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entitled 'Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, 
but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the 
Military Buildup on Guam' which was released on September 12, 2007. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

September 2007: 

Defense Infrastructure: 

Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress 
Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam: 

Defense Infrastructure: 

GAO-07-1015: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-1015, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Over the next several years, implementation of the Department of 
Defense’s (DOD) Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will 
result in the realignment of U.S. forces and the construction of new 
facilities costing billions of dollars at installations overseas. The 
Senate and House reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military 
construction appropriation bill directed GAO to monitor DOD’s overseas 
master plans and to provide congressional defense committees with 
assessments each year. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 
2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to review 
DOD’s master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual reviews. 
This report, first, examines how the overseas plans have changed and 
the extent to which they address the challenges faced by DOD and, 
second, assesses the status of DOD’s planning effort and the challenges 
associated with the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on 
Guam. 

What GAO Found: 

The fiscal year 2008 overseas master plans, which provide 
infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the 
overseas regional commands’ area of responsibility, have been updated 
to reflect U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements as 
well as GAO’s prior recommendations for improving the plans. The plans 
also address DOD’s challenges to a greater extent than they did in 
previous years. However, two areas continue to be of concern. First, 
the master plans do not address the issue of residual value—that is, 
the value of property being turned over to the host nation based on its 
reuse of property. Although DOD officials believe that residual value 
cannot be readily predicted and therefore should not be in the master 
plans, compensation received for U.S capital improvements at 
installations returned to host nations could affect U.S. funding 
requirements for overseas construction. Second, the master plan for 
PACOM, which provides details on the command’s training limitations in 
Japan and several other challenges, does not provide details regarding 
training limitations for the Air Force in South Korea, which could 
cause the United States to pursue alternatives, such as training in 
other locations, downsizing, or relocating that could affect overseas 
basing plans. Without addressing the residual value issue and providing 
details on these training challenges, DOD cannot provide Congress a 
comprehensive view enabling it to make informed decisions regarding 
funding. GAO has previously recommended that overseas regional commands 
address residual value issues and that PACOM explain how it plans to 
address existing training limitations. Because these recommendations 
have not been fully addressed, GAO considers them to be open and 
believes that they still have merit. 

DOD’s planning effort for the buildup of military forces and 
infrastructure on Guam is in its initial stages, with many key 
decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. Among the challenges to 
be addressed is completing the required environmental impact statement, 
initiated in March 2007. According to DOD officials, this statement and 
associated record of decision could take up to 3 years to complete and 
will affect many of the key decisions on the exact location, size, and 
makeup of the military infrastructure development—decisions needed to 
develop a master plan for the military buildup on Guam. DOD and the 
services are still determining the exact size and makeup of the forces 
to be moved to Guam, needed in order to identify the housing, 
operational, quality of life, and services support infrastructure 
required for the Marine Corps realignment and the other services’ 
buildup. DOD officials said that additional time is needed to fully 
address other challenges associated with the Guam military buildup, 
including funding requirements, operational requirements, and community 
impact. Until the environmental assessment and initial planning efforts 
are completed, Congress will need to be kept abreast of developments 
and challenges affecting infrastructure and funding decisions to make 
appropriate funding and oversight decisions. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is not recommending executive action. However, Congress should 
require DOD to report on residual value and U.S. Pacific Command’s 
(PACOM) training limitations, as well as periodically on its planning 
efforts for Guam and efforts to address various challenges. DOD 
believes congressional action is not necessary. 

[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-
4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes in Overseas Basing Strategies 
and Requirements, Key Challenges, and Our Prior Recommendations: 

Planning Effort for Guam Is in Its Initial Stages with Many Key 
Decisions and Challenges to Be Addressed: 

Concluding Observations: 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Proposed Increase in the Numbers of Active Duty Military 
Personnel and Dependents on Guam: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Location of Guam: 

Figure 2: U.S. Military Installations on Guam: 

Figure 3: PACOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM Geographic Areas of Responsibility: 

Abbreviations: 

CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command: 
DOD: Department of Defense: 
EUCOM: U.S. European Command: 
JGPO: Joint Guam Program Office: 
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act: 
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 
PACOM: U.S. Pacific Command: 
USFK: U.S. Forces Korea: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

September 12, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

Over the next several years, the ongoing implementation of the 
Department of Defense's (DOD) integrated global presence and basing 
strategy will result in a global realignment of U.S. forces and 
installations, including a reduction of the number of troops stationed 
overseas and a consolidation of overseas bases. While the strategy is 
intended to make the overseas posture of the United States more 
flexible and efficient, it will also require new facilities costing 
billions of dollars, some of the cost to be borne by the United States 
and some by other nations, such as Japan and South Korea. A key 
component of the U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) integrated global 
presence and basing strategy is the proposed military buildup on the 
island of Guam--a U.S. territory located in the western Pacific Ocean. 
This buildup includes personnel, weapons systems, and infrastructure of 
all the military services--Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The 
most ambitious undertaking involves moving approximately 8,000 marines 
and their estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam. 

As plans for overseas basing began to emerge, the Senate Appropriations 
Committee expressed concern about the use of military construction 
budget authority for projects at overseas bases that may soon be 
obsolete or closed because of changes being considered by DOD and the 
military services. Accordingly, the Senate report accompanying the 
fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed 
DOD[Footnote 1] to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans for 
changing infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in 
each of the overseas regional commands.[Footnote 2] DOD was required to 
provide a baseline report on these plans, along with yearly updates on 
their status and their implementation with the annual military 
construction budget submissions through 2008. Subsequently, the House 
conference report accompanying the 2004 military construction 
appropriation bill directed the department to prepare comprehensive 
master plans with yearly updates through fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 3] 
The Senate report directed that the master plans identify precise 
facility requirements and the status of properties being returned to 
host nations. Additionally, the Senate report stated that the plans 
should identify funding requirements as well as the division of funding 
responsibilities between the United States and host nations. The Senate 
report also directed us to monitor the master plans developed and 
implemented for the overseas regional commands and to provide the 
congressional defense committees with assessment reports each year. In 
July 2006, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military 
construction appropriation bill directed us to review DOD's master 
planning effort for Guam as part of our annual review of the overseas 
master plans.[Footnote 4] 

This is our fourth report responding to the requirements contained in 
the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill 
report. Our prior work found that DOD's overseas master plans generally 
exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress, but that 
there were opportunities for improvement.[Footnote 5] This report 
examines, first, how the overseas master plans have changed since last 
year, and the extent to which the plans address the challenges faced by 
DOD during implementation. Second, representing our initial examination 
of DOD's planning effort for the Guam military buildup, this report 
assesses the status of DOD's planning effort and the challenges 
associated with the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on 
Guam. 

In conducting our work, we visited overseas regional combatant 
commands--PACOM, including U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S. Forces 
Japan; U.S. European Command (EUCOM); and U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM)--to see selected installations and military construction 
projects firsthand and to discuss compliance with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense's (OSD) most recent guidance[Footnote 6] and the 
challenges the commands face in implementing the plans. After the plans 
were issued,[Footnote 7] we reviewed them to determine how the plans 
have changed since last year and the extent to which the plans complied 
with the congressional reporting requirements. We assessed whether the 
plans provided information in a complete, clear, and consistent manner, 
and we discussed with OSD and command officials whether improvements in 
the guidance and reporting were needed. We generally concluded that a 
plan was improved over those of prior years if it included details on 
base categories, host nation funding levels, facility requirements and 
costs, environmental remediation issues, and other challenges affecting 
implementation of the plans. To determine the status of the Guam 
planning effort, we met with officials of OSD, PACOM, and the Navy 
Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO)--the office established to plan and 
execute the military development on Guam--to discuss the status of 
DOD's planning effort and the challenges associated with the buildup of 
military forces and infrastructure on Guam. We also visited U.S. 
Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; U.S. Army Pacific; 
and Pacific Air Forces to discuss the various factors that can affect 
U.S. infrastructure requirements and costs in Guam, and we reviewed 
information included in the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan-
-a notional document detailing the future military development on Guam 
over the next decade and beyond.[Footnote 8] It is important to note 
that DOD considers the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan to be 
separate and distinct from the overseas master plans that it provides 
Congress annually in response to the Senate report and House conference 
report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction 
appropriation bill. In Guam, we visited the Naval Base Guam and 
Andersen Air Force Base to tour existing installations and facilities 
and observe future sites for military construction firsthand and to 
identify challenges to these plans. We also met with the Governor of 
Guam and his staff, members of the Guam legislature, staff from the 
Office of the Delegate of Guam for the House of Representatives, and 
various community groups to discuss their perspectives on the 
challenges associated with the influx of military personnel and 
missions to Guam. 

We conducted our review from September 2006 through July 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See 
appendix I for more information on our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

The fiscal year 2008 overseas master plans, which provide 
infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the 
overseas regional commands' area of responsibility, have been updated 
to reflect U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements and 
our prior recommendations for improving the plans, and they address 
DOD's challenges to a greater extent than in previous years. However, 
they do not address the issue of residual value and the PACOM master 
plan does not provide details regarding training challenges for the Air 
Force in South Korea. The plans incorporate key changes associated with 
the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategies. For 
example, the plans describe the department's recent efforts to 
establish missile defense sites in the Czech Republic and Poland and 
the creation of U.S. Africa Command. This year's plans also provide 
information to respond to most of our prior recommendations. For 
example, in 2006 we recommended that the plans explain how their 
implementation could be affected by other relevant and related defense 
plans and activities, and the 2008 plans describe how PACOM's force 
structure plans are linked to the military buildup on Guam, and how 
CENTCOM's increased troop strength and facilities requirements in Iraq 
and Afghanistan are linked to ongoing operations in its area of 
responsibility. This year, the overseas master plans provide a more 
comprehensive description of the challenges DOD faces in implementing 
the plans than they have done in previous years. Specifically, the 
master plans address the uncertainties associated with host nations and 
recent agreements, and they generally reflect environmental concerns 
and training limitations where those exist. Two areas continue to be of 
concern. First, OSD does not address the issue of residual value--the 
value of property being turned over to the host nation based on its 
reuse of property--in its guidance to the commands, and consequently 
the master plans omit this information. That is because officials 
believe that residual value, which is often diminished by actual or 
anticipated environmental remediation costs, cannot be readily 
predicted and therefore should not be assumed in the master plans. We 
recognize the uncertainties associated with predicting residual value 
of land and facilities returned to host nations. However, since 1989, 
the U.S. government has received approximately $592 million in residual 
value and payment-in-kind compensation[Footnote 9] from property 
returns in EUCOM's area of responsibility, and EUCOM continues to 
aggressively seek compensation for U.S. capital improvements at 
installations returned to host nations, which could thus affect U.S. 
funding requirements for overseas construction. As EUCOM continues the 
return of facilities in Germany, Italy, and Iceland, this figure may 
increase. Accordingly, we continue to believe that residual value 
should be addressed in the master plans. A second area of concern is 
that PACOM's master plan, which provides details on the command's 
training limitations in Japan and several other challenges, does not 
provide details on the challenges the Air Force faces with training in 
South Korea. Senior USFK officials told us that these limitations could 
cause the United States to pursue alternatives, such as training in 
other locations, downsizing, or relocating that could affect overseas 
basing plans. In May 2007, USFK officials said that some progress had 
been made in addressing the Air Force's training challenges in South 
Korea and that they expected the needed upgrades to possibly be 
completed by mid-2007. We have previously recommended that overseas 
regional commands address residual value issues and that PACOM explain 
how it plans to address existing training limitations in our prior 
reports and, because these recommendations have not been fully 
addressed, we consider them to be open and also continue to believe 
they have merit. 

