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entitled 'Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Improve Oversight of 
Relocatable Facilities and Develop a Strategy for Managing Their Use 
across the Military Services' which was released on June 12, 2009. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

June 2009: 

Defense Infrastructure: 

DOD Needs to Improve Oversight of Relocatable Facilities and Develop a 
Strategy for Managing Their Use across the Military Services: 

GAO-09-585: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-585, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The concurrent implementation of several major Department of Defense 
(DOD) force structure and infrastructure initiatives has stressed the 
ability of traditional military construction to provide enough 
permanent living and working space for servicemembers and other DOD 
personnel. As a result, the services are using some movable—or 
relocatable—facilities as barracks, administrative offices, medical 
facilities, dining halls, and equipment maintenance facilities to meet 
short-term needs. 

In Senate Report 110-77, the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
directed GAO to review the subject. This report assesses the extent to 
which (1) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is providing 
oversight of the services’ use of relocatable facilities to meet 
physical infrastructure needs, and (2) DOD has a strategy for managing 
such facilities. GAO assessed data reported to OSD on relocatable use 
and cost as well as visited seven defense installations selected from 
those identified as having a sizable number of relocatable facilities. 

What GAO Found: 

Although DOD considers the use of relocatable facilities a temporary 
measure to meet short-term physical infrastructure needs, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is not providing effective oversight of 
the number or cost of its relocatable facilities. OSD officials told 
GAO in March 2008 that they did not have information about how many 
relocatable facilities were being used, how many defense installations 
had them, or how much it has cost to acquire them. Subsequently, the 
military services reported to OSD that they have acquired over 4,000 
relocatable facilities at an estimated cost of about $1.5 billion over 
a 5-year period. However, GAO’s assessment of these data showed that 
the data were inaccurate and incomplete. At six of the seven 
installations visited, GAO found discrepancies between the number of 
relocatable facilities located on those installations and the numbers 
that the services had reported to OSD. For instance, at Camp Lejeune, 
North Carolina, installation officials told GAO the installation had 
about 170 relocatable facilities, which is about 80 more than the 
Marine Corps headquarters reported to OSD. Such discrepancies occurred 
in part because OSD has not provided the services with a clear 
definition of relocatable facilities. In addition, OSD lacks a 
mechanism for collecting and maintaining reliable data on these 
facilities. A clear, ongoing requirement for OSD to collect and 
maintain consistent data on relocatable facilities would better enable 
it to manage the use of these facilities to provide working and living 
space for military personnel. 

OSD has not developed a comprehensive strategy for managing relocatable 
facilities departmentwide. Although the military services plan to 
replace many of their relocatable facilities with permanent 
construction, some officials GAO spoke with expressed skepticism that 
the planned replacement funds will become available. In addition, GAO 
found that these facilities at many installations have been in use 
longer than the 3 years DOD’s guidance states it normally expects. 
Furthermore, some Army officials told GAO that due to several force 
structure and infrastructure initiatives, it expects that the influx of 
more military personnel at some installations could exacerbate the 
shortage of facilities, which could mean more relocatable facilities 
might be needed. Meanwhile, some DOD installations may be planning to 
acquire new relocatable facilities at market cost at the same time that 
other installations are disposing of them. Although the Army is moving 
in the direction of centralizing its management of relocatable 
facilities, none of the other military service headquarters told GAO 
they have initiated similar efforts. Because OSD does not have a 
comprehensive DOD-wide strategy for managing the use of relocatable 
facilities—including the transfer of relocatables from one location to 
another—the services could unnecessarily spend DOD funds by 
simultaneously acquiring new facilities at some locations while 
auctioning off or incurring costs to store or demolish similar 
facilities at other locations. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is making recommendations to improve OSD’s oversight and management 
of the services’ use of relocatable facilities by clarifying its 
definition of these facilities, developing a mechanism for collecting 
data on them, and developing a strategy for using, disposing of, and 
redistributing them. DOD generally agreed with GAO’s recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-585] or key 
components. For more information, contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-
4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

OSD Does Not Have Complete Oversight of the Services' Use of 
Relocatable Facilities to Meet Infrastructure Needs: 

OSD Does Not Have a Strategy for Managing the Use and Disposal of 
Relocatable Facilities: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Examples of Various Relocatable Facilities in Use at Seven 
Military Installations GAO Visited: 

Figure 2: Pictures of Sprung Shelter Relocatable Facilities at Two 
Military Installations: 

Figure 3: Pictures of Relocatable Facilities Arriving and Being 
Installed at a Defense Installation: 

Figure 4: A Relocatable Facility Consisting of 33 Trailers at Eglin Air 
Force Base, Florida: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548: 

June 12, 2009: 

Congressional Committees: 

The Department of Defense's (DOD) concurrent implementation of several 
major force structure and infrastructure initiatives has stressed the 
traditional military construction processes to provide needed living 
and working space for servicemembers and other DOD personnel. These 
initiatives--such as the continued transformation of the Army's force 
structure from an organization based on divisions to more rapidly 
deployable, combat brigade-based units; the implementation of about 800 
Base Realignment and Closure actions by 2011; the planned increase in 
the active-duty end strength of the Army and the Marine Corps by a 
combined 92,000 military members; and the planned drawdown of troops 
from Iraq--will place new and changing demands on DOD's capability to 
provide sufficient living and working space at many installations by 
the time these initiatives and actions are expected to be completed. 
The military services, in response to current shortages in physical 
infrastructure, are using a large number of movable--or relocatable-- 
facilities as barracks, administrative offices, medical facilities, 
dining halls, and equipment maintenance facilities. Such relocatable 
facilities can consist of a single trailer, or a set of trailers 
assembled together to form a larger, modular-type structure. 

In Senate Report 110-77, the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed 
concern about DOD's use and cost of temporary facilities and the 
possibility that such facilities would eventually be considered an 
acceptable working or living standard.[Footnote 1] The committee 
directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics to report in July 2008 to the congressional defense 
committees on the use of such facilities within DOD. The committee also 
directed us to analyze and report on the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense's (OSD) report within 90 days of the OSD report issuance. 
However, as of May 2009, OSD had not issued its report to the 
congressional defense committees; therefore we have not evaluated OSD's 
report. The committee also stipulated that we may conduct independent 
research and make independent findings and recommendations. 
Accordingly, this report discusses DOD's use of relocatable facilities 
to meet its physical infrastructure needs. Specifically, we assessed 
the extent to which (1) OSD is providing oversight of the military 
services' use of relocatable facilities to meet physical infrastructure 
needs, and (2) DOD has a strategy for managing such facilities. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed DOD and military service 
guidance on the use of relocatable facilities; obtained and reviewed 
inventory and cost data on relocatable facilities from each of the 
military services, which they reported to OSD for use in its pending 
report; and interviewed OSD and service headquarters officials 
responsible for overseeing the use of relocatable facilities. To gain 
insight into the numbers, costs, and disposal plans for relocatable 
facilities at the installation level, we visited seven installations, 
mostly focusing on the Army and the Marine Corps installations because 
the data they reported to OSD showed more extensive use of relocatable 
facilities than the Navy and the Air Force reported. We selected these 
installations to visit from those identified by service headquarters 
officials as having a sizable number of relocatable facilities. The 
Senate committee report limited DOD's review by excluding nonpermanent 
or temporary facilities used overseas at forward operating sites or 
cooperative security locations, thus we did not include the services' 
use of relocatable facilities at overseas locations. Our analysis of 
the seven installation visits cannot be generalized to other military 
installations. At each installation we visited, we compared 
installation data on the number and cost of relocatable facilities with 
similar data provided by each service headquarters to OSD and discussed 
any discrepancies identified. We also visited the Army Installation 
Management Command-West, Texas, to discuss the Army's use of 
relocatable facilities. We conducted this performance audit from 
February 2008 to June 2009, in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A 
more detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in 
appendix I of this report. 

