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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2007:
Department Of Homeland Security:
Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions:
Homeland Security Progress Report:
GAO-07-454:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-454, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) recent 4 year anniversary
provides an opportunity to reflect on the progress DHS has made since
its establishment. DHS began operations in March 2003 with the mission
to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
vulnerabilities, minimize damages from attacks, and aid in recovery
efforts. GAO has reported that the creation of DHS was an enormous
management challenge and that the size, complexity, and importance of
the effort made the challenge especially daunting and critical to the
nation’s security. Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions
found that successful transformations of large organizations, even
those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at
least 5 to 7 years to achieve. GAO was asked to report on DHS’s
progress in implementing its mission and management areas and
challenges DHS faces. This report also discusses key themes that have
affected DHS’s implementation efforts.
How GAO Did This Study:
To assess DHS’s progress, GAO identified performance expectations for
each mission and management area based on legislation, homeland
security presidential directives, DHS and component agencies’ strategic
plans, and other sources.
GAO analyzed these documents to identify responsibilities for DHS and
obtained and incorporated feedback from DHS officials on the
performance expectations. On the basis of GAO’s and the DHS Office of
Inspector General’s (IG) prior work and updated information provided by
DHS, GAO determined the extent to which DHS has taken actions to
generally achieve each performance expectation. An assessment of
generally achieved indicates that DHS has taken actions to satisfy most
elements of the expectation, and an assessment of generally not
achieved indicates that DHS has not yet taken actions to satisfy most
elements of the expectation. An assessment of generally not achieved
may be warranted even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to
satisfy some but not most elements of an expectation. In cases when we
or the DHS IG have not completed work upon which to base an assessment
or the information DHS provided did not enable us to clearly determine
the extent to which DHS has achieved the performance expectation, we
indicated no assessment made. Our assessment of DHS’s progress relative
to each performance expectation is not meant to imply that DHS should
have fully achieved the performance expectation by the end of its
fourth year. On the basis of this analysis, GAO determined whether DHS
has made limited, modest, moderate, or substantial progress in each
mission and management area. The assessments of progress do not
reflect, nor are they intended to reflect, the extent to which DHS’s
actions have made the nation more secure in each area.
What GAO Found:
At the time of its creation in 2003 as one of the largest federal
reorganizations in the last several decades, we designated the
implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk area due to the
magnitude of the challenges it confronted in areas vital to the
physical and economic well being of the nation. After 4 years into its
overall integration effort, DHS has attained some level of progress in
all of its mission and management areas. The rate of progress, however,
among these areas varies, as shown in the table below.
Summary of Assessments of DHS’s Progress in Mission and Management
Areas:
Mission/management area: Border security;
Number of performance expectations: 12;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 5;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 7;
Number of expectations not assessed: 0;
Overall assessment of progress: Modest.
Mission/management area: Immigration enforcement;
Number of performance expectations: 16;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 8;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 4;
Number of expectations not assessed: 4;
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.
Mission/management area: Immigration services;
Number of performance expectations: 14;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 5;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 9;
Number of expectations not assessed: 0;
Overall assessment of progress: Modest.
Mission/management area: Aviation security;
Number of performance expectations: 24;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 17;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 7;
Number of expectations not assessed: 0;
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.
Mission/management area: Surface transportation security;
Number of performance expectations: 5;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 3;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 2;
Number of expectations not assessed: 0;
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.
Mission/management area: Maritime security;
Number of performance expectations: 23;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 17;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 4;
Number of expectations not assessed: 2;
Overall assessment of progress: Substantial.
Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Number of performance expectations: 24;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 5;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 18;
Number of expectations not assessed: 1;
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.
Mission/management area: Critical infrastructure protection;
Number of performance expectations: 7;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 4;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 3;
Number of expectations not assessed: 9;
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.
Mission/management area: Science and technology;
Number of performance expectations: 6;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 1;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 5;
Number of expectations not assessed: 0;
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.
Mission/management area: Acquisition management;
Number of performance expectations: 3;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 1;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 2;
Number of expectations not assessed: 0;
Overall assessment of progress: Modest.
Mission/management area: Financial management;
Number of performance expectations: 7;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 2;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 5;
Number of expectations not assessed: 0;
Overall assessment of progress: Modest.
Mission/management area: Human capital management;
Number of performance expectations: 8;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 2;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 6;
Number of expectations not assessed: 0;
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.
Mission/management area: Information technology management;
Number of performance expectations: 13;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 2;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 8;
Number of expectations not assessed: 3;
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.
Mission/management area: Real property management;
Number of performance expectations: 9;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 6;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 3;
Number of expectations not assessed: 0;
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.
Mission/management area: Total;
Number of performance expectations: 171;
Number of expectations generally achieved: 78;
Number of expectations generally not achieved: 83;
Number of expectations not assessed: 10;
Overall assessment of progress:
Source: GAO analysis.
Definitions:
Substantial progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more
than 75 percent of the identified performance expectations.
Moderate progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than
50 percent but 75 percent or less of the identified performance
expectations.
Modest progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than
25 percent but 50 percent or less of the identified performance
expectations.
Limited progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve 25 percent
or less of the identified performance expectations.
What GAO Recommends:
While this report contains no new recommendations, in past products,
GAO has made approximately 700 recommendations to DHS designed to
strengthen departmental operations. DHS has implemented some of these
recommendations, has taken actions to address others, and has taken
other steps to strengthen its mission and management activities.
In its comments on a draft of this report, DHS took issues with our
methodology and disagreed with our assessments for 42 of 171
performance expectations. DHS’s five general concerns were with (1)
perceived alteration of standards used to judge progress; (2) our
binary approach to assess the performance expectations; (3) perceived
changes in criteria after DHS provided additional information; (4)
consistent application of our methodology; and (5) differences in the
priority of performance expectations. We believe that we have fully
disclosed and consistently applied our methodology and that it provides
a sound basis for this progress report.
Contents:
Letter:
Scope and Methodology:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DHS Has Made Varying Levels of Progress in Implementing its Core
Mission and Management Functions, but Has Faced Difficulties in Its
Implementation Efforts:
Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS's Implementation Efforts:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Key GAO Contacts for DHS Mission and Management Areas:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Border Security
Performance Expectations:
Table 2: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Immigration Enforcement
Performance Expectations:
Table 3: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Immigration Services
Performance Expectations:
Table 4: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Aviation Security
Performance Expectations:
Table 5: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Surface Transportation
Security Performance Expectations:
Table 6: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Maritime Security
Performance Expectations:
Table 7: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Emergency Preparedness
and Response Performance Expectations:
Table 8: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Critical Infrastructure
and Key Resources Protection Performance Expectations:
Table 9: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Science and Technology
Performance Expectations:
Table 10: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Acquisition Management
Performance Expectations:
Table 11: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Financial Management
Performance Expectations:
Table 12: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Human Capital Management
Performance Expectations:
Table 13: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Information Technology
Management Performance Expectations:
Table 14: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Real Property Management
Performance Expectations:
Table 15: DHS Budget Authority for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007 in
Thousands of Dollars, as Reported by DHS as of January 2007:
Table 16: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Border
Security:
Table 17: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Border Security:
Table 18: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Immigration
Enforcement:
Table 19: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Immigration Enforcement:
Table 20: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Immigration
Services:
Table 21: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Immigration Services:
Table 22: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Aviation
Security:
Table 23: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Aviation Security:
Table 24: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Surface
Transportation Security:
Table 25: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Surface Transportation Security:
Table 26: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Maritime
Security:
Table 27: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Maritime Security:
Table 28: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Emergency
Preparedness and Response:
Table 29: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Emergency Preparedness and Response:
Table 30: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection:
Table 31: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection:
Table 32: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Science and
Technology:
Table 33: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Science and Technology:
Table 34: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Acquisition
Management:
Table 35: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Acquisition Management:
Table 36: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Financial
Management:
Table 37: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Financial Management:
Table 38: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Human Capital
Management:
Table 39: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Human Capital Management:
Table 40: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Information
Technology Management:
Table 41: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Information Technology Management:
Table 42: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Real Property
Management:
Table 43: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Real Property Management:
Figures:
Figure 1: Example of Performance Expectations for Border Security:
Figure 2: Selected Key Events That Have Affected Department of Homeland
Security Implementation:
Abbreviations:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office:
EDS: explosive detection system:
ETD: explosive trace detection:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
IG: Inspector General:
INS: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
SBI: Secure Border Initiative:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
USCIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services:
US-VISIT: United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 17, 2007:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently passed its 4 year
anniversary, and this anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on
the progress it has made since its establishment, determine challenges
the department has faced in implementing its mission and management
areas, and identify issues that will be important for the department to
address as it moves forward. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of
2002, DHS began operations in March 2003 with missions that include
preventing terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States,
reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing the damages from
attacks that occur, and helping the nation recover from any attacks.
Over the past 4 years, the department has initiated and continued the
implementation of various policies and programs to address these
missions as well as its nonhomeland security functions.[Footnote 1] In
particular, DHS has implemented programs to secure the border and
administer the immigration system; strengthen the security of the
transportation sector; and defend against, prepare for, and respond to
threats and disasters. DHS has also taken actions to integrate its
management functions and to transform its component agencies into an
effective cabinet department.
We have evaluated many of DHS's programs and management functions since
the department's establishment. We have issued over 400 products on
major departmental programs in the areas of border security and
immigration; transportation security; defense against, preparedness
for, and response to threats and disasters; and the department's
management functions--including acquisition, financial, human capital,
information technology, and real property management. In November 2006,
we provided congressional leadership with a list of government
programs, functions, and activities that warrant further congressional
oversight. Among the issues included were border security and
immigration enforcement, security of transportation modes,
preparedness and response for catastrophic threats, and DHS
implementation and transformation.[Footnote 2] We have also reported on
broad themes that have underpinned DHS's implementation efforts,
including agency transformation, strategic planning and results
management, risk management, information sharing, and partnerships and
coordination. We have made about 700 recommendations to DHS on ways to
improve its operations and address these key themes, such as to develop
performance measures and set milestones for key programs, allocate
resources based on assessments of risk, and develop and implement
internal controls to help ensure program effectiveness. DHS has
implemented some of these recommendations, taken actions to address
others, and taken other steps to strengthen its mission activities and
facilitate management integration. However, we have reported that the
department still has much to do to ensure that it conducts its missions
efficiently and effectively while simultaneously preparing to address
future challenges that face the department and the nation.
In 2003, we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as
high-risk because it represented an enormous undertaking that would
require time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner.[Footnote
3] Additionally, the components merged into DHS already faced a wide
array of existing challenges, and any DHS failure to effectively carry
out its mission could expose the nation to potentially serious
consequences. The area has remained on our high-risk list since
2003.[Footnote 4] Most recently, in our January 2007 high-risk update,
we reported that although the department had made some progress
transforming its 22 agencies into an effective, integrated
organization, DHS had not yet developed a comprehensive management
integration strategy and its management systems and functions--
especially related to acquisition, financial, human capital, and
information management--were not yet fully integrated and wholly
operational. We also noted that DHS faces a number of challenges to
effectively carry out its program activities and enhance partnerships
with private and public sector entities to leverage resources. We
concluded that this array of management and programmatic challenges
continues to limit DHS's ability to fulfill its homeland security roles
in an effective, risk-based way. Furthermore, in 2005 we designated
information sharing for homeland security as high-risk,[Footnote 5] and
in 2006 we identified the National Flood Insurance Program as high-
risk.[Footnote 6] In 2003 we expanded the scope of the high-risk area
involving federal information security, which was initially designated
as high-risk in 1997, to include the protection of the nation's
computer-reliant critical infrastructure. We identified information
sharing for homeland security as high-risk because of the lack of
strategic plans; established processes, procedures, and mechanisms; and
incentives for sharing information. We identified the National Flood
Insurance Program as high-risk because it was highly unlikely that the
program would generate sufficient revenues to repay funds borrowed from
the Treasury to cover claims during catastrophic loss years and because
of concerns related to the program's financial resources, compliance
with mandatory purchase requirements, and the costly impact of
repetitive loss properties. We expanded the scope of the federal
information security high-risk area to include the protection of the
nation's computer-reliant critical infrastructure because, as the focal
point of federal efforts, DHS had not yet completely fulfilled any of
its key responsibilities for enhancing cyber security.
In designating the implementation and transformation of DHS as high-
risk, we noted that the creation of DHS was an enormous management
challenge.[Footnote 7] The size, complexity, and importance of the
effort made the challenge especially daunting and incomparably critical
to the nation's security. We noted that building an effective
department would require consistent and sustained leadership from top
management to ensure the needed transformation of disparate agencies,
programs, and missions into an integrated organization. Our prior work
on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the creation of DHS,
found that successful transformations of large organizations, even
those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take 5 to
7 years to achieve. We reported that in successful transformations,
organizations undergo a change of their cultures to become more
results-oriented, client-and customer-oriented, and collaborative in
nature. To successfully transform, an organization must fundamentally
reexamine its processes, organizational structures, and management
approaches. Organizational changes such as these are complex and cannot
be accomplished overnight. In the case of DHS, it will likely take at
least several more years for the department to complete its
transformation efforts. We also have recommended that Congress continue
to monitor whether it needs to provide additional leadership
authorities to the DHS Under Secretary for Management or create a Chief
Operating Officer/Chief Management Officer position that could help
elevate, integrate, and institutionalize DHS's management initiatives.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
enacted in August 2007, designates the Under Secretary for Management
as the Chief Management Officer and principal advisor on management-
related matters to the Secretary.[Footnote 8] Under the Act, the Under
Secretary is responsible for developing a transition and succession
plan for the incoming Secretary and Under Secretary to guide the
transition of management functions to a new administration. The Act
further authorizes the incumbent Under Secretary as of November 8, 2008
(after the next presidential election), to remain in the position until
a successor is confirmed to ensure continuity in the management
functions of DHS.
You asked us to review our past work on DHS and provide an assessment
of DHS's progress and challenges during its first 4 years. This report
addresses the following questions: (1) What progress has DHS made in
implementing key mission and core management functions since its
inception, and what challenges has the department faced in its
implementation efforts? (2) What key themes have affected DHS's
implementation of its mission and management functions?[Footnote 9]
DHS's major mission and management areas include border security;
immigration enforcement; immigration services; aviation security;
surface transportation security; maritime security; emergency
preparedness and response; critical infrastructure and key resources
protection; science and technology; and acquisition, financial, human
capital, information technology, and real property management. This
report also identifies the key cross-cutting themes that have affected
the department's efforts to implement its mission and management areas.
These key themes include agency transformation, strategic planning and
results management, risk management, information sharing, and
partnerships and coordination.
Scope and Methodology:
This report is based primarily on work that we and the DHS Office of
Inspector General (IG) have completed since the establishment of DHS in
March 2003 and updated information and documentation provided by the
department in March 2007 through July 2007. To determine the progress
DHS has made in implementing various mission and management areas, we
first identified key areas. To identify these mission and management
areas, we analyzed the critical mission areas for homeland security
identified in legislation, the National Strategy for Homeland Security,
the goals and objectives set forth in the DHS Strategic Plan and
homeland security presidential directives, and areas identified in our
reports along with studies conducted by the DHS IG and other
organizations and groups, such as the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States (9-11 Commission) and the Century
Foundation. We analyzed these documents to identify common mission and
management areas and discussed the areas we identified with our subject
matter experts[Footnote 10] and DHS officials.[Footnote 11] The mission
and management areas we identified are:
1. Border security:
2. Immigration enforcement:
3. Immigration services:
4. Aviation security:
5. Surface transportation security:
6. Maritime security:
7. Emergency preparedness and response:
8. Critical infrastructure and key resources protection:
9. Science and technology:
10. Acquisition management:
11. Financial management:
12. Human capital management:
13. Information technology management:
14. Real property management:
To determine the level of progress made by DHS in each mission and
management area, we identified performance expectations for each area.
We define performance expectations as a composite of the
responsibilities or functions--derived from legislation, homeland
security presidential directives and executive orders, DHS planning
documents, and other sources--that the department is to achieve or
satisfy in implementing efforts in its mission and management areas.
The performance expectations are not intended to represent performance
goals or measures for the department.[Footnote 12] Figure 1 provides an
example of performance expectations for the border security mission
area:
Figure 1: Example of Performance Expectations for Border Security:
DHS Mission and Management Areas:
1. Border security: Performance Expectations: Implement a biometric
entry system to prevent unauthorized border crossers from entering the
United States through ports of entry; Implement a biometric exit system
to collect information on border crossers leaving the United States
through ports of entry; Develop a program to detect and identify
illegal border crossings between ports of entry; Implement a program to
detect and identify illegal illegal border crossings between ports of
entry.
2. Immigration enforcement:
3. Immigration services:
4. Aviation security:
5. Surface transportation security:
6. Maritime security:
7. Emergency preparedness and response:
8. Critical infrastructure and key resources protection:
9. Science and technology:
10. Acquisition management:
11. Financial management:
12. Human capital management:
13. Information technology management:
14. Real property management:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
We primarily focused the performance expectations on DHS's homeland
security-related functions. We generally did not identify performance
expectations related to DHS's nonhomeland security functions, although
we did identify some performance expectations that relate to these
functions. We also did not apply a weight to the performance
expectations we developed for DHS, although qualitative differences
between the expectations exist. We recognize that these expectations
are not time bound, and DHS will take actions to satisfy these
expectations over a sustained period of time. Therefore, our assessment
of DHS's progress relative to each performance expectation refers to
the progress made by the department during its first 4 years. Our
assessment of DHS's progress relative to each performance expectation
is not meant to imply that DHS should have fully achieved the
performance expectation by the end of its fourth year.
To identify the performance expectations, we examined responsibilities
set for the department by Congress, the Administration, and department
leadership. In doing so, we reviewed homeland security-related
legislation, such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004,[Footnote 13] the Homeland Security Act of 2002,[Footnote
14] the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002,[Footnote 15] the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002,[Footnote
16] and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.[Footnote 17] We
also reviewed DHS appropriations acts and accompanying conference
reports for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. We did not consider
legislation enacted since September 2006 in developing the performance
expectations. To identify goals and measures set by the Administration,
we reviewed relevant homeland security presidential directives and
executive orders. For the goals and measures set by the department, we
analyzed the DHS Strategic Plan, Performance Budget Overviews,
Performance and Accountability Reports, and component agencies'
strategic plans. For management areas, we also examined effective
practices identified in our prior reports.[Footnote 18] We analyzed
these documents to identify common or similar responsibilities for DHS
mission and management areas and synthesized the responsibilities
identified in the various documents to develop performance expectations
for DHS. We obtained and incorporated feedback from our subject matter
experts on these performance expectations. We also provided the
performance expectations to DHS for review and incorporated DHS's
feedback.
Based primarily on our prior work and DHS IG work, as well as updated
information provided by DHS between March and June 2007, we examined
the extent to which DHS has taken actions to achieve the identified
performance expectations in each area and make a determination as to
whether DHS has achieved the key elements of each performance
expectation based on the criteria listed below:
* Generally achieved: Our work has shown that DHS has taken actions to
satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation but may
not have satisfied all of the elements.
* Generally not achieved: Our work has shown that DHS has not yet taken
actions to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance
expectation but may have taken steps to satisfy some of the elements.
* No assessment made: Neither we nor the DHS IG have completed work
and/or the information DHS provided did not enable us to clearly assess
DHS's progress in achieving the performance expectation. Therefore, we
have no basis for making an assessment of the extent to which DHS has
taken actions to satisfy the performance expectation.[Footnote 19]
An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation;
however, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken actions
to satisfy most elements of the performance expectation. An assessment
of "generally not achieved" may be warranted even where DHS has put
forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not most elements of an
expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have not completed work
upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to satisfy a
performance expectation and/or the information DHS provided did not
enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has achieved the
performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment made." We analyzed
the extent of our work, the DHS IG's work, and DHS's updated
information and conferred with our subject matter experts to determine
whether the work and information were sufficient for a making a
determination of generally achieved or generally not achieved.
Between March and June 2007, we obtained updated information from DHS
and met with program officials to discuss DHS's efforts to implement
actions to achieve the performance expectations in each mission and
management area. We incorporated DHS's additional information and
documentation into the report and, to the extent that DHS provided
documentation verifying its efforts, considered them in making our
assessments of DHS's progress.
For each performance expectation, an analyst on our staff reviewed our
relevant work, DHS IG reports, and updated information and
documentation provided by DHS, including information received during
meetings with DHS officials. On the basis of this review, the analyst
made a determination that either DHS generally achieved the performance
expectation or generally did not achieve the performance expectation,
or the analyst identified that no determination could be made because
neither we nor the DHS IG had completed work and DHS did not provide us
with updated information and documentation. A second analyst then
reviewed each determination to reach concurrence on the assessment for
each performance expectation by reviewing the first analyst's summary
of our reports, relevant DHS IG reports, and DHS's updated information
and documentation. In cases when the first and second analyst
disagreed, the two analysts reviewed and discussed the assessments and
relevant documents to reach concurrence. Then, our subject matter
experts reviewed the summary of our reports, relevant DHS IG reports,
and DHS's updated information and documentation to reach concurrence on
the assessment for each performance expectation.
To develop criteria for assessing DHS's progress in each mission and
management area, we analyzed criteria used for ratings or assessments
in our prior work, in DHS IG reports, and in other reports and studies,
such as those conducted by the 9-11 Commission and the Century
Foundation. We also reviewed our past work in each mission and
management area and obtained feedback from our subject matter experts
and DHS officials on these criteria. Based on this analysis, we
developed the following criteria for assessing DHS's progress in each
mission and management area:
* Substantial progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more
than 75 percent of the identified performance expectations.
* Moderate progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more
than 50 percent but 75 percent or less of the identified performance
expectations.
* Modest progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than
25 percent but 50 percent or less of the identified performance
expectations.
* Limited progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve 25
percent or less of the identified performance expectations.
After making a determination as to whether DHS has generally achieved
or generally not achieved the identified performance expectations, we
added up the number of performance expectations that we determined DHS
has generally achieved. We divided this number by the total number of
performance expectations for each mission and management area,
excluding those performance expectations for which we could not make an
assessment. Based on the resulting percentage, we identified DHS's
overall progress in each mission and management area, as (1)
substantial progress, (2) moderate progress, (3) modest progress, or
(4) limited progress. Our subject matter experts reviewed the overall
assessments of progress we identified for DHS in each mission and
management area.
Our assessments of the progress made by DHS in each mission and
management area are based on the performance expectations we
identified. The assessments of progress do not reflect, nor are they
intended to reflect, the extent to which DHS's actions have made the
nation more secure in each area. For example, in determining that DHS
has made modest progress in border security, we are not stating or
implying that the border is modestly more secure than it was prior to
the creation of DHS. In addition, we are not assessing DHS's progress
against a baseline in each mission and management area. We also did not
consider DHS component agencies' funding levels or the extent to which
funding levels have affected the department's ability to carry out its
missions. We also did not consider the extent to which competing
priorities and resource demands have affected DHS's progress in each
mission and management area relative to other areas, although competing
priorities and resource demands have clearly affected DHS's progress in
specific areas.
In addition, because we and the DHS IG have completed varying degrees
of work (in terms of the amount and scope of reviews completed) for
each mission and management area, and because different DHS components
and offices provided us with different amounts and types of
information, our assessments of DHS's progress in each mission and
management area reflect the information available for our review and
analysis and are not necessarily equally comprehensive across all 14
mission and management areas. For example, as a result of the post-
September 11, 2001, focus on aviation, we have conducted more reviews
of aviation security, and our methodology identified a much larger
number of related performance expectations than for the department's
progress in surface transportation security. Further, for some
performance expectations, we were unable to make an assessment of DHS's
progress because (1) we had not conducted work in that area, (2) the
DHS IG's work in the area was also limited, and (3) the supplemental
information provided by DHS was insufficient to form a basis for our
analysis. Most notably, we were unable to make an assessment for four
performance expectations in the area of immigration enforcement. This
affected our overall assessment of DHS's progress in that area as there
were fewer performance expectations to tally in determining the overall
level of progress.
We conducted our work for this report from September 2006 through July
2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
At the time of its creation in 2003 as one of the largest federal
reorganizations in the last several decades, we designated the
implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk area due to the
magnitude of the challenges it confronted in areas vital to the
physical and economic well being of the nation. After 4 years into its
overall integration effort, DHS has attained some level of progress in
all of its major mission and management areas. The rate of progress,
however, among these areas varies.
* DHS's border security mission includes detecting and preventing
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States;
facilitating the orderly and efficient flow of legitimate trade and
travel; interdicting illegal drugs and other contraband; apprehending
individuals who are attempting to enter the United States illegally;
inspecting inbound and outbound people, vehicles, and cargo; and
enforcing pertinent laws of the United States at the border. As shown
in table 1, we identified 12 performance expectations for DHS in the
area of border security and found that DHS has generally achieved 5 of
them and has generally not achieved 7 others.
Table 1: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Border Security
Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 5.
Performance expectation: Implement a biometric entry system to prevent
unauthorized border crossers from entering the United States through
ports of entry;
Performance expectation: Develop a program to detect and identify
illegal border crossings between ports of entry;
Performance expectation: Develop a strategy to detect and interdict
illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into the United States;
Performance expectation: Provide adequate training for all border
related employees;
Performance expectation: Develop staffing plans for hiring and
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's border
security mission.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 7.
Performance expectation: Implement a biometric exit system to collect
information on border crossers leaving the United States through ports
of entry;
Performance expectation: Implement a program to detect and identify
illegal border crossings between ports of entry;
Performance expectation: Implement a strategy to detect and interdict
illegal flows of cargo, drugs and other items into the United States;
Performance expectation: Implement effective security measures in the
visa issuance process;
Performance expectation: Implement initiatives related to the security
of certain documents used to enter the United States;
Performance expectation: Ensure adequate infrastructure and facilities;
Performance expectation: Leverage technology, personnel, and
information to secure the border.
Overall assessment of progress: Modest.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's immigration enforcement mission includes apprehending,
detaining, and removing criminal and illegal aliens; disrupting and
dismantling organized smuggling of humans and contraband as well as
human trafficking; investigating and prosecuting those who engage in
benefit and document fraud; blocking and removing employers' access to
undocumented workers; and enforcing compliance with programs to monitor
visitors. As shown in table 2, we identified 16 performance
expectations for DHS in the area of immigration enforcement and found
that DHS has generally achieved 8 of them and has generally not
achieved 4 others. For 4 performance expectations, we could not make an
assessment.
Table 2: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Immigration Enforcement
Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 8.
Performance expectation: Develop a program to ensure the timely
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal
from the United States;
Performance expectation: Assess and prioritize the use of alien
detention resources to prevent the release of aliens subject to
removal;
Performance expectation: Develop a program to allow for the secure
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens;
Performance expectation: Develop a prioritized worksite enforcement
strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are employed;
Performance expectation: Develop a comprehensive strategy to interdict
and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the United States;
Performance expectation: Develop a law enforcement strategy to combat
criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border criminal
activity;
Performance expectation: Develop a program to screen and respond to
local law enforcement and community complaints about aliens who many be
subject to removal;
Performance expectation: Develop staffing plans for hiring and
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's immigration
enforcement mission.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 4.
Performance expectation: Implement a program to ensure the timely
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal
from the United States;
Performance expectation: Ensure the removal of criminal aliens;
Performance expectation: Implement a prioritized worksite enforcement
strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are employed;
Performance expectation: Implement a comprehensive strategy to
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the
United States.
Performance expectation: No assessment made; Total: 4.
Performance expectation: Implement a program to allow for the secure
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens;
Performance expectation: Implement a law enforcement strategy to combat
criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border criminal
activity;
Performance expectation: Disrupt and dismantle mechanisms for money
laundering and financial crimes;
Performance expectation: Provide training, including foreign language
training, and equipment for all immigration enforcement personnel to
fulfill the agency's mission.
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's immigration services mission includes administering immigration
benefits and working to reduce immigration benefit fraud. As shown in
table 3, we identified 14 performance expectations for DHS in the area
of immigration services and found that DHS has generally achieved 5 of
them and has generally not achieved 9 others.
Table 3: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Immigration Services
Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 5.
Performance expectation: Institute process and staffing reforms to
improve application processes;
Performance expectation: Establish online access to status information
about benefit applications;
Performance expectation: Establish revised immigration application
fees based on a comprehensive fee study;
Performance expectation: Communicate immigration-related information
to other relevant agencies;
Performance expectation: Create an office to reduce immigration benefit
fraud.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 9.
Performance expectation: Eliminate the benefit application backlog and
reduce application completion times to 6 months;
Performance expectation: Establish a timetable for reviewing the
program rules, business processes, and procedures for immigration
benefit applications;
Performance expectation: Institute a case management system to manage
applications and provide management information;
Performance expectation: Develop new programs to prevent future
backlogs from developing;
Performance expectation: Establish online filing for benefit
applications;
Performance expectation: Capture biometric information on all benefits
applicants;
Performance expectation: Implement an automated background check system
to track and store all requests for applications;
Performance expectation: Establish training programs to reduce fraud in
the benefits process;
Performance expectation: Implement a fraud assessment program to reduce
benefit fraud.
Overall assessment of progress; Total: Modest.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's aviation security mission includes strengthening airport
security; providing and training a screening workforce; prescreening
passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screening passengers,
baggage, and cargo. As shown in table 4, we identified 24 performance
expectations for DHS in the area of aviation security and found that
DHS has generally achieved 17 of them and has generally not achieved 7
others.
Table 4: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Aviation Security
Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 17.
Performance expectation: Implement a strategic approach for aviation
security functions;
Performance expectation: Ensure the screening of airport employees
against terrorist watch lists;
Performance expectation: Hire and deploy a federal screening workforce;
Performance expectation: Develop standards for determining aviation
security staffing at airports;
Performance expectation: Establish standards for training and testing
the performance of airport screener staff;
Performance expectation: Establish a program and requirements to allow
eligible airports to use a private screening workforce;
Performance expectation: Train and deploy federal air marshals on high-
risk flights;
Performance expectation: Establish standards for training flight and
cabin crews;
Performance expectation: Establish a program to allow authorized flight
deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or
criminal acts;
Performance expectation: Establish policies and procedures to ensure
that individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk or
threat to security are identified and subjected to appropriate action;
Performance expectation: Develop and implement processes and procedures
for physically screening passengers at airport checkpoints;
Performance expectation: Develop and test checkpoint technologies to
address vulnerabilities;
Performance expectation: Deploy explosive detection systems (EDS) and
explosive trace detection (ETD) systems to screen checked baggage for
explosives;
Performance expectation: Develop a plan to deploy in-line baggage
screening equipment at airports;
Performance expectation: Pursue the deployment and use of in-line
baggage screening equipment at airports;
Performance expectation: Develop a plan for air cargo security;
Performance expectation: Develop and implement procedures to screen air
cargo.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 7.
Performance expectation: Establish standards and procedures for
effective airport perimeter security;
Performance expectation: Establish standards and procedures to
effectively control access to airport secured areas;
Performance expectation: Establish procedures for implementing
biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas access control;
Performance expectation: Develop and implement an advanced prescreening
system to allow DHS to compare domestic passenger information to the
Selectee List and No Fly List;
Performance expectation: Develop and implement an international
passenger prescreening process to compare passenger information to
terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure;
Performance expectation: Deploy checkpoint technologies to address
vulnerabilities;
Performance expectation: Develop and implement technologies to screen
air cargo.
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's surface transportation security mission includes establishing
security standards and conducting assessments and inspections of
surface transportation modes, which include passenger and freight rail;
mass transit; highways, including commercial vehicles; and pipelines.
As shown in table 5, we identified 5 performance expectations for DHS
in the area of surface transportation security and found that DHS has
generally achieved 3 of them and has generally not achieved 2.
Table 5: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Surface Transportation
Security Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 3.
Performance expectation: Develop and adopt a strategic approach for
implementing surface transportation security functions;
Performance expectation: Conduct threat, criticality, and
vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets;
Performance expectation: Administer grant programs for surface
transportation security.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 2.
Performance expectation: Issue standards for securing surface
transportation modes;
Performance expectation: Conduct compliance inspections for surface
transportation systems.
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's maritime security responsibilities include port and vessel
security, maritime intelligence, and maritime supply chain security. As
shown in table 6, we identified 23 performance expectations for DHS in
the area of maritime security and found that DHS has generally achieved
17 of them and has generally not achieved 4 others. For 2 performance
expectations, we could not make an assessment.
Table 6: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Maritime Security
Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 17.
Performance expectation: Develop national plans for maritime security;
Performance expectation: Develop national plans for maritime response;
Performance expectation: Develop national plans for maritime recovery;
Performance expectation: Develop regional (port-specific) plans for
security;
Performance expectation: Develop regional (port-specific) plans for
response;
Performance expectation: Ensure port facilities have completed
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans;
Performance expectation: Ensure that vessels have completed
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans;
Performance expectation: Exercise security, response, and recovery
plans with key maritime stakeholders to enhance security, response, and
recovery efforts;
Performance expectation: Implement a port security grant program to
help facilities improve their security capabilities;
Performance expectation: Establish operational centers to monitor
threats and fuse intelligence and operations at the regional/port
level;
Performance expectation: Collect information on incoming ships to
assess risks and threats;
Performance expectation: Develop a vessel-tracking system to improve
intelligence and maritime domain awareness on vessels in U.S. waters;
Performance expectation: Collect information on arriving cargo for
screening purposes;
Performance expectation: Develop a system for screening and inspecting
cargo for illegal contraband;
Performance expectation: Develop a program to work with foreign
governments to inspect suspicious cargo before it leaves for U.S.
ports;
Performance expectation: Develop a program to work with the private
sector to improve and validate supply chain security;
Performance expectation: Develop an international port security program
to assess security at foreign ports.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 4.
Performance expectation: Develop regional (port-specific) plans for
recovery;
Performance expectation: Implement a national facility access control
system for port secured areas;
Performance expectation: Develop a long-range vessel-tracking system to
improve maritime domain awareness;
Performance expectation: Develop a program to screen incoming cargo for
radiation.
Performance expectation: No assessment made; Total: 2.
Performance expectation: Develop a national plan to establish and
improve maritime; intelligence;
Performance expectation: Develop standards for cargo containers to
ensure their physical security.
Overall assessment of progress: Substantial.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's emergency preparedness and response mission includes preparing
to minimize the damage and recover from terrorist attacks and
disasters; helping to plan, equip, train, and practice needed skills of
first responders; and consolidating federal response plans and
activities to build a national, coordinated system for incident
management. As shown in table 7, we identified 24 performance
expectations for DHS in the area of emergency preparedness and response
and found that DHS has generally achieved 5 of them and has generally
not achieved 18 others. For 1 performance expectation, we could not
make an assessment.
Table 7: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Emergency Preparedness
and Response Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 5.
Performance expectation: Establish a program for conducting emergency
preparedness exercises;
Performance expectation: Develop a national incident management system;
Performance expectation: Provide grant funding to first responders in
developing and implementing interoperable communications capabilities;
Performance expectation: Administer a program for providing grants and
assistance to state and local governments and first responders;
Performance expectation: Allocate grants based on assessment factors
that account for population, critical infrastructure, and other risk
factors.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 18.
Performance expectation: Establish a comprehensive training program for
national preparedness;
Performance expectation: Conduct and support risk assessments and risk
management capabilities for emergency preparedness;
Performance expectation: Ensure the capacity and readiness of disaster
response teams;
Performance expectation: Coordinate implementation of a national
incident management system;
Performance expectation: Establish a single, all-hazards national
response plan;
Performance expectation: Coordinate implementation of a single, all-
hazards response plan;
Performance expectation: Develop a complete inventory of federal
response capabilities;
Performance expectation: Develop a national, all-hazards preparedness
goal;
Performance expectation: Develop plans and capabilities to strengthen
nationwide recovery efforts;
Performance expectation: Develop the capacity to provide needed
emergency assistance and services in a timely manner;
Performance expectation: Provide timely assistance and services to
individuals and communities in response to emergency events;
Performance expectation: Implement a program to improve interoperable
communications among federal, state, and local agencies;
Performance expectation: Implement procedures and capabilities for
effective interoperable communications;
Performance expectation: Increase the development and adoption of
interoperability communications standards;
Performance expectation: Develop performance goals and measures to
assess progress in developing interoperability;
Performance expectation: Provide guidance and technical assistance to
first responders in developing and implementing interoperable
communications capabilities;
Performance expectation: Provide assistance to state and local
governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities;
Performance expectation: Develop a system for collecting and
disseminating lessons learned and best practices to emergency
responders.
Performance expectation: No assessment made; Total: 1.
Performance expectation: Support citizen participation in national
preparedness efforts.
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's critical infrastructure and key resources protection activities
include developing and coordinating implementation of a comprehensive
national plan for critical infrastructure protection, developing
partnerships with stakeholders and information sharing and warning
capabilities, and identifying and reducing threats and vulnerabilities.
As shown in table 8, we identified 7 performance expectations for DHS
in the area of critical infrastructure and key resources protection and
found that DHS has generally achieved 4 of them and has generally not
achieved 3 others.
Table 8: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Critical Infrastructure
and Key Resources Protection Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 4.
Performance expectation: Develop a comprehensive national plan for
critical infrastructure protection;
Performance expectation: Develop partnerships and coordinate with other
federal agencies, state and local, governments, and the private sector;
Performance expectation: Identify and assess threats and
vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure;
Performance expectation: Support efforts to reduce threats and
vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 3.
Performance expectation: Improve and enhance public/private
information sharing involving attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities;
Performance expectation: Develop and enhance national analysis and
warning capabilities for critical infrastructure;
Performance expectation: Provide and coordinate incident response and
recovery planning efforts for critical infrastructure.
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's science and technology efforts include coordinating the federal
government's civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures
to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging
terrorist threats. As shown in table 9, we identified 6 performance
expectations for DHS in the area of science and technology and found
that DHS has generally achieved 1 of them and has generally not
achieved 5 others.
Table 9: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Science and Technology
Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 1.
Performance expectation: Coordinate with and share homeland security
technologies with federal, state, local, and private sector entities.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 5.
Performance expectation: Develop a plan for departmental research,
development, testing, and evaluation activities;
Performance expectation: Assess emerging chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats and homeland security
vulnerabilities;
Performance expectation: Coordinate research, development, and testing
efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to address chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist
threats;
Performance expectation: Coordinate deployment of nuclear, biological,
chemical, and radiological detection capabilities and other
countermeasures;
Performance expectation: Assess and evaluate nuclear, biological,
chemical, and radiological detection capabilities and other
countermeasures.
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's acquisition management efforts include managing the use of
contracts to acquire goods and services needed to fulfill or support
the agency's missions, such as information systems, new technologies,
aircraft, ships, and professional services. As shown in table 10, we
identified 3 performance expectations for DHS in the area of
acquisition management and found that DHS has generally achieved 1 of
them and has generally not achieved 2 others.
Table 10: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Acquisition Management
Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 1.
Performance expectation: Assess and organize acquisition functions to
meet agency needs.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 2.
Performance expectation: Develop clear and transparent policies and
processes for all acquisitions;
Performance expectation: Develop an acquisition workforce to implement
and monitor acquisitions.
Overall assessment of progress: Modest.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
*DHS's financial management efforts include consolidating or
integrating component agencies' financial management systems. As shown
in table 11, we identified 7 performance expectations for DHS in the
area of financial management and found that DHS has generally achieved
2 of them and has generally not achieved 5 others.
Table 11: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Financial Management
Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 2.
Performance expectation: Designate a department Chief Financial Officer
who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate;
Performance expectation: Prepare corrective action plans for internal
control weaknesses.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 5.
Performance expectation: Subject all financial statements to an annual
financial statement audit;
Performance expectation: Obtain an unqualified financial statement
audit opinion;
Performance expectation: Substantially comply with federal financial
management system requirements, applicable federal accounting
standards, and the U.S. Standard General Ledger at the transaction
level;
Performance expectation: Obtain an unqualified opinion on internal
control over financial reporting;
Performance expectation: Correct internal control weaknesses.
Overall assessment of progress: Modest.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's key human capital management areas include pay, performance
management, classification, labor relations, adverse actions, employee
appeals, and diversity management. As shown in table 12, we identified
8 performance expectations for DHS in the area of human capital
management and found that DHS has generally achieved 2 of them and has
generally not achieved 6 others.
Table 12: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Human Capital Management
Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 2.
Performance expectation: Develop a results-oriented strategic human
capital plan;
Performance expectation: Create a comprehensive plan for training and
professional development.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 6.
Performance expectation: Implement a human capital system that links
human capital planning to overall agency strategic planning;
Performance expectation: Develop and implement processes to recruit and
hire employees who possess needed skills;
Performance expectation: Measure agency performance and make strategic
human capital decisions;
Performance expectation: Establish a market-based and more performance-
oriented pay system;
Performance expectation: Seek feedback from employees to allow for
their participation in the decision-making process;
Performance expectation: Implement training and development programs in
support of DHS's mission and goals.
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's information technology management efforts include developing
and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as an
authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain system
investments; defining and following a corporate process for informed
decision making by senior leadership about competing information
technology investment options; applying system and software development
and acquisition discipline and rigor when defining, designing,
developing, testing, deploying, and maintaining systems; establishing a
comprehensive, departmentwide information security program to protect
information and systems; having sufficient people with the right
knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute each of these areas now and
in the future; and centralizing leadership for extending these
disciplines throughout the organization with an empowered Chief
Information Officer. As shown in table 13, we identified 13 performance
expectations for DHS in the area of information technology management
and found that DHS has generally achieved 2 of them and has generally
not achieved 8 others. For 3 performance expectations, we could not
make an assessment.
Table 13: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Information Technology
Management Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 2.
Performance expectation: Organize roles and responsibilities for
information technology under the Chief Information Officer;
Performance expectation: Develop policies and procedures to ensure
protection of sensitive information.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 8.
Performance expectation: Develop a strategy and plan for information
technology management;
Performance expectation: Develop measures to assess performance in the
management of information technology;
Performance expectation: Implement a comprehensive enterprise
architecture;
Performance expectation: Develop a process to effectively manage
information technology investments;
Performance expectation: Implement a process to effectively manage
information technology investments;
Performance expectation: Develop policies and procedures for effective
information systems development and acquisition;
Performance expectation: Implement policies and procedures for
effective information systems development and acquisition;
Performance expectation: Implement policies and procedures to
effectively safeguard sensitive information.
Performance expectation: No assessment made; Total: 3.
Performance expectation: Strategically manage information technology
human capital;
Performance expectation: Develop a comprehensive enterprise
architecture;
Performance expectation: Provide operational capabilities for
information technology infrastructure and applications.
Overall assessment of progress: Limited.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
* DHS's responsibilities for real property management are specified in
Executive Order 13327, "Federal Real Property Asset Management," and
include establishment of a senior real property officer, development of
an asset inventory, and development and implementation of an asset
management plan and performance measures. As shown in table 14, we
identified 9 performance expectations for DHS in the area of real
property management and found that DHS has generally achieved 6 of them
and has generally not achieved 3 others.
Table 14: Summary of Our Assessments for DHS's Real Property Management
Performance Expectations:
Performance expectation: Generally achieved; Total: 6.
Performance expectation: Establish a Senior Real Property Officer who
actively serves on the Federal Real Property Council;
Performance expectation: Complete and maintain a comprehensive
inventory and profile of agency real property;
Performance expectation: Provide timely and accurate information for
inclusion in the governmentwide real property inventory database;
Performance expectation: Develop an Office of Management and Budget-
approved asset management plan;
Performance expectation: Establish an Office of Management and Budget-
approved 3-year rolling timeline with certain deadlines by which the
agency will address opportunities and determine its priorities as
identified in the asset management plan;
Performance expectation: Establish real property performance measures.
Performance expectation: Generally not achieved; Total: 3.
Performance expectation: Demonstrate steps taken toward implementation
of the asset management plan;
Performance expectation: Use accurate and current asset inventory
information and real property performance measures in management
decision making;
Performance expectation: Ensure the management of agency property
assets is consistent with the agency's overall strategic plan, the
agency asset management plan, and the performance measures.
Overall assessment of progress: Moderate.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
A variety of cross-cutting themes have affected DHS's efforts to
implement its mission and management functions. These key themes
include agency transformation, strategic planning and results
management, risk management, information sharing, and partnerships and
coordination.
* In past work, we reported on the importance of integration and
transformation in helping DHS ensure that it can implement its mission
and management functions. We designated the implementation and
transformation of DHS as a high-risk area in 2003 and continued that
designation in our 2005 and 2007 updates. As of May 2007, we reported
that DHS had yet to submit a corrective action plan to the Office of
Management and Budget. We reported that the creation of DHS is an
enormous management challenge and that DHS faces a formidable task in
its transformation efforts as it works to integrate over 170,000
federal employees from 22 component agencies. We noted that it can take
a minimum of 5 to 7 years until organizations complete their
transformations.
* We have identified strategic planning and the development and use of
outcome-based performance measures as two of the key success factors
for the management of any organization. DHS issued a departmentwide
strategic plan that met most of the required elements for a strategic
plan and is planning to issue an updated plan. However, we have
reported that some component agencies have had difficulties in
developing outcome-based goals and measures for assessing program
performance. For example, in August 2005 we reported that U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had not yet developed outcome
goals and measures for its worksite enforcement program, and in March
2006 we reported that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
had not yet established performance goals and measures to assess its
benefit fraud activities. We have also noted that DHS faces inherent
challenges in developing outcome-based goals and measures to assess the
affect of its efforts on strengthening homeland security.
* We have also reported on the importance of using a risk management
approach to set homeland security priorities and allocate resources
accordingly. The National Strategy for Homeland Security and DHS's
strategic plan have called for the use of risk-based decisions to
prioritize DHS's resource investments, and risk management has been
widely supported by the President, Congress, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security as a management approach for homeland security. In
past work we found that while some DHS component agencies, such as the
Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), have
taken steps to apply risk-based decision making in implementing some of
their mission functions, other components have not utilized such an
approach. For example, we reported that DHS has not applied a risk
management approach in deciding whether and how to invest in specific
capabilities for preparing for and responding to catastrophic threats.
* In 2005 we designated information sharing for homeland security as
high-risk. We recently reported that more than 5 years after September
11, 2001, the nation still lacked an implemented set of governmentwide
policies and processes for sharing terrorism-related information and
the area remained high-risk. However, we noted that the federal
government has issued a strategy for how it will put in place the
overall framework and policies for sharing information with critical
partners and that DHS has taken actions to implement its information
sharing responsibilities. For example, DHS has implemented an
information system to share homeland security information and has
supported the efforts of states and localities to create information
"fusion" centers. We have reported that DHS faces challenges in
continuing to develop productive information sharing relationships with
federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector.
* We have also reported on the important role that DHS plays in
partnering and coordinating its homeland security efforts with federal,
state, local, private sector, and international stakeholders. The
National Strategy for Homeland Security underscores the importance of
DHS partnering with other stakeholders, as the majority of the
strategy's initiatives are intended to be implemented by three or more
federal agencies. Our prior work has shown that, among other things,
successful partnering and coordination involve collaborating and
consulting with stakeholders to develop goals, strategies, and roles.
DHS has taken steps to strengthen partnering frameworks and
capabilities. For example, DHS has formed a working group to coordinate
the federal response to cyber incidents of national significance.
However, we have also reported on difficulties faced by DHS in its
partnership efforts. For example, DHS faced challenges in coordinating
with its emergency preparedness and response partners in the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita due to, among other things, unclear
designations of partners' roles and responsibilities.
Given DHS's dominant role in securing the homeland, it is critical that
the department's mission and management programs are operating as
efficiently and effectively as possible. DHS has taken important
actions to secure the border and transportation sectors and to prepare
for and respond to disasters. DHS has had to undertake these missions
while also working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet
department--a difficult task for any organization. As DHS moves
forward, it will be important for the department to continue to develop
more measurable goals to guide implementation efforts and to enable
better accountability of its progress toward achieving desired
outcomes. It will also be important for DHS to continually reassess its
mission and management goals, measures, and milestones to evaluate
progress made, identify past and emerging obstacles, and examine
alternatives to address those obstacles and effectively implement its
missions.
In its comments on a draft of this report, DHS took issues with our
methodology and disagreed with our assessments for 42 of 171
performance expectations. DHS's five general issues were (1)
perceptions that we altered our standards used to judge the
department's progress; (2) concerns with the binary approach we used to
assess the performance expectations; (3) concerns regarding perceived
changes in criteria after DHS provided additional information; (4)
concerns with consistency in our application of the methodology; and
(5) concerns regarding our treatment of performance expectations as
having equal weight. With regard to the first issue, as we communicated
to DHS, we did not change our criteria; rather we made a change in
language to better convey the intent behind the performance
expectations that DHS achieve them instead of merely taken actions that
apply or relate to them. Second, regarding our use of a binary standard
to judge whether or not DHS generally met each of 171 performance
expectations, we acknowledge the limitations of this standard, but
believe it is appropriate for this review given the administration has
generally not established quantitative goals and measures for the 171
expectations, which are necessary to systematically assess where along
a spectrum of progress DHS stood in achieving each performance
expectation. We applied a scale to assess different levels of progress
made by DHS for its overall mission and management areas. With regard
to the third issue, what DHS perceives as a change in criteria for
certain performance expectations is not a change in criteria but simply
the process by which we disclosed our preliminary assessment to DHS,
analyzed additional documents and information from DHS, and updated
and, in some cases revised, our assessments based on this additional
input. Fourth, regarding concerns with consistency in our methodology
application, our core team of GAO analysts and managers reviewed all
inputs from GAO staff to ensure consistent application of our
methodology, criteria, and analytical process. Finally, regarding
concerns with our treatment of performance expectations as having equal
weight, we acknowledge that differences exist between expectations, but
we did not weight the performance expectations because congressional,
departmental and others' views on the relative priority of each
expectation may be different and we did not believe it was appropriate
to substitute our judgment for theirs.
With regard to DHS's disagreement with our assessments for 42 of the
performance expectations, DHS generally contends that (1) we expected
DHS to have achieved an entire expectation in cases when that ultimate
achievement will likely take several more years, and (2) we did not
adequately use or appropriately interpret additional information DHS
provided. In general, we believe that it is appropriate, after pointing
out the expectation for a multiyear program and documenting the
activities DHS has actually accomplished to date, to reach a conclusion
that DHS has not yet fully implemented the program. We also believe we
have appropriately used the documents DHS has provided us. In some
cases, the information and documents DHS provided were not relevant to
the specific performance expectation; in these situations we did not
discuss them in our assessment. In other cases, the information did not
convince us that DHS had achieved the performance expectation as stated
or as we had interpreted it. In the assessment portion of each
performance expectation, we have described how we applied the
information DHS provided to the performance expectation and describe
the level of progress DHS has made.
Overall, we appreciate DHS's concerns and recognize that in a broad-
based endeavor such as this, some level of disagreement is inevitable,
especially at any given point in time. However, we have been as
transparent as possible regarding our purpose, methodology, and
professional judgments.
Background:
In July 2002, President Bush issued the National Strategy for Homeland
Security. The strategy set forth overall objectives to prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the
recovery from attacks that may occur. The strategy set out a plan to
improve homeland security through the cooperation and partnering of
federal, state, local, and private sector organizations on an array of
functions. The National Strategy for Homeland Security specified a
number of federal departments, as well as nonfederal organizations,
that have important roles in securing the homeland. In terms of federal
departments, DHS was assigned a prominent role in implementing
established homeland security mission areas.
In November 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was enacted into
law, creating DHS. This act defined the department's missions to
include preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing
U.S. vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the damages, and
assisting in the recovery from, attacks that occur within the United
States. The act also specified major responsibilities for the
department, including to analyze information and protect
infrastructure; develop countermeasures against chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats; secure
U.S. borders and transportation systems; and organize emergency
preparedness and response efforts.
DHS began operations in March 2003. Its establishment represented a
fusion of 22 federal agencies to coordinate and centralize the
leadership of many homeland security activities under a single
department.[Footnote 20] According to data provided to us by DHS, the
department's total budget authority was about $39 billion in fiscal
year 2004, about $108 billion in fiscal year 2005, about $49 billion in
fiscal year 2006, and about $45 billion in fiscal year 2007.[Footnote
21] The President's fiscal year 2008 budget submission requests
approximately $46 billion for DHS. Table 15 provides information on
DHS's budget authority, as reported by DHS, for each fiscal year from
2004 though 2007.
Table 15: DHS Budget Authority for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007 in
Thousands of Dollars, as Reported by DHS:
DHS component agency/program: Departmental Operations;
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $394,435;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $527,257;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $610,473;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $626,123.
DHS component agency/program: Analysis and Operations;
Fiscal year 2004
budget authority:
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority:
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $252,940;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $299,663.
DHS component agency/program: DHS IG;
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $80,318;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $97,317;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $84,187;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: 98,685.
DHS component agency/program: U.S. Secret Service;
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $1,334,128;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $1,375,758;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $1,423,489;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $1,479,158.
DHS component agency/program: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $5,994,287;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $6,520,698;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $7,970,695;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $9,344,781.
DHS component agency/program: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)[A];
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $328,053;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $340,000;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $336,600;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $362,494.
DHS component agency/program: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE);
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $3,669,615;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $4,244,228;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $4,206,443;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $4,726,641.
DHS component agency/program: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS);
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $1,549,733;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $1,775,000;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $1,887,850;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $1,985,990.
DHS component agency/program: Transportation Security Administration
(TSA);
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $4,578,043;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $5,405,375;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $6,167,014;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $6,329,291.
DHS component agency/program: U.S. Coast Guard;
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $7,097,405;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $7,853,427;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $8,782,689;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $8,729,152.
DHS component agency/program: National Protection and Programs
Directorate/Preparedness Directorate[A];
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority:
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority:
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $678,395;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $618,577.
DHS component agency/program: Counter-Terrorism Fund;
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $9,941;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $8,000;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $1,980;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority:
DHS component agency/program: Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA);
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $8,378,109;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $74,031,032;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $11,175,544;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $5,223,503.
DHS component agency/program: FEMA: Office of Grant Programs[B];
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $4,013,182;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $3,984,846;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $3,377,737;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $3,393,000.
DHS component agency/program: Science and Technology Directorate;
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $912,751;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $1,115,450;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $1,487,075;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $973,109.
DHS component agency/program: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office;
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority:
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority:
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority:
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $480,968.
DHS component agency/program: Border and Transportation Security
Directorate[A];
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $8,058;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $9,617;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority:
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority:
DHS component agency/program: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center;
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $191,643;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $226,807;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $304,534;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $275,279.
DHS component agency/program: Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate[A];
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $834,348;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $887,108;
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: [Empty];
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: [Empty].
DHS component agency/program: Total;
Fiscal year 2004 budget authority: $39,374,049;
Fiscal year 2005 budget authority: $108,401,920[C];
Fiscal year 2006 budget authority: $48,747,645;
Fiscal year 2007 budget authority: $44,946,414.
Source: DHS.
Note: Data are rounded to the nearest thousand. Fiscal year 2007
amounts are as of January 31, 2007. The data reflect total budget
authority amounts as reported to us by DHS. The amounts include annual
and supplemental appropriations, rescissions, amounts reprogrammed or
transferred, fee estimates, and mandatory amounts. The amounts do not
reflect carryover or rescissions of unobligated balances.
[A] The Border and Transportation Security Directorate, the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and the US-VISIT
program are legacy organizations within DHS. The functions of these
organizations have been realigned through DHS reorganizations. In
particular, in March 2007 US-VISIT was reorganized under the National
Protection and Programs Directorate. The Border and Transportation
Security Directorate included U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Transportation Security
Administration, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
[B] The Office of Grant Programs has undergone several realignments. It
was previously known as the Office of Grants and Training in the
Preparedness Directorate, the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness, and the Office for Domestic
Preparedness.
[C] The FEMA Fiscal Year 2005 Amount Includes About $45 Billion In
Supplemental Funding For Hurricane Katrina.]
[End of table]
Since creating and issuing its first strategic plan, the department has
undergone several reorganizations. Most notably, in July 2005, DHS
announced the outcome of its Second-Stage Review, an internal study of
the department's programs, policies, operations, and structures. As a
result of this review, the department realigned several component
agencies and functions. In particular, the Secretary of Homeland
Security established a Directorate of Policy to coordinate
departmentwide policies, regulations, and other initiatives and
consolidated preparedness activities in one directorate, the
Directorate for Preparedness. In addition, the Secretary established a
new Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the Office of
Infrastructure Protection composed of analysts from the former
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate. The
Office of Infrastructure Protection was placed in the Directorate for
Preparedness. The fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act provided for
the further reorganization of functions within the department by, in
particular, realigning DHS's emergency preparedness and response
responsibilities.[Footnote 22]
In addition to these reorganizations, a variety of factors have
affected DHS's efforts to implement its mission and management
functions. These factors include both domestic and international
events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and major homeland
security-related legislation. Figure 2 provides a timeline of key
events that have affected DHS's implementation.
Figure 2: Selected Key Events That Have Affected Department of Homeland
Security Implementation:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DHS Has Made Varying Levels of Progress in Implementing its Core
Mission and Management Functions, but Has Faced Difficulties in Its
Implementation Efforts:
Based on the performance expectations we identified, DHS has made
progress in implementing its mission and management functions, but
various challenges have affected its efforts. Specifically, DHS has
made limited progress in the areas of emergency preparedness and
response; science and technology; and human capital and information
technology management. We found that DHS has made modest progress in
the areas of border security; immigration services; and acquisition and
financial management. We also found that DHS has made moderate progress
in the areas of immigration enforcement, aviation security, surface
transportation security; critical infrastructure and key resources
protection, and real property management, and that DHS has made
substantial progress in the area of maritime security.
DHS Has Made Modest Progress in Border Security:
The United States shares a 5,525 mile border with Canada and a 1,989
mile border with Mexico, and all goods and people traveling to the
United States must be inspected at air, land, or sea ports of entry. In
2006, more than 400 million legal entries were made to the United
States--a majority of all border crossings were at land border ports of
entry. Within DHS, CBP is the lead agency responsible for implementing
the department's border security mission. Specifically, CBP's two
priority missions are (1) detecting and preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States, and (2) facilitating
the orderly and efficient flow of legitimate trade and travel. CBP's
supporting missions include interdicting illegal drugs and other
contraband; apprehending individuals who are attempting to enter the
United States illegally; inspecting inbound and outbound people,
vehicles, and cargo; enforcing laws of the United States at the border;
protecting U.S. agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests
and diseases; regulating and facilitating international trade;
collecting import duties; and enforcing U.S. trade laws. Within CBP,
the United States Border Patrol is responsible for border security
between designated official ports of entry, and CBP's Office of Field
Operations enforces trade, immigration, and agricultural laws and
regulations by securing the flow of people and goods into and out of
the country, while facilitating legitimate travel and trade at U.S.
ports of entry.
As shown in table 16, we identified 12 performance expectations for DHS
in the area of border security and found that overall DHS has made
modest progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found
that DHS has generally achieved 5 of its performance expectations and
has generally not achieved 7 of its performance expectations.
Table 16: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Border
Security:
Performance expectation: 1. Implement a biometric entry system to
prevent unauthorized border crossers from entering the United States
through ports of entry;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Implement a biometric exit system to
collect information on border crossers leaving the United States
through ports of entry;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Develop a program to detect and identify
illegal border crossings between ports of entry;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Implement a program to detect and identify
illegal border crossings between ports of entry;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop a strategy to detect and interdict
illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into the United States;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Implement a strategy to detect and
interdict illegal flows of cargo, drugs and other items into the United
States;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Implement effective security measures in
the visa issuance process;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Implement initiatives related to the
security of certain documents used to enter the United States;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Provide adequate training for all border
related employees;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Develop staffing plans for hiring and
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's border
security mission;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Ensure adequate infrastructure and
facilities;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 12. Leverage technology, personnel, and
information to secure the border;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 5;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 7;
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 17 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of border security and our assessment of whether DHS has taken
steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).
Table 17: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Border Security:
Performance expectation: 1. Implement a biometric entry system to
prevent unauthorized border crossers from entering the United States
through ports of entry;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. According to DHS,
the entry portion of US-VISIT has been deployed at 154 of 170 land
ports of entry, 115 airports, and 14 seaports, as of December 2006.
With regard to 14 of the 16 land ports of entry where US-VISIT was not
installed, CBP and US-VISIT program office officials told us there was
no operational need for US-VISIT because visitors who are required to
be processed into US-VISIT are, by regulation, not authorized to enter
the United States at these locations. We reported that US-VISIT needs
to be installed at the remaining 2 ports of entry in order to achieve
full implementation as required by law, but both of these locations
present significant challenges to installation of US-VISIT. These ports
of entry do not currently have access to appropriate communication
transmission lines to operate US-VISIT. CBP officials told us that,
given this constraint, they determined that they could continue to
operate as before. CBP officials told us that having US-VISIT biometric
entry capability generally improved their ability to process visitors
required to enroll in US-VISIT because it provided them additional
assurance that visitors are who they say they are and automated the
paperwork associated with processing the I-94 arrival/departure form.
For more information, see Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces
Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of
Entry, GAO-07-248;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Implement a biometric exit system to
collect information on border crossers leaving the United States
through ports of entry;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has faced challenges in
deploying a biometric exit system at ports of entry. Legislation
required US-VISIT to collect biometric exit data from all individuals
who are required to provide biometric entry data, but did not set a
specific deadline for this requirement. Although US-VISIT had set a
December 2007 deadline for implementing exit capability at the 50
busiest land ports of entry, US-VISIT has since determined that
implementing an exit capability by this date is no longer feasible. A
new date for exit implementation has not been set. In March 2007, we
reported that DHS has devoted considerable time and resources toward
establishing an operational exit capability. Over the last 4 years, it
has committed over $160 million to pilot test and evaluate an exit
solution at 12 air, 2 sea, and 5 land ports of entry. Despite this
considerable investment of time and resources, the US-VISIT program
still does not have either an operational exit capability or a viable
exit solution to deploy to all air, sea, and land ports of entry. With
regard to air and sea ports of entry, we reported that although US-
VISIT has pilot tested a biometric exit capability for these ports of
entry, it has not been available at all ports. A pilot test in 2004
through 2005 identified issues that limited the operational
effectiveness of the solution, such as the lack of traveler compliance
with the processes. According to program officials, US-VISIT is now
developing a plan for deploying a comprehensive, affordable exit
solution at all ports of entry. However, no time frame has been
established for this plan being approved or implemented. There are
interrelated logistical, technological, and infrastructure constraints
that have precluded DHS from achieving this mandate, and there are cost
factors related to the feasibility of implementation of such a
solution. With regard to land ports of entry, for example, we reported
that the major constraint to performing biometric verification upon
exit at this time, in the US-VISIT Program Office's view, is that the
only proven technology available would necessitate mirroring the
processes currently in use for US-VISIT at entry. The US-VISIT Program
Office concluded in January 2005 that the mirror-imaging solution was
"an infeasible alternative for numerous reasons, including but not
limited to, the additional staffing demands, new infrastructure
requirements, and potential trade and commerce impacts." US-VISIT
officials stated that they believe that technological advances over the
next 5 to 10 years will make it possible to utilize alternative
technologies that provide biometric verification of persons exiting the
country without major changes to facility infrastructure and without
requiring those exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles, thereby
precluding traffic backup, congestion, and resulting delays. For more
information, see GAO-07-248 and Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program
Faces Operational, Technological and Management Challenges, GAO-07-
632T.
DHS updated information: Between March and June 2007, DHS told
us that, it expected that further land exit testing may be conducted in
fiscal year 2008. DHS reported that it provided an exit strategy to
Congress in the spring of 2007; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally not achieved this performance expectation. Although DHS
is continuing to explore various possibilities for implementing an exit
capability, the department has not yet implemented a biometric exit
system at land, air, and sea ports of entry.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Develop a program to detect and identify
illegal border crossings between ports of entry;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress toward
developing a program to detect illegal border crossings between ports
of entry. In February 2007, we reported that the Secure Border
Initiative is a comprehensive, multiyear program established in
November 2005 by the Secretary of Homeland Security to secure U.S.
borders and reduce illegal immigration. The Secure Border Initiative's
mission is to promote border security strategies that help protect
against and prevent terrorist attacks and other transnational crimes.
Elements of the Secure Border Initiative will be carried out by several
organizations within DHS. One element of the Secure Border Initiative
is SBInet, the program within CBP responsible for developing a
comprehensive border protection system. SBInet is responsible for
leading the effort to ensure that the proper mix of personnel, tactical
infrastructure, rapid response capability, and technology is deployed
along the border. According to DHS, the SBInet solution is to include a
variety of sensors, communications systems, information technology,
tactical infrastructure (roads, barriers, and fencing), and command and
control capabilities to enhance situational awareness of the responding
officers. The solution is also to include the development of a common
operating picture that provides uniform data, through a command center
environment, to all DHS agencies and is interoperable with stakeholders
external to DHS. We have ongoing work to further assess the Secure
Border Initiative. For more information, see GAO-07-248 and Secure
Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better Support
Oversight and Accountability, GAO-07-309.
DHS updated information: According to updated information provided by
DHS between March and May 2007, the Secure Border Initiative program is
in place, with a Program Management Office and governance structure,
system integrator, and funding. In September 2006, the SBInet contract
was awarded. CBP has been designated as the DHS executive agent for the
SBInet program and has established a Program Management Office to
oversee SBInet. With regard to other border security initiatives, DHS
noted that Operation Streamline, launched in December 2005, is a
coordinated effort among CBP, ICE, and the Department of Justice to
create a zero-tolerance zone for illegal entries in the Del Rio Border
Patrol sector.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has made progress in developing a strategy
to detect and identify illegal border crossings between ports of entry-
-namely the Secure Border Initiative--and has developed other
initiatives to detect and deter illegal border crossings.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Implement a program to detect and identify
illegal border crossings between ports of entry;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has not yet fully
implemented a program to effectively detect and identify illegal border
crossings between ports of entry. In past work, we and the DHS IG
identified challenges in implementing earlier border security programs
designed to detect and deter illegal border crossings. For example, in
February 2006 the DHS IG reported that initiatives using technology,
such as unmanned aerial vehicles and remote video surveillance, had
failed to consistently demonstrate the predicted force multiplier
effect for border security. More recently, we reported that although
DHS has published some information on various aspects of the Secure
Border Initiative and SBInet, it remains unclear how SBInet will be
linked, if at all, to US-VISIT so that the two systems can share
technology, infrastructure, and data across programs. In addition, we
reported that according to DHS, work on the northern border for the
Secure Border Initiative is not projected to begin before fiscal year
2009. We have ongoing work to further assess the Secure Border
Initiative. For more information, see GAO-07-309; GAO-07-248; Border
Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border
Surveillance Technology Program, GAO-06-295; and Border Security:
Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies and Operations on
Federal Lands, GAO-04-590. Also, see Department of Homeland Security
Office of the Inspector General, A Review of Remote Surveillance
Technology Along U.S. Land Borders, OIG-06-15 (Washington, D.C.:
December 2005).
DHS updated information: DHS provided evidence of SBInet progress,
including the award of four task orders as of May 2007. At the end of
fiscal year 2006, DHS reported that 75 miles of fence were constructed
and a total of 370 miles are planned to be constructed by the end of
calendar year 2008. CBP also plans to establish 200 miles of vehicle
barriers by the end of calendar year 2008, with 67 miles completed.
