services 
Association, American Bankers Association, Independent Community 
Bankers of America, National Association of Mortgage Brokers, Center 
for Responsible Lending, National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 
National Consumer Law Center, Neighborhood Association of Consumer 
Advocates, and Consumer Federation of America. In addition, we 
interviewed officials from a large mortgage lender and a major 
investment bank involved in the securitization of mortgages. Finally, 
we interviewed officials from the federal banking regulatory agencies, 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2008 to July 2009, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Description of the Econometric Analysis of Safe Harbor 
Requirements: 

This appendix describes the econometric model we developed to examine 
the relationship between variables associated with the bill's safe 
harbor requirements, as well as other variables, and the probability of 
a loan entering default. Safe harbor requirements include features 
related to documentation of borrower income and assets, limits on debt- 
service-to-income (DTI) ratios, the duration before which any interest 
rate adjustments may occur, limits on the relationship between a loan's 
annual percentage rate and other prevailing interest rates at 
origination, and prohibitions on mortgages that allow negative 
amortization. The safe harbor requirements limit features that may 
increase the risk of default, but they may also restrict the number and 
types of mortgages lenders are willing to originate. Since the 
requirements were not in effect during the recent past, we do not know 
in what ways lenders and securitizers may have responded to their 
introduction. Therefore, we characterize our evaluation as an 
assessment of whether mortgages with safe harbor characteristics 
performed better than those without them, as opposed to an assessment 
of the effects of the introduction of a safe harbor. Our investigation 
focused on a recent set of nonprime mortgages and controlled for a 
variety of loan, borrower, and housing market conditions that are 
likely to affect mortgage performance. 

To do this work, we analyzed a 2 percent random sample of securitized 
nonprime loans originated from 2000 through 2006 from LoanPerformance's 
(LP) Asset-backed Securities database. Our sample was comprised of the 
approximately 92 percent of loans for which the associated property was 
located in an area covered by the Federal Housing Finance Agency's 
house price indexes for metropolitan areas. The LP database has been 
used extensively by regulators and others to examine the 
characteristics and performance of nonprime loans. The database 
provides information on loan characteristics, from which we developed 
variables that indicated or measured relevant safe harbor requirements. 
We determined the status of each loan 24 months after the month of 
first payment. We used loan performance history through the end of 
December 2008. We defined a loan as being in default if it was 
delinquent by at least 90 days, in the foreclosure process (including 
loans identified as in real-estate-owned status), paid off after being 
90-days delinquent or in foreclosure, or had already terminated with 
evidence of a loss. 

We categorized loans as follows: short-term hybrid adjustable rate 
mortgages (ARM) (essentially 2/28 and 3/27 mortgages), fixed-rate 
mortgages, payment-option ARMs, and other longer-term ARMs (i.e., ARMs 
with 5-, 7-, and 10-year fixed-rate periods). We included only first- 
lien loans for which the borrower is identified as an owner-occupant, 
and we estimated default probabilities for purchase money loans 
separately from loans for refinancing except for payment-option ARMs, 
for which we examined purchase and refinancing loans together. Our 
primary reason for examining performance by mortgage type is that 
borrower incentives and motivations may vary for loans with different 
characteristics. For example, short-term hybrid ARMs provide a strong 
incentive for a borrower to exit from a mortgage by the time the 
interest rate begins to reset. 

We estimated separate default models for each mortgage type, although 
the general underlying structure of the models was similar. We used a 
logistic regression model to explain the probability of loan default, 
based on the observed pattern of actual defaults and the values of safe 
harbor variables and a subset of other variables known to be associated 
with loan performance (see table 8). Many loan and borrower 
characteristics are likely to influence the status of a mortgage over 
time. Some factors describe conditions at the time of mortgage 
origination, such as the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the borrower's 
credit score. Other important factors may change over time, sometimes 
dramatically, without being observed by a lender, loan servicer, or 
researcher. For instance, an individual household's income may change 
due to job loss, increasing the probability of default. Other 
conditions vary over time in ways that can be observed, or at least 
approximated. For example, greater house price appreciation (HPA) 
contributes to greater housing equity, thus reducing the probability 
that a borrower, if facing financial distress, views defaulting on a 
loan as a better option than prepaying. We focused on whether a loan 
defaulted within 24 months as our measure of performance because a 
large proportion of nonprime borrowers had hybrid ARMs and prepaid 
their loans (e.g., by refinancing) within 2 years. Using a 24-month 
time frame allowed us to include these loans in our model, as well as 
loans originated in 2006, a year in which many nonprime loans were 
originated. 

Table 8: Variables Used in the Model: 

Variable: Mortgage default (dependent variable); 
Variable description: 1 if the mortgage was in default by 24 months, 0 
otherwise. We defined a loan as in default if it was delinquent by at 
least 90 days, in the foreclosure process (including loans identified 
as in real-estate-owned status), paid off after being 90-days 
delinquent or in foreclosure, or had already terminated with evidence 
of a loss. 

Variable: Origination year indicator; 
Variable description: 1 if the mortgage was originated in 2000, 0 
otherwise. 

Variable: Origination year indicator; 
Variable description: Variable: 1 if the mortgage was originated in 
2001, 0 otherwise. 

Variable: Origination year indicator; 
Variable description: Variable: 1 if the mortgage was originated in 
2002, 0 otherwise. 

Variable: Origination year indicator; 
Variable description: Variable: 1 if the mortgage was originated in 
2003, 0 otherwise. 

Variable: Origination year indicator; 
Variable description: Variable: 1 if the mortgage was originated in 
2005, 0 otherwise. 

Variable: Origination year indicator; 
Variable description: Variable: 1 if the mortgage was originated in 
2006, 0 otherwise. 

Variable: Combined LTV ratio; 
Variable description: Defined as a continuous variable. Represents the 
amount of the mortgage and any associated second lien divided by the 
house value. The LP data do not capture all second liens. As a result, 
the combined LTV ratios are likely understated for some loans. 