Results in Brief: 

Although DOD considers the use of relocatable facilities a temporary 
measure to meet short-term physical infrastructure needs, OSD has not 
provided effective oversight of the number or cost of its inventory of 
relocatable facilities across the military services. In March 2008, OSD 
officials told us that they did not have information about how many 
relocatable facilities were being used, how many defense installations 
had them, or how much it has cost to acquire them. Subsequently, OSD 
began to collect that information from the military services in 
response to direction from the Senate Armed Services Committee. The 
services responded with data indicating that DOD has procured or leased 
over 4,000 relocatable facilities over a 5-year period.[Footnote 2] 
However, our assessment of these data showed some inaccuracies and 
indications that the data are incomplete. At six of the seven 
installations we visited, we found discrepancies between the number of 
relocatable facilities located on those installations and the numbers 
that the military services had reported to OSD. For instance, during 
our visit to Fort Bliss, Texas, installation officials showed us over 
100 relocatable facilities that had not been included in the Army 
headquarters data provided to OSD. Similarly, during our visit to Camp 
Lejeune, North Carolina, installation officials told us that the 
installation had about 170 relocatable facilities, which is about 80 
more than Marine Corps headquarters reported to OSD. Such discrepancies 
occur in part because OSD has not provided the services with a clear 
definition of relocatable facilities. Officials we spoke with at Navy 
headquarters, for example, expressed confusion about whether structures 
like equipment sheds and rain shelters should be counted as relocatable 
facilities. In addition, OSD lacks a mechanism for collecting and 
maintaining reliable data on the number and costs of these facilities 
on an ongoing basis. Although the services reported to OSD data 
indicating that DOD has spent about $1.5 billion over 5 years to 
acquire relocatable facilities, some service officials told us that 
collecting accurate cost data was difficult given that cost records 
were not always available. For example, at the Marine Corps and Air 
Force installations we visited, officials told us that their cost data 
were incomplete. A clear, ongoing requirement for the services to 
collect and maintain consistent data on the number and cost of 
relocatable facilities would better enable OSD to manage the military 
services' use of relocatable facilities to provide working and living 
space for military personnel. Thus, we are recommending that OSD 
clarify the definition of a relocatable facility and develop a 
mechanism for collecting and maintaining consistent and reliable data 
on the number and costs of such facilities across the military 
services. 

OSD has not developed a comprehensive strategy for ensuring sound 
management of relocatable facilities departmentwide. DOD Instruction 
4165.56 states that relocatable facilities may be used when these 
facilities constitute the most feasible and economical means of 
satisfying an interim facility requirement, which is defined in this 
instruction as a short-term, normally 3 years or less, requirement to 
meet urgent or peak facilities requirements. Although the military 
services plan to replace many of their relocatable facilities with 
permanent construction and some funds have been programmed to do so in 
fiscal years 2010 to 2013, some officials we spoke with across DOD 
expressed skepticism that the planned replacement funds will become 
available. For example, Navy officials at Little Creek Naval Amphibious 
Base, Virginia, told us that funds are planned for 2012 to begin 
permanent construction to replace some of the installation's current 
stock of relocatable facilities; however, the officials expect its 
relocatable facilities to be in use well beyond 2014, since these 
facilities are being used for administrative buildings, which officials 
told us historically do not compete well for military construction 
appropriations. In addition, we found that these facilities at many 
installations have already been in use for longer than 3 years. The 
Army recently issued guidance indicating that it normally expects its 
relocatable facilities to be used for no more than 6 years, and 
officials at Fort Bliss, Texas, told us that about 550 of its nearly 
600 relocatables, which are already more than 3 years old, will be used 
until at least 2014 for new incoming missions due to shortages of 
permanent facilities. Furthermore, some Army officials told us that, if 
the proposed drawdown of troops from Iraq occurs as planned--on top of 
DOD's implementation of other force structure initiatives--the influx 
of more military personnel could exacerbate the shortage of facilities 
already stressing some installations, which consequently could mean 
more relocatable facilities might be needed. Additionally, OSD does not 
have a strategy to manage the disposal or relocation of those 
facilities once they are no longer needed in their current location. 
For instance, Army officials at Fort Drum, New York, which has about 
140 relocatable facilities, told us that once their installation no 
longer needs those facilities, they plan to disassemble and store the 
buildings on base, whereas Army officials at Fort Bliss, Texas, which 
has about 600 relocatables, told us that they plan to auction off as 
many of their relocatable buildings as possible when they are no longer 
needed. Meanwhile, some other DOD installations may be planning to 
acquire new relocatable facilities at market cost at the same time that 
installations are disposing of them. Although the Army is moving in the 
direction of centralizing its management of these facilities, none of 
the other service headquarters told us they have initiated similar 
efforts. Without a comprehensive DOD-wide strategy for effectively 
managing the use of relocatable facilities--including the transfer of 
relocatables from one location to another across the services--the 
services could unnecessarily spend DOD funds by simultaneously 
acquiring new facilities at some locations while auctioning off or 
incurring costs to store or demolish similar facilities at other 
locations. We are recommending that OSD develop a strategic DOD-wide 
view for managing the use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable 
facilities across all the services. 