DOD's planning effort for the buildup of military forces and 
infrastructure on Guam is in its initial stages, with many key 
decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. While the Guam Integrated 
Military Development Plan provides an overview of the projected 
military population, units, and infrastructure requirements for future 
military realignments on Guam, it is not a master plan and does not 
specify individual facility or infrastructure projects, nor does it 
direct individual service programming actions or provide for specific 
funding requirements. Also, the plan is not intended to meet the Senate 
Appropriations Committee's mandate to provide a master plan for the 
military buildup on Guam by December 2006.[Footnote 10] Among the 
challenges to be addressed first is the required environmental impact 
statement--initiated on March 7, 2007--which could take up to 3 years 
to complete, according to DOD officials. According to these officials, 
the results of the required environmental impact statement may affect 
many of the key decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of 
the military infrastructure development--decisions needed to develop a 
master plan for Guam. Additionally, DOD and the services are still 
finalizing the exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam, 
which must be determined in order to identify the housing, operational, 
quality of life, and services support infrastructure required for the 
Marine Corps realignment and the other services' buildup. DOD officials 
also said that additional time is needed to fully address other 
challenges associated with the military buildup. For example: 

* Funding requirements are not yet fully identified and may be 
difficult to meet given other DOD priorities and funding constraints, 
according to DOD officials. DOD agencies, such as the Defense Logistics 
Agency and Defense Education Activity, that will help support the 
services' influx of personnel, missions, and equipment to Guam will 
likely incur costs that are not yet included in current cost estimates 
for the military buildup. Even so, costs for the total military buildup 
on Guam are estimated at $13 billion, with the realignment of the 
Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam estimated at $10.3 billion. The 
remainder of the costs will be used to construct a Navy pier and 
station an Army ballistic missile defense task force on Guam. The 
Government of Japan has agreed to contribute about $6.1 billion toward 
the costs of the Marine Corps move, although a portion of these funds 
will be repaid by the U.S. government through rent or service charges. 
Nevertheless, given other DOD priorities and funding constraints, DOD 
officials are concerned about their ability to obtain a continuous flow 
of funds adequate to pay the costs of the Guam buildup due to pressures 
on DOD's budget from the cost of current operations. The Government of 
Japan may also encounter challenges in funding its share of the Marine 
Corps move, considering Japan's other national priorities and its 
commitment under the defense policy initiatives with the United 
States.[Footnote 11] 

* Operational challenges have not been fully addressed, such as a plan 
to provide appropriate mobility support and training capabilities to 
meet Marine Corps requirements. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, officials 
noted that during a contingency operation, the U.S. Marines in Guam 
after the move from Okinawa will depend on strategic military sealift 
and airlift to reach destinations in Asia that will be farther away 
than was the case when they were based in Okinawa, Japan. For example, 
in a contingency operation that requires sealift, the ships may have to 
deploy from Sasebo, Japan, or another location to transport soldiers 
and equipment in Guam to the area where the contingency is taking 
place. In addition, existing training opportunities in Guam are not 
sufficient to meet the training requirements of the projected Marine 
Corps force. 

* Many of Guam's unique economic and infrastructure requirements have 
not been fully addressed. Historically, for example, construction 
capacity on Guam has been approximately $800 million per year, as 
compared with the estimated construction capacity of more than $3 
billion per year projected to be needed by DOD to meet the planned 
fiscal year 2014 completion date. DOD's preliminary analysis indicates 
that 15,000 to 20,000 workers will be required to support this 
development, which will likely necessitate additional foreign workers, 
training of the workers, and support facilities, such as housing and 
medical care. Similarly, demands on Guam's roads, port capabilities, 
and utility services--such as electrical generation, wastewater 
treatment, and solid waste disposal--can be expected with the military 
buildup, and these have not been fully addressed. Without effective 
partnering with other federal departments and coordination with the 
Government of Guam, it will be difficult to successfully address many 
of these unique requirements. 

To further facilitate annual review and oversight by Congress and other 
users of the overseas master plans, Congress should consider requiring 
DOD to ensure that future master plans address residual value issues 
and future PACOM plans address existing training limitations. Congress 
should consider requiring DOD, until it develops a master plan, to 
report periodically on the status of its planning efforts on Guam, 
including environmental assessments, the size and makeup of the forces 
to be moved to Guam, and other challenges associated with the military 
buildup. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that 
congressional action was not necessary. We continue to believe that our 
matters for congressional consideration have merit. We discuss DOD's 
comments in detail later in this report. DOD also provided technical 
comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated where 
appropriate. 

Background: 

Military construction appropriations fund the planning, design, 
construction, alteration, and improvement of military facilities 
worldwide. The military construction appropriation request for fiscal 
year 2008 included approximately $21.3 billion for military 
construction and family housing, of which nearly $1.2 billion (5.6 
percent) is designated for specific overseas locations, mostly 
comprising enduring installations, and not for new and emerging 
requirements outside existing basing structures.[Footnote 12] As of 
fiscal year 2006, DOD had 3,731 installations, with 766 installations 
located overseas. 

DOD's Global Realignment: 

In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation to develop a 
defense strategy and force structure capable of meeting changing global 
threats. As part of its transformation, DOD has been reexamining 
overseas basing requirements to allow for greater U.S. military 
flexibility to combat conventional and asymmetric threats worldwide. In 
September 2001, DOD issued its Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which 
addressed, among other issues, reorienting the U.S. military global 
posture. The report called for developing a permanent basing system 
that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of 
the world as well as providing temporary access to facilities in 
foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to train and operate in the 
absence of permanent ranges and bases. 

In August 2004, President Bush announced what has been described as the 
most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since 
the end of the Korean War. The initiative is intended to close bases no 
longer needed to meet Cold War threats, as well as bring home many U.S. 
forces while stationing more flexible, deployable capabilities in 
strategic locations around the world. The integrated global presence 
and basing strategy is the culmination of various DOD studies, 
including the overseas basing and requirements study, the overseas 
presence study, and the U.S. global posture study. 

As a part of DOD's global realignment, in 2004 the United States and 
Japan began a series of sustained security consultations aimed at 
strengthening the U.S.-Japan security alliance to better address 
today's rapidly changing global security environment. DOD's Defense 
Policy Review Initiative established a framework for the future of U.S. 
force structure in Japan designed to create the conditions to reduce 
the burden on local Japanese communities and create a continuing 
presence for U.S. forces by relocating units to other areas, including 
Guam, while repositioning U.S. forces to respond better to regional 
crises. This initiative also includes a significant reduction and 
reorganization of the Marine Corps posture on Okinawa, Japan, to 
include relocating 8,000 marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents 
to Guam. More than 10,000 marines and their dependents will remain 
stationed in Okinawa after this relocation. The initiatives also 
include the relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five from Atsugi Naval Air 
Facility to Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Japan; the replacement of 
the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station, Japan; transformation of 
Army headquarters at Camp Zama, Japan; deployment of a nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan; deployment of a 
transportable ballistic missile defense radar system; relocation of 
training activities; land returns; and shared use of facilities. 

Guam is the westernmost territory of the United States and is 
strategically located in the Pacific Ocean approximately 3,810 miles 
southwest of Honolulu, Hawaii; 1,600 miles east of Manila, the 
Philippines; and 1,560 miles southeast of Tokyo, Japan (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Location of Guam: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: PACOM. 

[End of figure] 

Given its strategic location, Guam is an integral part of DOD's 
logistical support system and serves as an important forward 
operational hub for a mix of military mission requirements. According 
to DOD, Guam provides strategic flexibility, freedom of action, and 
prompt global action for the Global War on Terrorism, peace and wartime 
engagement, and crisis response. About 29 percent of the land is 
controlled by DOD (see fig. 2), 52 percent is privately owned, and 19 
percent is under the supervision of the Government of Guam. 

Figure 2: U.S. Military Installations on Guam: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: PACOM. 

Notes: ESQD is the explosive safety quantity distance arc, which 
represents the prescribed minimum distance between explosive storing or 
handling sites and specified exposures, such as inhabited buildings and 
public highways. NCTS is the Naval Computer Telecommunications Station. 
GLUP 77, the Guam Land Use Plan 1977, refers to Navy land scheduled to 
be returned to the Government of Guam. 

[End of figure] 

Requirements for the Overseas Master Plans and a Master Plan for the 
Military Buildup on Guam: 

In 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed concern that the 
overseas basing structure had not been updated to reflect the new 
realities of the post-Cold War world.[Footnote 13] The committee has 
also expressed concern about the use of military construction budget 
authority for projects at bases that may soon be obsolete because of 
changes being considered in overseas presence and basing. Consequently, 
in Senate Report 108-82, the Senate Appropriations Committee directed 
DOD to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans for the changing 
infrastructure requirements for U.S. military facilities in each of its 
overseas regional commands. According to the Senate report, at a 
minimum, the plans are to identify precise facility requirements and 
the status of properties being returned to host nations. In addition, 
the report stated that the plans should identify funding requirements 
and the division of funding responsibilities between the United States 
and cognizant host nations. The Senate report also directed DOD to 
provide congressional defense committees a report on the status and 
implementation of those plans with each yearly military construction 
budget submission through fiscal year 2008. Subsequently, the House 
conference report accompanying the 2004 military construction 
appropriation bill also directed the department to prepare 
comprehensive master plans with yearly updates through fiscal year 
2009. The first report was due with the fiscal year 2005 military 
construction budget submission and is to be updated each succeeding 
year to reflect changes to the plans involving specific construction 
projects being added, canceled, or modified, or funding for those 
projects being redirected to other needs, and justification for such 
changes. The Senate report also directed GAO to monitor the 
comprehensive master plans being developed and implemented for the 
overseas regional commands and to provide the congressional defense 
committees with a report each year giving an assessment of the plans. 