Further, DHS has established a Miles of Effective Control goal. The
goal is to gain effective control of the entire southwest border by
2013. According to DHS, effective control indicates that defense-in-
depth capabilities in the area are robust enough to (1) detect illegal
entries; (2) identify and classify the entries; (3) efficiently and
effectively respond; and (4) bring events to a satisfactory law
enforcement resolution. As of March 2007, DHS reported that it had 392
miles under effective control, and the goal for the end of calendar
year 2008 is 642 miles. DHS stated that SBInet Technology Coverage goal
is to cover 387 miles of the border completed by the end of calendar
year 2008 in the Tucson and Yuma sectors. With regard to Operation
Streamline, CBP reported that beginning with a 5-mile stretch of the
border, the initiative now spans the entire 210 mile Del Rio Sector
Border. DHS also noted that National Guard resources have been deployed
to the border to enhance capabilities under Operation Jumpstart. As of
February 28, 2007, DHS reported that nearly 46,000 aliens were
apprehended and more than 520 vehicles were seized through Operation
Jumpstart. Additionally, CBP plans to add 6,000 Border Patrol agents by
the end of calendar year 2008. In fiscal year 2007, DHS plans to
increase its Border Patrol presence between ports of entry by hiring,
training, and deploying 1,500 additional agents.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. The Secure Border Initiative and SBInet are in
the early phases of implementation, and DHS has taken actions to
implement the initiative, particularly in awarding four task orders
under SBInet. However, these contracts have only recently been awarded,
and it is unclear what progress contractors have made in implementing
the activities specified in the task orders. Moreover, DHS reported
that it has effective control of 380 miles of the border as of March
2007, but the U.S. land border encompasses more than 6,000 miles, and
DHS does not expect to begin work on the northern border until fiscal
year 2009. Although DHS has only recently begun to implement SBInet,
which is a multi-year program, DHS and its legacy components
implemented programs to secure the border between ports of entry prior
to the Secure Border Initiative and SBInet. We and the DHS IG reported
on challenges faced by DHS in implementing programs that pre-dated the
Secure Border Initiative and SBInet.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop a strategy to detect and interdict
illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into the United States;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken steps to develop a
strategic approach for interdicting illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and
other items into the United States.[A] For example, according to DHS,
in August 2006 DHS and the Department of Justice submitted a National
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy and Implementation Plan to
the International Drug Control Policy Coordinating Committee. This
document identified the major goals, objectives, and resource
requirements for closing gaps in U.S. and Mexico counternarcotics
capabilities along the southwest border. DHS has also taken steps to
plan for the deployment of radiation portal monitors at ports of entry.
For more information, see Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made
Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-
Entry, but Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389; Prescription Drugs: Strategic
Framework Would Promote Accountability and Enhance Efforts to Enforce
the Prohibitions on Personal Importation, GAO-05-372; and Cigarette
Smuggling: Federal Law Enforcement Efforts and Seizures Increasing,
GAO-04-641.
DHS updated information: According to updated information
provided by DHS, the CBP Office of Field Operations developed a
comprehensive strategic plan entitled Securing America's Borders at the
Ports of Entry that defines CBP's national strategy specifically at all
air, land, and sea ports of entry. This plan was finalized and
published in September 2006 concurrent with the development of the
Secure Border Initiative. According to DHS, it complements the national
strategy for gaining operational control of the borders between ports
of entry and addresses the specific security concerns and required
actions that are the direct responsibility of the Office of Field
Operations. Programs under the auspices of the Office of Field
Operations that support enhanced detection and interdiction of illegal
flows of contraband and harmful substances into the United States
include the National Targeting Center for Cargo; the Automated
Targeting System; the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism; the
Container Security Initiative; the Secure Freight Initiative; and
deployment of radiation portal monitors, large-scale, non-intrusive
inspection technology, and canine enforcement teams. Additionally,
according to the Office of Counternarcotics, in March 2006, the
National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy was approved by the
International Drug Control Policy Coordinating Committee. This document
identified the major goals, objectives, and recommendations for closing
gaps in U.S. and Mexico counternarcotics capabilities along the
southwest border.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has made progress in
developing a strategy to implement its various programs for detecting
and interdicting illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into
the United States. With regard to flows of illegal drugs in particular,
the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy has been
approved by the International Drug Control Policy Coordinating
Committee.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Implement a strategy to detect and
interdict illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into the
United States.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have identified challenges in
DHS's efforts to interdict flows of illegal goods into the United
States.[B] DHS has implemented the Container Security Initiative to
allow CBP officials to target containers at foreign seaports so that
any high-risk containers maybe inspected prior to their departure for
the United States. We have identified challenges in implementation of
the program, including staffing imbalances that, in the past, impeded
CBP's targeting of containers. DHS has also implemented the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, a voluntary program design to
improve the security of international supply chain through which CBP
officials work in partnership with private companies to review supply
chain security plans. Our work has identified a number of challenges in
implementation of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism,
including that CBP's standard for validation is hard to achieve and,
given that the program is voluntary, there are limits on how intrusive
CBP can be in its validations. With regard to radiation portal
monitors, we reported as of December 2005, DHS had completed deployment
of portal monitors at two categories of entry--a total of 61 ports of
entry--and had begun work on two other categories; overall, however,
progress had been slower than planned. According to DHS officials, the
slow progress resulted from a late disbursal of funds and delays in
negotiating deployment agreements with seaport operators. Further, we
noted the expected cost of the program was uncertain because DHS's
plans to purchase newer, more advanced equipment were not yet
finalized, and we projected that the program's final cost would be much
higher than CBP anticipated at the time of our review. In 2006, we
reported on the results of our investigation of potential security
weaknesses associated with the installation of radiation detection
equipment at ports of entry. As part of this investigation, we deployed
two teams of investigators to the field to make simultaneous border
crossings at the northern and southern borders in an attempt to
transport radioactive sources into the United States. The radiation
portal monitors properly signaled the presence of radioactive material
when our two teams of investigators conducted simultaneous border
crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were inspected in accordance
with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and southern borders.
However, our investigators, using counterfeit documents, were able to
enter the United States with the radioactive sources in the trunks of
their vehicles. In 2005 we also reported that inspection and
interdiction efforts at international mail branches and express carrier
facilities had not prevented a reported substantial volume of
prescription drugs from being illegally imported from foreign Internet
pharmacies into the United States. We acknowledged that CBP and other
agencies, including ICE, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration, had taken a step in the right direction by
collaborating to establish a task force designed to address challenges
that we identified, but nonetheless, an unknown number of illegal drugs
entered the country each day. In addition, in 2004 we noted that CBP
reported that the number of cigarette seizures by CBP and ICE increased
dramatically, from 12 total seizures in 1998 to 191 seizures in 2003.
CBP attributed this increase to better intelligence and better
inspections--based on electronic methods such as its Automated
Targeting System. For more information, see GAO-06-389; GAO-05-372; GAO-
04-641; Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources
Across Our Nation's Borders at Two Locations, GAO-06-940T; and Maritime
Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act, GAO-07-
754T.
DHS updated information: DHS provided updated information related to
its implementation of a strategy to detect and interdict illegal flows
of cargo, drugs, and other items into the United States. In general,
the Strategic Plan on Securing America's Borders at the Ports of Entry,
which defines CBP's national strategy at all air, land, and sea ports
of entry, outlines programs designed to achieve border security
objectives. CBP's Office of Field Operations has developed a formal
implementation process to execute the Securing America's Borders at the
Ports of Entry strategic plan that includes regular senior executive
participations, steering committee oversight, and the creation of
Securing America's Borders at the Ports of Entry Implementation
Division to provide ongoing oversight and coordination of a
comprehensive development schedule for the Office of Field Operations'
high priority programs. More specifically, DHS has several programs in
place to help detect and interdict illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and
other items into the United States. These programs include the National
Targeting Center for Cargo, the Automated Targeting System, the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, the Container Security Initiative,
deployment of radiation portal monitors, large-scale non-intrusive
inspection technology, canine enforcement programs, and the Secure
Freight Initiative.[C] With regard to the National Targeting Center for
Cargo, CBP reported that this center expands CBP's
capability to do cargo shipment targeting to provide ports of entry
with immediate analysis capabilities. With regard to radiation portal
monitors, as of March 9, 2007, CBP has deployed 966 radiation portal
monitors to ports of entry. According to CBP, these radiation portal
monitor deployments provide CBP with the capability to screen
approximately 91 percent of containerized cargo and 88 percent of
personally owned vehicles entering the United States. With regard to
non-intrusive technology, CBP reported deploying about 189 systems and
is scheduled to have 224 large-scale systems deployed by the end of
fiscal year 2009. CBP's canine enforcement teams are assigned to 73
ports of entry and more than 300 detector dog teams were trained in
fiscal year 2006. DHS provided us with other sensitive data on the
outputs of its efforts, which we considered in making our assessment.
Furthermore, according to the Office of Counternarcotics, the
Implementation Plan for the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics
Strategy includes recommendations on funding and resource requirements
and estimated timelines for implementing the National Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy in fiscal years 2008 through 2011. In
addition, in fiscal year 2007, DHS plans to increase its Border Patrol
presence between ports of entry by hiring, training, and deploying
1,500 additional agents.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to implement various
programs to detect and interdict illegal flows of goods into the United
States. For example, DHS has deployed radiation portal monitors and
large scale non-intrusive detection systems at ports of entry and has
developed the Container Security Initiative and Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism Program. However, we have reported on
challenges in implementation efforts associated with these programs.
Moreover, CBP's Securing America's Borders at the Ports of Entry plan
is still in the early stages of implementation, but once implemented,
will help CBP detect and interdict illegal flows of goods into the
United States. Further, the Implementation Plan for the National
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy has only recently been
developed. In addition, we considered the sensitive data provided by
DHS on the outputs of its efforts as well as our prior work in making
our assessment.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Implement effective security measures in
the visa issuance process.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress but still
faces challenges in its efforts to implement effective security
measures as part of the visa issuance process.[D] In 2005 we reported
that DHS had not yet expanded the Visa Security Program as it planned.
The Visa Security Program is DHS's program to oversee the assigning of
visa security officers to locations overseas to review visa
applications. In prior work we reported that DHS had begun supplying
Visa Security Officers to the U.S. embassy and consulate in Saudi
Arabia. According to DHS, the Department of State's consular officials,
and the deputy chief of mission in Saudi Arabia, the Visa Security
Officers strengthened visa security at these posts. Visa Security
Officers offer law enforcement and immigration experience and have
access to and experience using information from law enforcement
databases, which are not readily available to consular officers. DHS
planned to expand the Visa Security Program to additional posts
throughout fiscal years 2005 and 2006, but faced various difficulties
in its efforts to expand. For example, chiefs of mission at the posts
chosen for expansion in fiscal year 2005 delayed approval of DHS's
requests. Embassy and Department of State officials attributed the
delays to questions about the program's goals, objectives, and staffing
requirements, as well as DHS's plans to coordinate with existing law
enforcement and border security staff and programs at post at that
time. For more information, see Border Security: Actions Needed to
Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland Security's Visa
Security Program, GAO-05-801.
DHS updated information: Since the time of our review, DHS has made
progress in expanding the Visa Security Program to additional posts;
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. Although the department has made some progress
in expanding the Visa Security Program, the department has reported
facing similar challenges to those that we previously identified in its
expansion and implementation efforts and did not provide us with
evidence that it has fully addressed those challenges.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Implement initiatives related to the
security of certain documents used to enter the United States;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has various initiatives related
to the security of documents used to enter the United States but has
faced difficulties in implementing these initiatives.[E] With regard to
the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, we reported in May 2006 on
challenges faced by DHS in implementation. This initiative is DHS's
program to implement requirements for U.S. citizens and citizens of
Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico to show a passport or other documents that
the Secretary of Homeland Security deems sufficient to show identity
and citizenship to CBP officers when those individuals enter the United
States from certain countries in North, Central, or South America. We
reported that alternative programs or documents, such as frequent
traveler programs and driver's licenses with enhanced security
features, had various challenges and using them in lieu of a passport
would not easily resolve the management issues faced by DHS. We
reported that once decisions are made on what documents will be needed,
DHS and the Department of State will face challenges in program
implementation and management. Major challenges would remain in
developing (1) an implementation plan, (2) budget estimates, (3)
awareness programs for the public, (4) training programs for DHS staff,
(5) bilateral coordination with Canada, and (6) a common understanding
of how the Travel Initiative links to the overall strategy for securing
the nation's borders. Falling short in any of these areas may hinder
the ability of the agencies to achieve their goal of improving security
while facilitating commerce and tourism. According to DHS officials,
they have formed working groups to take action in each of these areas,
but much more work remains in developing plans and approaches that
improve the likelihood of program success; With regard to the Visa
Waiver Program, the program enables citizens of 27 countries to travel
to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less
without obtaining a visa. In July 2004, we reported that DHS
established a Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit, which completed
security assessments of the 27 countries that participate in the Visa
Waiver Program. DHS also submitted a report to Congress summarizing the
assessment findings. However, we identified several problems with the
2004 review process, as key stakeholders were not consulted during
portions of the process, the review process lacked clear criteria and
guidance to make key judgments, and the final reports were untimely.
Furthermore, the monitoring unit could not effectively achieve its
mission to monitor and report on ongoing law enforcement and security
concerns in visa waiver countries due to insufficient resources. In
September 2006 we testified that while DHS had taken some actions to
mitigate the program's risks, the department faced difficulties in
further mitigating these risks. In particular, the department had not
established time frames and operating procedures regarding timely
stolen passport reporting--a program requirement since 2002.
Furthermore, DHS sought to require the reporting of lost and stolen
passport data to the United States and the International Criminal
Police Organization, but it had not issued clear reporting guidelines
to participating countries; With regard to the Immigration Advisory
Program, this pilot program is designed to increase the level of
scrutiny given to the travel documents of certain high-risk passengers
before they board international flights traveling to the United States.
Under this program, CBP assigns officers to selected foreign airports
where they utilize an automated risk-targeting system that identifies
passengers as potentially high-risk--including passengers who do not
need a visa to travel to the United States. CBP officers then
personally interview some of these passengers and evaluate the
authenticity and completeness of these passengers' travel documents.
CBP has reported several successes through the Immigration Advisory
Program pilot. According to CBP documents, from the start of the
program in June 2004 through February 2006, Immigration Advisory
Program teams made more than 700 no-board recommendations for
inadmissible passengers and intercepted approximately 70 fraudulent
travel documents. However, in May 2007 we reported that CBP had not
taken all of the steps necessary to fully learn from its pilot sites in
order to determine whether the program should be made permanent and the
number of sites that should exist. These steps are part of a risk
management approach to developing and evaluating homeland security
programs; In addition, in prior work our agents have attempted to
enter the United States using fictitious documents. Our periodic tests
since 2002 clearly showed that CBP officers were unable to effectively
identify counterfeit driver's licenses, birth certificates, and other
documents. Specifically, in 2003 our agents were able to easily enter
the United States from Canada and Mexico using fictitious names and
counterfeit driver's licenses and birth certificates. Later in 2003 and
2004, we continued to be able to successfully enter the United States
using counterfeit identification at land border crossings, but were
denied entry on one occasion. In 2006, the results of our work
indicated that CBP officers at the nine land border crossings we tested
at that time did not detect the counterfeit identification we used. At
the time of our review, CBP agreed that its officers were not able to
identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land
border crossings and fully supported the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative that will require all travelers to present a passport before
entering the United States. We did not assess whether this initiative
would be effective in preventing terrorists from entering the United
States or whether it would fully address the vulnerabilities shown by
our work. We have ongoing work assessing the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative and the use of fraudulent travel documents. For more
information, see GAO-07-248; Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed
to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854;
Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative on the U.S. Border with Canada, GAO-06-741R; Border
Security: Consular Identification Cards Accepted within United States,
but Consistent Federal Guidance Needed, GAO-04-881; Aviation Security:
Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening Are Under
Way, but Planning and Implementation Issues Remain, GAO-07-346; and
Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the
United States, GAO-06-976T.
DHS updated information: According to updated information provided by
DHS, CBP has undertaken a variety of efforts associated with the
security of documents used to enter the United States. These efforts
include implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative in
the air environment; enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program; increased
access to lost and stolen passport information from multiple sources;
introduction of the Fraudulent Documents Analysis Unit, which issues
notices to the field regarding detection of fraudulent documents; and
training of carrier agents overseas in documentary requirements and
fraudulent document detection. With regard to the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative, since January 23, 2007, all U.S. citizens and
nonimmigrant aliens from Canada, Bermuda and Mexico entering the United
States from within the Western Hemisphere at air ports of entry are
required to present a valid passport. CBP has reported more than 99
percent compliance with these requirements at air ports of entry. DHS
stated that the department is working toward implementation of the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative for travelers entering the United
States through land and sea ports of entry, and in June 2007 announced
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the land and sea portions. U.S.
and Canadian citizens entering the United States from within the
Western Hemisphere at land and sea ports currently may make a verbal
declaration of citizenship or present a myriad of forms and documents
to enter the country such as birth certificates and drivers' licenses.
On June 8, 2007, because of delays in processing applications for U.S.
passports, U.S. citizens traveling to Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean,
and Bermuda who have applied for but not yet received passports can
temporarily enter and depart from the United States by air with a
government issued photo identification and Department of State official
proof of application for a passport through September 30, 2007. With
regard to fraudulent documents, CBP reported that it has electronic
copies of all U.S.-issued travel and citizenship documents, with the
exception of U.S.-issued passports, which CBP is working to gain access
to with the Department of State. When travelers apply for admission at
a port of entry, CBP officers are to scan the document presented by the
travelers to help minimize the risk of photograph substitution on the
documents and the use of canceled travel documents. Over 4,400 CBP
officers have access to the Department of State Consolidated Consular
Database, which allows officers to view unique visa information. During
2006, CBP stated that it provided ports of entry with the highest rate
of fraudulent document interceptions with comprehensive document
examination workstations to better equip them with the ability to
examine questioned documents presented for entry to the United States.
According to CBP, workstations have been deployed at 11 ports of entry,
where the equipment improves the ability of officers to thoroughly
inspect documents to detect forgeries. CBP reported that its Fraudulent
Document Analysis Unit received 40,362 fraudulent documents from the
ports of entry during fiscal year 2006. Of this number, there were
7,252 passports from 84 countries, the majority of which were issued by
Mexico and the United States. CBP also reported that it has deployed
ePassport readers to 200 primary inspection lanes at the 33 largest
airports to enhance document verification. With regard to lost and
stolen passports, DHS reported that it has a real-time interface with
the State Department that provides data on all lost or stolen passports
reported to the State Department, both United States and foreign. CBP
noted that the programs mentioned above are used in conjunction with
US-VISIT fingerprinting of non-U.S. citizens and resident aliens to
provide a biometric authentication of the document-bearers' identity
and verification of documents' validity. With regard to the Immigration
Advisory Program, DHS has issued a strategic plan for fiscal years 2007
through 2012.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has taken actions related to the security
of certain documents used to enter the country by, for example,
implementing the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at air ports of
entry. However, we have reported on management challenges faced by DHS
with regard to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and, although
the requirement for implementing the initiative is not until 2009, we
reported that the Departments of Homeland Security and State have a
long way to go to implement their proposed plans, and the time to get
the job done has been slipping by. We have also reported on risks and
challenges faced by DHS with regard to the Visa Waiver Program, such as
the timely reporting of stolen passports, and DHS did not provide us
with evidence that it has taken actions to fully address these risks
and challenges. Furthermore, while DHS has made progress in deploying
document examination workstations and ePassport readers to lanes at
ports of entry, DHS did not provide us with evidence that it has yet
determined proposed locations for deploying additional workstations. In
addition, DHS has not yet fully used a risk management approach in
implementing its Immigration Advisory Program.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Provide adequate training for all border
related employees; Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken
steps to provide training to border security personnel. In September
2005, we reported that the creation of CBP within DHS merged border
inspection functions at U.S. ports of entry, which had previously been
performed by three separate agencies. We reported that the "One Face at
the Border," initiative created the positions of CBP officer and CBP
agriculture specialist and combined aspects of three former inspector
functions. CBP created a series of training courses to provide former
U.S. Customs and former Immigration and Naturalization Service officers
with the knowledge and skills necessary to carry out the
responsibilities of this new position. In addition, CBP officers
received training to meet CBP's new mission priority of terrorism
prevention. Because agricultural inspections were more specialized, CBP
officers received training sufficient to enable them to identify
potential agricultural threats, make initial regulatory decisions, and
determine when to make referrals to CBP agriculture specialists. We
reported that CBP emphasized on-the-job training in an effort not to
place officers on the job without direct supervisory and tutorial
backup. CBP's main strategy to prepare for field delivery of training
was to provide extensive train-the-trainer courses so that trainers
could return to their field sites and instruct officers there. We
reported that change had not come about without challenges, as many
officers were reported to have resisted changes to their
responsibilities, mainly related to the difficulties in learning a new
set of procedures and laws. Officials noted that there has been an
enormous amount of required training for CBP officers, and it could
sometimes be overwhelming. For former officers, in addition to
completing an extensive cross-training schedule and new training
related to terrorism prevention, there were many other required courses
related to their mission. We reported that although staffing challenges
may ultimately have been relieved with trained officers able to perform
dual inspections, officials noted that it had been extremely difficult
to take staff off-line to complete the "One Face at the Border"
training. In March 2007, we reported that Border Patrol's basic
training program exhibited attributes of an effective training program.
However, we also reported while Border Patrol officials were confident
that the academy could accommodate the large influx of new trainees
anticipated over the next 2 years, they have expressed concerns over
the sectors' ability to provide sufficient field training. For example,
officials were concerned with having a sufficient number of experienced
agents available in the sectors to serve as field training officers and
first-line supervisors. We reported that the Border Patrol is
considering several alternatives to improve the efficiency of basic
training delivery and to return agents to the sectors more quickly. For
example, the Border Patrol is pilot-testing a proficiency test for
Spanish that will allow those who pass the test to shorten their time
at the academy by about 30 days. However, we concluded that the Border
Patrol's plan to hire an unprecedented number of new agents over the
next 2 years could strain the sectors' ability to provide adequate
supervision and training. Moreover, the field training new agents
receive has not been consistent from sector to sector, a fact that has
implications for how well agents perform their duties. To ensure that
these new agents become proficient in the safe, effective, and ethical
performance of their duties, it will be extremely important that new
agents have the appropriate level of supervision and that the Border
Patrol has a standardized field training program. For more information,
see Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training
Important for Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888 and Homeland
Security: Information on Training New Border Patrol Agents, GAO-07-
540R.
DHS updated information: In May 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to provide training for border security
personnel. Specifically, CBP reported that it has implemented a plan to
hire and train 3,900 Border Patrol agents in fiscal year 2007; 4,800
agents in fiscal year 2008; and 850 agents in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2009. CBP, working with the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center, reported making various modifications to the Border
Patrol basic training program to accommodate the volume of new
trainees. CBP also reported that it is designing its post-Academy
training to align with the new Academy program and to use the 2-year
Federal Career Intern Program. In addition, CBP has an annual call for
training and uses a National Training Plan and a Training Advisory
Board to determine ongoing basic and advanced training requirements.
Post-Academy training for Border Patrol Agents includes a structured
academic program with two pass or fail probationary exams, and Border
Patrol local offices provide agents with area-specific training through
the Border Patrol Field Training Program. Post-Academy training for CBP
officers working at ports of entry feature classroom, online, and on-
the-job experiences linked to the job that the individual CBP officer
will perform in his or her home duty post. According to CBP, CBP
provides in-depth, task-based training to CBP officers that address
tasks that the CBP officer will be called on to perform. In addition,
CBP provides "cross-training" to officers from the former U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service or Customs Services based on
operational requirements.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. CBP has established and implemented programs
for training its border security personnel. With regard to basic
training, we previously reported that Border Patrol's basic training
program exhibited attributes of an effective training program. CBP also
uses a National Training Plan and a Training Advisory Board to
determine training requirements. However, in prior work we reported on
various challenges in CBP's provision and adequacy of field-based
training. For example, with regard to Border Patrol agents, we reported
that the field training new agents receive has not been consistent from
sector to sector, which has implications for how well agents perform
their duties. In addition, we identified concerns regarding CBP's
capacity to provide training to the projected large influx of new
Border Patrol agents over the next 2 years.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Develop staffing plans for hiring and
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's border
security mission.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: CBP has taken actions to develop
staffing plans for hiring and allocating human capital resources to
fulfill the agency's border security mission. In July 2005 we reported
that CBP had taken steps to increase management flexibility in
assigning staff to inspection functions and improve staff allocation in
an effort to minimize passenger wait times and ensure the most
efficient use of existing staff at airports. We reported that CBP had
introduced its "One Face at the Border" program to increase staffing
flexibility so that staff could conduct different types of inspections
within airports. We also reported that CBP was developing a national
staffing model to more systematically allocate existing staff levels at
airports nationwide, however, the model did not address weaknesses
identified in Customs' and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service's staffing models in our and the Department of Justice
Inspector General's previous audit work. In February 2006, we reported
that for program acquisitions like the America's Shield Initiative to
be successful, DHS needed to, among other things, have adequate staff
to fill positions that have clearly defined roles and responsibilities
and that it had not fully staffed the America's Shield Initiative
program office. One criticism we had of the former U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service was that because of staffing shortages, mission
staff often had to assume administrative or other functions as a
collateral duty. One effect of assigning mission staff to
administrative work was that they were not spending all of their time
on duties needed to accomplish the program's mission and thus were not
reaching the full potential of the program position. In 2005 we found
that this was a problem in some offices. Some officials we contacted in
CBP said they had to use mission staff in this way because they did not
have enough administrative support to compensate for the realignment of
administrative staff to shared services, the addition of mission
personnel that came as a result of mergers of some programs in the
transition, and hiring freezes. As a result, officers, adjudicators,
and investigators in some field offices were taking on administrative
work full-time or as a collateral duty. For more information, see GAO-
06-295 and Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in
Transforming Immigration Programs, GAO-05-81.
DHS updated information: In May 2007, DHS provided us with data on
CBP's fiscal year 2007 hiring projections and documentation of its
staffing models for various positions within CBP, such as CBP officers
and Border Patrol agents. Information on these staffing models is
sensitive; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved
this performance expectation. DHS has developed staffing models and
plans for border security personnel.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Ensure adequate infrastructure and
facilities.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet satisfactorily
ensured that CBP inspectors and Border Patrol have adequate
infrastructure and facilities to support their activities. CBP Field
Operations maintains programs at 20 field operations offices and 327
ports of entry, of which 15 are pre-clearance stations in Canada and
the Caribbean. Border Patrol agents are assigned to patrol more than
6,000 miles of the nation's land borders and are coordinated through 20
sectors. CBP's facilities and tactical infrastructure portfolio
consisted of CBP-owned and leased facilities and real estate; temporary
structures, such as modular buildings for rapid deployment and
temporary base camps; and other tactical infrastructure, such as
fences, lights, and barriers. Additionally, CBP owned and maintained a
motor vehicle fleet; a variety of aircraft including fixed wing
aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles; and different
types of marine vessels such as hovercrafts, airboats, and high-speed
interceptors. Further, the agency acquired different types of scanning
and detection equipment, such as large-scale x-ray and gamma-imaging
systems, nuclear and radiological detection equipment, as well as a
variety of portable and hand-held devices. In February 2007, we
reported that CBP's capital planning process was evolving and not yet
mature. Although the agency has established a review and approval
framework that required documentation to (1) describe how a proposed
capital project supports the agency's strategic goals and (2) identify
the mission need and gap between current and required capabilities, we
were unable to verify implementation of these practices due to a lack
of non-information technology examples. Additionally, we reported that
CBP has not developed a comprehensive, agencywide, long-term capital
plan, although it produced several documents that included some
elements of such a plan. For land ports of entry, CBP implemented a
capital investment planning process to ensure that facility and real
property funding is allocated in a manner that supports critical
facility projects. CBP piloted the capital investment planning process
and the strategic resource assessments on the land port of entry. In
December 2006, we reported that with regard to US-VISIT going forward,
DHS plans to introduce changes and enhancements to US-VISIT at land
ports of entry, including a transition from digitally scanning 2
fingerprints to 10. While such changes are intended to further enhance
border security, deploying them may have an impact on aging and space-
constrained land ports of entry facilities because they could increase
inspection times and adversely affect port of entry operations.
Moreover, our previous work showed that the US-VISIT program office had
not taken necessary steps to help ensure that US-VISIT entry capability
operates as intended. For example, in February 2006 we reported that
the approach taken by the US-VISIT program office to evaluate the
impact of US-VISIT on land port of entry facilities focused on changes
in I-94 processing time at 5 ports of entry and did not examine other
operational factors, such as US-VISIT's impact on physical facilities
or work force requirements. As a result, program officials did not
always have the information they needed to anticipate problems that
occurred, such as problems processing high volumes of visitors in space
constrained facilities. For more information please see GAO-07-248 and
Federal Capital: Three Entities' Implementation of Capital Planning
Principles is Mixed. GAO-07-274.
DHS updated information: In May 2007, DHS provided updated information
outlining steps it has and is taking to improve land ports of entry
inspection and Border Patrol facilities so they effectively meet
mission requirements. CBP plans to extend the methodology piloted on
land ports of entry to air and sea ports of entry by the end of 2007.
According to DHS, its fiscal year 2007 to 2011 Construction Spending
Plan includes a rapid response component to address urgent facility
requirements for the 6,000 new Border Patrol agents who will be
deployed between fiscal year 2007 and December 2008 as well as the
existing facility gap for 3,400 currently deployed agents. According to
DHS, the focus of the rapid response effort is the Border Patrol
Stations, which will accommodate the vast majority of new agents.
Border Patrol sector headquarters, checkpoints, horse stables, and
remote processing facilities are included in CBP's investment strategy,
but not in the rapid response solutions since they are minimally
affected by the increase in deployment.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. According to DHS, there is an existing
facility gap for 3,400 currently deployed Border Patrol agents, and
although DHS is planning a rapid response to a legislative mandate
requiring a large staffing increase by the end of 2008, DHS has not yet
sufficiently increased infrastructure and facilities. Furthermore, as
we previously reported, DHS's capital investment planning process is
not yet mature and has only been piloted at the land ports of entry. In
addition, with regard to US-VISIT, we reported on various
infrastructure-related difficulties which could affect effective
implementation of the program.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 12. Leverage technology, personnel, and
information to secure the border.
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has worked to
leverage its resources to secure the border, but has faced challenges
in doing so. For example, CBP's Interagency Border Inspection System
has sought to improve screening of travelers entering the United States
at ports of entry by utilizing terrorist information that the National
Terrorist Screening Center gathers and consolidates. The DHS IG
reported, though, that the name-based watch lists that this system
utilizes had been prone to repeated false hits for the same individual
on different trips, a situation that results in CBP officers conducting
secondary inspections of the travelers every time they enter the United
States, an inefficient use of the officers' time. In addition, in
December 2006 we reported that DHS has not yet articulated how US-VISIT
is to strategically fit with other land-border security initiatives and
mandates, and thus cannot ensure that these programs work in harmony to
meet mission goals and operate cost effectively. We noted that agency
programs need to properly fit within a common strategic context
governing key aspects of program operations, such as what functions are
to be performed, what facility or infrastructure changes will be needed
to ensure that they operate in harmony and as intended, and what
standards govern the use of technology. We reported that until
decisions on DHS's border security initiatives are made, it remains
unclear how programs will be integrated with US-VISIT, if at all--
raising the possibility that CBP would be faced with managing differing
technology platforms and border inspection processes at each land port
of entry. We reported that knowing how US-VISIT is to work in concert
with other border security and homeland security initiatives and what
facility or facility modifications might be needed could help Congress,
DHS, and others better understand what resources and tools are needed
to ensure success. For more information, see GAO-07-248 and Terrorist
Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the
Public, GAO-06-1031. Also, see Department of Homeland Security Office
of Inspector General, Review of CBP Actions Taken to Intercept
Suspected Terrorists at U.S. Ports of Entry, OIG-06-43 (Washington,
D.C.: June 2006).
DHS updated information: In April 2007, DHS reported that its
interagency Border Inspection System and US-VISIT are well integrated
at air, sea and land border ports. According to CBP, CBP officers at
these ports of entry are able to screen travelers against both
biographic and biometric watch lists in addition to verifying
identities and travel documents. CBP reported that false hits on watch
lists have been addressed with an enhancement that allows port
personnel to identify the subjects if false hits in the system to
prevent hits on subsequent trips. US-VISIT and other border and port
systems utilize the same architecture and infrastructure to minimize
costs and promote information sharing. Additionally, DHS stated that
the Secure Border Initiative Strategic Plan is bringing clarity of
mission, effective coordination of DHS assets, and greater
accountability to the work of DHS in securing the nation's borders.
Moreover, according to DHS, Operation Streamline, launched in December
2005, is a coordinated effort among CBP, ICE, and the Department of
Justice to create a zero tolerance zone for illegal entries in the Del
Rio Office of Border Patrol sector. Beginning with a 5 mile stretch of
the border, Operation Streamline now spans the entire 210 mile Del Rio
Sector Border.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. Although DHS has taken some actions to
leverage technology, personnel, and information to secure the border,
such as using watch lists, more work remains. For example, it is still
unclear how US-VISIT will work with other border security initiatives,
including the Secure Border Initiative. While the Secure Border
Strategic Plan provides some information on how the various border
security initiatives relate, the plan does not fully describe how these
initiatives will interact once implemented. In addition, the further
development and implementation of SBInet will be key to DHS efforts in
achieving this performance expectation, but SBInet is still in the
early phases of implementation.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[A] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of
Justice, have a role to play in developing a strategy to detect and
interdict illegal flows of goods in the country. This performance
expectation is focused on DHS's roles and responsibilities in
developing a strategy for detecting and interdicting illegal flows of
goods into the United States.
[B] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of
Justice, have a role to play in detecting and interdicting illegal
flows of goods in the country. This performance expectation is focused
on DHS's roles and responsibilities in implementing a strategy for
detecting and interdicting illegal flows of goods into the United
States. We address cargo security in the context of maritime security
in a later section of this report.
[C] We address those programs related to maritime cargo security, for
example the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and the
Container Security Initiative, in a later section of this report.
[D] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of
State, have a role to play in implementing effective security measures
in the visa issuance process. This performance expectation is focused
on DHS's roles and responsibilities in implementing effective security
measures in the visa issuance process--namely the Visa Security
Program.
[E] Other agencies, such as the Department of State, have
responsibilities for enhancing the security of documents used to enter
the United States.
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Immigration Enforcement:
DHS is responsible for enforcing U.S. immigration laws. Immigration
enforcement includes apprehending, detaining, and removing criminal and
illegal aliens; disrupting and dismantling organized smuggling of
humans and contraband as well as human trafficking; investigating and
prosecuting those who engage in benefit and document fraud; blocking
and removing employers' access to undocumented workers; and enforcing
compliance with programs to monitor visitors. Within DHS, ICE is
primarily responsible for immigration enforcement efforts. In
particular, ICE's Office of Investigations is responsible for enforcing
immigration and customs laws and its Office of Detention and Removal
Operations is responsible for processing, detaining, and removing
aliens subject to removal from the United States.
As shown in table 18, we identified 16 performance expectations for DHS
in the area of immigration enforcement, and we found that overall DHS
has made moderate progress in meeting those expectations.[Footnote 23]
Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved 8 of the
performance expectations and has generally not achieved 4 other
performance expectations.[Footnote 24] For 4 performance expectations,
we could not make an assessment. In meeting its performance
expectations, ICE faced budget constraints that significantly affected
its overall operations during fiscal year 2004. For example, ICE was
faced with a hiring freeze in fiscal year 2004 that affected its
ability to recruit, hire, and train personnel. Over the past 2 years,
ICE has reported taking actions to strengthen its immigration
enforcement functions and has, for example, hired and trained
additional personnel to help fulfill the agency's mission.
Table 18: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Immigration
Enforcement:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop a program to ensure the timely
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal
from the United States.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Implement a program to ensure the timely
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal
from the United States.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Ensure the removal of criminal aliens.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Assess and prioritize the use of alien
detention resources to prevent the release of aliens subject to
removal.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop a program to allow for the secure
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Implement a program to allow for the secure
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens.
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 7. Develop a prioritized worksite enforcement
strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are employed.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Implement a prioritized worksite
enforcement strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are
employed.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Develop a comprehensive strategy to
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the
United States.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Implement a comprehensive strategy to
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the
United States.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Develop a law enforcement strategy to
combat criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border
criminal activity.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 12. Implement a law enforcement strategy to
combat criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border
criminal activity.
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 13. Disrupt and dismantle mechanisms for money
laundering and financial crimes.
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 14. Develop a program to screen and respond to
local law enforcement and community complaints about aliens who many be
subject to removal.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 15. Develop staffing plans for hiring and
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's immigration
enforcement mission.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 16. Provide training, including foreign
language training, and equipment for all immigration enforcement
personnel to fulfill the agency's mission.
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 8;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 4;
Assessment: No assessment made: 4.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 19 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of immigration enforcement and our assessment of whether DHS
has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).
Table 19: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Immigration Enforcement:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop a program to ensure the timely
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal
from the United States.
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has taken actions to
develop programs to help ensure the timely identification and removal
of noncriminal aliens subject to removal from the United States. In
June 2003, ICE established the Compliance Enforcement Unit to reduce
the number of aliens who had violated the terms of certain types of
visas and were residing in the United States. According to the DHS IG,
the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, the Student and
Exchange Visitor System, and the United States Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology identify visa violators. These three
systems are designed to track a specific segment of the nonimmigrant
population and provide ICE with information concerning visa overstays.
The DHS IG reported that when compliance violations were identified,
enforcement actions must identify, locate, and apprehend violators.
Once apprehended, violators must be detained, adjudicated, and removed.
We have ongoing work assessing DHS guidelines for removing aliens from
the United States who are subject to removal. For more information, see
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Review of
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Compliance Enforcement Unit,
OIG-05-50 (Washington, D.C: September 2005); Detention and Removal of
Illegal Aliens, OIG-06-33 (Washington, D.C.: April 2006); An Assessment
of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fugitive
Operations Teams, OIG-07-34 (Washington, D.C.: March 2007); and Review
of U.S. ICE's Detainee Tracking Process, OIG-07-08 (Washington, D.C.:
November 2006).
DHS updated information: In March, April, and May 2007, ICE provided
updated information on its efforts to ensure the timely identification
and removal of aliens subject to removal from the United States. ICE
established the National Fugitive Operations Program in fiscal year
2003 to reduce the number of fugitive aliens in the United States and
established the Fugitive Operations Support Center in June 2006 to aid
in accounting for and reporting on the U.S. fugitive alien population,
reviewing cases in ICE's Deportable Alien Control System, developing
targeted field operational initiatives, assessing national absconder
data, and providing comprehensive leads and other support to field
offices. ICE reported establishing fiscal year goals for the Fugitive
Operations Teams located throughout its field offices. Each field
office, based on the number of teams located within its area of
operational responsibility, is expected to arrest 1,000 fugitive
targets and targets' associates. Furthermore, the Fugitive Operations
Support Center has a goal of eliminating another 26,000 fugitive cases
annually as a result of data integrity updates to ICE's Deportable
Alien Control System.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation as DHS has taken actions to develop a program
to ensure the timely identification and removal of aliens subject to
removal from the United States.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Implement a program to ensure the timely
identification and removal of noncriminal aliens subject to removal
from the United States.
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: Various factors have
affected DHS's efforts to identify and remove noncriminal aliens
subject to removal from the United States in a timely manner. According
to the DHS IG, in recent years the number of "other than Mexican"
aliens that DHS has apprehended has been rising, and such aliens have
consumed more ICE resources because they cannot simply be returned over
the border. In April 2006, the DHS IG found that Detention and Removal
Operations was unable to ensure the departure from the United States of
all removable aliens. In April 2006, the DHS IG reported that of the
774,112 illegal aliens apprehended during the prior 3 years, 280,987
(36 percent) were released largely due to a lack of personnel, bed
space, and funding needed to detain illegal aliens while their
immigration status was being adjudicated. The DHS IG noted that their
release presented a significant risk due to the inability of CBP and
ICE to verify the identity, country of origin, and terrorist or
criminal affiliation of many of the aliens being released. Further, the
DHS IG reported that the declining personnel and bed space level was
occurring when the number of illegal aliens apprehended was increasing.
The DHS IG stated that even though the Detention and Removal Operations
had received additional funding and enhanced its Fugitive Operations
Program, it was unlikely that many of the released aliens would ever be
removed. ICE has encountered trouble deporting other than Mexican
aliens because it has to first obtain travel documents from the aliens'
countries of origin in order to repatriate them, and some countries
have been unwilling to issue these documents. The DHS IG found that
this unwillingness on the part of the countries of origin to issue
travel documents created a "mini-amnesty" program for some aliens and
also encouraged aliens to enter the United States illegally if they
knew that their countries did not cooperate. DHS reported that it was
working with the Department of State to address travel documents and
related issues preventing or impeding the repatriation of aliens,
particularly to Central and South American countries. However, the DHS
IG reported that these efforts had yet to fully address the potential
national security and public safety risks associated with DHS's
inability to remove tens of thousands of illegal aliens. In addition,
in March 2007, the DHS IG reported on DHS's National Fugitive
Operations Program. The purpose of the program is to identify, locate,
apprehend, and remove aliens--both criminal and noncriminal--who have
unexecuted final orders of removal. This program analyzes data
contained in various systems, such as the Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System that contains information on international students
and exchange visitors, to identify those who may have violated their
terms of entry or who might otherwise pose a threat to national
security. The DHS IG found that the backlog of fugitive aliens
increased despite Fugitive Operation Teams' efforts and that the teams'
efforts were hampered by insufficient detention capacity; database
limitations; and inadequate working space. Additionally, the DHS IG
reported that the removal rate of fugitive aliens apprehended by the
teams could not be determined. The DHS IG noted that progress had been
made in staffing the teams and that the teams had effective
partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies. We have ongoing
work assessing DHS guidelines for removing aliens from the United
States who are subject to removal. For more information, see Department
of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Detention and Removal
of Illegal Aliens, OIG-06-33 (Washington, D.C.: April 2006); An
Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's
Fugitive Operations Teams, OIG-07-34 (Washington, D.C.: March 2007);
and Review of U.S. ICE's Detainee Tracking Process, OIG-07-08
(Washington, D.C.: November 2006).
DHS updated information: In March, April, and May 2007, ICE provided
data on the results of its efforts to implement a program to ensure the
timely identification and removal of aliens subject to removal from the
United States. According to DHS, under the Secure Border Initiative,
DHS has ended "catch and release" of non-Mexican nationals apprehended
at or near U.S. borders. DHS stated that it remains committed to a
"catch and return" regime, ensuring that no alien is released due to
lack of detention capacity in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. DHS also
reported that the average length of time spent in detention by an alien
during removal proceedings has generally decreased from about 41.5 days
in fiscal year 2002 to about 33.7 days as of August 31, 2006. However,
ICE reported that during the first 5 months of fiscal year 2007, the
average length of stay increased to 38.5 days. ICE officials noted that
various factors can affect the average length of stay, such as the
unwillingness of foreign countries to issue travel documents and the
type of proceeding in which an alien is placed (e.g., expedited removal
or a full hearing).[A] ICE also stated that increased use of electronic
travel documents and video teleconferencing have helped reduce delays
that have contributed to longer periods of detention. ICE officials
noted that decisions by foreign countries to refuse or delay issuance
of travel documents are outside the control of DHS, and ICE has
stationed a full-time liaison officer at the Department of State to
help improve relations with the Department of State and foreign
countries. ICE reported that it has improved relations with Central
American countries in particular regarding the issuance of travel
documents and noted, for example, that El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras--which are among the countries with the highest number of
removals from the United States--have agreed to use ICE's Electronic
Travel Document System. With regard to its National Fugitive Operations
Program, ICE reported that at the end of fiscal year 2006, it had
deployed 50 Fugitive Operations Teams nationwide and noted that 75 such
teams have been fully funded for fiscal year 2007. Additional
information reported by ICE on its effort to identify and remove
criminal aliens from the United States is provided under the next
performance expectation; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has
generally not achieved this performance expectation. DHS has undertaken
efforts to ensure the timely identification of aliens subject to
removal from the United States and provided us with data on its
efforts, including data on the number of removable aliens arrested. DHS
also provided us with data on the average length of time spent in
detention by aliens during removal proceedings. While the average
length of stay has generally decreased over time, DHS still faces
difficulties in ensuring the removal of all aliens subject to removal
from the United States in a timely manner. First, the average length of
stay for an alien in detention between October 2006 and the end of
February 2007 has increased from the fiscal year 2006 level; it remains
to be seen whether the average of length of stay in fiscal year 2007
will increase, decrease, or stay the same as the fiscal year 2006
level. Second, the DHS IG reported that DHS has faced difficulties in
removing aliens from the United States because of the unwillingness of
some countries to provide the necessary travel documents, a
circumstance that may be outside of DHS's control but that DHS has
implemented efforts to help address, such as negotiating memoranda of
understanding with foreign countries. DHS has finalized memorandum of
understanding with three countries, and is working with other countries
to expand use of the Electronic Travel Document System. Nevertheless,
as previously suggested by the DHS IG, these efforts may not yet fully
address the potential national security and public safety risks
associated with DHS's inability to remove tens of thousands of illegal
aliens. Third, DHS has faced challenges in identifying aliens for
removal from the United States and, according to the DHS IG, the
fugitive alien population appears to be growing at a rate that exceeds
Fugitive Operations Teams' ability to apprehend.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Ensure the removal of criminal aliens.
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: Our work and the DHS IG's
work have shown that DHS has faced difficulties in its efforts to
ensure the removal of criminal aliens from the United States. In
October 2004 we reported that although the legacy U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service was to identify and remove criminal aliens as
they came out of federal and state prison systems, it had failed to
identify all removable imprisoned criminal aliens. Some who were
released from prison committed and were convicted of new felonies. At
that time, ICE Detention and Removal Operations officials, who took
over the program from the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
stated that they were taking steps to ensure the departure of all
removable aliens. For example, they established fugitive operations
teams. In April 2006, the DHS IG also reported that the expansion of
the Criminal Alien Program, which identifies and processes criminal
aliens incarcerated in federal, state, and local correctional
institutions and jails who have no legal right to remain in the United
States after serving out their sentence, would create more demands for
the Detention and Removal Operations to detain, process, and remove
illegal aliens. The DHS IG concluded that DHS and ICE needed to ensure
that any planned increase in the Detention and Removal Operations'
ability to identify and remove criminal aliens be accompanied by a
comparable increase in support personnel, detention bed space,
equipment, infrastructure, and funding to ensure the timely removal of
criminal aliens from the United States. Besides the lack of bed space,
the DHS IG reported that the Detention and Removal Operations' ability
to detain and remove illegal aliens with final orders of removal was
affected by (1) the propensity of illegal aliens to disobey orders to
appear in immigration court; (2) the penchant of released illegal
aliens with final orders to abscond; (3) the practice of some countries
to block or inhibit the repatriation of its citizens; and (4) two U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that mandate the release of criminal and other
high-risk aliens 180 days after the issuance of the final removal order
except in "Special Circumstances." The DHS IG reported that,
collectively, the bed space, personnel, and funding shortages, coupled
with the other factors, had created an unofficial "mini-amnesty"
program for criminal and other high-risk aliens. For more information,
see Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration
Enforcement Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning Requirements,
GAO-05-66. Also, see Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General, Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens, OIG-06-33
(Washington, D.C.: April 2006); An Assessment of United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fugitive Operations Teams, OIG-
07-34 (Washington, D.C.: March 2007); and Review of U.S. ICE's Detainee
Tracking Process, OIG-07-08 (Washington, D.C.: November 2006); DHS
updated information: During March, April, and May 2007, ICE provided
updated information on its efforts to ensure the removal of criminal
aliens from the United States. According to ICE, there are no data on
the universe of aliens incarcerated in state and local jails who are
amenable to removal proceedings. This is because prisons and jails
utilize independent booking software that tracks place of birth in
different ways. Additionally, information on place of birth is not
sufficient to determine whether an individual is an alien subject to
removal from the United States. According to ICE, while it does not
know the exact number of incarcerated criminal aliens subject to
removal at this time, there are approximately 158,000 incarcerated
criminal aliens with immigration detainers within the Enforcement
Operational Immigration Records system, ICE's administrative case
management system. In June 2006 and in support of its Criminal Alien
Program, ICE established the National Detection Enforcement and
Processing Offenders by Remote Technology Center in Chicago, Illinois
to help in the screening, interviewing, and removal processing of
criminal aliens in federal detention facilities throughout the United
States to help ensure that these criminal aliens are deported rather
than released into the community upon completion of their federal
sentences. ICE reported that this center has screened more than 9,200
incarcerated criminal aliens, issued nearly 7,000 charging documents,
and located nearly 1,000 alien absconders. Moreover, ICE reported that
it has finalized agreements with nine local law enforcement agencies to
work with these agencies to take into custody and remove aliens
convicted of crimes at the state and local level. Using these
partnerships and other measures, ICE reported that as of March 2007,
its Criminal Alien Program has provided coverage for 1,674 of the 4,828
federal, state, and local jails and prisons nationwide, including for
all 114 Bureau of Prisons federal detention facilities. ICE reported
that for fiscal year 2007 it has set a target of removing 90,000 aliens
from U.S. prisons and jails and, for fiscal year 2007, is on pace to
double the approximately 60,000 charging documents it issued through
the Criminal Alien Program in fiscal year 2006. ICE plans to expand
coverage of the Criminal Alien Program to 3,400 covered facilities by
fiscal year 2009. According to ICE, each Criminal Alien Program team is
expected to process 1,800 new administrative cases per year. ICE also
reported that from October 1, 2006, through March 31, 2007, it has
removed more than 17,000 Bureau of Prison non-U.S. citizen inmates. If
the bureau releases a similar number in fiscal year 2007 as it released
in fiscal year 2006 (about 26,600, according to ICE), ICE reported that
it is on track to remove all removable aliens released from the Bureau
of Prisons in fiscal year 2007. Overall, ICE projects that in fiscal
year 2007, it will process for removal more than 120,000 removable
aliens located in prisons and jails nationwide; Our assessment: We
conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation. Although DHS has made progress in removing criminal aliens
from the United States, much more work remains. For example, DHS has
taken actions to expand its Criminal Alien Program to remove criminal
aliens subject to removal from the United States after they complete
their sentences in federal, state, and local correctional institutions
and jails. However, ICE has not yet expanded the Criminal Alien Program
or taken actions to ensure coverage of all federal, state, and local
correctional institutions and jails. ICE has reached agreements with
only nine local law enforcement agencies to remove aliens convicted of
crimes at the state or local level. As a result, ICE may not be able to
fully ensure the removal of criminal aliens from facilities that are
not covered through the Criminal Alien Program or agreements with local
law enforcement agencies. Moreover, the DHS IG reported that ICE faces
a variety of challenges in its efforts to expand the Criminal Alien
Program, and DHS did not provide us with evidence that it has yet
addressed these challenges;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Assess and prioritize the use of alien
detention resources to prevent the release of aliens subject to
removal;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has taken actions to
assess and prioritize use of alien detention and removal resources. In
November 2005, the DHS IG reported that the separation of CBP's
apprehension components from Detention and Removal Operations created
challenges in national coordination because the two are part of
different agencies that pursued different sets of priorities and each
has its own planning process. The DHS IG noted that Detention and
Removal Operations prepared detention bed space and staff needs
projections without the benefit of CBP apprehension and arrest
projections, while CBP developed its future apprehension initiatives
without the benefit of insight into Detention and Removal Operations'
future processing capability. In an effort to achieve better efficiency
and effectiveness, ICE and CBP negotiated a memorandum of understanding
between Border Patrol agents and ICE investigators, although employees
of both agencies noted persisting coordination problems in the
apprehension and detention process. Other factors that increased the
number of aliens that the Detention and Removal Operations have
detained include the rising number of aliens that require mandatory
detention and Detention and Removal Operations' improved ability to
identify criminal aliens who are incarcerated in correctional
institutions and jails and who will be subject to removal upon release
from jail. The DHS IG also found that ICE has worked to improve
strategic planning for detention resources, and the ICE Detention and
Removal Operations issued a strategic plan in 2003 called "Endgame."
This plan includes specific objectives for optimizing the means for
detaining illegal aliens, including (1) ensuring sufficient and
appropriate bed space is available based on detention category,
characteristic, and condition of release; (2) enhancing partnerships
with other federal detention agencies for better use of their
resources, to include facilities and training; and (3) developing a
National Custody Management Plan promoting the effective utilization of
available bed space and alternative detention settings. The plan
identified several significant challenges, many beyond DHS's control,
including the number of aliens to remove, limited resources, political
will, foreign governments, and nonremovable aliens. The DHS IG reported
that, for these reasons, DHS needed to intensify its efforts to provide
ICE with the resources and interagency support needed to overcome these
challenges. For more information, see Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge
Customs and Border Protection with Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
OIG-06-04 (Washington, D.C.: November 2005); ICE's Compliance with
Detention Limits for Aliens with a Final Order of Removal from the
United States, OIG-07-28 (Washington, D.C.: February 2007); Treatment
of Immigration Detainees Housed at Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Facilities, OIG-07-01 (Washington, D.C.: December 2006); Review of U.S.
ICE's Detainee Tracking Process, OIG-07-08 (Washington, D.C.: November
2006); and Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens, OIG-06-33
(Washington, D.C.: April 2006).
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated
information on efforts to assess and prioritize use of alien detention
and removal resources. According to ICE, successful enforcement
strategies and the requirement to manage within ICE's operational
budget have resulted in a situation where Detention and Removal
Operations has exceeded its funded bed space level and therefore must
apply rigorous criteria to determine which apprehended aliens are
detained. According to DHS, ICE detains all aliens who pose a threat to
community safety or national security, and those required to be
detained under the nation's immigration laws. In fiscal year 2006, ICE
added 7,000 beds in facilities along the southern border, and in the
first quarter of fiscal year 2007 added 2,000 beds. In order to ensure
the availability of bed space in the future, ICE introduced a formal
capacity planning program designed to provide advance notice of future
bed space requirements and collaborated with apprehending entities to
obtain apprehension forecasts to project short and long term needs. The
Detention Operations Coordination Center, established in July 2006,
coordinates the transfer of detainees from field offices with a
shortage of detention space to those with available beds. ICE also
reported that the detainee transportation system has been restructured
to increase in-flight service routes for longer, more cost effective
flights. ICE reported that as it creates models to determine detention
capacity needs, Detention and Removal Operations is taking account of
the capacity needs of CBP and ICE and is working with the U.S. Bureau
of Prisons, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the
Departments of Justice and State to develop a more efficient detention
and removal system.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. While the availability of detention space
depends on resources, DHS has taken actions to assess and prioritize
the use of alien detention resources to prevent the release of aliens
subject to removal by increasing bed space, relocating detainees, and
better coordinating with relevant agencies. DHS has also taken actions
to develop and implement a capacity planning program to identify future
bed space requirements and has established priorities for bed space
needs.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop a program to allow for the secure
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress in developing
programs to allow secure alternatives to detention. In October 2004, we
reported that Detention and Removal Operations planned to use the
results of its pilot programs (e.g., electronic monitoring and home
visits of nondetained aliens) to determine which efforts intended to
prevent nondetained aliens from fleeing while in immigration
proceedings would merit additional funding.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated
information on its Intensive Supervision Appearance Program and its
Electronic Monitoring Program. According to ICE, under the Intensive
Supervision Appearance Program, established in June 2004 and only
available to aliens not subject to mandatory detention, all
participants must agree to comply with the conditions of their release.
Case specialists are then assigned a limited caseload of participants
and are responsible for monitoring those participants in the community
by using tools such as electronic monitoring (bracelets), home visits,
work visits, and reporting by telephone. The Electronic Monitoring
Program is a reporting and case management tool for aliens released
from custody that utilizes telephone reporting and electronic devices,
such as radio frequency and Global Positioning System technology, to
identify a nondetained alien's location and help ensure the alien's
appearance at scheduled hearings and, as appropriate, the alien's
scheduled removal. Last, DHS is conducting research on piloting a
program that would utilize a kiosk-type hardware like the US-VISIT
program to which an alien could report monthly. Instead of reporting to
a deportation officer, the alien would scan his fingerprint and have
his photo taken at the kiosk, which would be linked to appropriate
databases.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has developed two programs that allow for
the secure alternative detention of noncriminal aliens--the Intensive
Supervision Appearance program and the Electronic Monitoring Program--
and is exploring other alternatives to detention for noncriminal
aliens.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Implement a program to allow for the secure
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not conducted work on DHS's
efforts to provide for the secure alternative detention of noncriminal
aliens.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated
information on its efforts to provide alternatives to detention. ICE
reported that under its Intensive Supervision Appearance Program there
has been an 82 percent court appearance rate, as compared to 61 percent
for the general nondetained population and that 47 percent of program-
enrolled aliens who received final removal orders were confirmed to
have left the United States compared to 13 percent of aliens in the
nondetained general population believed to have compiled with removal
orders. According to ICE, since the inception of the Electronic
Monitoring Program in 2003, the program has been used by almost 9,100
aliens and is currently used by 6,500 aliens. ICE noted that the number
of aliens who have participated in these programs has been relatively
small and that only certain aliens are eligible to be detained through
these programs. ICE noted that no limit exists on the total number of
aliens who can be monitored under the program. Furthermore, ICE noted
that it is working to improve its alternative to detention programs by,
for example, exploring additional supervision technologies and
developing a memorandum of understanding with the Executive Office for
Immigration Review to fast-track alternative-to-detention participants
through the immigration hearing process. In addition, ICE reported that
it is planning to expand its programs for secure alternative detention
to increase programs' capacity to allow for a total detained population
of 10,500 aliens.
Our assessment: We cannot assess of the extent to which DHS has
generally achieved this performance expectation. We have not completed
work related to DHS's effort to implement a program for
secure alternatives to detention, and while DHS provided us with some
information on its implementation efforts, we are unable to assess
DHS's progress in achieving this performance expectation based on this
information.
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 7. Develop a prioritized worksite enforcement
strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are employed.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: Our work has shown that DHS has
taken actions to develop a prioritized worksite enforcement program. As
part of the Secure Border Initiative, in April 2006 ICE announced a new
interior enforcement strategy to target employers of unauthorized
aliens, immigration violators, and criminal networks. As we testified
in June 2006, under this strategy, ICE has planned to target employers
who knowingly employ unauthorized workers by bringing criminal charges
against them. For more information, see Immigration Enforcement:
Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement
Efforts, GAO-06-895T and Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder
Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-05-813.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated
information on its worksite enforcement program. Specifically, ICE
reported that its worksite enforcement strategy includes (1) critical
infrastructure protection, (2) criminal investigations of egregious
employer violators, and (3) enhanced employer compliance and outreach
through implementation of the ICE Mutual Agreement between Government
and Employers. As part of its critical infrastructure protection
efforts, ICE has undertaken enforcement actions to remove unauthorized
workers from critical infrastructure sites, as those unauthorized
workers may pose a threat to sensitive facilities. ICE has also engaged
in criminal investigations targeting unscrupulous employers for
significant criminal violations and has sought to prosecute employers'
managers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. ICE has also
announced the first nine charter members of the ICE Mutual Agreement
between Government and Employers, a program designed to build
cooperative relationships between the federal government and businesses
to strengthen hiring practices and reduce the employment of
unauthorized workers. Through the program, ICE seeks to encourage
industry compliance through enhanced employer training and education.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has developed a prioritized worksite
enforcement strategy focused on critical infrastructure protection and
egregious employers and has provided employers with a tool for enhanced
training and education on compliance with laws prohibiting the
employment of unauthorized workers.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Implement a prioritized worksite
enforcement strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are
employed.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: Our work has shown that DHS has
faced challenges in implementing a prioritized worksite enforcement
strategy. In August 2005 and June 2006 we reported that worksite
enforcement was one of various immigration enforcement programs that
competed for resources among ICE responsibilities and that worksite
enforcement had been a relatively low priority. We reported that
competing needs for resources and difficulties in proving that
employers knowingly hired unauthorized workers hindered ICE's worksite
enforcement efforts. In addition, ICE officials stated that the lack of
sufficient detention space limited the effectiveness of worksite
enforcement efforts. We also noted that the availability and use of
fraudulent documents made it difficult for ICE agents to prove that
employers knowingly hired unauthorized workers. We reported that the
number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers for improperly
completing paperwork or knowingly hiring unauthorized workers generally
declined between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. We also reported that the
percentage of ICE agent work-years spent on worksite enforcement
generally decreased between fiscal years 1999 and 2003. In addition, we
reported that ICE lacked outcome goals and measures that hindered its
ability to effectively assess the results of its worksite enforcement
efforts. For example, we noted that until ICE fully develops outcome
goals and measures, it may not be able to determine the extent to which
its critical infrastructure protection efforts have resulted in the
elimination of unauthorized workers' access to secure areas of critical
infrastructure sites, one possible goal that ICE may use for its
worksite enforcement program. For more information, see GAO-06-895T and
GAO-05-813.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated
information on its worksite enforcement implementation efforts. ICE
reported that during fiscal year 2006 it initiated about 1,200 worksite
enforcement investigations, seized property and assets valued at
approximately $1.7 million at the time of the initial enforcement
action, and made 716 criminal arrests, a substantial increase over
criminal arrests made in previous fiscal years. ICE reported that
during fiscal year 2006 criminal fines, forfeitures, and payments in
lieu of forfeiture yielded more than $2.5 million. ICE reported that it
obtained criminal and civil judgments totaling $26.7 million as a
result of its worksite enforcement efforts for the first quarter of
fiscal year 2007. With regard to the third prong of ICE's worksite
enforcement strategy--the ICE Mutual Agreement between Government and
Employers--as of January 2007, ICE had nine employers as members.[B]
One requirement for participation in this program is that member
employers enroll in the Employment Eligibility Verification system,
which allows participating employers to electronically verify the work
authorization status of newly hired employees. ICE reported that it
does not yet have systems in place to measure the effectiveness and
success of its program. ICE reported that it does not collect data on
program effectiveness because it would require the law enforcement
agency to collect data from a wide range of agencies that are
responsible for carrying out the specific law enforcement mission. ICE
reported that it uses its law enforcement statistics (e.g., numbers of
arrests, indictments, convictions, seizures, and forfeitures);
consequences resulting from closed cases (e.g., indictments and
convictions); and risk assessments to assess efficiency and
effectiveness of its efforts. With regard to the consequences resulting
from closed cases, ICE noted that a measure of success is if an
investigation results in an indictment and a conviction. ICE reported
that it measures the quality of cases and focuses its efforts on those
cases that are the highest priority for protecting the United States.
With regard to risk assessments, ICE reported that it conducts threat,
vulnerability, and consequences assessments of customs and immigration
systems to determine the greatest risks for exploitation by terrorists
and other criminals and to determine the optimal application of
resources to ensure the maximum contribution to national security and
public safety. ICE reported that additional time is needed to afford
its programs the opportunity to mature into an outcome-based system.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to implement its
worksite enforcement strategy and, among other things, has conducted
more worksite enforcement investigations and made more criminal arrests
in fiscal year 2006 in comparison to prior fiscal years. However,
millions of unauthorized workers face little likelihood of confronting
ICE worksite enforcements actions. Moreover, DHS did not provide us
with evidence on the extent to which its efforts have contributed to
the achievement of ICE's desired outcomes for its worksite enforcement
program and on the extent to which ICE has developed outcome goals and
measures for its worksite enforcement program. We previously reported,
without these goals and measures, it may be difficult for ICE to fully
determine whether its worksite enforcement program is achieving its
desired outcomes. With regard to the ICE Mutual Agreement between
Government and Employers, the third prong of ICE's worksite enforcement
strategy, we have previously identified weaknesses in one of the
program's key requirements--participation in the Employment Eligibility
Verification program. These weaknesses include the program's inability
to identify document fraud, DHS delays in entering information into its
databases, and some employer noncompliance with program. DHS has
undertaken some efforts to address these weakness, but they would have
to be fully addressed to help ensure the efficient and effective
operation of an expanded program.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Develop a comprehensive strategy to
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the
United States.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In prior work we reported that as of
April 2005, ICE had not yet finalized a national strategy for combating
alien smuggling.[C] For more information, see Combating Alien
Smuggling: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Federal Response, GAO-05-
305.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated
information on its efforts to develop a strategy to combat human
smuggling and trafficking. For example, the Secure Border Initiative is
a comprehensive, multiyear program established by the Secretary of
Homeland Security to secure U.S. borders and reduce illegal
immigration. The Secure Border Initiative includes DHS's efforts to
identify and dismantle smuggling organizations. According to DHS, the
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center is an important component of
DHS's strategy to combat alien smuggling. Additionally, ICE reported
that, in 2006, it initiated its Trafficking in Persons Strategy to
target criminal organizations and individuals engaged in human
trafficking worldwide. The Trafficking in Persons Strategy focuses on
building partnerships and collaboration with other DHS agencies,
foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, the Department of
Justice Civil Rights Division, and federal, state, and local law
enforcement.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has made progress toward developing a
comprehensive strategy to interdict and prevent trafficking and
smuggling of aliens into the United States by, for
example, establishing the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center and
the Trafficking in Persons Strategy.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Implement a comprehensive strategy to
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the
United States.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: Our work has shown that DHS has
faced challenges in implementing its antismuggling and trafficking
mission.[D] In May 2005 we reported that ICE and CBP--two DHS
components with antismuggling missions--signed a memorandum of
understanding in November 2004 to address their respective roles and
responsibilities, including provisions to ensure proper and timely
sharing of information and intelligence. However, we reported that
there was no mechanism in place for tracking the number and the results
of referrals or leads made by CBP to ICE for investigation. Without
such a mechanism, there may have been missed opportunities for
identifying and developing cases on large or significant alien-
smuggling organizations. CBP and ICE officials acknowledged that
establishing a tracking mechanism would have benefits for both
agencies. Such a mechanism would help ICE ensure that appropriate
action is taken on the referrals. Also, CBP could continue to pursue
certain leads if ICE--for lack of available resources or other reasons-
-could not take action on the referrals. For more information, see GAO-
05-305.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided updated
information on its antismuggling and trafficking efforts. With regard
to smuggling, CBP established its Office of Alien Smuggling
Interdiction to set guidelines for the development and maintenance of a
program to address human smuggling incidents. This office is also
intended to institutionalize information sharing within CBP on migrant
smuggling, trafficking in persons, and clandestine terrorist travel.
CBP noted that the office is still a work in progress, and CBP has
established various goals and associated time frames for completing
these goals. With regard to human trafficking, ICE reported that in
fiscal year 2006 it opened nearly 300 human trafficking investigations
and made about 180 arrests as a result of human trafficking
investigations. ICE reported that since 2005 it has hosted or
participated in training sessions on human trafficking and has
collaborated with nongovernmental organizations that provide services
to human trafficking victims. In addition, ICE reported on various
initiatives to share information with CBP regarding human smuggling and
trafficking. As previously discussed, ICE reported that it does not yet
have systems in place to measure the effectiveness and success of its
program. ICE reported that it does not collect data on program
effectiveness because doing so would require the law enforcement agency
to collect data from a wide range of agencies that are responsible for
carrying out the specific law enforcement mission. ICE reported that it
uses its law enforcement statistics (e.g., numbers of arrests,
indictments, convictions, seizures, and forfeitures); consequences
resulting from closed cases (e.g., indictments and convictions); and
risk assessments to assess efficiency and effectiveness of its efforts.
ICE reported that in May 2007, the ICE Offices of Investigations and
International Affairs issued a joint memorandum to field offices
providing guidance in accomplishing the component of the human
trafficking strategy and requiring quarterly outreach reports and
annual assessments. According to ICE, these quarterly reports and
annual assessments will be used to monitor future progress in
antitrafficking efforts.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. In prior work, we noted that effectiveness of
a strategy for smuggling depends partly on having clearly defined roles
and responsibilities for those agencies with antismuggling missions.
CBP and ICE largely addressed this point in signing a memorandum of
understanding and undertaking other information sharing initiatives.
However, coordination between these two agencies and implementation of
antismuggling efforts could be enhanced by development and use of a
mechanism for sharing information. In addition, as part of its efforts
to implement its antismuggling and trafficking strategy, DHS has
identified the importance of performance evaluation but has not yet
developed outcome goals and measures to assess the extent to which its
efforts are achieving desired outcomes and has only recently initiated
efforts to obtain quarterly reports and annual assessments from field
offices. Until DHS has developed a mechanism to better share
information among the responsible agencies and the ability to evaluate
the outcomes of its efforts, DHS will not have a comprehensive strategy
in place. In addition, although CBP has established goals for its
Office of Alien Smuggling Interdiction, the majority of these goals
have target time frames later than May 2007, or CBP noted that time
frames are ongoing.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Develop a law enforcement strategy to
combat criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border
criminal activity.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not completed work on DHS
efforts to combat criminal alien gangs.[E].