In written comments to a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with 
two of our three recommendations and agreed to take action. While DOD's 
written comments indicated partial agreement with another 
recommendation, based on its response and our subsequent follow-up 
discussion with an OSD official, we believe DOD's planned action meets 
the intent of our recommendation. DOD's comments are reprinted in 
appendix II of this report. Also, DOD provided one technical comment on 
a draft of this report, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

Background: 

According to DOD, a relocatable facility is a building designed to be 
readily moved, erected, disassembled, stored, and reused.[Footnote 3] 
In classifying buildings as relocatable, the estimated costs for 
average building disassembly, repackaging, and nonrecoverable building 
components, including typical foundations, may not exceed 20 percent of 
the building acquisition cost. DOD has stated that these facilities may 
be used when they constitute the most feasible and economical means of 
satisfying an interim facility requirement, which they have defined as 
a short-term, normally 3 years or less, requirement due to transitory 
peak military missions, deployments, military contingency operations, 
disaster relief; or urgent requirements, pending approval and 
construction of facilities through normal military construction 
programs.[Footnote 4] Such facilities can consist of a single trailer, 
or a set of trailers assembled together to form a larger, modular-type 
structure. The military services acquire relocatable facilities by 
either buying or leasing them, depending on the results of an economic 
analysis to determine the most economical approach. 

In response to OSD's request for data on the military services' use of 
relocatable facilities over the past 5 years,[Footnote 5] the services 
reported that they have bought or leased over 4,000 relocatable 
facilities and have spent about $1.5 billion to acquire them. According 
to these data, the Army and the Marine Corps have relied on relocatable 
facilities the most, reporting to OSD that they have about 2,800 and 
800 of these facilities respectively. The Navy and the Air Force 
reported to OSD that they have about 400 and 200 relocatables 
respectively. Typically, the military services are using relocatable 
facilities as barracks, administrative offices, medical facilities, 
dining halls, and equipment maintenance facilities. Some relocatable 
facilities we saw during our installation visits are shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: Examples of Various Relocatable Facilities in Use at Seven 
Military Installations GAO Visited: 

[Refer to PDF for image: seven photographs] 

* Barracks at Fort Bliss, Texas. 

Source: DOD. 

* Barracks for about 600 soldiers at Fort Drum, New York. 

Source: GAO. 

* Barracks at Fort Hood, Texas. 

Source: GAO. 

* Training management space at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. 

Source: GAO. 

* Counseling center at Camp Pendleton, California. 

Source: GAO. 

* Administrative space for about 60 people at Naval Amphibious Base 
Little Creek, Virginia. 

Source: GAO. 

* Administrative space at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Oversight and Guidance: 

The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations 
and Environment issues guidance on relocatable facilities. DOD last 
issued guidance on relocatable buildings in 1988. According to that 
guidance, unlike other nonpermanent buildings, relocatable facilities 
are to be accounted for as personal property rather than real property, 
unless these facilities are authorized for procurement using 
construction procedures, in which case the buildings should be 
accounted for as real property.[Footnote 6] Additionally, the guidance 
states that in classifying a building as relocatable, it must meet a 
requirement known as the "20 percent rule." This rule generally means 
the estimated costs for disassembling the building and repackaging it 
for storage or reuse, among other cost considerations, may not exceed 
20 percent of the cost to acquire the facility. Generally, relocatable 
facilities are acquired as personal property using procurement or 
operation and maintenance appropriations. If other buildings do not 
meet the 20 percent rule, they are acquired as real property with 
military construction or with operation and maintenance appropriations. 

In addition to DOD's guidance, each of the military services have also 
developed specific guidance to govern the management, acquisition, and 
disposition of relocatable facilities. For example, to provide more 
specific guidance on funding relocatables, the Army has issued its own 
amplifying guidance. This guidance follows DOD Instruction 4165.56 that 
states that relocatable buildings procured and accounted for in a 
particular manner are considered personal property. The Army used the 
funding limits for procurement of equipment when it outlined the funds 
to be used for relocatable facility acquisition in both an Army 
regulation and interim policy for relocatable buildings.[Footnote 7] If 
the cost to buy or lease relocatables is under $250,000, the Army is to 
use funds from its Operation and Maintenance appropriations, however if 
the cost is $250,000 or more, it is to use funds from its Other 
Procurement, Army, appropriation. In contrast, if the Army is acquiring 
other buildings, meaning real property, it generally uses funds from 
its Military Construction appropriations for projects over $750,000. 
[Footnote 8] 

Committee Interest on Relocatable Facilities: 

In addition to the committee interest that led to our review,[Footnote 
9] other congressional committees have previously expressed interest in 
DOD's use of relocatable facilities, specifically within the Department 
of the Army. For example: 

* In 2005, the Senate Armed Services Committee[Footnote 10] expressed 
concern that the Army had not included funds to sustain or replace 
trailers with permanent facilities, among other issues. 

* Also in 2005, the House Armed Services Committee[Footnote 11] noted 
that it was troubled by the Army's reliance on temporary facilities to 
support its modularity initiative and the Army's failure to budget for 
permanent construction to replace temporary facilities. The House Armed 
Services Committee further directed the Army to report on several 
issues related to the use and replacement of temporary facilities, and 
the Army provided its report in March 2006.[Footnote 12] 

More recently, the House Armed Services Committee directed OSD to 
submit to the defense committees by March 1, 2009, the department's 
plan to replace relocatable buildings with permanent facilities by 
fiscal year 2015.[Footnote 13] OSD officials told us they planned on 
providing these committees with this report as well as the report 
directed by the Senate Armed Services Committee that was due in July 
2008, although they had not yet done so as of May 2009. To develop 
these reports, OSD requested that the military services provide data, 
and the services generally did the following in response to OSD's data 
request: 

* Army headquarters officials stated that the Army updated its 
information on relocatable facilities in March 2008 by requesting data 
from its installations. Officials noted that these data were compared 
to data in the Army's real property database to supplement its 
completeness. The Army provided its data to OSD in the summer of 2008. 

* Navy headquarters officials stated that the Navy used its database on 
facilities to obtain information on the number of relocatable 
facilities it is using. The Navy then provided these data to each of 
its 13 regions to review and supplement with data not contained in the 
database. The Navy provided its data to OSD during the summer of 2008. 

* Marine Corps headquarters requested data from its major commands, 
citing that it was the responsibility of its commands to obtain data on 
relocatable facility use. The Marine Corps provided its data to OSD in 
the fall of 2008. 

* Air Force headquarters requested the civil engineer for each of its 
major commands, who in turn tasked the civil engineer for each Air 
Force installation, to provide data on relocatable facility use. The 
Air Force provided its data to OSD in the summer of 2008. 

OSD Does Not Have Complete Oversight of the Services' Use of 
Relocatable Facilities to Meet Infrastructure Needs: 

Although military services are relying on relocatable facilities to 
meet shortages in their physical infrastructure needs, OSD lacks 
oversight over how many of these facilities are being used on defense 
installations and how much DOD has spent on such facilities. Neither 
OSD nor the services have a complete or accurate accounting of the 
number or cost of relocatable facilities because OSD has not issued 
clear guidance on how the military services should define relocatable 
facilities, and it lacks a mechanism for collecting and maintaining 
consistent use and cost data across the services. 