As initiatives for expanding U.S. military presence on Guam began to 
emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted the ambitiousness of 
the military construction program and the need for a well-developed 
master plan to efficiently use the available land and infrastructure. 
In July 2006, the committee recommended deferral of two military 
construction projects at Andersen Air Force Base that were included in 
the President's budget request until such time as they can be 
incorporated into a master plan for Guam and viewed in that context. To 
that end, the committee directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to 
the appropriations committees a master plan for Guam by December 29, 
2006, and a report accounting for the United States' share of this 
construction program to project-level detail and the year in which each 
project is expected to be funded.[Footnote 14] The Senate report also 
directed GAO to review DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of 
its annual review of DOD's overseas master plans. 

DOD Organizations and Responsibilities: 

Within DOD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics was tasked to prepare the detailed, comprehensive master 
plans. In turn, the Under Secretary assigned the overseas regional 
combatant commands responsibility for preparing comprehensive master 
plans for their areas of responsibility. As shown in figure 3, PACOM 
coordinates East Asia and South Asia; EUCOM coordinates much of sub- 
Saharan Africa and Europe, as well as the Indian Ocean islands off the 
coast of southeast Africa; and CENTCOM coordinates efforts in the 
Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and Central Asia. Not shown are 
Northern Command, which coordinates activities in North America, and 
Southern Command, which coordinates activities in South America, 
Central America, and the Caribbean. We did not include Northern and 
Southern Commands in our review because they have significantly fewer 
facilities outside of the United States than the other regional 
commands in the Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia. There are also four 
functional unified combatant commands that are assigned worldwide 
functional responsibilities not bounded by geography: Special 
Operations Command, Strategic Command, Joint Forces Command, and 
Transportation Command.[Footnote 15] 

Figure 3: PACOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM Geographic Areas of Responsibility: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

Note: This map does not reflect the future establishment of the U.S. 
Africa Command. The Africa Command eventually will encompass the entire 
continent of Africa except for Egypt, which will continue to fall under 
CENTCOM's area of responsibility. 

[End of figure] 

Initial implementation details for the movement of U.S. Marines to Guam 
and associated military construction projects took place under the 
leadership of PACOM. In August 2006, OSD directed the Navy to establish 
JGPO to facilitate, manage, and execute requirements associated with 
the rebasing of Marine Corps assets from Okinawa to Guam, including 
master planning efforts.[Footnote 16] The office's responsibilities 
include integration of operational support requirements, development, 
program, and budget synchronization; oversight of the construction; and 
coordination of government and business activities. Specifically, JGPO 
was tasked to lead the coordinated planning efforts among the DOD 
components and other stakeholders to consolidate, optimize, and 
integrate the existing DOD infrastructure capabilities on Guam. The 
office is expected to work closely with the Government of Japan and the 
local Guam government, other federal agencies, and Congress in order to 
manage this comprehensive effort and to develop a master plan. At the 
time of our review, JGPO and the Department of the Interior had formed 
a federal interagency task force in order to coordinate efforts to 
address issues relating to commerce, transportation, environment, and 
other areas. JGPO falls under the direct oversight of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment. 

Prior GAO Work: 

In our prior work, we found that while DOD's master plans generally 
exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress, 
opportunities existed for the plans to provide more complete, clear, 
and consistent information and to present a more definitive picture of 
future requirements. 

* In 2006, we reported that the master plans did not always explain how 
their implementation could be affected by other relevant and related 
defense plans and activities because there is not a requirement for 
them to do so.[Footnote 17] However without such explanations and 
linkage, it was difficult to determine the extent to which the master 
plans were coordinated and synchronized with other defense plans and 
activities and the effects these other activities have on the master 
plans in terms of infrastructure and funding requirements. We also 
reported that while the plans addressed a number of challenges that DOD 
faced in implementation--such as uncertainties with host nation 
relations and environmental concerns--PACOM's plan did not address 
training limitations in South Korea and Japan. We explained how some of 
these challenges could have a significant effect on infrastructure and 
funding requirements and, because the plans did not always describe 
such challenges and their potential effects, that Congress lacked the 
complete picture it needed to evaluate the annual military construction 
funding request. 

* In 2005, we reported that without more complete, clear, and 
consistent reporting of various items--host nation agreements and 
funding levels, including special bilateral agreements; U.S. funding 
levels and sources in addition to military construction funds; 
environmental remediation and restoration issues; population levels; 
and facility requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. 
territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific--across the master 
plans, Congress and other users did not have the best data available to 
facilitate their annual review and oversight.[Footnote 18] Also, we 
reported that without the detailed information on individual 
construction projects and the anticipated strategic end state of the 
command's overseas basing infrastructure, Congress did not have the 
best available and consistent data on which to track progress and 
changes from year to year and between commands. 

* In 2004, before DOD issued its initial overseas master plans, we 
reported that various factors, such as residual property value, 
environmental remediation, and the availability of multiple U.S. 
funding sources, could affect the funding of U.S. infrastructure 
overseas as well as the implementation of the plans once they were 
issued.[Footnote 19] At that time, we recommended that the overseas 
regional commands address these and other factors in the development of 
their plans. 

Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes in Overseas Basing Strategies 
and Requirements, Key Challenges, and Our Prior Recommendations: 

The fiscal year 2008 master plans, which provide infrastructure 
requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas 
regional commands' area of responsibility, reflect changes--to include 
recent decisions in the U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and 
requirements--and they generally describe the challenges that DOD faces 
in implementing the plans as well as our prior recommendations for 
improving the plans. The plans generally incorporate key changes 
associated with the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing 
strategies and provide a more comprehensive description of the 
challenges DOD faces in implementing the plans than in previous years. 
But while this year's plans provide information to respond to most of 
our prior recommendations, they do not address residual value--that is, 
the value of property being turned over to the host nation based on its 
reuse of property. Furthermore, PACOM's master plan does not describe 
the challenges the Air Force faces in training in South Korea, although 
it does describe for the first time the challenges addressing training 
limitations in Japan. 

Plans Reflect Key Changes in Overseas Basing Strategies and 
Requirements: 

This year's master plans incorporated key changes--including some very 
recent changes--associated with the continuing evolution of U.S. 
overseas basing strategies and requirements. In the 2008 master plans, 
OSD recognized that further changes will result as it continues to 
implement the global defense posture decisions. The department reported 
that as the overseas political and military environment and strategic 
landscape further evolve, global defense posture plans will continue to 
mature to address new priorities. Specifically, several changes 
identified in the overseas master plans included updated information 
involving realignment initiatives in South Korea and Japan, DOD's 
efforts to establish missile defense in Eastern Europe, and the 
creation of U.S. Africa Command. 

PACOM's master plan discussed the progress of dynamic realignment 
initiatives, which will relocate military personnel and facilities in 
South Korea and Japan. For example, last year PACOM reported that the 
U.S. and Japanese governments had established an interim agreement in 
October 2005 involving the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. This 
year, PACOM updated this information by indicating that final 
implementation documents were approved in May 2006. In addition, PACOM 
described the importance of relocating 8,000 marines and their 
dependents from Okinawa to Guam, returning additional land to Japan, 
and retaining a forward Marine Corps command and control capability to 
ensure a balanced, flexible contingency response capacity within the 
Asia-Pacific region. With respect to South Korea, PACOM provided 
information updating the status of the Land Partnership Plan and the 
Yongsan Relocation Plan,[Footnote 20] including a list of U.S. military 
camps and sites returned to the Government of South Korea, and 
describing the results from the October 2006 meeting between the 
Secretary of Defense and South Korea's Minister of Defense. 

As a part of DOD's efforts to establish a U.S. presence in Eastern 
Europe through a network of forward operating sites and cooperative 
security locations, EUCOM's master plan stated that the United States 
signed individual agreements with the governments of Romania and of 
Bulgaria in 2005 and 2006, respectively, which will allow DOD access to 
facilities and training sites. EUCOM also provided additional details, 
such as the mission, planned capabilities, equipment and aircraft, and 
population. Furthermore, EUCOM provided a status of ongoing 
transformation realignments in its area of responsibility, including 
listing the return of facilities to host nations, changes to its basing 
categories, and the rationale for these realignments. The master plans 
also described recent efforts to proceed with formal negotiations with 
the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic on establishing 
missile defense sites. 

This year, DOD forecasted changes for next year's master plans 
involving the development of a new command responsible for Africa, 
which is expected to be established by September 30, 2008. The 
President announced in February 2007 that the U.S. military will 
establish a new, separate U.S. Africa Command to enhance security 
cooperation, extend humanitarian assistance, and build partnership 
capacity on the African continent. At the time of our review, U.S. 
involvement in Africa is shared among three combatant commands. PACOM 
is responsible for Madagascar, the Seychelles, and the Indian Ocean 
area off the African coast. EUCOM is responsible for the largest swath 
of the continent: North Africa; West Africa, including the Gulf of 
Guinea; and central and southern Africa. CENTCOM covers the Horn of 
Africa--including Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, and 
Sudan. There are 13 cooperative security locations throughout Africa 
that historically have been identified in the EUCOM master plan. The 
new U.S. Africa Command eventually will encompass the entire continent 
of Africa except for Egypt, which will continue to fall under CENTCOM's 
area of responsibility. Discussions are ongoing on the possible 
headquarters location and what kinds of military forces would be 
assigned to the command. 

This year, the changes identified in the plans provided useful 
information on evolving costs and facility requirements in overseas 
basing. In addition, the commands continue to focus first on the 
mission and then on the infrastructure requirements needed to support 
the mission. For example, in CENTCOM's master plan, the descriptions of 
each forward operating site focus first on the mission and then on 
requirements by providing the type of mission the site has (such as 
providing logistical support), the unit that it could host, and its 
role in the region (such as supporting the war against terrorism or 
strengthening capabilities for rapid and flexible response in the 
central Asian states), as well as identifying the requirements for 
equipment and facilities to support the mission at the site. All of the 
commands provide similar information for their main operating bases, 
forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations. 

Even with the department's effort to update the plans as changes 
occurred and decisions were made, the evolution of U.S. overseas 
defense basing strategies and requirements continues. Accordingly, OSD 
and the regional commands will be faced with more changes in the 
future, and the changes occurring after this year's plans were 
submitted to Congress will have to be reflected in next year's plans. 