Variable: FICO score; 
Variable description: Defined as a continuous variable for payment-
option ARMs. For other mortgage types, defined as a set of continuous 
variables split into low, middle, and high ranges. Specifically, for 
short-term hybrid ARMs and fixed-rate mortgages, the low FICO range was 
either 600 or the FICO score itself if the FICO score was below 600; 
the middle range varied between 0 and 60, with a minimum of 0 if the 
FICO score was below 600, a maximum of 60 if the FICO score was above 
660, and between 0 and 60 if the FICO was between 600 and 660; and the 
high range was 0 for FICO scores below 660 and the difference between 
the FICO score and 660 for FICO scores above 660. Because Alt-A 
borrowers generally had higher credit scores, the range boundaries for 
longer-term ARMs were 660 and 720, rather than 600 and 660. 

Variable: House price appreciation; 
Variable description: Defined using the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency's metropolitan house price indexes and split into two time 
periods: one measuring appreciation during the first four quarters 
after origination and the second measuring appreciation during the 
second four quarters after origination. We assigned each loan to a 
metropolitan area using the property zip code information in the LP 
database and data that relates zip codes to Core-based Statistical 
Areas. 

Variable: Full documentation of borrower income and assets; 
Variable description: 1 if full documentation, 0 otherwise. 

Variable: Negative amortization feature; 
Variable description: 1 if allows negative amortization, 0 otherwise. 

Variable: Meets fully indexed proxy; 
Variable description: 1 if the fully indexed rate is 1 percentage point 
or less over the initial rate, 0 otherwise. Only used for ARMs. 

Variable: DTI ratio; 
Variable description: Defined as a continuous variable. Represented the 
borrower's total monthly debt service payments divided by monthly gross 
income. 

Variable: Spread over relevant interest rate index; 
Variable description: Defined as a continuous variable. Represented the 
difference between a loan's initial interest rate and the relevant 
Treasury rate at the time of origination. For short-term hybrid ARMs, 
we used the 2-year Treasury constant maturity rate, for fixed-rate 
mortgages we used the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate, and for 
payment-option and longer-term ARMs, we used the 5-year Treasury 
constant maturity rate. 

Variable: Interest-only loan; 
Variable description: 1 if loan type indicated interest-only feature, 0 
otherwise. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: In the case of longer-term ARMs and fixed-rate mortgages, we also 
included indicator variables for whether the loan was securitized in a 
subprime or Alt-A pool because these mortgage types appear in 
substantial numbers in both types of pools. In contrast, payment-option 
ARMs were almost entirely found in Alt-A pools, and short-term hybrid 
ARMs were substantially found in subprime pools. In the case of longer-
term ARMs, we included indicator variables for loans with 7-and 10-year 
fixed-rate periods. In the case of payment-option ARMs, we included an 
indicator variable for whether the loan was a purchase or refinance 
loan. 

[End of table] 

For reasons described below, some of the variables associated with the 
safe harbor requirements are included in all four models, while others 
are only included in certain models: 

* Full documentation of borrower income and assets: This variable is in 
all four models. 

* Negative amortization feature: This variable is only in the model for 
longer-term ARMs. We did not include it in the models for the other 
mortgage types because the negative amortization feature was 
essentially never present (in the case of fixed-rate mortgages and 
short-term hybrid ARMs) or was essentially always present (in the case 
of payment-option ARMs). The lack of variation within these mortgage 
types made estimating the marginal effects of the negative amortization 
variable problematic. 

* Fully indexed proxy: This variable is in three of the models, but we 
do not include it in the model for fixed-rate mortgages because it is 
only relevant to loans with adjustable interest rates. 

* DTI ratio: In the context of the bill's safe harbor requirements, 
this variable would only apply to short-term hybrid ARMs and payment- 
option ARMs. However, we include it in all four models because the DTI 
ratio is an important measure of the borrower's ability to repay. 

* Spread over relevant interest rate index: In the context of the 
bill's safe harbor requirements, this variable would only apply to 
short-term hybrid ARMs.[Footnote 64] However, we include it in all four 
models because loans with higher interest rates may be at greater risk 
of default due to their higher monthly payments. 

Tables 9 through 12 provide information on the number of loans and mean 
values for each of the mortgage types for which we estimated default 
probabilities. Short-term hybrid ARMs were the most prevalent type of 
mortgage, and refinance loans were more prevalent than purchase loans. 
In addition, more loans were originated in the later portion of the 
time period we examined than the earlier portion. Default rates were 
highest for short-term hybrid ARMs, lower for loans originated in the 
middle years of the time period and higher for purchase loans than for 
refinance loans. 

Table 9: Mean Values for Short-term Hybrid ARMs with DTI Information: 

Number of observations; 
Purchase loans: 33,985; 
Refinance loans: 45,622. 

Mortgage in default by 24 months; 
Purchase loans: 0.208; 
Refinance loans: 0.146. 

Mortgage originated in 2000; 
Purchase loans: 0.027; 
Refinance loans: 0.029. 

Mortgage originated in 2001; 
Purchase loans: 0.034; 
Refinance loans: 0.049. 

Mortgage originated in 2002; 
Purchase loans: 0.051; 
Refinance loans: 0.081. 

Mortgage originated in 2003; 
Purchase loans: 0.100; 
Refinance loans: 0.142. 

Mortgage originated in 2005; 
Purchase loans: 0.303; 
Refinance loans: 0.256. 

Mortgage originated in 2006; 
Purchase loans: 0.257; 
Refinance loans: 0.205. 

Combined LTV ratio; 
Purchase loans: 93.008; 
Refinance loans: 80.292. 

DTI ratio; 
Purchase loans: 41.358; 
Refinance loans: 40.104. 

FICO score: Low range; 
Purchase loans: 592.302; 
Refinance loans: 573.569. 

FICO score: Middle range; 
Purchase loans: 33.245; 
Refinance loans: 15.665. 

FICO score: High range; 
Purchase loans: 13.821; 
Refinance loans: 3.654. 