OSD Does Not Fully Know How Many Relocatable Facilities the Services 
Are Using to Meet Physical Infrastructure Needs: 

OSD does not have accurate and complete data on the number of 
relocatable facilities that the services are using to meet current 
shortages in their physical infrastructure needs. Although the military 
services recently reported to OSD that they have bought or leased over 
4,000 relocatable facilities over a 5-year period, our assessment of 
the data uncovered many discrepancies. At six of the seven 
installations we visited, including locations representing each of the 
military services, we found discrepancies between the number of 
relocatable facilities located on those installations and the number 
that the service headquarters had reported to OSD. For instance: 

* At Fort Bliss, Texas, officials showed us over 100 relocatable 
facilities located on the installation that were not included in Army's 
data provided to OSD on relocatable facilities. Army headquarters did 
not know about these facilities until shortly prior to our visit. 

* At Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, officials told us that the 
installation had about 170 relocatable facilities, which was about 80 
more than Marine Corps headquarters had reported to OSD. Marine Corps 
headquarters officials told us they had no way to reconcile the 
discrepancies and suggested we ask the Marine Corps Forces Command, 
which was tasked to collect inventory data on relocatable facilities 
for its installations. Those officials stated that there is a lot of 
subjectivity in the definitions of relocatable facilities, which is 
contributing to data discrepancies. 

* At Camp Pendleton, California, officials told us they only had 2 
relocatable facilities; however, Marine Corps headquarters reported to 
OSD that the installation had a total of 330 relocatables and other 
nonpermanent facilities. Marine Corps headquarters officials told us 
there is confusion as to how many relocatable facilities are actually 
at Camp Pendleton. Based on our audit work, we believe there are 
several factors contributing to the data discrepancies. First, Marine 
Corps headquarters included both relocatable facilities as well as 
other nonpermanent facilities in their numbers in response to OSD's 
data request. Second, Marine Corps headquarters also included future 
requirements for these facilities at Camp Pendleton even before 
obtaining the relocatable facilities. Third, Camp Pendleton officials 
told us they changed the property classification on their relocatable 
facilities from personal property to real property based on 
communications from Marine Corps headquarters officials. Camp Pendleton 
officials told us they properly classified these facilities although 
Marine Corps headquarters officials told us the reclassification was 
not correct. As of April 2009, Camp Pendleton officials told us their 
data had not changed. 

* At Fort Hood, Texas, we found over 25 facilities that appeared to us 
to be relocatable facilities but were not accounted for as such. After 
our review of the installation's facility records, Fort Hood officials 
agreed that the facilities we had questioned should have been included 
in its count of relocatable facilities. 

* We found other instances of data discrepancies at two other 
installations we visited. Although these discrepancies were minor, they 
nonetheless still represent an inaccurate count. At Naval Amphibious 
Base Little Creek, Virginia, officials told us that they had three 
fewer relocatable facilities than the data reported to OSD showed. 
Also, at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, service officials told us they 
had two fewer relocatable facilities than the data reported to OSD 
showed, citing that one facility was counted twice and one facility was 
no longer at the installation. 

Similar data discrepancies in the number of relocatable facilities on 
some Army installations were also reported on by the Army Audit Agency. 
[Footnote 14] At the request of the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Financial Management and Comptroller), the Army Audit Agency recently 
conducted a review on the Army's management of its relocatable 
facilities and reported on its use at five Army installations--Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Drum, New York; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; 
Fort Riley, Kansas; and Fort Stewart, Georgia. The Army Audit Agency 
reported that it found discrepancies in the inventory of relocatable 
facilities at all five installations it reviewed. For example, the Army 
Audit Agency reported that Fort Bragg actually had about 20 more 
relocatable facilities than what was recorded in Army's database. As a 
result, the Army Audit Agency reported that Fort Bragg had lost 
visibility and accountability for relocatable facilities that could 
result in incorrect decisions on the management of these facilities. 

In addition, both the Army and the Marine Corps--two of the military 
services that rely on relocatable facilities the most, according to 
data these services provided to OSD--told us there might be 
relocatables located at their installations that they do not know 
about. For example, Army officials told us they do not know if Army 
National Guard installations and readiness centers have relocatable 
facilities given that the Army National Guard manages its own facility 
needs and Army headquarters does not have readily available data on 
such use. In addition, Army officials said that some tenants on an 
installation might be using relocatable facilities that have not been 
accounted for at the host installation. These officials told us that 
tenants, like DOD's Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary School 
system, could be using relocatable facilities on an installation that 
the installation might not be aware of, which also presents challenges 
in maintaining a complete and accurate inventory of these facilities. 
Also, Army officials told us that they do not know the extent to which 
relocatable facilities might be on Army training ranges given the 
millions of acres of land in the ranges and that an accurate count 
would be difficult to verify. Moreover, Marine Corps headquarters 
officials told us they were not sure if their inventory count of 
relocatable facilities was complete since they do not routinely 
maintain data on relocatables at the headquarters level. 

Furthermore, Navy headquarters told us its data provided to OSD did not 
include all of its relocatable facilities located at its installations. 
For example, Navy officials told us they did not collect and report 
data on relocatable facilities from four of its major commands--Naval 
Air Systems Command; Naval Sea Systems Command; Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command; and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery--although the 
Navy estimated that these four commands had about 200 relocatable 
facilities. Navy officials told us they did not collect and report data 
on relocatables for these four Navy commands because OSD was 
independently seeking the data. However, OSD officials told us they did 
not request data specifically from these Navy commands and that its 
expectation was that each service would collect its own data covering 
the entire service. Also, Navy officials told us they could not verify 
their data collection on relocatables by major command because all of 
the collected data was accidentally lost when a computer failed and 
that the Navy does not routinely maintain data on relocatables at the 
headquarters level. Air Force officials, on the other hand, told us it 
does routinely collect data on relocatable facilities at the 
headquarters level for inclusion in its annual report;[Footnote 15] 
however, the Air Force last reported on the use of relocatable 
facilities in fiscal year 2006 and has not issued its annual reports on 
its usage in fiscal years 2007 or 2008. 