Plans Generally Reflected Key Challenges: 

The fiscal year 2008 master plans discussed a number of challenges that 
DOD faces in the implementation of the plans, such as uncertainties 
with host nation relations and environmental concerns. In our prior 
reports, we explained how these challenges could have an effect on 
infrastructure and funding requirements and, because the prior plans 
did not always describe such challenges and their potential effects, 
that Congress lacked the complete picture it needed to evaluate the 
annual military construction funding requests. This year, the plans 
provided a much more comprehensive description of challenges and the 
potential effects on implementation. 

This Year's Plans Provided More Complete Descriptions of Host Nation 
Relations: 

All of the regional commands describe to varying degrees the status of 
recent negotiations and agreements with host nations in their fiscal 
year 2008 master plans. In our review of the overseas master plans in 
2005, we found that none of the commands fully explained the status of 
or challenges to finalizing host nation agreements and recommended that 
the commands briefly explain the status of negotiations with host 
nations to provide more complete and clearer plans. These agreements 
depend largely on the political environment and economic conditions in 
host nations and can affect the extent of host nation support--access 
to facilities or funding--to U.S. forces. Accordingly, the resulting 
agreements may increase or decrease U.S.-funded costs for future 
infrastructure changes. For example, this year: 

* PACOM's master plan updated information on the results of the Defense 
Policy Review Initiative, including the importance of certain 
initiatives, such as the replacement of the Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma in hopes that it will lessen the effect of military aviation 
operations on the local citizens of Japan. In addition, U.S. Forces 
Japan identified decreasing funds for the Japanese facilities 
improvement program, historically the source of major construction on 
U.S. bases in Japan. U.S. Forces Japan anticipates the Government of 
Japan will continue to decrease these funds on the basis that in 
addition to this program and other forms of host nation support (i.e., 
utilities and Japanese labor force), the Government of Japan is also 
responsible for providing funding for the Defense Policy Review 
Initiative. Potential Government of Japan financial constraints may 
result in U.S. facilities in Japan requiring more financial support 
from the U.S. government than in the past. In addition, USFK provided 
details on current realignment efforts, including the Government of 
South Korea's approval of the Land Partnership Plan and Yongsan 
Relocation Plan and efforts to coordinate the transfer of U.S.-vacated 
bases. The plans also discussed USFK's efforts to work with South Korea 
to complete the transition of wartime operational control from the 
United States to South Korea in the future. 

* EUCOM's master plan identified specific information on efforts to 
close or return installations, such as Naval Air Station Keflavik, 
Iceland; Naval Support Activity La Maddalena, Italy; selected sites in 
Germany, Belgium, and Turkey; and several classified locations in the 
region. The plan also recognized that current U.S. basing may not 
adequately support either strategic changes in an expanding North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Alliance or the requirements of a rapidly 
changing area of responsibility while seeking to preserve assets with 
enduring value to its missions, goals, and national interests. EUCOM 
also explained that its transformation execution depends on host nation 
negotiations, political-military considerations, base realignment and 
closure, and fiscal limitations. 

* CENTCOM's master plan discussed efforts to solicit host nation 
contributions and the amount of coordination and support that is needed 
from DOD, the State Department, and Congress. The plan discussed the 
challenge of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and CENTCOM's 
intention to sustain long-term access to locations across its area of 
responsibility. The plan also reflected land return actions in Kuwait 
and Uzbekistan and changes to base category designations, such as 
consolidation of a cooperative security location into a forward 
operating site, both of which support surge capability for ground force 
support. 

This Year's Plans Provided Better Descriptions of Environmental 
Challenges: 

All of the commands addressed the extent of their environmental 
challenges in this year's overseas master plans. In contrast, during 
our review of the overseas master plans in 2005, none of the commands 
identified environmental remediation and restoration issues. This year, 
PACOM provided information on remediation actions taken by USFK before 
returning installations to South Korea, such as skimming fuel from 
groundwater at five camps. Last year, USFK also discussed its efforts 
to coordinate with the Government of South Korea on remediation of 
vacated U.S. bases; officials expect these efforts will accelerate the 
return of vacated facilities and areas to the Government of South Korea 
and the relocation of U.S. forces from Seoul and other 
locations.[Footnote 21] This year, EUCOM identified areas for cleanup, 
groundwater investigation, and monitoring and discussed contamination 
at one site that did not present an unacceptable risk to human health 
or the mission. Last year, CENTCOM did not report any environmental 
issues. Though a senior CENTCOM official said that there were no 
environmental issues last year in the command's area of responsibility, 
this year, CENTCOM's master plan identified funding requirements for a 
wastewater treatment plant and a water treatment and distribution 
system at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, in hopes of avoiding potential 
environmental problems. The extent to which the commands provide 
information involving environmental activities provides the users of 
the plans with the ability to compare and comprehend how costs have 
varied and how these costs may affect planned U.S. funding levels. 

Plans Generally Reflect Our Prior Recommendations: 

The fiscal year 2008 overseas master plans have been updated to reflect 
our prior recommendations for improving the plans, though they do not 
address the issue of residual value as we recommended in 2004. To 
improve the overseas master plans and address our recommendations from 
last year, OSD provided additional guidance on October 12, 2006, to the 
regional commands in preparing this year's plans. As a result, the 
fiscal year 2008 master plans identify how implementation of the plans 
could be affected by other relevant and related defense plans and 
activities. For example, PACOM's force structure plans are linked to 
the military buildup on Guam and CENTCOM's increased troop strength and 
facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan are linked to ongoing operations. In 
addition, the commands generally provided more detailed information on 
a variety of key areas, such as precise facility requirements and 
costs, time frames for an end state, base categories, host nation 
funding levels, and effects of other defense activities. For example: 

* Facility requirements and costs. This year, all of the regional 
commands identified their precise facility requirements and costs for 
fiscal year 2008 and for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and reported 
estimated facility sustainment costs for fiscal year 2008. In addition, 
CENTCOM provided information on supplemental appropriations for 
facilities and projects at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. 

* Base categories. This year, all of the commands categorized their 
installations into applicable base categories of main operating base, 
forward operating site, and cooperative security location,[Footnote 22] 
which provided users a clearer picture of the infrastructure plans and 
requirements at these sites. The commands also supplemented the 
information on base categories with detailed data on the installations' 
capabilities, overall mission, population, and types of equipment and 
facilities located at each site. For example, CENTCOM and EUCOM also 
identified adjustments to the base categories, such as redesignating a 
main operating base as a forward operating site or consolidating two 
cooperative security locations into one. EUCOM also provided specific 
details on sites no longer considered cooperative security locations in 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, such as sites with no operational 
importance and a commercial facility readily available for military use 
that did not require U.S. investment or presence. 

* End state date. This year, all of the commands identified a common 
strategic end state date of 2013, which identifies the last fiscal year 
of the construction time frame. The strategic end state date of 2013 
provides users a more complete and clearer basis for tracking progress 
in meeting the command infrastructure objectives for their areas of 
responsibility. Previously, OSD had provided the commands the 
discretion in choosing an end date from 2011 to 2015. 

* Host nation funding levels. This year, all of the commands reported 
host nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal year 2008 
and at the aggregate level for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, which 
provided users a better basis to determine the extent to which U.S. 
funding is needed for facility requirements. Also, PACOM identified 
host nation funding for its bilateral agreements in South Korea, such 
as the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan. On the 
other hand, PACOM did not identify specific host nation funding from 
the Defense Policy Review Initiative--while the Government of Japan's 
share for the Guam relocation is $6.1 billion, the Government of Japan 
has not made an official, public estimate of the costs for several 
major realignments within Japan. Although, in relation to this 
initiative, the command did identify the need for U.S. military 
construction funds to support realignment costs not paid by the 
Japanese government. EUCOM provided information on North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization contributions and discussed a burden-sharing 
arrangement with the Government of Norway. CENTCOM also provided host 
nation estimates and explained that its efforts to attain host nation 
funding were ongoing. 

* Effects of other defense activities. This year, all of the commands 
described the effects of other defense activities on implementation of 
their master plans. Last year, only PACOM's plan gave some indication 
of how its implementation could be affected by another activity--the 
potential decrease in traditional Japanese construction funding that 
would help Japan offset its Defense Policy Review Initiative costs, 
such as those associated with the relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam. 
This year, PACOM discussed this topic as well as the progress of 
bilateral negotiations with Japan and challenges associated with this 
realignment. Last year, EUCOM's master plan did not explain the 
potential effect of implementing base realignment and closure 
recommendations on the movement of troops from Germany to bases in the 
United States, commonly called overseas rebasing. EUCOM and Army 
officials told us that any delay in the implementation of base 
realignment and closure recommendations would cause them to delay the 
movement of Army servicemembers and their families if facilities were 
not available at receiving installations in the United States. This 
would delay the closings of Army installations in Europe and increase 
costs to operate those installations while they remain open. This year, 
the overseas master plan identified that the base realignment and 
closure recommendations supported overseas restructuring and that 
EUCOM's transformation depends on this effort. Last year, CENTCOM's 
master plan only made general references to operations in Iraq and did 
not fully explain the potential effects of such operations on other 
installations and facility requirements outside of Iraq in its area of 
responsibility. This year, CENTCOM officials emphasized that 
infrastructure requirements in their master plan directly supported and 
responded to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in terms of 
increased troop strength and its facilities requirements in theater. In 
addition, CENTCOM's plan identified how future basing and 
infrastructure will be defined by ongoing contingencies and global 
defense posture. 

Two Areas of Concern Continue to Be Overlooked: 

While the overseas master plans have continued to evolve and have 
provided more comprehensive data every year since 2004, two key topics 
continue to be omitted from the plans. First, the master plans do not 
address the issue of residual value--the value of property being turned 
over to the host nation based on its reuse of property. As we reported 
last year, residual value was excluded from OSD's guidance because it 
is based on the reuse of property being turned over to the host nation, 
which is limited for most categories of military facilities and is 
often reduced by actual or anticipated environmental remediation costs. 
Consequently, as we have noted in the past,[Footnote 23] DOD officials 
believe that residual value cannot be readily predicted and therefore 
should not be assumed in the master plans. However, since these issues 
vary by host nation and may not be clear to all users of the plans, we 
continue to believe that OSD should require commands, at a minimum, to 
explain the issues with obtaining residual value in each host nation 
and report the implications for U.S. funding requirements. Also, the 
U.S. government has received approximately $592 million since 1989 in 
residual value and payment-in-kind compensation from property returns 
in EUCOM's area of responsibility, and EUCOM continues to aggressively 
seek compensation for U.S. capital improvements at installations 
returned to host nations. As EUCOM continues to return facilities in 
Germany, Italy, and Iceland, this figure may increase. Accordingly, we 
continue to believe that residual value should be addressed in the 
master plans. 