HPA: First four quarters after origination; 
Purchase loans: 1.095; 
Refinance loans: 1.098. 

HPA: Second four quarters after origination; 
Purchase loans: 1.033; 
Refinance loans: 1.044. 

Full documentation; 
Purchase loans: 0.545; 
Refinance loans: 0.658. 

Meets fully indexed proxy; 
Purchase loans: 0.374; 
Refinance loans: 0.446. 

Spread over 2-year Treasury constant maturity rate; 
Purchase loans: 4.174; 
Refinance loans: 4.663. 

Interest-only loan; 
Purchase loans: 0.254; 
Refinance loans: 0.118. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

[End of table] 

Table 10: Mean Values for Fixed-rate mortgages with DTI Information: 

Number of observations; 
Purchase loans: 7,566; 
Refinance loans: 23,858. 

Mortgage in default by 24 months; 
Purchase loans: 0.104; 
Refinance loans: 0.074. 

Mortgage originated in 2000; 
Purchase loans: 0.053; 
Refinance loans: 0.042. 

Mortgage originated in 2001; 
Purchase loans: 0.069; 
Refinance loans: 0.065. 

Mortgage originated in 2002; 
Purchase loans: 0.077; 
Refinance loans: 0.092. 

Mortgage originated in 2003; 
Purchase loans: 0.128; 
Refinance loans: 0.194. 

Mortgage originated in 2005; 
Purchase loans: 0.221; 
Refinance loans: 0.196. 

Mortgage originated in 2006; 
Purchase loans: 0.278; 
Refinance loans: 0.202. 

Mortgage in subprime pool; 
Purchase loans: 0.547; 
Refinance loans: 0.854. 

Combined LTV ratio; 
Purchase loans: 90.427; 
Refinance loans: 75.599. 

DTI ratio; 
Purchase loans: 38.691; 
Refinance loans: 38.550. 

FICO score: Low range; 
Purchase loans: 595.235; 
Refinance loans: 587.043. 

FICO score: Middle range; 
Purchase loans: 43.275; 
Refinance loans: 30.122. 

FICO score: High range; 
Purchase loans: 32.693; 
Refinance loans: 14.220. 

HPA: First four quarters after origination; 
Purchase loans: 1.085; 
Refinance loans: 1.098. 

HPA: Second four quarters after origination; 
Purchase loans: 1.049; 
Refinance loans: 1.059. 

Full documentation; 
Purchase loans: 0.567; 
Refinance loans: 0.701. 

Spread over 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate; 
Purchase loans: 3.121; 
Refinance loans: 3.234. 

Interest-only loan; 
Purchase loans: 0.135; 
Refinance loans: 0.045. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

[End of table] 

Table 11: Mean Values for Longer-term ARMs with DTI Information: 

Number of observations; 
Purchase loans: 5,764; 
Refinance loans: 4,211. 

Mortgage in default by 24 months; 
Purchase loans: 0.129; 
Refinance loans: 0.082. 

Mortgage originated in 2000; 
Purchase loans: 0.005; 
Refinance loans: 0.005. 

Mortgage originated in 2001; 
Purchase loans: 0.005; 
Refinance loans: 0.013. 

Mortgage originated in 2002; 
Purchase loans: 0.018; 
Refinance loans: 0.035. 

Mortgage originated in 2003; 
Purchase loans: 0.053; 
Refinance loans: 0.084. 

Mortgage originated in 2005; 
Purchase loans: 0.317; 
Refinance loans: 0.278. 

Mortgage originated in 2006; 
Purchase loans: 0.433; 
Refinance loans: 0.427. 

Mortgage in a subprime pool; 
Purchase loans: 0.118; 
Refinance loans: 0.256. 

Initial rate fixed for 7 years; 
Purchase loans: 0.090; 
Refinance loans: 0.080. 

Initial rate fixed for 10 years; 
Purchase loans: 0.105; 
Refinance loans: 0.112. 

Combined LTV ratio; 
Purchase loans: 93.174; 
Refinance loans: 78.229. 

DTI ratio; 
Purchase loans: 38.549; 
Refinance loans: 37.527. 

FICO score: Low range; 
Purchase loans: 656.300; 
Refinance loans: 647.370. 

FICO score: Middle range; 
Purchase loans: 38.551; 
Refinance loans: 28.142. 

FICO score: High range; 
Purchase loans: 15.246; 
Refinance loans: 9.465. 

HPA: First four quarters after origination; 
Purchase loans: 1.074; 
Refinance loans: 1.067. 

HPA: Second four quarters after origination; 
Purchase loans: 0.980; 
Refinance loans: 0.984. 

Full documentation; 
Purchase loans: 0.371; 
Refinance loans: 0.437. 

Meets fully indexed proxy; 
Purchase loans: 0.726; 
Refinance loans: 0.615. 

Spread over 5-year Treasury constant maturity rate; 
Purchase loans: 2.131; 
Refinance loans: 2.183. 

Negative amortization feature; 
Purchase loans: 0.027; 
Refinance loans: 0.059. 

Interest-only loan; 
Purchase loans: 0.797; 
Refinance loans: 0.669. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

[End of table] 

Table 12: Mean Values for Payment-option ARMs with DTI Information: 

Number of observations: 6,623. 

Mortgage in default by 24 months: 0.100. 

Mortgage originated in 2003: 0.018. 

Mortgage originated in 2005: 0.368. 

Mortgage originated in 2006: 0.474. 

Purchase loan: 0.262. 

Combined LTV ratio: 78.716. 

DTI ratio: 34.771. 

FICO score: 702.505. 

HPA: First four quarters after origination: 1.062. 

HPA: Second four quarters after origination: 0.941. 

Full documentation: 0.160. 

Meets fully indexed proxy: 0.045. 