Also, some service officials expressed confusion about whether other 
types of facilities should be included in their count of relocatables. 
For example, some officials asked us if certain types of structures, 
such as equipment sheds and rain shelters, should be counted as 
relocatable facilities. We also found that the Air Force does not count 
a certain type of facility called Sprung shelters--which are generally 
a rigid frame structure covered by heavy tension fabric--as relocatable 
facilities if it buys them, but will count them if it leases them. On 
the other hand, the other three military services count these 
facilities as relocatables depending on the proper application of the 
relocatable definition.[Footnote 16] DOD's instruction on relocatable 
buildings does not address these structures.[Footnote 17] Two examples 
of Sprung shelters are shown in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Pictures of Sprung Shelter Relocatable Facilities at Two 
Military Installations: 

[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs] 

Sprung shelter relocatable facilities used as administrative and 
training management space at Fort Hood, Texas, and a dining facility at 
Fort Bliss, Texas. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

OSD does not have adequate oversight over the military services' use of 
relocatable facilities to meet its physical infrastructure shortages 
based on our observations on the difficulty some of the services had to 
collect data on these facilities and our assessment that these data are 
inaccurate and incomplete. DOD's Instruction 4165.56 on relocatable 
facilities prescribes policies and procedures for the acquisition and 
use of these facilities; however, officials with the Navy and the 
Marine Corps headquarters and several officials at installations we 
visited told us OSD's guidance on defining relocatable facilities was 
confusing to distinguish relocatables from other types of nonpermanent 
facilities because the definition of these types of facilities was not 
clear. This distinction is important because DOD generally considers 
relocatable facilities to be personal property--like vehicles and other 
equipment--which is acquired using either procurement or operation and 
maintenance appropriations--whereas other types of buildings, including 
temporary buildings, are considered real property, which are funded 
mostly through military construction appropriations and, in some cases, 
operation and maintenance appropriations. Furthermore, without a clear 
definition of relocatable facilities, DOD will not be able to reliably 
determine the extent to which the services are relying on these 
facilities to meet shortages in needed facilities. 

OSD Does Not Fully Know How Much the Services Have Spent to Acquire 
Relocatable Facilities: 

Although some of the services' headquarters have begun to capture the 
cost of acquiring relocatable facilities, based on our analysis we 
believe these data are not reliable and the total cost of relocatable 
facilities acquired by the military services is uncertain. According to 
cost data we obtained from the services, DOD estimates it has spent 
about $1.5 billion over a 5-year period[Footnote 18] to acquire 
relocatable facilities, yet service officials told us that because the 
number of relocatable facilities was uncertain, then the associated 
cost to acquire these facilities was also uncertain. Also, some service 
officials told us that collecting acquisition cost data was difficult 
given that reliable records on these costs were not always available 
and that maintaining information on these costs had not been a 
priority. For example, Navy and Marine Corps headquarters told us that 
they did not maintain any cost information on relocatable facilities, 
although they told us cost information on relocatables should be 
readily available at the installation. However, during our visit to 
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, 
Virginia, officials at both installations told us that their cost data 
to acquire relocatable facilities were incomplete. Marine Corps 
officials at Camp Lejeune told us that they did not retain cost 
information on their relocatable facilities prior to March, 2007, thus 
they could not provide acquisition cost data covering the last 5 years 
as requested by OSD. Likewise, Navy officials at Little Creek Naval 
Amphibious Base told us that their cost data on relocatable facilities 
were their best estimates given that they did not maintain the 
contracts for all of their leased relocatable facilities. 

Army officials stated that although the service updated its cost data 
for their relocatable facilities in March 2008, the data are not 
complete for all installations. According to these officials, the cost 
information reported represents the best available data. 

The Air Force, in response to direction from the Secretary of the Air 
Force, is to produce an annual report that captures the costs of 
acquiring relocatable facilities; however, the most recently completed 
annual report was for 2006. Air Force officials noted that a 2007 
report was never officially completed, and as of February 2009, it had 
not begun to gather the data needed for the 2008 report. The officials 
told us they were relatively unconcerned about the size or cost of 
their inventory of relocatable facilities compared to other physical 
infrastructure issues, given the low use of relocatables located on 
their installations. 

Limited Oversight of Relocatable Facilities Hindered OSD's Ability to 
Respond to Congressional Request for Information: 

OSD does not have adequate oversight over the military services' use or 
cost to acquire relocatable facilities although it sets policy and 
develops overarching instructions on relocatable use. As a result, 
OSD's limited oversight over the military services' use of relocatable 
facilities has hindered its ability to respond to congressional 
requests for such information. For example, OSD was expected to issue 
its report in response to direction from the Senate Armed Services 
Committee in July 2008; however, it had not yet done so by May 2009. 
When we talked to OSD officials in March 2008, these officials told us 
they did not have information about how many relocatable facilities 
were being used, how many defense installations had them, nor how much 
it had cost to acquire them. OSD requested information from each of the 
military services but OSD officials told us they had experienced some 
data-collection problems. 

Despite receiving information from the services, our work has shown 
that OSD still does not have reliable information given a number of 
identified discrepancies among the installations, service headquarters, 
and information provided to OSD on relocatable facilities numbers and 
associated acquisition cost. DOD's guidance states that DOD-owned 
equipment and other accountable property, such as relocatable 
facilities, should be properly inventoried, records should reflect 
current status, and documentation should be maintained to permit 
validation of information such as the purchase cost.[Footnote 19] 
Although the military services provided data in response to OSD's 
request indicating they had acquired over 4,000 relocatable facilities 
over a 5-year period recently, it will be difficult for OSD to know the 
extent the services are relying on these facilities because it lacks a 
mechanism for collecting and maintaining such information as required 
by its own guidance. 

OSD Does Not Have a Strategy for Managing the Use and Disposal of 
Relocatable Facilities: 

OSD does not have a strategy for managing the military services' use 
and disposal of relocatable facilities, even though many of these 
facilities most likely will be used for longer than the 3 years that is 
normally expected for relocatables. In the absence of such a strategy, 
the services are at risk of managing these facilities in an inefficient 
manner. 

Military Services Expect to Use Relocatable Facilities Longer than 
Called for by DOD Guidance: 

Recognizing that the services would prefer to use permanent buildings 
to meet their infrastructure needs, some relocatable facilities could 
remain in use for many years. According to DOD guidance, the military 
services are expected to use relocatable facilities when they 
constitute the most feasible and economical means of satisfying an 
interim facility requirement, which is a short-term--normally 3 years 
or less--requirement for facilities in order to meet urgent or peak 
facilities requirements.[Footnote 20] However, we found that 
relocatable facilities at many installations have already been in use 
for longer than 3 years. The Army recently issued guidance indicating 
that it normally expects its relocatable facilities to be used for no 
more than 6 years, and officials at Fort Bliss, Texas, told us that 
about 550 of its nearly 600 relocatables, which are already more than 3 
years old, will be used at least 5 more years until 2014 to meet new 
incoming missions due to the lack of permanent facilities. Similarly, 
Marine Corps headquarters officials noted that rapid growth, changes in 
missions, and reorganizations have created new facility requirements 
that outstrip the Marine Corps' ability to meet the requirements 
through permanent construction. Thus, the Marine Corps continues to 
look to the use of relocatable facilities as the only available option 
to meet the needs. The officials stated that most likely relocatable 
facilities will be used at many installations for longer than 3 years. 