Second, while PACOM's master plan provided details on other challenges, 
it did not describe the challenges the command faces in addressing 
training limitations for the Seventh Air Force in South Korea, although 
senior officials told us that these limitations could cause the United 
States to pursue alternatives, such as training in other locations, 
downsizing, or relocating, which could affect overseas basing plans. 
Specifically, we found that the PACOM master plan did not point out 
that the Seventh Air Force in South Korea may be unable to maintain 
combat capability in the long term because of a lack of adequate air- 
to-surface ranges, according to senior Air Force and USFK officials. 
For decades, the Government of South Korea has attempted to relocate 
the Koon-Ni range, which had served as the primary air-to-ground range 
for the Seventh Air Force. The air and ground range management of the 
Koon-Ni training range was transferred to the Government of South 
Korea, which closed the range in August 2005. While there is an 
agreement with the Government of South Korea to train at other ranges, 
according to senior Air Force and USFK officials, the other ranges do 
not provide electronic scoring capabilities necessary to meet the Air 
Force's air-to-surface training requirements and there is difficultly 
in scheduling these ranges. As a result, the Air Force has been using 
ranges in Japan and Alaska to meet its training requirements, which 
results in additional transportation costs to the U.S. government. In 
May 2007, officials said that some progress had been made in addressing 
the Air Force's training challenges in South Korea and that they 
expected the needed upgrades to be completed by mid-2007. In contrast, 
the PACOM plan described the training limitations involving bombing and 
live fire training ranges and the effects of airspace access 
restrictions in Japan on C-130 training. In addition, the plan 
discusses how noise and land use sensitivities and maneuver area 
limitations in Okinawa require U.S. forces to deploy to other Pacific 
Rim locations to supplement their training, which results in additional 
transportation requirements and costs. The plan also discussed efforts 
by U.S. Forces Japan and the Government of Japan to engage in bilateral 
discussions to address training shortfalls and explore solutions. 

We have previously recommended that overseas regional commands address 
residual value issues and that PACOM explain how it plans to address 
existing training limitations in our prior reports. We believe that 
identifying these issues would make Congress aware of potential 
challenges to obtaining residual value and to training U.S. forces in 
South Korea, which may affect facility requirements and funding in this 
country. Even though our prior recommendations have not been fully 
addressed, we continue to believe that they have merit and that 
Congress would benefit from disclosure of this information. 

Planning Effort for Guam Is in Its Initial Stages with Many Key 
Decisions and Challenges to Be Addressed: 

DOD's planning effort for the buildup of military forces and 
infrastructure on Guam is in its initial stages, with many key 
decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. While the Guam Integrated 
Military Development Plan provides information on the projected 
military population, units, and infrastructure that may be needed for 
the Guam realignments, it lacks specific information and is not 
intended to be a master plan. Additional time is needed for DOD to 
address several challenges before JGPO can develop a Guam master plan. 
First, the required environmental impact statement--which will take up 
to 3 years to complete, according to DOD documents and officials--was 
initiated on March 7, 2007. According to DOD officials, the results of 
this environmental impact statement will influence many of the key 
decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military 
infrastructure development on Guam. Second, exact size and makeup of 
the forces to be moved to Guam are not yet identified. Third, DOD 
officials said that additional time is needed to fully address the 
challenges related to funding uncertainties, operational requirements, 
and Guam's unique economic and infrastructure requirements. At the same 
time, DOD has not established a comprehensive and routine process to 
keep Congress informed on its progress in dealing with these issues and 
the overall status of implementing the military buildup on Guam. 

Planning Effort Is in Initial Stages: 

While the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan provides the best 
available information on the projected military population, units, and 
infrastructure that may be needed for future Guam realignments, DOD 
officials told us that their planning effort was still in its initial 
phases with many key decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. In 
July 2006, PACOM issued its Guam development plan--a notional document 
describing the future development of the military services on Guam over 
the next decade and beyond. The plan is based upon a notional force 
structure that was used to generate land and facility requirements for 
basing, operations, logistics, training, and quality of life involving 
the Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations Forces 
in Guam. DOD officials told us that the plan was not a master plan 
because it did not include specific information on facility 
requirements, associated costs, and a timeline for specific actions and 
was not intended to meet the requirement to provide a master plan to 
both congressional appropriations committees by December 2006.[Footnote 
24] In addition, the development plan does not direct individual 
service programming actions or provide for specific funding 
requirements. According to DOD documents and officials, additional 
detailed service and joint planning will be required to identify 
specific facility, infrastructure, and funding requirements and address 
the challenges associated with the military buildup. 

Environmental Impact Statement Process Affects Development and Timing 
of a Guam Master Plan: 

Among the challenges to be addressed before JGPO can develop a Guam 
master plan is to complete the required environmental impact statement. 
According to DOD officials, the results of the environmental statement-
-which could take up 3 years to complete--will affect many of the key 
decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military 
infrastructure development. 

On March 7, 2007, the Navy issued a public notice of intent to prepare 
an environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969[Footnote 25] (NEPA), as 
implemented by the Council on Environmental Quality 
Regulations,[Footnote 26] and Executive Order 12114. The notice of 
intent in the Federal Register[Footnote 27] states that the 
environmental impact statement will: 

* Examine the potential environmental effects associated with 
relocating Marine Corps command, air, ground, and logistics units 
(which comprise approximately 8,000 marines and their estimated 9,000 
dependents) from Okinawa to Guam. The environmental impact statement 
will examine potential effects from activities associated with Marine 
Corps units' relocation to include operations, training, and 
infrastructure changes. 

* Examine the Navy's plan to enhance the infrastructure, logistic 
capabilities, and pier/waterfront facilities to support transient 
nuclear aircraft carrier berthing at Naval Base Guam. The environmental 
impact statement will examine potential effects of the waterfront 
improvements associated with the proposed transient berthing. 

* Evaluate placing a ballistic missile defense task force 
(approximately 630 servicemembers and 950 family members) in Guam. The 
environmental impact statement will examine potential effects from 
activities associated with the task force to include operations, 
training, and infrastructure changes. 

DOD officials recognize that the results of this environmental 
assessment process may affect the development and timing of DOD's plan 
for Guam.[Footnote 28] Under NEPA[Footnote 29] and the regulations for 
implementing NEPA established by the Council on Environmental 
Quality,[Footnote 30] an environmental impact statement must include a 
purpose and need statement, a description of all reasonable project 
alternatives and their associated environmental impacts (including a 
"no action" alternative), a description of the environment of the area 
to be affected or created by the alternatives being considered, and an 
analysis of the environmental impacts of the proposed action and each 
alternative.[Footnote 31] Further, accurate scientific analysis, expert 
agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing 
NEPA. For example, federal agencies such as DOD are required to ensure 
the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the 
discussions and analyses in the environmental impact statement. 
Additionally, after preparing a draft environmental impact statement, 
federal agencies such as DOD are required to obtain the comments of any 
federal agency that has jurisdiction by law or certain special 
expertise and request the comments of appropriate state and local 
agencies, Native American tribes, and any agency that has requested 
that it receive such statements. Until an agency issues a final 
environmental impact statement and record of decision, it generally may 
not take any action concerning the proposal that would either have an 
adverse environmental impact or limit the choice of reasonable 
alternatives. DOD officials stated that performing these alternative 
site analyses and cumulative effects analyses will delay the Guam 
master plan's completion. Based on the expected completion of the 
environmental impact statement, according to JGPO officials, the master 
plan may not be completed until fiscal year 2009. 

Exact Size and Makeup of Forces to Move to Guam Are Not Yet Decided: 

The exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam and the 
housing, operational, quality of life, and services support 
infrastructure required are not yet fully known and are expected to be 
identified and assessed during the parallel environmental analysis and 
the individual service and joint planning processes. 

While DOD identified some Marine Corps units for relocation as a part 
of realignment initiatives, there are assessments still under way to 
determine the optimal mix of units in Guam and in Okinawa. The 
following Marine Corps units have been identified for relocation to 
Guam: Third Marine Expeditionary Forces Command Element, Third Marine 
Division Headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Group Headquarters, 1st 
Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters. 
The Marine Corps forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-
Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and 
combat service support, as well as a base support capability. 
Approximately 10,000 marines plus their dependents are expected to 
remain on the island of Okinawa following the realignment of forces to 
Guam. While these broad estimates provide a baseline, according to 
officials we visited, the Marine Corps is still determining the 
specific mix of units and capabilities needed to meet mission 
requirements on both Guam and Okinawa. The mix of units is significant 
because, according to Marine Corps officials, the functional and base 
support requirements will be based on the type, size, and number of 
units that will relocate to Guam. This determination will define the 
training and facility requirements, such as barracks, family housing, 
schools, and other infrastructure. In response to the ongoing 
assessment by the Marine Corps, a JGPO official said that the office 
was initiating a master plan that will reflect the building of flexible 
infrastructure that could accommodate any type of military units that 
may relocate to Guam. However, in the absence of information on the 
number and mix of forces, it will be difficult to provide an accurate 
assessment of specific facility requirements to support the Guam 
realignment actions. 

DOD is still determining requirements for berthing a transient aircraft 
carrier and the exact size and mix of the Army missile defense task 
force as well as the infrastructure requirements. In the future, the 
Navy is planning on periodically berthing an aircraft carrier in Guam 
and the support facilities needed for this ship are still being 
determined. According to Navy officials, a new carrier pier with 
additional capabilities will need to be constructed in order to 
accommodate this plan. Additionally, most of the aircraft from the 
aircraft carrier will also require temporary beddown at Andersen Air 
Force Base, which may cause additional facilities requirements. The 
Army is also planning on basing a ballistic missile defense task force 
in Guam, though the size and mix of this task force as well as the 
infrastructure requirements are still being determined. At the time of 
this review, Army officials projected that the missile defense site 
will be located at Andersen Air Force Base but acknowledged that the 
site may be located elsewhere depending on the capability that will be 
brought to Guam. 

Additional Time Is Needed to Fully Address Several Challenges: 

DOD faces several significant challenges associated with its master 
planning effort for Guam, including funding requirements, operational 
challenges, and community impacts that could adversely affect the 
development and implementation of the master plan. 