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated
information on its efforts to combat alien gangs. According to ICE, one
of the goals of the Secure Border Initiative is to identify and remove
immigration violators who are criminal aliens at large in the United
States. ICE stated that it will use the additional resources in the
proposed fiscal year 2008 budget to enhance ICE's anti-gang initiative--
Operation Community Shield--and increase the number of transnational
gang members that are identified, arrested, and removed from the United
States. Operation Community Shield, a national law enforcement
initiative, partners ICE with other federal, state, and local law
enforcement. Additionally, ICE participates in the National Gang
Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center, a multi-agency
national anti-gang enforcement targeting center, and in regular policy
coordination meetings at the National Security Council concerning
international organized crime. As a participant in the National
Security Council Policy Coordination Committee meetings, ICE is
assisting in the development of a strategy to combat transnational
gangs in the United States, Mexico, and Central America.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has initiated various efforts, such as
Operation Community Shield, in developing a strategy for combating
criminal alien gangs. ICE has also worked with other agencies and
groups to develop a strategy to combat alien gangs.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 12. Implement a law enforcement strategy to
combat criminal alien gangs in the United States and cross-border
criminal activity.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not completed work on DHS
efforts to combat criminal alien gangs.[F].
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated
information on its efforts to combat criminal alien gangs. Operation
Community Shield was initiated by ICE in February 2005 to combat
violent transnational street gangs and expanded to include all criminal
and prison gangs. Under Operation Community Shield, ICE identifies
violent gangs and develops intelligence on their membership; deters,
disrupts, and dismantles gang operations by tracing and seizing their
cash, weapons, and other assets; criminally prosecutes or removes gang
members from the United States; partners with other law enforcement
agencies at the federal, state and local levels to develop a force
multiplier effect for gang investigations; and conducts outreach to
boost public awareness about gangs. In March 2007, ICE reported that
since its inception in February 2005, Operation Community Shield has
resulted in the arrests of more than 4,000 gang members and associates.
Additionally, ICE stated that it will provide staffing positions to
identified high-threat gang areas based on the current transnational
threat at the time the positions and funding are received. Given the
mobility of transnational gangs, ICE will make a determination on the
placement of resources in specific areas needing staffing based on
tactical intelligence and other operational considerations. As
previously discussed, ICE reported that it does not yet have systems in
place to measure the effectiveness and success of its program, but uses
its law enforcement statistics (e.g., numbers of arrests, indictments,
convictions, seizures, and forfeitures); consequences resulting from
closed cases (e.g., indictments and convictions); and risk assessments
to assess efficiency and effectiveness of its efforts.
Our assessment: We cannot make an assessment of the extent to which DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. We have not
completed work related to DHS's effort to combat criminal alien gangs,
and while DHS provided us with some information on its implementation
efforts, we are unable to assess DHS's progress in achieving this
performance expectation based on the information DHS provided.
Specifically, DHS did not provide us with information that would
clearly enable us to assess the extent to which DHS's efforts to
implement a strategy to combat alien gangs have resulted in desired
outcomes.
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 13. Disrupt and dismantle mechanisms for money
laundering and financial crimes.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not completed work related
to ICE's ability to disrupt and dismantle mechanisms for money
laundering and financial crimes.[G].
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated
information on its efforts to combat money laundering and financial
crimes. With regard to a strategy for money laundering, ICE reported
that it was a major contributor to the 2005 U.S. Money Laundering
Threat Assessment produced by an interagency group to assess the
progress that the United States had made in combating money laundering,
evaluating the changing environment, and identifying areas that require
further attention. ICE was also active in preparing the 2006 and 2007
National Money Laundering Strategies that addressed the findings and
recommendations in the earlier report and set out goals, strategies,
and specific actions for agencies to follow. The 2007 National Money
Laundering Strategy noted that to measure the effectiveness of U.S.
enforcement measures, ICE will compile investigative data. To support
investigations with a potential nexus to terrorism and other financial
crimes investigations, in July 2003, ICE launched Operation
Cornerstone, an outreach program designed to identify and eliminate
systemic vulnerabilities in financial systems that could be exploited
by individuals, criminal organizations, and terrorists. ICE reported
conducting more than 4,000 outreach presentations that have resulted in
over 275 criminal investigations and $3 million seized since its
establishment. With regard to bulk cash smuggling, ICE reported that
the launch of Operation Firewall in August 2005, and its subsequent
expansion in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, helped combat bulk cash
smuggling. ICE reported that since its inception, Operation Firewall
has resulted in the seizure of more than $76 million and the arrest of
more than 200 suspects. ICE noted that the November 2004 establishment
of Trade Transparency Units created cooperative international
investigative efforts to identify and eliminate trade-based money
laundering system, which supports the trafficking of drugs, people, and
other contraband as well as terrorism. ICE also reported that it
launched the Unlicensed Money Service Business/Informal Value Transfer
System to prevent terrorists and other criminals from moving illicit
funds through unlicensed money service businesses. Overall, in fiscal
year 2006, ICE reported conducting nearly 4,000 financial
investigations that resulted in more than 1,200 arrests and the seizure
of more than $137 million in suspected illicit proceeds. As previously
discussed, ICE reported that it does not yet have systems in place to
prove that it has disrupted and dismantled mechanisms for money
laundering and financial crimes. ICE reported that it uses its law
enforcement statistics (e.g., numbers of arrests, indictments,
convictions, seizures, and forfeitures); consequences resulting from
closed cases (e.g., indictments and convictions); and risk assessments
to assess efficiency and effectiveness of its efforts.
Our assessment: We cannot make an assessment of the extent to which DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. We have not
completed work related to DHS efforts to disrupt and dismantle
mechanisms for money laundering and financial crimes. Although DHS
provided us with some information on its implementation efforts, we are
unable to assess DHS's progress in achieving this performance
expectation based on the information DHS provided. Specifically, DHS
did not provide us with information that would clearly enable us to
assess the extent to which DHS's efforts to disrupt and dismantle
mechanisms for money laundering and financial crimes have resulted in
desired outcomes.
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 14. Develop a program to screen and respond to
local law enforcement and community complaints about aliens who may be
subject to removal.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not completed work related
to ICE programs for screening and responding to local law enforcement
and community complaints about aliens who may be subject to removal.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated
information on its efforts to work with state and local law enforcement
agencies. ICE reported that it in 2006 it initiated a pilot program,
called the Law Enforcement Agency Response, in Phoenix, Arizona, to
provide full-time response to local law enforcement agencies' requests
for immigration-related assistance. As of March 2007, ICE reported that
this program unit has received nearly 400 requests for assistance. ICE
is studying the feasibility of continuing the pilot program and
expanding it to other locations. In addition, ICE has established
memoranda of agreement with 21 law enforcement agencies to provide
training and assistance to state and local police and correctional
personnel in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. ICE reported
that as a result of these efforts, in fiscal year 2006 more than 6,000
individuals were arrested and, as of March 2007, more than 4,000
individuals have been arrested during fiscal year 2007 for violating
misdemeanor and felony state and local laws. According to ICE, its Law
Enforcement Support Center also provides information to law enforcement
agencies relating to foreign nationals suspected of criminal activity
and immigration status information of foreign nationals under arrest or
investigation. Further, the Forensic Document Laboratory provides
assistance to federal, state, tribal, local, and foreign authorities in
making authenticity determinations of travel and identity documents.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has developed a number of programs to
screen and respond to local law enforcement and community complaints
about aliens who may be subject to removal. Additionally DHS has
provided field guidance directing an enhanced response to state and
local requests for information.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 15. Develop staffing plans for hiring and
allocating human capital resources to fulfill the agency's immigration
enforcement mission.
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: Since the transfer of
responsibilities to DHS in March 2003, ICE has faced resource and
financial management challenges that affected its ability to fully
address all of its competing priorities. For example, ICE was faced
with a hiring freeze in fiscal year 2004, which affected its ability to
recruit, hire, and train personnel. Moreover, in June 2006 we reported
that ICE did not yet have a formal risk management process for
prioritizing and allocating its limited resources. Rather ICE primarily
relied on the judgment of staff in major field offices in addition to
national programs developed in headquarters. For more information, see
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in
the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, ICE provided updated
information on its human capital functions. ICE reported that it has
developed comprehensive staffing plans for all of the agency's critical
positions in support of ICE's immigration enforcement mission and
provided us with the operational assumptions underlying the staffing
models. ICE also reported streamlining its hiring process and noted
meeting all of its 2006 hiring goals. ICE reported (1) establishing
preliminary guidance to provide ICE leadership and program managers
with a framework for hiring and funding decisions and (2) implementing
a workforce planning initiative to examine interdependencies and
relationships among component programs. ICE stated that it has a hiring
plan for supplemental, enhancement, and attrition hiring and that it is
currently filling these positions. As of April 10, 2007, ICE reported
that it has hired 1,213 employees in key occupations with 892 remaining
for this fiscal year. ICE noted that Detention and Removal Operations
is currently working toward hiring to its authorized and funded level
for positions of 6,762 and that approximately 5,222 positions are
filled with 1,540 vacancies. Due to the number of vacancies, Detention
and Removal Operations stated that it is striving to achieve a hiring
goal that would ensure that at least 90 percent of its field and 85
percent of its headquarters vacancies are filled by the end of fiscal
year 2007.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has provided information outlining its
current staffing allocations and the operational basis of staffing
models and has created initiatives to facilitate hiring and staffing.
ICE staffing models are taken into consideration when requesting funds
in the budget.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 16. Provide training, including foreign
language training, and equipment for all immigration enforcement
personnel to fulfill the agency's mission.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We have not completed work on DHS's
provision of training for immigration enforcement personnel.
DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, ICE provided updated
information on its training efforts. ICE reported that its ICE-D Basic
Law Enforcement Training Program is an 18.5-week basic law enforcement
training program that provides newly hired Detention and Removal
Operations employees with entry-level training in law, tactical
physical techniques, firearms, and operational training. ICE also
reported that the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has added a 5-
week Spanish language immersion course that became part of the ICE-D
program in April 2007. According to ICE, in November 2006 ICE offered a
4-hour instructor-led course on Alien Smuggling/Victims of Trafficking,
but is in the process of developing a more balanced course that is not
just focused on the southern border. ICE also offers other training
courses. See Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector
General, A Review of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Discipline
Procedures, OIG-06-57 (Washington, D.C.: August 2006).
Our assessment: We cannot make an assessment of the extent to which DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. We have not
completed work related to DHS's effort to provide training and
equipment to immigration enforcement personnel. While DHS provided us
with some information on its training efforts, we are unable to assess
DHS's progress in achieving this performance expectation based on the
information DHS provided. Specifically, DHS did not provide us with
information that would clearly enable us to assess the extent to which
DHS has provided training, beyond basic training, for all immigration
enforcement personnel.
Assessment: No assessment made.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken a sufficient number of actions to satisfy most elements of the
expectation. However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not
signify that no further action is required of DHS or that functions
covered by the expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced.
Conversely, "generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet
taken a sufficient number of actions to satisfy most elements of the
performance expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may
be warranted even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy
some but not most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the
DHS IG have not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS
actions to satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information
DHS provided did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which
DHS has achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no
assessment made."
[A] Under expedited removal, aliens apprehended within 100 miles of the
border and within 14 days of entry who do not have documents, or who
have false documents, can be removed from the United States without a
hearing before an immigration judge.
[B] The other two prongs of ICE's worksite enforcement strategy are
critical infrastructure protection and criminal investigations of
egregious employer violators.
[C] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of
Justice, have a role to play in developing a strategy for antismuggling
and trafficking. This performance expectation is focused on DHS's roles
and responsibilities.
[D] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of
Justice, have a role to play antismuggling and trafficking efforts.
This performance expectation is focused on DHS's roles and
responsibilities.
[E] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of
Justice, have a role to play in developing a strategy for combating
alien gangs. This performance expectation is focused on DHS's roles and
responsibilities.
[F] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of
Justice, have a role to play in combating criminal alien gangs. This
performance expectation is focused on DHS's roles and responsibilities.
[G] In addition to DHS, other agencies, such as the Department of
Justice, have a role to play in disrupting and dismantling mechanisms
for money laundering and financial crimes. This performance expectation
is focused on DHS's roles and responsibilities.
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Modest Progress in Providing Immigration Services:
USCIS is the agency within DHS that is responsible for processing
millions of immigration benefit applications received each year for
various types of immigration benefits, determining whether applicants
are eligible to receive immigration benefits, and detecting suspicious
information and evidence to refer for fraud investigation and possible
sanctioning by other DHS components or external agencies. USCIS
processes applications for about 50 types of immigration benefits with
a goal of ensuring that processing of benefits applications takes place
within a 6 month time frame. USCIS has introduced new initiatives to
modernize business practices and upgrade information technology
infrastructure to transform its current, paper-based data systems into
a digital processing resource to enhance customer service, prevent
future backlogs of immigration benefit applications, and improve
efficiency with expanded electronic filing.
As shown in table 20, we identified 14 performance expectations for DHS
in the area of immigration services and found that overall DHS has made
modest progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found
that DHS has generally achieved 5 performance expectations and has
generally not achieved 9 others.
Table 20: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Immigration
Services:
Performance expectation: 1. Eliminate the benefit application backlog
and reduce application completion times to 6 months.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Institute process and staffing reforms to
improve application processes.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Establish a timetable for reviewing the
program rules, business processes, and procedures for immigration
benefit applications.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Institute a case management system to
manage applications and provide management information.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop new programs to prevent future
backlogs from developing.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Establish online access to status
information about benefit applications.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Establish online filing for benefit
applications.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Establish revised immigration application
fees based on a comprehensive fee study.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Capture biometric information on all
benefits applicants.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Implement an automated background check
system to track and store all requests for applications.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Communicate immigration-related
information to other relevant agencies;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 12. Establish training programs to reduce
fraud in the benefits process.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 13. Create an office to reduce immigration
benefit fraud.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 14. Implement a fraud assessment program to
reduce benefit fraud.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 5;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 9;
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 21 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of immigration services and our assessment of whether DHS has
taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).
Table 21: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Immigration Services:
Performance expectation: 1. Eliminate the benefit application backlog
and reduce application completion times to 6 months.
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has made significant
progress in reducing the number of immigration benefit applications
pending adjudication and has prioritized pending applications in a
reasonable manner. However, USCIS cannot yet ensure that it has
eliminated the backlog and reduced application completion time to 6
months primarily because (1) a large number of applications are still
pending before the agency, many of which USCIS stated are of lower
priority in its backlog elimination efforts, and (2) USCIS does not yet
have a case management system for tracking applications it receives to
determine whether applications are processed within 6 months of
receipt. In addition, USCIS has yet to demonstrate that it has overcome
long-standing technology problems. With respect to an immigration
benefit application, the term backlog, as defined by statute, means the
period of time in excess of 180 days (6 months) that such application
has been pending before USCIS. USCIS, using its operational definition
of backlog, measures the volume of its backlog as the number of
applications pending before the agency in excess of the number of
applications received in the most recent 6 months. USCIS then subtracts
from this number all applications pending where either benefits would
not be immediately available even if the applications were granted or
further adjudication of the application depends on action by another
agency or the applicant; USCIS stated that by consistently completing
more applications than are filed each month, the agency should
gradually reduce its pending workload of applications to a level at
which it can complete all incoming applications within the workload
targets established for each application type. Eventually, according to
the agency's backlog elimination plan, as long as USCIS is processing
more applications than it is receiving, there should be no backlog.
However, we reported that under USCIS's definition of backlog, the
agency cannot guarantee that every applicant requesting a benefit will
receive a decision within 6 months of filing. Moreover, although
USCIS's data showed a significant decrease in the backlog from January
2004 through June 2005, we reported that the sharp drop in the backlog
was due to USCIS's decision in July 2004 to remove from its backlog
count those 1.15 million cases for which an immigration visa was not
immediately available and a benefit therefore could not be provided. In
September 2005, the DHS IG noted that removal of some applications from
the backlog, as well as other backlog reduction efforts such as the
hiring of temporary staff, may have benefited the agency in the short-
term. However, the DHS IG reported that these actions would not resolve
the long-standing processing and information technology problems that
contributed to the backlog in the first place and that, until these
problems were addressed, USCIS would not be able to apply its resources
to meet mission and customer needs effectively; In our previous work,
we noted that USCIS's automated systems were not complete and reliable
enough to determine how long it actually takes to process specific
benefit applications or to determine the exact size of its backlog.
USCIS has identified requirements for transforming its information
technology systems to address deficiencies in its capabilities, but
these transformation efforts have not yet been fully developed or
implemented. We reported that until USCIS develops this capability, it
cannot assure Congress that it has successfully eliminated the backlog,
and it will not be able to provide accurate information about the
actual number of applications that have been pending in excess of 180
days or the actual amount of time they have been pending. For more
information, see Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address
Backlogs and Ensure Quality of Adjudications, GAO-06-20. Also, see
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services' Progress in Modernizing
Information Technology, OIG-07-11 (Washington, D.C.: November 2006) and
USCIS Faces Challenges in Modernizing Information Technology, OIG-05-41
(Washington, D.C.: September 2005).
DHS updated information: In March through June 2007, DHS provided
updated information on its backlog. In January 2004, USCIS had
approximately 3.8 million applications backlogged pending adjudication,
including applications that, according to USCIS, if granted would not
provide the applicant or petitioner with an immediate immigration
benefit or were pending as a result of delays outside of USCIS's
control. Based on an analysis of data provided in USCIS's Backlog
Elimination Plan Update for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2006, as
of September 2006, USCIS had a total of about 1.0 million backlogged
applications, including applications that, according to USCIS, if
granted would not provide the applicant or petitioner with an immediate
immigration benefit or were pending as a result of delays outside of
USCIS's control. As a subset of this 1.0 million, USCIS reported that
the backlog under its control was less then 10,000. Specifically, for
each application type, USCIS removed from the calculated backlog the
total number of pending applications that, even if the application were
granted, the ultimate benefit sought would not be immediately available
due to annual numerical caps set by statute. As reported in the USCIS
Backlog Elimination Plan updates, certain applications and petitions
were removed from the backlog count because (1) the benefit was not
immediately available to the applicant or beneficiary; (2) USCIS was
waiting for applicants or petitioners to respond to requests for
information; (3) applicants were afforded the opportunity to retake
naturalization tests; or (4) USCIS was waiting for actions from outside
federal agencies, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation name checks.
USCIS has previously acknowledged that there may be some applications
that have been pending more than 6 months and reported to us that the
agency cannot determine the precise composition of the total
applications pending adjudication as of September 2006 because such
data are not available for all applications within USCIS; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. USCIS has made significant progress in
reducing the number of applications pending adjudication and processing
times for adjudicating applications. However, USCIS's method of
calculating its backlog leaves the possibility of individual
applications pending for longer than 6 months, so long as in the
aggregate the number of pending applications on any given date does not
exceed the number received in the previous 6 months. USCIS has
acknowledged that some applications received in fiscal years 2005 and
2004, or even earlier, may still be pending. Moreover, USCIS removed
from its backlog calculation any pending applications for which a
benefit would not be immediately available, even if the application
were granted, or that were awaiting action outside of USCIS. While
giving such applications lower priority is a reasonable approach to
backlog reduction and is useful for workload analysis, those
applications--1 million as of September 2006--are still awaiting
adjudication. For example, about 750,000 of these applications are
those for which a benefit would not be immediately available even if
granted, according to USCIS. Adjudicating these applications would let
applicants or their beneficiaries know their eligibility for benefits,
however, and could prevent future delays if large numbers of these
benefits suddenly became immediately available due to a statutory
increase in the caps, as happened when a 2005 law eliminated the annual
cap on asylum beneficiaries. Additionally, DHS's current data systems
cannot produce backlog information based on the date of the filing of a
benefit application, which contributes to USCIS's difficulty in
measuring its backlog consistent with the statutory definition, upon
which the performance expectation is in part based, and in providing
information on whether it is processing applications within 6 months of
receipt. USCIS has not yet demonstrated that it has overcome long-
standing technology problems which, according to the DHS IG,
contributed to the backlog in the first place. Without information on
whether individual applications have been pending for more than 6
months, we cannot verify that USCIS has eliminated its backlog and
reduced application completion time to 6 months.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Institute process and staffing reforms to
improve application processes.
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. We reported that
in fiscal year 2002 USCIS committed about 70 percent of its backlog
reduction funds to employing about 1,100 temporary adjudicator staff
and authorizing overtime. In May 2005, USCIS finalized a staffing
allocation model to address how many and where staff were needed to
better match projected workloads. On the basis of this model, USCIS
determined it had to retain the temporary adjudicators currently on
hand (about 1,100) through the end of fiscal year 2006 and fill
vacancies to increase its level of permanent adjudicator staff by 27
percent (about 460) to maintain productivity and prevent future
backlogs through fiscal year 2007. Additionally, USCIS's staffing model
addressed how many and where staff were needed to better match
projected workloads. USCIS officials said that the need for future
staffing adjustments could be offset by future efficiencies gained
during its transition to more robust information technology
capabilities. We reported that reflection in its planning processes and
documents of expected gains as a result of new technologies should
improve USCIS's ability to make strategic staffing decisions. In
addition, we reported that USCIS issued guidance and regulations to
streamline processes, including clarifying guidance to adjudicators
about requests for additional evidence and notices of intent to deny,
and establishing greater flexibility in setting the length of validity
of the employment authorization document. For more information, see GAO-
06-20;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Establish a timetable for reviewing the
program rules, business processes, and procedures for immigration
benefit applications;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has not yet
established a timetable for reviewing program rules, processes, and
procedures for immigration benefits applications. In November 2006, the
DHS IG reported that USCIS had undertaken a structured approach to
address process challenges through its business transformation program
and established cross-functional teams with dedicated management
participation and generated several strategic level plans to provide a
business-centric vision and guidance for implementing technical
solutions. The DHS IG reported that the accomplishments to date were
steps in the right direction for both business and information
technology modernization, but that USCIS remained entrenched in a cycle
of continual planning, with limited progress toward achieving its long-
term transformation goals. Obtaining the funding needed to support
implementation of the business transformation program was a continual
concern. The DHS IG reported that establishing a clearly defined
transformation strategy, including the funding plans, goals, and
performance measures needed to manage its execution, is fundamental.
Linking information technology objectives to this transformation
strategy and ensuring sufficient internal and external stakeholder
involvement in information technology and process improvement
initiatives also would be key. The DHS IG reported that until USCIS
addresses these issues, it would not be in a position to either
effectively manage existing workloads or handle the potentially
dramatic increase in immigration benefits processing workloads that
could result from proposed immigration reform legislation. For more
information, see Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector
General, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Progress in
Modernizing Information Technology, OIG-07-11 (Washington, D.C.:
November 2006).
DHS updated information: According to updated information provided by
USCIS in March and April 2007, the USCIS Transformation Program Office
will prepare its detailed timetable for reviewing program rules,
business processes, and procedures for each benefit category once it
receives and awards the contract for information technology services.
USCIS reported analyzing over 50 existing transactions and grouped them
into lines of business--the adjudication of citizenship benefit
applications, immigrant benefit applications, humanitarian benefit
applications, and non-immigrant benefit applications. USCIS has
incorporated a timetable for incrementally implementing each of the
lines of business in its transformation expenditure plan. USCIS plans
to transform benefit adjudication for citizenship benefits by October
2008; immigrant benefits by October 2010; humanitarian benefits by
October 2011; and non-immigrant benefits by October 2012. USCIS
reported that the Transformation Spend Plan has been approved by the
Office of Management and the Budget and that the plan's transmittal to
Congress should occur shortly. According to the tentative schedule,
USCIS plans to transform its paper-based process into an electronic end-
to-end adjudicative process.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. USCIS has made progress in meeting this
performance expectation, but has not yet established a detailed
timetable for reviewing program rules, processes, and procedures for
immigration benefits applications. USCIS officials noted that the
agency will prepare its detailed timetable for reviewing program rules,
business processes, and procedures for each benefit category once it
receives and awards the contract for information technology services.
Until USCIS establishes such a timetable, it has not yet achieved this
performance expectation.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Institute a case management system to
manage applications and provide management information.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet instituted a case
management system for managing applications and providing management
information. In November 2005, we reported that USCIS cannot readily
determine the number of applications that have been pending for more
than 6 months from the data management systems it is currently using to
manage its backlog elimination efforts. However, USCIS has identified
the technology improvements necessary to develop this capability. Since
fiscal year 2002, the agency has invested about 2 percent ($10.5
million) of its funds allocated for backlog elimination for technology
improvements. We reported that among the critical elements of USCIS's
planned technology modernization efforts was a new case management
system that should provide the agency with the capability to produce
management reports on the age of all pending benefit applications. We
reported that an integrated case management system is a tool that will
be used by USCIS staff in processing benefits and adjudicating cases.
USCIS reported that system development began during fiscal year 2006 as
part of the agency's transformation efforts. In November 2005, we
reported that USCIS was assembling the system requirements and
conducting surveys of industry best practices. In addition, USCIS
reviewed a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate alternative implementation
strategies for the new integrated case management system. USCIS
anticipated that its current case management systems would be
decommissioned by fiscal year 2011. We reported that USCIS did not
expect these systems to be fully deployed before fiscal year 2010. For
more information, see GAO-06-20.
DHS updated information: According to USCIS, a case management system
to manage applications and provide management information will be
incorporated in the Secure Information Management Service, for which
the first increment pilot was deployed in July 2007. This increment
will include forms related to USCIS's citizenship function. Three
additional increments will address the functions of immigrant,
asylum/refugee, and nonimmigrant. USCIS noted that development of its
case management system is tied to transformation that began in fiscal
year 2006.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. Although USCIS is planning to pilot the first
phase of its Secure Information Management Service, USCIS does not yet
have a case management system that provides reliable information on its
application processing and backlog.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop new programs to prevent future
backlogs from developing.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken actions to examine and
test new programs to prevent future backlogs, but these programs are
still in the pilot stages. In 2005 we reported that in response to
recommendations made in the USCIS Ombudsman's 2004 annual report, USCIS
conducted a number of pilot projects designed to reduce benefit
application processing times and was considering adopting several
practices it determined to be successful. We reported that the agency
studied the processing of two types of applications during the pilots:
(1) applications to replace permanent resident cards (form I-90) and
(2) applications to register permanent residence or adjust status (form
I-485). First, during the period March 2004 through November 2004,
USCIS conducted a pilot program designed to reduce processing time for
applications for permanent resident cards. The pilot, conducted in the
Los Angeles area, allowed for electronically filed permanent resident
cards to be processed at application support centers, where applicants
have their initial contact with the agency and have their photographs
and fingerprints taken. During the pilot, average processing times were
reduced from over 8 months to about 2 weeks. USCIS's Performance
Management Division recommended that USCIS implement the pilot
nationwide. Second, beginning in March 2004 and May 2004 respectively,
USCIS conducted pilot programs in the New York and Dallas district
offices that focused on testing new processes for adjudicating family-
based applications for adjustments of status within 90 days. Each
sought to streamline and accelerate application processing by shifting
aspects of processing responsibility from the National Benefits Center,
a central processing hub for certain benefit applications, to the
district offices. Using elements of processes tested in the Dallas and
New York pilot projects, USCIS has implemented up-front processing at
three district officesæSan Diego, San Antonio, and Buffalo--that did
not have a backlog of adjustment of status applications when
implemented. USCIS anticipates expanding the number of offices on a
quarterly basis as they become current in their processing so that
applicants with pending applications are not disadvantaged. The pilot
in Dallas will also continue as long as USCIS determines that
additional information may be gleaned and until the district office
becomes current in processing applications. In March 2004, a third
adjustment of status pilot for employment-based applications was
implemented at the California service center. The focus was to
adjudicate within 75 days petitions for immigrant workers with advanced
degrees concurrently with the associated applications for adjustment of
status. Ultimately, USCIS deemed the pilot inefficient and adverse to
the service center backlog elimination goals because resources were
diverted from addressing backlogged cases. For more information, see
GAO-06-20.
DHS updated information: According to information provided by DHS in
March, April, and May 2007, in September of 2006, USCIS expanded its
District Office Rapid Adjudication Pilot program by extending that
program in Dallas, the office of origin, and by including field offices
located in El Paso and Oklahoma City. USCIS noted that for applicants
within the jurisdiction of these offices, the pilot program makes it
mandatory that adjustment of status applications be filed in person
rather than by mail, after the applicant has scheduled an appointment
using InfoPass. According to USCIS, the pilot is slated to run through
September 21, 2007. Additionally, USCIS stated that it is monitoring
the adjustment of status workflow in three identified offices, Buffalo,
San Antonio, and San Diego, which are currently within a 90-day
processing time frame. Under the "90-Day Office" process, processing is
initiated on the application at the National Benefits Center. To date,
USCIS noted that it has not captured sufficient statistical data to
assess the effects of expanding the Dallas pilot to El Paso and
Oklahoma City. Moreover, it has yet been able to assess whether the
process in the Dallas pilot or the "90-Day Office" process is more
likely to result in better customer service, administrative efficiency,
and national security. USCIS issued a final rule in May 2007 to adjust
the Immigration and Naturalization Benefit Application and Petition
Schedule. According to USCIS, this rule will help ensure that the
agency has the resources necessary to prevent backlogs from developing
by providing a stable source of revenue to support staff and technology
to meet USCIS's goal of at least a 20 percent reduction in processing
times by the end of fiscal year 2009.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. Although USCIS has explored reducing
processing times through a number of programs, these programs are still
in the pilot stages. In some cases, USCIS ended the pilot programs
because they were inefficient or did not meet program goals. In other
cases, USCIS has not yet fully assessed the results of its pilot
programs to determine the extent to which the programs could be
implemented on a national basis. Moreover, USCIS has not yet
demonstrated that it has addressed its long-standing technology
challenges, which have contributed to backlog development. In addition,
USCIS reported that its revisions to the Immigration and Naturalization
Benefit Application and Petition Schedule will help it ensure that
future backlogs do not develop. However, at the time of this review,
the extent to which these revisions will help to prevent the
development of future backlogs is unknown.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Establish online access to status
information about benefit applications.
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS has established
online access to status information about benefits applications. In
June 2005, we reported that private attorneys, paralegals, and other
representatives can use the USCIS Internet Web site to check the status
of their clients' immigration cases using a USCIS receipt number. Under
the system, USCIS also notifies the representatives via e-mail when a
case status changes; for example, when actions are taken, such as the
approval or denial of an application. As of April 2005, over 300,000
customers, attorneys, and other representatives had used this system.
For more information, see Immigration Services: Better Contracting
Practices Needed at Call Centers, GAO-05-526.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Establish online filing for benefit
applications.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: On November 1, 2006, USCIS announced
a new Web portal to serve as a "one-stop shop" for all information
about U.S. immigration and citizenship. According to DHS, the new site
should facilitate downloading of petitions and applications, filing
applications electronically, and signing up online for appointments.
DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided updated
information on its efforts to establish online filing for benefit
applications. In fiscal year 2006, USCIS reported that of the 5,953,490
forms filed, a total of 350,838 were filed online. According to updated
information provided by DHS in April 2007, eight forms are available
online for e-filing, and other forms are available on the USCIS Web
site for downloading, completing, and mailing to the appropriate
Service Center. According to USCIS, the Secure Information Management
Service, with the citizenship increment released in July 2007, will
serve as the foundation for the paperless, account-based case
processing environment, and subsequent releases of the immigration,
asylum/refugee, and nonimmigration increments will result in additional
online e-filing capabilities. In addition, USCIS stated that while it
may be feasible to automate additional forms and make them available
electronically, USCIS transformation will fundamentally reengineer e-
filing, increase data integrity, and increase operational efficiency.
Our assessment: Until USCIS expands its online filing capabilities and
further defines requirements and capabilities and implements those
capabilities through its Secure Information Management Service, we
conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation. Although DHS has established online filing for eight types
of applications, there are other types of applications for which online
filing is not yet available. Moreover, USCIS plans to expand its online
filing capabilities through its Secure Information Management Service,
but this service is still in the development stages and has not yet
been implemented.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Establish revised immigration application
fees based on a comprehensive study.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: USCIS issued a proposed rule to
adjust immigration benefit fees and issued the final rule in May 2007.
As required under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, we reviewed the
USCIS's funding to determine whether in the absence of appropriated
funds USCIS was likely to derive sufficient funds from fees to carry
out its functions. In January 2004, we concluded that USCIS fees were
not sufficient to fully fund USCIS's operations, in part because (1)
the fee schedule was based on an outdated fee study that did not
include all costs of USCIS's operations and (2) costs had increased
since that study was completed due to an additional processing
requirement and other actions. We reported that although fees were not
sufficient, there were insufficient data to determine the full extent
of the shortfall. A fundamental problem was that USCIS has not had a
system to track the status of each application as it moves through the
process. Accordingly, USCIS did not have information on the extent to
which work on applications in process remained to be finished. In
addition, USCIS did not know the current cost of each step to process
each application. The effect was that USCIS knew neither the cost to
process new applications nor the cost to complete pending applications.
Further because DHS was still determining how administrative and
overhead functions would be carried out and the related costs
allocated, USCIS did not know what future administrative and overhead
costs would be. For the 3-year period from fiscal year 2001 through
2003, USCIS reported operating costs exceeded available fees by almost
$460 million, thus creating the need for appropriated funds. USCIS
projected that this situation would remain in fiscal year 2004. We
reported that absent actions to increase fees, reduce processing costs
and times, or both, as well as to improve the timeliness and
completeness of fee schedule updates, USCIS would continue to need
appropriated funds to avoid even greater increases in the backlog of
pending applications. We recommended that in order to determine the
cost to process new and pending applications, USCIS should perform a
comprehensive fee study to determine the cost to process new
immigration applications and determine the cost to eliminate the
backlog of pending applications. For more information, see Immigration
Application Fees: Current Fees Are Not Sufficient to Fund U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services' Operations, GAO-04-309R.
DHS updated information: On February 1, 2007, USCIS issued a Proposed
Rule for the Adjustment of the Immigration and Naturalization Benefit
Applications and Petition Fee Schedule and issued the final rule in May
2007. Based on a 2004 GAO recommendation, USCIS conducted a
comprehensive review of its resources and activities for the first time
in 10 years, employing the Activity Based Costing methodology to
determine the full costs of immigration benefit applications and in
which USCIS fees are based on the complexity of the work. In updated
information provided by DHS in March and April 2007, USCIS stated that
the new fee structure ensures appropriate funding to meet customer
service needs and national security requirements and modernizes an
outdated business infrastructure. According to DHS, the fiscal year
2008 President's budget reflects that 99 percent of USCIS funding would
be derived from fee collections. The remaining 1 percent, $30 million,
is requested as an appropriation to support the Employment Eligibility
Verification program. According to USCIS, a number of problems caused
the present day funding gap, including (1) the failure of fees to
reflect the actual cost of doing business, (2) the loss of significant
appropriated funding for backlog reduction, (3) the need for payment of
additional fees because of processing delays, (4) reliance on money
from temporary programs to fund operating costs, (5) reallocation of
funds from their intended purpose to cover base operations, and (6)
insufficient funds to provide for additional, costly security
requirements. USCIS indicated that additional funding was necessary to
enhance the security and integrity of the immigration system, improve
service delivery, and modernize business infrastructure.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. In following up on our prior recommendations,
we found that USCIS has conducted a comprehensive review of its
resources and activities and determined that the current fees did not
reflect current processes or recover the full cost of services being
provided. USCIS employed an activity-based costing methodology to
determine the full costs of immigration benefit applications. As a
result of its comprehensive fee review, USCIS published a proposed rule
in February 2007 in the Federal Register and a final rule in May 2007
to increase the immigration and naturalization benefit application
fees.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Capture biometric information on all
benefits applicants.
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS does not yet have the
capabilities in place to capture and store biometric information on all
benefits applicants. In 2006 we reported that USCIS was developing
various systems for capturing and storing biometric information
including the Biometric Storage System, which would allow USCIS to
store biometrics information for verification of identity and for
future form submissions. USCIS planned to expand biometric storage
capacity to allow storage of biometric information for all USCIS
customers, allowing information to be resubmitted for subsequent
security checks. The system would capture 10 prints for Federal Bureau
of Investigation fingerprint checks and image sets (photograph, press-
prints, and signatures). Senior officials told the DHS IG that USCIS's
use of biometrics had been constrained by the capacity of application
support centers to collect the data. In addition, the DHS IG reported
in November 2005 that USCIS collected photographs with many
applications but did not have a system for automated, facial
recognition screening. For more information, see GAO-06-20. Also, see
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, A Review
of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Alien Security Checks,
OIG-06-06 (Washington, D.C.: November 2005).
DHS updated information: According to DHS officials, the Biometric
Storage System is in the design phase. According to the Biometric
Storage System Project Management Plan, the system is intended to
facilitate the deterrence, detection, and pursuit of immigration
benefit fraud and promote identification and communication of
immigration-related information to partners in support of the DHS
Strategic Plan. In developing the system, USCIS plans to leverage
existing capabilities already being developed by other components in
the immigration and border management enterprise. USCIS plans to share
Biometric Storage System data with the US-VISIT biometric repository
called IDENT. This should enable data sharing and provide USCIS
information about applicants with a record in IDENT. USCIS estimated
that the first phase of Biometric Storage System, which will replace
existing outdated biometrics infrastructure with a foundation for the
new system, would begin in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. At
that time, USCIS plans to have access to limited biometrics data
available to the intra-agency community--ICE, CBP, and USCIS--on a view-
only basis. USCIS reported that although the Biometric Storage System
is not yet in place, the agency shares biometric information with US-
VISIT and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example.
Our assessment: Until the Biometric Storage System is more fully
developed and implemented, we conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has not yet deployed its
Biometric Storage System, but plans to implement the first phase of the
system in 2008.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Implement an automated background check
system to track and store all requests for applications.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet implemented an
automated background check system to track and store all requests for
applications. In 2006 we reported that USCIS's Background Check Service
system automated and managed the submission of all security checks
including name and fingerprints from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Interagency Border Inspection System. We noted
that the Background Check Service system was intended to track and
store security check responses in a centralized system and that USCIS
was preparing to initiate the testing and implementation phase, but
USCIS had to first select a hosting and production facility for the
system. For more information, see GAO-06-20.
DHS updated information: In March, April, and June 2007, USCIS provided
us with updated information on its efforts to develop and implement its
Background Check Service. According to USCIS, the schedule for
deploying the Background Check Service has changed from May 2007 to
December 2007 because USCIS moved the Background Check Service to a new
location and encountered problems at the new center. According to
USCIS, there were several firewall issues and other communication
problems, but the problems are being worked on by the contractor.
Our assessment: Until DHS more fully develops and implements its
Background Check Service, we conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has worked toward deployment
of the first phase of its Background Check Service, but has pushed back
its target time frame for deploying the first phase until December 2007.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Communicate immigration related
information to other relevant agencies.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken some actions to share
immigration information for enforcement and fraud prevention purposes.
In 2006 we reported that USCIS had three major projects under way to
improve its ability to receive and share data within the agency as well
as with other agencies as part of its information technology
transformation. First, the data layer/repository project was intended
to present users with a consolidated system to access information from
63 USCIS systems rather than the situation where users had to log onto
separate systems to obtain data. This capability would be available to
adjudicators and, eventually, to external users. Second, the software
updates project was intended to upgrade, among other things, USCIS's
desktop and software capabilities, USCIS's servers and network, and
USCIS's capability to support the new electronic processes. Third, the
e-adjudication pilot project was intended to allow paperless
(electronic) adjudication for certain immigration forms. USCIS could
not provide a completion date for the data layer and e-adjudication
pilots due, in part, to uncertainty regarding future funding. USCIS
expected to complete full implementation for its information technology
transformation by fiscal year 2010. With regard to US-VISIT, we
reported that the program intended to collect, maintain, and share
information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United
States and facilitate information sharing and coordination within the
immigration and border management community. For more information, see
Taxpayer Information: Options Exist to Enable Data Sharing between IRS
and USCIS but Each Presents Challenges, GAO-06-100 and GAO-06-20.
DHS updated information: According to updated information provided by
DHS in March, April, and May 2007, in fiscal year 2006 USCIS launched
the Integrated Digitization Document Management Program to convert
existing paper-based A-files and related documents into a digitized
format; ensure that data are accurately captured electronically from
paper A files; and provide storage, discovery, and electronic delivery
of digitized files. USCIS stated that the last function was released in
June 2007. USCIS has entered into a number of memoranda of
understanding that outline agreements on immigration-related
information sharing with other federal agencies and foreign
governments. In addition, immigration information is shared though
others programs, such as US-VISIT. US-VISIT, for example, provides for
the sharing of biometric and biographic-related information between DHS
components, and the Departments of Justice and State. USCIS, CBP, and
ICE have also entered into memoranda of understanding with other
federal agencies and foreign governments to enhance information
sharing.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has taken some actions to develop and
launch systems to facilitate information sharing with other agencies,
such as by allowing for the electronic delivery of files and
information. Moreover, USCIS has completed memoranda of understanding
with other agencies.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 12. Establish training programs to reduce
fraud in the benefits process.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress in
establishing training programs to reduce fraud in the benefits process,
but more work remains. In 2006 we reported that adjudicators at USCIS
service centers and district offices that we visited received some
fraud-related information or training subsequent to their initial hire.
We reported that USCIS initial adjudicator training provided
approximately 4 hours of fraud-related training that focused primarily
on detecting fraudulent documents. However, USCIS headquarters
officials responsible for field operations told us that there was no
standard training regarding fraud trends and that fraud-related
training varied across field offices. Our interviews indicated that the
frequency and method for distributing ongoing information about fraud
detection was not uniform across the service centers and district
offices we visited. For more information, see Immigration Benefits:
Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS's
Ability to Control Benefit Fraud, GAO-06-259.
DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided updated
information outlining its training programs to reduce fraud in the
benefits process. With regard to adjudication officers, the Office of
Fraud Detection and National Security has created an hour anti-fraud
module that is provided to adjudicators attending immigration officer
basic training, journeyman Immigration Officer training, and
supervisory adjudications training. USCIS has also developed training
for specific areas with a past history of fraud. For example, USCIS has
provided Religious Worker anti-fraud training to 145 officers at the
California Service Center where adjudication of religious worker
petitions is centralized. With regard to Office of Fraud Detection and
National Security Officers, during a basic 3-week national security and
anti-fraud course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center,
instruction is provided to these officers on such areas as Fraud
Detection and National Security anti-fraud standard operating
procedures, practical training on USCIS and other government systems,
interviewing techniques, national security reporting, Headquarters
Fraud Detection and National Security intelligence processes, legal
issues, and report writing. Additionally, all Immigration Officers and
Intelligence Research Specialists must attend the Fraud Detection and
National Security Data System training, which serves as the case
management system for all fraud and national security related work
conducted by the Office of Fraud Detection and National Security, as
part of the basic 3-week course and will continue to be provided
ongoing training as systems evolve through the use of formal
correspondence, informal conference calls, e-newsletters.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. USCIS has initiated a number training programs
focused on detecting fraud in the benefits process. However, the intent
of this performance expectation is not only that DHS has anti-fraud
training programs, but also that these programs are delivered to
individuals according to their roles and responsibilities for
adjudicating applications. DHS did not provide us with evidence on the
extent to which it has taken actions to ensure that its anti-fraud
training courses have been distributed and implemented appropriately
across all field offices, a key concern we identified in our prior
work. In addition, DHS did not provide us with evidence that it has
taken actions to ensure that all staff receive the anti-fraud training
appropriate to their roles and responsibilities in adjudicating certain
types of applications.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 13. Create an office to reduce immigration
benefit fraud.
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. USCIS established
the Fraud Detection and National Security office to enhance its fraud
control efforts by serving as its focal point for addressing
immigration benefit fraud. Established in 2003, Fraud Detection and
National Security is intended to combat fraud and foster a positive
control environment by pursuing objectives to develop, coordinate, and
lead the national antifraud operations for USCIS; oversee and enhance
policies and procedures pertaining to the enforcement of law
enforcement background checks on those applying for immigration
benefits; identify and evaluate vulnerabilities in the various
policies, practices, and procedures that threaten the legal immigration
process; recommend solutions and internal controls to address these
vulnerabilities; and act as the primary USCIS conduit and liaison with
ICE, CBP, and other members of the law enforcement and intelligence
community. For more information, see GAO-06-259;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 14. Implement a fraud assessment program to
reduce benefit fraud;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken steps to implement a
fraud assessment program, but much more work remains. In 2006 we
reported that the Office of Fraud Detection and National Security,
established in 2003, outlined a strategy for detecting immigration
benefit fraud, and undertook two assessments in a series of fraud
assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud for certain
immigration benefits. A complimentary effort is USCIS's plan to develop
automated fraud analysis tools. USCIS has hired a contractor to develop
the Fraud Detection and National Security, an automated capability to
screen incoming applications against known fraud indicators, such as
multiple applications received from the same person. According to the
Office of Fraud Detection and National Security, it planned to deploy
an initial data analysis capability by the third quarter of fiscal year
2006 and release additional data analyses capabilities at later dates
but could not predict when these latter capabilities would be achieved.
However, according to a Fraud Detection and National Security
operations manager, the near and midterm plans were not aimed at
providing a full data-mining capability. In the long term, USCIS
planned to integrate these data analyses tools for fraud detection into
a new application management system being developed as part of USCIS's
efforts to transform its business processes for adjudicating
immigration benefits, which includes developing the information
technology needed to support these business processes. Also, in the
long term, according to the Fraud Detection and National Security
Office Director, a new USCIS application management system would
ideally include fraud filters to screen applications and remove
suspicious applications from the processing stream before they are seen
by adjudicators. For more information, see GAO-06-259.
DHS updated information: According to USCIS, the purpose of the benefit
fraud assessment is to use statistically valid methods to determine the
amount, percentage, and type of fraud in benefit applications to aid
USCIS in its efforts to develop anti-fraud strategies, establish
priorities for planning purposes, and identify fraud patterns and
linkages for referral to ICE. In updated information provided by USCIS
in April 2007, USCIS reported that it has completed benefit fraud
assessments for the I-140 Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers, I-90
Application to Replace a Permanent Resident Card, and Religious Worker
applications. USCIS reported that it is analyzing data from other
assessments of the I-129 H1B Employment-based, I-130 Marriage-based, I-
130 Yemeni-specific Family-based, and 1-589 Asylum applications and
expect final reports on these assessments to be issued by the end of
fiscal year 2007. USCIS also reported that it is conducting an
assessment for I-129 L-1A Employment-based application. USCIS reported
that as a result of these assessments, it now has baseline data and can
focus on developing a more comprehensive benefit fraud assessment
strategy. In fiscal year 2008, USCIS intends to issue a roadmap
outlining the visa categories for which it will conduct benefit fraud
assessments in the future. In addition, USCIS officials stated that
development work for the Fraud Detection and National Security Program
Data Systems' initial analytical capabilities was completed in the
first quarter of fiscal year 2007. USCIS indicated that development
delays for the initial analytical capabilities were encountered due to
budgetary, contractual, and performance issues. Full implementation of
the initial capability was delayed until the second quarter of fiscal
year 2007 due to hardware acquisition issues. According to USCIS,
procurement activities are underway to award the next development
contract with a plan that includes a contract award in early third
quarter of fiscal year 2007 with the implementation of follow-on
analytical capabilities early in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008.
USCIS stated that this procurement was briefly delayed due to an
evaluation of another case management software application. A final
decision was made in February 2007 to move forward with the development
of Fraud Detection and National Security Data System.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has completed fraud assessments for three
types of immigration benefits--having completed two at the time of our
March 2006 report--and expects to issue final reports on four
additional assessments later in fiscal year 2007. However, USCIS has
not yet fully developed a comprehensive strategy for conducting benefit
fraud assessments. Until DHS does so and demonstrates successful
application of a strategy and approach for conducting fraud assessment,
we conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation. In addition, DHS has taken actions to develop a data
system to identify fraud through automated analysis tools. However,
this data analysis capability has not yet been fully implemented.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Securing the Aviation Sector:
DHS has implemented a variety of programs to help secure the aviation
sector. Within the department, TSA is the primary agency with
responsibility for aviation security efforts. TSA was established in
2001 with the mission to protect the transportation network while also
ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. Since its inception,
TSA has focused much of its efforts on aviation security and has
developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to
secure commercial aviation. For example, TSA has undertaken efforts to
strengthen airport security; provide and train a screening workforce;
prescreen passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screen
passengers, baggage, and cargo. TSA has implemented these efforts in
part to meet numerous mandates for strengthening aviation security
placed on the agency following the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. These mandates set priorities for the agency and guided TSA's
initial efforts to enhance aviation security. In addition to TSA, CBP,
and DHS's Science and Technology Directorate play roles in securing
commercial aviation. In particular, CBP has responsibility for
conducting passenger prescreening--or the matching of passenger
information against terrorist watch lists--for international flights
operating to or from the United States, as well as inspecting inbound
air cargo upon its arrival in the United States. The Science and
Technology Directorate is responsible for the research and development
of aviation security technologies.
As shown in table 22, we identified 24 performance expectations for DHS
in the area of aviation security, and we found that overall DHS has
made moderate progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we
found that DHS has generally achieved 17 performance expectations and
has generally not achieved 7 performance expectations.
Table 22: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Aviation
Security:
Performance expectation: 1. Implement a strategic approach for aviation
security functions.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Establish standards and procedures for
effective airport perimeter security.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Establish standards and procedures to
effectively control access to airport secured areas.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Establish procedures for implementing
biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas access control.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Ensure the screening of airport employees
against terrorist watch lists.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Hire and deploy a federal screening
workforce.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Develop standards for determining aviation
security staffing at airports.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Establish standards for training and
testing the performance of airport screener staff.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Establish a program and requirements to
allow eligible airports to use a private screening workforce.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Train and deploy federal air marshals on
high-risk flights.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Establish standards for training flight
and cabin crews.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 12. Establish a program to allow authorized
flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or
criminal acts.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 13. Establish policies and procedures to
ensure that individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk
or threat to security are identified and subjected to appropriate
action.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 14. Develop and implement an advanced
prescreening system to allow DHS to compare domestic passenger
information to the Selectee List and No Fly List.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 15. Develop and implement an international
passenger prescreening process to compare passenger information to
terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 16. Develop and implement processes and
procedures for physically screening passengers at airport checkpoints.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 17. Develop and test checkpoint technologies
to address vulnerabilities.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 18. Deploy checkpoint technologies to address
vulnerabilities.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 19. Deploy explosive detection systems (EDS)
and explosive trace detection (ETD) systems to screen checked baggage
for explosives.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 20. Develop a plan to deploy in-line baggage
screening equipment at airports;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 21. Pursue the deployment and use of in-line
baggage screening equipment at airports.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 22. Develop a plan for air cargo security.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 23. Develop and implement procedures to screen
air cargo.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 24. Develop and implement technologies to
screen air cargo.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 17;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 7;
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 23 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of aviation security and our assessment of whether DHS has
taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).
Table 23: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Aviation Security:
Performance expectation: 1. Implement a strategic approach for aviation
security functions:
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has adhered to a strategic
approach for implementing its aviation security functions, governed
largely by legislative requirements. TSA, which has responsibility for
securing all modes of transportation, has also taken steps to ensure
that it implements its aviation security functions in a strategic
manner. For example, in April 2006, we reported that TSA has spent
billions of dollars and implemented a wide range of initiatives to
strengthen the key components of its passenger and checked baggage
screening systems--people, processes, and technology. These components
are interconnected and are critical to the overall security of
commercial aviation. For more information, see Aviation Security:
Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but
Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, the National Strategy on
Aviation Security and its six supporting plans were released. The six
supporting plans are Aviation Transportation System Security, Aviation
Operational Threat Response, Aviation Transportation System Recovery,
Aviation Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration, Domestic
Outreach, and International Outreach. According to TSA, an Interagency
Implementation Working Group was established under TSA leadership in
January 2007 to initiate implementation efforts for the 112 actions
specified in the supporting plans.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation, as DHS has taken a strategic approach to
implementing its aviation security functions, and the National Strategy
on Aviation Security has been issued.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Establish standards and procedures for
effective airport perimeter security.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In June 2004, we reported on TSA's
efforts to strengthen the security of airport perimeters (such as
airfield fencing and access gates), the adequacy of controls
restricting unauthorized access to secured areas (such as building
entryways leading to aircraft), and security measures pertaining to
individuals who work at airports. At the time of our review, we found
TSA had begun evaluating commercial airport security but had not yet
implemented a number of congressionally mandated requirements. We
reported that TSA had begun evaluating the security of airport
perimeters, but had not yet determined how the results of these
evaluations could be used to make improvements to the nation's airport
system as a whole. Specifically, we found that TSA had begun conducting
regulatory compliance inspections, covert testing of selected security
procedures, and vulnerability assessments at selected airports. These
evaluations, though not yet complete at the time of our report,
identified perimeter security concerns. In addition, we reported that
TSA intended to compile baseline data on security vulnerabilities to
enable it to conduct a systematic analysis of airport security
vulnerabilities on a nationwide basis. TSA said such an analysis was
essential since it would allow the agency to determine minimum
standards and the adequacy of security policies and help the agency and
airports better direct limited resources. Nonetheless, at the time of
our review, TSA had not yet developed a plan that prioritized its
assessment efforts, provided a schedule for completing these
assessments, or described how assessment results would be used to help
guide agency decisions on what, if any, security improvements were
needed. We are conducting follow-on work in this area. For more
information, see Aviation Security: Transportation Security
Administration Has Made Progress in Managing a Federal Security
Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges
Remain, GAO-06-597T and Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to
Strengthen the Security of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access
Controls, GAO-04-728.
DHS updated information: In April and July 2007, DHS provided us with
updated sensitive information on efforts to secure airport perimeters.
This information described TSA's plans to assess technology being used
to enhance perimeter security, as well as a summary of TSA's policies
and procedures related to perimeter security. DHS also provided us with
updated sensitive information on its efforts to enhance security
procedures for gate screening, aircraft cabin searches, and security
measures for personnel identification media.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. While DHS has taken actions to enhance
perimeter security, DHS did not provide us with evidence that these
actions provide for effective airport perimeter security and thus
satisfy the intent of this performance expectation. DHS also did not
provide information or documentation that it had addressed all of the
relevant requirements established in the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act and our 2004 recommendations related to (1) identifying
security weaknesses of the commercial airport system as a whole, (2)
prioritizing funding to address the most critical needs, or (3)
reducing the risks posed by airport workers. Until DHS demonstrates how
the security efforts it has undertaken have strengthened commercial
airport perimeters security, it will be difficult for it to justify its
resources needs and clearly identify progress made in the area.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Establish standards and procedures to
effectively control access to airport secured areas.
Summary of findings: GAO findings and DHS IG findings: In June 2004 we
reported that TSA had begun evaluating the controls that limit access
into secured airport areas, but had not completed actions to ensure
that all airport workers employed in these areas were vetted prior to
being hired and trained. We also reported that TSA had begun evaluating
the security of the controls that limited access into secured airport
areas, but had not yet determined how the results of these evaluations
could be used to make improvements to the nation's airport system as a
whole. Specifically, we found that TSA had begun conducting regulatory
compliance inspections, covert testing of selected security procedures,
and vulnerability assessments at selected airports. These evaluations-
-though not completed at the time of our report--identified access
control security concerns. For example, TSA identified instances where
airport operators failed to comply with existing security requirements.
In addition, we reported that TSA intended to compile baseline data on
security vulnerabilities to enable it to conduct a systematic analysis
of airport security vulnerabilities on a nationwide basis. TSA said
such an analysis was essential since it would allow the agency to
determine minimum standards and the adequacy of security policies and
help the agency and airports better direct limited resources.
Nonetheless, at the time of our review, TSA had not yet developed a
plan that prioritized its assessment efforts, provided a schedule for
completing these assessments, or described how assessment results would
be used to help guide agency decisions on what, if any, security
improvements were needed. More recently, in March 2007, the DHS IG
reported the results of its access control testing at 14 domestic
airports of various sizes nationwide. As a result of more than 600
access control tests, the DHS IG identified various recommendations to
enhance the overall effectiveness of controls that limit access to
airport secured areas. We are conducting follow-on work in this area.
For more information, see GAO-06-597T and GAO-04-728. See also
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Audit of
Access to Airport Secured Areas (Unclassified Summary), OIG-07-35
(Washington, D.C., March 15, 2007).
DHS updated information: In March, April, and July 2007, DHS provided
us with updated information on its efforts to establish standards and
procedures for effective access control of airport secured areas. TSA
reported that its Aviation Direct Access Screening Program was piloted
in March 2006 and disseminated to Federal Security Directors in August
2006 to provide for random screening of airport and airline employees
and employees' property and vehicles as they enter secure areas of
airports. Transportation security officers screen for the presence of
explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and other items of interest as well
as improper airport identification. TSA reported that the Aviation
Direct Access Screening Program was reissued in March 2007 to include
boarding gate screening and aircraft cabin searches and to mandate
participation for airports nationwide. TSA also reported that it
verifies the identification of individuals present in airport secured
areas and assists operators and air carriers in performance of security
responsibilities. DHS also provided us with updated sensitive
information on its efforts to enhance security procedures for gate
screening, aircraft cabin searches, and security measures for personnel
identification media, as well as a description of TSA's plans to assess
technology being used to enhance access controls and a summary of TSA's
access control policies and procedures.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to establish procedures
for access control of airport secured areas. However, DHS did not
provide us with evidence that these actions provide for effective
access control for airport secured areas and thus satisfy the intent of
this performance expectation. Additionally, DHS did not provide
information or documentation that it had addressed all of the relevant
requirements established in the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act and our 2004 recommendations related to (1) identifying security
weaknesses of the commercial airport system as a whole, (2)
prioritizing funding to address the most critical needs, or (3)
reducing the risks posed by airport workers. The recent assessment by
the DHS OIG identified continuing weaknesses in TSA's procedures to
prevent unauthorized individuals from access to secured airport areas.
Until DHS demonstrates how the security efforts it has undertaken have
strengthened the security of airport access controls, it will be
difficult for it to justify its resource needs and clearly identify
progress in this area.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Establish procedures for implementing
biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas access control.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In June 2004, we reported that TSA
had begun efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related
technologies, such as biometric identification systems. However, we
reported that TSA had not developed a plan for implementing new
technologies or balancing the costs and effectiveness of these
technologies with the security needs of individual airports and the
commercial airport system as a whole. In September 2005, TSA issued a
guidance package for biometrics for airport access control. This
guidance was primarily directed at airport operators who own and
operate access control systems at airports and manufacturers of
biometric devices who would need to submit their devices for
qualification, including performance testing, in order to be
potentially placed on a TSA biometric Qualified Products List. The
guidance package includes information on technical and operational
requirements and standards, implementation guidance, and a plan for
biometric qualified products list.
DHS updated information: DHS did not provide us with updated
information on its efforts to establish procedures for implementing
biometric identifier systems.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. Although TSA issued a guidance package, we
reported in April 2007 that DHS and industry stakeholders continue to
face difficult challenges in ensuring that the biometric access control
technologies will work effectively in the maritime environment where
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program (DHS's
effort to develop biometric access control systems to verify the
identity of individuals accessing secure transportation areas) is being
initially tested. Because of the challenges in implementing the system
in the maritime environment, DHS has not yet determined how and when it
will implement a biometric identification system for access controls at
commercials airports. We have initiated ongoing work to further assess
DHS's efforts to establish procedures for implementing biometric
identifier systems for airport secured areas access control.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Ensure the screening of airport employees
against terrorist watch lists.
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as it has worked
to ensure the screening of airport employees against terrorist watch
lists. We reported that TSA requires most airport workers who perform
duties in secured and sterile areas to undergo a fingerprint-based
criminal history records check. TSA further requires airport operators
to compare applicants' names against the No Fly List and Selectee List.
Once workers undergo this review, they are granted access to airport
areas in which they perform duties. For more information, see GAO-06-
597T and GAO-04-728.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Hire and deploy a federal screening
workforce.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has hired and deployed a federal
screening workforce at airports. TSA initially deployed over 50,000
screeners (now called transportation security officers) at over 440
commercial airports nationwide. However, TSA has experienced staffing
shortages, and we reported that to accomplish its security mission, TSA
needs a sufficient number of passenger and checked baggage
transportation security officers trained and certified in the latest
screening procedures and technology. We reported in February 2004 that
staffing shortages and TSA's hiring process had hindered the ability of
some Federal Security Directors to provide sufficient resources to
staff screening checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their
checkpoints without using additional measures such as overtime. TSA has
taken action to address some of these staffing challenges by, for
example, developing a model to determine the most appropriate
allocation of transportation security officers among airports and
implementing human capital initiatives to address hiring and retention
challenges. For more information, see GAO-06-597T; Airport Passenger
Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges
Remaining, GAO-03-1173; and Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing
Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its
Assumptions Should Be Systematically Reassessed, GAO-07-299.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported that TSA deployed
a pay-for-performance system, called Performance Accountability and
Standards System, for transportation security officers, lead and
supervisory transportation security officers, and screening managers.
TSA also reported that it has developed a local, decentralized hiring
process to give Federal Security Directors more control over aspects of
hiring.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. We have not yet fully evaluated TSA's pay-for-
performance system or its hiring process. However, DHS has hired and
deployed a federal screening workforce at airports.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Develop standards for determining aviation
security staffing at airports.
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation as DHS has
developed standards for determining aviation security staffing levels.
In June 2005, TSA submitted its report on aviation security staffing
standards to Congress. Known as the Staffing Allocation Model, these
standards are intended to provide an objective measure for determining
staffing levels for transportation security officers, while staying
within the congressionally mandated limit of 45,000 full-time
equivalent screeners. In February 2007, we reported that TSA's Staffing
Allocation Model is intended to provide a sufficient number of
transportation security officers--or screeners--to perform passenger
and checked baggage screening through built-in assumptions, which are
designed to ensure the necessary levels of security and to minimize
wait times, along with multiple monitoring mechanisms to assess the
sufficiency of the model's outputs. However, we identified concerns
with some of the fiscal year 2006-model assumptions. Further, although
TSA officials stated that they plan to conduct an annual review of
select assumptions, and based changes to the fiscal year 2007 model on
such a review, TSA does not have a mechanism in place for prioritizing
its review and for ensuring that all assumptions are periodically
validated to help ensure that they reflect operating conditions. We
reported that TSA risks basing its staffing allocations on assumptions
that do not reflect operating conditions if periodic validations are
not conducted. For more information, see GAO-06-597T; Aviation
Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment
Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T; and GAO-07-299;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Establish standards for training and
testing the performance of airport screener staff;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has established standards for
training and testing airport transportation security officers. For
example, TSA introduced an Online Learning Center that made self-guided
courses available over the Internet. In December 2005, TSA reported
completing enhanced explosives detection training for over 18,000
transportation security officers. TSA also implemented and strengthened
efforts to collect performance data on the effectiveness of screening
operations. For example, TSA increased its use of covert testing to
assess the performance of screening operations. However, we identified
concerns with transportation security officers' access to online
training. In May 2005, we also noted that TSA had not yet begun to use
data from local covert testing to identify training and performance
needs because of difficulties in ensuring that local covert testing was
implemented consistently nationwide, although TSA is taking some
actions to address this issue. In April 2007, we reported that TSA
monitors transportation security officers' compliance with passenger
checkpoint screening standard operating procedures through its
performance accountability and standards system and through local and
national covert testing. According to TSA officials, the agency
developed the performance accountability and standards system in
response to our 2003 report that recommended that TSA establish a
performance management system that makes meaningful distinctions in
employee performance and in response to input from TSA airport staff on
how to improve passenger and checked baggage screening measures. This
system is used by TSA to measure transportation security officers'
compliance with passenger checkpoint screening procedures. We have
ongoing work assessing TSA's covert testing program, which we will
complete later this year. For more information, see GAO-597T; Aviation
Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement Strengthened,
but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457; and GAO-07-448T.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to train and test the performance of airport
screener staff. TSA reported that its Aviation Screening Assessment
Program, which is to be implemented at all airports this year, is
intended to use local screening workforce and Bomb Appraisal Officers
to perform covert testing of passenger and baggage screening
capabilities. TSA reported that the program is intended to measure
screening performance using standardized test scenarios. In addition,
TSA reported that it is implementing Improvised Explosive Devices
Checkpoint Screening Drills in which transportation security officers
will be routinely exposed to simulated items, without warning.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation, as DHS has established standards for training
and testing for airport transportation security officers.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Establish a program and requirements to
allow eligible airports to use a private screening workforce.
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as DHS has taken
actions to establish a program that allows eligible airports to use
private screeners. In March 2006, we reported that TSA created the
Screening Partnership Program to allow all commercial airports an
opportunity to apply to TSA for permission to use qualified private
screening contractors and private sector screeners. We noted that TSA
developed performance goals and began drafting related measures and
targets to assess the performance of private screening contractors
under the Screening Partnership Program in the areas of security,
customer service, costs, workforce management, and innovation. However,
we noted that as TSA moved forward with this program, it had
opportunities to strengthen the management and oversight of the
program, including providing clear guidance to program applicants on
their roles and responsibilities at airports where a privatized
screener workforce operates and identifying the underlying reasons for
the small number of program applicants. For more information, see
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private-Sector
Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains, GAO-06-166 and Aviation
Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to Allow Airports
to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services, GAO-05-126;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Train and deploy federal air marshals on
high-risk flights;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as DHS has trained
and deployed federal air marshals on flights deemed high-risk. To carry
out its mission, the Federal Air Marshal Service deploys federal air
marshals on board flights either destined for or originating in the
United States. Deployed to passenger flights, federal air marshals
dress in plain clothes to blend in with other passengers and perform
their duties discreetly in an effort to avoid drawing undue attention
to themselves. We have ongoing work assessing the Federal Air Marshal
Service program. For more information, see Aviation Security: Federal
Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Controls,
GAO-06-203;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Establish standards for training flight
and cabin crews;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as it has
established standards for training flight and cabin crews. In September
2005, we reported that TSA enhanced guidance and standards for flight
and cabin crew member security training with input from stakeholders.
Specifically, TSA revised the guidance and standards to include
additional training elements required by law and to improve the
organization and clarity of the guidance and standards. TSA also took
steps to strengthen its efforts to oversee air carriers' flight and
cabin crew security training to ensure they were complying with the
required guidance and standards. For example, in January 2005, TSA
added staff with expertise in designing training programs to review air
carriers' crew member security training curriculums and developed a
standard form for staff to use to conduct their reviews. TSA also
developed an advanced voluntary self-defense training program with
input from stakeholders and implemented the program in December 2004.
However, we noted that TSA had not established strategic goals and
performance measures for assessing the effectiveness of the training
because it considered its role in the training program as regulatory.
We also noted that TSA lacked adequate controls for monitoring and
reviewing air carriers' crew member security training, including
written procedures for conducting and documenting these reviews. For
more information, see Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member
Security Training Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal
Controls Needed, GAO-05-781;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 12. Establish a program to allow authorized
flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or
criminal acts;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: According to the DHS IG,
TSA's Federal Flight Deck Officer program is to select, train,
deputize, arm with handguns, and supervise volunteer airline pilots and
other flight deck crew members for the purpose of defending the flight
decks of passenger and cargo aircraft. The IG reported in December
2006, they surveyed a sample of federal flight deck officers to
identify pilot concerns about the Federal Flight Deck Officer program.
Pilot concerns included not being given time off to attend training,
the remote location of the training and the amount of time needed to
get to the training site, TSA's weapons carriage policy, and the type
of credentials used to identify federal flight deck officers. These
concerns may have dissuaded pilots from participating in the program,
thus reducing the number of federal flight deck officers. In December
2005, management of the Federal Flight Deck Officer program was
assigned to TSA's Office of Law Enforcement-Federal Air Marshal
Service. This office established focus groups to foster communications
among the federal flight deck officer community, the airline industry,
and professional associations, and to address federal flight deck
officer operational concerns. Also, the office management established a
federal flight deck officer working group to assess recommendations on
proposals concerning federal flight deck officer credentials and
badges, checkpoint requirements, weapons issues (including transport,
storage, and qualifications), communications protocols, training, and
industry liaison. While TSA has now trained and deputized federal
flight deck officers and has addressed various procedural and process
issues, the DHS IG concluded that more needed to be accomplished to
maximize the use of federal flight deck officers on international and
domestic flights. TSA continues to work with federal flight deck
officers, Federal Security Directors, and industry to improve Federal
Flight Deck Officer program effectiveness. For more information, see
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
Improvements Needed in TSA's Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, OIG-
07-14 (Washington, D.C.: December 2006).
DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported that it has
implemented a Federal Flight Deck Officer program for all-cargo
aircraft operators and noted that this program provides training to
pilots, program management, resources, and equipment to protect the
aircraft.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. The DHS IG reported that TSA has established
and is working to improve the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program.
However, the DHS IG also reported that a variety of challenges have
affected the program, including the amount of time and location of
training, the weapons carriage policy, and type of credentials used to
identify federal flight deck officers.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 13. Establish policies and procedures to
ensure that individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk
or threat to security are identified and subjected to appropriate
action.
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. TSA ensures that
all passengers on domestic flights are checked against the Selectee
List and No Fly List. Passenger prescreening is used to identify
passengers who may pose a higher risk to aviation security than other
passengers and therefore should receive additional and more thorough
security scrutiny. Air carriers check passenger information against
government supplied watch lists that contain the names of individuals
who, for certain reasons, are either not allowed to fly (the No Fly
List) or pose a higher than normal risk and therefore require
additional security attention (the Selectee List). Passengers on the No
Fly List are denied boarding passes and are not permitted to fly unless
cleared by law enforcement officers. Passengers who are on the Selectee
List are issued boarding passes, and they and their baggage undergo
additional security measures. For more information, see Aviation
Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks
Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed, GAO-05-356;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 14. Develop and implement an advanced
prescreening system to allow DHS to compare domestic passenger
information to the Selectee List and No Fly List;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS is developing an advanced
passenger prescreening system called Secure Flight. However, TSA has
faced challenges in developing and implementing Secure Flight and has
not yet completed its development efforts. In 2006 we reported that TSA
had not conducted critical activities in accordance with best practices
for large-scale information technology programs and had not followed a
disciplined life cycle approach in developing Secure Flight, in which
all phases of the project are defined by a series of orderly steps and
the development of related documentation. We also found that while TSA
had taken steps to implement an information security management program
for protecting Secure Flight information and assets, its efforts were
incomplete, based on federal standards and industry best practices. In
addition, in 2006 we reported that prior to TSA's rebaselining effort
of Secure Flight, several oversight reviews of the program had been
conducted that raised questions about program management, including the
lack of fully defined requirements. In January 2007, TSA reported that
it has completed its rebaselining efforts, which included reassessing
program goals and capabilities and developing a new schedule and cost
estimates. However, we have not yet assessed TSA's progress in
addressing past problems. In February 2007, we reported that as TSA
moves forward with Secure Flight, it will need to employ a range of
program management disciplines, which we previously found missing, to
control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. We have
ongoing work reviewing DHS's efforts to develop and implement Secure
Flight, including progress made during its rebaselining efforts. For
more information, see Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain
for the Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program,
GAO-06-864T; Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Did Not Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure
Flight Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken
Steps to More Fully Inform the Public, GAO-05-864R; and Aviation
Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks
Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed, GAO-05-356; DHS
updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to develop and implement Secure Flight. DHS
reported that as a result of its rebaselining efforts, government
controls were developed to implement Secure Flight, and DHS provided
information on Secure Flight's technical and system engineering
management plans and requirements, concept of operations, risk
assessments, and privacy issues. DHS reported that it plans to begin
parallel operations with the first groups of domestic aircraft
operators in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009 and to take over
full responsibility for watch list matching in fiscal year 2010; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. DHS is continuing efforts to develop the
Secure Flight program, but has not yet completed its development
efforts and has not yet implemented the program;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 15. Develop and implement an international
passenger prescreening process to compare passenger information to
terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet implemented
enhancements to its passenger prescreening process for passengers on
international flights departing from or bound to the United States. We
recently reported that the existing identity-matching component of
DHS's process involves separate matching activities conducted by air
carriers (prior to a flight's departure and pursuant to TSA
requirements) and by CBP (generally after a flight's departure). We
reported that as with domestic passenger prescreening, air carriers
conduct an initial match of self-reported passenger name record data
against the No Fly List and Selectee List before international flight
departures. CBP's process, in effect, supplements the air carrier
identity-matching for international flights by comparing additional
passenger information collected from passports (this information
becomes part of Advanced Passenger Information System data), against
the No Fly List and Selectee List and other government databases. Under
current federal regulations for CBP's prescreening of passengers on
international flights, air carriers are required to provide the U.S.
government with passenger name record data as well as Advanced
Passenger Information System data to allow the government to conduct,
among other things, identity matching procedures against the No Fly
List and Selectee List--which typically occur just after or at times
just before the departure of international flights traveling to or from
the United States, respectively. To address a concern that the federal
government's identity matching may not be conducted in a timely manner,
in 2004, Congress mandated that DHS issue a proposed rule requiring
that the U.S. government's identity-matching process occur before the
departure of international flights. CBP published this proposed rule in
July 2006 and, if implemented, it would allow the U.S. government to
conduct passenger prescreening in advance of flight departure, and
would eliminate the need for air carriers to continue performing an
identity-matching function for international flights. For more
information, see GAO-07-448T and Aviation Security: Efforts to
Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening Are Under Way, but
Planning and Implementation Issues Remain, GAO-07-346; DHS updated
information: In March 2007, TSA reported that it was working with CBP
to combine the predeparture Advance Passenger Information System and
Secure Flight into one DHS solution; Our assessment: We conclude that
DHS has generally not achieved this performance expectation. We
identified various problems with DHS's implementation of the
international prescreening process and made recommendations to help
address some of those concerns. In addition, while efforts to define
functional requirements and operations are underway for aligning
international and domestic passenger prescreening, full implementation
of an integrated system will not occur for several years, as Secure
Flight is not yet operational for domestic passenger prescreening;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 16. Develop and implement processes and
procedures for physically screening passengers at airport checkpoints;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed and implemented
processes and procedures for screening passengers at checkpoints.
Passenger screening is a process by which authorized TSA personnel
inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of
any unauthorized explosives, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous
item onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area. Authorized TSA
personnel must inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated
screening locations. The passenger-screening functions are X-ray
screening of property, walk-through metal detector screening of
individuals, hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, physical
search of property and trace detection for explosives, and behavioral
observation. We have also reported that TSA has developed processes and
procedures for screening passengers at security checkpoints, balancing
security needs with efficiency and customer service considerations. TSA
has also revised these policies and procedures to generally improve the
efficiency, effectiveness, and clarity of the procedures, but could
improve the evaluation of procedures before they are implemented. In
April 2007, we reported that standard operating procedures
modifications were proposed based on the professional judgment of TSA
senior-level officials and program-level staff. In some cases, TSA
tested proposed modifications at selected airports to help determine
whether the changes would achieve their intended purpose. However, we
reported that TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved to
help TSA determine whether proposed procedures that are operationally
tested would achieve their intended purpose. We also reported that
TSA's documentation on proposed modifications to screening procedures
was not complete. We noted that without more complete documentation,
TSA may not be able to justify key modifications to passenger screening
procedures to Congress and the traveling public. For more information,
see Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive
Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and
Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634;
Aviation Security: TSA's Change to Its Prohibited Items List Has Not
Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of the
Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive, GAO-07-623R; GAO-03-
1173; and GAO-06-371T.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported that it trained
tens of thousands of transportation security officers and took various
regulatory actions to address concerns regarding liquids and gels
carried aboard aircraft. DHS reported that TSA worked with technical
experts and counterparts in other countries to harmonize security
procedures. TSA also reported making changes to the Prohibited Items
List to allow transportation security officers to focus on detecting
high-risk threats which have the ability to cause catastrophic damage,
such as improvised explosive devices. Moreover, TSA provided
information on two recent initiatives intended to strengthen the
passenger checkpoint screening process. TSA's Screening Passenger by
Observation Technique program is a behavior observation and analysis
program designed to provide TSA Behavior Detection Officers with a
nonintrusive means of identifying potentially high-risk individuals who
exhibit behaviors indicative of inordinate levels of stress, fear,
and/or deception that could indicate possible terrorist or criminal
activity. TSA reported that this program is implemented using a threat-
based strategy and is based on other behavioral analysis programs used
by law enforcement and security personnel. In addition, TSA's Travel
Document Checker program replaces current travel document checkers with
transportation security officers who have access to sensitive security
information on the threat posture of the aviation industry and check
for fraudulent documents.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation, as DHS has developed and implemented processes
and procedures for screening passengers at airport checkpoints.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 17. Develop and test checkpoint technologies
to address vulnerabilities.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has undertaken efforts to
develop and test checkpoint technologies to address vulnerabilities
that may be exploited by identified threats such as improvised
explosive devices. For example, TSA recently placed increased focus on
the threats posed by liquid explosives and has been developing
technology to automatically detect liquid explosives in bottles. TSA
has also been modifying commercial-off-the-shelf technologies to
mitigate threats posed by passengers bearing improvised explosive
devices. However, these machines do not automatically detect
explosives. For example, TSA is modifying a whole body image to screen
passengers for explosives, plastics, and metals otherwise obfuscated by
clothing. The machine uses x-ray backscatter technology to produce an
image that transportation security officers interpret. We are currently
reviewing DHS and TSA's efforts to develop and test technologies and
will be reporting on these efforts later this year. For more
information, see GAO-06-371T.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to develop and test checkpoint technologies.
TSA reported that it is exploring portable explosive detection system
units and explosive trace portals at various airport locations and is
operationally testing a whole body imaging system. TSA also reported
that it is planning to pilot test a cast and prosthetics screening
technology and an automated explosives detection system for carry-on
baggage. TSA also reported that, in partnership with the Science and
Technology Directorate, it is assessing the capabilities of advanced x-
ray technologies to provide enhanced capabilities in the detection of
improvised explosives devices in carry-on items.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has reported taking actions to develop and
test checkpoint technologies. The full extent of DHS's efforts is the
focus of an ongoing GAO review scheduled for completion later this year.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 18. Deploy checkpoint technologies to address
vulnerabilities.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet deployed checkpoint
technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities. For example, in
July 2006, TSA provided us with information that 97 explosives trace
portal machines had been installed at over 37 airports. This new
technology uses puffs of air to help detect the presence of explosives
on individuals. However, DHS identified problems with these machines
and has halted their deployment. DHS's fiscal year 2007 budget request
stated that TSA expected that 434 explosives trace portal machines
would be in operation throughout the country by September 2007. TSA is
also developing backscatter technology, but limited progress has been
made in fielding this technology at airport passenger screening
checkpoints. We are currently reviewing TSA's technology development
and deployment efforts and will be reporting on these efforts later
this year. For more information, see GAO-06-371T.
DHS updated information: DHS reported in March 2007 that extensive
deployment of new technologies will not be realized for another 2
years.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has faced challenges and delays in
deploying checkpoint technologies to effectively address
vulnerabilities, and TSA has reported that deployment of new
technologies is likely 2 years away.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 19. Deploy EDS and ETD systems to screen
checked baggage for explosives.
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as TSA has
deployed EDS and ETD systems at the nation's airports. From November
2001 through June 2006, TSA procured and installed about 1,600 EDS
machines and about 7,200 ETD machines to screen checked baggage for
explosives at over 400 commercial airports. TSA made progress in
fielding EDS and ETD equipment at the nation's airports, placing this
equipment in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--to conduct
the primary screening of checked baggage for explosives, due to
congressional mandates to field the equipment quickly and limitations
in airport design. For more information, see Aviation Security: TSA
Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be
Strengthened, GAO-06-869 and GAO-06-371T.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 20. Develop a plan to deploy in-line baggage
screening equipment at airports.
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed
a plan to deploy in-line baggage screening equipment at airports, based
in part on a recommendation we made. The plan is aimed at increasing
security through deploying more EDS machines, lowering program life-
cycle costs, minimizing impacts on TSA and airport and airline
operations, and providing a flexible security infrastructure. In March
2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA had agreed to help
fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA estimated that
screening with in-line EDS machines could save the federal government
about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006, TSA reported that
many of the initial in-line EDS systems did not achieve the anticipated
savings. However, recent improvements in the design of the in-line EDS
systems and EDS screening technology offer the opportunity for higher-
performance and lower-cost screening systems. Screening with in-line
EDS systems may also result in security benefits by reducing the need
for TSA to use alternative screening procedures, such as screening with
explosives detection canines and physical bag searches, which involve
trade-offs in security effectiveness. For more information, see GAO-06-
869; GAO-06-371T; and GAO-07-448T.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 21. Pursue the deployment and use of in-line
baggage screening equipment at airports.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: Despite delays in the widespread
deployment of in-line systems due to the high upfront capital
investment required, DHS is pursuing the deployment and use of in-line
explosives detection equipment and is seeking creative financing
solutions to fund the deployment of these systems. TSA determined that
recent improvements in the design of the in-line EDS systems and EDS
screening technology offer the opportunity for higher performance and
lower cost screening systems. Screening with in-line EDS systems could
also result in security benefits by reducing congestion in airport
lobbies and reducing the need for TSA to use alternative screening
procedures, such as screening with explosives detection canines and
physical bag searches. TSA's use of these procedures, which are to be
used only when volumes of baggage awaiting screening pose security
vulnerabilities or when TSA officials determine that there is a
security risk associated with large concentrations of passengers in an
area, has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness. TSA has begun
to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked baggage
screening systems, but resources have not been made available by
Congress to fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-
scale basis. TSA reported that as of June 2006, 25 airports had
operational in-line EDS systems and an additional 24 airports had in-
line systems under development. In May 2006, TSA reported that under
current investment levels, installation of optimal checked baggage
screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. For
more information, see GAO-06-869 and GAO-06-371T.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported that it is working
with its airport and air carrier stakeholders to improve checked
baggage screening solutions and to look creatively at in-line baggage
screening system solutions to enhance security and free up lobby space
at airports.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has undertaken efforts to deploy and use
in-line baggage screening equipment, but challenges exist to deploying
in-line systems due to the high costs of the systems and questions
regarding how the systems will be funded.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 22. Develop a plan for air cargo security.
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed
a strategic plan for domestic air cargo security and has taken actions
to use risk management principles to guide investment decisions related
to air cargo bound for the United States from a foreign country,
referred to as inbound air cargo, but these actions are not yet
complete. With regard to domestic air cargo, we reported that TSA
completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a
threat-based risk management approach to securing the nation's air
cargo transportation system. TSA's plan identified strategic objectives
and priority actions for enhancing air cargo security based on risk,
cost, and deadlines. With regard to inbound air cargo, in April 2007,
we reported that TSA and CBP have taken some preliminary steps to use
risk management principles to guide their investment decisions related
to inbound air cargo, as advocated by DHS, but most of these efforts
are in the planning stages. We reported that although TSA completed a
risk-based strategic plan to address domestic air cargo security, it
has not developed a similar strategy for addressing inbound air cargo
security, including how best to partner with CBP and international air
cargo stakeholders. Further, TSA has identified the primary threats
associated with inbound air cargo, but has not yet assessed which areas
of inbound air cargo are most vulnerable to attack and which inbound
air cargo assets are deemed most critical to protect. TSA plans to
assess inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets--two
crucial elements of a risk-based management approach--but has not yet
established a methodology or time frame for how and when these
assessments will be completed. Without such assessments, we reported
that TSA may not be able to appropriately focus its resources on the
most critical security needs. We recommended that TSA more fully
develop a risk-based strategy to address inbound air cargo security,
including establishing goals and objectives for securing inbound air
cargo and establishing a methodology and time frames for completing
assessments of inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets
that can be used to help prioritize the actions necessary to enhance
security. For more information, see Aviation Security: Federal Action
Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76, and
Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are
in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 23. Develop and implement procedures to screen
air cargo.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken actions to develop and
implement procedures for screening domestic air cargo.[A] With regard
to domestic air cargo, air carriers are responsible for implementing
TSA security requirements that include measures related to the
acceptance, handling, and inspection of cargo; training of employees in
security and cargo inspection procedures; testing employee proficiency
in cargo inspection; and access to cargo areas and aircraft, and TSA
inspects carriers' compliance. We reported in October 2005 that TSA had
significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections
conducted of air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with
security requirements. We also reported that TSA exempted certain cargo
from random inspection because it did not view the exempted cargo as
posing a significant security risk. However, airline industry
stakeholders told us that while the rationale for exempting certain
types of cargo from random inspection was understandable, the
exemptions may have created potential security risks and
vulnerabilities. Partly on the basis of a recommendation we made, TSA
is evaluating existing exemptions to determine whether they pose a
security risk and has reduced some exemptions that were previously
allowed. We also noted that TSA had not developed performance measures
to determine to what extent air carriers and indirect air carriers were
complying with security requirements and had not analyzed the results
of inspections to systematically target future inspections on those
entities that pose a higher security risk to the domestic air cargo
system. We have reported that without these performance measures and
systematic analyses, TSA would be limited in its ability to effectively
target its workforce for future inspections and fulfill its oversight
responsibilities for this essential area of aviation security. With
regard to inbound air cargo, in April 2007, we reported that TSA issued
its air cargo security rule in May 2006, which included a number of
provisions aimed at enhancing the security of inbound air cargo. For
example, the final rule acknowledged that TSA amended its security
directives and programs to triple the percentage of cargo inspected on
domestic and foreign passenger aircraft. To implement the requirements
contained in the air cargo security rule, TSA drafted revisions to its
existing security programs for domestic and foreign passenger air
carriers and created new security programs for domestic and foreign all-
cargo carriers. However, we reported that TSA requirements continue to
allow inspection exemptions for certain types of inbound air cargo
transported on passenger air carriers. We reported that this risk was
further heightened because TSA has limited information on the
background of and security risk posed by foreign shippers whose cargo
may fall within these exemptions. TSA officials stated that the agency
is holding discussions with industry stakeholders to determine whether
additional revisions to current air cargo inspection exemptions are
needed. We also reported that TSA inspects domestic and foreign
passenger air carriers with service to the United States to assess
whether the air carriers are complying with air cargo security
requirements, such as inspecting a certain percentage of air cargo. We
reported, however, that TSA did not currently inspect all air carriers
transporting cargo into the United States. While TSA's compliance
inspections provide useful information, the agency has not developed an
inspection plan that includes performance goals and measures to
determine to what extent air carriers are complying with security
requirements. For more information, see GAO-06-76 and GAO-07-660.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to develop and implement procedures for
screening air cargo. DHS noted that because the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act set specific milestones for screening cargo
and baggage carried on passenger aircraft, TSA focused initially on
passenger aircraft. DHS issued the Air Cargo Security Requirements
Final Rule in May 2006 that requires airports that currently maintain a
Security Identification Display Area to expand the area to air cargo
operating areas. At airports where a Security Identification Display
Area is nonexistent but all-cargo operations occur, TSA requires
aircraft operators to incorporate other security measures, such as
security threat assessments for all persons with unescorted access to
cargo, into their programs. TSA also reported that as of March 2007, it
had 300 inspectors dedicated solely to oversight of the air cargo
supply chain. During 2006, TSA reported that inspectors conducted more
than 31,000 compliance reviews of air carriers and freight
consolidators and have conducted covert testing of the domestic air
cargo supply chain. TSA also reported that it is developing an air
cargo risk-based targeting system to assess the risk of cargo to be
moved on all aircraft operating within the United States.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has developed and implemented procedures
to screen domestic and inbound air cargo. Furthermore, TSA has
significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections
conducted of air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with
security requirements. However, as we previously reported, TSA
requirements continue to allow inspection exemptions for certain types
of inbound air cargo transported on passenger air carriers, which could
create security vulnerabilities, and TSA has limited information on the
background of and security risk posed by foreign shippers whose cargo
may fall within these exemptions.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 24. Develop and implement technologies to
screen air cargo.
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet developed and
implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. TSA's plans for
enhancing air cargo security include developing and testing air cargo
inspection technology. However, these planned enhancements may pose
operational, financial, and technological challenges to the agency and
air cargo industry stakeholders. In October 2005 we reported that TSA
had completed a pilot program focused on testing the applicability of
EDS technology to inspect individual pieces of air cargo, referred to
as break bulk cargo. Although EDS is an approved method for inspecting
passenger baggage, it had not been tested by TSA to determine its
effectiveness in inspecting air cargo. According to TSA officials, TSA
must review the results of its EDS pilot test before the agency would
determine whether to certify EDS for inspecting air cargo. According to
TSA officials, the agency has also been pursuing multiple technologies
to automate the detection of explosives in the types and quantities
that would cause catastrophic damage to an aircraft in flight. TSA
planned to develop working prototypes of these technologies by
September 2006 and complete operational testing by 2008. TSA
acknowledged that full development of these technologies may take 5 to
7 years. In April 2007, we reported that DHS has taken some steps to
incorporate new technologies into strengthening the security of air
cargo, which will affect both domestic and inbound air cargo. However,
we reported that TSA and DHS's Science and Technology Directorate were
in the early stages of evaluating available aviation security
technologies to determine their applicability to the domestic air cargo
environment. TSA and the Science and Technology Directorate are seeking
to identify and develop technologies that can effectively inspect and
secure air cargo with minimal impact on the flow of commerce. According
to TSA officials, there is no single technology capable of efficiently
and effectively inspecting all types of air cargo for the full range of
potential terrorist threats, including explosives and weapons of mass
destruction. Accordingly, TSA, together with the Science and Technology
Directorate, is conducting a number of pilot programs that are testing
a variety of different technologies that may be used separately or in
combination to inspect and secure air cargo. These pilot programs seek
to enhance the security of air cargo by improving the effectiveness of
air cargo inspections through increased detection rates and reduced
false alarm rates, while addressing the two primary threats to air
cargo identified by TSA--hijackers on an all-cargo aircraft and
explosives on passenger aircraft. TSA anticipates completing its pilot
tests by 2008, but has not yet established time frames for when it
might implement these methods or technologies for the inbound air cargo
system. According to DHS and TSA officials, further testing and
analysis will be necessary to make determinations about the
capabilities and costs of these technologies when employed for
inspecting inbound air cargo at foreign locations. For more
information, see GAO-06-76 and GAO-07-660.
DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to develop and implement air cargo screening
technologies. TSA reported that new technologies to physically screen
air cargo will not be available in the near term. TSA reported that it
is using and improving existing technologies to screen air cargo. For
example, TSA reported increasing the use of canine teams and stated
that these teams dedicate about 25 percent of their time of air cargo
security activities.
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. DHS focused initial aviation security efforts
on fulfilling congressional mandates related to passenger and baggage
screening and has faced challenges in its efforts to develop and
implement air cargo screening technologies. In prior work, we reported
that TSA has taken actions to develop technologies for screening air
cargo, but had not yet tested the effectiveness of various technologies
in inspecting air cargo. We also reported that full development of
technologies for screening air cargo may be years away.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken a
sufficient number of actions to satisfy most elements of the
performance expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may
be warranted even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy
some but not most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the
DHS IG have not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS
actions to satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information
DHS provided did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which
DHS has achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no
assessment made."
[A] The terms "inspecting" and "screening" have been used
interchangeably by TSA to denote some level of examination of a person
or good, which can entail a number of different actions, including
manual physical inspections to ensure that cargo does not contain
weapons, explosives, or stowaways, or inspections using nonintrusive
technologies that do not require the cargo to be opened in order to be
inspected. For this and the subsequent performance expectation, we use
the term "screen" to refer to this broad range of activities. However,
in our April 2007 report that is referenced in this performance
expectation's associated findings section, the term "screening" was
used when referring to TSA or CBP efforts to apply a filter to analyze
cargo related information to identify cargo shipment characteristics or
anomalies for security risks. The term "inspection" was used to refer
only to air carrier, TSA, or CBP efforts to examine air cargo through
physical searches and the use of nonintrusive technologies.
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Securing Surface Transportation
Modes:
DHS has undertaken various initiatives to secure surface transportation
modes, and within the department, TSA is primarily responsible for
surface transportation security efforts. Since its creation following
the events of September 11, 2001, TSA has focused much of its efforts
and resources on meeting legislative mandates to strengthen commercial
aviation security. However, TSA has more recently placed additional
focus on securing surface modes of transportation, which includes
establishing security standards and conducting assessments and
inspections of surface transportation modes such as passenger and
freight rail; mass transit; highways, including commercial vehicles;
and pipelines. Although TSA has primary responsibility within the
department for surface transportation security, the responsibility for
securing rail and other transportation modes is shared among federal,
state, and local governments and the private sector. For example, with
regard to passenger rail security, in addition to TSA, DHS's Office of
Grant Programs provides grant funds to rail operators and conducts risk
assessments for passenger rail agencies. Within the Department of
Transportation, the Federal Transit Administration and Federal Railroad
Administration have responsibilities for passenger rail safety and
security. In addition, public and private passenger rail operators are
also responsible for securing their rail systems.
As shown in table 24, we identified five performance expectations for
DHS in the area of surface transportation security, and we found that
overall DHS has made moderate progress in meeting those performance
expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved
three of these performance expectations and has generally not achieved
two others.
Table 24: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Surface
Transportation Security:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop and adopt a strategic approach for
implementing surface transportation security functions.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Conduct threat, criticality, and
vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Issue standards for securing surface
transportation modes.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Conduct compliance inspections for surface
transportation systems.
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Administer grant programs for surface
transportation security.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 3;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 2;
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 25 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of surface transportation security and our assessment of
whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the
performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to
satisfy most of the performance expectation's key elements (generally
not achieved).
Table 25: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Surface Transportation Security:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop and adopt a strategic approach for
implementing surface transportation security functions;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed a strategic
approach for securing surface transportation modes, which include mass
transit, passenger rail, freight rail, commercial vehicles, pipelines,
and related infrastructure such as roads and highways. In the past we
have reported that TSA had not issued the Transportation Sector
Specific Plan or supporting plans for securing all modes of
transportation, in accordance with DHS's National Infrastructure
Protection Plan and a December 2006 executive order. We reported that
until TSA issued the sector-specific plan and supporting plans, it
lacked a clearly communicated strategy with goals and objectives for
securing the transportation sector. In addition, in March 2007, we
testified that as of September 2005, DHS had begun developing, but had
not yet completed a framework to help federal agencies and the private
sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks
to transportation and other critical sectors. For more information, see
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Leadership Needed to Prioritize and
Guide Security Efforts, GAO-07-225T and Passenger Rail Security:
Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and
Guide Security Efforts, GAO-07-583T; DHS updated information: In May
2007, DHS issued the sector-specific plan for transportation systems
and supporting annexes for surface transportation assets, and reported
taking actions to adopt the strategic approach outlined by the plan.
The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan and its supporting
modal implementation plans and appendixes establish a strategic
approach based on the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and
Executive Order 13416, Strengthening Surface Transportation Security.
The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan describes the security
framework that is intended to enable sector stakeholders to make
effective and appropriate risk-based security and resource allocation
decisions. The key efforts to be undertaken according to the plan
include the (1) identification of assets, systems, networks and
functions to be protected; (2) assessment of risks; (3) prioritization
of risk management options; (4) development and implementation of
security programs; (5) measurement of progress; (6) assessment and
prioritization of research and development investments; and (7)
management and coordination of sector responsibilities, including the
sharing of information. In addition, during the course of our ongoing
work assessing mass transit, freight rail, commercial vehicles, and
highway infrastructure, we identified that DHS has begun to implement
some of the security initiatives outlined in the sector-specific plan
for transportation systems and supporting annexes; Our assessment: We
conclude that DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation
because TSA has issued the Transportation Sector-Specific Plan and
supporting plans, a significant step in its efforts to develop and
adopt a strategic approach for surface transportation security
functions. While DHS has issued a strategy for securing all
transportation modes, and has demonstrated that it has begun to take
actions to implement the goals and objectives outlined in the strategy,
we have not yet analyzed the overall quality of the plan or supporting
modal annexes, the extent to which efforts outlined in the plans and
annexes were implemented, or the effectiveness of identified security
initiatives. The four performance expectations in the surface
transportation security mission area discussed below are generally
related to DHS's implementation of the strategy. In addition, we
recognize that the acceptance of DHS's approach by federal, state,
local, and private sector stakeholders is crucial to its successful
implementation. However, we have not assessed the extent to which the
plan and supporting modal annexes were coordinated with or adopted by
these stakeholders. We will continue to assess DHS' efforts to
implement its strategy for securing surface transportation modes as
part of our ongoing reviews of mass transit, freight rail, commercial
vehicles, and highway infrastructure security;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Conduct threat, criticality, and
vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken actions to conduct
threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of some surface
transportation assets, particularly passenger and freight rail, but has
not provided us with evidence that it has completed assessments in
other surface transportation modes. In 2005, we reported that DHS and
TSA conducted threat and vulnerability assessments of passenger rail
systems. More recently, we testified that TSA had reported completing
an overall threat assessment for mass transit, passenger, and freight
rail modes and had conducted criticality assessments of nearly 700
passenger rail stations. In addition, in March 2007 we testified that
DHS's Office of Grants and Training, now called the Office of Grant
Programs, developed and implemented a risk assessment tool to help
passenger rail operators better respond to terrorist attacks and
prioritize security measures. Passenger rail operators must have
completed a risk assessment to be eligible for financial assistance
through the fiscal year 2007 Transit Security Grant Program, which
includes funding for passenger rail. To receive grant funding, rail
operators are also required to have a security and emergency
preparedness plan that identifies how the operator intends to respond
to security gaps identified by risk assessments. As of February 2007,
DHS had completed or planned to conduct risk assessments of most
passenger rail operators. According to rail operators, DHS's risk
assessment process enabled them to prioritize investments on the basis
of risk and allowed them to target and allocate resources toward
security measures that will have the greatest impact on reducing risk
across their rail systems. However, TSA has not provided us with
evidence that it has yet conducted threat and vulnerability assessments
of all surface transportation assets, which may adversely affect its
ability to adopt a risk-based approach for prioritizing security
initiatives within and across all transportation modes. Until threat,
criticality, and vulnerability assessments have been coordinated and
completed, and until TSA determines how to use the results of these
assessments to analyze and characterize risk, it may not be possible to
effectively prioritize passenger rail assets and guide investment
decisions about protecting them. TSA has reported conducting additional
risk assessments in rail and other transportation modes since the
issuance of our September 2005 report. We will review these assessments
and other TSA efforts to secure surface transportation modes in our
ongoing and planned work related to passenger and freight rail, highway
infrastructure, and commercial vehicle security. For more information,
see GAO-07-225T; Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership
Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-06-181T; and
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851; DHS updated
information: In March and April 2007, and as part of ongoing work
assessing freight rail, commercial vehicles, and highway
infrastructure, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts
to conduct threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments for
surface transportation assets. With regard to threat assessments, DHS
receives and uses threat information as part of its surface
transportation security efforts. TSA's Office of Intelligence provides
annual intelligence summaries, periodic updates, and other current
intelligence briefings to the rest of TSA. The annual assessments are
shared with TSA stakeholders, and TSA provided us copies for all
transportation modes. With regard to criticality assessments, DHS has
conducted such assessments for some surface transportation modes. For
example, TSA has conducted Corporate Security Reviews with 38 state
Department of Transportation highway programs. For commercial vehicles,
TSA has conducted 32 Corporate Security Reviews with large motor
carriers, in an industry with over one million firms. It has also
completed a pilot program with the state of Missouri to supplement the
state's regular safety inspections of trucking firms with Corporate
Security Reviews. TSA reports that over 1,800 Corporate Security
Reviews have been completed in Missouri as part of this program. In
addition, the National Protection and Programs Directorate
Infrastructure Protection conducts highway infrastructure assessments
that look at tier one and tier two critical highway infrastructure. The
National Protection and Programs Directorate completed 54 highway
infrastructure assessments performed from 2004 through May 2007. With
regard to vulnerability assessments, DHS has conducted such assessments
for surface transportation modes. For example, TSA reported that its
Security Analysis and Action Program utilizes several different tools
to identify vulnerabilities based on specific scenarios, such as an
improvised explosive device on a passenger train. The purpose of the
program is to gather information, identify generally accepted best
practices, and benchmark existing security operations in comparison to
established industry security practices. According to TSA, among other
things, the Security Analysis and Action Program creates a baseline for
future multimodal security assessments, develops a road map for future
passenger rail security evaluations, and helps prioritize security
countermeasures and emergency response enhancement needs based on
threats and risks. For freight rail, we found that TSA has conducted
vulnerability assessments of High Threat Urban Area rail corridors
where toxic inhalation hazard shipments are transported. TSA reported
that these corridor assessments provide site-specific mitigation
strategies and lessons learned as well as tactics that can be modified
for use at the corporate or national level. Furthermore, TSA reported
that its Visible Intermodal Prevention and Protection Teams are
deployed randomly to prepare for emergency situations in which TSA
assets would be invited to assist a local transit agency. According to
TSA, these teams allow TSA and local entities to develop templates that
can be implemented in emergency situations and to supplement existing
security resources. As of March 20, 2007, TSA reported that 50 Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Protection team exercises have been conducted
at various mass transit and passenger rail systems since December 2005.
In addition, TSA reported that through its Pipeline Security Division,
it has conducted 63 Corporate Security Reviews, on-site reviews of
pipeline companies' security planning. The goals of these reviews are
to develop knowledge of security planning and execution at pipeline
sites; establish and maintain working relationships with pipeline
security personnel; and identify and share security practices; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to conduct threat,
criticality, and vulnerability assessments in surface transportation
sectors, but we have not yet reviewed the quality of many of these
assessments. DHS uses threat assessments and information as part of its
surface transportation security efforts and has used criticality
assessments to help prioritize its efforts. DHS has also conducted
vulnerability assessment of assets within surface transportation modes,
particularly for mass transit, freight rail, and highway
infrastructure. However, with regard to High Threat Urban Area rail
corridor assessments, DHS has not yet fully designated those corridors
for which it plans to conduct future assessments. Moreover, for
commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure, DHS has not yet
completed all planned vulnerability assessments;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Issue standards for securing surface
transportation modes;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has initiated efforts to develop
security standards for surface transportation modes, but DHS did not
provide us with information on its efforts beyond passenger and freight
rail. In 2006, TSA was planning to issue security standards for all
modes of transportation. TSA planned to issue only a limited number of
standards--that is, standards will be issued only when assessments of
the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that the level
of risk is too high or unacceptable. TSA has developed security
directives and security action items--recommended measures for
passenger rail operators to implement in their security programs to
improve both security and emergency preparedness--for passenger rail
and issued a proposed rule in December 2006 on passenger and freight
rail security requirements. For more information, see GAO-07-225T; GAO-
06-181T; and GAO-05-851; DHS updated information: In April 2007, and as
part of ongoing work, DHS provided us with updated information on TSA's
efforts to issue standards for securing surface transportation modes.
According to DHS, TSA uses field activities to assess compliance with
security directives and implementation of noncompulsory security
standards and protective measures with the objective of a broad-based
enhancement of passenger rail and rail transit security. Through the
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement inspectors review
implementation by mass transit and passenger rail systems of the 17
Security and Emergency Management Action Items (security action items)
that TSA and the Federal Transit Administration jointly developed, in
coordination with the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council. This
initiative aims to elevate security posture throughout the mass transit
and passenger rail mode by implementation of baseline security measures
adaptable to the operating circumstances of any system. TSA also
reported that in December 2006, it issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking on new security measures for freight rail carriers designed
to ensure 100 percent positive handoff of toxic inhalation hazard
shipments that enter high threat urban areas and establish security
protocols for custody transfers of toxic inhalation hazard rail cars in
high-threat urban areas. TSA also reported that its High Threat Urban
Area rail corridor assessments supported the development of the
Recommended Security Action Items for the Rail Transportation of Toxic
Inhalation Materials issued by DHS and the Department of Transportation
in June 2006; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to develop
and issue surface transportation security standards for passenger and
freight rail modes. However, DHS did not provide us with evidence of
its efforts to develop and issue security standards for all surface
transportation modes or a rationale or explanation why standards may
not be needed for other modes;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Conduct compliance inspections for surface
transportation systems;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress in conducting
compliance inspections, particularly in hiring and deploying
inspectors, but inspectors' roles and missions have not yet been fully
defined. TSA officials stated the agency has hired 100 surface
transportation inspectors whose stated mission is to, among other
duties, monitor and enforce compliance with TSA's rail security
directives. However, some passenger rail operators have expressed
confusion and concern about the role of TSA's inspectors and the
potential that TSA inspections could be duplicative of other federal
and state rail inspections. TSA rail inspector staff stated that they
were committed to avoiding duplication in the program and communicating
their respective roles to rail agency officials. According to TSA,
since the initial deployment of surface inspectors, these inspectors
have developed relationships with security officials in passenger rail
and transit systems, coordinated access to operations centers,
participated in emergency exercises, and provided assistance in
enhancing security. However, the role of inspectors in enforcing
security directives has not been fully defined. We will continue to
assess TSA's compliance efforts during follow-on reviews of surface
transportation modes For more information, see GAO-07-225T; GAO-06-
181T; and GAO-05-851; DHS updated information: In March and April
2007, and as part of ongoing reviews, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to conduct compliance inspections for
surface transportation systems. For example, with regard to freight
rail, TSA reported visiting terminal and railroad yards to measure
implementation of 7 of 24 recommended security action items for the
rail transportation of toxic inhalation hazard materials. TSA reported
that during the end of 2006, its inspectors visited about 150
individual railroad facilities. Through its Surface Transportation
Security Inspection program, TSA reported that its inspectors conduct
inspections of key facilities for rail and transit systems to assess
transit systems' implementation of core transit security fundamentals
and comprehensive security action items; conduct examinations of
stakeholder operations, including compliance with security directives;
identify security gaps; and develop effective practices. TSA noted that
its field activities also assess compliance with security directives
and implementation of noncompulsory security standards and protective
measures. For example, TSA reported that through the Baseline
Assessment for Security Enhancements program, inspectors review mass
transit and passenger rail systems' implementation of the 17 Security
and Emergency Management Action Items jointly developed by TSA and the
Federal Transit Administration. The program is a means to establish
baseline security program data applicable to all surface mass transit
systems. TSA also noted that it deploys inspectors to serve as federal
liaisons to mass transit and passenger rail system operations centers
and provide other security support and assistance in periods of
heightened alert or in response to security incidents; Our assessment:
We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation. DHS has taken steps to conduct compliance inspections for
surface transportation systems and has made progress in hiring and
deploying inspectors. Although DHS has deployed inspectors to conduct
compliance inspections and carry out other security activities in the
mass transit (mass transit includes passenger rail) and freight rail
modes, DHS did not provide us with evidence that it has conducted
compliance inspections for other surface transportation modes or
information on whether the department believes compliance inspections
are needed for other modes. Moreover, we reported that the role of
inspectors in enforcing security requirements has not been fully
defined, and DHS did not provide us with documentation on its efforts
to better define these roles;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Administer grant programs for surface
transportation security;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In March 2007, we reported that the
DHS Office of Grants and Training, now called the Office of Grant
Programs, has used various programs to fund passenger rail security
since 2003. Through the Urban Area Security Initiative grant program,
the Office of Grants and Training has provided grants to urban areas to
help enhance their overall security and preparedness level to prevent,
respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. In 2003 and 2004, $65
million and $50 million, respectively, were provided to rail transit
agencies through the Urban Area Security Initiative program. In
addition, the 2005 DHS appropriations action provided $150 million for
intercity passenger rail transportation, freight rail, and transit
security grants. In fiscal year 2006, $150 million was appropriated,
and in fiscal year 2007 $175 million was appropriated for the same
purposes. The Office of Grants and Training used this funding to build
on the work under way through the Urban Area Security Initiative
program and create and administer new programs focused specifically on
transportation security, including the Transit Security Grant Program
and the Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program. During fiscal
year 2006, the Office of Grants and Training provided $110 million to
passenger rail transit agencies through the Transit Security Grant
Program and about $7 million to Amtrak through the Intercity Passenger
Rail Security Grant Program. During fiscal year 2007, the Office of
Grants and Training plans to distribute $156 million for rail and bus
security grants and $8 million to Amtrak. In January 2007, the Office
of Grants and Training reported that the Intercity Passenger Rail
Security Program had been incorporated into the Transit Security Grant
Program. We reported that although the Office of Grants and Training
has distributed hundreds of millions of dollars in grants to improve
passenger rail security, issues have surfaced about the grant process.
For example, we reported that as DHS works to refine its risk
assessment methodologies, develop better means of assessing proposed
investments using grant funds, and align grant guidance with the
implementation of broader emergency preparedness goals, such as
implementation of the National Preparedness Goal, it has annually made
changes to the guidance for the various grants it administers. These
changes include changes in the eligibility for grants. As a result of
these annual changes, awardees and potential grant recipients must
annually review and understand new information on the requirements for
grant applications including justification of their proposed use of
grant funds. We also reported that funds awarded through the Transit
Security Grant Program can be used to supplement funds received from
other grant programs. However, allowable uses are not clearly defined.
For example, Transit Security Grant Program funds can be used to create
canine teams but cannot be used to maintain these teams--that is, the
grant funds cannot be used for food, medical care, and other such
maintenance costs for the dogs on the team. Grant recipients have
expressed a need for clear guidance on the allowable use of grants and
how they can combine funds from more than one grant to fund and
implement specific projects. In addition, some industry stakeholders
have raised concerns regarding DHS's current grant process, noting that
there are time delays and other barriers in grant funding reaching
owners and operators of surface transportation assets. We will be
assessing grants for mass transit as part of our ongoing work. For more
information, see GAO-06-181T and Passenger Rail Security: Federal
Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide
Security Efforts, GAO-07-583T; DHS updated information: In March 2007,
DHS provided us with updated information on its grant programs for
surface transportation security. For example, TSA considers various
factors in Transit Security Grant Program proposals, including the
enhancement of capabilities to (1) deter, detect, and respond to
terrorist attacks employing improvised explosive devices; (2) mitigate
high-consequence risks identified in individual transit system risk
assessments; (3) implement technology for detection of explosives and
monitoring for suspicious activities; (4) improve coordination with law
enforcement and emergency responders; and (5) expand security training
and awareness among employees and passengers. TSA reported using the
Transit Security Grant Program to drive improvements in areas such as
training for key personnel, drills, exercises, and public awareness and
preparedness; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed and
administered grant programs for various surface transportation modes.
However, some industry stakeholders have raised concerns regarding
DHS's current grant process, such as time delays and other barriers in
the provision of grant funding. We have not yet assessed DHS's
provision of grant funding or the extent to which DHS monitors use of
the funds. A recent legislative proposal would have the Department of
Transportation, rather than DHS, distribute grant funds for specified
surface transportation security purposes;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Substantial Progress in Maritime Security:
DHS has undertaken various programs to secure the maritime sector. In
general, these maritime security programs fall under one of three
areasæport and vessel security, maritime intelligence, and maritime
supply chain security. Within DHS, various component agencies are
responsible for maritime security efforts, including the Coast Guard,
CBP, TSA, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. The Coast Guard is
responsible for port facility inspections and has lead responsibility
in coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. CBP is
responsible for addressing the threat posed by terrorist smuggling of
weapons in oceangoing containers. TSA is responsible for the
implementation of the transportation worker identification credential
program. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is responsible for
acquiring and supporting the deployment of radiation detection
equipment, including portal monitors, within the United States.
As shown in table 26, we identified 23 performance expectations for DHS
in the area of maritime security, and we found that overall DHS has
made substantial progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically,
we found that DHS has generally achieved 17 performance expectations
and has generally not achieved 4 others. For 2 performance
expectations, we did not make an assessment.
Table 26: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Maritime
Security:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop national plans for maritime
security;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Develop national plans for maritime
response;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Develop national plans for maritime
recovery;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for
security;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for
response;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for
recovery;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Ensure port facilities have completed
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Ensure that vessels have completed
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Exercise security, response, and recovery
plans with key maritime stakeholders to enhance security, response, and
recovery efforts;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Implement a national facility access
control system for port secured areas;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Implement a port security grant program to
help facilities improve their security capabilities;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 12. Develop a national plan to establish and
improve maritime intelligence;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 13. Establish operational centers to monitor
threats and fuse intelligence and operations at the regional/port
level;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 14. Collect information on incoming ships to
assess risks and threats;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 15. Develop a vessel-tracking system to
improve intelligence and maritime domain awareness on vessels in U.S.
waters;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 16. Develop a long-range vessel-tracking
system to improve maritime domain awareness;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 17. Collect information on arriving cargo for
screening purposes;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 18. Develop a system for screening and
inspecting cargo for illegal contraband;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 19. Develop a program to screen incoming cargo
for radiation;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 20. Develop a program to work with foreign
governments to inspect suspicious cargo before it leaves for U.S.
ports;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 21. Develop a program to work with the private
sector to improve and validate supply chain security;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 22. Develop standards for cargo containers to
ensure their physical security;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 23. Develop an international port security
program to assess security at foreign ports;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 17;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 4;
Assessment: No assessment made: 2.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 27 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of maritime security and our assessment of whether DHS has
taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).
Table 27: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Maritime Security:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop national plans for maritime
security;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: The President and the Secretaries of
Homeland Security, Defense, and State approved the supporting plans for
National Strategy for Maritime Security in October 2005. The National
Strategy for Maritime Security has eight supporting plans that are
intended to address the specific threats and challenges of the maritime
environment. The supporting plans are the National Plan to Achieve
Domain Awareness; the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan;
the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan; the International
Outreach and Coordination Strategy; the Maritime Infrastructure
Recovery Plan; the Maritime Transportation System Security Plan; the
Maritime Commerce Security Plan; and the Domestic Outreach Plan. In
addition, in September 2005, the Coast Guard issued Maritime Sentinel.
Maritime Sentinel provides a framework for the Coast Guard's Ports,
Waterways and Coastal Security program, setting out the Coast Guard's
mission and goals in that area. Our review of Maritime Sentinel showed
that the plan is results-oriented with outcome-based goals but that it
needs to better describe the human capital resources necessary to
achieve them; DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS
provided us with updated information on its efforts to develop national
plans for maritime security. DHS reported that the Coast Guard has
issued a number of plans supporting or relating to maritime security;
Our assessment: Based on our review of Maritime Sentinel and updated
information DHS provided, we conclude that that DHS has generally
achieved this expectation;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Develop national plans for maritime
response;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed a national plan
for response in conjunction with the Department of Defense. We have
reported that the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan establishes
roles and responsibilities for responding to marine terrorism to help
resolve jurisdictional issues among responding agencies. For more
information, see Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons
Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170; DHS
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to develop national plans for
maritime response. For example, DHS reported that the Maritime
Operational Threat Response Plan is a strategic plan that addresses the
full range of maritime threats including terrorism, piracy, drug
smuggling, migrant smuggling, weapons of mass destruction
proliferation, maritime hijacking, and fisheries incursions. DHS stated
that this interagency national plan supersedes Presidential Directive-
27 (in the maritime domain only) for addressing nonmilitary incidents
of national security significance and has been successfully exercised
numerous times among agencies, including actual effective threat
resolution. DHS further stated that the Maritime Operational Threat
Response Plan is a national-level process to achieve consistently
coordinated action and desired outcomes that directly support National
Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-13; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally
achieved this performance expectation as DHS has developed the Maritime
Operational Threat Response Plan, which details agency responsibilities
during incidents of marine terrorism;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Develop national plans for maritime
recovery;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as DHS has
developed the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan, and the plan
establishes a framework for maritime recovery. In April 2006, DHS
released the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan. The Maritime
Infrastructure Recovery Plan is intended to facilitate the restoration
of maritime commerce after a terrorist attack or natural disaster and
reflects the disaster management framework outlined in the National
Response Plan. The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan addresses
issues that should be considered by ports when planning for natural
disasters. However, it does not set forth particular actions that
should be taken at the port level, leaving those determinations to be
made by the port operators themselves. For more information, see Port
Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in
Disaster Planning and Recovery, GAO-07-412;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for
security;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed
regional (port-specific) plans for security. The Coast Guard led
efforts to conduct a security assessment of each of the nation's
seaports and develop a security plan for each seaport zone. Under
regulations implementing the Maritime Transportation Security Act, a
Coast Guard Captain of the Port must develop an area plan in
consultation with an Area Maritime Security Committee. These committees
are typically composed of members from federal, local, and state
governments; law enforcement agencies; maritime industry and labor
organizations; and other port stakeholders that may be affected by
security policies. In April 2007 we reported that implementing
regulations for the Maritime Transportation Security Act specified that
area plans include, among other things, operational and physical
security measures in place at the port under different security levels,
details of the security incident command and response structure,
procedures for responding to security threats including provisions for
maintaining operations in the port, and procedures to facilitate the
recovery of the marine transportation system after a security incident.
A Coast Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular provided a
common template for area plans and specified the responsibilities of
port stakeholders under the plans. Currently, 46 area plans are in
place at ports around the country. For more information, see Maritime
Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act, GAO-
07-754T; Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations
and Future Challenges, GAO-06-448T; Maritime Security: Enhancements
Made, but Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-
05-448T; and Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure
an Effective Port Security Assessment Program, GAO-04-1062;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for
response;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed
regional (port-specific) plans for response. We have reported that the
Captain of the Port is responsible for establishing both spill and
terrorism response plans. In doing so, the Captain of the Port must
identify local public and private port stakeholders who will develop
and revise separate plans for marine spills of oil and hazardous
materials and for terrorism response. Both plans call for coordinated
implementation with other plans, such as the response and security
plans developed by specific facilities or vessels. At the port level,
effectively integrating spill and terrorism emergency responses
requires all plans to operate in unison--the port spill response plan
and the port terrorism response plan, as well as facility and vessel
response plans;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Develop regional (port-specific) plans for
recovery;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has generally not developed
regional (port-specific) plans for recovery. We have reported that
guidance in the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan suggests that
ports develop priorities for bringing vessels into port after a
closure. Additionally, port terrorism response plans must include a
section on crisis management and recovery to ensure the continuity of
port operations; DHS updated information: In April 2007, DHS provided
us with updated information on its efforts to develop regional (port-
specific) plans for recovery. DHS reported that the Coast Guard and CBP
have developed protocols for recovery and resumption of trade. DHS
stated that these protocols are currently being discussed with other
federal agencies for coordination purposes and with the private sector
to ensure that federal activities facilitate private sector recovery
efforts. DHS also reported that Coast Guard headquarters is preparing
guidance for field units for including recovery in their plans for
creating Maritime Transportation System Recovery Units at the local
(sector) level. Further, DHS reported that several ports have included
recovery as part of their area plans, such as all ports in the Coast
Guard's Atlantic Area, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and San
Francisco. DHS stated that the level of detail in these plans varies
but noted that many are working to enhance the section on recovery and
resumption of trade. DHS added that these plans are developing as all-
hazard plans to include both natural and man-made incidents; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. Our prior work has shown that work remains in
DHS's efforts to develop regional (port-specific) plans for recovery;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Ensure port facilities have completed
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken steps to ensure that
port facilities have completed vulnerability assessments and developed
security plans. Maritime Transportation Security Act implementing
regulations require designated owners or operators of maritime
facilities to identify vulnerabilities and develop security plans for
their facilities. In May 2005 we reported that the Coast Guard had
reviewed and approved the security plans of the over 3,000 facilities
that were required to identify their vulnerabilities and take action to
reduce them. Six months after July 1, 2004, the date by which the
security plans were to be implemented, the Coast Guard reported that it
had completed on-site inspections of all facilities to ensure the plans
were being implemented as approved. In April 2007 we reported that
Coast Guard guidance calls for the Coast Guard to conduct on-site
facility inspections to verify continued compliance with security plans
on an annual basis. A Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port
Act amendment to the Maritime Transportation Security Act requires the
Coast Guard to conduct at least two inspections of each facility
annually, and it required that one of these inspections be unannounced.
We are currently conducting a review of the Coast Guard's efforts for
ensuring facilities' compliance with various Maritime Transportation
Security Act requirements. For more information, see GAO-07-754T; GAO-
05-448T; and Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate
New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838;
DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to ensure that port facilities have
completed vulnerability assessments and developed security plans. DHS
reported that its Alternative Security Program allows for participants
to use templates pre-approved by the Coast Guard for developing their
security plans. Facilities that use these plans then undergo security
plan verifications, as required by the Maritime Transportation Security
Act; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has made progress in ensuring that port
facilities have completed vulnerability assessments and developed
security plans;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Ensure that vessels have completed
vulnerability assessments and developed security plans;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has made progress in ensuring
that vessels have done vulnerability assessments and developed security
plans. In May 2005 we reported that the Coast Guard had reviewed and
approved the security plans of the more than 9,000 vessels that were
required to identify their vulnerabilities and take action to reduce
them. Six months after July 1, 2004, the date by which the security
plans were to be implemented, the Coast Guard reported that it had
completed on-site inspections of thousands of vessels to ensure the
plans were being implemented as approved. For more information, see
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning
Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838 and GAO-05-448T;
DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to ensure that vessels have
completed vulnerability assessments and developed security plans. DHS
reported that the Coast Guard completed security plan verifications for
all inspected U.S.-flagged vessels by July 2005. DHS further reported
that to date, the Coast Guard has completed security plan verifications
on 98 percent of uninspected U.S.-flagged vessels regulated in
accordance with the Maritime Transportation Security Act. DHS noted
that uninspected vessels are not required to undergo security plan
verifications exams by regulation but stated the Coast Guard was
committed to the goal of encouraging all vessel owners of uninspected
vessels to undergo such examinations on a voluntary basis by the end of
2006; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has taken steps to ensure that vessels
have completed vulnerability assessments and developed security plans;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Exercise security, response, and recovery
plans with key maritime stakeholders to enhance security, response, and
recovery efforts;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has generally exercised
security, response, and recovery plans (at least at the regional level)
with key stakeholders. The Coast Guard has primary responsibility for
such testing and evaluation in the nation's ports and waterways, and as
part of its response, it has added multi-agency and multicontingency
terrorism exercises to its training program. These exercises vary in
size and scope and are designed to test specific aspects of the Coast
Guard's terrorism response plans, such as communicating with state and
local responders, raising maritime security levels, or responding to
incidents within the port. For each exercise the Coast Guard conducts,
an after-action report detailing the objectives, participants, and
lessons learned must be produced. We reported in January 2005 on the
issues identified in port security exercises. For example, we found
that 59 percent of the exercises raised communications issues, and 28
percent raised concerns with participants' knowledge about who has
jurisdiction or decision-making authority. In April 2007, we reported
that the Coast Guard had conducted a number of exercises of its area
plans over the past several years. For example, in fiscal year 2004,
the Coast Guard conducted 85 port-based terrorism exercises that
addressed a variety of possible scenarios. In August 2005, the Coast
Guard and TSA initiated the Port Security Training Exercise Program--an
exercise program designed to involve the entire port community,
including public governmental agencies and private industry, and
intended to improve connectivity of various surface transportation
modes and enhance area plans. Between August 2005 and October 2007, the
Coast Guard expects to conduct Port Security Training Exercise Program
exercises for 40 area committees and other port stakeholders. For more
information, see GAO-07-754T and Homeland Security: Process for
Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further
Attention, GAO-05-170; DHS updated information: In March and April
2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts to
exercise security, response, and recovery plans with key maritime
stakeholders to enhance security, response, and recovery efforts. DHS
reported that for each exercise the Coast Guard conducts, an after-
action report detailing the objectives, participants, and lessons
learned must be produced within 21 days for non-contract-supported
exercises and within 81 days for contract-supported exercises; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has made progress in exercising security,
response, and recovery plans with key maritime stakeholders to enhance
security, response, and recovery efforts;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Implement a national facility access
control system for port secured areas;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: While DHS has taken steps
to provide for an effective national facility access control system at
ports, significant challenges remain. In September 2006 we identified
several major challenges DHS and industry stakeholders face in
addressing problems identified during Transportation Worker
Identification Credential program testing and ensuring that key
components of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
program can work effectively in the maritime sector, such as ensuring
that the access control technology required to operate the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential program, such as
biometric card readers, works effectively in the maritime sector.
Further, stakeholders at all 15 Transportation Worker Identification
Credential testing locations we visited told us that TSA did not
effectively communicate and coordinate with them regarding any problems
that arose during testing at their facility. In July 2006 the DHS IG
found that significant security vulnerabilities existed relative to the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential prototype systems,
documentation, and program management. Further, the DHS IG reported
that the Transportation Worker Identification Credential prototype
systems were vulnerable to various internal and external security
threats and that security-related issues identified could threaten the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive
Transportation Worker Identification Credential data. In April 2007 we
testified that DHS had made progress toward implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential. We reported, for
example, that DHS had issued a rule that sets forth the requirements
for enrolling and issuing cards to workers in the maritime sector and
developed a schedule for enrolling worker and issuing Transportation
Worker Identification Credential cards at ports; In April 2007 we
reported that the SAFE Port Act contained a requirement for
implementing the first major phase of the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential program by mid-2007. More specifically, it
required DHS to implement Transportation Worker Identification
Credential at the 10 highest risk ports by July 1, 2007; conduct a
pilot program to test various aspects relating to Transportation Worker
Identification Credential security card readers including access
control technologies in the maritime environment; issue regulations
requiring Transportation Worker Identification Credential card readers
based on the findings of the pilot; and periodically report to Congress
on the status of the program. DHS is taking steps to address these
requirements, such as establishing a rollout schedule for enrolling
workers and issuing Transportation Worker Identification Credential
cards at ports and conducting a pilot program to test Transportation
Worker Identification Credential access control technologies. However,
we identified a number of challenges. For example, while DHS reports
taking steps to address contract planning and oversight problems, the
effectiveness of these steps will not be clear until implementation of
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program begins.
Additionally, significant challenges remain in enrolling about 770,000
persons at about 3,500 facilities in the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential program. Sufficient communication and
coordination to ensure that all individuals and organizations affected
by the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program are
aware of their responsibilities will require concerted effort on the
part of DHS and the enrollment contractor. Further DHS and industry
stakeholders need to address challenges regarding Transportation Worker
Identification Credential access control technologies to ensure that
the program is implemented effectively. Without fully testing all
aspects of the technology, DHS may not be able ensure that the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential access control
technology can meet the requirements of the system. For more
information, see GAO-07-754T; Transportation Security: TSA Has Made
Progress in Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential Program, but Challenges Remain, GAO-07-681T; Transportation
Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before Implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, GAO-06-982;
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-05-448T; and Port Security:
Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker
Identification Card Program, GAO-05-106. Also, see Department of
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, DHS Must Address
Significant Security Vulnerabilities Prior to TWIC Implementation
(Redacted), OIG-06-47 (Washington, D.C.: July 2006); DHS updated
information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on
its efforts to implement a national facility access control system for
port secured areas. DHS reported that the Coast Guard is moving forward
with TSA and its contractor to begin enrollments in the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential program. DHS stated that Version 1 of
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential will contain all of
the required biometric information and that a second Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking will be published in February 2008 to address the technical
requirements for readers that will be used at facilities and aboard
vessels. DHS stated that in the meantime, a field test of card reader
technology is scheduled for the Long Beach/Los Angeles port complex
beginning in July 2007 and that this activity is in compliance with the
timeline established in the SAFE Port Act. Further, DHS stated that the
Coast Guard will request legislation requiring all persons who are
deemed to need unescorted access to the secure areas of regulated
vessels and facilities possess a valid Transportation Worker
Identification Credential. DHS also reported that the Coast Guard is
consolidating a number of merchant mariner licenses and documents into
a single Merchant Mariner Credential. This consolidation is described
in a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking that was published in
the Federal Register simultaneously with the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential final rule on January 25, 2007, which will
result in an effective date of March 26, 2007; Our assessment: We
conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation. Although DHS has taken some actions to implement a
national facility access control system for port secured areas, more
work is needed for the department to achieve this performance
expectation. As our previous work demonstrated, DHS faces a number of
problems in implementing the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential, such as ensuring that access control technology meets
system requirements and ensuring sufficient communication and
coordination so that all individuals and organizations affected by the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential program are aware of
their responsibilities. Further, while DHS reported a number of actions
it has taken to meet this expectation, it did not provide us with
documentation for some aspects of its efforts. For example, DHS did not
provide us with documentation showing that it is making progress in
starting enrollments;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Implement a port security grant program to
help facilities improve their security capabilities;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings and our assessment: We
conclude that DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation.
The port security grant program provides assistance to nonfederal
stakeholders for making security improvements at the nation's ports.
During fiscal years 2002 through 2004, grants from the program totaled
about $560 million and covered such concerns as more fencing, cameras,
and communications equipment. For fiscal year 2005, the appropriations
act for DHS provided $150 million for port security grants. For fiscal
year 2006 the DHS appropriations act provided $175 million for the port
security grant program, and in fiscal year 2007 the appropriations act
provided $210 million for the program. While DHS has made progress in
applying risk management to the port security grant program, it faces
challenges in strengthening its approach, as demonstrated in part by
its experience in awarding past grants. For example, DHS has
established overall goals for the grant program but faces challenges in
setting specific and measurable program objectives, in part because
this effort hinges on similar action by other federal agencies. In
February 2006 the DHS IG reported that DHS had improved the
administration and effectiveness of the most recent round of port
security grants, which totaled $142 million for 132 projects. For
example, the DHS IG reported that DHS had directed funds to the
nation's 66 highest risk ports using a risk-based formula and tiering
process and had instituted a new funding allocation model. However, the
DHS IG also found several challenges, identifying, for example, 20
projects that reviewers determined did not meet national security
priorities but were funded nonetheless. In its fiscal year 2006
Performance and Accountability Report, DHS reported that a risk-based
grant allocation process was completed in the third quarter of fiscal
year 2006 and was a critical component of the process by which
allocations were determined for the Port Security Grant Program. For
more information, see Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to
Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other
Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91. Also, see Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General, Follow Up Review of the Port
Security Grant Program, OIG-06-24 (Washington, D.C.: February 2006,
Revised) and Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector
General, Review of the Port Security Grant Program, OIG-05-10
(Washington, D.C.: January 2005);
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 12. Develop a national plan to establish and
improve maritime intelligence;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: We generally have not conducted work
on DHS's efforts to develop a national plan to establish and improve
maritime intelligence, and as a result we cannot make an assessment of
the extent to which DHS has taken actions to address this performance
expectation; DHS updated information: In March and May 2007, DHS
provided us with updated information on its efforts to develop a
national plan to establish and improve maritime intelligence. DHS
reported that the President approved the Global Maritime Intelligence
Integration Plan in October 2005 in support of the National Strategy
for Maritime Security; Our assessment: We did not make an assessment of
DHS's progress in achieving this performance expectation. While DHS
reported that the President approved the Global Maritime Intelligence
Integration Plan, we were not able to determine the extent to which the
plan has established and improved maritime intelligence;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 13. Establish operational centers to monitor
threats and fuse intelligence and operations at the regional/port
level;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has established operational
centers to monitor threats and fuse intelligence and operations at the
regional/port level. In April 2005, we reported that the Coast Guard
had two Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, located on each coast,
that receive intelligence from, and provide intelligence to, the Coast
Guard Intelligence Coordination Center. Maritime Intelligence Fusion
Centers also provide actionable intelligence to Coast Guard commanders
at the district and port levels and share that analysis with
interagency partners. Another approach at improving information sharing
and port security operations involves interagency operational centers--
command centers that bring together the intelligence and operational
efforts of various federal and nonfederal participants. In April 2007,
we reported that three ports currently have such centers, which are
designed to have a unified command structure that can act on a variety
of incidents ranging from possible terrorist attacks to search and
rescue and environmental response operations. Several new interagency
operational centers are about to come on line, but in continuing the
expansion, DHS may face such challenges as creating effective working
relationships and dealing with potential coordination problems. We also
reported that the Coast Guard has the authority to create area
committees--composed of federal, state, local, and industry members--
that help to develop the area plan for the port. Area committees serve
as forums for port stakeholders, facilitating the dissemination of
information through regularly scheduled meetings, issuance of
electronic bulletins, and sharing key documents. As of June 2006, the
Coast Guard had organized 46 area committees. Each has flexibility to
assemble and operate in a way that reflects the needs of its port area,
resulting in variations in the number of participants, the types of
state and local organizations involved, and the way in which
information is shared. The Coast Guard also reported that it had
implemented a maritime monitoring system--known as the Common Operating
Picture system--that fuses data from different sources. According to
the Coast Guard, this system is the primary tool for Coast Guard
commanders in the field to attain maritime domain awareness. For more
information, see GAO-07-754T; Maritime Security: Information sharing
Efforts Are Improving, GAO-06-933T; Maritime Security: New Structures
Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing
Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-394; and GAO-05-448T; DHS updated
information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on
its efforts to establish operational centers to monitor threats and
fuse intelligence and operations at the regional/port level. DHS
reported that at the port level, it is using pre-existing, primarily
Coast Guard, command centers to foster information sharing and
coordination of the operations of various federal and nonfederal
participants. However, DHS noted that in most locations, these efforts
are hampered by the limitations of pre-9/11 technology and physical
space constraints; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally
achieved this performance expectation. The Coast Guard established two
regional Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, one on each coast.
Further, the Coast Guard, with local federal port security
stakeholders, has established three interagency operational centers
with several new centers scheduled to come on line, and as of June
2006, the Coast Guard had organized 46 area committees;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 14. Collect information on incoming ships to
assess risks and threats;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has taken
steps to collect information on incoming ships to assess risks and
threats. This includes information relating to, for example, crew,
passengers, and cargo. In March 2004, we reported that the Coast Guard
had extended the former 24-hour notice of arrival prior to entering a
United States port to 96 hours. The information provided with the
notice of arrival includes details on the crew, passengers, cargo, and
the vessel itself. This increase in notice has enabled the Coast Guard
to screen more vessels in advance of arrival and allows additional time
to prepare for boardings. For more information, see Coast Guard
Programs: Relationship between Resources Used and Results Achieved
Needs to Be Clearer, GAO-04-432;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 15. Develop a vessel-tracking system to
improve intelligence and maritime domain awareness on vessels in U.S.
waters;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has made
progress in developing a vessel-tracking system to improve
intelligence/maritime domain awareness on vessels in U.S. waters. The
Nationwide Automatic Identification System uses a device aboard a
vessel to transmit an identifying signal to a receiver located at the
seaport and other ships in the area. This signal gives seaport
officials and other vessels nearly instantaneous information and
awareness about a vessel's identity, position, speed, and course. The
Coast Guard intends to provide Nationwide Automatic Identification
System coverage to meet maritime domain awareness requirements in all
navigable waters of the United States and farther offshore. As of May
2005, the Coast Guard had Nationwide Automatic Identification System
coverage in several seaports and coastal areas. For more information,
see GAO-05-448T and Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal
Costs and Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification
System, GAO-04-868;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 16. Develop a long-range vessel-tracking
system to improve maritime domain awareness;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: While DHS has taken steps to develop
a long-range vessel-tracking system, more work remains. In May 2005 we
testified that the Coast Guard was working with the International
Maritime Organization to develop functional and technical requirements
for long-range tracking out to 2,000 nautical miles and had proposed an
amendment to the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea for
this initiative. The International Maritime Organization adopted
amendments for the long-range identification and tracking of ships in
May 2006. We have also reported that a recently passed International
Maritime Organization requirement calls for most commercial vessels,
including tankers, to begin transmitting identification and location
information on or before December 31, 2008, to Safety of Life at Sea
contracting governments under certain specified circumstances. This
will allow the vessels to be tracked over the course of their voyages.
Under this requirement, information on the ship's identity, location,
date, and time of the position will be made available to the ship's
flag state, the ship's destination port state, and any coastal state
within 1,000 miles of the ship's route. For more information, see GAO-
05-448T; DHS updated information: In March, April, and June 2007, DHS
provided us with updated information on its efforts to develop a long-
range vessel-tracking system to improve maritime domain awareness. DHS
reported that it has classified and unclassified means available to
perform long-range tracking. DHS stated that unclassified systems,
including the Nationwide Automatic Identification System, are currently
in the process of being fielded. DHS reported that the Nationwide
Automatic Identification System, when implemented, will provide
automatic identification system coverage from commercial satellites in
all U.S. waters and up to 2,000 miles offshore. DHS stated that it
expects initial capability in 2007. DHS also stated that it purchases
tracking data from commercial sources in places where those
capabilities are not currently fielded by the United States Coast
Guard. DHS reported that work is in progress to establish a system
through the International Maritime Organization that will provide an
unclassified global tracking capability by 2008 as a part of an
existing International Maritime Organization convention and give the
United States a system that is compatible and interoperable with the
Global maritime community. DHS reported that the Coast Guard will need
to establish the capability to receive signals and interact with the
International Maritime Organization's international data center and
that the Coast Guard has funded various studies and demonstrations to
address the implementation of long-range-tracking. Further, DHS
reported that the Coast Guard has developed rule-making language that
supports the International Maritime Organization rules regarding
implementation of long-range tracking under the recently approved
Safety of Life at Sea Chapter V. DHS stated that the proposed rule-
making is in final development and is expected to be published for
comment later this year; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has
generally not achieved this performance expectation. DHS has some
vessel-tracking capabilities and is working with the International
Maritime Organization to develop a long-range vessel-tracking system.