Spread over 5-year Treasury constant maturity rate: 2.193. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

[End of table] 

The results of our analysis are presented in tables 13 through 16. We 
ran seven regressions: separate purchase loan and refinance loan 
regressions for three of the product types (short-term hybrid ARMs, 
fixed-rate mortgages, and longer-term ARMs) and a single regression 
combining purchase and refinance loans for payment-option ARMs. 
[Footnote 65] For this set of regressions, we only included the 63 
percent of loans for which DTI information was available. We also ran a 
second set of regressions that used all of the loans for each mortgage 
type and binary variables indicating DTI ranges, including categories 
for missing information. We found that the results were very similar to 
those for the first set of regressions. We presented coefficient 
estimates, as well as a transformation of the coefficients into a form 
that can be interpreted as the marginal effect of each variable on the 
estimated probability of default. This marginal effect is the 
calculation of the change in the estimated probability of default that 
would result if a variable's standard deviation were added to that 
variable's mean value, while all other variables are held at their mean 
values. This permits a comparison of the impact of different variables 
within and across mortgage types. In general, combined LTV ratio, HPA, 
and FICO score had substantial marginal effects across different 
mortgage types and loan purposes. Specifically, higher LTV ratios, 
lower HPA, and lower FICO scores were associated with higher 
likelihoods of default. The observed effects for DTI ratio were 
relatively small. Among safe harbor characteristics, documentation of 
borrower income and assets and a loan's spread over the applicable 
Treasury rate had substantial marginal effects. Less than full 
documentation and higher spreads were associated with higher default 
probabilities. 

Our results for full documentation of borrower income and assets were 
not sensitive to alternative specifications. Including the loan amount 
as an additional variable, adding or substituting different interest 
rates, and changing the form in which house price appreciation or FICO 
scores entered the model all had no effect on our general conclusion 
that the presence of full documentation was strongly associated with 
lowering the probability of default. Our conclusion concerning high 
cost loans--that larger spreads over specified Treasury rates at the 
time of origination are associated with increased default probability-
-is somewhat more nuanced. In some respects, the spread variable is 
capturing something about the effect of higher interest rates 
generally. For example, alternative specifications which substituted 
the initial interest rate or the Treasury rate for the spread variable 
yielded similar results. However, when the Treasury rate and the spread 
variables are included in the model, both variables are significant and 
have large marginal effects. 

As an alternative specification for short-term hybrid ARMs, we included 
a variable indicating whether each mortgage was a safe harbor or a non- 
safe harbor loan, in contrast to including variables for separate safe 
harbor requirements. We found that this variable had a small marginal 
effect, most likely because many non-safe harbor loans met some of the 
safe harbor requirements. In particular, a substantial percentage of 
non-safe harbor loans had full documentation of borrower income and 
assets but failed to meet other safe harbor requirements.[Footnote 66] 

Table 13: Estimation Results for Short-term Hybrid ARMs with DTI 
Information: 

Number of observations: 
Purchase loans: 39,985; 
Refinance loans: 45,622. 

Intercept; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 7.74; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 3.83; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: [Empty]. 

Mortgage originated in: 2000; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.57; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 1.32; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 1.10; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 2.00. 

Mortgage originated in: 2001; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.27; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.67; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.50; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 1.11. 

Mortgage originated in: 2002; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.05; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.16; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.03. 

Mortgage originated in: 2003; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.18; 
Purchase loans, Significance: *; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.75; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.08; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.29. 

Mortgage originated in: 2005; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.27; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 1.75; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.25; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 1.12. 

Mortgage originated in: 2006; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.75; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 4.96; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.81; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 3.71. 

Combined LTV; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.02; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 2.27; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.03; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 4.24. 

FICO Low range; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -1.21; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -1.18. 

FICO Middle range; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -2.37; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.83. 

FICO High range; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -2.00; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.90. 

HPA: First four quarters; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -3.54; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -4.06; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -3.89; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -3.10. 

HPA: Second four quarters; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -4.74; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -6.05; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -3.02; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -2.92. 

DTI ratio; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.01; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.94; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 1.22. 

Full documentation; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.39; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -2.50; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.44; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -1.94. 

Meets fully indexed proxy; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.08; 
Purchase loans, Significance: *; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.54; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.03. 

Spread over 2-year Treasury constant maturity rate; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.15; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 3.09; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.24; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 4.36. 

Interest-only loan; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.04; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.24; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.07; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.23. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 

[End of table] 

Table 14: Estimation Results for Fixed-rate Mortgages with DTI 
Information: 

Number of observations: 
Purchase loans: 7,566; 
Refinance loans: 23,858. 

Intercept: 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 3.84; 
Purchase loans, Significance: **; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 4.57; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: [Empty]. 

Mortgage originated in: 2000; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.28; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.38; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.77; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.76. 

Mortgage originated in: 2001; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.35; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.54; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.41; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.48. 

Mortgage originated in: 2002; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.22; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.36; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.20; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.27. 

Mortgage originated in: 2003; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.23; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.47; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.15; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.27. 

Mortgage originated in: 2005; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.02; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.04; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.03; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.05. 

Mortgage originated in: 2006; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.44; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 1.27; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.35; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.69. 

Combined LTV; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.03; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.97; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.04; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.07. 

FICO Low range; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.00; 
Purchase loans, Significance: *; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.39; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.59. 

FICO Middle range; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -1.42; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.65. 

FICO High range; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -1.67; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.72. 

HPA: First four quarters; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -1.88; 
Purchase loans, Significance: *; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.87; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -3.82; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -1.33. 

HPA: Second four quarters; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -4.92; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -2.47; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -2.55; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -1.12. 

DTI ratio; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.01; 
Purchase loans, Significance: **; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.57; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.61. 

Full documentation; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.73; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -1.85; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.37; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.71. 

Spread over 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.26; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 2.40; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.25; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 1.82. 

Interest-only loan; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.26; 
Purchase loans, Significance: **; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.56; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.27; 
Refinance loans, Significance: **; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.26. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 

[End of table] 

Table 15: Estimation Results for Longer-term ARMs with DTI Information: 

Number of observations: 
Purchase loans: 5,764; 
Refinance loans: 4,211. 

Intercept; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 1.74; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 4.51; 
Refinance loans, Significance: **; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: [Empty]. 