Funding Requirements: 

Funding requirements for the military buildup on Guam are yet not fully 
identified and may be difficult to meet given other priorities and 
existing funding constraints, according to DOD officials. DOD agencies, 
such as the Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Education Activity, 
that will help support the services' influx of personnel, missions, and 
equipment to Guam will likely incur additional costs that are not yet 
included in the current DOD $13 billion cost estimate for military 
buildup on Guam. According to DOD officials, this cost estimate 
includes the costs to move Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam, to 
construct a Navy pier for a transient aircraft carrier, and to station 
an Army ballistic missile defense task force. However, it does not 
include the costs of other defense agencies to support the additional 
military personnel and dependents on Guam. According to JGPO, these 
costs will eventually be identified once further information is 
available on the master plan. 

Within the current DOD $13 billion cost estimate, the Marine Corps move 
from Okinawa to Guam is estimated to cost about $10.3 billion. Of this 
amount for the move, the Government of Japan has agreed to contribute 
about $6.1 billion to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam. 
Nearly half of Japan's contribution, or $2.8 billion, is expected to be 
direct contributions while the remaining $3.3 billion will consist of 
investment incentives for family housing and on-base infrastructure, 
such as utilities, which over time could be recouped by Japan in the 
form of rent or service charges. For example, the Government of Japan 
will finance construction of family housing units in Guam, but these 
construction costs will be reimbursed by payments from the 
servicemembers' housing allowance using U.S. funds. Furthermore, the 
Government of Japan's funds will not be made available until it has 
agreed to specific infrastructure plans for Guam. In addition, DOD 
officials recognize that the failure or delay of one plan outlined in 
the Defense Policy Review Initiative may affect another, since various 
planning variables need to fall into place in order for the initiative 
to move forward. For example, DOD officials expect that if the Futenma 
replacement facility in Okinawa (a facility intended to replace the 
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and estimated to cost from $4 billion 
to $5 billion) is not built, the Marine Corps relocation to Guam may be 
delayed. DOD officials view the success of the Futenma replacement 
facility as a key objective of the initiative that will need to be 
completed in order for other realignment actions to take place. The 
Government of Japan may encounter challenges in funding its share of 
the Marine Corps move considering Japan's other national priorities and 
its commitments associated with funding several other major 
realignments of U.S. forces in Japan under the Defense Policy Review 
Initiative. At the time of our review, the Japanese legislature had 
approved $228 million for planning and initial construction funds for 
force posture realignments, including efforts for project planning in 
Guam, and authorized the Japan Bank for International Cooperation to 
invest in businesses for Guam development. 

DOD officials also expressed concern regarding the department's ability 
to obtain a continuous flow of funds adequate to pay its share of the 
current $13 billion cost estimate for military buildup on Guam in light 
of ongoing operations and funding constraints and challenges. These 
officials said that obtaining funding for the military buildup on Guam 
at current estimated levels will be difficult because of the pressures 
the department faces in funding other defense priorities and 
activities, including the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and procurement costs for weapons systems. Also, there are other costs 
not included in the $13 billion cost estimate associated with the 
Marine Corps' move to Guam that will increase overall costs. 
Historically, for example, the Government of Japan has paid a large 
portion of the operation and maintenance costs of the Marine Corps in 
Okinawa in the form of host nation support that will be borne solely by 
DOD after the move. For example, the DOD Inspector General reported 
that the relocation to Guam will increase the Marine Corps' annual 
funding requirements by $465 million for operations and maintenance 
costs currently borne by the Government of Japan and for the costs of 
the additional strategic lift needed after the move. 

Additional costs will be incurred from building facilities that will 
house equipment and aircraft during inclement weather, and there may be 
additional incidental maintenance costs as a result of damage from 
typhoons and seismic shocks. Guam is located in an area of the Pacific 
commonly referred to as Typhoon Alley, where on average 31 tropical 
storms develop annually. Also, earthquake risk in Guam is caused by the 
island's proximity to the Mariana Trench, which leads to earthquakes 
throughout the region. Marine Corps officials stated that in estimating 
Guam facility development costs, DOD took into account that additional 
costs will occur when constructing to Guam's typhoon and seismic 
standards--including concrete and structural reinforcement and 
providing backup and redundant utility systems. Estimated costs to 
build infrastructure in Guam are based on the DOD Facilities Pricing 
Guide. The area cost factors identify Guam as one of the more expensive 
locations for military construction in comparison with other locations 
in the United States and its territories. Specifically, the 
construction costs for Guam are 2.64 times more expensive than the 
baseline average presented in the DOD Facilities Pricing 
Guide.[Footnote 32] The area cost factor is used by planners to adjust 
average historical facility costs to a specific project location, 
taking into consideration the costs of construction material, labor, 
and equipment, along with factors such as weather, climate, seismic 
conditions, mobilization, overhead and profit, labor availability, and 
labor productivity for each area. In addition, Marine Corps officials 
expect there will be additional facility repair costs periodically as a 
result of damage from typhoons and seismic shocks. 

Operational Challenges: 

Several operational challenges, such as providing appropriate mobility 
support and training capabilities to meet Marine Corps requirements, 
have not been fully addressed. For example, according to Marine Corps 
Forces, Pacific, officials, the Marine Corps in Guam will depend on 
strategic military sealift and airlift to reach destinations in Asia 
that will be farther away than was the case when the units were based 
in Okinawa. The Marine Corps depends on strategic lift for its 
operational and training-related movement needs, including 
transportation of forces and equipment. For example, in a contingency 
operation that requires sealift, the ships may have to deploy from 
Sasebo, Japan, or another location to transport soldiers and equipment 
in Guam and then return to the area of responsibility where the 
contingency is taking place. According to Marine Corps officials, 
amphibious shipping capability and airlift capacity are needed in Guam, 
which may include expanding staging facilities and systems support for 
both sealift and airlift. The Marine Corps estimated additional costs 
for strategic lift operating from Guam to be nearly $88 million 
annually. 

Existing training facilities and ranges on Guam are not sufficient to 
meet the training requirements of the projected Marine Corps force. A 
DOD analysis of training opportunities in Guam concluded that no ranges 
on Guam are suitable for the needs of the projected Marine Corps force, 
because of inadequacy in size or lack of availability. The services are 
in the process of conducting a training study that includes Guam and 
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands[Footnote 33] to assess 
the options for training in the region. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, 
officials stated that live fire artillery training, amphibious 
landings, and tracked vehicle operations will be challenging because of 
the combination of factors associated with the limited size of training 
areas available on the Northern Mariana Islands and the associated 
environmental concerns. Still, they are optimistic that the study, 
which will include environmental limitations, facility requirements, 
real estate requirements, and estimated costs, will result in the 
identification and development of new training areas. 

Economic and Infrastructure Requirements: 

The effects of the increase in military forces, in terms of population 
and military infrastructure, on Guam's unique economic and 
infrastructure requirements have not been fully addressed. The current 
population of Guam is estimated to be 171,000, and the projected future 
military population could increase it by more than 15 percent. The 
active duty military personnel and dependent population is estimated at 
14,195 in Guam, and it is expected to increase to 39,130--an increase 
of 176 percent (see table 1). 

Table 1: Proposed Increase in the Numbers of Active Duty Military 
Personnel and Dependents on Guam: 

Service/unit: Marine Corps; 
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 3; 
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 2; 
Baseline (current population): Total: 5; 
Proposed plan: Active duty: 8,000; 
Proposed plan: Dependents: 9,000; 
Proposed plan: Total: 17,000. 

Service/unit: Air Force; 
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 1,930; 
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 2,280; 
Baseline (current population): Total: 4,210; 
Proposed plan: Active duty: 4,560; 
Proposed plan: Dependents: 3,730; 
Proposed plan: Total: 8,290. 

Service/unit: Navy; 
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 4,350; 
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 5,230; 
Baseline (current population): Total: 9,580; 
Proposed plan: Active duty: 5,600; 
Proposed plan: Dependents: 5,280; 
Proposed plan: Total: 10,880. 

Service/unit: Army; 
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 30; 
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 50; 
Baseline (current population): Total: 80; 
Proposed plan: Active duty: 630; 
Proposed plan: Dependents: 950; 
Proposed plan: Total: 1,580. 

Service/unit: Coast Guard; 
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 140; 
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 180; 
Baseline (current population): Total: 320; 
Proposed plan: Active duty: 170; 
Proposed plan: Dependents: 230; 
Proposed plan: Total: 400. 

Service/unit: Special Operations; 
Baseline (current population): Active duty: [Empty]; 
Baseline (current population): Dependents: [Empty]; 
Baseline (current population): Total: [Empty]; 
Proposed plan: Active duty: 350; 
Proposed plan: Dependents: 630; 
Proposed plan: Total: 980. 

Service/unit: Total; 
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 6,453; 
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 7,742; 
Baseline (current population): Total: 14,195; 
Proposed plan: Active duty: 19,310; 
Proposed plan: Dependents: 19,820; 
Proposed plan: Total: 39,130. 

Source: PACOM. 

Note: GAO analysis of PACOM data presented in the Guam Integrated 
Military Development Plan. Baseline numbers represent active duty 
personnel stationed in Guam as of March 31, 2005. 

[End of table] 

The population could also swell further because DOD's estimates do not 
include DOD civilians, contractors, or Navy transient personnel from an 
aircraft carrier. According to Navy officials, transient personnel from 
an aircraft carrier could add as many 5,000 personnel on Guam during a 
port call. The sum of these increases is expected to have significant 
effects on Guam's unique economic and infrastructure requirements. For 
example: 

* Construction capacity. As a result of Guam realignment actions, the 
construction demands for infrastructure will exceed the availability of 
local contract labor on the island, though the extent to which the Guam 
local community and foreign workers can meet this increase has yet to 
be determined. Historically, construction capacity on Guam has been 
approximately $800 million per year, as compared with the estimated 
construction capacity of more than $3 billion per year projected to be 
needed to meet the fiscal year 2014 completion date for realignment 
actions. Preliminary analysis indicates that 15,000 to 20,000 workers 
will be required to support the development on Guam. Consequently, the 
increased demand for workers may require workforce training for the 
local population and possibly a need for foreign workers. Foreign 
workers would have to temporarily enter the United States on temporary 
nonagricultural workers visas, capped at 66,000 per year, and DOD 
officials have already indicated that visa waivers might be needed in 
order to mitigate limitations on the number of visas allowed into the 
United States each year. Other challenges associated with an increase 
of foreign workers in Guam include providing support facilities and 
services, such as housing and medical care for these workers, as well 
as possible social tensions between the local population and foreign 
workers because of job competition. 