However, DHS did not provide evidence that it has developed a long-
range vessel-tracking system out to 2,000 nautical miles;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 17. Collect information on arriving cargo for
screening purposes;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS collects
information on arriving cargo for screening purposes.[A] Pursuant to
federal law, CBP required ocean carriers to electronically transmit
cargo manifests to CBP's Automated Manifest System 24 hours before the
cargo is loaded on a ship at a foreign port. In March 2004 we reported
that according to CBP officials we contacted, although no formal
evaluations had been done, the 24-hour rule was beginning to improve
both the quality and timeliness of manifest information. CBP officials
acknowledged, however, that although improved, manifest information had
not always provided accurate or reliable data for targeting purposes.
For more information see Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model
and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and
Inspection Efforts, GAO-05-557 and 04-577T;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 18. Develop a system for screening and
inspecting cargo for illegal contraband;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings and our assessment: We
conclude that DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation.
DHS has developed a system for screening incoming cargo for illegal
contraband--called the Automated Targeting System.[B] However, our
previous work has identified a number of challenges to the
implementation of this program. CBP employs its Automated Targeting
System computer model to review documentation on all arriving
containers and help select or target containers for additional
scrutiny. The Automated Targeting System was originally designed to
help identify illegal narcotics in cargo containers, but was modified
to help detect all types of illegal contraband used by smugglers or
terrorists. In addition, CBP has a program, called the Supply Chain
Stratified Examination, which supplements the Automated Targeting
System by randomly selecting additional containers to be physically
examined. We identified a number of challenges to the implementation of
the Automated Targeting System. For example, in March 2006 we testified
that CBP did not yet have key controls in place to provide reasonable
assurance that the Automated Targeting System was effective at
targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of
containing smuggled weapons of mass destruction. Further, we reported
that while CBP strove to refine the Automated Targeting System to
include intelligence information it acquires and feedback it receives
from its targeting officers at the seaports, it was not able to
systematically adjust the system for inspection results. In November
2006, the DHS IG reported that national Automatic Targeting System
performance measures were still being developed to determine the
effectiveness of the Automatic Targeting System oceangoing container
targeting system. The DHS IG also found that that CBP did not use all
intelligence/information sources available for targeting purposes. In
April 2007 we reported CBP faced the challenge of implementing the
program while internal controls are being developed. CBP's vital
mission does not allow it to halt its screening efforts while it puts
these controls in place, and CBP thus faces the challenge of ensuring
that it inspects the highest-risk containers even though it lacks
information to optimally allocate inspection resources. For more
information, see GAO-07-754T; Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary
Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated
Targeting System, GAO-06-591T; and Homeland Security: Summary of
Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for
Inspection, GAO-04-557T. Also, see Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Audit of Targeting Oceangoing Cargo
Containers (Unclassified Summary), OIG-07-09 (Washington, D.C.:
November 2006) and Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector
General, Audit of Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers (Unclassified
Summary), OIG-05-26 (Washington, D.C.: July 2005);
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 19. Develop a program to screen incoming cargo
for radiation;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: While DHS has taken steps to develop
a program to screen incoming cargo for radiation, challenges remain.[C]
As of December 2005, DHS had deployed 670 of 3,034 radiation portal
monitors--about 22 percent of the portal monitors DHS plans to deploy.
As of February 2006, CBP estimated that with these deployments CBP had
the ability to screen about 62 percent of all containerized shipments
entering the United States, and roughly 77 percent of all private
vehicles. Within these total percentages, CBP could screen 32 percent
of all containerized seaborne shipments; 90 percent of commercial
trucks and 80 percent of private vehicles entering from Canada; and
approximately 88 percent of all commercial trucks and 74 percent of all
private vehicles entering from Mexico. However, in March 2006 we
reported that the deployment of portal monitors had fallen behind
schedule, making DHS's goal of deploying 3,034 by 2009 unlikely.
Further, in October 2006 we reviewed DHS's cost-benefit analysis for
the deployment and purchase of $1.2 billion worth of new portal
monitors. We found that DHS's cost-benefit analysis did not provide a
sound analytical basis for the decision to purchase and deploy new
portal monitor technology. For example, DHS did not use the results of
its own performance tests in its cost-benefit analysis and instead
relied on assumptions of the new technology's anticipated performance
level. Further, the department's analysis did not include all of the
major costs and benefits required by DHS guidelines. Finally, DHS used
questionable assumptions in estimating the costs of current portal
monitors. In March 2007 we reported that DHS has not yet collected a
comprehensive inventory of testing information on commercially
available polyvinyl toluene portal monitors. Such information--if
collected and used--could improve the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office's understanding of how well portal monitors detect different
radiological and nuclear materials under varying conditions. In turn,
this understanding would assist the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's
future testing, development, deployment, and purchases of portal
monitors. Further, while DHS is improving its efforts to provide
technical and operational information about radiation portal monitors
to state and local authorities, some state representatives with whom we
spoke, particularly those from states with less experience conducting
radiation detection programs, would like to see the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office provide more prescriptive advice on what types of
radiation detection equipment to deploy and how to use it. For more
information, see Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Decision to Procure
and Deploy the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not
Supported by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis, GAO-07-581T;Combating Nuclear
Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the National
Laboratories' Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in Support of
DNDO's Testing and Development Program, GAO-07-347R; Combating Nuclear
Smuggling: DHS's Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New
Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available
Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors' Costs and
Benefits, GAO-07-133R; and Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made
Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-
Entry, but Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389; DHS updated information: In
March and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its
efforts to develop a program to screen incoming cargo for radiation.
DHS reported that the Coast Guard continues to develop the procedures
and capabilities for detecting chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear and high-yield explosive threats in the maritime environment.
DHS reported that through these efforts, the Coast Guard has partnered
with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and reported that it
partnered with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of
Energy, and Department of Defense. DHS stated that the Coast Guard
maintains three dedicated response teams, on call 365 days a year, to
respond to and mitigate various environmental incidents. DHS reported
that the Coast Guard has distributed personal radiation detectors,
hand-held isotope identifiers, and radiation sensor backpacks to the
field, and continues to pursue procurement of additional equipment
through a joint acquisition strategy with Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office. Further, DHS as of March 9, 2007, CBP had deployed 966
radiation portal monitors. DHS stated that these deployments provide
CBP with the capability to screen approximately 91 percent of
containerized cargo and 88 percent of personally owned vehicles
entering the United States. DHS further stated that within these
totals, CBP could screen about 89 percent of seaborne containerized
cargo; 91 percent of commercial trucks and about 81 percent of
personally owned vehicles arriving from Canada; and 96 percent of
commercial trucks and 91 percent of personally owned vehicles arriving
from Mexico; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. In our prior work, we reported
that DHS was unlikely to reach its 2009 goal for radiation portal
deployment. We also reported that in conducting its cost-benefit
analysis of the decision to purchase and deploy new portal monitor
technology, DHS did not include all of the major costs and benefits
required by DHS guidelines and did not use the results of its own
performance tests. The department instead relied on assumptions of the
new technology's anticipated performance level. The lack of adequate
means for acquiring technology is a major impediment to the development
and implementation of the program;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 20. Develop a program to work with foreign
governments to inspect suspicious cargo before it leaves for U.S.
ports;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed a program to work
with foreign governments to inspect suspicious cargo before leaving for
U.S. ports. Announced in January 2002, the Container Security
Initiative program was implemented to allow CBP officials to target
containers at foreign seaports so that any high-risk containers may be
inspected prior to their departure for U.S. destinations. The Security
and Accountability for Every Port Act, which took effect in October
2006, codified the Container Security Initiative. CBP first solicited
the participation of the 20 foreign ports that shipped the highest
volume of ocean containers to the United States. These top 20 ports are
located in 14 countries and regions and shipped a total of 66 percent
of all containers that arrived in U.S. seaports in 2001. CBP has since
expanded the Container Security Initiative to strategic ports, which
may ship lesser amounts of cargo to the United States but may also have
terrorism or geographical concerns. We identified a number of
challenges to the Container Security Initiative. For example, in April
2005 we reported that staffing imbalances were impeding CBP from
targeting all containers shipped from Container Security Initiative
ports before they leave for the United States. However, we reported
that CBP had been unable to staff the Container Security Initiative
teams at the levels called for in the Container Security Initiative
staffing model because of diplomatic and practical considerations. In
terms of diplomatic considerations, the host government may limit the
overall number of U.S. government employees to be stationed in the
country and may restrict the size of the Container Security Initiative
team. In terms of practical considerations, the host governments may
not have enough workspace available for Container Security Initiative
staff and may thus restrict the size of the Container Security
Initiative team. The U.S. Department of State would also have to agree
to the size of the Container Security Initiative teams, a decision that
has to be balanced with the mission priorities of the embassy, the
programmatic and administrative costs associated with increases in
staffing, and security issues related to the number of Americans posted
overseas. We reported that as a result of these staff imbalances, 35
percent of U.S.-bound shipments from Container Security Initiative
ports were not targeted and were therefore not subject to inspection
overseas. We also reported the existence of limitations in one data
source Container Security Initiative teams use for targeting high-risk
containers. In April 2007 we reported that the number of seaports that
participate in the program had grown to 50, with plans to expand to a
total of 58 ports by the end of this fiscal year. We also identified
several challenges to the Container Security Initiative. For example,
we reported that there are no internationally recognized minimum
technical requirements for the detection capability of nonintrusive
inspection equipment used to scan containers. Consequently, host
nations at Container Security Initiative seaports use various types of
nonintrusive inspection equipment, and the detection capabilities of
such equipment can vary. Further, we reported that some containers
designated as high-risk did not receive an inspection at the Container
Security Initiative seaport. Containers designated as high-risk by
Container Security Initiative teams that are not inspected overseas
(for a variety of reasons) are supposed to be referred for inspection
upon arrival at the U.S. destination port. However, CBP officials noted
that between July and September 2004, only about 93 percent of
shipments referred for domestic inspection were inspected at a U.S.
seaport. According to CBP, it is working on improvements in its ability
to track such containers to ensure that they are inspected. We have
ongoing work to further assess the Container Security Initiative. For
more information, see GAO-07-754T; Homeland Security: Key Cargo
Security Programs Can Be Improved, GAO-05-466T; Container Security: A
Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would
Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts, GAO-05-557; Homeland
Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo
Containers for Inspection, GAO-04-557T; and Container Security:
Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to
Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-770. DHS updated information: In March
and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts
to develop a program to work with foreign governments to inspect
suspicious cargo before it leaves for U.S. ports. DHS reported that in
April 2005 the Container Security Initiative began implementing
revisions to the Container Security Initiative staffing model to have
optimal levels of staff at Container Security Initiative ports to
maximize the benefits of targeting and inspection activities, in
conjunction with host nation customs officials, and to increase its
staff at the National Targeting Center in the United States to
complement the work of targeters overseas. DHS stated that this enabled
Container Security Initiative ports to review and screen 100 percent of
manifest information for containers destined to the United States; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. The department has developed a program to work
with foreign governments to inspect suspicious cargo before it leaves
for U.S. ports. DHS has developed the Container Security Initiative,
and the program allows CBP officials to target containers at foreign
seaports for inspection. However, our previous work has identified a
number of challenges to the implementation of this program, such as the
detection capabilities of host nations' inspection equipment.
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 21. Develop a program to work with the private
sector to improve and validate supply chain security;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed a program to work
with the private sector to improve and validate supply chain security,
but some challenges remain. Initiated in November 2001, the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is a voluntary program designed to
improve the security of the international supply chain while
maintaining an efficient flow of goods. Under the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism, CBP officials work in partnership with
private companies to review their supply chain security plans to
improve members' overall security. In return for committing to making
improvements to the security of their shipments by joining the program,
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism members may receive
benefits that result in reduced scrutiny of their shipments. The
Security and Accountability For Every Port Act, which took effect in
October 2006, codified the program. In April 2007, we reported that
since the inception of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism,
CBP has certified 6,375 companies, and as of March 2007, it had
validated the security of 3,950 of them (61.9 percent). We also
reported that while CBP initially set a goal of validating all
companies within their first 3 years as Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism members, the program's rapid growth in membership
made the goal unachievable. CBP then moved to a risk-based approach to
selecting members for validation, considering factors such as the
company having foreign supply chain operations in a known terrorist
area or involving multiple foreign suppliers. CBP further modified its
approach to selecting companies for validation to achieve greater
efficiency by conducting "blitz" operations to validate foreign
elements of multiple members' supply chains in a single trip. Blitz
operations focus on factors such as Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism members within a certain industry, supply chains within a
certain geographic area, or foreign suppliers to multiple Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism members. Risks remain a consideration,
according to CBP, but the blitz strategy drives the decision of when a
member company will be validated. However, we identified a number of
challenges to Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. For example,
CBP's standard for validations--to ensure that members' security
measures are reliable, accurate and effective--is hard to achieve.
Since the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is a voluntary
rather than a mandatory program, there are limits on how intrusive CBP
can be in its validations. Further, challenges developing Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism outcome-based performance measures
persist because of difficulty measuring deterrent effect. CBP has
contracted with the University of Virginia for help in developing
useful measures. We have ongoing work to further assess the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program. For more information, see
GAO-07-754T; Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be
Improved, GAO-05-466T; Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants
Importers Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security,
GAO-05-404; and Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs
Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-
770; DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us
with updated information on its efforts to develop a program to work
with the private sector to improve and validate supply chain security.
For example, DHS reported that the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism program now has a Web based portal system that allows data
storage and statistical tracking of all participants and also allows
for reports to be run ensuring that performance goals are being met.
DHS also stated that the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
reached its full staffing level of 156 Supply Chain Security
Specialists in December of 2006; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. The department has
developed a program to work with the private sector to improve and
validate supply chain security. Through the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism, DHS officials work in partnership with private
companies to improve members' overall security. However, our previous
work has identified a number of challenges to the implementation of
this program. For example, because the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism is a voluntary program, CBP is limited in how
intrusive its validations can be, and CBP also faces challenges in
developing outcome-based performance measures for the program;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 22. Develop standards for cargo containers to
ensure their physical security;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We generally have not
conducted work on DHS's efforts to develop standards to better secure
containers, and as a result we cannot make an assessment of the extent
to which DHS has taken actions to address this performance expectation;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 23. Develop an international port security
program to assess security at foreign ports;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed
a program to assess security at foreign ports. However, our previous
work has identified a number of challenges to the implementation of
this program. To help secure the overseas supply chain, the Maritime
Transportation Security Act required the Coast Guard to develop a
program to assess security measures in foreign ports and, among other
things, recommend steps necessary to improve security measures in their
ports. In April 2007, we reported that the Coast Guard established this
program, called the International Port Security Program, in April 2004.
Under this program, the Coast Guard and host nations review the
implementation of security measures in the host nations' ports against
established security standards, such as the International Maritime
Organization's International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.
Coast Guard teams have been established to conduct country visits,
discuss security measures implemented, and collect and share best
practices to help ensure a comprehensive and consistent approach to
maritime security in ports worldwide. The conditions of these visits,
such as timing and locations, are negotiated between the Coast Guard
and the host nation. Coast Guard officials also make annual visits to
the countries to obtain additional observations on the implementation
of security measures and ensure deficiencies found during the country
visits are addressed. As of April 2007, the Coast Guard reported that
it has visited 86 countries under this program and plans to complete 29
more visits by the end of fiscal year 2007. We are currently conducting
a review of the Coast Guard's international enforcement programs, such
as the International Port Security Program. Although this work is still
in process and not yet ready to be included in this assessment, we have
completed a more narrowly scoped review required under the Security and
Accountability For Every Port Act regarding security at ports in the
Caribbean Basin. As part of this work, we looked at the efforts made by
the Coast Guard in the region under the program and the Coast Guard's
findings from the country visits it made in the region. In this review
we found a number of challenges concerning program implementation. For
example, for the countries in this region for which the Coast Guard had
issued a final report, the Coast Guard reported that most had
"substantially implemented the security code," while one country that
was just recently visited was found to have not yet implemented the
code and will be subject to a reassessment. At the facility level, the
Coast Guard found several facilities needing improvements in areas such
as access controls, communication devices, fencing, and lighting.
Because our review of the Coast Guard's International Port Security
Program is still ongoing, we have not yet reviewed the results of the
Coast Guard's findings in other regions of the world. While our larger
review is still not complete, Coast Guard officials have told us they
face challenges in carrying out this program in the Caribbean Basin.
These challenges include ensuring sufficient numbers of adequately
trained personnel and addressing host nation sovereignty issues. For
more information, see GAO-07-754T and GAO-05-448T;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[A] The terms "inspecting" and "screening" have been used
interchangeably to denote some level of examination of a person or
good, which can entail a number of different actions, including manual
physical inspections to ensure that cargo does not contain weapons,
explosives, or stowaways, or inspections using noninstrusive
technologies that do not require the cargo to be opened in order to be
inspected. However, for this performance expectation, we use the term
"inspect" to refer to this broad range of activities and "screening" to
refer to an assessment of the security risk posed by a container based
on available information.
[B] The terms "inspecting" and "screening" have been used
interchangeably to denote some level of examination of a person or
good, which can entail a number of different actions, including manual
physical inspections to ensure that cargo does not contain weapons,
explosives, or stowaways, or inspections using noninstrusive
technologies that do not require the cargo to be opened in order to be
inspected. However, for this performance expectation, we use the term
"inspect" to refer to this broad range of activities and "screening" to
refer to an assessment of the security risk posed by a container based
on available information.
[C] The terms "inspecting" and "screening" have been used
interchangeably to denote some level of examination of a person or
good, which can entail a number of different actions, including manual
physical inspections to ensure that cargo does not contain weapons,
explosives, or stowaways, or inspections using noninstrusive
technologies that do not require the cargo to be opened in order to be
inspected. For this performance expectation, we use the terms "screen"
and "inspect" to refer to this broad range of activities.
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Limited Progress in Its Emergency Preparedness and
Response Efforts:
Several federal legislative and executive provisions support
preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford
Act)[Footnote 25] primarily establishes the programs and processes for
the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency
assistance to state, local, and tribal governments; individuals; and
qualified private nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has
responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act.
FEMA's emergency preparedness and response efforts include programs
that prepare to minimize the damage and recover from terrorist attacks
and disasters; help to plan, equip, train, and practice needed skills
of first responders; and consolidate federal response plans and
activities to build a national, coordinated system for incident
management. DHS's emergency preparedness and response efforts have been
affected by DHS reorganizations and, in the wake of the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes, reassessments of some initiatives, such as the National
Response Plan and its Catastrophic Incident Supplement. DHS is
undergoing its second reorganization of its emergency preparedness and
response programs in about 18 months. The first reorganization was
initiated by the Secretary of Homeland Security in the summer of 2005
and created separate organizations within DHS responsible for
preparedness and for response and recovery. The second reorganization
was required by the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act and largely
took effect on April 1, 2007.
As shown in table 28, we identified 24 performance expectations for DHS
in the area of emergency preparedness and response and found that
overall DHS has made limited progress in meeting those performance
expectations. In particular, we found that DHS has generally achieved 5
performance expectations and has generally not achieved 18 others. For
1 performance expectation, we did not make an assessment.
Table 28: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Emergency
Preparedness and Response:
Performance expectation: 1. Establish a comprehensive training program
for national preparedness;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Establish a program for conducting
emergency preparedness exercises;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Conduct and support risk assessments and
risk management capabilities for emergency preparedness;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Ensure the capacity and readiness of
disaster response teams;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop a national incident management
system; Assessment:
Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Coordinate implementation of a national
incident management system; Assessment:
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Establish a single, all-hazards national
response plan;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Coordinate implementation of a single, all-
hazards response plan;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Develop a complete inventory of federal
response capabilities;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Develop a national, all-hazards
preparedness goal;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Support citizen participation in national
preparedness efforts;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 12. Develop plans and capabilities to
strengthen nationwide recovery efforts;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 13. Develop the capacity to provide needed
emergency assistance and services in a timely manner;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 14. Provide timely assistance and services to
individuals and communities in response to emergency events;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 15. Implement a program to improve
interoperable communications among federal, state, and local agencies;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 16. Implement procedures and capabilities for
effective interoperable communications; Assessment:
Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 17. Increase the development and adoption of
interoperability communications standards;
Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 18. Develop performance goals and measures to
assess progress in developing interoperability;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 19. Provide grant funding to first responders
in developing and implementing interoperable communications
capabilities;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 20. Provide guidance and technical assistance
to first responders in developing and implementing interoperable
communications capabilities;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 21. Provide assistance to state and local
governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 22. Administer a program for providing grants
and assistance to state and local governments and first responders;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 23. Allocate grants based on assessment
factors that account for population, critical infrastructure, and other
risk factors;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 24. Develop a system for collecting and
disseminating lessons learned and best practices to emergency
responders;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 5;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 18;
Assessment: No assessment made: 1.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 29 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of emergency preparedness and response and our assessment of
whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the
performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to
satisfy most of the performance expectation's key elements (generally
not achieved).
Table 29: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Emergency Preparedness and Response:
Performance expectation: 1. Establish a comprehensive training program
for national preparedness;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has developed and
implemented various training programs, but it is unclear how these
programs contribute or link to a comprehensive training program for
national preparedness. In July 2005, we reported that according to
DHS's National Training and Exercises and Lessons Learned
Implementation Plan, DHS intended to implement a system to develop and
maintain state and local responders' all-hazards capabilities. The goal
of this system was to provide integrated national programs for
training, exercise, and lessons learned that would reorient existing
initiatives at all government levels in order to develop, achieve, and
sustain the capabilities required to achieve the National Preparedness
Goal. As part of this system, DHS intended to implement a national
training program including providing criteria for accreditation of
training courses, a national directory of accredited training
providers, and a National Minimum Qualification Standards Guide. In
March 2006, the DHS IG reported that FEMA provided regular training for
emergency responders at the federal, state, and local levels; managed
the training and development of FEMA employees internally; and provided
disaster-specific training through the Disaster Field Training
Operations cadre. FEMA's Training Division increased the size and
number of classes it delivered, even as budgets decreased. The DHS IG
found that courses provided by the Emergency Management Institute were
one of FEMA's primary interactions with state and local emergency
managers and responders. However, the DHS IG reported that the ability
of Emergency Management Institute classes to improve emergency
management during a hurricane was not quantifiable with available
measurements. The DHS IG reported that employee development lacked the
resources and organizational alignment to improve performance.
Specifically, the DHS IG reported that FEMA had no centralized and
comprehensive information on employee training. FEMA used several
incompatible systems, including databases operated by the Employee
Development branch, Emergency Management Institute, Disaster Field
Training Operations cadre, and information technology security.
Additional classes, including classes provided at conferences, classes
provided by state or local entities, and leadership training courses,
were not consistently tracked. The DHS IG reported that FEMA regional
training managers maintained records on their own, drawing from each of
these systems. The DHS IG concluded that not only was this process
inefficient and susceptible to error, it also complicated efforts to
monitor employee development of mission-critical skills and
competencies. For more information, see Statement by Comptroller
General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R
and Homeland Security: DHS's Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652. Also, see
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); DHS
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to establish a comprehensive
training program for national preparedness. DHS has developed a series
of training programs on the National Response Plan and the National
Incident Management System to improve national preparedness. In
particular, DHS reported that more than 100 Office of Grants and
Training-supported courses are available to emergency responders and
that in fiscal year 2006, there were more than 336,000 participants in
Office of Grants and Training courses. DHS has also developed and
implemented a Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan designed to guide
states in linking training and exercise activities. According to DHS,
states identify priorities in their state strategies, translate them
into target capabilities that they need to build, and then attend a
workshop in which they build a schedule for training and exercises to
address the capabilities. DHS reported that course content in the
National Training Program is being aligned to target capabilities so
that there is a direct link between the capabilities a state needs to
build and the courses that its responders need to take to build those
skills. In addition, DHS reported that the U.S. Fire Administration's
National Fire Academy and FEMA's Emergency Management Institute have
coordinated to develop a curriculum for first responder training across
federal, state, local, and tribal governments and that in fiscal year
2006, more than 26,000 and 13,000 students attended training at the
National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute,
respectively. DHS noted that with the re-creation of the National
Integration Center in FEMA's new National Preparedness Directorate,
FEMA will be coordinating development of a comprehensive national
training strategy to ensure course curriculum is consistent among
training facilities and to avoid duplication or overlap; Our
assessment: Until DHS issues a comprehensive national training
strategy, we conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. Although DHS has developed and implemented a
variety of training programs related to national preparedness,
specifically on the National Response Plan and National Incident
Management System, DHS did not provide us with evidence on how these
various programs have contributed to the establishment of a
comprehensive, national training program. Moreover, DHS reported that
it is working to develop a comprehensive national training strategy,
but did not provide us with a target time frame for completing and
issuing the national strategy;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Establish a program for conducting
emergency preparedness exercises;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has taken actions to
establish a program for conducting emergency preparedness exercises,
but much more work remains. In July 2005 we reported that as part of
its plan for national training, exercises, and lessons learned, DHS
intended to establish a national exercise program. This program was
intended to reorient the existing National Exercise Program to
incorporate the capabilities-based planning process and provide
standardized guidance and methodologies to schedule, design, develop,
execute, and evaluate exercises at all levels of government. This
program was also intended to provide requirements for the number and
type of exercises that communities of varying sizes should conduct to
meet the National Preparedness Goal. In March 2006, the DHS IG reported
on the long-term deterioration in FEMA's exercise program. The DHS IG
reported that emergency management exercises were developed to test and
validate existing programs, policies, plans, and procedures to address
a wide range of disasters to which FEMA must respond. There were
numerous types of exercises, ranging from tabletop exercises, where
participants discussed actions and responses, to command post
exercises, where specific aspects of a situation were exercised, to
large-scale exercises, which involved multiple entities and a
significant planned event with activation of personnel and resources.
Further, the DHS IG reported that FEMA no longer had a significant role
in the development, scope, and conduct of state exercises, though FEMA
personnel maintained a presence at state events. FEMA participated in
exercises administered by other agencies, but those exercises limited
FEMA's ability to choose which plans, objectives, and relationships to
test. For more information, see GAO-06-365R and GAO-05-652. Also, see
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); DHS
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to establish a program for
conducting emergency preparedness exercises. DHS has developed a
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program that, according to DHS,
has been adopted by every major federal agency involved in emergency
preparedness. This program provides a standardized methodology for
exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement
planning and provides guidance and doctrine for exercises that are
conducted with homeland security grant funding. According to DHS, all
exercise grant recipients are mandated to comply with Homeland Security
Exercise Evaluation Program guidelines. DHS reported that for exercises
for which the department collected and analyzed information in fiscal
year 2006, 33 out of 48 Direct Support Exercises were compliant with
the Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program and 40 out of 110
state or locally funded grant exercises were compliant. DHS noted that
it has not evaluated regional and national exercises' compliance with
the Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program. DHS has also
developed a Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program Toolkit,
which is an online system that walks users through scheduling,
planning, evaluating, and tracking corrective actions from an exercise.
DHS has also developed the Corrective Action Program to track and
monitor corrective actions following exercises and the National
Exercise Schedule to facilitate the scheduling and synchronization of
national, federal, state, and local exercises. In addition, DHS
reported that the National Exercise Program charter was approved by the
Homeland Security Council, and DHS reported that the National Exercise
Program Implementation Plan has been approved by the President and is
scheduled to be released shortly; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. The National
Exercise Program charter has been established and approved. Moreover,
DHS has developed and begun to implement the Homeland Security Exercise
Evaluation Program. This program provides standardized guidance and
methodologies for scheduling, developing, executing, and evaluating
emergency preparedness exercises;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Conduct and support risk assessments and
risk management capabilities for emergency preparedness;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken actions to support
efforts to conduct risk assessments and develop risk management
capabilities for emergency preparedness, but much more work remains. In
July 2005 we reported that, according to DHS's Assessment and Reporting
Implementation Plan, DHS intended to implement an assessment and
reporting system to collect preparedness data to inform decision makers
at all levels on the capabilities of the federal government, states,
local jurisdictions, and the private sector. According to the plan, DHS
intended to collect data from all governmental recipients of direct
funding, using states to collect data from local jurisdictions and
using federal regulatory agencies and other appropriate sources to
collect private sector data. According to DHS, aggregating these data
at all levels would provide information needed to allocate resources,
execute training and exercises, and develop an annual status report on
the nation's preparedness. The purpose of the assessment and reporting
system was to provide information about the baseline status of national
preparedness and to serve as the third stage of DHS's capability-based
planning approach to ensure that state and local first responder
capabilities fully support the National Preparedness Goal. For more
information, see Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles
to Guide Federal Investments, GAO-07-386T and GAO-05-652; DHS updated
information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on
its efforts to conduct and support risk assessments and risk management
capabilities for emergency preparedness. In particular, in April 2007,
DHS established the new Office of Risk Management and Analysis to serve
as the DHS Executive Agent for national-level risk management analysis
standards and metrics; develop a standardized approach to risk; develop
an approach to risk management to help DHS leverage and integrate risk
expertise across components and external stakeholders; assess DHS risk
performance to ensure programs are measurably reducing risk; and
communicate DHS risk management in a manner that reinforces the risk-
based approach; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. DHS did not provide us with
documentation on its efforts to actually conduct risk assessments and
support risk management capabilities specifically for emergency
preparedness. Moreover, DHS has only recently established the new
Office of Risk Management and Analysis, and this office's effect on
DHS's efforts to support risk management capabilities for emergency
preparedness is not yet known;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Ensure the capacity and readiness of
disaster response teams;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has faced challenges
in ensuring the capacity and readiness of emergency response teams. In
our work reviewing the response to Hurricane Katrina, we reported that
while there were aspects that worked well, it appeared that logistics
systems for critical resources were often totally overwhelmed by the
hurricane, with critical resources apparently not available, properly
distributed, or provided in a timely manner. We also reported that the
magnitude of the affected population in a major catastrophe calls for
greater capabilities for disaster response. In March 2006, the DHS IG
reported that, historically, FEMA has established a 72-hour time period
as the maximum amount of time for emergency response teams to arrive on
scene. However, the DHS IG concluded that it was unclear whether this
was responsive to the needs of a state and the needs of disaster
victims. The DHS IG reported that a 72-hour response time did not meet
public expectations, as was vividly demonstrated by media accounts
within 24 hours after landfall of Hurricane Katrina. The DHS IG noted
that shorter time periods, such as 60 hours, 48 hours, or even 12
hours, had been mentioned. However, to meet this level of expectation,
several factors had to be addressed. According to the DHS IG, once
strategic performance measures and realistic expectations were
established, other actions could be taken to support those response
goals. For more information, see GAO-06-365R. Also, see Department of
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, A Performance Review of
FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina,
OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); DHS updated information: In
March and May 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its
efforts to ensure the capacity and readiness of disaster response
teams. DHS reported that FEMA has completed efforts to identify and
categorize more than 100 resources, including teams and pieces of
equipment, which are then grouped into eight disciplines, such as law
enforcement resources, emergency medical services, and search and
rescue resources. DHS also provided information on its various disaster
response teams currently in use. DHS's Emergency Response Teams-
National are to be deployed in response to incidents of national
significance and major disasters to coordinate disaster response
activities, coordinate and deploy key national response assets and
resources, provide situational awareness, and maintain connectivity
with DHS operations centers and components. DHS's Emergency Response
Teams-Advanced are designed to be deployed in the early phases of an
incident to work directly with states to assess disaster impact, gain
situational awareness, help coordinate disaster response, and respond
to specific state requests for assistance. DHS's Rapid Needs Assessment
Teams are small regional teams that are designed to collect disaster
information to determine more specific disaster response requirements.
In addition, Federal Incident Response Support Teams are designed to
serve as the forward component of Emergency Response Teams-Advanced to
provide preliminary on-scene federal management in support of the local
Incident or Area Commander. DHS has established readiness indicators
for the Federal Incident Response Support Teams and Urban Search and
Rescue teams have their own indicators, but FEMA officials stated that
they have not yet developed readiness indicators for other types of
response teams. DHS reported that its Federal Incident Response Teams
were tested during Tropical Storm Ernesto and other events, such as
tornadoes. In addition, FEMA reported that it is developing a concept
for new rapidly deployable interagency incident management teams
designed to provide a forward federal presence to facilitate managing
the national response for catastrophic incidents, called National
Incident Management and Regional Incident Management Teams; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. Although DHS provided us with documentation on
its various response teams and efforts taken to strengthen teams'
readiness and capacity, DHS did not provide us with concrete evidence
to demonstrate that response teams' readiness and capacity have
improved since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although DHS has tested its
response team capabilities in several small-scale disasters, they have
not been tested in a large-scale disaster. In addition, DHS did not
provide us with documentation of the results of exercises, tests, or
after-action reports on the small-scale disasters in which the response
teams have been used that would indicate enhancements in teams'
readiness and capacity. Moreover, DHS has not yet developed readiness
indicators for its disaster responses teams other than Urban Search and
Rescue and Federal Incident Response Support Teams;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop a national incident management
system;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed a national
incident management system. The National Incident Management System is
a policy document that defines roles and responsibilities of federal,
state, and local first responders during emergency events. The intent
of the system described in the document is to establish a core set of
concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes to
enable effective, efficient, and collaborative emergency event
management at all levels. These concepts, principles, and processes are
designed to improve the ability of different jurisdictions and first
responder disciplines to work together in various areas--command,
resource management, training, and communications. For more
information, see Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership,
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the
Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
System, GAO-06-618 and GAO-05-652; DHS updated information: In March
and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on efforts to
further develop the National Incident Management System. DHS reported
that the National Incident Management System has been undergoing review
and revision by federal, state, and local government officials; tribal
authorities; and nongovernmental and private sector authorities.
According to DHS, the National Incident Management System document is
under review pending release of the revised National Response Plan, now
the National Response Framework. The current version of the National
Incident Management System document remains in effect during the 2007
hurricane season; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed the National
Incident Management System, and the system defines the roles and
responsibilities of various entities during emergency events;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Coordinate implementation of a national
incident management system;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: Much more work remains for DHS to
effectively coordinate implementation of the National Incident
Management System. Drawing on our prior work identifying key practices
for helping to enhance and sustain collaboration among federal
agencies, key practices for collaboration and coordination include,
among other things, defining and articulating a common outcome;
establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies to achieve the
outcome; identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources;
agreeing upon agency roles and responsibilities; establishing
compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across
agency boundaries; developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and
report the results of collaborative efforts; and reinforcing agency
accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and
reports. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 requires all
federal departments and agencies to adopt and use the system in their
individual preparedness efforts, as well as in support of all actions
taken to assist state and local governments. However, in our work on
Hurricane Katrina, we reported on examples of how an incomplete
understanding of the National Incident Management System roles and
responsibilities led to misunderstandings, problems, and delays. In
Louisiana, for example, some city officials were unclear about federal
roles. In Mississippi, we were told that county and city officials were
not implementing the National Incident Management System because they
did not understand its provisions. For more information, see GAO-06-618
and GAO-05-652; DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS
provided us with updated information on efforts to coordinate
implementation of the National Incident Management System. DHS reported
that in March 2004, it established the National Incident Management
System Integration Center to coordinate implementation of the system.
This center issues compliance guidelines to state and local responders
annually and collects data on efforts to coordinate implementation of
the National Incident Management System. DHS reported that more than 1
million state and local responders have taken training following
guidelines established by the center for National Incident Management
System compliance and that about 5.4 million students have received
National Incident Management System-required training through the
Emergency Management Institute as of February 2007. DHS also reported
that the center, in conjunction with the Emergency Management
Institute, released seven new National Incident Management System
training programs in fiscal year 2006, including courses on multiagency
coordination, public information systems, and resource management,
among others. DHS has also developed sample National Incident
Management System-compliant tabletop, functional, and command post
exercises for use by federal, state, and local government agencies in
testing system policies, plans, procedures, and resources in emergency
operations plans. In addition, the National Incident Management System
specifies 34 requirements that state and local governments must meet to
be compliant with the system, and as of October 1, 2006, all federal
preparedness assistance administered by DHS became contingent on
states' compliance with the system, including federal funding through
the DHS Emergency Management Performance Grants, Homeland Security
Grant Program, and Urban Area Security Initiative. DHS reported that
during fiscal years 2005 and 2006, National Incident Management System
requirements, including the completion of training, were based on a
self-certification process. For fiscal year 2007, DHS reported that the
self-certification process will not be used; rather DHS provided states
a specific set of metrics for implementation of the National Incident
Management System, and states are required to report on the
establishment of these measurements; Our assessment: We conclude that
DHS has generally not achieved this performance expectation. In fiscal
years 2005 and 2006, states self-certified that they had met National
Incident Management System requirements, and DHS has not fully verified
the extent to which states were compliant with system requirements
during those years. DHS has provided states with a specific set of
metrics for fiscal year 2007, but the extent to which these metrics
will enhance DHS's ability to monitor states' compliance with the
National Incident Management System is not yet known. In addition,
although DHS has taken actions, such as issuing compliance guidelines,
providing training, developing sample exercises, and collecting data on
implementation of the National Incident Management System, DHS did not
provide us with documentation demonstrating how these actions have
contributed to DHS's effective coordination of implementation of the
system. For example, DHS did not provide us with documentation on how
these training and exercise programs have contributed to ensuring
effective coordination of National Incident Management System
implementation;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Establish a single, all-hazards national
response plan;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has established a single all-
hazards national response plan, but the plan is undergoing revision. In
December 2004, DHS issued the National Response Plan, which was
intended to be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a
single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic
incidents where federal involvement is necessary. The National Response
Plan is applicable to incidents that go beyond the state and local
levels and require a coordinated federal response, and the plan,
operating within the framework of the National Incident Management
System, provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy
and operational direction for domestic incident management. The plan
also includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex, which describes an
accelerated, proactive national response to catastrophic incidents. DHS
revised the National Response Plan following Hurricane Katrina, but we
reported that these revisions did not fully address, or they raised
new, challenges faced in implementing the plan. For more information,
see GAO-06-618; DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided
us with updated information on efforts to establish an all-hazards
national response plan. DHS reported that the National Response Plan is
currently undergoing review and revision by federal, state, and local
government officials; tribal authorities; and nongovernmental and
private sector officials. According to DHS, this review includes all
major components of the National Response Plan, including the base
plan, Emergency Support Functions, annexes, and the role of the
Principal Federal Official, Federal Coordinating Officer, and Joint
Field Office Structure. A Catastrophic Planning Work Group is examining
the Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement. DHS noted that this
review is being conducted in four phases, with the first phase focused
on prioritization of key issues, the second phase focused on the
rewriting process, the third phase focused on releasing the revised
documents, and the fourth phase focused on providing a continuous cycle
of training, exercises, and periodic reviews. DHS reported that, as of
March 2007, it was in the rewriting phase and has gathered input on key
issues from internal and external stakeholders, after-action reports,
Hurricane Katrina reports, and other resources. According to DHS, the
revised document is renamed the National Response Framework and was
released to internal stakeholders for review at the end of July 2007.
Based on the review, edits and updates will be made to the document
prior to its anticipated release on August 20, 2007 for a 30 day public
comment period. DHS reported that the current version of the National
Response Plan document remains in effect during the 2007 hurricane
season; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. DHS issued the National Response
Plan and a limited post-Katrina revision in May 2006, but we and others
have identified concerns with those revisions. DHS also recognized the
need for a more in-depth, substantive review and revision of the plan
and expects to issue the latest revision in August 2007. DHS has
acknowledged that some complex issues have taken more time than
expected to assess and resolve. The changes made to the plan may affect
roles and responsibilities under the plan and federal, state, and local
agencies' training, exercises, and implementation plans. Until the
National Response Plan and its annexes and Catastrophic Supplement are
completed and distributed to all those with roles and responsibilities
under the plan, federal agencies and others that have new or amended
responsibilities under the revised plan cannot complete their
implementation plans and the agreements needed to make the National
Response Plan, its annexes, and supplements fully operational;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Coordinate implementation of a single, all-
hazards response plan;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: Much more work remains
for DHS to effectively coordinate implementation of the National
Response Plan. Drawing on our prior work identifying key practices for
helping to enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies,
key practices for collaboration and coordination include, among other
things, defining and articulating a common outcome; establishing
mutually reinforcing or joint strategies to achieve the outcome;
identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources; agreeing upon
agency roles and responsibilities; establishing compatible policies,
procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries;
developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of
collaborative efforts; and reinforcing agency accountability for
collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports. In March 2006,
the DHS IG reported on FEMA's disaster management activities in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina. The DHS IG reported that during the
response, several significant departures from National Response Plan
protocols occurred: (1) DHS's actions to apply National Response Plan
protocols for Incidents of National Significance and catastrophic
incidents were ambiguous; (2) DHS defined a new, operational role for
the Principal Federal Officer by assigning the officer both Federal
Coordinating Officer and Disaster Recovery Manager authorities; and (3)
the Interagency Incident Management Group took an operational role not
prescribed in the National Response Plan. As a backdrop to these
changes, the DHS IG reported that FEMA had not yet developed or
implemented policies and training for roles and responsibilities
necessary to supplement the National Response Plan. In reviewing DHS's
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we also identified numerous
weaknesses in efforts to implement the plan. For example, in the
response to Hurricane Katrina, we reported in September 2006 that there
was confusion regarding roles and responsibilities under the plan. DHS
revised the National Response Plan following Hurricane Katrina, but we
reported that these revisions did not fully address, or they raised
new, challenges faced in implementing the plan. For more information,
see GAO-06-618. Also, see Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General, A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management
Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington,
D.C.: March 2006); DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided
us with updated information on efforts to coordinate implementation of
the National Response Plan. DHS reported that it developed and released
training programs to support the National Response Plan and that this
training has been required as a condition of certification of National
Incident Management System compliance by state and local governments.
DHS also reported that it is revising the National Response Framework
and intends to release the revised plan in August 2007; Our assessment:
We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation. DHS did not provide us with documentation on how its
training programs have contributed overall to the department's efforts
to coordinate implementation of the National Response Plan and could
not demonstrate to us that the department has made progress in
improving its ability to coordinate plan implementation since Hurricane
Katrina. As we previously stated, the revised National Response Plan
may require changes in federal, state, and local agencies' training,
exercises, and implementation plans. It is also unclear how the revised
plan will be implemented by states and first responders during the
coming hurricane season, given that these entities will not have had an
opportunity to train and practice under the revised version of the
plan. We are concerned that if the revisions are not completed prior to
the beginning of the 2007 hurricane season, it is unlikely that the
changes resulting from these revisions could be effectively implemented
for the 2007 hurricane season;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Develop a complete inventory of federal
response capabilities;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has undertaken efforts related
to development of an inventory of federal response capabilities, but
did not provide us with evidence on the extent to which its efforts
have resulted in the development of a complete inventory. In July 2005
we reported that DHS began the first stage of the capabilities-based
planning process identifying concerns using 15 National Planning
Scenarios that were developed by the Homeland Security Council. As it
moved to the step in the process of developing a sense of preparedness
needs and potential capabilities, DHS created a list of tasks that
would be required to manage each of the 15 National Planning Scenarios.
Then, in consultation with federal, state, and local emergency response
stakeholders, it consolidated the list to eliminate redundancies and
create a Universal Task List of over 1,600 discrete tasks. Next, DHS
identified target capabilities that encompassed these critical tasks.
From this universe of potential tasks, DHS worked with stakeholders to
identify a subset of about 300 critical tasks that must be performed
during a large-scale event to reduce loss of life or serious injuries,
mitigate significant property damage, or are essential to the success
of a homeland security mission. The final step of the first stage of
DHS's planning process was to decide on goals, requirements, and
metrics. To complete this step, DHS, working with its stakeholders,
developed a Target Capabilities List that identified 36 capabilities
needed to perform the critical tasks for the events illustrated by the
15 scenarios. In December 2005, DHS issued an updated version of the
Target Capabilities List. For more information, see GAO-05-652; DHS
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to develop a complete inventory of
federal response capabilities. For example, the Catastrophic Incident
Supplement of the National Response Plan has been approved and includes
identified specific capabilities from federal agencies that will be
deployed according to a specified time frame in the event of a
catastrophic incident (the Supplement may be revised based on the
ongoing review of the National Response Plan and its annexes and
supplements). DHS also reported that the National Incident Management
System Incident Response Information System is currently undergoing
development and testing. When testing is complete, the system will be
provided to all federal agencies involved in the National Response Plan
for collection of their inventory of National Incident Management
System-typed resources. DHS reported that it is preparing to issue
information to federal agencies that are signatories to the National
Response Plan for agencies' use in creating an inventory of their
resources. According to DHS, the database of these resources and
capabilities is expected to be operational by the end of 2007. At this
point, however, FEMA officials told us that the department does not
have one comprehensive inventory of response capabilities. In addition,
DHS reported that the Common Operating Picture Function in the Homeland
Security Information Network serves as a communication tool that allows
the DHS National Operations Center to gain real-time situational
awareness of disaster response. During disaster response operations,
automated reporting templates are populated by appropriate federal
departments and agencies as specified under the National Response Plan;
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has taken a variety of steps to develop a
complete inventory of federal response capabilities, including
finalizing the National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement.
DHS is also taking steps to develop the National Incident Management
System Incident Response Information System, but has not yet released
the system. While DHS provided us with information on its various tools
for identifying and specifying federal capabilities that will be
deployed in the event of an incident, DHS reported that it does not yet
have a complete inventory of all federal capabilities; Assessment:
Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Develop a national, all-hazards
preparedness goal;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed an interim,
national, all-hazards preparedness goal, but has not yet issued a final
version of the goal. The December 2005 version of the National
Preparedness Goal defines both the 37 major capabilities that first
responders should possess to prevent, protect from, respond to, and
recover from a wide range of incidents and the most critical tasks
associated with these capabilities. We reported that an inability to
effectively perform these critical tasks would, by definition, have a
detrimental impact on effective protection, prevention, response, and
recovery capabilities. For more information, see GAO-06-618 and GAO-05-
652; DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported to us that
public release of the final National Preparedness Goal was imminent,
but did not provide us with a target time frame for issuing the final
version of the goal. DHS officials noted that the department has worked
with various federal, state, and local entities to develop, review, and
get approval of the final National Preparedness Goal; Our assessment:
Until the final version of the National Preparedness Goal is issued, we
conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation. Although DHS has developed and issued an interim National
Preparedness Goal, it has not yet issued a final version of the goal
and did not provide a target time frame for doing so. Issuing a final
version of the goal is important for finalizing the major capabilities
required of first responders in preparing for and responding to various
incidents;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Support citizen participation in national
preparedness efforts;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We have not completed
work on DHS's efforts to support citizen participation in national
preparedness efforts, and DHS did not provide us with information on
its actions to meet this performance expectation. As a result, we
cannot make an assessment of DHS's progress for this performance
expectation;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 12. Develop plans and capabilities to
strengthen nationwide recovery efforts;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has faced challenges
in developing plans and capabilities needed to strengthen nationwide
recovery efforts.[A] In February 2006 we reported that beginning and
sustaining community and economic recovery, including restoring a
viable tax base for essential services, calls for immediate steps so
residents can restore their homes and businesses. Removing debris and
restoring essential gas, electric, oil, communications, water, sewer,
transportation and transportation infrastructure, other utilities, and
services such as public health and medical support are vital to
recovery and rebuilding. However, these recovery efforts in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina were hindered by various factors,
including the magnitude and scope of the hurricane. For more
information, see GAO-06-365R; DHS updated information: In March and May
2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts to
develop plans and capabilities to strengthen nationwide recovery
efforts. DHS and the American Red Cross developed the National
Sheltering System to provide a Web-based data system to support shelter
management and reporting and identification activities. DHS also issued
a recovery strategy for mass sheltering and housing assistance in June
2006 to address contingencies for providing sheltering and housing
assistance for declared emergencies and major disasters. FEMA also
developed a Web-based Housing Portal to consolidate available rental
resources for evacuees from federal agencies, private organization, and
individuals. In addition, DHS reported making enhancements to its
debris removal processes by, for example, adjusting its debris removal
policy to ensure cost sharing for federal contracting, establishing a
list of debris removal contractors, and developing guidance for local
government debris removal contractors. DHS reported that an interagency
work group, initiated in 2005, is working to develop federal
contaminated debris policy and operational procedure guidance. In
addition, FEMA officials noted that the agency is using a cost
estimating format to capture all costs for construction projects by
taking into account allowances for uncertainties in the construction
process; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. DHS did not provide us with
documentation on how its various initiatives have contributed overall
to develop the department's capabilities to strengthen nationwide
recovery efforts. DHS has taken steps to develop plans, policies, and
guidance for recovery efforts. However, DHS did not provide us with
evidence of its capabilities for recovery efforts;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 13. Develop the capacity to provide needed
emergency assistance and services in a timely manner;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has faced
difficulties in developing the capacity to provide emergency services
and assistance in a timely manner and has not provided us with
documentation to demonstrate that it has effectively met this
performance expectation. The various reports and our own work on FEMA's
performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina suggested that
FEMA's human, financial, and technological resources and capabilities
were insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the unprecedented
degree of damage and the resulting number of hurricane victims. Our
work pointed out that the National Response Plan did not specify the
proactive means or capabilities the federal government should use to
conduct damage assessments and gain situational awareness when the
responsible state and local officials were overwhelmed. As a result,
response efforts were hampered by the federal government's failure to
fully use its available assets to conduct timely, comprehensive damage
assessments in Louisiana and Mississippi. With regard to logistics, our
work and that of others indicated that logistics systems--the
capability to identify, dispatch, mobilize, and demobilize and to
accurately track and record available critical resources throughout all
incident management phases--were often totally overwhelmed by Hurricane
Katrina. Critical resources were not available, properly distributed,
or provided in a timely manner. The result was duplication of
deliveries, lost supplies, or supplies never being ordered. Reviews of
acquisition efforts indicated that while these efforts were noteworthy
given the scope of Hurricane Katrina, agencies needed additional
capabilities to (1) adequately anticipate requirements for needed goods
and services (2) clearly communicate responsibilities across agencies
and jurisdictions and (3) deploy sufficient numbers of personnel to
provide contractor oversight. For more information, see Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the Individuals and
Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed to Reduce Such
Problems in the Future, GAO-06-1013, and GAO-06-618. Also, see
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); DHS
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to develop the capacity to provide
needed emergency assistance and services in a timely manner. For
example, DHS reported that FEMA and the American Red Cross have
developed and improved methods to better identify and more quickly
assist individuals evacuated to a shelter, including developing and
implementing methods to identify and reunify missing and separated
family members during a disaster. DHS reported that it has developed
interim guidance regarding sending FEMA registration intake staff to
Red Cross management shelters following a disaster and plan to refine a
formal standard operating procedure for this activity. DHS also
reported that it is pursuing contract and contingency surge
capabilities that will allow for the rapid expansion of FEMA's
registration intake capacity of up to 200,000 people per day. (FEMA
surpassed 100,000 registrations per day following Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita.) FEMA has also reported tripling its daily home inspection
capacity through contracted firms from 7,000 to 20,000 per day.
Furthermore, FEMA reported that it is working with federal, state, and
local partners to provide mass evacuee support planning to assist state
and local governments in planning and preparing for hosting of large
displaced populations. As part of these efforts, FEMA reported that it
is working to develop an evacuee registration and tracking capability,
implementation plans for federal evacuation support to states, and
emergency sheltering guidance and planning assistance for potential
host states and communities. FEMA reported that it plans to have a Mass
Evacuation Management Unit operational by January 2008 and the National
Mass Evacuation Registration and Tracking System operational once
requirements are fully developed. In addition, DHS reported making
enhancements to its logistics capabilities. For example, DHS has
developed an Internet-based system that provides FEMA with the ability
to manage its inventory and track the location of trailers carrying
commodities. DHS officials also reported that the department is
undertaking an optimization planning initiative to, among other things,
identify best locations for logistics centers, but this planning effort
is still in its early stages. DHS also reported that its Pre-Positioned
Disaster Supply and Pre-Positioned Equipment Program provides equipment
and supplies to emergency responders. DHS reported that its Mobile
Emergency Response Support Detachments are equipped with communications
capabilities to provide communication, logistics, operations, and power
support for emergency responders and disaster victims; Our assessment:
We conclude that DHS generally has not achieved this performance
expectation. Although DHS has taken actions to strengthen its capacity
to provide emergency services and assistance, more work remains for DHS
to achieve this performance expectation. For example, although DHS has
reported making improvements to its logistics capabilities, its
optimization planning efforts are still in the preliminary stages.
Moreover, DHS did not provide us with documentation on how it
determined requirements for the prepositioning of disaster supplies and
equipment to assess whether FEMA has achieved its intended capacity.
Furthermore, although DHS reported that it is working to develop
various emergency assistance capabilities, such as evacuee
registration, DHS generally did not provide us with documentation
showing that these capabilities are currently in place and can provide
needed services in a timely and accurate manner following an incident.
In addition, none of DHS initiatives appear to have been tested on a
scale that reasonably simulates the conditions and demand they would
face following a major or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is difficult
to assess the probable results of these initiatives in improving
response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as a category 4 or 5
hurricane;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 14. Provide timely assistance and services to
individuals and communities in response to emergency events;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has faced
difficulties in providing assistance and services to individuals and
communities in a timely manner, particularly in response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. For example, each of the assessments of the federal
government's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita we reviewed
identified problems in FEMA's implementation of the Individuals and
Households Program during and after the storms. Our review and our
assessment of these reports showed that the agency's efforts to
implement the program were hindered by a lack of planning, trained
staff, and program limitations, despite its new and revised approaches
for implementing the program. More broadly, we reported that although
controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources
are used appropriately, during a catastrophic disaster decision makers
struggle with the tension between implementing controls and
accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and
recovery assistance. On one hand, our work found many examples where
quick action could not occur due to procedures that required extensive,
time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital supplies and
other assistance. On the other hand, we also found examples where
FEMA's processes under assistance programs to disaster victims left the
federal government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited
assistance payments. We estimate that through February 2006, FEMA made
about $600 million to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially
fraudulent payments to applicants who used invalid information to apply
for expedited cash assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of
actions that are to be in effect for the hurricane season so that
federal recovery programs would have more capacity to rapidly handle a
catastrophic incident but also provide accountability. Examples include
significantly increasing the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such
as food, ice, and water; placing global positioning systems on supply
trucks to track their location and better manage the delivery of
supplies; an enhanced phone system for victim assistance applications
that can handle up to 200,000 calls per day; and improved computer
systems and processes for verifying the eligibility of those applying
for assistance. We reported that effective implementation of these and
other planned improvements would be critical to achieving their
intended outcomes. In March 2006, the DHS IG reported that while FEMA
made major efforts to coordinate with other agencies and improve its
ability to provide housing resources in its response to Hurricane
Katrina, some of its efforts were more effective than others. For
example, the DHS IG reported that FEMA and the Red Cross experienced
difficulty in identifying the number and location of evacuees because
both held different expectations for coordinating the mass care
function. FEMA was slow in identifying and establishing its direct
housing mission, so alternative housing resources, such as cruise
ships, were initially used. Also, it was hard for FEMA to staff its
Disaster Recovery Centers with experienced personnel, according to the
DHS IG. In addition, the DHS IG reported that during the response to
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA provided record levels of support to victims
and emergency responders. Life-saving and life-sustaining commodities
and equipment were delivered to the affected areas; personnel increased
significantly in a short period of time to support response efforts and
provide assistance to victims; and assistance was provided quickly in
record amounts, sometime through innovative means. However, a lack of
asset visibility in the resource-ordering process, inexperienced and
untrained personnel, unreliable communications, and insufficient
internal management controls demonstrated a continued need for
improvement in how FEMA responds and delivers assistance, according to
the DHS IG. For more information, see GAO-06-618, GAO-06-1013, and GAO-
06-652. Also, see Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector
General, A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities
in Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March
2006); DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided
us with updated information on its efforts to provide timely assistance
and services to individuals and communities in response to emergency
events. For example, FEMA reported that it has developed new policies
to ensure that all types of temporary housing options are able to be
provided for displaced applicants with physical disabilities. FEMA also
reported that it has developed updated policies to improve and expedite
determination of applicant eligibility for the Individuals and
Households Program and Expedited Assistance and has clarified policy on
the appropriate authorization and use of emergency sheltering funds and
individual housing assistance funds for disaster victims. DHS also
reported taking steps to implement stronger controls in its
registration and application processes for disaster assistance
programs. For example, DHS reported deploying a new Internet
registration application that does not allow duplicate registrations,
adding identity proofing controls to the call center registration
application for the Individuals and Households Program, and flagging
applications in FEMA's database that fail identity proofing, are not
residential addresses, or include at-risk Social Security numbers. In
addition, DHS reported that it has five Mobile Registration Intake
Centers that can be deployed to provide an on-site mechanism for
disaster victims to register for FEMA assistance. According to DHS,
these mobile centers have been tested several times, including in June
2006, in August 2006 during Tropical Storm Ernesto, and in April 2007.
DHS reported that issues were identified during the earlier tests that
indicated that improvements were needed, but noted that these issues
have been resolved; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally
not achieved this performance expectation. Although DHS reported taking
actions to provide timely assistance to individuals and communities,
with appropriate safeguards against fraud and abuse, DHS did not
provide us with documentation to demonstrate that these steps have
improved the department's provision of assistance and services. For
example, DHS did not provide us with documentation on the results of
its provision of assistance and services to individuals affected by
emergency incidents and disasters since 2006. Furthermore, DHS did not
provide with results of tests or exercises of its emergency assistance
and service capabilities. For example, although DHS stated that it has
resolved issues identified during tests of its Mobile Registration
Intake Centers, DHS did not provide us with information on these issues
or evidence that the issues have actually been resolved;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 15. Implement a program to improve
interoperable communications among federal, state, and local agencies;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has faced challenges in
implementing a program to improve interoperable communications among
federal, state, and local agencies. While DHS has implemented a
program, referred to as SAFECOM, to improve interoperable
communications, our past work showed that problems defining the scope,
establishing performance goals and standards, and defining the roles of
federal, state, local government and other entities were the three
principal challenges to achieving effective interoperable
communications for first responders. In April 2007 we reported that
while SAFECOM is intended to improve interoperable communications at
all levels of government, the objectives that the program has been
working toward do not include improving interoperability between
federal agencies and state and local agencies. For example, when
conducting their baseline national survey of first responders to
determine the current level of interoperability, program officials
included state and local officials, but not federal officials. The
survey included an extensive list of questions in which respondents
were asked to rate interoperability (1) with other disciplines, (2)
with other jurisdictions, and (3) between state and local governments.
Respondents were also asked at the end of the survey to list federal
agencies they interoperate with; however, no effort was made to gauge
the level of interoperability with the federal government, as had been
done for other disciplines and jurisdictions and between state and
local governments. In lieu of having communications systems that enable
direct interoperability between federal first responders and state and
local first responders, first responders have resorted to alternative
means of communicating. For example, state or local agencies may loan
radios to federal first responders or physically pair a federal first
responder with a state or local responder so they can share information
and relay it back to their agencies. While approaches such as these may
be effective in certain situations, they can reflect a general lack of
planning for communications interoperability. We reported that using
"work-arounds" such as these could reduce the efficiency and
effectiveness of the overall public safety response to an incident.
SAFECOM officials stated that the program's focus has been on state and
local agencies because they consider them to be a higher priority.
Further, while they stated that it would be possible for federal
agencies to make use of some of the planning tools being developed
primarily for state and local agencies, SAFECOM has not developed any
tools that directly address interoperability with federal agencies.
However, interoperability with federal first responders remains an
important element in achieving nationwide interoperability. We reported
that until a federal coordinating entity such as SAFECOM makes a
concerted effort to promote federal interoperability with other
governmental entities, overall progress in improving communications
interoperability will remain limited. For more information, see Project
SAFECOM: Key Cross-Agency Emergency Communications Effort Requires
Stronger Collaboration, GAO-04-494 and First Responders: Much Work
Remains to Improve Communications Interoperability, GAO-07-301; DHS
updated information: In March and June 2007, DHS provided us with
information on its efforts to implement a program for improving
interoperable communications. For example, DHS established the Office
for Interoperability and Compatibility, of which SAFECOM is a part, to
strengthen and integrate interoperability and compatibility efforts.
DHS also reported that SAFECOM is developing tools, templates, and
guidance documents for interoperability, including field-tested
statewide planning methodologies, online collaboration tools,
communications requirements, and an online library of lessons learned
and best practices. The department established the Office of Emergency
Communications to administer the responsibilities and authorities of
SAFECOM, the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance
Program, and the Integrated Wireless Network, which are three programs
focused on improving interoperable communications. According to DHS,
the mission of the Office of Emergency Communications is to support and
promote the ability of emergency response providers and government
officials at the local, tribal, state, and federal levels to continue
to communicate in the event of disasters or acts of terrorism, and to
ensure, accelerate, and attain emergency interoperable communications
nationwide. Moreover, DHS noted that its focus on state and local
interoperable communications is proportional to the nature of the
interoperability problem, as there are over 50,000 emergency response
agencies at the state and local level and 90 percent of communications
infrastructure is owned and operated at the state level. With regard to
federal agencies, DHS noted that SAFECOM has and will continue to
partner with federal agencies, such as the Departments of Justice and
Defense, and that DHS participates in the Federal Partnership for
Interoperable Communications, which is charged with addressing federal
wireless communications interoperability. In addition, DHS noted that
is it in the process of conducting a baseline assessment evaluating
interoperable capabilities for all departments and agencies; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. While DHS has made progress in implementing a
program to improve interoperable communications, these implementation
efforts have focused primarily on improving interoperability among
state and local entities, and DHS is in the process of evaluating
federal agencies' interoperable communications' capabilities through
the recently established Office of Emergency Communications. DHS did
not provide us with documentation on the extent to which it has taken
actions to improve interoperability with federal agencies, which we
reported is a key part of communications interoperability. Moreover,
while, SAFECOM officials stated that the program's focus has been on
state and local agencies because there are more state and local first
responder agencies and most of the communications infrastructure is
owned by state and local agencies, interoperability with federal first
responders remains an important element in achieving nationwide
interoperability and is part of SAFECOM's tasking under the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. As we
previously reported, until a more concerted effort is made to promote
federal interoperability with other governmental entities, overall
progress in improving communications interoperability would remain
limited;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 16. Implement procedures and capabilities for
effective interoperable communications;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has faced difficulties in
implementing procedures for effective interoperable communications. In
April 2007, we reported that SAFECOM--a DHS program intended to
strengthen interoperable public safety communications at all levels of
government--has provided planning tools to state and local governments
intended to help states and local agencies improve their procedures and
capabilities to enable effective interoperable communications. However,
based on our review of four states and selected localities, SAFECOM's
progress in achieving its goals of helping these states and localities
improve interoperable communications has been limited. We often found
that the states and local jurisdictions either did not find the tools
useful or were unaware that the tools existed. These state and local
officials did not find the tools and guidance useful for various
reasons, including that (1) the tools and guidance are too abstract and
do not provide practical implementation guidance on specific issues;
(2) the documents are lengthy and hard to use as reference tools; and
(3) awareness of SAFECOM and its tools has not reached all state and
local agencies. To its credit, SAFECOM's Interoperability Continuum--
which is intended to provide a framework that emergency response
agencies can use to baseline their planning and implementation of
interoperability solutions--was the most widely used and recognized of
its tools. Seven of the 15 states and localities we visited indicated
that they used the continuum to assess their interoperability status
and plan improvements. Another initiative that had a significant impact
was the Regional Communications Interoperability Pilot. Officials from
Kentucky--one of the two states that participated in the pilot--
indicated that the pilot was very helpful in facilitating
communications planning by identifying relevant stakeholders and
bringing those stakeholders together for extended discussions about
interoperability. In April 2007 we reported that one factor
contributing to the limited impact that SAFECOM has had on implementing
procedures and capabilities to enable effective interoperable
communications, is that its activities have not been guided by a
program plan. A program plan is a critical tool to ensure a program
meets its goals and responsibilities. Such a tool is used to align
planned activities with program goals and objectives, as well as define
how progress in meeting the goals will be measured, compared, and
validated. Rather than using a program plan to guide their activities,
SAFECOM officials stated that they develop tools and guidance based on
a list of suggestions obtained from first responders. The SAFECOM
Executive Committee--a steering group composed of public safety
officials from across the country--prioritized the list of suggestions,
but this prioritization has not been used to develop a plan. Instead,
program officials have made ad hoc decisions regarding which
suggestions to implement based on executive committee input, as well as
the difficulty of implementation. We reported that while this approach
incorporates a degree of prioritization from first responders, it does
not provide the structure and traceability of a program plan. For more
information, see Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and
Intergovernmental Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder
Interoperable Communications, GAO-04-740 and GAO-07-301; DHS updated
information: In March and June 2007, DHS provided us with information
on its efforts to implement policies and procedures for effective
interoperable communications. DHS reported that it developed the
Statement of Requirements to define operational and functional
requirements for emergency response communications and the Public
Safety Architecture Framework to help emergency response agencies map
interoperable communications system requirements and identify system
gaps. DHS also reported that it developed the Statewide Communications
Interoperability Planning Methodology to assist states in initiating
statewide interoperability planning efforts and that it is helping
states develop their interoperability plans by the end of 2007. DHS
reported that SAFECOM's guidance and tools are driven by and
incorporate the input of emergency responders and that its
Interoperability Continuum is, for example, widely used as the model
framework for defining and addressing the problem of interoperability.
In addition, DHS reported that it is conducting a national baseline
assessment to, among other things, define the range of interoperable
and emergency capabilities needed; assess the current available
capabilities to meet needs; identify the gap between current
capabilities and defined requirements; and include a national
interoperable emergency communications inventory to identify
requirements for federal agencies. DHS noted that the Office of
Emergency Communications will develop a National Emergency
Communications Plan in fiscal year 2008 and is in the process of
developing a strategic plan for fiscal years 2008 through 2013; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. As we previously reported, officials from
selected states and localities often found that the key tools DHS
issued such as the Statement of Requirement and the Public Safety
Architecture Framework which are intended to provide capabilities and
procedures to state and local agencies to help enable effective
interoperable communications were not helpful, or officials were
unaware of what assistance the program had to offer. We also found that
DHS does not have performance measures in place to determine how
effective these tools are and to make improvements based on feedback;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 17. Increase the development and adoption of
interoperability communications standards;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: More work remains for DHS to
increase the development and adoption of interoperability
communications standards. In April 2007 we reported that until
recently, little progress had been made in developing Project 25
standards--a suite of national standards that are intended to enable
interoperability among the communications products of different
vendors. We reported that although one of the eight major subsets of
standards was defined in the project's first 4 years (from 1989 to
1993), from 1993 through 2005, no additional standards were completed
that could be used by a vendor to develop elements of a Project 25
compliant system. Over the past 2 years, progress has been made in
developing specifications for three additional subsets of standards.
However, we reported that ambiguities in the published standards have
led to incompatibilities among products made by different vendors, and
no formal compliance testing has been conducted to ensure vendors'
products are interoperable. More recently, informal peer testing among
vendors has occurred. To address the lack of well-defined standards,
users and manufacturers have been revising the standards. To address
the issue of a lack of formal compliance testing, SAFECOM, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Project 25 steering
committee, began developing a peer compliance assessment program for
Project 25 products in April 2005. We reported that this compliance
assessment program is to use various vendors' approved laboratories to
test Project 25 systems through a set of agreed-upon tests that will
validate that the systems from various vendors can successfully
interoperate and meet conformance and performance requirements.
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the
vendors will be expected to conduct the tests in compliance with a
handbook on general testing procedures and requirements, which the
National Institute of Standards and Technology is preparing to publish.