Services Plan to Replace Relocatable Facilities with Permanent 
Buildings, but Could Face Management Challenges: 

Although the services plan to eventually replace many of their 
relocatable facilities with permanent buildings, and military 
construction funds have been programmed to do so in fiscal years 2010 
to 2013, some service officials expressed skepticism that the planned 
replacement funds will become available, potentially further prolonging 
the need for relocatables. Even if planned military construction funds 
are appropriated in the later years, some of these relocatable 
facilities will have been in use beyond the normal amount of time as 
indicated in DOD's instruction. For example: 

* Navy officials at Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, Virginia, told 
us that they expect to obtain funding in fiscal year 2012 to begin 
permanent construction to replace some of the installation's 
relocatable facilities. However, for many of their relocatable 
facilities, they said they might not receive funding until fiscal year 
2014. Once funding is received, the officials told us it generally 
takes about 2 years to build a permanent facility. Thus these 
relocatable facilities, acquired in November 2004, will be 
approximately 12 years old when replaced. Furthermore, these officials 
also expect some existing relocatable facilities to be used beyond 2014 
because they are being used as administrative buildings, which the 
officials told us have not competed well historically for military 
construction appropriations within DOD. 

* Army officials at Fort Bliss, Texas, told us they are currently using 
about 550 relocatable facilities to house a combat brigade pending 
permanent construction to replace these facilities. The officials said 
they plan to use these facilities, which were acquired in 2006, until 
at least 2014, at which time these facilities will be approximately 9 
years old. 

* Air Force officials at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, provided us 
information that shows 27 of their 36 relocatables are currently over 5 
years old. In fact, 3 of these facilities were acquired in March 1984, 
making them 25 years old. The officials noted that these facilities 
were scheduled to be replaced in 2009; however, they said the 
facilities will continue to be used for administrative purposes to 
support a training range. 

Of the military services, the Army and the Marine Corps are the most 
affected by the implementation of DOD's force structure and 
infrastructure initiatives and will be challenged the most to find ways 
to meet their physical infrastructure needs in the short term. With the 
recent passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
[Footnote 21] DOD plans to spend about $7 billion in funds on numerous 
infrastructure projects, among other items and activities, which in 
turn, holds the possibility that certain funded projects could lessen 
the need to rely on relocatable facilities at certain installations 
although it still might be too early to quantify such effects. On the 
other hand, other recent decisions could increase the use of 
relocatables. For example, officials at Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Drum, 
New York; and at Army Installation Management Command-West, Texas, told 
us that, if the proposed drawdown of troops from Iraq occurs as 
planned--on top of DOD's other force structure initiatives-- the influx 
of more military personnel could exacerbate the shortage of facilities 
at these and other installations. Meeting these facility needs could 
result in an increased use of relocatable facilities and the continued 
use of these facilities for longer than normally called for by DOD 
guidance. 

Army officials told us that installation commanders generally consider 
relocatables to be the property of their installations. Thus, even 
though plans exist to replace relocatable facilities with permanent 
construction, some installation commanders might be resistant to 
transferring their relocatables to another installation that needs them 
or even to disposing of them once the planned permanent buildings have 
been constructed, in case they are subsequently needed again. Although 
the Army has not yet redistributed any relocatables from one location 
to another, Army officials told us that they are in the process of 
trying to redistribute some relocatable facilities from Fort Irwin, 
California--an installation in which the Army believes it no longer 
needs its relocatable facilities--to Fort Sill, Oklahoma--an 
installation that currently needs relocatable facilities to address 
some of its facility space shortages. Although the Army plans to 
centralize its management of these facilities, neither the other 
service headquarters nor OSD have similar plans. Without a DOD strategy 
for managing relocatables that includes the redistribution of 
relocatables from one location to another when needed and when 
appropriate, installations with unneeded relocatables could 
unnecessarily spend defense funds disposing of facilities while another 
installation that needs them is spending defense funds to acquire them. 

When appropriate to dispose of relocatable facilities, neither OSD nor 
the services have completed disposal strategies nor budgeting for the 
cost involved to remove these facilities. Officials told us relocatable 
facilities used today are often not facilities that can be easily towed 
away or sold at on-site auctions, such as would be true with single 
trailers with attached wheels. Rather, some installation officials told 
us that disposing of these facilities by auctioning them off in the 
local community might be more challenging than what is currently 
expected given these facilities normally arrive on flat-bed trucks and 
are either largely preassembled or assembled at the installation, as 
shown in figure 3. 

Figure 3: Pictures of Relocatable Facilities Arriving and Being 
Installed at a Defense Installation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs] 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

For example, officials at Fort Bliss, Texas, told us they expect to 
incur costs to dispose of or demolish their relocatable facilities, 
citing doubts that enough of their facilities could be auctioned off in 
the local community given the large quantities (about 600) of 
relocatable facilities at the installation. Officials at Fort Hood 
expressed similar views regarding the salvage value of the relocatable 
facilities at their installation, given the large quantities (nearly 
300) of relocatable facilities that will need to be disposed of. 
Officials at Fort Drum, New York, told us that once their installation 
no longer needs its relocatable facilities (about 140), they plan to 
disassemble them and store the facilities on base, which officials said 
will likely incur cost to do. 

Furthermore, the numbers of relocatable facilities for DOD to 
eventually dispose of could be more challenging given the actual size 
of some of these relocatable facilities. DOD currently counts as 
relocatables multiple trailers, which can be joined together, as one 
facility. For example, according to Air Force data, a facility at 
MacDill Air Force Base in Florida is actually made up of 72 trailers. 
We saw a similar situation at Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, 
Virginia, in which officials there counted 146 trailers, many of which 
were connected to one another, as 23 relocatable facilities. Also, at 
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, one relocatable facility--representing 
about 35,000 square feet of space--was actually comprised of 33 
individual trailers, as shown in figure 4. 

Figure 4: A Relocatable Facility Consisting of 33 Trailers at Eglin Air 
Force Base, Florida: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

DOD's guidance states that relocatable facilities accounted for as 
personal property, upon becoming excess to DOD, shall be redistributed 
or disposed of.[Footnote 22] However, OSD has not effectively 
communicated guidance on how the services are to manage its reliance on 
relocatable facilities because OSD does not have a strategy to manage 
the use, disposal, and redistribution of these facilities across all 
the services, including projected costs. Our prior work has shown that 
management control should be designed to provide reasonable assurance 
against unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of an agency's 
assets.[Footnote 23] One way to accomplish this is an adequate means of 
communicating with and obtaining information from stakeholders that may 
have an effect on the agency achieving its goals. Collectively, OSD has 
a unique set of challenges in managing its current inventory of over 
4,000 relocatable facilities; however, without a strategy that includes 
provisions for the disposal of relocatable facilities, including 
projected costs, some relocatable facilities could remain in place for 
years to come. Without a comprehensive DOD strategy for managing 
relocatables--including the transfer of relocatables from one location 
to another--a military service could unnecessarily spend funds by 
simultaneously acquiring new facilities while another military service 
is incurring costs to store or demolish similar facilities. In 
addition, if this strategy does not include a consistent, common 
measure for estimating disposal costs based on size of the facility, 
DOD might not be planning for this expense in the most accurate and 
efficient way possible. 