* Public infrastructure. The effects of the increased demand on Guam's 
roads, port capabilities, and utility services--such as electrical 
generation, wastewater treatment, and solid waste disposal--have not 
been fully addressed. DOD and Guam officials recognize that the 
island's infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand and 
will require significant funding to address these needs. For example, 
the Government of Guam has estimated that it will cost about $2.6 
billion to improve the local infrastructure to accommodate forecasted 
military and civilian growth on the island and that federal assistance 
is needed to meet these requirements. DOD officials and the Guam 
Integrated Military Development Plan identified several infrastructure 
areas that are in need of improvements: (1) the two major roads in Guam 
are in poor condition and, when ordnance (ammunition and explosives) is 
unloaded from ships for the Air Force now and for the Marine Corps in 
the future, it must be transported on one of these major roads that 
runs through highly populated areas; (2) the Government of Guam plans a 
number of projects to upgrade the capability and efficiency of Guam's 
port facilities that total about $155 million with only $56 million 
funded at the time of our review; (3) the utilities transmission lines 
are antiquated and the system is not reliable, and voltage and 
frequency fluctuations are common; (4) the wastewater treatment 
facilities have a long history of failing and are near capacity; and 
(5) the solid waste landfills have a number of unresolved issues 
related to discharge of pollutants and are near capacity. Although the 
Government of Japan has agreed to provide $700 million for utilities 
infrastructure on DOD bases in Guam, this funding is neither intended 
nor is it sufficient to improve the infrastructure throughout the 
island. Future DOD operations may be constrained on Guam if 
improvements are not made to Guam's infrastructure. 

* DOD land use on Guam. DOD officials initially told Guam officials 
that they could implement force structure plans with currently held 
land although they are now reviewing the possibility of using 
additional land to prevent future encroachment. For example, the Guam 
Integrated Military Development Plan considered both existing and 
former DOD land areas for potential use to accommodate realignment 
actions. In terms of existing land, DOD owned about 40,000 acres of 
land in Guam at the time of this review--approximately 29 percent of 
the island. Former DOD land areas have previously been a part of the 
base realignment and closure process or released to the Government of 
Guam. There are political sensitivities to using former DOD land areas, 
since local community officials in Guam are concerned with the 
community's reaction to DOD's possible expansion of land holdings on 
the island. 

Funding uncertainties, operational challenges, and community impacts 
may not only affect the development of the Guam master plan but also 
increase costs for the U.S. government. Until DOD provides further 
information on how these challenges will be resolved, it will not know 
the precise costs of the Guam realignment plans to the U.S. government. 
DOD's has begun efforts to create a successful partnership and 
coordinate with other federal departments and agencies, the Government 
of Guam, and other organizations, which are important in addressing 
Guam's unique economic and infrastructure requirements. At the same 
time, DOD has not established a comprehensive and routine process to 
keep Congress informed on its progress dealing with these issues and 
the overall status of implementing the military buildup on Guam. In the 
absence of this information on how challenges will be addressed in the 
future, Congress is not in a position to help ensure the best 
application of limited federal funds and the leveraging of all 
available options for supporting the military buildup on Guam. 

Concluding Observations: 

As U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements continue to 
evolve, so do the department's master plans. The plans continue to 
improve each year by providing more complete, clear, and consistent 
information and descriptions of the challenges DOD faces overseas. 
However, we have previously recommended that overseas regional commands 
address the extent to which they are seeking residual value 
compensation for U.S. capital improvements at installations returned to 
host nations and that PACOM explain how it plans to address existing 
training limitations that may affect infrastructure and funding 
requirements. We believe that identifying these issues would provide 
Congress an awareness of potential challenges of recouping residual 
value from host nations and training U.S. forces in South Korea, which 
may affect facility requirements and funding in these countries. We 
continue to believe that these recommendations have merit and that 
Congress would benefit from disclosure of this information. 

In July 2006, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 
military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to provide a 
master plan on the military buildup in Guam. DOD needs several more 
years to complete a master plan. Completion of a Guam master plan 
depends on the outcome of the environmental impact assessments and 
statement that could take up to 3 years to complete, on decisions that 
finalize the exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam, 
and on efforts that address challenges associated with the military 
buildup, including funding, operational requirements, and local 
economic and infrastructure needs. DOD's planning efforts for Guam are 
evolving and up-to-date information on facility requirements and 
associated costs would be useful for funding decisions and assessments 
of all available options to assist DOD, federal departments and 
agencies, the Government of Guam, and other organizations in addressing 
the challenges associated with the military buildup. 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

GAO is not recommending executive action. However, to further 
facilitate annual review and oversight by Congress and other users of 
the overseas master plans, Congress should consider requiring the 
Secretary of Defense to ensure that (1) future overseas master plans 
address the extent to which the regional commands are seeking residual 
value compensation for U.S. capital improvements at installations 
returned to host nations and (2) future PACOM plans address existing 
training limitations in its area of responsibility and the potential 
effects of those limitations on infrastructure and funding 
requirements. 

To help ensure the best application of limited federal funds and the 
leveraging of all available options for supporting the military buildup 
on Guam until DOD prepares a master plan, Congress should consider 
requiring the Secretary of Defense to report periodically to all the 
defense committees on the status of DOD's planning efforts for Guam, 
including DOD's efforts to complete its environmental impact statement, 
identify the exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam 
and the associated infrastructure required, and address the various 
challenges associated with the military buildup. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Installations and Environment responded that congressional 
action is not necessary. 

* In commenting on our matter for congressional consideration to 
require that future overseas master plans address the extent to which 
commands are seeking residual value compensation, the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense stated that DOD already provides status reports on 
its residual value negotiations to the Committees on Appropriations and 
Armed Services and that prior legislation outlines reporting 
requirements on the closure of foreign military installations 
worldwide, with specific reporting requirements throughout the residual 
value negotiation process. While we were aware of these reporting 
requirements, these reports do not provide users of the master plans 
the kind of information needed to address their concerns about the 
status of residual value negotiations or the implications for U.S. 
funding. Our recommendation to Congress is grounded in the fact that 
residual value issues vary by host nation and the implications for U.S. 
funding also vary accordingly and thus may not be clear enough to all 
users of the plans. We continue to believe that the Secretary of 
Defense should require commands to explain the issues with obtaining 
residual value from each host nation and report the implications for 
U.S. funding. 

* In commenting on our matter for congressional consideration that 
future PACOM plans address training limitations in its area of 
responsibility, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense responded that 
the department agrees that validated training requirements that are 
affected by force posture transformation plans should be addressed in 
overseas master plans. He further stated that nonprogrammed and 
nonvalidated training limitations experienced by service components 
were not appropriate for inclusion and would not be addressed in the 
overseas commands' risk assessment for their master plans. While we are 
not aware of any nonprogrammed and nonvalidated training limitations, 
our report discusses only those training limitations raised by senior 
command officials during our review. We assume that if there is a need 
to make a distinction between nonvalidated versus validated training 
limitations, OSD and the overseas commands would work together to 
identify those validated limitations that should be addressed in their 
master plans. In addition, last year OSD included in its guidance a 
requirement for the combatant commands to identify and discuss risks to 
their master plans as well as steps taken to mitigate those risks, 
including validated training requirements and limitations. In response 
to this guidance U.S. Forces Japan provided information on training 
limitations, while USFK omitted this information from the overseas 
master plan. This inconsistency led to our recommendation that Congress 
require such reporting, and we continue to believe that this 
information is necessary to provide a complete picture of the potential 
effects on infrastructure and funding requirements in South Korea. 

* In commenting on our matter for congressional consideration that the 
Secretary of Defense report periodically to all the defense committees 
on the status of DOD's planning efforts for Guam, the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense responded that the Guam master plan is scheduled 
to be completed in 2008, at which time a copy will be provided to 
congressional defense committees. It should be noted that Senate Report 
109-286 directed DOD to submit a master plan for the military buildup 
on Guam by December 2006; however, DOD did not submit the plan for 
several reasons that we discuss in this report. Moreover, because the 
master plan cannot be completed until the environmental impact 
statement is completed, a process that could take until 2009, Congress 
may not see the master plan for another 2 years at least. Also, DOD 
faces a variety of funding challenges, operational challenges, and 
community impacts that may both affect the development and timing of 
the Guam master plan and increase costs for the U.S. government. Thus, 
in the interim before receiving a master plan, congressional oversight 
could be enhanced by Congress periodically receiving an update on the 
planning efforts in Guam, including DOD's efforts to complete its 
environmental impact statement, identify the exact size and makeup of 
the forces to be moved to Guam and the associated infrastructure 
required, and address the various challenges associated with the 
military buildup. 

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense's comments are reprinted in 
appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments on a draft of this 
report, which we incorporated where appropriated. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; 
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be made 
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. The GAO staff members who made key 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Brian J. Lepore: 
Director Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tim Johnson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Chet Edwards: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Roger F. Wicker: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the fiscal year 2008 overseas master 
plans have changed since last year, and the extent to which the plans 
address the challenges faced by the Department of Defense (DOD) during 
implementation, we compared the reporting requirements in the 
congressional mandate and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
guidance, which incorporated our prior recommendations. In order to 
identify improvements to the overseas master plan, we compared and 
contrasted the fiscal year 2007 and 2008 plans. We assessed the 
quantity and quality of one plan's responses for each of the data 
elements, including details on base categories, host nation funding 
levels, facility requirements and costs, environmental remediation 
issues, and other issues affecting the implementation of the plans, and 
compared them to equivalent responses in other plans; formed 
conclusions as to the completeness, clarity, and consistency of the 
latest plan's responses; and generated observations and recommendations 
for improving the plans. We also discussed with DOD officials our 
observations and recommendations, specific reporting requirements, and 
whether improvements in the guidance and reporting were needed. We also 
interviewed cognizant officials from DOD about the various changes and 
challenges that were identified within the plans. We met with officials 
from OSD and each of the following commands and agencies: U.S. Pacific 
Command (PACOM); U.S. Army Pacific; Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. 
Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Forces 
Korea; U.S. Eighth Army; Seventh Air Force; Commander, Naval Forces 
Korea; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Far East District; DOD Education 
Activity; U.S. Forces Korea Status of Forces Agreement Office; U.S. 
Forces Japan; U.S. Army Japan; U.S. Air Forces Japan; Commander, Naval 
Forces Japan; U.S. Marine Forces Japan; Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command-Pacific, Japan; U.S. European Command; U.S. Army Europe; 
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command-Italy; U.S. Air Force Europe; Army Installation Management 
Agency, Europe Regional Office; U.S. Central Command; and Special 
Operations Command. In general, we discussed the reporting requirements 
contained in OSD's guidance, host nation agreements and funding levels, 
U.S. funding levels and sources, environmental remediation and 
restoration issues, property returns to host nations, and training 
requirements. We also analyzed available reports, documents, policies, 
directives, international agreements, guidance, and media articles to 
keep abreast of ongoing changes in overseas defense basing strategies 
and requirements. To see firsthand the condition of facilities and 
status of selected construction projects, we visited and toured 
facilities at Camp Schwab, Camp Kinser, Camp Foster, Torii Station, 
Camp Zama, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Yokota Air Base, Japan; Camp 
Humphreys and Kunsan Air Force Base, South Korea; and Aviano Air Base, 
Caserma Ederle, Dal Molin, and Naval Support Activity La Maddalena, 
Italy. 