For more information, see GAO-07-301. Also, see Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General, Review of DHS' Progress in
Adopting and Enforcing Equipment Standards for First Responders, OIG-06-
30 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); DHS updated information: In March
2007, DHS reported that it has helped to develop initial standards for
six of the eight major system interfaces associated with Project 25, a
suite of standards for interoperability. In June 2007, DHS reported
that its Office of Emergency Communications is to establish
requirements for interoperable communications capabilities in
coordination with the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility.
DHS reported that it has worked to promote the acceleration,
completion, and deployment of interoperable communications standards,
but noted that DHS does not have the authority to set standards.
Specifically, DHS reported that it has worked with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology to establish a vision and key
priorities for standards and that the Project 25 standards should be
completed within 18 to 24 months; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally not achieved this performance expectation. In our prior
work, we reported that there were ambiguities in published standards,
which led to incompatibilities among products made by different
vendors. DHS has taken some steps to address these challenges, but the
effectiveness of these efforts is unclear. Moreover, DHS reported that
it has worked with its partners to develop the Project 25 standards
but, according to DHS, completion of these standards is many months
away;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 18. Develop performance goals and measures to
assess progress in developing interoperability;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet developed a
sufficient set of performance goals and measures to effectively assess
progress in developing interoperability. For instance, in April 2007 we
reported that since 2001, the management and goals of the SAFECOM
program have changed several times. In 2003, the SAFECOM program was
transferred to the Office of Interoperability and Compatibility within
the Directorate of Science and Technology in DHS and is now within the
Office of Emergency Communications.[B] Its goals included increasing
interoperable communications capacity of local, tribal, and state
public safety agencies, and increasing the number of states that have
initiated or completed statewide plans. However, these goals do not
include improving interoperability between federal agencies and state
and local agencies which is part of SAFECOM's tasking in accordance
with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. With
regard to establishing performance measures, we reported that SAFECOM
program officials have established six performance measures to assess
progress, including the percentage of fire, emergency medical services,
and law enforcement organizations that have established informal
interoperability agreements with other public safety organizations; the
percentage of public safety agencies that report using interoperability
to some degree in their operations; the percentage of states that have
completed statewide interoperability plans; the percentage of grant
programs for public safety communications that include SAFECOM
guidance; and the amount of reduction in the cycle time for national
interoperability standards development. However, we noted that several
key aspects of the program are not being measured. For example, one of
the program's goals is to increase the development and adoption of
standards. However, the only associated performance measure is
reduction in the cycle time for national interoperability standards
development--not the extent to which adoption of standards has
increased or whether interoperability is being facilitated. Also, in
assessing the growth of interoperable communications capacity at local,
tribal, and state public safety agencies, SAFECOM's measures--the
percentage of states that have established informal interoperability
agreements with other public safety organizations and the percentage of
public safety agencies that report using interoperability to some
degree in their operations --addresses only two of the five areas that
SAFECOM has defined as key to improving interoperability (it does not
assess improvements made in governance, technology, or training).
Moreover, none of the program's measures assess the extent to which the
first responder community finds the tools and assistance helpful or the
effectiveness of program outreach initiatives. Consequently, we
reported that measures of the effectiveness of the program and areas
for improvement are not being collected and are not driving
improvements in the program, contributing to its limited impact.
According to SAFECOM officials, by mid-2007, they plan to establish a
measure to assess customer satisfaction. We reported that until DHS
develops and implements a program plan that includes goals focusing on
improving interoperability among all levels of government, establishes
performances measures that determine if key aspects of the SAFECOM
program are being achieved, and assesses the extent to which the first
responder community finds the tools and assistance helpful, the impact
of its efforts to improve interoperable communications among federal,
state, and local agencies will likely remain limited. For more
information, see GAO-07-301; DHS updated information: In March 2007,
DHS reported that SAFECOM has goals for improving interoperability
among federal, state, local, and tribal agencies. It also reported that
SAFECOM, with the Office of Management and Budget, adopted a strategy,
with metrics, based on user needs to meet its mission as an e-
government project. DHS also reported that it is working to establish
quantifiable performance measures by the third quarter of 2007. In
addition, DHS reported that its Office of Emergency Communications has
initiated a program planning and performance measurement initiative to
incorporate and build upon past performance measures established by
SAEFCOM and the Office of Management and Budget; Our assessment: We
conclude that DHS generally has not achieved this performance
expectation. While DHS officials indicate that the Office Emergency
Communications plans to better address this performance expectation,
the office is not yet operational. For example, this office was
required to provide Congress with an initial plan for establishing this
office by February 1, 2007, and as of June this plan was not yet
complete. In our prior work, we reported that while DHS established
performance measures for the SAFECOM program, key aspects of the
program were not being measured. We also reported that none of the
program's measures assess the extent to which first responders find DHS
tools and assistance helpful or the effectiveness of outreach
initiatives;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 19. Provide grant funding to first responders
in developing and implementing interoperable communications
capabilities;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has provided grant funding to
first responders for developing and implementing interoperable
communications. In April 2007 we reported according to DHS, $2.15
billion in grant funding was awarded to states and localities from
fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005 for communications
interoperability enhancements. This funding, along with technical
assistance, has helped to make improvements on a variety of specific
interoperability projects. We reported that one of the main purposes of
the DHS grants program is to provide financial assistance to states and
localities to help them fund projects to develop and implement
interoperable communications systems. We reported that, according to
SAFECOM guidance, interoperability cannot be solved by any one entity
alone and, therefore, an effective and interoperable communications
system requires a clear and compelling statewide strategy focused on
increasing public safety effectiveness and coordination across all
related organizations. A statewide interoperability plan is essential
for outlining such a strategy. We reported that the narrow and specific
use of DHS funding in the states we reviewed could be traced in part to
the lack of statewide plans; interoperability investments by individual
localities have not been coordinated toward achieving a broader goal
for the state. We reported that in accordance with a previous
recommendation, DHS has required grant recipients to develop and adopt
a statewide communications plan by the end of 2007. Additionally, the
fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act states that DHS may restrict
funding to a state if it does not submit a statewide interoperable
communication plan. However, despite our other previous recommendation
that DHS should require that states certify that grant applications be
consistent with statewide plans, no process has yet been established
for ensuring that states' grant requests are consistent with their
statewide plans and long-term objectives for improving
interoperability. We noted that DHS Grants and Training officials were
considering instituting such a process but they did not yet have
specific plans to do so. We reported that because of the lack of
coordination, state and local governments were investing significant
resources, including DHS grant funds, in developing independent
interoperability solutions that do not always support each others'
needs. Until the DHS-mandated statewide communications plans are in
place, and processes have been established for ensuring that each
state's grant request is consistent with its statewide plan and longer-
term interoperability goals, progress by states and localities in
improving interoperability is likely to be impeded. We also reported
that in addition to statewide plans, an overarching national plan is
critical to coordinating interoperability spending, especially where
federal first responders are involved. For more information, see GAO-07-
301; DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported that SAFECOM
had developed coordinated grant guidance that is required for all grant
programs that provide federal funds for interoperable communications.
DHS also reported that it is working to ensure all grant funding is
tied to statewide interoperable communications plans; Our assessment:
We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this performance
expectation, as the department has provided grant funding to first
responders for developing and implementing interoperable communications
capabilities;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 20. Provide guidance and technical assistance
to first responders in developing and implementing interoperable
communications capabilities;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: While DHS has provided some guidance
and technical assistance, the usefulness of these efforts varies. For
example, based on a previous review of four states and selected
localities, we often found that the selected states and local
jurisdictions either did not find key tools useful or were unaware that
the tools existed. Selected state and local officials did not find the
tools and guidance useful for various reasons, including that (1) the
tools and guidance are too abstract and do not provide practical
implementation guidance on specific issues; (2) the documents are
lengthy and hard to use as reference tools; and (3) awareness of
SAFECOM and its tools has not reached all state and local agencies. As
we previously reported, recently, SAFECOM has issued additional tools
and guidance for state and local agencies to use, however, we were
unable to assess them during our previous review because these tools
were still new and we did not receive assessments of them from state
and local officials. To its credit, as we reported in April 2007, the
Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program, which is
intended to provide on-site assistance to Urban Area Security
Initiative areas to, among other things, assist with developing
tactical interoperability plans, planning exercises, assessing
communication gaps, and designing interoperable systems, had been
beneficial to each of the four Urban Area Security Initiative areas we
visited. DHS provided extensive assistance to the urban areas in
developing their tactical interoperability communications plans,
However, DHS curtailed the exercises that each urban areas was required
to conduct to validate the robustness and completeness of their plans.
Due to the complexity of these exercises, the Urban Area Security
Initiative areas were originally allotted 12 months to plan and execute
robust, full-scale exercises; DHS subsequently reduced this to 5
months. DHS officials indicated that they accelerated the deadline so
that they could use the results as inputs into the interoperability
scorecards that they published in January 2007. To compensate for the
reduced time frame, DHS reduced the requirements of the full-scale
exercise, advising the Urban Area Security Initiative areas to limit
the scope and size of their activities. In reducing the scope of their
exercises, the Urban Area Security Initiative areas had to reduce the
extent to which they tested the robustness and effectiveness of their
interoperability plans. Without robust exercises to validate tactical
interoperability communications plans, the Urban Area Security
Initiative areas can only have limited confidence in the plans'
effectiveness, and thus the value of DHS's efforts may continue to be
limited. Similarly, the constraints placed on the exercises means that
DHS's scorecards of each of the Urban Area Security Initiative areas
are based on questionable data. In addition, we reported that SAFECOM's
activities have focused primarily on providing planning tools to state
and local governments. For more information, see GAO-07-301; DHS
updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported that it has developed
a variety of guidance documents related to interoperability. These
documents include the Statewide Communications Interoperability
Planning Methodology and Brochure; Tabletop Methodology; State Planning
Guidebook; Migration Model; and guides on a creating a charter, writing
a memorandum of understanding, writing standard operating procedures,
standards and technology, and procurement. DHS also reported that by
the end of fiscal year 2007, all states and territories are to develop
and adopt a Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan to be
reviewed by the Office of Emergency Communications. DHS reported that
it will provide technical assistance to states and territories in the
development of their plans through the Interoperable Communications
Technical Assistance Program. Moreover, DHS reported that it has
provided various assistance to state and local jurisdictions through
the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program,
including providing assistance in the development Tactical
Interoperable Communication Plans for 65 metropolitan areas;
participating in the plans' exercise validation; and developing and
providing assistance to jurisdictions in using the Communication and
Asset Survey Mapping Tool. In addition, DHS reported that SAFECOM is in
the process of developing performance measures to ensure its tools are
being used throughout the emergency response community; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has provided various guidance and
technical assistance to first responders in developing and implementing
interoperable communications. However, as we recently reported, several
states and localities were not aware of SAFECOM tools and guidance and
did not find the tools and guidance useful. In addition, DHS reported
that it is developing performance measures to assess use of its tools
and guidance, but the department has not yet developed these measures;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 21. Provide assistance to state and local
governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: Although DHS has taken
actions to provide assistance to state and local governments, this
assistance has not always focused on the development of all-hazards
plans and capabilities. In July 2005 we reported that because terrorist
attacks share many common characteristics with natural and accidental
disasters, many of the capabilities first responders need to support
national preparedness efforts are similar. Our analysis of DHS's Target
Capabilities List and our discussions with first responders and other
emergency management stakeholders revealed that the capabilities
required to address terrorist attacks and to address natural and
accidental disasters are most similar for protection, response, and
recovery, and differ most for prevention. More specifically at the time
of our review, 30 of the 36 target capabilities yielded by DHS's
capabilities based planning process applied across all types of
emergency events. It is possible that terrorist attacks could be
prevented through actionable intelligence (i.e., information that can
lead to stopping or apprehending terrorists), but there is no known way
to prevent natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and
tornadoes. Natural or accidental disasters differ from terrorist
attacks in that they are unintentional and unplanned rather than the
result of deliberate, planned action. It is the deliberate, planned
nature of terrorist attacks that makes preventive efforts for such
attacks principally the responsibility of intelligence and law
enforcement agencies. In 2005 we also reported that DHS grant programs
have largely focused on enhancing first responders' capabilities to
respond to terrorist attacks based on Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8 and legislation that emphasize preparedness assistance for
catastrophic terrorism as the highest priority for federal funding. The
priorities of some first responders we interviewed did not align with
DHS's priorities for enhancing capabilities. For example, during our
interviews, 31 of 39 first responder departments who replied to a
question about DHS's training programs, exercise activities, and grant
funds disagreed that these were focused on all-hazards. In addition,
officials from four first responder departments went on to say that DHS
required too much emphasis on terrorism-related activities in requests
for equipment and training--for example, combating weapons of mass
destruction and preventing and responding to terrorist attacks using
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials.
However, responders said that they had a greater need for assistance
preparing for natural and accidental disasters. During our interviews,
37 of the 69 first responder departments who responded to a question
about the programmatic challenges they face cited the need for
additional flexibility from DHS or state agencies in order to use grant
funds to enhance their ability to respond to events that were more
likely to occur in their jurisdictions. In March 2006, the DHS IG
reported that the response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that DHS's
efforts to protect and prepare the nation for terrorist events and
natural disasters had not yet translated into preparedness for all
hazards. State emergency management staff interviewed said the majority
of DHS preparedness grants were spent on terrorism preparedness, which
had not afforded sufficient support or funding for natural hazards
preparedness. Staff in the Hurricane Katrina affected states described
a heavy emphasis on terrorism funding and expressed bafflement at the
lack of natural hazards funding. Few perceived grants as "all-hazard."
The DHS IG reported that this perception may have been fueled by the
fact that all DHS preparedness grants were managed by an entityæthe
former Office of Domestic Preparednessæwhose mandate was originally
terrorism preparedness. Additionally, only 2 of the 15 National
Planning Scenarios, a compilation of potential disasters developed to
support preparedness, involved natural disasters (a major hurricane and
a major earthquake). The DHS IG found that although the documents in
the National Preparedness System addressed all hazards, the prevalence
of terrorism-related items in them fostered a perception that the
preparedness for and response to a terrorist event is different from
that of a naturally occurring event. Further, the DHS IG reported that
requirements associated with federal emergency preparedness grants to
states also supported the perception that terrorism preparedness is
separate from natural disaster preparedness. A majority of grants to
states emphasized preparedness for terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction and limited use of the grants to terrorism-preparedness
measures, such as the purchase of specific personal protective
equipment. Office of Domestic Preparedness staff said that state
grantees were failing to take advantage of the grants' flexibility and
use them for all-hazards preparedness measures. State emergency
managers questioned grant packages that required so much spending on
potential events involving terrorism and weapons of mass destruction,
when they received far less funding to prepare for natural disasters
that are certain to recur. For example, the DHS IG found that the Gulf
Coast region experienced 91 major disaster and emergency declarations
from September 1, 1995, to September 1, 2005, all due to natural
hazards such as hurricanes and flooding. Yet a significant portion of
the federal funding for these states was earmarked for terrorism
preparedness to the exclusion of natural hazards preparedness. For more
information, see GAO-05-652 and Homeland Security: Management of First
Responder Grant Programs and Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue
to Evolve, GAO-05-530T. Also, see Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster
Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32
(Washington, D.C.: March 2006); DHS updated information: In March
2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts to
provide assistance to state and local governments in developing all-
hazards plans and capabilities. For example, DHS reported that its
Office of Grants and Training conducted a series of mobile
implementation training team interviews with senior state and local
officials to facilitate the development of state and local all-hazards
plans and capabilities. This office also completed the Nationwide Plan
Review, a national review of preparedness planning following Hurricane
Katrina. Moreover, DHS reported that FEMA's Mitigation Division
provides assistance to communities in the development of hazard
mitigation plans that include hazard identification and risk assessment
and identification and prioritization of potential mitigation measures.
DHS noted that the Mitigation Division reviews and approves these
plans. DHS reported that FEMA has approved over 13,500 community hazard
mitigation plans, 54 tribal hazard mitigation plans, 50 state hazard
mitigation plans, and 11 state enhanced hazard mitigation plans as of
March 2007. In addition, FEMA reported that is has provided grants
totaling over $110 million (since 2002) to fund the development of more
than 1,500 state and local hazard mitigation plans through the Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program and the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant
Program; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS generally has not
achieved this performance expectation. DHS did not provide us with
evidence on the extent to which its assistance to state and local
governments has focused on all-hazards, rather than just terrorism
preparedness and response or hazard mitigation. DHS also did not
provide us with documentation that its assistance to state and local
governments has helped these government agencies develop all-hazards
capabilities, in addition to hazard mitigation plans;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 22. Administer a program for providing grants
and assistance to state and local governments and first responders;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has developed
and is administering programs for providing grants and assistance to
state and local governments and first responders. DHS provides grant
funds to the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealths of
Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, and selected urban areas. For more information,
see Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs Has
Improved, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-121 and GAO-05-652;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 23. Allocate grants based on assessment
factors that account for population, critical infrastructure, and other
risk factors;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS has taken actions
to allocate grants based on assessment factors that account for
population, critical infrastructure, and other risk factors, and we
conclude that DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation.
From fiscal year 2003 through 2005, DHS used an approach for assessing
risk based largely on indicators such as population density combined
with threat assessments. For fiscal year 2006, DHS adopted a more
sophisticated risk assessment approach to determine both (1) which
Urban Area Security Initiative areas were eligible for funding, based
on their potential risk relative to other areas, and (2) in conjunction
with a new effectiveness assessment, the amount of funds awarded to
eligible areas. As described by DHS officials, the fiscal year 2007
grant process included substantial changes to the 2006 risk assessment
model, simplifying its structure, reducing the number of variables
considered, and incorporating the intelligence community's assessment
of threats for all candidate urban areas, which was used to assign the
areas to one of four tiers, according to their relative threat, with
Tier I being those at highest threat. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007,
the risk assessment process has been used to assess threat,
vulnerability, and the consequences of various types of successful
attacks for each urban area assessed. One difference in 2007 is that
DHS considered most areas of the country equally vulnerable to attack,
given the freedom of movement within the United States. It focused its
analysis on the expected impact and consequences of successful attacks
occurring in specific areas of the country, given their population,
population density, and assets. The risk assessment process is not
perfect, is evolving, and of necessity involves professional judgments,
such as assigning the weights to be used for specific factors in the
risk assessment model. Although DHS has made progress in developing a
method of assessing relative risk among urban areas, DHS officials have
said that they cannot yet assess how effective the actual investments
from grant funds are in enhancing preparedness and mitigating risk
because they do not yet have the metrics necessary to do so. For more
information, see GAO-07-386T and Homeland Security Grants: Observations
on Process DHS Used to Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas, GAO-07-
381R;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 24. Develop a system for collecting and
disseminating lessons learned and best practices to emergency
responders;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken actions to develop a
system to effectively collect and disseminate lessons learned and best
practices to emergency responders, but more work remains. DHS has
established the Lessons Learned Information Sharing online portal. The
portal states that it seeks to improve preparedness nationwide by
allowing local, state, and federal homeland security and response
professionals to access information on the most effective planning,
training, equipping, and operating practices for preventing, preparing
for, responding to, and recovering from acts of terrorism. However, we
reported in December 2006 that although the Lessons Learned Information
Sharing portal includes guidance and other emergency preparedness
information, officials from two of the five major cities and two of the
four states we visited told us that specific information is not easy to
find, in part, because the portal is difficult to navigate. Upon using
the portal, we also found this to be true. For example, the search
results appeared to be in no particular order and were not sorted by
date or relevant key terms, and searched terms were not highlighted or
shown anywhere in the abstracts of listed documents. In addition, some
studies were not available through the portal, including studies from
some of the experts with whom we have spoken and who provided us with
useful information on evacuation preparedness for transportation-
disadvantaged populations. In commenting on our December 2006 report,
DHS officials told us that they had improved the overall functionality
of DHS's Lessons Learned Information Sharing portal. We revisited the
portal as of December 7, 2006, and it appeared to have improved some of
its search and organizational functions. We have found, however, that
some of the issues we previously identified still remained, including,
when using the portal's search function, no direct link to key
evacuation preparedness documents, such as DHS's Nationwide Plan Review
Phase I and II reports. For more information, see Transportation-
Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify Responsibilities
and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations, GAO-07-44 and GAO-05-652;
DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to collect and disseminate lessons learned
and best practices to emergency responders. DHS reported that its
Lessons Learned Information Sharing System houses over 400 after-action
reports; 1,200 emergency operations plans; and 500 lessons learned and
best practices that are shared among the system's more than 31,000
members. DHS reported that in a survey of system users conducted in
June 2006, 86 percent reported being "satisfied" or "very satisfied"
with the information provided. In addition, DHS reported that it is
working to improve the functionality of the Lessons Learned Information
Sharing System and that enhancements to the system, including an
improved search engine, is expected to be implemented by the end of
September 2007; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. Although DHS has developed and
implemented the Lessons Learned Information Sharing System, it is not
clear that this system is effectively collecting and disseminating
lessons learned and best practices to emergency responders. In
addition, DHS is taking some actions to address the issues with the
Lessons Learned Information Sharing System that we previously
identified, but these actions are not yet complete;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[A] We refer to DHS's recovery efforts as the development,
coordination, and execution of service and site restoration plans
through DHS assistance programs.
[B] The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-295, tit. VI, 120 Stat. at 1394-62, transferred the
responsibilities for administering SAFECOM to the Office of Emergency
Communications, which is under the Office of Cyber Security and
Communications within the Directorate for National Protection and
Programs. The Office for Interoperability and Compatibility retained
responsibility for research, development, testing, evaluation, and
standards-related elements of SAFECOM. See id., § 671(b).
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Strengthening the Protection of
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources:
Critical infrastructure are systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacity or
destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security,
national economic security, and national public health or safety, or
any combination of these matters. Key resources are publicly or
privately controlled resources essential to minimal operations of the
economy or government, including individual targets whose destruction
would not endanger vital systems but could create a local disaster or
profoundly damage the nation's morale or confidence. While the private
sector owns approximately 85 percent of the nation's critical
infrastructure and key resources, DHS has wide-ranging responsibilities
for leading and coordinating the overall national critical
infrastructure and key resources protection effort.
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan identifies 17 critical
infrastructure and key resources sectors:
* agriculture and food;
* banking and finance;
* chemical;
* commercial facilities;
* commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste;
* dams;
* defense industrial base;
* drinking water and water treatment systems;
* emergency services;
* energy;
* government facilities;
* information technology;
* national monuments and icons;
* postal and shipping;
* public health and healthcare;
* telecommunications; and:
* transportation systems.
DHS has overall responsibility for coordinating critical infrastructure
and key resources protection efforts.[Footnote 26] Within DHS, the
Office of Infrastructure Protection has been designated as the Sector-
Specific Agency[Footnote 27] responsible for the chemical; commercial
facilities; dams; emergency services; and commercial nuclear reactors,
materials, and waste sectors. TSA has been designated as the Sector-
Specific Agency for postal and shipping, and TSA and the Coast Guard
have been designated the Sector-Specific Agencies for transportation
systems. The Federal Protective Service within ICE has been designated
as the Sector-Specific Agency for government facilities. The Office of
Cyber Security and Telecommunications has been designated the Sector-
Specific Agency for Information Technology and Telecommunications.
As shown in table 30, we identified seven performance expectations for
DHS in the area of critical infrastructure and key resources
protection, and we found that overall DHS has made moderate progress in
meeting those performance expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS
has generally achieved four performance expectations and has generally
not achieved three others.
Table 30: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop a comprehensive national plan for
critical infrastructure protection;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Develop partnerships and coordinate with
other federal agencies, state and local, governments, and the private
sector;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Improve and enhance public/private
information sharing involving attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Develop and enhance national analysis and
warning capabilities for critical infrastructure;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Provide and coordinate incident response
and recovery planning efforts for critical infrastructure;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Identify and assess threats and
vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Support efforts to reduce threats and
vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 4;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 3;
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 31 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of critical infrastructure and key resources protection and
our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the
key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has
not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation's key
elements (generally not achieved).
Table 31: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop a comprehensive national plan for
critical infrastructure protection;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS issued the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan in June 2006. In October 2006, we
reported that the National Infrastructure Protection Plan serves as a
road map for how DHS and other relevant stakeholders should use risk
management principles to prioritize protection activities within and
across sectors in an integrated, coordinated fashion. We reported that
each of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors had provided a sector-
specific plan to DHS by the end of December 2006. In May 2007, DHS
announced the completion of the 17 sector-specific plans. For more
information see Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress
Coordinating Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors'
Characteristics, GAO-07-39; Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed
to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other
Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91; and Homeland Security: Much Is
Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but
Important Challenges Remain, GAO-05-214; DHS updated information: In
March and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its
efforts to develop a comprehensive national plan for critical
infrastructure protection. DHS reported that each sector submitted by
July 14, 2006, its sector Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
Protection Annual Report to DHS in which the sectors identified
priorities and goals for critical infrastructure and key resources
protection based on risk, need, and projected resource requirements.
DHS also reported that on October 15, 2006, it finalized the National
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection Annual Report,
which is an aggregate of the sector annual reports; Our assessment: We
conclude that DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation
as DHS issued the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which
provides a comprehensive national plan for critical infrastructure
protection;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Develop partnerships and coordinate with
other federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private
sector;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken steps to develop
partnerships and coordinate with other federal agencies, state and
local governments, and the private sector. DHS is responsible for
coordinating a national protection strategy, including formation of
government and private sector councils as a collaborating tool. The
councils, among other things, are to identify their most critical
assets and identify protective measures in sector-specific plans that
comply with DHS's National Infrastructure Protection Plan. In October
2006 we reported that all 17 critical infrastructure sectors
established their respective government councils, and nearly all
sectors initiated their voluntary private sector councils in response
to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. In addition, DHS has
undertaken numerous initiatives to foster partnerships with other
federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector
about cyber attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities. For example, the
National Cyber Response and Coordination Group facilitates coordination
of intragovernmental and public/private preparedness and operations in
order to respond to and recover from incidents that have significant
cyber consequences and also brings together officials from national
security, law enforcement, defense, intelligence, and other government
agencies that maintain significant cybersecurity responsibilities and
capabilities. For more information see GAO-07-39; Critical
Infrastructure Protection: DHS Leadership Needed to Enhance
Cybersecurity, GAO-06-1087T; Homeland Security: DHS Is Taking Steps to
Enhance Security at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is
Needed, GAO-06-150; Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in
Addressing Cybersecurity, GAO-05-827T; Critical Infrastructure
Protection: Department of Homeland Security Faces Challenges in
Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities, GAO-05-434; and Protection
of Chemical and Water Infrastructure: Federal Requirements, Actions of
Selected Facilities, and Remaining Challenges, GAO-05-327; DHS updated
information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to develop partnerships and coordinate with
other federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private
sector. For example, DHS reported that its Protective Security Advisor
program has provided support to state and local officials during
incidents and contingencies and has made over 13,000 liaison visits to
local jurisdictions and facilities and also established over 31,000
points of contact. DHS also reported that its Nuclear and Chemical
Sector-Specific Agencies have cultivated relationships with their
respective Government Coordinating Councils and Sector Coordinating
Councils. DHS identified a number of other efforts these Sector-
Specific agencies made. For example, the Chemical Sector-Specific
Agency hosts biweekly Chemical Security teleconferences for senior
chemical industry security managers. It also sponsors classified
briefings for industry representatives and holds Government
Coordinating Council meetings to discuss initiatives throughout the
government that affect the chemical sector. Similarly, the Nuclear
Sector-Specific Agency reported that it provides quarterly classified
threat briefs by the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis
Center to the sector. It has also signed a memorandum of understanding
with the Nuclear Sector Coordinating Council concerning the management
and maintenance of the Homeland Security Information Network-Nuclear
Sector and standard operating procedures agreements with the Nuclear
Energy Institute and Constellation Energy for the safeguard and
protection of classified information. The Emergency Service Sector
Sector-Specific Agency reported that it uses the Emergency Services
Regional Assessment Process to gather and analyze information provided
by state, local, and tribal communities to identify capability
weaknesses and protective measures for reducing or eliminating them;
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has undertaken a number of efforts to
develop partnerships and coordinate with other federal agencies, state
and local governments, and the private sector, such as coordinating
collaborative tools detailed in the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Improve and enhance public/private
information sharing involving attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: While DHS has worked to
improve and enhance public/private information sharing involving
attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities, a number of challenges remain.
In 2004, DHS piloted the Homeland Security Information Network, which
is DHS's primary conduit through which it shares information on
domestic terrorist threats, suspicious activity reports, and incident
management. We reported in March 2006 that the Homeland Security
Information Network platform for critical sectors was being developed
and offered to each sector to provide a suite of information and
communication tools to share critical information within the sector,
with DHS, and eventually across sectors. However, in June 2006, the DHS
IG reported that DHS had failed to take a number of key steps in
planning and implementing the Homeland Security Information Network.
For example, DHS did not provide adequate user guidance and had not
developed specific performance measures for tracking information
sharing on the Homeland Security Information Network. The DHS IG
reported that as a result the Homeland Security Information Network was
not effectively supporting state and local information sharing. In
April 2007, we reported that DHS did not fully adhere to key practices
in coordinating efforts on its Homeland Security Information Network
with key state and local information-sharing initiatives. For example,
it did not work with the two key state and local information-sharing
initiatives (of the Regional Information Sharing System program) to
fully develop joint strategies to meet mutual needs. It also did not
develop compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate
across organizational boundaries. DHS's limited use of these practices
is attributable in part to the department's expediting its schedule to
deploy information-sharing capabilities after September 11, 2001, and
in doing so not developing an inventory of key state and local
information-sharing initiatives. We also reported that DHS officials
have efforts planned and under way to improve coordination and
collaboration, including establishing an advisory committee to obtain
state and local views on network operations. DHS also plans to
coordinate its efforts with the Administration's Information Sharing
Environment initiative that aims to improve information sharing among
all levels of government and the private sector. However, these
activities have either just begun or are being planned. Consequently,
until DHS develops an inventory of key state and local initiatives and
fully implements coordination and collaboration practices, it is at
risk that effective information sharing is not occurring and that its
Homeland Security Information Network may be duplicating state and
local capabilities. This also raises the issue of whether similar
coordination and duplication issues exist with the other homeland
security networks, systems, and applications under DHS's purview; In
April 2006 we reported that DHS had issued an interim rule that
established operating procedures for the receipt, care, and storage of
critical infrastructure information, such as vulnerability assessments
and security methods, and the agency has created a program office to
administer the protected critical infrastructure information program.
However, we noted that DHS had not defined the specific information--
such as industry-specific vulnerabilities and interdependencies--
needed under the program, nor has it comprehensively worked with other
federal agencies with critical infrastructure responsibilities to find
out what they need; With regard to one critical infrastructure sector,
the DHS IG reported in February 2007 that the National Infrastructure
Coordinating Center, the Homeland Security Information Network Food and
Agriculture portal, the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk
Analysis Center, and the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
program each had shortcomings concerning food sector information
sharing. For example, the DHS IG reported that food sector experts
expressed concern that while the Homeland Security Information Network
Food and Agriculture portal had potential value, it had limited utility
for the sector's information sharing purposes in its current form. For
more information, see Information Technology: Homeland Security
Information Network Needs to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and
Local Initiatives, GAO-07-822T; Information Technology: Numerous
Federal Networks Used to Support Homeland Security Need to Be Better
Coordinated with Key State and Local Information-Sharing Initiatives,
GAO-07-455; GAO-06-1087T; Securing Wastewater Facilities: Utilities
Have Made Important Upgrades but Further Improvements to Key System
Components May Be Limited by Costs and Other Constraints; GAO-06-390;
Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies
and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but
Unclassified Information, GAO-06-385; Information Sharing: DHS Should
Take Steps to Encourage More Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect
and Share Critical Infrastructure Information, GAO-06-383; GAO-06-150;
GAO-05-434; Critical Infrastructure Protection: Establishing Effective
Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors, GAO-04-699T; and
Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure
Protection, GAO-04-321. Also, see Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Homeland Security Information Network
Could Support Information Sharing More Effectively, OIG-06-38
(Washington, D.C.: June 2006) and The Department of Homeland Security's
Role in Food Defense and Critical Infrastructure Protection, OIG-07-33
(Washington, D.C.: February 2007); DHS updated information: In March,
April, and June 2007, DHS provided updated information regarding its
efforts to improve and enhance public/private information sharing
involving attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities. DHS reported that its
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Information Sharing
Environment encompasses a number of mechanisms that facilitate the flow
of information, mitigate obstacles to voluntary information sharing by
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources owners and operators, and
provide feedback and continuous improvement for structures and
processes. DHS stated that the creation of an effective and efficient
information sharing environment encompasses five components:
governance (the sector partnerships), content, delivery vehicle (the
Homeland Security Information Network and the National Infrastructure
Coordination Center), relationship management, and an adaptive legal
and policy framework to address the unique requirements of the critical
infrastructure/key resources sectors. DHS stated the Homeland Security
Information Network is a key enabler for information delivery. For
example, in September 2006 testimony before the House Committee on
Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Operations
Coordination stated that the Homeland Security Information Network "is
the primary, secure nationwide network through which DHS receives and
shares critical information, including alerts and warnings, with its
components and its public-and private-sector partners, including
Federal, State, local, and tribal officials and the owners and
operators of critical infrastructures". Yet DHS reported that the
Homeland Security Information Network represents only one of the parts
of the whole; With regard to other elements of information sharing,
DHS stated that it has developed its critical infrastructure/key
resources information sharing environment strategy paper, a roadmap
that describes and provides the basis for developing process and
outcome metrics. DHS stated that this strategy has been accepted by the
information sharing environment program manager as the way ahead for
sharing information with the critical infrastructure/key resources
sectors. DHS reported that within this framework, a critical
infrastructure partnership advisory council working group has been
established between the information sharing environment program manager
and the private sector so the private sector can have direct
representation in the decision making process regarding public/private
information sharing. The department also reported that it had made a
number of efforts to address concerns about the Homeland Security
Information Network. For example, DHS stated that it is coordinating
the implementation of the Homeland Security Information Network in
state and local fusion centers and is implementing the DHS Common
Operating Picture, which is a Web-based tool available through the
Homeland Security Information Network that is designed to provide a
common view of critical information to senior executive officials and
other partners during a crisis. DHS also reported that it is focusing
training and outreach efforts on state and local government throughout
the Gulf Coast and East Coast regions, which the department sees as
areas of high priority for hurricane season that would rely heavily on
the Common Operating Picture and Homeland Security Information Network
during incident response. Further, DHS stated that the National
Infrastructure Coordination Center, which was established to maintain
operational awareness of the nation's critical infrastructures and key
resources, and provide a process and mechanism for information sharing
and coordination with government and industry partners, has established
processes to share routine and incident-driven information with sectors
via the Homeland Security Information Network. DHS reported that the
National Infrastructure Coordination Center also serves as the
recognized DHS hub for critical infrastructure and key resources
information during major incidents, facilitating daily interactive
teleconferences with sector stakeholders; collecting, logging, and
tracking information requests from critical infrastructure and key
resources owners and operators; and providing a situation summary for
stakeholders through the Common Operating Picture. DHS also stated that
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan provided a framework for
developing metrics for information sharing and that these metrics are
in the process of being developed; Further, DHS reported that its
Technical Resource for Incident Prevention systemæDHS's online,
collaborative, information sharing network for bomb squad, law
enforcement, and emergency services personnel to learn about current
terrorist improvised explosive device tactics, techniques, and
proceduresæimproves and enhances information sharing involving
improvised explosive device attacks and threats. DHS also reported that
in fiscal year 2007 it has had provided easier access to its
Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities, Potential Indicators of
Terrorist Attack, and Protective Measure papers, which are derived from
vulnerability assessments. DHS stated that in the past 6 months it has
provide over 385 federal, state, local, and private sector stakeholders
access to these reports through a web-based portal and that they are
available on the Homeland Security Information Network; DHS provided
several examples of information sharing by the Nuclear Sector-Specific
Agency, the Dams Sector-Specific Agency, the Emergency Sector-Specific
Agency, and the Chemical Sector-Specific Agency. For example, DHS
reported that every two weeks the Chemical Sector-Specific Agency hosts
a security briefing teleconference for the chemical sector and twice a
year will sponsor a classified briefing for all clear industry
representatives. In addition, the Coast Guard reported that it launched
Homeport in October 2005. The Coast Guard stated that Homeport is an
internet portal and the official Coast Guard information technology
system for maritime security. The Coast Guard reported that Homeport
provides instant access to information necessary to support increased
information sharing requirements among federal, state, local and
industry decision makers for security management and increased maritime
domain awareness and is publicly accessible, providing all users with
current maritime security information including DHS and Federal Bureau
of Investigation threat products; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally not achieved this performance expectation. DHS identified
five components to its information sharing environmentægovernance (the
sector partnerships), content, delivery vehicle (the Homeland Security
Information Network and the National Infrastructure Coordination
Center), relationship management, and an adaptive legal and policy
framework. According to the department, the Homeland Security
Information Network is a key part of its information sharing efforts
and serves as the primary mechanism for delivering information to its
critical infrastructure partners. For example, in September 2006
testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, the Director
of the Office of Operations Coordination stated that the Homeland
Security Information Network "is the primary, secure nationwide network
through which DHS receives and shares critical information, including
alerts and warnings, with its components and its public-and private-
sector partners, including Federal, State, local, and tribal officials
and the owners and operators of critical infrastructures". In previous
work, we and the DHS IG identified a number of challenges to the
Homeland Security Information Network, such as coordination with state
and local information sharing initiatives, and DHS did not provide
evidence demonstrating that it has addressed these challenges. Further,
in previous work, we also identified challenges to DHS's efforts to
collect, care for, and store critical infrastructure information
through its protected critical infrastructure information program. For
example, DHS had not defined the specific information it needed nor had
it worked with other federal agencies to find out what they needed. DHS
also was not able to provide metrics indicating that its efforts have
improved information sharing. As a result, it is difficult for
Congress, us, and other stakeholders to assess the extent to which
DHS's various initiatives have enhanced and improved information
sharing related to critical infrastructure and key resources
protection;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Develop and enhance national analysis and
warning capabilities for critical infrastructure;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has taken steps to
develop and enhance national analysis and warning capabilities for
critical infrastructure, but more work remains. Our work to date has
primarily focused on cyber critical infrastructure protection and the
DHS IG's work on the food and agriculture sector. In the cyber area, in
May 2005 we reported that DHS has collaborated on, developed, and
worked to enhance tools and communication mechanisms for providing
analysis and warning of occurring and potential cyber incidents.
Through its involvement in the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team,
DHS provides cyber analysis and warning capabilities by providing
continuous operational support in monitoring the status of systems and
networks. When a new vulnerability or exploit is identified, the U.S.
Computer Emergency Readiness Team evaluates its severity, determines
what actions should be taken and what message should be disseminated,
and provides information through the National Cyber Security Division's
multiple communications channels. However, we reported that DHS faced
the same challenges in developing strategic analysis and warning
capabilities that we reported on 4 years prior during a review of the
National Cyber Security Division's predecessor. At that time, we
reported that a generally accepted methodology for analyzing strategic
cyber-based threats did not exist. We also reported that the center did
not have the industry-specific data on factors such as critical systems
components, known vulnerabilities, and interdependencies. In February
2007, the DHS IG reported that while DHS is not the designated lead for
a number of key activities for food defense and critical
infrastructure, Congress and the President have assigned DHS many
important responsibilities in this area. The DHS IG identified several
limitations in these efforts. For example, the DHS IG stated that
modeling and simulation of food contamination incidents has not
developed to the extent desirable. The DHS IG reported that DHS
currently funds modeling and simulation efforts of the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Decision Support System, the National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, and the National Center
for Food Protection and Defense and that these programs have developed
promising models in several areas of the food supply chain. The DHS IG
reported that at the time of its fieldwork, these DHS-sponsored
programs had developed detailed models or contamination scenarios for
only the beef, dairy, corn, and fresh vegetable supply chains. The DHS
IG also stated that experts in all three of the programs acknowledged
that their models for these supply chains needed further refinement and
could not account for the second-and third-order impacts of a major
food contamination incident. For more information see GAO-06-383 and
GAO-05-434. Also see Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General, The Department of Homeland Security's Role in Food
Defense and Critical Infrastructure Protection, OIG-07-33 (Washington,
D.C.: February 2007); DHS updated information: In March, April, and
June 2007, DHS provided updated information regarding its efforts to
develop and enhance national analysis and warning capabilities for
critical infrastructure. DHS reported that over the past 2 years it has
built out and continues to build the Critical Infrastructure Warning
Information Network. DHS stated that the Critical infrastructure
Warning Information Network is its critical, survivable network that
connects DHS with the vital sector entities (including federal, state,
private sector, and Canada and the United Kingdom) that are essential
for restoring the nation's infrastructure during incidents of national
significance. DHS stated that the Critical Infrastructure Warning
Information Network has 143 Critical Infrastructure Warning Information
Network members and provides both data and voice connectivity to allow
its membership to exchange information, including alerts and
notifications, as well as other routine information. DHS reported that
it includes representation from all the critical infrastructure
sectors, including 68 private sector entities that own and operate key
concerns in the infrastructure sectors, as well as federal entities
involved in monitoring and protecting them. DHS also reported that the
Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network connects the
emergency operations centers of the 50 states and the District of
Columbia to the DHS National Operations Center and is also used to
provide classified connectivity and secure video teleconferencing
between DHS and the states. Further, DHS stated that DHS's Office of
Infrastructure Protection has sponsored a prompt notification pilot
program with the Nuclear Sector Coordination Counsel. DHS reported that
the pilot program demonstrated, for example, that DHS has the ability
to ensure that nuclear sector infrastructure is promptly notified if
infrastructure other than nuclear assets comes under attack nearby and
that DHS can make notifications across its components, as well as to
senior officials; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally
not achieved this performance expectation. While DHS has undertaken a
number of efforts to develop and enhance national analysis and warning
capacities for critical infrastructure, our prior work has shown that
the department still faces a number of challenges. In the area of
cybersecurity, for example, issues concerning methodology and data
continue to pose challenges while a lack of collaboration creates
challenges for its information gathering and/or analysis centers. These
methodological issues in the cyber sector raise concerns as to whether
sound methodologies exist for conducting analysis and warning in the
other areas. Further, while DHS reported that it has expanded the
Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network, the department did
not provide evidence demonstrating that it has enhanced national
warning capabilities;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Provide and coordinate incident response
and recovery planning efforts for critical infrastructure;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has faced challenges
in its efforts to provide and coordinate incident response and recovery
planning efforts in cases when critical infrastructure and key
resources are attacked or otherwise affected by catastrophic events or
disasters. Our work to date has primarily focused on cyber critical
infrastructure protection. In that area, we reported in June 2006 that
DHS had begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility
for developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery,
but these efforts were not yet complete or comprehensive. Specifically,
DHS developed high-level plans for infrastructure protection and
incident response, but the components of these plans that address the
Internet infrastructure were not yet complete. We noted that key
challenges to establishing a plan for recovering from an Internet
disruption included (1) innate characteristics of the Internet (such as
the diffuse control of the many networks that make up the Internet and
the private sector ownership of core components) that make planning for
and responding to disruptions difficult, (2) lack of consensus on DHS's
role and when the department should get involved in responding to a
disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS's ability to provide
assistance to entities working to restore Internet service, (4)
reluctance of many in the private sector to share information on
Internet disruptions with DHS, and (5) leadership and organizational
uncertainties within DHS. We reported that until these challenges were
addressed, DHS would have difficulty achieving results in its role as a
focal point for helping to recover the Internet from a major
disruption. In September 2006, we reported that the nation's experience
with Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that enhanced capabilities for
catastrophic response and recovery were needed, particularly for
capabilities such as the assessment of the disaster's effects, and
communications. We noted that DHS had reported taking some actions to
improve capabilities in response to findings in Congress' and the
administration's reviews. However, ongoing work was still needed by DHS
to address significant human resource challenges. In February 2007 the
DHS IG reported that food contamination exercises provide key learning
opportunities for food sector representatives, and generate valuable
lessons about how the response to a food-related incident is likely to
proceed and that Sector Coordinating Council and Government
Coordinating Council representatives said that they found food
contamination exercises to be very instructive. The DHS IG reported
that DHS has provided little direct support for or attention to
exercises relating to food contamination. Since 2003, DHS has provided
direct support for only four post-harvest food-related exercises
through Grants and Training's Exercise and Training Division. DHS has
sponsored six additional post-harvest food contamination tabletop
exercises through the Multi-State Partnership for Security in
Agriculture. And while the June 1, 2006, National Exercise Schedule
listed a total of 226 exercises over the following year, it did not
register a single post-harvest food-related exercise. For more
information see Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership,
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the
Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
System, GAO-06-618; Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in
Developing a Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan, GAO-06-672; GAO-05-
434; and GAO-05-214. Also see Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General, The Department of Homeland Security's Role in Food
Defense and Critical Infrastructure Protection, OIG-07-33 (Washington,
D.C.: February 2007); DHS updated information: In June 2007, DHS
provided updated information regarding its efforts to provide and
coordinate incident response and recovery planning efforts for critical
infrastructure. DHS reported that it has led a coordinated effort with
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy,
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to develop
interim Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Devices and
Improvised Nuclear Device Incidents. DHS stated that the objective of
the proposed guidance is to provide federal, state, local, and tribal
decision-makers with uniform federal guidance to protect the public,
emergency responders, and surrounding environments from the effects of
radiation following an radiological dispersal devices or improvised
nuclear device incident and to ensure that local and federal first
responders can address any issues or circumstances that may arise. DHS
reported that use of this guidance in subsequent exercises has
significantly improved the federal and state governments' ability to
provide sound guidance to the public. DHS also reported that the
Pandemic Flu Planning initiative for the Nuclear Sector is sponsored by
the Nuclear Sector Coordination Council, in cooperation with DHS; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. While DHS has taken steps to provide and
coordinate incident response and recovery planning efforts for critical
infrastructure, our previous work has shown that DHS efforts to develop
a public/private plan for Internet recovery were neither complete nor
comprehensive. We also reported that a number of challenges existed
that make it difficult to develop a plan. Further, in reviewing the
nation's experience with Hurricane Katrina, we reported that enhanced
capabilities for catastrophic response and recovery were needed;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Identify and assess threats and
vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has identified and
assessed threats and vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure. In
December 2005 we reported that DHS has taken steps to identify and
assess threats and vulnerabilities by, for example, establishing the
National Asset Database, an inventory of approximately 80,000 assets,
and developing and analyzing various threat scenarios. We also reported
that DHS had begun work to develop threat scenarios and analyze them.
We found that the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis
Center, staffed by sector specialists and intelligence analysts with
backgrounds from the intelligence community, was responsible for
generating these plausible threat scenarios and had developed 16, such
as a suicide bomber and a weapon of mass destruction. However, DHS has
faced challenges in, among other things, developing a way to
differentiate the relative probability of various threats and a
strategy for identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection
of critical infrastructure. In June 2006, the DHS IG reported that DHS
was still in the process of identifying and collecting critical
infrastructure and key resources data for populating the National Asset
Database while also building the next version of it. The DHS IG also
found that the National Asset Database contained numerous assets whose
criticality was not obvious and found inconsistencies in what critical
infrastructure and key resources states reported. Further, the DHS IG
reported that the National Asset Database was not yet comprehensive
enough to support the role envisioned for it in the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan. In February 2007 we reported that DHS
developed a method to estimate the relative risk of terrorist attacks
to urban areas for the Urban Areas Security Initiative, a discretionary
grant under the Homeland Security Grant Program. In fiscal year 2006,
DHS estimated the risk faced by urban areas by assessing the relative
risk of terrorism as a product of three componentsæthreat, or the
likelihood that a type of attack might be attempted; vulnerability, or
the likelihood of a successful attack using a particular attack
scenario; and consequence, or the potential impact of a particular
attack. To estimate the relative risk, DHS assessed risk from two
perspectives, asset-based and geographic, and then combined the
assessments. To estimate asset risk, DHS computed the product of
threat, vulnerability, and consequence by assessing the intent and
capabilities of an adversary to successfully attack an asset type, such
as a chemical plant, dam, or commercial airport, using one of 14
different attack scenarios. Simultaneously, DHS assessed geographic
risk by approximating the threat, vulnerability, and consequences
considering general geographic characteristics mostly independent of
the area's assets, using counts of data such as reports of suspicious
incidents, the number of visitors from countries of interest, and
population. For fiscal year 2007, DHS officials stated that they will
to continue to use the risk assessments to inform final funding
decisions. They also described changes that simplified the risk
methodology, integrating the separate analyses for asset-based and
geographic-based risk, and included more sensitivity analysis in
determining what the final results of its risk analysis should be.
While DHS stated that the department had made significant progress in
developing its risk assessment methods, DHS officials told us that for
the 2006 risk assessment process the department had limited knowledge
of how changes to its risk assessment methods, such as adding asset
types and using additional or different data sources, affected its risk
estimates. For more information see Homeland Security Grants:
Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate Funds to Selected Urban
Areas, GAO-07-381R; GAO-06-91; and GAO-05-434. Also, see Department of
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Progress in Developing
the National Asset Database, OIG-06-40 (Washington, D.C.: June 2006);
DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to identify and assess threats and
vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure. For example, DHS has
conducted over 2,600 vulnerability assessments on every critical
infrastructure sector though the Comprehensive Review program, the
Buffer Zone Protection Program, and the Site Assistance Visit program.
DHS describes the Comprehensive Review as a structured, collaborative
government and private sector analysis of high value critical
infrastructure and key resources facilities. The purpose of the review
is to explore exposure to potential terrorist attacks, their
consequences, and the integrated prevention and response capabilities
of stakeholders; Through the Buffer Zone Protection Program, and with
the support of DHS, local authorities develop Buffer Zone Protection
Plans, which DHS reported have several purposes, including identifying
specific threats and vulnerabilities associated with the buffer zone
and analyzing the level of risk associated with each vulnerability. DHS
describes the Site Assistance Visit Program as an information gathering
visit with several goals, such as better understanding and prioritizing
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure and key resources and
increasing awareness of threats and vulnerabilities among critical
infrastructure and key resources owners and operators. DHS has
conducted a total of 49 Comprehensive Reviews, 1,900 Buffer Zone Plans,
and 700 Site Assistance Visits and reported that more are scheduled
throughout fiscal year 2007; The Coast Guard stated that it is a
partner in the Comprehensive Review process and reported that the
results of the Comprehensive Reviews and Port Security Assessments were
entered into the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model to prioritize
risk according to a combination of possible threat, consequence, and
vulnerability scenarios. The Coast Guard stated that under this
approach, seaport infrastructure that was determined to be both a
critical asset and a likely and vulnerable target would be a high
priority for funding security enhancements while infrastructure that
was vulnerable to attack but not as critical or that was very critical
but already well-protected would be lower in priority. Further, DHS
reported that through its Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk
Assessment program, the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk
Analysis Center has developed a methodology for comparing and
prioritizing risks across infrastructure sectors. According to DHS, the
Center differentiates the relative probability of various threats. DHS
stated that the Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment was
produced in 2006 and it served as the National Critical Infrastructure
and Key Resources Risk Profile in the 2006 National Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection Annual Report. DHS reported
that this risk assessment model provides a mechanism to capture threat
estimates based on terrorist capability and the intent to attach
critical infrastructure and key resources. The Homeland Infrastructure
Threat and Risk Analysis Center provides sources for all analytical
judgments and coordinates the threat analysis with the Intelligence
Community. These estimates provide the basis for differentiating the
relative probability of the threat for each scenario assessed in the
Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment report. DHS also
reported that the department uses information contained within the
National Asset Database, further informed by comprehensive risk
analysis, to facilitate prioritization of the support it provides to
help secure the nation's infrastructure. DHS stated that in
collaboration with the Sector-Specific Agencies and state governments,
it has developed a list of the nation's most important infrastructure
to assets to inform the 2007 grants program. DHS stated that this
prioritization allows it to focus its planning, stakeholder
interaction, and resource allocation on those sites with the potential
to have a severe impact on public health, governance, the economy, or
national security; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally
achieved this performance expectation, as DHS has taken a number of
steps to identify and assess threats and vulnerabilities for critical
infrastructure. For example, DHS has conducted over 2,600 vulnerability
assessments on each of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors, and it
has conducted a total of 49 Comprehensive Reviews, 1,900 Buffer Zone
Plans, and 700 Site Assistance Visits and reported that more are
scheduled throughout fiscal year 2007. DHS has also assessed threats
and vulnerabilities through its risk estimates for the Urban Areas
Security Initiative;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Support efforts to reduce threats and
vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has supported efforts to reduce
threats and vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure. Supporting
efforts have included targeted infrastructure protection grants,
research and development, and sharing best practices. DHS has funded
research in different critical infrastructure areas. In 2005, DHS
released a national research and development plan supporting critical
infrastructure protection, but acknowledged at the time, though, that
it was a baseline plan and did not include an investment plan and road
map that were to be added in 2006. In July 2005 we reported that in the
area of cybersecurity DHS had initiated efforts to reduce threats by
enhancing collaboration with the law enforcement community and to
reduce vulnerabilities by shoring up guidance on software and system
security. However, we reported that efforts were not completed and that
vulnerability reduction efforts were limited until the cyber-related
vulnerability assessments were completed. In February 2007 we reported
that in fiscal year 2006, DHS provided approximately $1.7 billion in
federal funding to states, localities, and territories through its
Homeland Security Grant Program to prevent, protect against, respond
to, and recover from acts of terrorism or other catastrophic events. In
fiscal year 2006, DHS awarded approximately $711 million in Urban Areas
Security Initiative grants, discretionary grants under the Homeland
Security Grant Program--a 14 percent reduction in funds from the
previous year--while the number of eligible urban areas identified by
the risk assessment decreased from 43 to 35. In March 2007 we reported
that DHS had used various programs to fund passenger rail security
since 2003. For example, the fiscal year 2005 DHS appropriations act
provided $150 million for intercity passenger rail transit, freight
rail, and transit security grants. DHS used this funding to create and
administer new programs focused specifically on transportation
security, including the Transit Security Grant Program and the
Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program, which provided
financial assistance to address security preparedness and enhancements
for passenger rail and transit systems. During fiscal year 2006, DHS
provided $110 million to passenger rail transit agencies through the
Transit Security Grant Program and about $7 million to Amtrak through
the Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program. While DHS has
distributed hundreds of millions of dollars in grants to improve
passenger rail security, issues have surfaced about the grant process.
As DHS works to refine its risk assessment methodologies, develop
better means of assessing proposed investments using grant funds, and
align grant guidance with the implementation of broader emergency
preparedness goals, such as implementation of the National Preparedness
Goal, it has annually made changes to the guidance for the various
grants it administers. As a result of these annual changes, awardees
and potential grant recipients must annually review and understand new
information on the requirements for grant applications, including
justification of their proposed use of grant funds. Further, while
funds awarded through the Transit Security Grant Program can be used to
supplement funds received from other grant programs, allowable uses are
not clearly defined. For more information see Passenger Rail Security:
Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and
Guide Security Efforts, GAO-07-583T; GAO-07-381R; Information
Security: Coordination of Federal Cyber Security Research and
Development, GAO-06-811; GAO-05-827T; GAO-05-434; and Homeland
Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist
Attack, but Important Challenges Remain, GAO-05-214; DHS updated
information: In March, April, and June 2007 DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to support efforts to reduce threats
and vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure. Through the Buffer
Zone Protection Program, DHS reported that it assists local law
enforcement to make it more difficult for terrorists to conduct
surveillance or successfully launch attacks from the immediate vicinity
of critical infrastructure and key resources targets. DHS reported that
in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 Buffer Zone Protection Program grants
awarded to the states totaled approximately $140 million. DHS stated
that the program requires that funding be subgranted to the responsible
jurisdictions in support of prevention and protection focused
activities. DHS stated that of the approximately $140 million awarded,
the majority, approximately $107 million, or approximately 76 percent,
has gone to law enforcement organizations as subgrantees. DHS reported
that the remaining funding was subgranted to other disciplines, such as
emergency management, agriculture, and cyber security, with emergency
management receiving the second highest proportion of the funds,
approximately $18 million or 13 percent. DHS also reported that it is
documenting, through the Vulnerability Reduction Purchasing Plan, how
sub-grantees are utilizing grant money to reduce threats and
vulnerabilities based on the Buffer Zone Plan, Buffer Zone Protection
Program guidance, and the Authorized Equipment list, a DHS reference
tool. Further, in April 2007, DHS released the Chemical Facilities
Anti-Terrorism Standards, which established risk-based performance
standards for the security of chemical facilities. DHS provided several
examples of how the Nuclear Sector-Specific Agency, the Dams Sector-
Specific Agency, the Chemical Sector-Specific Agency, and the
Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Agency have supported efforts to
reduce threats and vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure. For
example, DHS reported that the Dams Sector-Specific Agency is
supporting a study on the vulnerabilities of dams to terrorist attacks
using large aircraft impact as the attack scenarios and that the
Nuclear Sector-Specific Agency has established the Comprehensive Review
Outcomes Working Network to reach back to the sites where Comprehensive
Reviews were conducted, identify the status of the gaps and potential
enhancements identified by the team, and continue the open and candid
dialogue between the government, industry, and State/local emergency
services organizations. In addition, DHS reported that the department's
Office for Bombing Prevention conducts capabilities assessments of
public safety bomb squads, explosives detection canine teams, and
public safety dive teams; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has
generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has funded
research in different critical infrastructure areas and, in the area of
cybersecurity, initiated efforts to reduce threats by enhancing
collaboration with the law enforcement community and to reduce
vulnerabilities by shoring up guidance on software and system security.
However, while DHS has taken steps to support efforts to reduce threats
and vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure, our prior work has
shown that challenges remain. For example, DHS has issued different
targeted infrastructure protection grants, but allowable uses of some
of these grants are not clearly defined. Further, DHS has released the
Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards, but it is too early to
evaluate their impact; Assessment: Generally achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Limited Progress in the Area of Science and Technology:
DHS's Science and Technology Directorate was established to coordinate
the federal government's civilian efforts to identify and develop
countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
other emerging terrorist threats to our nation. To coordinate the
national effort to protect the United States from nuclear and
radiological threats, in April 2005, the President directed the
establishment of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office within DHS. The
new office's mission covers a broad spectrum of responsibilities and
activities, but is focused primarily on providing a single accountable
organization to develop a layered defense system. This system is
intended to integrate the federal government's nuclear detection,
notification, and response systems. In addition, under the directive,
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is to acquire, develop, and
support the deployment of detection equipment in the United States, as
well as to coordinate the nation's nuclear detection research and
development efforts.
As shown in table 32, we identified six performance expectations for
DHS in the area of science and technology, and we found that overall
DHS has made limited progress in meeting those performance
expectations. In particular, we found that DHS has generally achieved
one performance expectation and has generally not achieved five other
performance expectations.
Table 32: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Science and
Technology:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop a plan for departmental research,
development, testing, and evaluation activities;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Assess emerging chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats and homeland security
vulnerabilities;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Coordinate research, development, and
testing efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to address
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging
terrorist threats;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Coordinate deployment of nuclear,
biological, chemical, and radiological detection capabilities and other
countermeasures;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Assess and evaluate nuclear, biological,
chemical, and radiological detection capabilities and other
countermeasures;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Coordinate with and share homeland security
technologies with federal, state, local, and private sector entities;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 1;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 5;
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 33 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of science and technology and our assessment of whether DHS
has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).
Table 33: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Science and Technology:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop a plan for departmental research,
development, testing, and evaluation activities;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has not yet developed
a plan for its research, development, testing, and evaluation
activities to achieve this performance expectation. In 2004, we
reported that DHS was still developing a strategic plan to identify
priorities, goals, objectives, and policies for the research and
development of countermeasures to nuclear, biological, chemical, and
other emerging terrorist threats. We reported that completion of this
strategic plan was delayed because much of the time since DHS's March
2003 creation had been spent organizing the Science and Technology
Directorate, developing policies and procedures, and hiring necessary
staff. In addition, the DHS IG has reported that the Science and
Technology Directorate had to contend with a set of administrative and
logistical challenges similar to those encountered by other startup
ventures, including the inability to hire personnel quickly who can
work in a secure environment, the lack of centralized space, and the
lack of consistent information technology systems and procurement
support. For more information, see Homeland Security: DHS Needs to
Improve Ethics-Related Management Controls for the Science and
Technology Directorate, GAO-06-206; Transportation Security R&D: TSA
and DHS Are Researching and Developing Technologies, but Need to
Improve R&D Management, GAO-04-890; and Homeland Security: DHS Needs a
Strategy to Use DOE's Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies, GAO-04-653. Also, see
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Survey of
the Science and Technology Directorate, OIG-04-24 (Washington, D.C.:
March 2004); DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS
provided us with updated information on its efforts to develop a plan
and strategy for research, development, testing, and evaluation
activities. The department reported that it has put into place a
combined organization and research portfolio strategy within the
Science and Technology Directorate aimed at identifying and
transitioning homeland security capabilities to customers. As part of
these efforts, DHS developed its FY2007-2008 Science and Technology
Execution Plan, which details the Science and Technology Directorate's
research, development, testing, and evaluation activities planned for
those years. The plan includes an overview of the mission, strategy,
and function of each Science and Technology Directorate division. DHS
has also developed and released its Technology Development and Transfer
report, which provides information on the department's strategy and
approach to homeland security research, development, testing, and
evaluation. In June 2007, DHS released the Science and Technology
Directorate Strategic Plan, which included the Science and Technology
Directorate Five-Year Research and Development Plan (fiscal years 2007
through 2011); Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. Since our prior work, DHS has
developed plans and reports that, according to the department, reflect
its overall strategy for research, development, testing, and evaluation
activities. However, our assessment of these plans and reports shows
that they do not include key elements of a strategic plan, such as
goals, measures, and milestones. For example, the FY2007-2008 Science
and Technology Execution Plan discusses activities for a 2-year period
and does not include performance measures and goals for the
department's research, development, testing, and evaluation
activities. The report on Technology Development and Transfer provides
a framework for how the Science and Technology Directorate plans to
conduct its activities but does not define the work to be undertaken by
the directorate. The Science and Technology Directorate Strategic Plan
and associated Five-Year Research Development Plan provide information
on deliverables and milestones for fiscal years 2007 through 2011.
However, these plans do not include goals and measures for the
department's science and technology activities. In addition, according
to the department, these plans do not address the requirement in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 for the department to develop a national
policy and strategic plan for identifying priorities, goals,
objectives, and policies for, and coordinating the federal government's
civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical,
biological, and other emerging terrorist threats, upon which this
performance expectation is, in part, based;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Assess emerging chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats and homeland security
vulnerabilities;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In 2004, we reported that DHS was in
the process of conducting risk assessments of various critical
infrastructure sectors. We reported that in the absence of completed
risk assessments, DHS officials were using available threat
intelligence, expert judgment, congressional mandates, mission needs,
and information about past terrorist incidents to select and prioritize
their research and development projects. For more information, see GAO-
04-890; DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided
us with updated information on its efforts to assess emerging chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and homeland security
vulnerabilities. In fiscal year 2006, DHS completed and distributed the
Bioterrorism Threat Risk Assessment that calculates risk for 28
biological threats agents considered in the context of numerous
possible scenarios, including aerosol dissemination and food and water
contamination. According to DHS, the process used for determining
bioterrorism risks included estimating the probabilities of occurrence
for the scenarios under consideration and then calculating consequences
for those scenarios should they occur. DHS reported that the
Bioterrorism Threat Risk Assessment has been used as a basis for other
assessments, the definition of intelligence collection requirements,
and technology development and to help decision makers evaluate
possible risk mitigation strategies. The Science and Technology
Directorate is currently updating this assessment to include
agricultural and economic effects and plans to reissue it in fiscal
year 2008. DHS reported that it is currently conducting a Chemical
Threat Risk Assessment and the Integrated Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Assessment to be delivered in June 2008. DHS
is also conducting four chemical threat assessments, and these threat
assessments are known as Population Threat Assessments. Each Population
Threat Assessment depicts a plausible, high-consequence scenario and
addresses aspects of an attack process, including the possible
acquisition, production, and dissemination of agents that could result
in a high consequence event. The assessment then provides an estimate
of the number of people potentially exposed to different doses of the
threat. The Population Threat Assessments are intended to assess
potential human exposures from a chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear event and provide population exposure estimates to perform
consequence modeling studies. Moreover, according to DHS, the
Biodefense Knowledge Center and the Chemical Security Analysis Center
assess known and emerging threats and issue Technical Bulletins on
threats and vulnerabilities; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has
generally not achieved this performance expectation. DHS has completed
some assessments on biological and chemical threats and
vulnerabilities. However, DHS is still in the process of completing
assessments in the chemical sector as well as its Integrated Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Assessment. Although DHS plans to
take actions to assess threats and vulnerabilities over time, including
updating past assessments, DHS's assessment efforts overall appear to
be the early stages, and substantial more work remains for DHS to more
fully conduct assessments of chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear threats;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Coordinate research, development, and
testing efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to address
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging
terrorist threats;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In prior work we reported that with
the creation of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in April 2005,
DHS took an important step in coordinating national research efforts to
address emerging threats. Among other responsibilities, the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office is taking the lead in developing a "global
architecture," an integrated approach to detecting and stopping nuclear
smuggling. However, we reported that because the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office was created so recently, these efforts are in their
early stages of development and implementation. With regard to
radiation portal monitors, in March 2006 we reported that DHS has
sponsored research, development, and testing activities that attempt to
improve the capabilities of existing radiation portal monitors and to
produce new, advanced technologies with even greater detection and
identification enhancements. However, we noted that much work remained
for the agency to achieve consistently better detection capabilities.
For example, DHS sponsored the development of a software package
designed to reduce the number of false alarms from portal monitors
already in widespread use. Further, we found that DHS was testing
advanced portal monitors that use a technology designed to both detect
the presence of radiation and identify its source. In addition, we
reported that DHS has sponsored a long-range research program aimed at
developing innovative technologies designed to improve the capabilities
of radiation detection equipment. More recently, in October 2006 we
reported that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's cost-benefit
analysis for the acquisition and deployment of new portal monitors did
not provide a sound analytical basis for the office's decision to
purchase and deploy new portal monitor technology. Specifically, we
reported that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office did not use the
results of its own performance tests in its cost-benefit analysis and
instead relied on assumptions of the new technology's anticipated
performance level. Furthermore, the analysis did not include the
results from side-by-side tests that the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office conducted of the advanced portal monitors and current portal
monitors. The cost-benefit analysis for acquiring and deploying portal
monitors was also incomplete because it did not include all of the
major costs and benefits required by DHS guidelines. In particular, the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office did not assess the likelihood that
radiation detection equipment would either misidentify or fail to
detect nuclear or radiological material. Rather, it focused its
analysis on reducing the time necessary to screen traffic at border
checkpoints and reduce the impact of any delays on commerce. In March
2007, we reported that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office had not
yet collected a comprehensive inventory of testing information on
commercially available portal monitors. Such information--if collected
and used--could improve the office's understanding of how well portal
monitors detect different radiological and nuclear materials under
varying conditions. In turn, this understanding would assist the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's future testing, development,
deployment, and purchases of portal monitors. We also reported that the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has been improving its efforts to
provide technical and operational information about radiation portal
monitors to state and local authorities. For example, the office helped
to establish a Web site that, among other things, includes information
for state and local officials on radiation detection equipment products
and performance requirements. However, some state representatives,
particularly those from states with less experience conducting
radiation detection programs, would like to see the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office provide more prescriptive advice on what types of
radiation detection equipment to deploy and how to use it. For more
information, see Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet
Collected Most of the National Laboratories' Test Results on Radiation
Portal Monitors in Support of DNDO's Testing and Development Program,
GAO-07-347R; Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress
Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but
Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389; Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Cost-
Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New Radiation Detection
Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not
Fully Evaluate All the Monitors' Costs and Benefits, GAO-07-133R; and
GAO-04-653; DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS
provided us with updated information on its efforts to coordinate
research, development, and testing efforts to identify and develop
countermeasures to address threats. According to DHS, the Science and
Technology Directorate is currently developing and testing several
systems to provide the technology needed to counter the use of chemical
and biological weapons. There are currently 6 projects under
development as chemical countermeasures and 10 projects for biological
counter measures. These countermeasures include sensors, detection
capabilities, and identification systems. DHS also reported that the
interagency Technical Support Working Group has worked with the DHS
Science and Technology Directorate to identify technologies that could
assist DHS customers in addressing their capability gaps. The DHS
Science and Technology Directorate also noted that it has taken steps,
such as establishing an International Program Division, to coordinate
efforts with international partners. DHS also reported that it works
with other federal agencies and entities to coordinate research and
development activities, including the National Science and Technology
Council's Committee on Homeland and National Security; the National
Nuclear Security Administration; the Departments of Defense, Energy,
Health and Human Services; the Food and Drug Administration; the
Centers for Disease Control; and the Environmental Protection Agency.