Mortgage originated in: 2000; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.97; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.38; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 1.92; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.48. 

Mortgage originated in: 2001; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 2.01; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.84; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.79; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.31. 

Mortgage originated in: 2002; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.63; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.46; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.22; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.14. 

Mortgage originated in: 2003; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 1.54; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 2.28; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.77; 
Refinance loans, Significance: *; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.79. 

Mortgage originated in: 2005; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.46; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 1.32; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.06; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.08. 

Mortgage originated in: 2006; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 1.23; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 4.54; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.98; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 2.02. 

Mortgage in subprime pool; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.10;
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.18; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.03; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.44. 

Initial rate fixed for 7 years; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.15; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.24; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.02; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.02. 

Initial rate fixed for 10 years; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.29; 
Purchase loans, Significance: *; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.48; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.46; 
Refinance loans, Significance: *; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.45. 

Combined LTV; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.05; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 3.31; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.06;
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 4.12. 

FICO Low range; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.00; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.34; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.75. 

FICO Middle range; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.00; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.38; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.70. 

FICO High range; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -1.69; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.32. 

HPA: First four quarters; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -2.29; 
Purchase loans, Significance: **; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -1.21; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -3.78; 
Refinance loans, Significance: **; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -1.08. 

HPA: Second four quarters; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -4.94; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -2.69; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -3.10; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -1.13. 

DTI ratio; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.02; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 1.10; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.01; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.30. 

Full documentation; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.92; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -2.08; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.86; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -1.16. 

Meets fully indexed proxy; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.05; 
Purchase loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.13; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: -0.11; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: -0.17. 

Negative amortization feature; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.77; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 0.74; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.40; 
Refinance loans, Significance: *; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.32. 

Spread over 5-year Treasury constant maturity rate; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: 0.42; 
Purchase loans, Significance: ***; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: 2.28; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.19; 
Refinance loans, Significance: ***; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.84. 

Interest-only loan; 
Purchase loans, Coefficient: -0.21; 
Purchase loans, Significance: *; 
Purchase loans, Marginal effect: -0.46; 
Refinance loans, Coefficient: 0.15; 
Refinance loans, Significance: [Empty]; 
Refinance loans, Marginal effect: 0.24. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 

[End of table] 

Table 16: Estimation Results for Payment-option ARMs with DTI 
Information: 

All loans: 
Number of observations; 6,623. 

Intercept; 
Coefficient: 0.96; 
Significance: [Empty]; 
Marginal effect: [Empty]. 

Mortgage originated in: 2003; 
Coefficient: 1.25; 
Significance: [Empty]; 
Marginal effect: 0.64. 

Mortgage originated in: 2005; 
Coefficient: 0.35; 
Significance: [Empty]; 
Marginal effect: 0.64. 

Mortgage originated in: 2006; 
Coefficient: 0.86; 
Significance: *; 
Marginal effect: 1.87. 

Purchase loan; 
Coefficient: -0.11; 
Significance: [Empty]; 
Marginal effect: -0.16. 

Combined LTV; 
Coefficient: 0.08; 
Significance: ***; 
Marginal effect: 6.33. 

FICO score; 
Coefficient: -0.01; 
Significance: ***; 
Marginal effect: -1.20. 

HPA: First four quarters; 
Coefficient: -2.75; 
Significance: **; 
Marginal effect: -0.89. 

HPA: Second four quarters; 
Coefficient: -3.58; 
Significance: ***; 
Marginal effect: -1.22. 

DTI ratio; 
Coefficient: 0.00; 
Significance: [Empty]; 
Marginal effect: 0.05. 

Full documentation; 
Coefficient: -0.70; 
Significance: ***; 
Marginal effect: -0.81. 

Meets fully indexed proxy; 
Coefficient: -0.06; 
Significance: [Empty]; 
Marginal effect: -0.05. 

Spread over 5-year Treasury constant maturity rate; 
Coefficient: 0.48; 
Significance: ***; 
Marginal effect: 1.97. 

Source: GAO analysis of LP data. 

Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the National Credit Union Administration: 

National Credit Union Administration: 
Office of the Chairman: 
1775 Duke Street: 
Alexandria, VA 22314-3428: 
703-518-6300: 

July 23, 2009: 

Mr. William B. Shear, Director: 
Financial Markets & Community Investment: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Director Shear: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review and provide our comments on 
your draft report entitled Mortgage Reform: Provisions in H.R. 3915 
(2007) Would Strengthen Borrower Protections but Views on Their Long-
term Impact Differ (GAO 09-741), dated July 2009. The report discusses 
the proportions of recent nonprime loans that likely would have met and 
not met the safe harbor requirements in the Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act of 2007 (H.R. 3915), factors influencing the 
performance of these loans, and the views of mortgage industry 
stakeholders concerning the potential impact of key provisions of H.R. 
3915 on the availability of mortgage credit. 

H.R. 3915, among other things, would have set minimum standards for 
residential mortgage loans requiring that consumers have a reasonable 
ability to repay at the time the loan is made and that they receive a 
net tangible benefit from mortgage refinancings, H. R. 3915 also 
provided a safe harbor from potential liability for assignees and 
securitizers of mortgages, provided that the loans met certain 
requirements. 

Based on an analysis of a proprietary database of securitized nonprime 
loans, the GAO estimates that almost 75 percent of securitized nonprime 
mortgages originated from 2000 to 2007 would not have met the safe 
harbor requirements of H.R. 3915. The analysis also shows that less 
than full documentation, higher interest rates, lower house price 
appreciation, lower borrower credit scores, and higher loan-to-value 
ratios were associated with higher probabilities of default. 