To determine the status of DOD's planning effort for the buildup of 
forces and infrastructure on Guam, we met with officials from OSD, the 
Navy, PACOM, and the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO). In general, we 
discussed the development of a Guam master plan and the Integrated 
Military Development Plan with PACOM and JGPO officials. We also met 
with officials from U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Forces, 
Pacific; U.S. Marine Forces Japan; Third Marine Expeditionary Forces; 
U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army Pacific; and Pacific Air Forces to discuss 
the various factors that can affect U.S. infrastructure requirements 
and costs associated with the buildup in Guam. We visited Naval Base 
Guam and Andersen Air Force Base in Guam to see the installations and 
future military construction sites firsthand. We also reviewed DOD's 
military construction budgets for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and 
planned for future years to identify U.S. funding levels and sources 
planned for the military buildup in Guam. To identify challenges 
associated with the buildup in this planning effort, we met with the 
aforementioned DOD officials and other interested parties in Guam, 
including the Governor, legislative leaders, the Chamber of Commerce, 
the Civil Military Task Force, the Guam Women's Group, and the Office 
of the Delegate from Guam to the U.S. House of Representatives. We did 
not evaluate concerns raised by the officials, but we reviewed relevant 
federal laws and discussed them with DOD officials. We also analyzed 
available reports, documents, international agreements, and media 
articles to keep abreast of ongoing activities in Guam pertaining to 
challenges that may affect DOD's development and implementation of a 
master plan. 

While we met with Special Operations Command officials, its planning 
efforts were not specifically required for the master plans in response 
to the congressional mandates. In addition, we did not include Southern 
and Northern Commands in our analysis because these commands have 
significantly fewer facilities overseas than the other regional 
commands in the Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia. 

We conducted our review from September 2006 through July 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, Dc 20301-3000: 

Acquisition Technology And Logistics: 

August 15, 2007: 

Mr. Brian Lepore: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Lepore:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-07-1015, "Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are 
Improving, but DoD Needs To Provide Congress Additional Information 
about the Military Buildup on Guam", dated July 16, 2007 (GAO Code 
350916).

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Philip W. Grone: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: 
(Installations and Environment): 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report, GAO-07-1015, "Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master 
Plans Are Improving, but DoD Needs To Provide Congress Additional 
Information about the Military Buildup on Guam", dated July 16, 2007 
(GAO Code 350916): 

Department Of Defense Comments: 

Although the GAO did not recommend executive actions, the GAO, as a 
matter for Congressional Consideration, stated that "Congress should 
require DOD to report on residual value and U.S. Pacific Command's 
(PACOM) training limitations, as well as periodically on its planning 
efforts for Guam, including the environmental impact statement, the 
exact size and makeup of forces, and efforts to address various 
challenges." 

DoD RESPONSE: For the reasons set out below, Congressional action is 
not necessary. 

Residual Value: The DoD already provides status reports on its residual 
value negotiations to the Committees on Appropriations and Armed 
Services pursuant to the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations Report 
No. 103-153, accompanying the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Appropriations Act, 1994, as amended. Additionally, Section 2921 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 (Public Law 101-510), as 
amended, outlines reporting requirements on the closure of foreign 
military installations worldwide, with specific reporting requirements 
throughout the residual value negotiation process. 

U.S. Pacific Command Training Limitations: The Department concurs that 
validated training requirements which are affected by force posture 
transformation plans should be addressed in the overseas master plans. 
However, it is more germane for these issues to be addressed as part of 
the discussions on risk assessment than to be addressed separately. 
Therefore, DoD will advise overseas combatant commands to include 
training issues as part of their risk assessment discussion, to include 
steps taken to mitigate those risks. Non-programmed and non-validated 
training limitations experienced by Service components are not 
appropriate for inclusion and will not be addressed. 

Report on planning efforts for Guam, including the environmental impact 
statement, the exact size and makeup of forces, and efforts to address 
various challenges. The U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations Report 
No. 109-286, accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 
2006, requests that the Secretary of Defense to submit a master plan 
for Guam including a report accounting for the U.S. share of the $10.3B 
construction program (project-level detail) and the year in which each 
project is expected to be funded. The Guam Master Plan is scheduled to 
be completed in 2008, at which time a copy will be provide to the 
Congressional Defense Committees.

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant 
Director; Nelsie Alcoser; Kate Lenane; Erika Prochaska; Roger 
Tomlinson; and Cheryl Weissman made major contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] In fulfilling this requirement, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense asked the overseas regional combatant commands to prepare 
comprehensive master plans for their areas of responsibility. 

[2] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003). 

[3] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-342, at 17 (2003). 

[4] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006). 

[5] GAO, DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve, 
GAO-06-913R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 2006); Opportunities Exist to 
Improve Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense 
Infrastructure Overseas, GAO-05-680R (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005); 
and Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs 
Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans, GAO-04-609 
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004). 

[6] Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, Update of Overseas Master Plans (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 12, 2006). OSD also issued guidance in 2004 and 2005 to aid 
the overseas regional commands in developing their plans. 

[7] Department of Defense, Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing 
Infrastructure Requirements at Department of Defense Overseas 
Facilities (Washington, D.C.: February 2007). This year, OSD submitted 
the overseas master plans to Congress on March 28, 2007, and made them 
available to us on April 20, 2007, which did not provide us sufficient 
time to fully assess the plans or provide a draft report to Congress by 
May 15 as we have done in prior years. 

[8] U.S. Pacific Command, Guam Integrated Military Development Plan 
(Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii: July 11, 2006). 

[9] In lieu of cash payments, a country may choose payment-in-kind 
compensation--such as construction of facilities for U.S. forces--which 
in turn reduces U.S. expenditures. 

[10] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006). The report directed the 
Secretary of Defense to submit a master plan for Guam by December 29, 
2006, to the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of Congress. 

[11] DOD officials refer to the process through which the United States 
and Japan negotiated the initiatives that realign U.S. forces in Japan 
as the Defense Policy Review Initiative. The realignment initiatives 
were the result of Security Consultative Committee meetings in 2005 and 
2006 between U.S. and Japanese officials. The results of these meetings 
established a framework for the future U.S. force structure in Japan, 
including the Marine Corps move from Okinawa to Guam. 

[12] We included Guam in our estimate for military construction and 
family housing for overseas locations. However, we excluded worldwide 
classified and unspecified appropriations from our total because these 
categories may include domestic military construction and family 
housing. 

[13] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 10 (2003). 

[14] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006). 

[15] The functional commands have few facilities outside the United 
States and are not required to issue master plans for changing 
infrastructure requirements at DOD overseas facilities. 

[16] JGPO is responsible for implementation of the base realignment and 
closure decision to establish a joint base on Guam. This also includes 
the realignment of installation management functions at Andersen Air 
Force Base to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Marianas. 

[17] GAO-06-913R. 

[18] GAO-05-680R. 

[19] GAO-04-609. 

[20] As discussed in our prior reports, within the provisions of the 
Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan, USFK intends to 
strengthen its overall military effectiveness by consolidating 
installations north of Seoul, including the Yongsan Army Garrison 
located in the Seoul metropolitan area, into two major hubs in the 
central and southern sections of South Korea. USFK expects the 
consolidation and relocation of thousands of soldiers to increase 
readiness, efficiencies, and cost savings; enhance quality of life; 
provide a less-intrusive presence; and increase training opportunities. 

[21] On April 7, 2006, USFK announced a plan for the return of 
facilities and areas that have been vacated by the command to the 
Government of South Korea. This plan includes a number of measures 
designed to address issues identified in joint South Korea and U.S. 
environmental surveys of these vacated facilities and areas. For 
example, the plan calls for the United States to remove underground 
fuel storage tanks to preclude future leaks and initiate a technology 
process for skimming fuel from the groundwater at locations where this 
contamination was found. 

[22] Overseas master plans defined the bases categories as the 
following: (1) main operating base, a facility outside the United 
States and U.S. territories with permanently stationed operating forces 
and robust infrastructure and characterized by command and control 
structures, enduring family support facilities, and strengthened force 
protection measures; (2) forward operating site, a scalable location 
outside the United States and U.S. territories intended for rotational 
use by operating forces with limited U.S. military support presence and 
possibly pre-positioned equipment; and (3) cooperative security 
location, a facility located outside the United States and U.S. 
territories with little or no permanent U.S. presence that is 
maintained with periodic service, contractor, or host nation support. 
Cooperative security locations provide contingency access, logistics 
support, and rotational use by operating forces and can be a focal 
point for security cooperation activities. 

[23] GAO-04-609. 

[24] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006). 

[25] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347. 

[26] 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508. 

[27] 72 Fed. Reg. 10186-7 (Mar. 7, 2007). 

[28] The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to 
serve as an action-forcing device to ensure that the policies and goals 
defined in NEPA are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of 
the federal government. Further, regulations for implementing the act 
established by the Council on Environmental Quality specify that to the 
fullest extent possible, agencies shall prepare draft environmental 
impact statements concurrently with and integrated with other 
environmental impact analyses and related surveys and studies required 
by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, the National Historic 
Preservation Act of 1966, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and other 
environmental review laws and executive orders. See 40 C.F.R. § 
1502.25. 

[29] 40 C.F.R. § 1500-1508. 

[30] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347. 

[31] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13-1502.16. 

[32] The baseline average is 1.00, representing the average cost of 
construction at U.S. and overseas locations. In 2004, the baseline 
average was computed on the basis of construction costs at 202 U.S. 
locations and 91 overseas locations. 

[33] The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands is a self- 
governing commonwealth of the United States that administers its own 
local government functions under its own constitution. The commonwealth 
consists of 14 islands--Rota, Saipan, Tinian, and others--located north 
of Guam. 

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