DHS reported that in 2004 it started four Regional Technology
Integration pilots to test chemical and biological explosives detection
systems; planning and exercise tools to evaluate performance; and
technologies for credentialing emergency responders and verifying
victims' identities during an incident; Our assessment: We conclude
that DHS has generally not achieved this performance expectation. DHS
has taken some actions to coordinate research, development, and testing
efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to address various
threats. Specifically, DHS has taken actions to develop and test
various capabilities to detect the presence of radiation in cargo
entering the United States. DHS has also coordinated research,
development, and testing activities for detecting and identifying
biological and chemical threats. However, DHS has not always
comprehensively collected testing shared information with regard to
radiation portal monitors, and some state officials have identified
concerns in the advice on the monitors provided by DHS. Moreover, as
previously discussed, DHS has completed some assessments of threats and
vulnerabilities and is in the processing of conducting others. Until
these assessments are completed across the nuclear, radiological,
biological, and chemical sectors, DHS may not fully know what
technologies or countermeasures and associated requirements are needed
to address identified threats and vulnerabilities;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Coordinate deployment of nuclear,
biological, chemical and radiological detection capabilities and other
countermeasures;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In prior work, we reported on the
progress DHS has made in coordinating the deployment of capabilities
for screening containerized shipments entering the United States. As of
February 2006, CBP estimated that it had the ability to screen about 62
percent of all containerized shipments entering the United States and
roughly 77 percent of all private vehicles. However, we reported that
CBP and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory were behind schedule in
deploying radiation portal monitors and would have to increase the
speed of deployment by almost 230 percent in order to meet their
September 2009 program completion date. For more information, see GAO-
06-389 and GAO-04-890; DHS updated information: In March and April
2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts to
coordinate the deployment of nuclear, biological, chemical, and
radiological detection capabilities and countermeasures. For example,
DHS reported as of March 2007, it was scanning 91 percent of
containerized cargo entering the United States by land and sea for
radiation, deploying 283 new portal monitors in fiscal year 2006 and
bringing the total number of deployed portal monitors to 966 as of
March 9, 2007. DHS has deployed the BioWatch system, a biological and
chemical aerosol monitoring system, in more than 30 cities nationwide
to provide early warning of a bio-attack. DHS also reported that it is
piloting the Biological Warning and Incident Characterization system to
better and more rapidly characterize the public health effects of a
BioWatch positive indication. DHS also reported that it has deployed
the Rapidly Deployable Chemical Defense Systems to multiple national
security special events. This system is a network of chemical ground-
based detectors and aerial surveillance monitors that can identify
specific chemical compounds and image the impact of a downwind chemical
hazard. DHS has also deployed the Program for Response Options and
Technology Enhancements for Chemical Terrorism that detects the release
of toxic chemical agents in subway systems. In addition, through the
Public Health Actionable Assays project, DHS is working to establish
sampling evaluation and biodetection standards by developing a
mechanism for rigorous, independent evaluation and validation of Assay
Technologies; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not
yet achieved this performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to
coordinate the deployment of various chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear detection capabilities and countermeasures.
In particular, DHS has deployed various systems to ports of entry, for
example, to detect possible nuclear or radiological materials entering
the United States. DHS has also deployed systems to detect the presence
of biological or chemical agents in the air and to provide warning of
the presence of these agents. However, DHS generally did not provide us
with documentation on its efforts to coordinate the deployment of
countermeasures beyond radiation detection capabilities at ports of
entry and monitoring of possible aerosol-based attacks. Moreover, as
previously discussed, DHS has completed some assessments of threats and
vulnerabilities and is in the processing of conducting others. Until
these assessments are completed across the nuclear, radiological,
biological, and chemical sectors, DHS may not fully know what
technologies or countermeasures and associated requirements are needed
to address identified threats and vulnerabilities. Although we see
progress in DHS's activities for deploying capabilities and
countermeasures, much more work is needed for us to conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Assess and evaluate nuclear, biological,
chemical, and radiological detection capabilities and other
countermeasures;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In prior work we reported on the
effort to test radiation detection equipment. We reported that in
February 2005, DHS sponsored testing of commercially available portal
monitors, isotope identifiers, and pagers against criteria set out in
American National Standards Institute standards. These standards
provided performance specifications and test methods for testing
radiation detection equipment, including portal monitors and handheld
devices. The actual testing was performed by four Department of Energy
laboratories, with coordination, technical management, and data
evaluation provided by the Department of Commerce's National Institute
for Standards and Technology. The laboratories tested a total of 14
portal monitors from eight manufacturers against 29 performance
requirements in the standards. Overall, none of the radiation detection
equipment, including the portal monitors and handheld devices deployed
by CBP, met all of the performance requirements in this first round of
testing. However, according to Science and Technology Directorate
officials, many of the limitations noted in CBP's equipment were
related to withstanding environmental conditions--not radiation
detection or isotope identification. More recently, in March 2007 we
reported that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office had not yet
collected a comprehensive inventory of testing information on
commercially available polyvinyl toluene portal monitors, which detect
the presence of radiation but cannot distinguish between benign,
naturally occurring radiological materials, such as ceramic tile, and
dangerous materials, such as highly enriched uranium. We reported that
such information--if collected and used--could improve the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office's understanding of how well portal monitors
detect different radiological and nuclear materials under varying
conditions. In turn, this understanding would assist the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office's future testing, development, deployment, and
purchases of portal monitors. Radiation detection experts with the
national laboratories and industry told us that, in their view, the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office should collect and maintain all the
national laboratory test reports on commercially available portal
monitors because these reports provide a comprehensive inventory of how
well portal monitors detect a wide variety of radiological and nuclear
materials and how environmental conditions and other factors may affect
performance. For more information, see GAO-07-347R and GAO-06-389; DHS
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to assess and evaluate nuclear,
biological, chemical, and radiological detection capabilities and
countermeasures. DHS reported that the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office has conducted a variety of tests on radiation portal monitors.
In addition, DHS reported that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
has worked with various partners to develop a global nuclear detection
architecture that identifies vulnerabilities and is used by DHS and its
partners as a basis for assessing gaps in detection capabilities and
identifying possible paths from the original source of the radiological
or nuclear material to targets within the United States. DHS also
reported that it has evaluated the capabilities it has deployed to
address chemical and biological threats, including BioWatch and Rapidly
Deployable Chemical Detection Systems. In addition, DHS has
participated in efforts to develop and assess a set of procedures,
plans, and technologies to rapidly restore transportation nodes
following a biological attack, with a focus on major international
airports; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not yet
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has undertaken efforts to
assess its chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detection
capabilities, including radiation portal monitors and BioWatch.
However, we identified concerns about DHS's efforts to collect and
analyze data on the results of testing of radiation mortal monitors,
and DHS did not provide us with evidence on the results of its efforts
to assess countermeasures deployed to address chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats. Although we see progress in DHS's
activities for assessing deployed capabilities and countermeasures,
much more work is needed for us to conclude that DHS has generally
achieved this performance expectation;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Coordinate with and share homeland security
technologies with federal, state, local, and private sector entities;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has taken actions to
coordinate with homeland security partners. For example, DHS has
coordinated with some interagency groups, including the National
Security Council's Policy Coordinating Committee for Counterterrorism
and National Preparedness. DHS also cochairs a standing committee on
Homeland and National Security in the White House's Office of Science
and Technology Policy. This committee identifies key areas requiring
interagency coordination in the formulation of research and development
agendas. DHS has also worked with the Technical Support Working Group-
-an interagency working group of representatives from over 80 federal
agencies that is jointly overseen by the Departments of State and
Defense. DHS also coordinated some of its research and development
projects with other federal agencies. For example, DHS is responsible
for BioWatch, a federal program that monitors about 30 major cities for
chemical and biological threats. BioWatch is executed jointly by DHS,
Department of Energy's laboratories, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In March
2007, we reported that with regard to radiation portal monitors, the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has been improving its efforts to
provide technical and operational information about radiation portal
monitors to state and local authorities. For example, the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office recently helped to establish a Web site that,
among other things, includes information for state and local officials
on radiation detection equipment products and performance requirements.
However, some state representatives with whom we spoke, particularly
those from states with less experience conducting radiation detection
programs, would like to see the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
provide more prescriptive advice on what types of radiation detection
equipment to deploy and how to use it. For more information, see GAO-
07-347R, GAO-04-653, and GAO-04-890; DHS updated information: In March
and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts
to coordinate with and share homeland security technologies with
federal, state, local, and private sector entities. For example, DHS
reported that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has supported the
Domestic Nuclear Defense Research and Development Working Group to
develop a coordinated research and development roadmap for domestic
nuclear defense efforts. Specifically, this working group coordinates
research and development strategies for domestic nuclear defense, the
identification and filling of technology gaps, efforts to develop and
sustain capabilities through appropriate investments in science and
research, interagency funding for science and technology, and
collaboration and exchange of research and development information. DHS
reported that this working group's initial report was completed in
January 2006 and that the roadmap is currently being updated, with a
scheduled completion date of September 2007. The DHS Science and
Technology Directorate reported that its Technology Clearinghouse and
TechSolutions initiatives provide direct support to emergency
responders. The Technology Clearinghouse is designed to provide access
to technology information for federal, state, and local public safety
and first responder entities. TechSolutions provides a Web-based
mechanism for first responders to provide information on their
capability gaps. The Science and Technology Directorate responds by
identifying existing technology that could meet the need or, if no
existing technology is available, to prototype a possible solution. DHS
has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the Department of
Health and Human Services, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Justice, and the U.S. Postal Service for the coordination of air
monitoring programs and, among other things, the development a national
architecture and joint technology roadmap for investing in technologies
for monitoring biological threats. Moreover, the Science and Technology
Directorate has established centers for analysis and development
efforts with other federal agencies. In addition, metropolitan subway
systems have taken over operation of the Program for Response Options
and Technology Enhancements for Chemical Terrorism, a system that
detects releases of toxic chemical agents; Our assessment: We conclude
that DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has
taken actions to coordinate with and share homeland security
technologies with a wide variety of partners;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Modest Progress in Acquisition Management:
Federal agencies use a variety of approaches and tools, including
contracts, to acquire goods and services needed to fulfill or support
the agencies' missions. DHS has some of the most extensive acquisition
needs within the U.S. government. In fiscal year 2004, for example, the
department obligated $9.8 billion to acquire a wide range of goods and
services--such as information systems, new technologies, weapons,
aircraft, ships, and professional services. In fiscal year 2006, the
department reported that it obligated $15.6 billion to acquire a wide
range of goods and services. The DHS acquisitions portfolio is broad
and complex. For example, the department has purchased increasingly
sophisticated screening equipment for air passenger security; acquired
technologies to secure the nation's borders; purchased trailers to meet
the housing needs of Hurricane Katrina victims; and is upgrading the
Coast Guard's offshore fleet of surface and air assets. DHS has been
working to integrate the many acquisition processes and systems that
the disparate agencies and organizations brought with them when they
merged into DHS in 2003 while still addressing ongoing mission
requirements and emergency situations, such as responding to Hurricane
Katrina.
As shown in table 34, we identified three performance expectations for
DHS in the area of acquisition management and found that overall DHS
has made modest progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically,
we found that DHS has generally achieved one and not achieved two of
the three performance expectations.
Table 34: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Acquisition
Management:
Performance expectation: 1. Assess and organize acquisition functions
to meet agency needs;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Develop clear and transparent policies and
processes for all acquisitions;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Develop an acquisition workforce to
implement and monitor acquisitions;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 1;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 2;
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 35 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of acquisition management and our assessment of whether DHS
has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).
Table 35: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Acquisition Management:
Performance expectation: 1. Assess and organize acquisition functions
to meet agency needs;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken positive steps to
assess and organize acquisition functions within the department to meet
agency needs, but more work remains. For example, the department has
developed an acquisition oversight plan that it expects to be fully
implemented during fiscal year 2007. The Chief Procurement Officer has
taken several actions to implement the plan--which generally
incorporates basic principles of an effective and accountable
acquisition function. The plan monitors acquisition performance through
four recurring reviews: self-assessment, operational status, on-site,
and acquisition planning. Each component has completed the first self-
assessment, which has helped components to identify and prioritize
acquisition weaknesses. In addition, each component has submitted an
initial operational status report to the Chief Procurement Officer and
on-site reviews are being conducted. However, the plan is in the
process of being implemented, and is just one of the mechanisms to
oversee DHS acquisitions. For example, there is a separate investment
review process established to oversee major, complex acquisitions.
Regarding the organization of the acquisition function, the October
2004 management directive entitled "Acquisition Line of Business
Integration and Management" provided the department's principal
guidance for "leading, governing, integrating, and managing" the
acquisition function. This directive states that DHS will create
departmentwide acquisition policies and procedures and continue to
consolidate and integrate the number of systems supporting the
acquisition function. However, our prior work found that the Chief
Procurement Officer's enforcement authority over procurement decisions
at the component agencies was unclear. In addition, according to the
directive, the Coast Guard and Secret Service were exempt from
complying with the management directive. DHS officials have stated that
they are in the process of modifying the lines of business management
directive to ensure that no contracting organization is exempt. DHS
stated that the Under Secretary for Management has authority as the
Chief Acquisition Officer to monitor acquisition performance, establish
clear lines of authority for making acquisition decisions, and manage
the direction of acquisition policy for the department. They further
stated that these authorities devolve to the Chief Procurement Officer.
In addition, DHS reported significant progress in staffing of the
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer and stated that these
additional personnel will significantly contribute to improvement in
the DHS acquisition and contracting enterprise. For more information,
see Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Department's
Acquisition Oversight Plan, GAO-07-900; Ongoing Challenges in Creating
an Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-07-948T; Interagency
Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight Would Enable
the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks, GAO-06-996;
Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Promote Successful Use of
Special DHS Acquisition Authority, GAO-05-136; Homeland Security:
Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-06-
1012T; and Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS's Efforts
to Create an Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-05-179; DHS
updated information: DHS provided additional information on its efforts
to assess and organize acquisition functions. For example, DHS reported
the Chief Procurement Officer has some means to influence components
compliance with procurement policies and procedures. DHS also reported
that the Chief Procurement Officer meets monthly with the Component
Heads of Contracting Activities to discuss and address issues and
common problems. According to DHS, the Chief Procurement Officer has
asked the component heads to align their performance goals with the
Chief Procurement Officer goals and has direct input into components'
performance assessments. DHS reported that the Chief Procurement
Officer is developing a series of common metrics to assess the status
of acquisition activities within DHS. In addition, the Under Secretary
for Management testified that he is examining the authorities of the
Chief Procurement Officer to determine whether any change is needed;
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. Modifying the acquisition lines of business
management directive to ensure that no DHS contracting organization is
exempt is a positive step. However, until DHS formally designates the
Chief Acquisition Officer, and modifies applicable management
directives to support this designation, DHS's existing policy of dual
accountability between the component heads and the Chief Procurement
Officer leaves unclear the Chief Procurement Officer's authority to
enforce corrective actions to achieve the department's acquisition
goals;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Develop clear and transparent policies and
processes for all acquisitions;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet developed clear and
transparent policies and processes for all acquisitions. For example,
DHS put into place an investment review process that adopts many
acquisition best practices to help the department reduce risk and
increase the chances for successful investment in terms of cost,
schedule, and performance. However, in 2005, we found that the process
did not include critical management reviews to help ensure that the
design for the product performs as expected and that resources match
customer needs before any funds are invested. Our prior work on large
DHS acquisition programs, such as TSA's Secure Flight program and the
Coast Guard's Deepwater program, highlight the need for improved
oversight of contractors and adherence to a rigorous management review
process. The investment review process is still under revision and the
department's performance and accountability report for fiscal year 2006
stated that DHS will incorporate changes to the process by the first
quarter of fiscal year 2008. In addition, we found that DHS does not
have clear guidance for all types of acquisitions, such as how to
manage the risks of interagency contracting. The management of this
contracting method was identified as a governmentwide high-risk area in
2005 as a result of improper use. For more information, see GAO-07-
948T; GAO-06-996; GAO-06-1012T; and GAO-05-179; DHS updated
information: DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts to
develop clear policies and processes for acquisitions. DHS reported
that the department has been working to integrate its organizations
through common policies and procedures under the Homeland Security
Acquisition Regulation and the Homeland Security Acquisition Manual.
DHS also reported that the Chief Procurement Officer works with the
Component Heads of Contracting Activities to ensure all acquisitions
are handled according to DHS policies and procedures; Our assessment:
We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation. DHS did not provide us with documentation of its efforts
to ensure that all acquisitions follow DHS's policies and procedures
and address challenges we previously identified in DHS's acquisition
process. For example, DHS did not report progress on efforts to address
weaknesses we identified in its investment review process, including
the lack of critical management reviews to help ensure that the design
of the product performs as expected and that resource match customer
needs. We also reported that DHS lacked guidance for managing certain
types of acquisitions, such as how to manage interagency contracting
risks, and DHS did not provide us with updated guidance;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Develop an acquisition workforce to
implement and monitor acquisitions;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken initial steps needed
to develop a workforce to ensure that acquisitions are effectively
implemented and monitored, but more work remains. Our reviews have
found staffing shortages led the Office of Procurement Operations to
rely extensively on outside agencies for contracting support in order
to meet contracting needs of several component organizations. Our work
on contracting issues following Hurricane Katrina indicated that the
number of contract monitoring staff available was not always
sufficient, nor were they effectively deployed to provide sufficient
oversight. Based on work at the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, in July 2003, we recommended that DHS develop a data-driven
assessment of the department's acquisition personnel, resulting in a
workforce plan that would identify the number, location, skills, and
competencies of the workforce. In 2005, we reported on disparities in
the staffing levels and workload imbalance among the component
procurement offices. We recommended that DHS conduct a departmentwide
assessment of the number of contracting staff, and if a workload
imbalance were to be found, take steps to correct it by realigning
resources. In 2006, DHS reported significant progress in providing
staff for the component contracting offices, though much work remained
to fill the positions with qualified, trained acquisition
professionals. DHS has established a goal of aligning procurement
staffing levels with contract spending at its various components by the
last quarter of fiscal year 2009. For more information, see
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618; Contract
Management: INS Contracting Weaknesses Need Attention from the
Department of Homeland Security, GAO-3-799; GAO-06-996; and GAO-05-179;
DHS updated information: DHS provided us with additional information on
its efforts to develop an acquisition workforce. DHS reported that it
authorized the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer 25 full-time
equivalents for fiscal year 2007 and has requested an additional 25
full-time equivalents for fiscal year 2008. According to DHS, these
additional full-time equivalents will allow the Chief Procurement
Officer to complete staffing of its procurement oversight and
management functions and provide staff for other acquisition functions,
such as program management and cost analysis. In addition, DHS reported
that it requested funding in fiscal year 2008 to establish a centrally
managed acquisition intern program and provide acquisition training to
the DHS acquisition workforce; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS
generally has not achieved this performance expectation. DHS has much
work to fill approved positions and has not corrected workload
imbalances among component organizations;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Modest Progress in Financial Management:
Effective financial management is a key element of financial
accountability. With its establishment by the Homeland Security Act of
2002, DHS inherited a myriad of redundant financial management systems
from 22 diverse agencies, along with about 100 resource management
systems and 30 reportable conditions identified in prior component
financial audits. Additionally, most of the 22 components that
transferred to DHS had not been subjected to significant financial
statement audit scrutiny prior to their transfer, so the extent to
which additional significant internal control deficiencies existed was
unknown. DHS's Office of the Chief Financial Officer is responsible for
functions, such as budget, finance and accounting, strategic planning
and evaluation, and financial systems for the department. The Office of
the Chief Financial Officer is also charged with ongoing integration of
these functions within the department. For fiscal year 2006, DHS was
again unable to obtain an opinion on its financial statements, and
numerous material internal control weaknesses continued to be reported.
DHS's auditor had issued a disclaimer of opinion on DHS's fiscal years
2003, 2004, and 2005 financial statements.
As shown in table 36, we identified seven performance expectations for
DHS in the area of financial management and found that overall DHS has
made modest progress meeting those performance expectations.
Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved two performance
expectations and has generally not achieved five others.
Table 36: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Financial
Management:
Performance expectation: 1. Designate a department Chief Financial
Officer who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Subject all financial statements to an
annual financial statement audit; Assessment: Generally achieved:
[Empty]; Assessment: Generally not achieved: P; Assessment: No
assessment made: [Empty].
Performance expectation: 3. Obtain an unqualified financial statement
audit opinion;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Substantially comply with federal financial
management system requirements, applicable federal accounting
standards, and the U.S. Standard General Ledger at the transaction
level;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Obtain an unqualified opinion on internal
control over financial reporting;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Prepare corrective action plans for
internal control weaknesses;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Correct internal control weaknesses;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 2;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 5;
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 37 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of financial management and our assessment of whether DHS has
taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).
Table 37: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Financial Management:
Performance expectation: 1. Designate a department Chief Financial
Officer who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings and our assessment: DHS
has designated a Chief Financial Officer appointed by the President on
January 18, 2006, and confirmed by the Senate on May 26, 2006. In July
2004, we noted that with the size and complexity of DHS and the many
significant financial management challenges it faces, it is important
that DHS's Chief Financial Officer be qualified for the position,
displays leadership characteristics, and is regarded as part of DHS's
top management. This is because the Chief Financial Officer Act
requires, among other things, that the agency's Chief Financial Officer
develop and maintain an integrated accounting and financial management
system that provides for complete, reliable, and timely financial
information that facilitates the systematic measurement of performance
at the agency, the development and reporting of cost information, and
the integration of accounting and budget information. The Chief
Financial Officer is also responsible for all financial management
personnel and all financial management systems and operations, which in
the case of DHS would include the component Chief Financial Officers
and their staff. For more information, see Department of Homeland
Security: Financial Management Challenges, GAO-04-945T;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Subject all financial statements to an
annual financial statement audit;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has not subjected all
financial statements to an annual financial statement audit. According
to DHS's fiscal year 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, the
DHS IG engaged an independent auditor to audit the September 30, 2006,
balance sheet and statement of custodial activity only. According to
the Independent Auditor's Report, DHS is to represent that its balance
sheet is fairly stated and obtain at least a qualified opinion before
it is practical to extend the audit to other financial statements. The
Office of Financial Management, Coast Guard, TSA, FEMA, ICE, and the
DHS Management Directorate were unable to provide sufficient evidence
to support account balances presented in the financial statements and
collectively contributed to the auditors' inability to render an
opinion for fiscal year 2006. According to the DHS's financial audit
results, many of the department's difficulties in financial management
and reporting could be attributed to the original stand-up of a large,
new, and complex executive branch agency without adequate
organizational expertise in financial management and accounting. DHS
recently committed to obtaining additional human resources and other
critical infrastructure necessary to develop reliable financial
processes, policies, procedures, and internal controls to enable
management to represent that financial statements are complete and
accurate. For more information, see Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY
2006 Financial Statements, OIG-07-10 (Washington, D.C.: November
2006); DHS updated Information: DHS did not provide updated
information relating to this performance expectation. In March 2007,
DHS officials indicated that they generally agreed with our assessment
and noted that the department has determined that it is not an
effective use of resources to subject all financial statements to an
annual audit until its balance sheet receives an unqualified opinion;
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. According to the DHS fiscal year 2006
Performance and Accountability Report and audits conducted by the DHS
IG and independent auditors that DHS has not subjected all of its
financial statements to an annual financial statement audit;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Obtain an unqualified financial statement
audit opinion;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: For fiscal year 2006, DHS
was unable to obtain an opinion on its financial statements, and
numerous material internal control weaknesses continued to be reported.
Independent auditors under contract with the DHS IG issued a disclaimer
of opinion on DHS's fiscal year 2004, 2005, and 2006 financial
statements. The disclaimer of opinion was due primarily to financial
reporting problems at four component agencies and at the department
level. In September 2003, we noted that although many of the larger
agencies that transferred to DHS had been able to obtain unqualified,
or "clean," audit opinions on their annual financial statements, most
employed significant effort and manual workarounds to do so in order to
overcome a history of poor financial management systems and significant
internal control weaknesses. For more information, see Department of
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Fiscal Year 2006 DHS
Performance and Accountability Report (Washington, D.C.: 2006) and
Department of Homeland Security: Challenges and Steps in Establishing
Sound Financial Management, GAO-03-1134T; DHS updated information: In
March 2007, DHS provided updated information about progress component
agencies had made in audits of their financial statements. DHS stated
that CBP underwent a full scope, standalone audit of its fiscal year
2006 financial statements and received an unqualified audit opinion,
and that the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center achieved an
unqualified opinion of its first balance sheet audit. However, DHS
officials stated that the department will likely not be able to obtain
an unqualified opinion on its financial statements, primarily because
of material weaknesses at the Coast Guard. According to the DHS Office
of the Chief Financial Officer, the Coast Guard has a material weakness
in virtually every category and has not yet addressed many of the root
causes of these weaknesses, including insufficient policies and
procedures and lack of effective control systems. With regard to other
DHS components, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer noted that in
the fiscal year 2006 audit report, the auditors dropped several
material conditions that were reported in the fiscal year 2005 report,
indicating that DHS has made progress in addressing some material
weaknesses. For example, during fiscal year 2006, the Office of the
Chief Financial Officer noted that ICE and TSA made significant
progress in addressing their material weaknesses and are projected to
make more progress in fiscal year 2007. According to DHS officials, the
Coast Guard also established a Financial Management Transformation Task
Force in July 2006 through which the Coast Guard developed milestones
to address its financial management challenges. In addition, the Office
of the Chief Financial Officer noted that the department has faced
challenges in ensuring the development and implementation of effective
control systems due to the multiple departmental reorganizations since
its establishment 4 years ago. For more information, see Department of
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Independent Auditors'
Report on CBP's FY 2006 Consolidated Financial Statements, OIG-07-19
(Washington, D.C.: December 2006) and Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Special Report: Letter on Information
Technology Matters Related to TSA's FY 2005 Financial Statements
(Redacted), OIG-07-18 (Washington, D.C.: December 2006); Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. Some DHS components have recently made
progress in their component financial statement and balance sheet
audits, but substantial more work remains, as DHS has not yet obtained
an unqualified opinion on its financial statement;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Substantially comply with federal financial
management system requirements, federal accounting standards, and the
U.S. Standard General Ledger at the transaction level;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has not yet ensured
that it substantially complies with the Federal Financial Management
Systems Requirements, Federal Accounting Standards, and the U.S.
Standard General Ledger at the transaction level. In 2006, we reported
that the eMerge2 program was supposed to provide DHS with the financial
system functionality to consolidate and integrate the department's
financial accounting and reporting systems, including budget,
accounting and reporting, cost management, asset management, and
acquisition and grants functions, thereby helping the department comply
with the Federal Financial Management Systems Requirements, Federal
Accounting Standards, and the U.S. Standard General Ledger at the
transaction level. We noted that DHS officials stated that a systems
integrator was hired in December 2003, and the project was expected to
be fully deployed and operational in 2006. According to DHS officials,
because the project was not meeting its performance goals and timeline,
DHS officials began considering whether to continue the project and in
spring 2005 started looking at another strategy. Further, we reported
that DHS officials decided to change the strategy for the eMerge2
program in October 2005 and focus on leveraging the systems already in
place. DHS planed to continue eMerge2 using a shared services approach.
According to DHS officials, although a departmentwide concept of
operations and migration plan were still under development, they
expected progress to be made in the next 5 years. We reported that DHS
officials said that they had decided to develop a new strategy for the
planned financial management systems integration program because the
prior strategy was not meeting its performance goals and timeline. For
more information, see Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an
Opportunity to Incorporate Best Practices in Modernization Efforts,
GAO-06-553T. Also, see Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General, Fiscal Year 2006 DHS Performance and Accountability
Report (Washington, D.C.: 2006); DHS updated information: In March
2007, DHS provided us with updated information on components' efforts
to comply with Federal Financial Management System Requirements,
Federal Accounting Standards, and the U.S. Standard General Ledger at
the transaction level. In October 2004, CBP successfully implemented,
on schedule, its third and last phase of its financial system.
According to DHS, the system replaced several legacy systems and
provides CBP with a fully integrated system for budget, acquisition,
finance, and property and therefore helping to ensure CBP's compliance
with the Federal Financial Management Systems Requirements, Federal
Accounting Standards, and the U.S. Standard General Ledger at the
transaction level. DHS further noted that this successful
implementation was an integral part of CBP obtaining an unqualified
audit opinion; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. DHS is still in the process of
developing a new strategy for integrating its financial management
systems, but departmentwide has not yet substantially compiled with
Federal Financial Management System Requirements, Federal Accounting
Standards, and the U.S. Standard General Ledger at the transaction
level;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Obtain an unqualified opinion on internal
control over financial reporting;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS is required by the
DHS Financial Accountability Act to obtain an opinion on its internal
control over financial reporting. According to DHS's fiscal year 2006
Performance and Accountability Report, the DHS IG issued an adverse
opinion. During fiscal year 2006, the auditors identified the following
reportable conditions, which are considered material weaknesses:
financial management oversight (entity level controls); financial
reporting; financial systems security; fund balance with Treasury;
property, plant, and equipment; operating materials and supplies; legal
and other liabilities; actuarial liabilities; budgetary accounting; and
intragovernmental and intradepartmental balances. For more information,
see Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, FY
2006 Audit of DHS' Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, OIG-07-20
(Washington, D.C.: December 2006) and Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Review of FEMA Internal Controls for
Funding Administrative Cost Under State Management Grants, OIG-07-
21(Washington, D.C.: December 2007); DHS updated information: DHS did
not provide us with updated information on its efforts to obtain an
unqualified opinion on internal control over financial reporting; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation, as DHS has not yet obtained an unqualified
opinion on internal control over financial reporting;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Prepare corrective action plans for
internal control weaknesses;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has taken steps to
prepare corrective action plans for internal control weaknesses.
According to the fiscal year 2006 DHS Performance and Accountability
Report, during 2006, DHS reported formalizing the corrective action
planning process through a management directive, guidance, and
training; implementing an automated corrective action tracking system
to ensure progress is tracked and management is held accountable for
progress; developing a corrective action strategic planning process for
improving financial management at DHS; working with the Office of
Management and Budget to monitor corrective action plans; establishing
ongoing reporting by the DHS IG that assesses and complements
management's corrective action efforts through performance audits; and
executing the first phase of the Office of Management and Budget-
approved multiyear plan to implement a comprehensive internal control
assessment pursuant to the Office of Management and Budget Circular No.
A-123, Appendix A, Management's Responsibility for Internal Control,
guidelines. However, according to the fiscal year 2006 DHS Performance
and Accountability Report, DHS and its components did not fully develop
corrective action plans to address all material weaknesses and
reportable conditions identified by previous financial statement
audits. In the past, the DHS IG noted that some corrective action plans
lacked sufficient detail, such as clearly defined roles and
responsibilities, actions to be taken, timetables for completion of
actions, and documented supervisory review and approval of completed
actions. For more information, see Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Audit of DHS' Corrective Action Plan
Process for Financial Reporting, Report No. 4, OIG-07-29 (Washington,
D.C.: February 2007) and Audit of DHS' Corrective Action Plan Process
for Financial Reporting - Report No. 3, OIG-07-13 (Washington, D.C.:
December 2006); DHS updated information: In April 2007, DHS provided
us with updated information on its efforts to develop corrective action
plans. According to DHS, a departmentwide committee has been working
since January 2006 to develop its first departmentwide Corrective
Action Plan, which it refers to as its Internal Controls over Financial
Reporting Playbook Fiscal Year 2007. The department started its
corrective action planning process in November 2005 by holding internal
meetings and initiating the procurement process to obtain a contractor
to develop a tracking system for the department's corrective action
plans. Additionally, beginning in December 2005, DHS held meetings with
its components, including the Coast Guard and ICE, to develop
corrective action plans and establish financial management remediation
issues for fiscal year 2006. Throughout 2006, the DHS Chief Financial
Officer held approximately 12 corrective action plan workshops with the
component agencies regarding areas of focus for improving financial
management and stressing the importance of identifying and addressing
the root causes of component agencies' financial management weaknesses.
Additionally, the department has developed reports to illustrate
progress in corrective action planning on a quarterly basis; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has taken actions to develop corrective
action plans by, for example, developing and issuing a departmentwide
plan for the corrective action plan process and holding workshops or
corrective action plans;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Correct internal control weaknesses;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS and its components
have not fully implemented corrective action plans to address all
material weaknesses and reportable conditions identified by previous
financial statement audits. In its fiscal year 2006 Performance and
Accountability Report, DHS reported on planned corrective actions to
address materials weaknesses in internal controls over financial
reporting and established target dates for completing the corrections.
In addition, the DHS IG reported that progress in implementing
corrective action plans among DHS component agencies was mixed. For
more information, see Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General, Audit of DHS' Corrective Action Plan Process for
Financial Reporting, Report No. 4, OIG-07-29 (Washington, D.C.:
February 2007) and Audit of DHS' Corrective Action Plan Process for
Financial Reporting - Report No. 3, OIG-07-13 (Washington, D.C.:
December 2006); DHS updated information: DHS did not provide updated
information relating to this performance expectation but DHS officials
indicated that they generally agreed with our assessment, and that DHS
has not yet corrected its internal control weaknesses. The Office of
the Chief Financial Officer noted that while DHS addressed many
weaknesses during fiscal year 2006 and, as shown in the Internal
Controls over Financial Reporting Playbook, plans to address these
weaknesses through fiscal year 2010, it will likely take DHS until
fiscal year 2010 to address all of its weaknesses because of pervasive
financial management problems at the Coast Guard. According to DHS
officials, the Coast Guard has made some progress, establishing a
Financial Management Transformation Task Force in July 2006 through
which the Coast Guard developed milestones to address its financial
management challenges. Office of the Chief Financial Officer officials
stated that DHS has developed goals and milestones for addressing its
material weaknesses and reportable conditions in the Electronic Program
Management Office, a project management tool that is supposed to help
improve communication on activities in component offices, ensure
accountability, and enhance the department's ability to react quickly
to meet mission-critical objectives; Our assessment: We conclude that
DHS has generally not achieved this performance expectation. DHS has
not yet corrected internal control weaknesses, according to the
department, the DHS IG, and independent auditors;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Limited Progress in Managing Human Capital:
Key human capital management areas for all agencies, including DHS, are
pay, performance management, classification, labor relations, adverse
actions, employee appeals, and diversity management. Congress provided
DHS with significant flexibility to design a modern human capital
management system. DHS and the Office of Personnel Management jointly
released the final regulations on DHS's new human capital system in
February 2005. The final regulations established a new human capital
system for DHS that was intended to ensure its ability to attract,
retain, and reward a workforce that is able to meet its critical
mission. Further, the human capital system provided for greater
flexibility and accountability in the way employees are to be paid,
developed, evaluated, afforded due process, and represented by labor
organizations while reflecting the principles of merit and fairness
embodied in the statutory merit systems principles. Although DHS
intended to implement the new personnel system in the summer of 2005,
court decisions enjoined the department from implementing certain labor
management portions of it. Since that time, DHS has taken actions to
implement its human capital system and issued its Fiscal Year 2007 and
2008 Human Capital Operational Plan in April 2007.
As shown in table 38, we identified eight performance expectations for
DHS in the area of human capital management and found that overall DHS
has made limited progress in meeting those performance expectations.
Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved two performance
expectations and has generally not achieved six other expectations.
Table 38: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Human Capital
Management:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop a results-oriented strategic human
capital plan;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Implement a human capital system that links
human capital planning to overall agency strategic planning;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Develop and implement processes to recruit
and hire employees who possess needed skills;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Measure agency performance and make
strategic human capital decisions;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Establish a market-based and more
performance-oriented pay system;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Seek feedback from employees to allow for
their participation in the decision-making process;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Create a comprehensive plan for training
and professional development;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Implement training and development programs
in support of DHS's mission and goals;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 2;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 6;
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 39 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of human capital management and our assessment of whether DHS
has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).
Table 39: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Human Capital Management:
Performance expectation: 1. Develop a results-oriented strategic human
capital plan;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has developed a results-oriented
strategic human capital plan and issued its human capital strategic
plan in October 2004. In September 2005 we reported that the plan
includes selected training strategies, such as developing a leadership
curriculum to ensure consistency of organizational values across the
department and using training to support the implementation of the DHS
human capital management system. We also reported that it provides an
illustration of one way to communicate linkages between goals and
strategies contained in the plan and the broader organizational goals
they are intended to support. For more information see Department of
Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training Important for
Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888 and Human Capital: DHS Faces
Challenges In Implementing Its New Personnel System, GAO-04-790; DHS
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information related to this performance expectation. In
addition to its strategic human capital plan, DHS has developed a
fiscal year 2007 and 2008 Human Capital Operational Plan, which
provides specific measurable goals that the department is using to
gauge the effectiveness of the its human capital efforts; Our
assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved this
performance expectation, as it has developed a strategic human capital
plan;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Implement a human capital system that links
human capital planning to overall agency strategic planning;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has taken steps to implement a
human capital system that links human capital planning to overall
agency strategic planning, but more work remains. For example, federal
court decisions have enjoined the department from implementing the
labor management portions of its human capital system. We reported in
September 2005 that human capital management system, known at that time
as MAX[HR], represented a fundamental change in many of the
department's human capital policies and procedures that would affect a
large majority--approximately 110,000--of its civilian employees.
MAXHR covered many key human capital areas, such as pay, performance
management, classification, labor relations, adverse actions, and
employee appeals. For more information see GAO-05-888; Human Capital:
Observations on Final DHS Human Capital Regulations, GAO-05-391T; GAO-
04-790; and Human Capital: DHS Personnel System Design Effort Provides
for Collaboration and Employee Participation, GAO-03-1099; DHS updated
information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to implement a human capital system that
links human capital planning to overall agency strategic planning. DHS
has developed the Human Capital Operational Plan, which identifies five
department priorities--hiring and retaining a talented and diverse
workforce; creating a DHS-wide culture of performance; creating high-
quality learning and development programs for DHS employees;
implementing a DHS-wide integrated leadership system; and being a model
of human capital service excellence. DHS told us that the Human Capital
Operational Plan encompasses the initiatives of the previous human
capital management system, MAX[HR], but represents a more
comprehensive human resources program. The Human Capital Operational
Plan identifies 77 goals for the department to achieve throughout
fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and DHS has met the 8 goals with target
dates of April 30, 2007, or earlier. For example, DHS has developed a
hiring model, developed a communication plan for the Human Capital
Operational Plan, and equipped components with a service level
agreement model. DHS also reported that its Performance Management
Program has been expanded and continues to be expanded across the
department and is an integral part in DHS's strategy for building a
single, unified department and linking individual performance with
specific organizational goals. DHS stated that since deployment of the
Performance Management Program to bargaining unit employees will
require collective bargaining, further expansion is proceeding as
appropriate and that once negotiation is complete at the component
level, the new program will be rolled out to both bargaining unit and
non-bargaining unit employees at the same time; Our assessment: We
conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this expectation. While
DHS has taken actions to implement a human capital system that links
human capital planning to overall agency strategic planning, more work
remains. DHS has issued the Human Capital Operational Plan, which
identifies department priorities and goals for fiscal years 2007 and
2008. While DHS has met goals with target dates of April 30, 2007, or
earlier, the vast majority of goals set out in the Human Capital
Operational Plan have target dates after April 30, 2007. DHS reported
that it is on track to meet future goals, but the goals have not yet
been met;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Develop and implement processes to recruit
and hire employees who possess needed skills;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has faced difficulties in
developing and implementing processes to recruit and hire employees who
possess needed skills. We have noted that hiring or staffing
difficulties have adversely affected DHS operations in various areas,
including border security and immigration enforcement, aviation
security, emergency preparedness and response, and acquisition
management. For example, in May 2005 we reported that ineffective DHS
management processes have impeded the department's ability to hire
employees and maintain contracts. In September 2006 we reported that
concerns regarding staffing for disaster response management have been
longstanding, and we noted that FEMA officials cited the lack of agency
and contractor staffing as a difficulty. We also reported that DHS's
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer has not focused on oversight
due in part to limited staffing. In addition, in January 2007 we
reported that FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and related human
capital strategies--such as succession planning or a coordinated
training effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they
enable an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical
skills needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps
between current and future skills and competencies. For more
information see Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and
Systems to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-
07-139; Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Leadership Needed to
Enhance Cybersecurity, GAO-06-1087T; Homeland Security: Visitor and
Immigrant Status Program Operating, but Management Improvements Are
Still Needed, GAO-06-318T; Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to
Address Backlogs and Ensure Quality of Adjudications, GAO-06-20;
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security
Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities, GAO-05-
434; Information Technology: Homeland Security Should Better Balance
Need for System Integration Strategy with Spending for New and Enhanced
Systems, GAO-04-509; and Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and
Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083; DHS
updated information: In March, April, and May 2007, DHS provided us
with updated information on its efforts to develop and implement
processes to recruit and hire employees who possess needed skills. In
the Human Capital Operational Plan, DHS identifies a number of goals
and target dates concerning hiring and recruitment, such as
implementing DHS-wide recruitment strategies and establishing an intern
program for specific occupations. DHS has met two of the plan's hiring
goals and associated target dates--developing/benchmarking a hiring
model and developing training on the hiring model. DHS's 45-day hiring
model has 20 steps, such as posting a vacancy announcement and checking
references, and 8 of the steps are measured for the purposes of the 45-
day target; DHS stated that the hiring model has been provided to all
components and that it receives regular reporting from components
against the 45-day hiring target. DHS reported that it is on track to
meet the July target date for assessing hiring practices against the
hiring model and stated that it is on schedule to meet target dates for
other future goals as well. For example, DHS stated that it is in the
process of developing e-Recruitment, an enterprise-wide tool for
application processing and workforce planning; Our assessment: We
conclude that this performance expectation has generally not been
achieved. While DHS has taken steps to develop processes to recruit and
hire employees who possess needed skills, more work remains. For
example, DHS has developed a hiring model, but the department has not
yet assessed the component's practices against it. DHS is also still in
the process of meeting other recruitment and hiring goals, such as the
deployment of e-Recruitment and the establishment of an intern program
in specific occupations;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Measure agency performance and make
strategic human capital decisions;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet taken the steps
needed to measure performance and make strategic human capital
decisions. In June 2004, we reported that DHS headquarters has not yet
been systematic or consistent in gathering relevant data on the
successes or shortcomings of legacy component human capital approaches
or current and future workforce challenges, despite the potential
usefulness of this information to strategic human capital planning
activities. We reported that efforts were under way to gather such
data. For more information see GAO-05-391T and GAO-04-790; DHS updated
information: In March, April, and May 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to measure agency performance and
make strategic human capital decisions. Specifically, DHS stated that
its human capital accountability plan has been distributed, approved by
the Office of Personnel Management, and is operational but not final.
This plan will outline the department's strategy for monitoring and
evaluating its human capital policies and programs and for conducting
cyclical compliance audits of human resources management operations.
DHS also reported that it has identified component representatives to
serve on audit teams for accountability that will specialize in human
resources issues. DHS plans to audit the Coast Guard this year.
Further, DHS stated that it is currently working with components to
develop metrics for human capital management. DHS stated that these
metrics will revolve around hiring, talent, leadership, and
accountability. DHS reported that the department has put together an
initial framework for these metrics and hopes to have some in use by
October 2007. DHS also stated that since 2005, the DHS Human Capital
Office has served on the DHS Chief Financial Officer's Internal
Controls Committee. DHS reported that GAO's Internal Control Management
Tool has been used each year to collect and review DHS-wide responses
and develop corrective action plans, including data on the many Human
Capital-related questions within this tool. DHS stated that DHS Chief
Financial Officer tracks and reports the compiled data to the Office of
Management and Budget; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has
generally not achieved this performance expectation. DHS has made
efforts to measure agency performance and make strategic human capital
decisions. However, these efforts are not yet complete. For example,
DHS's human capital accountability plan is operational but not yet
final, and the department has not finalized metrics it will use for
human capital management;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Establish a market-based and more
performance-oriented pay system;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not yet established a market-
based and more performance-oriented pay system. In 2005 we testified
that the final regulations on DHS's human capital system provided for a
flexible, contemporary, performance-oriented, and market-based
compensation system. Specifically, DHS planned to establish
occupational clusters and pay bands and may, after coordination with
the Office of Personnel Management, set and adjust pay rangesætaking
into account mission requirements, labor market conditions,
availability of funds, and other relevant factors. While the final
regulations contained many elements of a market-based and performance-
oriented pay system, there were several issues that we identified that
DHS needed to continue to address as it moved forward with the
implementation of the system. These issues included linking
organizational goals to individual performance, using competencies to
provide a fuller assessment of performance, making meaningful
distinctions in employee performance, and continuing to incorporate
adequate safeguards to ensure fairness and guard against abuse. For
more information, see GAO-05-391T; DHS updated information: In March
and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts
to establish a market-based and more performance-oriented pay system.
DHS reported that it is developing implementation plans to conduct a
performance-based pay pilot program in a component or organization in
order to validate, measure, and refine the pay band models and
processes developed. DHS stated that the steps required for
implementation of a pilot program have been identified and reported
that as an initial step in that process it is identifying a group that
would serve as a reasonable sample for an assessment of DHS's pay band
model and pay administration procedures. Further, DHS stated that it is
assessing the budget implications for implementation and taking the
steps necessary to ensure availability of sufficient funding. DHS also
told us that it has developed competencies for 115 occupations. DHS
stated that the competencies will be validated by August 2007 and
implemented in September 2007; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has
generally not achieved this performance expectation. While DHS has
taken steps to develop a market-based and more performance-oriented pay
system, the department has not yet established such a system. The
department reported that it is developing a pilot program but that this
program is still in the planning stages;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Seek feedback from employees to allow for
their participation in the decision-making process;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: While DHS has taken steps to seek
feedback from employees to allow them to be involved in the decision-
making process, more work remains. In September 2003, for example, we
reported that employee perspectives on the design of the DHS human
capital system, formerly known as MAX[HR], were sought through many
mechanisms. Activity updates were provided in the DHS weekly
newsletter, an e-mail mailbox for employees to submit their suggestions
and comments was used, and multiple town hall meetings and focus groups
conducted between the end of May and the beginning of July 2003 were
held in 10 cities across the United States. However, in June 2004 we
pointed to challenges in implementing the human capital system in a
collaborative way. We reported that regardless of whether it is a part
of collective bargaining, involving employees in such important
decisions as how they are deployed and how work is assigned is critical
to the successful operation of the department. This is likely to be a
significant challenge in light of employee responses to the 2006 U.S.
Office of Personnel Management Federal Human Capital Survey in which
about 30 percent of DHS employees indicated a feeling of personal
empowerment, which is less than the governmentwide response of about 42
percent. Additionally, about 39 percent of DHS employees reported
satisfaction with their involvement in decisions that affect their
work, compared to about 54 percent governmentwide. For more
information, see GAO-05-391T; GAO-04-790; and GAO-03-1099; DHS updated
information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to seek feedback from employees to allow for
their participation in the decision-making process. DHS reported that
it is expanding its communication strategy, including an enhanced DHS
human capital Web site. Further, DHS reported that in consultation with
the Undersecretary for Management, component heads, and the DHS Human
Capital Council, it developed an overall strategy for addressing
employee concerns as reflected in the Federal Human Capital Survey
results, and the department reported that it has already completed a
number of actions to address the issues raised in the 2006 Federal
Human Capital Survey, as well as the findings of the Common Culture
Task Force. For example, DHS stated that it is continuing ongoing focus
groups and surveys; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally
not achieved this performance expectation. DHS has taken a variety of
steps to seek feedback from employees to allow for their participation
in the decision-making process, but it continues to face challenges.
For example, during the design of MAX[HR] , DHS took actions to obtain
employees' perspectives through focus groups and town hall meetings.
However, the results of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management Federal
Human Capital Survey indicate that DHS employees do not perceive that
they have had sufficient involvement in decision making at DHS. While
DHS reported that it is taking actions to address the concerns raised
in the Federal Human Capital Survey, it is too early to evaluate their
effectiveness;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Create a comprehensive plan for training
and professional development;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has created a comprehensive plan
for training and development. DHS's department-level training strategy
is presented in its human capital and training strategic plans. Issued
in October 2004, its human capital strategic plan includes selected
training strategies, such as developing a leadership curriculum to
ensure consistency of organizational values across the department and
using training to support the implementation of the DHS human capital
management system. In July 2005, DHS issued its first departmental
training plan, the Department of Homeland Security Learning and
Development Strategic Plan, which provides a strategic vision for
departmentwide training. We reported that this plan is a significant
and positive step toward addressing departmentwide training challenges.
For more information, see GAO-05-888; DHS updated information: In March
and April 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts
to create comprehensive plans for training and professional
development. DHS has filled the position of Chief Learning Officer and
has developed a draft Learning and Development Strategy. The draft plan
provides a strategy for how the department will institutionalize and
standardize employee training, education, and professional development,
and it also identifies the four pillars of the DHS University System,
which include the Leadership Institute, the Preparedness Center, the
Homeland Security Academy, and the Center for Academic and Interagency
Programs; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally achieved
this performance expectation as the department has created a training
and professional development plan;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Implement training and development programs
in support of DHS's mission and goals;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: While DHS has taken steps to
implement training and development programs in support of DHS's mission
and goals, it continues to face difficulties. In September 2005, we
reported that under the overall direction of the Chief Human Capital
Officer office, DHS has established a structure of training councils
and groups that cover a wide range of issues and include
representatives from each organizational component within DHS. The
Training Leaders Council plays a vital role in DHS's efforts to foster
communication and interchange among the department's various training
communities. DHS has also established a Chief Learning Officer.
However, the formation of DHS from 22 legacy agencies and programs has
created challenges to achieving departmentwide training goals. Of
particular concern to the training officials we spoke with were the
lack of common management information systems and the absence of
commonly understood training terminology across components. For more
information, see GAO-05-888; DHS updated information: In March, April,
and May 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts
to implement training and development programs in support of DHS's
mission and goals. Specifically, DHS has established an Office of
Personnel Management-approved Senior Executive Service Candidate
Development Program and held the orientation for its initial Senior
Executive Service Candidate Development Program class in March 2007.
DHS also reported that it has created and launched the National Capital
Region Homeland Security Academy. The Academy will offer a fully
accredited graduate degree in Homeland Security Studies and, when
combined with the West Coast program, will matriculate 200 students
annually. Further, DHS reported that it is conducting academic and
outreach partnerships with National Defense University, Minority
Servicing Institutions, and educational consortiums, such as the
National Security Education Consortium and the Homeland Security and
Defense Education Consortium. DHS also stated that it is developing
electronic courses for employees in need of specific training and plans
to roll out these courses in the near future. DHS reported that the DHS
Training Leaders Council, a council of training representatives from
DHS Components, created a Training Glossary that is used across the
department. DHS also reported that on February 5, 2007, the department
successfully launched its learning management system, DHScovery. DHS
stated that ultimately DHScovery will deliver and track DHS
departmentwide employee training events; Our assessment: We conclude
that DHS generally has not achieved this performance expectation. DHS
has made progress in implementing training and development programs in
support of DHS's mission and goals. However, most of DHS's training and
development goals identified in the Human Capital Operational Plan have
not yet been fully implemented;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Limited Progress in Information Technology Management:
DHS has undertaken efforts to establish and institutionalize the range
of information technology management controls and capabilities that our
research and past work have shown are fundamental to any organization's
ability to use technology effectively to transform itself and
accomplish mission goals. Among these information technology management
controls and capabilities are:
* centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout
the organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer,
* having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and
abilities to execute each of these areas now and in the future;
* developing and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate
blueprint, as an authoritative frame of reference to guide and
constrain system investments;
* defining and following a corporate process for informed decision
making by senior leadership about competing information technology
investment options;
* applying system and software development and acquisition discipline
and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and
maintaining systems; and:
* establishing a comprehensive, departmentwide information security
program to protect information and systems;
Despite its efforts over the last several years, the department has
significantly more to do before each of these management controls and
capabilities is fully in place and is integral to how each system
investment is managed.
As shown in table 40, we identified 13 performance expectations for DHS
in the area of information technology management and found that overall
DHS has made limited progress in meeting those expectations. In
particular, we found that DHS has generally achieved 2 performance
expectations and has generally not achieved 8 others. For 3 other
performance expectations, we did not make an assessment.
Table 40: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Information
Technology Management:
Performance expectation: 1. Organize roles and responsibilities for
information technology under the Chief Information Officer;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Develop a strategy and plan for information
technology management;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Develop measures to assess performance in
the management of information technology;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Strategically manage information
technology human capital;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop a comprehensive enterprise
architecture;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 6. Implement a comprehensive enterprise
architecture;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Develop a process to effectively manage
information technology investments;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Implement a process to effectively manage
information technology investments;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Develop policies and procedures for
effective information systems development and acquisition;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Implement policies and procedures for
effective information systems development and acquisition;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Provide operational capabilities for
information technology infrastructure and applications;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 12. Develop policies and procedures to ensure
protection of sensitive information;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 13. Implement policies and procedures to
effectively safeguard sensitive information;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 2;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 8;
Assessment: No assessment made: 3.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 41 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of information technology management and our assessment of
whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the
performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to
satisfy most of the performance expectation's key elements (generally
not achieved).
Table 41: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Information Technology Management:
Performance expectation: 1. Organize roles and responsibilities for
information technology under the Chief Information Officer;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In May 2004, we reported that the
DHS Chief Information Officer did not have the authority and control
over departmentwide information technology spending. Control over the
department's information technology budget was vested primarily with
the Chief Information Officer organizations within each DHS component.
As a result, DHS's Chief Information Officer did not have authority to
manage information technology assets across the department. For more
information, see Homeland Security Progress Continues but Challenges
Remain on Department's Management of Information Technology, GAO-06-
598T; DHS updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided
us with updated information on its efforts to organize roles and
responsibilities under the Chief Information Officer. Specifically, in
March 2007 DHS issued a management directive that expanded the
authorities and responsibilities of its Chief Information Officer. The
directive gives the Chief Information Officer responsibility for and
authority over information technology resources, including funding and
human capital of DHS's components; Our assessment: We conclude that
DHS has generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS's March
2007 management directive is consistent with our 2004 recommendation
that the department strengthen the Chief Information Officer's
authority and control over departmentwide information technology
spending;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Develop a strategy and plan for information
technology management;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In 2004 we reported DHS's draft
information resource management strategic plan dated March 2004 listed
the priorities of the department's and component agencies' Chief
Information Officers for 2004. We also reported that the department was
in the process of developing what it termed as road maps for each of
these priority areas that included descriptions of the current
condition of the area, the need for change, the planned future state,
initiatives, and barriers. However, we reported that neither DHS's
draft information resource management strategic plan nor the draft
priority area road maps developed by DHS contained sufficient
information regarding the department's information technology goals and
performance measures, when the department expected that significant
activities would be completed, and the staff resources necessary to
implement those activities. For more information, see GAO-06-598T and
Department of Homeland Security: Formidable Information and Technology
Management Challenge Requires Institutional Approach, GAO-04-702; DHS
updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to develop a strategy for information
technology management. In particular, DHS provided us with a document
titled the Office of the Chief Information Officer Strategic Plan,
Fiscal years 2007-2011. This plan lays out five goals for the
department's information technology capabilities and includes
information on strategic objectives linked to those goals. The plan's
five goals are (1) continuing cyber security improvements; (2) driving
information technology operational efficiencies, improvements; and
resiliency; (3) aligning information technology planning and budgeting
with procurement activities and the enterprise architecture; (4)
establishing a foundation for information sharing, data collection, and
integration; and (5) establishing and governing a portfolio of cross-
departmental information technology capabilities to support DHS mission
and management objectives. The plan also aligns the Office of the Chief
Information Officer's information technology goals to DHS's mission
priorities; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. DHS's Office of the Chief
Information Officer Strategic Plan represents a starting point for DHS
in its efforts to develop a strategy and plan for information
technology management. However, the plan does not include well-
developed milestones and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for
executing initiatives, which we have previously reported are key
elements of a good strategic plan;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Develop measures to assess performance in
the management of information technology;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In 2004 we reported that neither
DHS's draft information resource management strategic plan nor the
draft priority area road maps developed by DHS contained sufficient
information regarding the department's information technology goals and
performance measures. We reported that leading organizations define
specific goals, objectives, and measures; use a diversity of
measurement types; and describe how information technology outputs and
outcomes affect organizational customer and agency program delivery
requirements. In addition, we reported that the Paperwork Reduction Act
and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 requires agencies to establish goals
and performance measures on how information and technology management
contributes to program productivity, the efficiency and effectiveness
of agency operations, and service to the public. More recently, DHS has
taken actions consistent with the expectation. Specifically, DHS
established key information technology initiatives and associated goals
as part of its 2005-2006 Information Technology Strategy. This strategy
linked key information technology initiatives and goals to DHS's
overarching mission and goals, such as providing service to the public
and increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of agency operations
and program productivity. For more information, see GAO-04-702; DHS
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
updated information on its efforts to develop performance measures for
information technology management. DHS reported that it uses the Office
of Management and Budget's Program Assessment Rating Tool to measure
the performance if individual information technology programs. DHS also
reported that performance measures for major programs are tracked in
the Office of Management and Budget Exhibit 300 business cases; Our
assessment: Until DHS provides evidence that it has developed measures
for assessing the department's management of information technology, we
conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation. DHS reported using various tools to measure performance of
individual information technology programs. However, we believe that
while the Program Assessment Rating Tool and the Exhibit 300 business
cases can help provide important information for the department on the
management of individual investments, these tools do not provide
measures for routinely assessing overall information technology
management performance;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Strategically manage information
technology human capital;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We have not conducted
work on DHS's information technology human capital management and DHS
did not provide us with information on its efforts to achieve this
performance expectation that would allow us to make an assessment on
DHS's progress in achieving this performance expectation. In the past,
we noted that DHS faced difficulties in strategically managing its
human capital for information technology. We also reported that DHS had
begun strategic planning for information technology human capital at
the headquarters level, but it had not yet systematically gathered
baseline data about its existing workforce. We have ongoing work in
this area and plan to report on the results of this work later this
year. For more information, see GAO-06-598T and GAO-04-702;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 5. Develop a comprehensive enterprise
architecture;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: An enterprise architecture provides
systematic structural descriptions--in useful models, diagrams, tables,
and narrative--of how a given entity operates today and how it plans to
operate in the future, and it includes a road map for transitioning
from today to tomorrow. The Clinger-Cohen Act and the Office of
Management and Budget require that departments such as DHS develop and
use an architecture. DHS has begun developing an enterprise
architecture using an evolutionary approach that entails producing
successively more mature versions. DHS released the initial version of
its enterprise architecture in September 2003. In August 2004 we
reported that the department's initial enterprise architecture provided
a partial basis upon which to build future versions but was missing
most of the content necessary to be considered a well-defined
architecture. In particular, the content of this initial version was
not systematically derived from a DHS or national corporate business
strategy; rather, it was more the result of an amalgamation of the
existing architectures that several of DHS's predecessor agencies
already had. To its credit, the department recognized the limitations
of the initial architecture. To assist DHS in evolving its
architecture, we recommended 41 actions aimed at having DHS add needed
architecture content. Since then, the department reported that it had
taken steps in response to our recommendations. For example, DHS issued
version 2 of its enterprise architecture, which the department reported
contained additional business/mission, service, and technical
descriptions, in October 2004. Subsequently, DHS decided to issue
annual architecture updates. The first of these, DHS EA 2006, was
issued in March 2006. In May 2007 we reported that DHS EA 2006
partially addresses the content shortcomings in earlier versions.
However, the full depth and breadth of architecture content that our 41
recommendations provided for is not reflected. For example, we
recommended that DHS use, among other things, an analysis of the gaps
between the current ("as-is") and future ("to-be") states of the
architecture to define missing and needed capabilities and form the
basis for its transition plan. However, DHS EA 2006 does not include a
transition plan and it does not include any evidence of a gap analysis.
In addition we reported in August 2006 on DHS's enterprise architecture
management capability, stating, among other things, that DHS has not
fully implemented 7 of 31 elements of our Enterprise Architecture
Management Maturity Framework. For example, we found that the
department's enterprise architecture products and management processes
do not undergo independent verification and validation and that the
return on enterprise architecture investment is not measured and
reported. For more information, see Homeland Security: Efforts Under
Way to Develop Enterprise Architecture, but Much Work Remains, GAO-04-
777; GAO-06-598T; Homeland Security: DHS Enterprise Architecture
Continues to Evolve but Improvements Needed, GAO-07-564; Enterprise
Architecture: Leadership Remains Key to Establishing and Leveraging
Architectures for Organizational Transformation, GAO-06-831; and
Information Technology: A Framework for Assessing and Improving
Enterprise Architecture Management (Version 1.1), GAO-03-584G; DHS
updated information: In March 2007, DHS reported that it has already
addressed, or has identified tasks in its program plan to address,
those elements of our Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity
Framework that we found that the department had previously not fully or
partially satisfied. In June 2007, DHS provided us with a newer, more
current version of its architecture (i.e., DHS EA 2007), which it
reports addresses many of our prior concerns; Our assessment: Because
of the considerable time and resources necessary to evaluate an
architecture as large and complex as DHS's, we have not had an
opportunity to assess this latest version;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 6. Implement a comprehensive enterprise
architecture;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: Between 2003 and 2007, we have
reported on the extent to which the department has implemented its
enterprise architecture to ensure alignment of major information
technology investments, such as US-VISIT, CBP's Automated Commercial
Environment system, and ICE's Atlas program. We reported in September
2003 that US-VISIT was making assumptions and decisions about the
program because the operational context was unsettled and unclear. In
February 2005 we reported that DHS had assessed US-VISIT for alignment
with the business and information/data views of its architecture and
found it to be in compliance. However, the assessment did not include
other architecture views, and DHS could not provide us with sufficient
documentation to understand its architecture compliance methodology and
criteria, or verifiable analysis to justify its determination. In
February 2007, we reported that DHS had not reviewed US-VISIT
architecture compliance for more than 2 years, during which time both
US-VISIT and the DHS enterprise architecture had changed. We also
reported in March 2005 and again in May 2006 that DHS's determination
that the Automated Commercial Environment was aligned with DHS's
architecture was not supported by sufficient documentation to allow us
to understand its architecture compliance methodology and criteria or
with verifiable analysis demonstrating alignment. We reported in
September 2005 and again in July 2006 that DHS had determined that
Atlas was in compliance with the architecture but that this
determination was also not based on a documented analysis or
methodology that is necessary to make such a determination. In August
2006 we reported on DHS's enterprise architecture management
capability. Among other things, we found that although DHS had a
process that required information technology investment compliance with
its enterprise architecture, the process did not include a methodology
with detailed compliance criteria. For more information, see Homeland
Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program
Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083; Homeland Security: Some Progress
Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology Program, GAO-05-202; Homeland Security: Planned
Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be
Adequately Defined and Justified, GAO-07-278; Information Technology:
Customs Automated Commercial Environment Progress Progressing, but Need
for Management Improvements Continues, GAO-05-267; Information
Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated Commercial
Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing Management Challenges
and New Risks, GAO-06-580; Information Technology: Management
Improvements Needed on Immigration and Customs Enforcement's
Infrastructure Modernization Program, GAO-05-805; Information
Technology: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Is Beginning to Address
Infrastructure Modernization Program Weaknesses but Key Improvements
Still Needed, GAO-06-823; GAO-03-584G; and GAO-06-831; DHS updated
information: DHS did not provide us with updated information on its
efforts to implement an enterprise architecture; Our assessment: We
conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation. We have reported that major DHS information technology
investments have not been fully aligned with DHS's enterprise
architecture, and DHS did not provide us evidence that these
investments and others have been fully aligned with DHS's enterprise
architecture;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Develop a process to effectively manage
information technology investments;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has not fully developed a
process to manage information technology investments. Specifically, in
April 2007, we reported that DHS has established the management
structure to effectively manage its investments. However, the
department had yet to fully define 8 of the 11 related policies and
procedures defined by our information technology investment management
framework.[A] Specifically, while DHS had documented the policies and
related procedures for project-level management, some of these
procedures did not include key elements. For example, procedures for
selecting investments did not cite either the specific criteria or
steps for prioritizing and selecting new information technology
proposals, and procedures for management oversight of information
technology projects and systems did not specify the rules that the
investment boards were to follow in overseeing investments. In
addition, the department had yet to define most of the policies
associated with managing its information technology projects as
investment portfolios. Officials attributed the absence of project-
level procedures to resource constraints, stating that with a full time
staff of six to support departmentwide investment management
activities, they were more focused on performing investment management
rather than documenting it in great detail. They attributed the absence
of policies and procedures at the portfolio level to other investment
management priorities. For more information, see Information
Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Define and Implement Policies and
Procedures for Effectively Managing Investments, GAO-07-424; DHS
updated information: In March and April 2007, DHS provided us with
information on its efforts to develop a process to effectively manage
information technology investments. In particular, DHS reported that
while it has substantial room for improvement in this area, DHS has
developed an investment oversight foundation that can be effective;
Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation. DHS has taken some actions to develop a
process to effectively manage information technology investments, but
much work remains. Specifically, the department has not yet fully
defined many of the key policies and procedures identified in our
information technology investment management framework;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Implement a process to effectively manage
information technology investments;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS is not effectively managing its
information technology investments. Specifically, in April 2007, we
reported that DHS had not fully implemented any of the key practices
our information technology investment management framework specifies as
being needed to actually control investments--either at the project
level or at the portfolio level. For example, according to DHS
officials and the department's control review schedule, the investment
boards had not conducted regular reviews of investments. Further, while
control activities were sometimes performed, they were not performed
consistently across all information technology projects. In addition,
because the policies and procedures for portfolio management had yet to
be defined, control of the department's investment portfolios was ad
hoc, according to DHS officials. To strengthen information technology
investment management, officials told us that they had hired a
portfolio manager and were recruiting another one. For more
information, see GAO-07-424; DHS updated information: In March 2007,
DHS provided us with information on its efforts to develop a process to
effectively manage information technology investments. In particular,
DHS reported that while it has substantial room for improvement in this
area, DHS has developed an investment oversight foundation that can be
effective; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation. DHS has taken some actions to
implement a process to effectively manage information technology
investments, but more work remains, particularly in implementing the
key practices of our information technology investment management
framework for actually controlling investments;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Develop policies and procedures for
effective information systems development and acquisition;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: In March 2006, we reported that DHS
was in the process of drafting policies and procedures to establish a
departmentwide systems development life cycle methodology that was
intended to provide a common management approach to systems development
and acquisition. According to DHS, the goals of the systems development
life cycle are to help align projects to mission and business needs and
requirements; incorporate accepted industry and government standards,
best practices, and disciplined engineering methods, including
information technology maturity model concepts; ensure that formal
reviews and approval required by the process are consistent with DHS's
investment management process; and institute disciplined life cycle
management practices, including planning and evaluation in each phase
of the information system cycle. The methodology is to apply to DHS's
information technology portfolio as well as other capital asset
acquisitions. Under the methodology, each program is expected to, among
other things, follow disciplined project planning and management
processes balanced by effective management controls; have a
comprehensive project management plan; base project plans on user
requirements that are testable, and traceable to the work products
produced; and integrate information security activities throughout the
systems development life cycle. For more information, see GAO-06-598T;
DHS updated information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated
information on its efforts to develop policies and procedures for
information systems development and acquisition. Specifically, DHS's
March 2007 Information Technology Integration and Management directive
notes that the DHS Chief Information Officer is responsible for
reviewing and approving any information technology acquisition in
excess of $2.5 million; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has
generally not achieved this performance expectation, as the life cycle
methodology for managing systems development and acquisition in still
in draft form and each component has its own methodology;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 10. Implement policies and procedures for
effective information systems development and acquisition;
Summary of findings: GAO findings: DHS has faced challenges in
implementing policies and procedures for effective information systems
development and acquisition. Specifically, our reviews of several key
(nonfinancial) information technology programs (e.g., US-VISIT, CBP's
Automated Commercial Environment, and ICE's Atlas program) have
disclosed numerous weaknesses in the implementation of policies and
procedures relating to key development and acquisition areas, such as
requirements development and management, test management, project
planning, validation and verification, and contract management
oversight. We have ongoing work related to specific systems acquisition
programs. For more information, see GAO-04-702; DHS updated
information: In March 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on
its efforts to develop policies and procedures for information systems
development and acquisition. Specifically, DHS's March 2007 Information
Technology Integration and Management directive notes that the DHS
Chief Information Officer is responsible for reviewing and approving
any information technology acquisition in excess of $2.5 million and to
ensure the alignment of the department's purchases with the target
enterprise architecture; Our assessment: We conclude that DHS has
generally not achieved this performance expectation. DHS has taken some
actions to develop policies and procedures for reviewing information
technology acquisitions. However, DHS did not provide us with evidence
that these policies and procedures have been effectively implemented
with regard to specific information technology acquisition programs,
such as US-VISIT and the Automated Commercial Environment;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 11. Provide operational capabilities for
information technology infrastructure and applications;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We have not completed
work in this area upon which to make an assessment. We previously
reported that a gauge of DHS's progress in managing its information
technology investments is the extent to which it has deployed and is
currently operating more modern information technology systems and
infrastructure;
Assessment: No assessment made.