We appreciate the research and analysis that went into the performance 
audit. Your findings support our continued belief that ensuring 
borrowers have a reasonable ability to repay at the time the loan is 
made is in the best interest of both credit unions and their members 
and is consistent with our mission of facilitating the availability of 
credit union services to all eligible consumers, especially those of 
modest means, through a regulatory environment that fosters a safe and 
sound credit union system. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Michael E. Fryzel: 
Chairman: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

William B. Shear, (202) 512-8678, shearw@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Steve Westley, Assistant 
Director; Bill Bates; Stephen Brown; Emily Chalmers; Rudy Chatlos; 
Randy Fasnacht; Tom McCool; John McGrail; Mark Metcalfe; Rachel Munn; 
Susan Offutt; Jasminee Persaud; José R. Peña; Scott Purdy; and Jim 
Vitarello made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The conventional mortgage market (i.e., mortgages not insured or 
guaranteed by the federal government) comprises prime loans for the 
most creditworthy borrowers and nonprime loans (i.e., subprime and Alt- 
A loans). The subprime market generally serves borrowers with blemished 
credit and features higher interest rates and fees than the prime 
market. The Alt-A market generally serves borrowers whose credit 
histories are close to prime, but the loans often have one or more 
higher-risk features, such as limited documentation of income or 
assets. 

[2] Securitization allows lenders to sell loans from their portfolios, 
transferring credit risk to investors, and use the proceeds to make 
more loans. Private label MBS, which are bought and sold on the 
secondary market, are backed by mortgages that do not conform to 
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) purchase requirements because 
they are too large or do not meet GSE underwriting criteria. 

[3] GAO, Information on Recent Default and Foreclosure Trends for Home 
Mortgages and Associated Economic and Market Developments, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-78R] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 16, 
2007). 

[4] While there is no uniformly accepted definition of predatory 
lending, a number of practices are widely acknowledged to be predatory. 
These include, among other things, charging excessive fees and interest 
rates, lending without regard to borrowers' ability to repay, 
refinancing borrowers' loans repeatedly over a short period of time 
without any economic gain for the borrower, and committing outright 
fraud or deception--for example, falsifying documents or intentionally 
misinforming borrowers about the terms of a loan. 

[5] On May 7, 2009, the House of Representatives passed the Mortgage 
Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2009 (H.R. 1728, 111th 
Congress), which has a similar purpose to H.R. 3915. 

[6] For ease of presentation, we use the term "assignee" to mean either 
an assignee or a securitizer. 

[7] LoanPerformance is a unit of First American CoreLogic, Inc. 

[8] GAO, Alternative Mortgage Products: Impact on Defaults Remains 
Unclear, but Disclosure of Risks to Borrowers Could Be Improved, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1021] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 19, 2006). 

[9] The GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are private, federally 
chartered companies created by Congress to, among other things, provide 
liquidity to home mortgage markets by purchasing mortgage loans, thus, 
enabling lenders to make additional loans. To be eligible for purchase 
by the GSEs, loans (and borrowers receiving the loans) must meet 
specified requirements. In September 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
were placed into federal government conservatorship. 

[10] TILA, as amended, is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 - 1666j. 

[11] HOEPA imposes substantive restrictions and special pre-closing 
disclosures on particularly high-cost refinancings and home equity 
loans secured by the borrower's principal dwelling. These restrictions 
and disclosures have been in effect since 1995. When Congress enacted 
HOEPA in 1994, it authorized the Federal Reserve to adopt new or 
expanded restrictions, as needed, to protect consumers from unfairness, 
deception, or evasion of HOEPA in connection with mortgage loans. The 
Federal Reserve is also authorized to prohibit acts or practices in 
connection with refinancings that are associated with abusive lending 
practices or are otherwise not in the interest of the borrower. In 
2008, the Federal Reserve used this authority to put in place special 
protections for certain higher-priced loans secured by the borrower's 
principal dwelling, including home purchase loans, as well as 
refinancing and home equity loans. 

[12] Second lien loans are also subject to TILA and HOEPA restrictions, 
but have higher rate triggers. 

[13] HOEPA requires the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System to adjust this dollar figure, initially set at $400, every year 
according to changes in the Consumer Price Index. For loans made in 
2009, the adjusted dollar figure is $583. 73 F.R. 46190 (Aug. 8, 2008). 

[14] Prepayment penalties are prohibited on high-cost HOEPA loans 
unless (a) the monthly payment will not change during the first 4 years 
of the loan; (b) the consumer's total monthly debts with the mortgage 
do not exceed 50 percent of the consumer's monthly gross income, as 
verified by the consumer's signed financial statement, a credit report, 
and payment records for employment income; (c) the penalty is limited 
to 2 years; and (d) the source of the prepayment funds is not a 
refinancing by the creditor or an affiliate of the creditor. Negative 
amortization occurs when loan payment amounts do not cover the interest 
accruing on a loan, resulting in an increasing outstanding principal 
balance over time. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(f). 

[15] In the context of this report, the term "federal banking 
regulators" refers to the Federal Reserve, the federal supervisory 
agency for state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal 
Reserve System; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which 
supervises national banks and their subsidiaries; Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the federal regulator responsible for insured 
state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve 
System; Office of Thrift Supervision, the primary federal supervisory 
agency for federally insured thrifts and their subsidiaries; and 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), which supervises federally 
insured credit unions. 

[16] See 24 C.F.R. § 3500.19(a), "It is the policy of the [HUD] 
Secretary regarding RESPA enforcement matters to cooperate with 
Federal, State, or local agencies having supervisory powers over 
lenders or other persons with responsibilities under RESPA. Federal 
agencies with supervisory powers over lenders may use their powers to 
require compliance with RESPA." 

[17] For more information on federal laws and statutes related to 
mortgage lending, see GAO, Consumer Protection: Federal and State 
Agencies Face Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending, GAO-04-280 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004). 

[18] 71 Fed. Reg. 58609 "Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional 
Mortgage Product Risks," (Oct. 4, 2006). 

[19] 72 Fed. Reg. 37569 "Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending," (Jul. 
10, 2007). Banking regulators have issued other guidance on subprime 
lending, including Interagency Guidance on Subprime Lending, Mar. 1, 
1999; and Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs, Jan. 31, 
2001. 

[20] Congressional Research Service, A Predatory Lending Primer: The 
Homeownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), RL34259 (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 2008). 