Conclusions: 

The pace of growth at some installations is exceeding the ability of 
traditional military construction to provide permanent facilities. 
Without a complete and accurate accounting of how many relocatable 
facilities DOD actually has or how much it spent to acquire them; DOD 
will continue to have a limited ability to oversee and manage the steps 
the services are taking in response to personnel growth at some 
installations. Until OSD develops clear guidance for the services to 
follow on what it expects to count as a relocatable facility, along 
with an expectation for the services to provide a complete and accurate 
accounting of them, OSD and Congress will continue to have incomplete 
information on the extent to which these relocatable facilities are 
being used on defense installations as interim solutions to facility 
infrastructure shortages. In addition, without a mechanism to 
accurately record and monitor its inventory of relocatable facilities, 
along with its cost to acquire them, OSD will not have reliable data 
for making effective choices on funding decisions. 

Similar to DOD's experience with World War II-era wooden buildings, 
which were expected to be in use no more than 5 years, but of which 
many are still in use today, DOD's use of relocatable facilities could 
outlast the services' current expectations, especially in an 
increasingly competitive budget environment that could delay needed 
military construction funds beyond current expectations. In addition to 
the cost of acquiring relocatable facilities, DOD is likely to incur 
costs to store, dispose of, or relocate them. Without a comprehensive 
strategy to effectively manage the services' use of relocatable 
facilities, DOD may be unprepared to reliably budget for these costs. 
Finally, without a more strategic DOD-wide view of the services' plans 
to acquire and dispose of relocatable facilities, OSD may not be in a 
position to coordinate or to ensure the services transfer used 
relocatables from one location to another when appropriate, in lieu of 
acquiring new relocatable facilities at one location needing them, 
thereby avoiding waste. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve OSD's oversight and management of the military services' use 
of relocatable facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics to take the following three actions: 

* clarify its guidance on the definition of relocatable facilities; 

* develop a mechanism for collecting and maintaining complete and 
reliable data on the number of relocatable facilities used by the 
military services and on the costs of acquiring them once OSD clarifies 
the guidance on the definition of relocatable facilities; and: 

* develop and implement a strategy to help effectively manage the use, 
disposal, and redistribution of relocatable facilities across all the 
services when redistribution is appropriate, including projected costs. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments to a draft of this report, the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) fully agreed with 
two of our three recommendation and stated it would take actions to 
implement them. The Deputy Under Secretary partially agreed with our 
recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics develop and implement a strategy to help 
effectively manage the use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable 
facilities across all the services when redistribution is appropriate, 
including projected costs, citing that the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should not be involved in 
implementation but rather should promulgate policy and monitor 
implementation on the use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable 
facilities across all the services when redistribution is appropriate. 

In a follow-up discussion with an OSD official regarding DOD's written 
response to a draft of this report, the official noted that OSD will 
promulgate policy, which includes directing the military services to 
redistribute relocatable facilities across the services when 
redistribution is appropriate, and will monitor implementation on the 
use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable facilities across all 
services when redistribution is appropriate. As such, we believe DOD's 
planned action meets the intent of our recommendation. DOD's comments 
are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. Also, DOD provided one 
technical comment on a draft of this report, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the 
Director, Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the report will 
be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me on (202) 512-4523 or by e-mail at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
are on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Brian J. Lepore, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tim Johnson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr. 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Chet Edwards: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Zach Wamp: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) is providing oversight of the military services' use of 
relocatable facilities to meet physical infrastructure needs, we 
reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance on the authorization, 
acquisition, use, and disposition of relocatable facilities and the 
military services' policies and procedures that implement DOD's 
guidance. We obtained and reviewed inventory and cost data on 
relocatable facilities as reported to OSD by each military service. 
Although service headquarters officials stated that their data 
reflected information collected from their installations, we found that 
the data were not reliable because they were not always complete and 
accurate. Examples of the data reliability issues are included in this 
report. To gain insight into the numbers, costs, and disposal plans for 
relocatable facilities at the installation level, we visited seven 
defense installations. We selected installations to visit from those 
identified by service headquarters' officials as having a sizable 
number of relocatable facilities. We focused mostly on Army and Marine 
Corps installations because they use relocatable facilities to a 
greater extent than the Navy and the Air Force. Specifically, we 
visited Fort Hood and Fort Bliss in Texas; Fort Drum in New York; Naval 
Amphibious Base Little Creek in Virginia; Eglin Air Force Base in 
Florida; Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in North Carolina; and Marine 
Corps Base Camp Pendleton in California. At each installation we 
visited, we obtained data on the number and cost of purchasing or 
leasing relocatable facilities. We compared the installation's 
inventory of relocatable facilities to the numbers the service 
headquarters reported to OSD and documented and discussed any 
discrepancies with installation and service headquarters officials. Our 
analysis of the seven installation visits cannot be generalized to 
other military installations. We also visited the Army Installation 
Management Command-West in Texas to discuss the Army's relocatable 
facilities. Furthermore, we interviewed OSD and military service 
headquarters officials managing relocatable facilities to discuss the 
primary reasons for acquiring and using relocatable facilities, the 
process used to acquire them, and plans for their disposal. The Senate 
committee report limited DOD's review by excluding nonpermanent or 
temporary facilities used overseas at forward operating sites or 
cooperative security locations, thus we did not include the services' 
use of relocatable facilities at overseas locations. Also, we did not 
include the use of trailers by construction contractors or associated 
with any ongoing construction projects at defense installations. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive strategy for 
managing relocatable facilities, we interviewed OSD and military 
service officials to discuss whether they have a plan to track whether 
relocatable facilities are used for time periods that exceed DOD's or 
the service's length of use criteria, the implications of using 
relocatable facilities longer than called for in the guidance, and any 
issues regarding the disposal of relocatable facilities. At the 
installations we visited, we obtained information on the relocatable 
facilities that were in use longer than called for in DOD guidance and 
ascertained the reasons why. We also discussed with installation 
officials their plans for replacing relocatables with permanent 
buildings and the potential for costs to dispose of relocatable 
facilities. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to June 2009, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

May 28, 2009: 

Mr. Brian J. Lepore: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Lepore: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, "Defense Infrastructure: DoD Needs to Improve Oversight of 
Relocatable Facilities and Develop a Strategy for Managing Their Use 
across the Military Services," dated May 4, 2009, (GAO Code 351177/GAO-
09-585). Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed. 