[21] A recent Supreme Court case (Cuomo v. The Clearing House 
Association) allows states to bring lawsuits against national banks to 
enforce state fair lending and consumer protection laws. 

[22] For more information about preemption, see [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-280]; GAO, OCC Preemption 
Rulemaking: Opportunities Existed to Enhance the Consultative Efforts 
and Better Document the Rulemaking Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-8] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 
2005); and GAO, OCC Preemption Rules: OCC Should Further Clarify the 
Applicability of State Consumer Protection Laws to National Banks, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-387] (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 28, 2006). 

[23] H.R. 3915 was one of several bills introduced during the 110th 
Congress to address concerns about rising foreclosures and abusive 
lending practices. See also S. 2452, 110th Congress (2007), Home 
Ownership Preservation and Protection Act of 2007. 

[24] The bill provided the federal banking agencies the authority to 
jointly prescribe regulations to revise, add to, or subtract from these 
safe harbor provisions to the extent necessary and appropriate to meet 
the purposes intended in the law, to prevent circumvention or evasion 
of the provisions, or to facilitate compliance with the provisions. 

[25] Credit insurance is a loan product that repays the lender should 
the borrower die or become disabled. In the case of single-premium 
credit insurance, the full premium is paid all at once--by being added 
to the amount financed in the loan--rather than on a monthly basis. 
Because adding the full premium to the amount of the loan unnecessarily 
raises the amount of interest borrowers pay, single-premium credit 
insurance is generally considered inherently abusive. 

[26] Under the terms of the bill, the liability of rescission faced by 
creditors would have been "[i]n addition to any other liability" under 
TILA for violating the minimum standards. H.R. 3915, § 204. Those 
additional liabilities include individual and class action damages. See 
12 U.S.C. §1640. 

[27] Committee Report, 110th Congress, 1st Session, Report 110-441. 

[28] We used the FHA guidelines because FHA primarily serves borrowers 
with credit characteristics somewhat similar to those of nonprime 
borrowers. 

[29] Because the APR is generally higher than the initial interest 
rate, our results may overestimate the number of loans that would meet 
this requirement. The bill did not specify particular interest rate 
indexes, so we used the Treasury 2-year constant maturity rate for 
short-term hybrid ARMs (e.g., 2/28 and 3/27 mortgages), the Treasury 5- 
year constant maturity rate for longer-term ARMs, and the Treasury 10- 
year constant maturity rate for fixed-rate mortgages. 

[30] One industry and one consumer group representative told us that 
nonprime lenders often underwrote loans to less than the fully indexed 
rate. We based our assumption on the policy of a major subprime lender, 
which underwrote its riskiest loans at one percentage point below the 
fully indexed rate. To the extent that lenders underwrote loans to more 
than one percentage point below that rate, our approach would tend to 
underestimate the proportion of loans meeting the fully indexed rate 
requirement. 

[31] While our analysis examined the documentation requirement in the 
context of the bill's safe harbor provisions, the bill's minimum 
lending standards include a similar requirement, as discussed in the 
Background section of this report. 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1021]. 

[33] While our analysis examined the fully indexed rate requirement in 
the context of the bill's safe harbor provisions, the bill's minimum 
lending standards include a similar requirement, as discussed in the 
Background section of this report. 

[34] GAO, Federal Housing Administration: Decline in the Agency's 
Market Share Was Associated with Product and Process Developments of 
Other Mortgage Market Participants, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-645] (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 
2007) and Mayer and Pence, "Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and to 
Whom?", Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-29, Federal 
Reserve Board (2008). 

[35] We did not examine the reasons for differences among the various 
groupings as part of our analysis. 

[36] We used the Census 2000 data for our analysis. 

[37] Individuals who classify themselves as Hispanic or Latino include 
people of different racial backgrounds. 

[38] We defined low-, moderate-, and upper-income census tracts as 
those with median incomes that were less than 80 percent, at least 80 
percent but less than 120 percent, and 120 percent and above, 
respectively, of the median income for the associated metropolitan 
statistical area. 

[39] As previously discussed, data limitations prevented us from 
developing variables that precisely replicated all of the safe harbor 
requirements. Had we been able to do so, the results of our statistical 
analysis might have been different. Additionally, certain variables 
associated with the risk of default (e.g., borrower income) were not 
contained in the data set we used and, therefore, are not reflected in 
our model. 

[40] As an alternative specification for short-term hybrid ARMs, we 
included a variable indicating whether each mortgage was a safe harbor 
or a non-safe harbor loan, in contrast to including variables for 
separate safe harbor requirements. We found that this variable had a 
small marginal effect, most likely because many non-safe harbor loans 
met some of the safe harbor requirements. In particular, a substantial 
percentage of non-safe harbor loans had full documentation of borrower 
income and assets but failed to meet other safe harbor requirements. 

[41] For short-term hybrid ARMs, longer-term ARMs, and fixed-rate 
mortgages, we present estimation results for purchase loans in the body 
of the report, and results for both purchase and refinance loans in 
appendix II. In the body of the report and appendix II, the estimation 
results we present for payment-option ARMs are for purchase and 
refinance loans combined, and reflect mortgages originated from 2003 
through 2006. We took this approach for payment-option ARMs because the 
proportion of purchase loans was relatively small and very few of these 
loans were made prior to 2003. 

[42] Pennington-Cross and Ho, "The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and 
Fixed Rate Mortgages," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 
Series (2006), Sherlund, "The Past, Present, and Future of Subprime 
Mortgages," Finance and Economic Discussion Series 2008-63, Federal 
Reserve Board (2008), Demyanyk, "Quick Exits of Subprime Mortgages," 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 91(2): (2009). 

[43] Demyanyk, "Quick Exits of Subprime Mortgages." 

[44] For a further discussion of this hypothesis, see Foote and others, 
Reducing Foreclosures, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy 
Discussion Paper 09-2, (Apr. 2009). 