The Department concurs with recommendations 1 and 2, and partially 
concurs with recommendation 3. We appreciate your efforts in conducting 
this review, and we thank the members of your staff for their 
comprehensive work. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Wayne Arny: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: 
(Installations and Environment): 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report - Dated May 4, 2009: 
GAO Code 351177/GAO-09-585: 

"Defense Infrastructure: DoD Needs to Improve Oversight of Relocatable 
Facilities and Develop a Strategy for Managing Their Use across the 
Military Services" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics to clarify its guidance on the definition of relocatable 
facilities. 

DOD Response: Concur. The existing guidance needs to be updated and 
clarified. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics to develop a mechanism for collecting and maintaining 
complete and reliable data on the number of relocatable facilities used 
by the military services and on the costs of acquiring them once OSD 
clarifies the guidance on the definition of relocatable facilities. 

DOD Response: Concur. DoD agrees that collecting and maintaining 
reliable data on the number of relocatable facilities acquired and the 
costs associated with acquiring them is necessary. We will look into 
how best to address this requirement and will attempt to leverage 
existing information technology system modernization efforts. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics to develop and implement a strategy to help effectively 
manage the use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable facilities 
across all the services when redistribution is appropriate, including 
projected costs. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. Rather than being directly involved in 
implementation, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics should promulgate policy and monitor 
implementation on the use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable 
facilities across all the services when redistribution is appropriate, 
including projected costs. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Laura Talbott, Assistant 
Director; Leslie Bharadwaja; Susan Ditto; Mary Jo LaCasse; Katherine 
Lenane; Clara Mejstrik; Charles Perdue; and Sharon Reid made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] S. Rep. No. 110-77 (2007), 585-586. 

[2] On May 16, 2008, OSD requested each service provide information on 
the number and cost of its relocatable facilities acquired over the 
past 5 years. OSD did not specify which 5-year period. Service 
officials from the Army and Navy noted that they reported data on 
calendar years 2003-2007 in their response; Air Force officials 
reported data on calendar years 2004-2008; and Marine Corps officials 
told us they reported data on fiscal years 2004-2008. 

[3] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings" (Apr. 13, 1988). 

[4] DOD guidance further states that in addition to the use of 
relocatable buildings for interim facility requirements, relocatable 
buildings may also be used instead of conventional, permanent 
construction when the duration of the requirement is uncertain. 

[5] See footnote 2. 

[6] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings." 

[7] Army Regulation 420-1, "Army Facilities Management" (Feb. 12, 
2008); and Army Memorandum, "Interim Policy Change on Relocatable 
Buildings for Paragraphs 6-13 through 6-17 in AR 420-1, Army Facilities 
Management" (Feb. 19, 2008). 

[8] There are two authorities available to DOD to use operation and 
maintenance funds to carry out military construction projects. Section 
2805(c) of Title 10, U.S. Code, permits DOD to use operation and 
maintenance funds to carry out an unspecified minor military 
construction project costing not more than $750,000, or up to 
$1,500,000 in the case of a project intended solely to correct a 
deficiency that threatens life, health, or safety. DOD also possesses 
temporary, limited authority to obligate up to $200,000,000 (and under 
certain circumstances, up to $500,000,000) of operation and maintenance 
funds in a fiscal year to carry out construction projects that meet a 
specified set of conditions. Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 2808(a) (2003), as 
amended by Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 2810 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 
2809 (2006); Pub. L. No 109-364, § 2802 (2006); Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 
2801 (2008); and Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 2812 (2008). 

[9] S. Rep. No. 110-77 (2007), 585-586, directed the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to report to the 
congressional defense committees on the use of temporary facilities 
within DOD. Specifically, the Under Secretary was required to report on 
(1) a list of the acquisition or leasing actions of temporary 
facilities in each service over the past 5 years; (2) amounts spent on 
temporary facilities in the following categories: (a) operation and 
maintenance funding obligated in service contracts; (b) operation and 
maintenance funding obligated solely for nonpermanent, temporary 
facility construction or procurement; (c) operation and maintenance 
funding obligated for leases of nonpermanent, temporary facilities; and 
(d) procurement funding spent to procure nonpermanent, temporary 
facilities; (3) the plan for the construction of permanent facilities 
to replace each temporary facility acquired or leased in the DOD 
inventory to include project title, planned budget year, and estimated 
cost; and (4) the number of nonpermanent, temporary facilities 
previously leased by the department or the military services that were 
later purchased, and the costs associated with these arrangements. 
Although these reporting requirements do not specifically state 
relocatable facilities, OSD told us it plans to report data on 
relocatables given that the questions are mostly relevant to only 
relocatable facilities. 

[10] S. Rep. No. 109-69 (2005), 434. 

[11] H.R. Rep. No. 109-89 (2005), 443-4. 

[12] Department of the Army, Report to Congress on Permanent Facilities 
for new Army unit (For Official Use Only) (March 2006). 

[13] H.R. Rep. No. 110-652 (2008), 476-7. 

[14] The Army Audit Agency issued six separate reports on relocatable 
facilities--one for each of the five installations audited along with a 
summary report. These reports are: U.S. Army Audit Agency, Management 
of Relocatable Facilities Fort Bragg, North Carolina, A-2008-0292-ALO 
(Alexandria, Va., Sept. 30, 2008); Management of Relocatable Facilities 
Fort Drum, New York, A-2008-0268-ALO (Alexandria, Va., Sept. 29, 2008); 
Management of Relocatable Facilities Fort Huachuca, Arizona, A-2008- 
0268-ALO (Alexandria, Va., Sept. 29, 2008); Management of Relocatable 
Facilities Fort Riley, Kansas, A-2008-0235-ALO (Alexandria, Va., Sept. 
2, 2008); Management of Relocatable Facilities Fort Stewart and Hunter 
Army Airfield, Georgia, A-2008-0236-ALO (Alexandria, Va., Sept. 2, 
2008); and Management of Relocatable Facilities, A-2009-0065-ALO 
(Alexandria, Va., Mar. 4, 2009). 

[15] Department of the Air Force Memorandum, Annual Comprehensive 
Temporary Use Facilities Report (Feb. 8, 2007). 

[16] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings," states that in 
classifying a building as relocatable, the estimated costs for 
disassembling the building and repackaging it for storage or reuse, 
among other cost considerations, may not exceed 20 percent of the cost 
to acquire the facility. 

[17] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings." 

[18] See footnote 2. 

[19] DOD Instruction 5000.64, "Accountability and Management of DOD- 
Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property" (Nov. 2, 2006). 

[20] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings," § 3.1. Section 
4.2 of the instruction further states that in addition to the use of 
relocatable buildings for interim facility requirements, relocatable 
buildings may also be used instead of conventional, permanent 
construction when the duration of the requirement is uncertain. 

[21] Pub. L. No. 111-5 (2009). 

[22] DOD Instruction 4165.56, "Relocatable Buildings," § 5.3.1. 

[23] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[End of section] 

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