[45] We did not estimate the effect of the safe harbor variable 
representing whether a loan was fixed for at least 5 years because this 
feature is only associated with certain mortgage products. We only 
estimated the effect of the safe harbor variable representing whether a 
loan had a negative amortization feature for longer-term ARMs. We did 
not include it in the models for the other mortgage types because the 
negative amortization feature was, essentially, never present (in the 
case of fixed-rate mortgages and short-term hybrid ARMs) or was, 
essentially, always present (in the case of payment-option ARMs). The 
lack of variation within these mortgage types made estimating the 
marginal effects of the negative amortization variable problematic. 

[46] Danis and Pennington-Cross, "The Delinquency of Subprime 
Mortgages," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 05-022A 
(2005), and Sherlund, "The Past, Present, and Future of Subprime 
Mortgages." 

[47] We used the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) house index 
(HPI), which is a broad measure of the movement of single-family house 
prices. The HPI is a measure designed to capture changes in the value 
of single-family homes in the U.S. as a whole, in various regions of 
the country, and in the individual states and the District of Columbia. 
The HPI is published by FHFA using data provided by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO), one of FHFA's predecessor agencies, began publishing the HPI 
in the fourth quarter of 1995. 

[48] We identified a number of studies examining the impact of state 
and local anti-predatory lending laws on subprime mortgage lending. We 
narrowed our scope to eight studies that used control groups (e.g., 
comparison states without anti-predatory lending laws) or statistical 
techniques that controlled for factors other than the laws that could 
affect lending patterns. 

[49] Elliehausen and Staten, "Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: 
An Analysis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law," Journal of Real 
Estate Finance and Economics 29: (2004). The study used data covering 
the period from January 1997 through March 2000. 

[50] Quercia, Stegman, and Davis, "Assessing the Impact of North 
Carolina's Predatory Lending Law," Housing Policy Debate 15: (2004). 
The study compared the volume of subprime originations in the seven 
quarters prior to the initial implementation of the law to the seven 
quarters after the law's full implementation. 

[51] Burnett, Finkel, and Kaul, "Mortgage Lending in North Carolina 
After the Anti-Predatory Lending Law," A Report from Abt Associates to 
the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, (Cambridge, MA: 2004). The 
study used data covering 1997 through 1998 and 2000 through 2002. 

[52] Ho and Pennington-Cross, "The Varying Effects of Predatory Lending 
Laws on High-Cost Mortgage Applications," Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Review 89: (2007). The study used data covering 1999 through 
2004. 

[53] Ho and Pennington-Cross, "The impact of local predatory lending 
laws on the flow of subprime credit," Journal of Urban Economics 60: 
(2006). 

[54] Bostic and others, "State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: 
The Effect of Legal Enforcement Mechanisms," Journal of Economics and 
Business 60: (2007). The study examined 44 states with either anti- 
predatory lending laws or other laws or regulations regulating 
prepayment penalties, balloon clauses, or mandatory arbitration clauses 
in residential mortgages as of January 1, 2007. 

[55] Li and Ernst, "Do State Predatory Lending Laws Work? A Panel 
Analysis of Market Reforms," Housing Policy Debate 18: (2007). 

[56] Pennington-Cross and Ho, "Predatory Lending Laws and the Cost of 
Credit," Real Estate Economics, 36: (2008). 

[57] The Federal Reserve Board made revisions in 2008 to Regulation Z, 
which implement the Truth in Lending Act and HOEPA. 

[58] The bill's safe harbor requires lenders to qualify borrowers at 
the fully indexed rate, which is defined as the index rate at the time 
of origination plus the lender's margin. Regulation Z requires lenders 
to qualify borrowers at the highest possible payment in the first 7 
years of the loan for both higher-priced and high-cost HOEPA loans. In 
addition, both the Act and Regulation Z limit, or in certain cases 
prohibit, prepayment penalties. 

[59] A more recent bill with similar purposes, the Mortgage Reform and 
Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2009 (H.R. 1728) bans yield spread 
premiums for all mortgages. A "yield spread premium" is a payment a 
mortgage broker receives from a lender based on the difference between 
the actual interest rate on the loan and the rate the lender would have 
accepted on the loan given the risks and costs involved. 

[60] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-280]. 

[61] Nonagency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), also known as private- 
label MBS, are backed by nonconforming mortgages securitized primarily 
by investment banks. 

[62] We used this approach because the field in the LP database 
indicating whether a mortgage was subprime or Alt-A was not well- 
populated. According to mortgage researchers, some of the loans in 
subprime pools may not be subprime loans, and some of the loans in Alt- 
A pools may not be Alt-A loans. 

[63] We used the Census 2000 data for our analysis. We were able to 
link race and ethnicity information for about 98 percent of the loans 
and income information for about 89 percent of the loans. 

[64] As discussed earlier, this variable is one of three requirements 
in the bill's interest rate and debt burden requirements. Under the 
bill, safe harbor mortgages would only have to meet one of the three 
requirements. As a result, the "spread" requirement would not apply to 
fixed-rate mortgages and longer-term ARMs because they would meet the 
requirement that a loan have a fixed interest rate for at least 5 
years. The spread requirement would also not apply to payment-option 
ARMs because they typically fail to meet the safe harbor requirement 
that loans not contain a negative amortization feature. 

[65] For our analysis of payment-option ARMs, we combined purchase and 
refinance loans and limited our analysis to mortgages originated from 
2003 through 2006 because the proportion of purchase loans was 
relatively small and very few payment-option ARMs were made prior to 
2003. 

[66] This alternative specification was not well suited for other 
mortgage types. For payment-option ARMs, almost no loans were safe 
harbor loans because of the prevalence of the negative amortization 
feature. For fixed-rate mortgages, a safe harbor loan was identical to 
a loan that met the full documentation requirement because the fully 
indexed rate condition did not apply and these loans were fixed for an 
initial term of at least 5 years. Similarly, for longer-term ARMs, 
initial terms were fixed for at least 5 years, and, as a practical 
matter, about two-thirds of these loans met our fully indexed rate 
proxy, thus, making a single safe harbor test similar to a full 
documentation test. 

[End of section] 

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