Performance expectation: 12. Develop policies and procedures to ensure
protection of sensitive information;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: We conclude that DHS
has generally achieved this performance expectation, as DHS has
developed policies and procedures for protecting sensitive information.
The Chief Information Officer designated the Chief Information Security
Officer to carry out specific information security responsibilities
that include developing and maintaining a departmentwide information
security program; developing departmental information security policies
and procedures; providing the direction and guidance necessary to
ensure that information security throughout the department is compliant
with federal information security requirements and policies; and
advising the Chief Information Officer on the status and issues
involving security aspects of the departmentwide information security
program. Since DHS became operational in March 2003, the Chief
Information Security Officer has developed and documented departmental
policies and procedures that could provide a framework for implementing
an agencywide information security program. For more information, see
Information Security: Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully
Implement Its Security Program, GAO-05-700;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 13. Implement policies and procedures to
effectively safeguard sensitive information;
Summary of findings: GAO and DHS IG findings: DHS has not yet
implemented policies and procedures for safeguarding sensitive
information. In June 2005, we reported that DHS had yet to effectively
implement a comprehensive, departmentwide information security program
to protect the information and information systems that support its
operations and assets. In particular, although it had developed and
documented departmental policies and procedures that could provide a
framework for implementing such a program, certain departmental
components had not yet fully implemented key information security
practices and controls. Examples of weaknesses in components'
implementation included incomplete or missing elements in risk
assessments, security plans, and remedial action plans, as well as
incomplete, nonexistent, or untested continuity of operations plans. In
September 2006, the DHS IG reported that DHS had made progress in
implementing its information security program. For example, the DHS IG
found that DHS had taken measures to develop a process to maintain a
comprehensive systems inventory and to increase the number of
operational systems that had been certified and accredited. Despite
several improvements in DHS's information security program, the DHS IG
found that DHS components, through their Information Systems Security
Managers, had not completely aligned their respective information
security programs with DHS's overall policies, procedures, and
practices. For example, all DHS systems had not been properly certified
and accredited; all components' information security weaknesses were
not included in a plan of action and milestones; data in the enterprise
management tool, Trusted Agent FISMA, was not complete or current; and
system contingency plans had not been tested for all systems. The DHS
IG reported that while DHS had issued substantial guidance designed to
create and maintain secure systems, there were areas where the
implementation of agencywide information security procedures required
strengthening: (1) certification and accreditation; (2) plan of action
and milestones; (3) security configurations; (4) vulnerability testing
and remediation; (5) contingency plan testing; (6) incident detection,
analysis, and reporting; and (7) specialized security training. For
more information, see GAO-06-598T and GAO-05-700. Also, see Department
of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Evaluation of DHS'
Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2006, OIG-06-62
(Washington, D.C.: September 2006); DHS updated information: In March
2007, DHS provided us with updated information on its efforts to
implement policies and procedures to safeguard sensitive information.
DHS reported initiating an Information Technology Security Remediation
Project in 2006 to ensure that all DHS components implemented a common
set of information security practices and key controls at the system
level. According to DHS, all system owners were required to implement a
common set of baseline controls as outlined in the directive on DHS
Information Security Policy and to demonstrate compliance by submitting
appropriate system security documentation, including a risk assessment,
a system security plan, results of controls testing, a contingency plan
(if required), and an accreditation letter signed by an appropriate
Designated Accrediting Authority, for a department-level review. By the
end of October 2006, DHS reported that 95 percent of the department's
information technology systems were fully accredited; Our assessment:
We conclude that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation. Although DHS has taken actions to implement policies and
procedures to safeguard sensitive information, it has not yet
effectively done so. For example, the DHS IG reported that the
department had a material weaknesses in the effectiveness of general
and application controls over its financial systems, and our ongoing
work has identified significant information security weaknesses that
pervade systems supporting a key departmental program. In addition,
while DHS has taken actions to ensure that certification and
accreditation activities are completed, the department did not provide
evidence that it has strengthened its incident detection, analysis, and
reporting and testing activities;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[A] GAO, Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework for
Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, GAO-04-394G (Washington,
D.C.: March 2004).
[End of table]
DHS Has Made Moderate Progress in Real Property Management:
DHS has taken actions to implement its real property management
responsibilities. Key elements of real property management, as
specified in Executive Order 13327, "Federal Real Property Asset
Management," include establishment of a Senior Real Property Officer,
development of an asset inventory, and development and implementation
of an asset management plan and performance measures. In June 2006, the
Office of Management and Budget upgraded DHS's Real Property Asset
Management Score from red to yellow after DHS developed an approved
Asset Management Plan, developed a generally complete real property
data inventory, submitted this inventory for inclusion in the
governmentwide real property inventory database, and established
performance measures consistent with Federal Real Property Council
standards. DHS also designated a Senior Real Property Officer as
directed by Executive Order 13327.
As shown in table 42, we identified nine performance expectations for
DHS in the area of real property management and found that overall DHS
has made moderate progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically,
we found that DHS has generally achieved six of the expectations and
has generally not achieved three others. Our assessments for real
property management are based on a report on DHS's real property
management released in June 2007.
Table 42: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Real Property
Management:
Performance expectation: 1. Establish a Senior Real Property Officer
who actively serves on the Federal Real Property Council;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Complete and maintain a comprehensive
inventory and profile of agency real property;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Provide timely and accurate information for
inclusion in the governmentwide real property inventory database;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Develop an Office of Management and Budget-
approved asset management plan;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Establish an Office of Management and
Budget-approved 3-year rolling timeline with certain deadlines by which
the agency will address opportunities and determine its priorities as
identified in the asset management plan;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Demonstrate steps taken toward
implementation of the asset management plan;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Establish real property performance
measures;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Use accurate and current asset inventory
information and real property performance measures in management
decision making;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Ensure the management of agency property
assets is consistent with the agency's overall strategic plan, the
agency asset management plan, and the performance measures;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved: 6;
Assessment: Generally not achieved: 3;
Assessment: No assessment made: 0.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Table 43 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS
has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in
the area of real property management and our assessment of whether DHS
has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance
expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most
of the performance expectation's key elements (generally not achieved).
Table 43: Performance Expectations and Assessment of DHS Progress in
Real Property Management:
Performance expectation: 1. Establish a Senior Real Property Officer
who actively serves on the Federal Real Property Council;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS has appointed a
Senior Real Property Officer whose official title is Chief
Administrative Officer. The Senior Real Property Officer serves on the
Federal Real Property Council and coordinates the formulation and
implementation of real property management planning for DHS. For more
information, see Federal Real Property: DHS Has Made Progress, but
Additional Actions Are Needed to Address Real Property Management and
Security Challenges, GAO-07-658;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 2. Complete and maintain a comprehensive
inventory and profile of agency real property;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS has developed and
maintained an inventory of agency real property. DHS's real property
data inventory, called the Real Property Information System, is
designed to enable active and efficient stewardship of its real
property assets. It has been in place since April 2006. For more
information, see GAO-07-658;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 3. Provide timely and accurate information for
inclusion in the governmentwide real property inventory database;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS submits data on
real property that it owns and directly leases to the General Services
Administration's governmentwide real property inventory. For more
information, see GAO-07-658;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 4. Develop an Office of Management and Budget-
approved asset management plan;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS has developed an
Office of Management and Budget-approved asset management plan. The
administration's Real Property Initiative required DHS to develop and
implement an asset management plan, develop a real property inventory
that tracked DHS's assets, and develop and use performance measures.
The Office of Management and Budget approved DHS's asset management
plan in June 2006. For more information, see GAO-07-658;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 5. Establish an Office of Management and
Budget-approved 3-year rolling timeline with certain deadlines by which
the agency will address opportunities and determine its priorities as
identified in the asset management plan;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS has developed an
Office of Management and Budget-approved 3-year timeline to implement
the goals and objectives of the asset management plan. For more
information, see GAO-07-658;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 6. Demonstrate steps taken toward
implementation of the asset management plan;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS has yet to
demonstrate full implementation of its asset management plan. For more
information, see GAO-07-658;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 7. Establish real property performance
measures;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS has established
asset management performance measures, including facility condition,
utilization, mission dependency, and annual operating and maintenance
costs. For more information, see GAO-07-658;
Assessment: Generally achieved.
Performance expectation: 8. Use accurate and current asset inventory
information and real property performance measures in management
decision making;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS has yet to
demonstrate full use of asset inventory information and performance
measures in management decision making. For more information, see GAO-
07-658;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Performance expectation: 9. Ensure the management of agency property
assets is consistent with the agency's overall strategic plan, the
agency asset management plan, and the performance measures;
Summary of findings: GAO findings and assessment: DHS has not yet taken
steps to ensure that the management of agency property assets is
consistent with the DHS strategic plan, asset management plan, and
performance measures. For more information, see GAO-07-658;
Assessment: Generally not achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: An assessment of "generally achieved" indicates that DHS has
taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation.
However, an assessment of "generally achieved" does not signify that no
further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the
expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely,
"generally not achieved" indicates that DHS has not yet taken
sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the performance
expectation. An assessment of "generally not achieved" may be warranted
even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not
most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have
not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to
satisfy a performance expectation, and/or the information DHS provided
did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has
achieved the performance expectation, we indicated "no assessment
made."
[End of table]
Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS's Implementation Efforts:
Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across
DHS's mission and core management functions. These issues have impeded
the department's progress since its inception and will continue as DHS
moves forward. While it is important that DHS continue to work to
strengthen each of its mission and core management functions, it is
equally important that these key issues be addressed from a
comprehensive, departmentwide perspective to help ensure that the
department has the structure and processes in place to effectively
address the threats and vulnerabilities that face the nation. These
issues include: (1) transforming and integrating DHS's management
functions; (2) establishing baseline performance goals and measures and
engaging in effective strategic planning efforts; (3) applying and
improving a risk management approach for implementing missions and
making resource allocation decisions; (4) sharing information with key
stakeholders; and (5) coordinating and partnering with federal, state,
local, and private sector agencies. We have made numerous
recommendations to DHS to strengthen these efforts, and the department
has made progress in implementing some of these recommendations.
DHS Has Not Yet Transformed Its Component Agencies into a Fully
Functioning Department:
DHS has faced a variety of difficulties in its efforts to transform
into a fully functioning department, and we have designated DHS
implementation and transformation as high-risk. We first designated
DHS's implementation and transformation as high-risk in 2003 because 22
disparate agencies had to transform into one department. Many of these
individual agencies were facing their own management and mission
challenges. But most importantly, the failure to effectively address
DHS's management challenges and program risks could have serious
consequences for our homeland security as well as our economy. We kept
DHS implementation and transformation on the high-risk list in 2005
because serious transformation challenges continued to hinder DHS's
success. Since then, our and the DHS IG's reports have documented DHS's
progress and remaining challenges in transforming into an effective,
integrated organization. For example, in the management area, DHS has
developed a strategic plan, is working to integrate some management
functions, and has continued to form necessary partnerships to achieve
mission success. Despite these efforts, we reported that DHS
implementation and transformation remains on the 2007 high-risk list
because numerous management challenges remain, such as in the areas of
acquisition, financial, human capital, and information technology
management. We stated that the array of management and programmatic
challenges continues to limit DHS's ability to carry out its roles
under the National Strategy for Homeland Security in an effective risk-
based way.
We have recommended that agencies on the high-risk produce a corrective
action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems,
identifies effective solutions to those problems, and provides for
substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a
plan should include performance metrics and milestones, as well as
mechanisms to monitor progress. In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us
with a draft corrective action plan that did not contain key elements
we have identified as necessary for an effective corrective action
plan, including specific actions to address identified objectives. As
of May 2007, DHS had not submitted a corrective action plan to the
Office of Management and Budget. According to the Office of Management
and Budget, this is one of the few high-risk areas that has not
produced a final corrective action plan.
Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the
creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large
organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations
than DHS, can take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. We reported that
the creation of DHS is an enormous management challenge and that DHS
faces a formidable task in its transformation efforts as it works to
integrate over 170,000 federal employees from 22 component agencies.
Each component agency brought differing missions, cultures, systems,
and procedures that the new department had to efficiently and
effectively integrate into a single, functioning unit. At the same time
it weathers these growing pains, DHS must still fulfill its various
homeland security and other missions.
To strengthen its transformation efforts, we recommended, and DHS
agreed, that it should develop an overarching management integration
strategy, and provide the then DHS Business Transformation Office with
the authority and responsibility to serve as a dedicated integration
team and also to help develop and implement the strategy. We reported
that although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management
integration on a function by function basis, it has not developed a
plan that clearly identifies the critical links that should occur
across these functions, the necessary timing to make these links occur,
how these interrelationships will occur, and who will drive and manage
them. In addition, although DHS had established a Business
Transformation Office that reported to the Under Secretary for
Management to help monitor and look for interdependencies among the
individual functional management integration efforts, that office was
not responsible for leading and managing the coordination and
integration itself. We understand that the Business Transformation
Office has been recently eliminated. We have suggested that Congress
should continue to monitor whether it needs to provide additional
leadership authorities to the DHS Under Secretary for Management, or
create a Chief Operating Officer/Chief Management Officer position
which could help elevate, integrate, and institutionalize DHS's
management initiatives. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, enacted in August 2007, designates the Under
Secretary for Management as the Chief Management Officer and principal
advisor on management-related matters to the Secretary.[Footnote 28]
Under the Act, the Under Secretary is responsible for developing a
transition and succession plan for the incoming Secretary and Under
Secretary to guide the transition of management functions to a new
administration. The Act further authorizes the incumbent Under
Secretary as of November 8, 2008 (after the next presidential
election), to remain in the position until a successor is confirmed to
ensure continuity in the management functions of DHS.
In addition, transparency plays an important role in helping to ensure
efficient and effective transformation efforts. With regard to DHS, we
have reported that DHS has not made its management or operational
decisions transparent enough so that Congress can be sure it is
effectively, efficiently, and economically using the billions of
dollars in funding it receives annually. More specifically, in April
2007, we testified that we have encountered access issues in numerous
engagements, and the lengths of delay have been both varied and
significant and have affected our ability to do our work in a timely
manner. We reported that we have experienced delays with DHS components
that include CBP, ICE, FEMA, and TSA on different types of work such as
information sharing, immigration, emergency preparedness in primary and
secondary schools, and accounting systems. The Secretary of DHS and the
Under Secretary for Management have stated their desire to work with us
to resolve access issues and to provide greater transparency. It will
be important for DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring
delays in providing access to information on its programs and
operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess
its efforts.
DHS Has Not Yet Developed Outcome-Based Measures to Assess Strategic
Performance in Many Areas:
DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts and
has not yet fully developed performance measures or put into place
structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. We
have identified strategic planning as one of the critical success
factors for new organizations. This is particularly true for DHS, given
the breadth of its responsibility and need to clearly identify how
stakeholders' responsibilities and activities align to address homeland
security efforts. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of
1993 requires that federal agencies consult with the Congress and key
stakeholders to assess their missions, long-term goals, strategies, and
resources needed to achieve their goals. It also requires that the
agency include six key components in its strategic plan: (1) a mission
statement; (2) long-term goals and objectives; (3) approaches (or
strategies) to achieve the goals and objectives; (4) a description of
the relationship between annual and long-term performance goals; (5)
key factors that could significantly affect achievement of the
strategic goals; and (6) a description of how program evaluations were
used to establish or revise strategic goals. Other best practices in
strategic planning and results management that we have identified
include involving stakeholders in the strategic planning process,
continuously monitoring internal and external environments to
anticipate future challenges and avoid potential crises, holding
managers accountable for the results of their programs, and aligning
program performance measures and individual performance expectations at
each organizational level with agencywide goals and objectives.
DHS issued a departmentwide strategic plan in 2004 that addressed five
of six GPRA-required elements. The plan included a mission statement,
long-term goals, strategies to achieve the goals, key external factors,
and program evaluations, but did not describe the relationship between
annual and long-term goals. The linkage between annual and long-term
goals is important for determining whether an agency has a clear sense
of how it will assess progress toward achieving the intended results of
its long-term goals. While DHS's Performance Budget Overview and other
documents include a description of the relationship between annual and
long-term goals, not including this in the strategic plan made it more
difficult for DHS officials and stakeholders to identify how their
roles and responsibilities contributed to DHS's mission. In addition,
although DHS's planning documents described programs requiring
stakeholder coordination to effectively implement them, stakeholder
involvement in the planning process itself was limited. Given the many
other organizations at all levels of government and in the private
sector whose involvement is key to meeting homeland security goals,
earlier and more comprehensive stakeholder involvement in the planning
process is essential to the success of DHS's planning efforts. Such
involvement is important to ensure that stakeholders help identify and
agree on how their daily operations and activities contribute to
fulfilling DHS's mission. To make DHS a more results-oriented agency,
we recommended that DHS's strategic planning process include direct
consultation with external stakeholders, that its next strategic plan
include a description of the relationship between annual performance
goals and long-term goals, and that the next strategic plan adopt
additional good strategic planning practices, such as ensuring that the
strategic plan includes a timeline for achieving long-terms goals and a
description of the specific budgetary, human capital, and other
resources needed to achieve those goals. According to DHS officials,
the department is planning to issue an updated strategic plan, but they
did not provide a target time frame for when the plan would be issued.
We have also reported on the importance of the development of outcome-
based performance goals and measures as part of strategic planning and
results management efforts. Performance goals and measures are intended
to provide Congress and agency management with information to
systematically assess a program's strengths, weaknesses, and
performance. A performance goal is the target level of performance
expressed as a tangible, measurable objective against which actual
achievement will be compared. A performance measure can be defined as
an indicator, statistic, or metric used to gauge program performance.
Outcome-oriented measures show results or outcomes related to an
initiative or program in terms of its effectiveness, efficiency, or
impact.[Footnote 29]
A number of DHS's programs lack outcome goals and measures, which may
hinder the department's ability to effectively assess the results of
program efforts or fully assess whether the department is using
resources effectively and efficiently, especially given various agency
priorities for resources. In particular, we have reported that some of
DHS's components have not developed adequate outcome-based performance
measures or comprehensive plans to monitor, assess, and independently
evaluate the effectiveness of their plans and performance. For example,
in August 2005 we reported that ICE lacked outcome goals and measures
for its worksite enforcement program and recommended that the agency
set specific time frames for developing these goals and measures. In
March 2006, we reported that USCIS had not yet established performance
goals and measures to assess its benefit fraud activities, and we
recommended that they do so. Further, we have also reported that many
of DHS's border-related performance goals and measures are not fully
defined or adequately aligned with one another, and some performance
targets are not realistic. Yet, we have also recognized that DHS faces
some inherent difficulties in developing performance goals and measures
to address its unique mission and programs, such as in developing
measures for the effectiveness of its efforts to prevent and deter
terrorist attacks.
DHS Has Not Fully Applied a Risk Management Approach in Implementing
All Mission Areas:
DHS has not fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in
implementing its mission and core management functions. Risk management
has been widely supported by the President and Congress as a management
approach for homeland security, and the Secretary of Homeland Security
has made it the centerpiece of departmental policy. We have previously
reported that defining an acceptable, achievable (within constrained
budgets) level of risk is an imperative to address current and future
threats. Many have pointed out, as did the Gilmore and 9/11
Commissions, that the nation will never be completely safe and total
security is an unachievable goal. Within its sphere of responsibility,
DHS cannot afford to protect everything against all possible threats.
As a result, DHS must make choices about how to allocate its scarce
resources to most effectively manage risk. A risk management approach
can help DHS make decisions systematically and is consistent with the
National Strategy for Homeland Security and DHS's strategic plan, which
have called for the use of risk-based decisions to prioritize DHS's
resource investments regarding homeland security related programs.
Several DHS component agencies have taken steps toward integrating
risk-based decision making into their decision making processes. For
example, the Coast Guard has taken actions to mitigate vulnerabilities
and enhance maritime security. Security plans for seaports, facilities,
and vessels have been developed based on assessments that identify
their vulnerabilities. In addition, the Coast Guard used a Maritime
Security Risk Assessment Model to prioritize risk according to a
combination of possible threat, consequence, and vulnerability
scenarios. Under this approach, seaport infrastructure that was
determined to be both a critical asset and a likely and vulnerable
target would be a high priority for funding security enhancements. By
comparison, infrastructure that was vulnerable to attack but not as
critical or infrastructure that was very critical but already well
protected would be lower in priority. In the transportation area, TSA
has incorporated risk-based decision-making into number of its programs
and processes. For example, TSA has started to incorporate risk
management principles into securing air cargo, but has not conducted
assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities or critical assets (cargo
facilities and aircraft)--two crucial elements of a risk-based
management approach without which TSA may not be able to appropriately
focus its resources on the most critical security needs. TSA also
completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a
threat-based risk management approach to securing the nation's air
cargo transportation system. However, TSA's existing tools for
assessing vulnerability have not been adapted for use in conducting air
cargo assessments, nor has TSA established a schedule for when these
tools would be ready for use.
Although some DHS components have taken steps to apply risk-based
decision making in implementing their mission functions, we also found
that other components have not always utilized such an approach. DHS
has not performed comprehensive risk assessments in transportation,
critical infrastructure, and the immigration and customs systems to
guide resource allocation decisions. For example, DHS has not fully
utilized a risk-based strategy to allocate resources among
transportation sectors. Although TSA has developed tools and processes
to assess risk within and across transportation modes, it has not fully
implemented these efforts to drive resource allocation decisions. We
also recently identified concerns about DHS's use of risk management in
distributing grants to states and localities. For fiscal years 2006 and
2007, DHS has used risk assessments to identify urban areas that faced
the greatest potential risk, and were therefore eligible to apply for
the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant, and based the amount of
awards to all eligible areas primarily on the outcomes of the risk
assessment and a new effectiveness assessment. Starting in fiscal year
2006, DHS made several changes to the grant allocation process,
including modifying its risk assessment methodology, and introducing an
assessment of the anticipated effectiveness of investments. DHS
combined the outcomes of these two assessments to make funding
decisions. However, we found that DHS had limited knowledge of how
changes to its risk assessment methods, such as adding asset types and
using additional or different data sources, affect its risk estimates.
As a result, DHS had a limited understanding of the effects of the
judgments made in estimating risk that influenced eligibility and
allocation outcomes for fiscal year 2006. DHS leadership could make
more informed policy decisions if it were provided with alternative
risk estimates and funding allocations resulting from analyses of
varying data, judgments, and assumptions. We also reported that DHS has
not applied a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to
invest in specific capabilities for a catastrophic threat, and we
recommended that it do so.
In April 2007, DHS established the new Office of Risk Management and
Analysis to serve as the DHS Executive Agent for national-level risk
management analysis standards and metrics; develop a standardized
approach to risk; develop an approach to risk management to help DHS
leverage and integrate risk expertise across components and external
stakeholders; assess DHS risk performance to ensure programs are
measurably reducing risk; and communicating DHS risk management in a
manner that reinforces the risk-based approach. According to DHS, the
office's activities are intended to develop a risk architecture, with
standardized methodologies for risk analysis and management, to assist
in the prioritization of risk reduction programs and to ensure that DHS
component risk programs are synchronized, integrated, and use a common
approach. Although this new office should help to coordinate risk
management planning and activities across the department, it is too
early to tell what effect this office will have on strengthening
departmentwide risk management activities.
Information Sharing Remains a Challenge for DHS:
The federal government, including DHS, has made progress in developing
a framework to support a more unified effort to secure the homeland,
including information sharing. However, opportunities exist to enhance
the effectiveness of information sharing among federal agencies and
with state and local governments and private sector entities. As we
reported in August 2003, efforts to improve intelligence and
information sharing needed to be strengthened. In 2005, we designated
information sharing for homeland security as high-risk. We recently
reported that the nation still lacked an implemented set of
governmentwide policies and processes for sharing terrorism
information, but has issued a strategy on how it will put in place the
overall framework, policies, and architecture for sharing with all
critical partners--actions that we and others have recommended. The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required that
the President create an "information sharing environment" to facilitate
the sharing of terrorism information, yet this environment remains in
the planning stage. An implementation plan for the environment, which
was released on November 16, 2006, defines key tasks and milestones for
developing the information sharing environment, including identifying
barriers and ways to resolve them, as we recommended. We noted that
completing the information sharing environment is a complex task that
will take multiple years and long-term administration and congressional
support and oversight, and will pose cultural, operational, and
technical challenges that will require a collaborated response.
DHS has taken some steps to implement its information sharing
responsibilities. For example, DHS implemented a system to share
homeland security information. States and localities are also creating
their own information "fusion" centers, some with DHS support. DHS has
further implemented a program to protect sensitive information the
private sector provides it on security at critical infrastructure
assets, such as nuclear and chemical facilities. However, the DHS IG
found that users of the information system were confused with it and as
a result did not regularly use it; and DHS had not secured of the
private sector's trust that the agency could adequately protect and
effectively use the information that sector provided. These challenges
will require longer-term actions to resolve. Our past work in the
information sharing and warning areas has highlighted a number of other
challenges that need to be addressed. These challenges include
developing productive information sharing relationships among the
federal government, state and local governments, and the private
sector; and ensuring that the private sector receives better
information on potential threats.
DHS Has Faced Difficulties in Coordinating with Homeland Security
Partners:
In addition to providing federal leadership with respect to homeland
security, DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the activities of
other federal, state, local, private sector, and international
stakeholders, but has faced challenges in this regard. To secure the
nation, DHS must form effective and sustained partnerships between
legacy component agencies and also with a range of other entities,
including other federal agencies, state and local governments, the
private and nonprofit sectors, and international partners. We have
reported that successful partnering and coordination involves
collaborating and consulting with stakeholders to develop and agree on
goals, strategies, and roles to achieve a common purpose; identify
resource needs; establish a means to operate across agency boundaries,
such as compatible procedures, measures, data, and systems; and agree
upon and document mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report to the
public on the results of joint efforts. We have found that the
appropriate homeland security roles and responsibilities within and
between the levels of government and with the private sector are
evolving and need to be clarified.
The implementation of the National Strategy for Homeland Security
further underscores the importance for DHS of partnering and
coordination. For example, 33 of the strategy's 43 initiatives are
required to be implemented by 3 or more federal agencies and the
National Strategy identifies the private sector as a key homeland
security partner. If these entities do not effectively coordinate their
implementation activities, they may waste resources by creating
ineffective and incompatible pieces of a larger security program. For
example, because the private sector owns or operates 85 percent of the
nation's critical infrastructure, DHS must partner with individual
companies and sector organizations in order to protect vital national
infrastructure, such as the nation's water supply, transportation
systems and chemical facilities. In October 2006 we reported that all
17 critical infrastructure sectors established their respective
government councils, and nearly all sectors initiated their voluntary
private sector councils in response to the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan. The councils, among other things, are to identify
their most critical assets, assess the risks they face, and identify
protective measures, in sector-specific plans that comply with DHS's
National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
DHS has taken other important actions in developing partnerships and
mechanisms for coordinating with homeland security partners. For
example, DHS formed the National Cyber Response Coordination Group to
coordinate the federal response to cyber incidents of national
significance. It is a forum of national security, law enforcement,
defense, intelligence, and other government agencies that coordinates
intragovernmental and public/private preparedness and response to and
recovery from national level cyber incidents and physical attacks that
have significant cyber consequences. In the area of maritime security,
DHS has also taken actions to partner with a variety of stakeholders.
For example, the Coast Guard reported to us that as of June 2006, 35
sector command centers had been created and that these centers were the
primary conduit for daily collaboration and coordination between the
Coast Guard and its port partner agencies. We also found that through
its Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program, CBP has worked
in partnership with private companies to review their supply chain
security plans to improve members' overall security.
However, DHS has faced some challenges in developing other effective
partnerships and in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of
various homeland security stakeholders. For example, in February 2007
we testified that because DHS has only limited authority to address
security at chemical facilities it must continue to work with the
chemical industry to ensure that it is assessing vulnerabilities and
implementing security measures. Also, while TSA has taken steps to
collaborate with federal and private sector stakeholders in the
implementation of its Secure Flight program, in 2006 we reported these
stakeholders stated that TSA has not provided them with the information
they would need to support TSA's efforts as they move forward with the
program. In addition, we reported in September 2005 that TSA did not
effectively involve private sector stakeholders in its decision making
process for developing security standards for passenger rail assets We
recommended, and DHS developed, security standards that reflected
industry best practices and could be measured, monitored, and enforced
by TSA rail inspectors and, if appropriate, by rail asset owners. We
have also made other recommendations to DHS to help strengthen its
partnership efforts in the areas of transportation security and
research and development.
Further, lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities caused
DHS difficulties in coordinating with its emergency preparedness and
response partners in responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For
example, the Red Cross and FEMA had differing views about their roles
and responsibilities under the National Response Plan, which hampered
efforts to coordinate federal mass care assistance. Department of Labor
and FEMA officials also disagreed about which agency was responsible
for ensuring the safety and health of response and recovery workers.
This lack of clarity about each other's roles and procedures resulted
in delayed implementation of the National Response Plan's Worker Safety
and Health Support Annex. We recommended that DHS take steps to improve
partnering and coordination efforts as they relate to emergency
preparedness and response, including to seek input from the state and
local governments and private sector entities, such as the Red Cross,
on the development and implementation of key capabilities, including
those for interoperable communications.
Concluding Observations:
Given the dominant role that DHS plays in securing the homeland, it is
critical that the department's mission programs and management systems
and functions operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. In
the more than 4 years since its establishment, the department has taken
important actions to secure the border and the transportation sector
and to defend against, prepare for, and respond to threats and
disasters. DHS has had to undertake these critical missions while also
working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet
department--a difficult undertaking for any organization and one that
can take, at a minimum, 5 to 7 years to complete even under less
daunting circumstances. At the same time, a variety of factors,
including Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, threats to and attacks on
transportation systems in other countries, and new responsibilities and
authorities provided by Congress have forced the department to reassess
its priorities and reallocate resources to address key domestic and
international events and to respond to emerging issues and threats.
As it moves forward, DHS will continue to face the challenges that have
affected its operations thus far, including transforming into a high-
performing, results-oriented agency; developing results-oriented goals
and measures to effectively assess performance; developing and
implementing a risk-based approach to guide resource decisions; and
establishing effective frameworks and mechanisms for sharing
information and coordinating with homeland security partners. DHS has
undertaken efforts to address these challenges but will need to give
continued attention to these efforts in order to efficiently and
effectively identify and prioritize mission and management needs,
implement efforts to address those needs, and allocate resources
accordingly. Efforts to address these challenges will be especially
important over the next several years given the threat environment and
long-term fiscal imbalance facing the nation.
To address these challenges, DHS will need to continue its efforts to
develop a results-oriented mission and management framework to guide
implementation efforts and progress toward achieving desired outcomes.
In moving forward, it will also be important for DHS to routinely
reassess its mission and management goals, measures, and milestones to
evaluate progress made, identify past and emerging obstacles, and
examine alternatives to address those obstacles and effectively
implement its missions. We have made nearly 700 recommendations to DHS
on initiatives and reforms that would enhance its ability to implement
its core mission and management functions, including developing
performance goals and measures and setting milestones for key programs,
making resource allocation decisions based on risk assessments, and
developing and implementing internal controls to help ensure program
effectiveness. DHS has generally agreed with our prior recommendations.
Moreover, taking those actions that we have suggested for agencies on
our high-risk list provides a good road map for DHS as it works to
further develop management structures that, once in place, could help
the department more efficiently and effectively implement its mission
and management functions. To be removed from our high-risk list,
agencies first have to produce a corrective action plan that defines
the root causes of identified problems, identifies effective solutions
to those problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective
measures in the near term. Such a plan should include performance
metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. In
the spring of 2006, DHS provided us with a draft corrective action plan
that did not contain key elements we have identified as necessary for
an effective corrective action plan, including specific actions to
address identified objectives, and this plan has not yet been approved
by the Office of Management and Budget. Second, agencies must
demonstrate significant progress in addressing the problems identified
in their corrective action plans. It will be important for DHS to
become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing
access to information on its programs and operations so that Congress,
GAO, and others can independently assess its efforts. Finally,
agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a commitment
to sustain initial improvements in their performance over the long
term. Although DHS leaders have expressed their intent to integrate
legacy agencies into the new department, they have not dedicated the
resources needed to oversee this effort.
A well-managed, high-performing Department of Homeland Security is
essential to meeting the significant homeland security challenges
facing the nation. As DHS continues to evolve, implement its programs,
and integrate its functions, we will continue to review its progress
and performance and provide information to Congress and the public on
its efforts.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We requested comments on this report from the Secretary of Homeland
Security. In comments dated July 20, 2007, and signed by the
Undersecretary for Management (reprinted in their entirety in appendix
II), DHS took issues with our methodology and disagreed with the
conclusions we reached for 42 of the 171 performance expectations
(specifically 41 of the 84 performance expectations where we assessed
DHS as not having achieved the expectation and 1 of the 9 performance
expectations for which we did not make an assessment). DHS also
provided technical comments, which we considered and incorporated where
appropriate.
DHS raised five general issues with our methodology. First, DHS
believes that we altered the criteria by which we would judge the
department's progress in changing our terminology from "generally
addressed" to "generally achieved." As we communicated to DHS, we did
not change the underlying assessment approach or evaluation criteria.
Rather, we changed the way that we characterized DHS's progress for
each performance expectation. For example, our definition for
"generally addressed" and "generally achieved" did not change: "Our
work has shown that DHS has taken steps to effectively satisfy the key
elements of the performance expectation but may not have satisfied all
of the elements." The change from "addressed" to "achieved" was not a
change in methodology, criteria, or standards but only a change in
language to better convey, in the context of results-oriented
government, the legislative and executive intent behind these
performance expectations that DHS achieve these expectations rather
than merely begin to take steps that apply or are relevant to them.
Second, DHS took issue with the binary standard we used to assess each
performance expectation. While we acknowledge the binary standard we
applied is not perfect, we believe it is appropriate for this review
because the administration generally has not established quantitative
goals and measures for the performance expectations in connection with
the various mission and management areas. Thus, we could not assess
where along a spectrum of progress DHS stood for individual performance
expectations. We chose the 2-step process for assessing DHS's progress-
-using a binary standard for individual performance expectations and a
spectrum for broad mission and management areas--and fully disclosed it
to and discussed it with DHS officials at the outset and throughout the
review.
Third, DHS was concerned about how we defined our criteria for
assessing DHS's progress in achieving each performance expectation and
an apparent shift of criteria we applied after the department supplied
us additional information and documents. With regard to how we defined
our criteria and the performance expectations, the key elements for the
expectations were inherent to each one, and we discussed these elements
in each assessment. Further, we did not shift our criteria. Rather we
employed a process by which we disclosed our preliminary analysis and
assessments to DHS, received and analyzed additional documents and
statements from DHS officials, and updated (and in many cases changed)
our preliminary assessments based on the additional inputs. This
process resulted in an improvement, a diminution, or no change in our
assessment of the applicable area. In some cases, we added language to
clarify the basis of our assessment after our review of the additional
information DHS provided.
Fourth, DHS raised concerns that we did not "normalize" the application
of our criteria by the many GAO analysts who had input to this review.
Our methodology involved significant input by these analysts because
they have had experience with the mission and management areas we were
evaluating and were knowledgeable about the programs, specific
performance expectations, activities, data, and results from each area.
A core team of GAO analysts and managers reviewed all the inputs from
these other GAO staff to ensure the consistent application of our
methodology, criteria, and analytical process. In addition, our quality
control process included detailed reviews of the facts included in this
report, as well as assurance that we followed GAO's policies and
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Finally, DHS points out that we treated all performance expectations as
if they were of equal significance. In our scope and methodology
section we recognize that qualitative differences between the
performance expectations exist, but we did not apply a weight to the
performance expectations because congressional, departmental, and
other stakeholders' views on the relative priority of each performance
expectation may be different and we did not believe it was appropriate
to substitute our judgment for theirs.
DHS disagreed with our assessment of 42 of the 171 performance
expectations--including 41 of the 84 performance expectations we
assessed as generally not achieved--contending that we did not fully
take account of all the actions it has taken relative to each
expectation. Specifically, DHS believes that we expected DHS to achieve
an entire expectation in cases where both DHS and we agree that
ultimate achievement will not be possible for several more years, such
as in the areas of border security and science and technology. This
report provides Congress and the public with an assessment of DHS's
progress as of July 2007 and does not reflect the extent to which DHS
should have or could have made more progress. We believe that it is
appropriate, after pointing out the expectation for a multiyear program
and documenting the activities DHS has actually accomplished to date,
to reach a conclusion about whether DHS had not implemented the program
after 4 years.
DHS's concern that we have not adequately used or interpreted
additional information it provided us, such as for performance
expectations in the areas of aviation security and emergency
preparedness and response, has little basis. We fully considered all
information and documents DHS provided and described how we applied
this information in the assessment portion of each performance
expectation. In some cases DHS only provided us with testimonial
information regarding its actions to achieve each performance
expectation, but did not provide us with documentation verifying these
actions. In the absence of such documentation to support DHS's claims,
we concluded that DHS had generally not achieved the expectations. In
other cases, the information and documents DHS provided did not
convince us that DHS had generally achieved the performance expectation
as stated or as we had interpreted it. In these cases, we explain the
basis for our conclusions in the "GAO Assessment sections". Further, in
some cases the information and documents DHS provided were not relevant
to the specific performance expectation; in these situations we did not
discuss them in our assessment. In addition, in some of its comments on
individual performance expectations, DHS referenced new information
that it did not provide to us during our review. In these cases we
either explain our views on the information, or in one case we have
changed our conclusion to "no assessment made".
Overall, we appreciate DHS's concerns and recognize that in a broad-
based endeavor such as this, some level of disagreement is inevitable,
especially at any given point in time. However, we have been as
transparent as possible regarding our purpose, methodology, and
professional judgments. In table 44, we have summarized DHS's comments
on the 42 performance expectations and our response to those comments.
Table 44: Summary of DHS's Comments on 42 Performance Expectations and
Our Response:
Mission/management area: Border security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 4: Implement a program to detect and identify
illegal border crossings between ports of entry;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that it is well on its way toward
implementing the Secure Border Initiative, a comprehensive program to
detect and identify illegal border crossings. DHS expressed concern
that basing our assessment on the fact that SBInet has not been fully
deployed is inconsistent with our acknowledgement in an exit conference
that the Secure Border Initiative is "on a trajectory" towards
achieving this comprehensive program. Further, DHS stated that our
report's criticism of progress in implementing SBInet was surprising in
light of our previous concern that SBInet was being implemented too
quickly. DHS also expressed concern that we did not follow our ratings
system because we said that progress that has been made on the
implementation of SBInet is "unclear." In addition, DHS commented that
our report does not consider DHS's efforts toward effective control
over the northern border, and that contrary to the assertion that DHS
will not begin work on the northern border until fiscal year 2009, CBP
has tripled the number of agents assigned to the northern border since
fiscal year 2001.
Our response: Although we recognize that DHS has made progress in
implementing the Secure Border Initiative, SBInet, and other border
security efforts to achieve this performance expectation, DHS data and
our analysis showed that DHS has not yet achieved this expectation. For
example, DHS data show that only about 392 miles or 6.5 percent of the
6,000 miles of U.S. land border were under effective control as of
March 2007. Of these miles, only 12 miles are on the northern border.
Further, we believe that assigning more Border Patrol agents to the
northern border is only one part of the program DHS is implementing.
Moreover, Border Patrol currently estimates that it apprehends less
than half of the illegal alien traffic crossing our borders. We
recognize that the Secure Border Initiative and SBInet are multiyear
programs and are in the early stages of implementation and deployment,
but we also noted that programs that predated the Secure Border
Initiative faced challenges in implementation. Our work concluded that
the risks to completing the program on time and within budget needed to
be further reduced--not that program implementation needed to be
delayed.
Mission/management area: Border security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 6: Implement a strategy to detect and interdict
illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into the United States;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our report makes reference to DHS's
implementation efforts, but does not properly credit DHS for meeting
this performance expectation. DHS stated that the Securing America's
Borders at the Ports of Entry Strategic Plan defines a comprehensive
national strategy and specifically outlines the department's efforts
over the next 5 years to screen, detect, and interdict illegal cargo,
contraband, weapons, agricultural products and other illicit
substances. DHS reported that it has developed a formal Securing
America's Borders at the Ports of Entry Implementation Plan and
established the Securing America's Borders at the Ports of Entry
Implementation Division to provide oversight and coordination in the
execution of the strategic plan. DHS believes that it has set and
successfully met several milestones related to this performance
expectation in fiscal year 2006. Additionally, DHS stated that it has
been working with federal, state, and local partners to develop a
strategy and implementation plan which maximizes the efficiency of the
resources that are dedicated to stopping the entry of illegal drugs
into the United States along the southwest border. DHS commented that
while our report acknowledges these counternarcotics efforts, it does
not assign a proper assessment on the Counternarcotics Strategy and
Implementation Plan solely because it has only recently been
developed.
Our response: We fully reviewed and considered all of the information
and documentation DHS provided to us and concluded that DHS has not yet
generally achieved this performance expectation. DHS has made progress
in implementing programs to achieve this performance expectation.
However, our prior work identified challenges in implementation.
Additionally, while we recognize that DHS has developed the Securing
America's Borders at the Ports of Entry Strategic Plan and the related
implementation plan and division, as well as the Counternarcotics
Strategy and Implementation Plan, the actual implementation of these
efforts are still in the early stages. Once implemented, they should
help CBP detect and interdict illegal flows of goods into the United
States.
Mission/management area: Border security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 8: Implement initiatives related to the
security of certain documents used to enter the United States;
DHS's comments: According to DHS, our report's assessment of "generally
not achieved" for this performance expectation reflects shifting
criteria and does not take into account external factors beyond the
department's control. DHS commented that an earlier draft of our report
based a generally not achieved rating on a lack of evidence that DHS
had addressed risks and challenges associated with the security of
travel documents. DHS stated that our current report cites new issues
relating to plans for the deployment of document readers and the
development of a strategic plan for the Immigration Advisory Program.
DHS also commented that the report does not take into consideration
that Congress has delayed more extensive implementation of the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative. DHS noted that despite these changes, it
is on track and plans to implement the initiative at land and sea ports
well in advance of the statutory deadline.
Our response: We considered all of DHS's additional information and
documentation as part of our assessment. In doing so, we did not shift
our criteria. Rather we disclosed our preliminary analysis and
assessment to DHS in an earlier draft, received and analyzed additional
documents, and updated our preliminary assessment based on the
additional inputs. Our assessment recognized the extended timeframes
for implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative but also
noted that this initiative has faced and continues to face
implementation challenges despite the congressionally legislated
extension of the implementation deadline. We noted that DHS has a long
way to go to implement proposed plans for the initiative.
Mission/management area: Border security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 12: Leverage technology, personnel, and
information to secure the border;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that many of its programs currently
leverage technology, personnel, and information to secure the border
including US-VISIT, efforts to capture data on individuals attempting
illegal entry into the United States between the ports of entry, as
well as individuals who are being investigated or removed from the
interior of the country. DHS reported that it takes advantage of the
synergy from the efforts of both CBP and US-VISIT and leverages
existing resources.
Our response: In our assessment, we recognize that although DHS has
taken some actions to leverage technology, personnel, and information,
much more work remains. For example, we reported that it is still
unclear, and DHS has still not provided an adequate explanation of how
US-VISIT will work with other border security initiatives. We also
reported that while the Secure Border Strategic Plan provides some
information on how various border security initiatives relate, the plan
does not fully describe how these initiatives will interact once
implemented. In addition, we noted that further development and
implementation of SBInet would be key to achieving this performance
expectation.
Mission/management area: Immigration enforcement;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 2: Implement a program to ensure the timely
identification and removal of aliens subject to removal from the United
States;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that the methodology we used to reach
this assessment is flawed because it dismisses tangible results in
favor of potential challenges and holds DHS accountable for factors
outside its control. DHS reported making progress in ensuring the
timely identification of aliens subject to removal through programs to
end the practice of "catch and release," increasing its detention bed
space, shortening processing and detention times, and adding resources
for interviewing consular officials about removal actions and for
transporting aliens more quickly. DHS stated that certain variables
impede the agency's ability to remove an alien including where
expedited removal is halted or slowed due to certain foreign countries'
unwillingness to accept their returned nationals and delays due to the
lengthy duration of removal proceedings.
Our response: In our assessment, we recognize the difficulties DHS has
faced in achieving this performance expectation due in part to factors
beyond its control and highlight actions taken by DHS to address these
challenges. Nevertheless, we believe that the assessment is appropriate
and takes into account the challenges faced by DHS. For example, we
reported that while DHS has taken actions to address challenges
associated with foreign countries' unwillingness to provide travel
documents for removing aliens, these efforts may not yet fully address
the potential national security and public safety risks associated with
DHS's inability to remove illegal aliens. We also reported that DHS has
faced challenges in identifying aliens for removal and, according to
the DHS IG, the fugitive alien population appears to be growing at a
rate that exceeds Fugitive Operations Teams' ability to apprehend.
Overall, DHS has implemented some efforts to achieve this performance
expectation, but we believe that DHS can not yet ensure the timely
identification and removal of aliens.
Mission/management area: Immigration enforcement;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 3: Ensure the removal of criminal aliens;
DHS's comments: DHS expressed concern that our assessment for this
performance expectation undervalues DHS's progress made through the
Criminal Alien Program. DHS also commented that our report does not
consider that the program is an ongoing, multiyear effort. DHS outlined
its actions to ensure the removal of criminal aliens, including noting
that 40 ICE operation teams presently screen foreign-born inmates and
that ICE is continuing to train and hire nearly 200 additional staff to
support the program and extend coverage to state and local jails and
prisons. DHS indicated that fully implementing the Criminal Alien
Program in all of the more than 5,000 federal, state, and local
facilities across the country is an unrealistic expectation revealing a
marked lack of appreciation for the enormous resources that would be
required to implement such an expansion. According to DHS, even if it
were appropriated the funds necessary to expand the program to a single
additional institution every single day, it would take over eight years
to achieve this outcome.
Our response: In our response, we acknowledge the difficult undertaking
ICE is charged with in removing criminal aliens and have noted the
various efforts underway, including DHS's efforts to expand the
Criminal Alien Program. Our assessment is not intended to suggest that
DHS should expand the Criminal Alien Program to every federal, state,
and local correctional institution and jail. Rather, we reported that
ICE has not expanded the program or taken other actions--such as
reaching agreements with local law enforcement agencies--to ensure
coverage for federal, state, and local correctional institutions and
jails. Thus, ICE may not be able to fully ensure the removal of
criminal aliens from facilities not covered by the Criminal Alien
Program or agreements, and we concluded that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Immigration enforcement;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 6: Implement a program to allow for the secure
alternative detention of noncriminal aliens;
DHS's comments: Although we did not make an assessment for this
performance expectation, DHS commented that the information it provided
to us demonstrated that programs for secure alternatives to detention
of noncriminal aliens have been implemented. DHS highlighted its
progress in implementing such programs and noted that our report
drastically understates the level of meaningful participation in the
alternatives to detection programs and the promising results already
shown.
Our response: We did not make an assessment for this performance
expectation because neither we nor the DHS IG had completed prior work,
and we were unable to assess DHS's progress in achieving this
performance expectation based on the information DHS provided. DHS
provided us with procedures for its alternatives to detention program
and data on the number of aliens enrolled in its programs and the rate
of aliens' appearances in court and compliance with removal orders. We
could not clearly determine the extent to which DHS has implemented
program procedures, which we believe would be key to assessing DHS's
progress. On the basis of our methodology, we believe that "no
assessment" is appropriate for this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Immigration enforcement;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 8: Implement a prioritized worksite enforcement
strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are employed;
DHS's comments: DHS stated that we have largely not considered its
achievements in the worksite enforcement area and that DHS's efforts
have resulted in impressive outcomes, including the increased use of
employment verification systems and significant increases in
investigations and arrests. For example, DHS reported making more than
4,300 worksite enforcement arrests and apprehensions in fiscal year
2006, and completing nearly 6,000 compliance enforcement investigations
resulting in administrative arrests of more than 1,700 overstay and
status violators, a 75 percent increase over the number of
administrative arrests in fiscal year 2005.
Our response: We fully considered all of the information and
documentation provided by DHS related to this performance expectation.
In our assessment, we recognize the progress DHS has made in
implementing its worksite enforcement program and outline DHS's program
outputs, such as number of investigations conduced and arrests made.
However, DHS did not provide us with evidence that it has established
outcome-based goals and measures for its worksite enforcement program
and the extent to which it has achieved desired outcomes for the
program. We have previously reported that without outcome-based goals
and measures, it will be difficult for ICE to fully determine whether
its efforts are achieving desired outcomes. In addition, we highlighted
challenges associated with DHS's Employment Eligibility Verification
program, one of the requirements of the ICE Mutual Agreement between
Government and Employers program, that would have to be fully addressed
to help ensure the efficient and effective implementation of its
strategy.
Mission/management area: Immigration enforcement;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 10: Implement a comprehensive strategy to
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the
United States;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment of "generally not
achieved" is not supported by the facts provided to us. According to
DHS, its strategy for counteracting the trafficking and smuggling of
aliens is just one part of the larger Secure Border Initiative and
Securing America's Border at the Ports of Entry Strategic Plan. DHS
also stated that it has made significant progress in meeting this
performance expectation in coordination with other departmental
components and federal agencies. DHS pointed to Border Enforcement and
Security Task Forces to target cross-border criminal activity,
including human trafficking, and the ICE Trafficking in Persons
Strategy to target criminal organizations and individuals engaged in
human trafficking worldwide. DHS also stated that there are mechanisms
in place for ICE and CBP to share information related to the
trafficking or smuggling of aliens.
Our response: We fully considered all of the information and
documentation DHS provided to us for this performance expectation. In
our assessment, we recognize DHS's progress in implementing a strategy
to interdict and prevent human trafficking and smuggling. However, we
reported that the effectiveness of such a strategy depends on having
clearly defined roles and responsibilities and goals and measures for
assessing the extent to which DHS's efforts are achieving desired
outcomes. We reported that until DHS has developed a mechanism to
better share information among the responsible agencies and the ability
to evaluate the outcome of its efforts, DHS will not have a
comprehensive strategy in place, and we concluded that DHS has not yet
generally achieved this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Immigration services;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 1: Eliminate the benefit application backlog
and reduce application completion times to 6 months;
DHS's comments: DHS expressed disagreement with our assessment of
generally not achieved." According to DHS, it is well on its way to
eliminating the application backlog, which it reported as of September
2006 was less than 10,000 applications. DHS expressed concern that we
penalized DHS for not including in its definition of backlog cases
instances where information from the applicant or another agency is
pending. DHS commented that our report does not appropriately recognize
external factors beyond the department's control--including delays by
other agencies and the limitation on available visas. DHS also
commented that our assessment for this performance expectation is
inconsistent with other assessments made in the report that explicitly
limit the scope of performance expectations to "DHS's roles and
responsibilities."
Our response: In our assessment, we noted that while DHS has made
significant progress in reducing the number of applications pending
adjudication, USCIS's method of calculating its backlog leaves the
possibility of individual cases pending for longer than 6 months, and
USCIS stated that some applications received in 2004 and 2005, or even
earlier, may still be pending. We reported that while giving lower
priority to applications for which a benefit would not be immediately
available or were awaiting action outside of USCIS is a reasonable
approach to backlog reduction, those applications--1 million as of
September 2006--were awaiting adjudication. We reported that
adjudicating these applications would let applicants know their
eligibility for benefits and could help prevent future delays if large
numbers of those benefits became available, as happened when a 2005 law
eliminated the annual cap on asylum beneficiaries. As we believe that
adjudication of these applications is possible, we have applied our
methodology consistently for this performance expectation. In addition,
DHS's current data systems cannot produce backlog information based on
the date of the filing of a benefit application, which is necessary
under the congressional definition of "backlog." USCIS has also not yet
demonstrated that it has overcome long-standing technology problems
which have contributed to the backlog in the first place.
Mission/management area: Immigration services;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 3: Establish a timetable for reviewing the
program rules, business processes, and procedures for immigration
benefit applications;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment of "generally not
achieved" is not supported by the facts or documents provided to us.
DHS noted that it has grouped its existing transactions into four major
types of transactions handled--citizenship, immigrant, humanitarian,
nonimmigrant--and has developed a timetable to implement improved
processes for each of these four types of transactions contained in the
DHS-USCIS Transformation Program Office FY 2007 Expenditure Plan. DHS
expressed concern that we had not considered this timetable in our
assessment.
Our response: DHS provided us the FY2007 Transformation Expenditure
Plan, which we fully considered as part of our assessment. The plan
contained general timetables for reviewing each activity by fiscal
year. The FY 2007 Expenditure Plan states that the timelines and actual
costs incurred will depend on the specific acquisition strategy defined
for each increment. Additionally, DHS reported that it will prepare a
detailed timetable for reviewing program rules, business processes, and
procedures for each benefit category once it awards the contract. Until
it does so, we concluded that DHS has generally not achieved this
expectation.
Mission/management area: Immigration services;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 5: Develop new programs to prevent future
backlogs from developing;
DHS's comments: According to DHS, our report does not give proper
credit to the department's significant transformation efforts to
increase resources, improve customer service, and modernize business
practices relating to benefits applications. DHS expressed concern that
we did not consider the issuance of a rule to adjust the Immigration
and Naturalization Benefit Application and Petition Schedule to adjust
fees collected for benefit applications. DHS stated that this
adjustment will provide a stable source of revenue to support a
significant reduction in processing times.
Our response: In our assessment for this performance expectation, we
recognize revisions made by DHS to the Immigration and Naturalization
Benefit Application and Petition Schedule. We recognize that raising
fees may provide the agency with additional revenue and support its
efforts to reduce processing times. However, we believe that raising
fees alone will not ensure the prevention of future backlogs. Moreover,
USCIS has initiated various programs to help reduce processing times,
but these programs are still in the pilot stages and, in some cases,
DHS has not yet assessed their results to determine the extent to which
they could be implemented on a national basis.
Mission/management area: Immigration services;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 12: Establish training programs to reduce fraud
in the benefits process;
DHS's comments: According to DHS, it has developed a uniform training
course for all officers. DHS also stated that it has identified certain
fraud schemes that are unique to specific application processes and/or
prevalent in geographical areas. The department consequently has
provided specialized training to certain officers who handle these
particular types of matters or who are stationed in certain locations
above and beyond the uniform training provided to all officers. Instead
of recognizing the achievements of these programs, DHS commented that
our report appears to base its assessment of "generally not achieved"
on the "appropriate[ness]" of the training, which appears to be an
inconsistency of methodology.
Our response: In our assessment, we recognize USCIS's training programs
focused on detecting fraud in the benefits process. However, DHS did
not provide us with evidence on the extent to which it has taken
actions to ensure that its training courses have been distributed and
implemented appropriately across all of its field offices. DHS also did
not provide us with evidence that it has taken actions to ensure that
all staff receive training appropriate to their roles and
responsibilities in adjudicating certain types of applications.
Therefore, our assessment was not based on our evaluation of the
appropriateness of the training but, rather, that DHS did not provide
us with evidence showing that its staff have received the training
applicable to their roles and responsibilities, which we believe is a
key part of establishing programs to reduce benefit fraud.
Mission/management area: Immigration services;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 14: Implement a fraud assessment program to
reduce benefit fraud;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that the benefit fraud assessments it has
conducted to date have provided useful baseline data to assist in the
development of a comprehensive strategy. DHS reported that its
assessments have resulted in procedural and regulatory changes to
minimize certain types of fraud. DHS commented that our report states
that it has not developed and demonstrated the success of a strategy
for conducting assessments, while an earlier draft indicated that DHS
had not provided evidence of recently completed assessments.
Our response: In our assessment, we noted that DHS has completed fraud
assessments for three benefits types and expects to issue final reports
on four others later in fiscal year 2007. However, we noted that USCIS
has not yet developed and implemented a comprehensive strategy for
conducting fraud assessments, which we believe is a key part of this
expectation for DHS to implement a fraud assessment program. With
regard to DHS's comments on differences between our final report and an
earlier draft, for all of the performance expectations, we disclosed
our preliminary analysis and assessments to DHS, received and analyzed
the additional documents and statements from DHS officials, and updated
our preliminary assessments based on the additional inputs.
Mission/management area: Aviation security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 2: Establish standards and procedures for
effective airport perimeter security;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment for this performance
expectation does not recognize the significance of the steps the
department has taken in conjunction with airports and airlines to
enhance perimeter security, such as inspection of vehicles at access
gates and assessments of new technologies. DHS also noted that it
provided us with documentation outlining the department's full
compliance with relevant requirements established by the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act. TSA commented that per Aviation and
Transportation Security Act requirements, it has developed the Aviation
Inspection Plan, which is based on an analytical risk assessment
process evaluated threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences,
and is reviews and updated every year. Further, DHS commented that we
did not give sufficient consideration to the department's action plan
for addressing recommendations from our 2004 report on airport
perimeter security. In addition, DHS commented that it is difficult to
precisely measure the deterrent effect of its measures for airport
perimeter security.
Our response: In making our assessment, we considered all documents
provided by DHS on steps taken to enhance airport perimeter security,
including updated summaries of departmental policies and procedures and
plans to assess relevant technology. While DHS has taken actions to
enhance perimeter security, the department did not provide evidence
that these actions have resulted in effective airport perimeter
security, and it did not provide sufficient information or
documentation that it had addressed all of the relevant requirements
contained in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and
recommendations from our 2004 report. For example, DHS did not provide
documentation showing that TSA has met an Aviation and Transportation
Security Act requirement to recommend to airport operators commercially
available measures or procedures for preventing unauthorized access to
secured airport areas. In keeping with this requirement, we recommended
in our 2004 report that DHS compile the results of technology
assessments--those conducted by TSA as well as independent assessments
by airport operators--and communicate the integrated results of these
assessments to airport operators. DHS did not provide us with evidence
that it has fully addressed this recommendation.
Mission/management area: Aviation security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 3: Establish standards and procedures to
effectively control access to airport secured areas;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment for this performance
expectation does not recognize the significance of the steps the
department has taken to effectively control access to airport secured
areas, such as development of the Aviation Direct Access Screening
Program--which provides for the random screening of employees
attempting to access secure areas--and background checks of employees
before they are granted identification media. DHS noted that while it
is difficult to precisely measure the deterrent effect of these
actions, the department has determined that a random, risk-based
approach to controlling access to secured areas is more effective than
creating stationary screening stations. DHS also commented that it
provided us with documentation outlining the department's full
compliance with relevant requirements established by the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act. Further, DHS stated that we did not give
sufficient consideration to their action plan for addressing
recommendations from our 2004 report.
Our response: In making our assessment, we considered all documents
provided by DHS on steps taken to strengthen access controls of secured
areas, including updated information on its efforts to enhance security
procedures for gate screening and security measures for issuing
personnel identification media. While DHS has taken actions to enhance
procedures for controlling access to airport secured areas, it did not
provide us with evidence that these actions have resulted in effective
access control for airport secured areas, and the DHS IG has identified
continuing weaknesses in DHS's procedures to prevent unauthorized
workers from accessing secured airport areas. Additionally, DHS did not
provide sufficient information or documentation that it had addressed
all of the relevant requirements contained in the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act and recommendations from our 2004 report.
For example, DHS did not provide documentation that TSA has met an
Aviation and Transportation Security Act requirement to require vendors
who have direct access to aircraft and to the airfield to develop
security programs. We also did not receive documentation from DHS
showing that the department had complied with our 2004 report
recommendation to provide guidance and prioritized funding to airports
for enhancing the security of the commercial airport system as a
whole.
Mission/management area: Aviation security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 14: Develop and implement an advanced
prescreening system to allow DHS to compare domestic passenger
information to the Selectee List and No Fly List;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment for this performance
expectation does not recognize the department's progress in achieving
milestones in its multiyear effort. DHS also believes that we did not
consider all of the evidence the department provided detailing the
Secure Flight program's mission needs, concept of operations,
management plans, system requirements, acquisition plans,
testing/evaluation plans, privacy assessments, and the related
schedules.
Our response: In making our
assessment, we considered the documents provided by DHS on Secure
Flight's various plans, assessments and requirements, and concept of
operations. As we have previously reported, DHS has on numerous
occasions missed key development and implementation milestones it had
established for the Secure Flight program. Due in part to DHS not
following a disciplined development process for Secure Flight in 2006,
DHS halted development of the program to begin a "rebaselining" which
involves TSA reassessing program goals, requirements, and capabilities.
DHS has since made some program changes and is continuing its efforts
to develop Secure Flight. However, DHS has not yet completed
development efforts for the program and has not yet implemented it. In
addition, as this report provides an assessment of progress made by DHS
during its first 4 years, we believe that it is appropriate to assess
DHS's progress in achieving this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Aviation security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 15: Develop and implement an international
passenger prescreening process to compare passenger information to
terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment for this performance
expectation prematurely assesses the department's progress on a long-
term goal. The department noted that the Secure Flight Notice of
Proposed Rule Making and the Pre-Departure Advanced Passenger
Information System Final Rule are scheduled to be published in the
coming months. According to DHS, these rulemakings will place the
department on track to implement pre-departure international passenger
screening. DHS commented that it does not appear that we considered
these proposed rulemakings in making our assessment.
Our response: We considered the DHS proposed rulemaking
for Advanced Passenger Information System as part of our assessment for
this performance expectation. We did not consider the Secure Flight
Notice of Proposed Rule Making because DHS stated that it would be
published in the coming months. However, we have identified problems
with implementation of the international prescreening process and have
found that full implementation of an integrated domestic and
international prescreening process is still several years away. In
addition, as this report provides an assessment of progress made by DHS
during its first 4 years, we believe that it is appropriate to assess
DHS's progress in achieving this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Aviation security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 18: Deploy checkpoint technologies to address
vulnerabilities;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment for this performance
expectation does not recognize the department's progress and does not
consider the practical limitations inherent in developing and deploying
new technologies. According to DHS, it is constantly deploying existing
and developing new technologies to reduce checkpoint vulnerabilities.
In addition, DHS noted that we did not consider other efforts in
addition to checkpoint technologies that have effectively reduced
vulnerabilities, such as updated procedures to detect explosives,
enhanced training for transportation security officers, specially-
trained canine teams, and deployment of transportation security
officers specifically trained in behavior recognition and bomb
appraisal.
Our response: We recognize in our assessment of performance expectation
17 that DHS has generally achieved the expectation to develop and test
checkpoint technologies to address vulnerabilities. DHS has made some
enhancements to currently deployed technologies such as to metal
detectors and x-ray machines. DHS is also pilot testing new
technologies. However, DHS has had limited initial deployments of
technology to provide additional levels of explosives security at
checkpoints. Further, DHS reported in 2007 that extensive deployment of
new technologies will not be realized for another 2 years. In addition,
in our assessments for other performance expectations, we recognized
DHS's efforts, other than technologies, to reduce vulnerabilities. For
example, we considered DHS's updated procedures to detect explosives
and the implementation of a training for transportation security
officers in behavioral recognition and bomb appraisal in our assessment
for performance expectation 16--develop and implement processes and
procedures for physically screening passengers at airport checkpoints--
and concluded that DHS generally achieved that expectation.
Mission/management area: Surface transportation security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 3: issue standards for securing surface
transportation modes;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that while our assessment for this
performance expectation recognized the department's issuance of
standards related to mass transit and passenger and freight rail, it
did not consider standards issued by the department in other
transportation modes, including highways and pipelines. DHS noted that
it developed and provided us with draft Security Action Items that
contain standards, addressing personnel security, access control, and
en route security for highway modality. DHS also outlined voluntary
"smart practices" it has issued for pipeline security.
Our response: DHS has developed draft Security Action Items that
contain standards related to highways, but has not yet finalized these
standards. In general, the standards that have been issued are
voluntary, and DHS has not identified whether these will be made
mandatory. Moreover, the department did not provide us with
documentation that it had developed standards for pipeline security. In
accordance with our methodology and in absence of documentation
verifying these standards, we concluded that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Surface transportation security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 4: Conduct compliance inspections for surface
transportation systems;
DHS's comments: DHS believes that while our assessment recognizes that
the department has conducted compliance inspections for mass transit,
passenger rail, and freight rail, we did not give DHS credit for these
compliance inspections or progress made in other areas. DHS outlined
its efforts to conduct inspections for freight rail and mass transit
systems and noted that Baseline Assessment and Security Enhancements
reviews have been completed on 38 transportation systems.
Our response: In our assessment, we recognize DHS's efforts to conduct
compliance inspections for surface transportation systems, including
its Baseline Assessment and Security Enhancements reviews. Although DHS
has deployed inspectors to conduct compliance inspections and carry out
other security activities for mass transit, including passenger rail,
and freight rail modes, DHS did not provide us with evidence that it
has conducted compliance inspections for other surface transportation
modes or information on whether the department believes compliance
inspections are needed for other modes. In addition, we have reported
that DHS's role of inspectors in enforcing security requirements has
not been fully defined, and DHS did not provide us with documentation
on its efforts to better define these roles.
Mission/management area: Maritime security;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 16: Develop a long-range vessel-tracking system
to improve maritime domain awareness;
DHS's comments: DHS stated that the assessment of "generally not
achieved" demonstrates the problem of rating multi-year programs on the
basis of whether total implementation has already been achieved, and
the department provided examples of the progress it has made in
achieving this expectation. DHS stated that by the end of 2007 the
Coast Guard will receive identification and tracking information for
vessels in U.S. waters in the vicinity of 55 critical ports and 9
coastal areas. The department also said that it is working to establish
a Long Range Identification and Tracking system that will provide for
global information on all U.S. flagged vessels required to carry
transponders and information on all U.S.-bound vessels regardless of
flag state within 1000 miles. Further, DHS stated that there are other
vessel-tracking programs that fulfill the requirement for a long-range
vessel tracking system. The department said that these programs are
sensitive and consequently could not provide additional details in its
comments.
Our response: While we understand that the development of a long-range
vessel-tracking system is in process, our report is intended to provide
an assessment of DHS's progress after 4 years. DHS has made progress in
developing a long-range vessel-tracking and has vessel-tracking
capabilities in place. However, based on publicly available
information, it has not yet completed the development of its Long Range
Identification and Tracking system that can provide coverage up to
nautical 2,000 miles and is consistent with international treaties,
conventions, and agreements. We believe this is key to DHS achieving
this performance expectation. DHS has reported that the Coast Guard has
vessel-tracking capabilities, but noted that work is needed in the
processing, display, and training in the use of this information. In
addition, DHS has reported that it has worked and is continuing to work
with the International Maritime Organization to develop a long-range
vessel tracking system and that an international agreement to implement
a global tracking system by the end of 2008 has been reached.
Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 4: Ensure the capacity and readiness of
disaster response teams;
DHS's comments: DHS believes that we did not give sufficient
consideration to its disaster response team capacity and readiness
improvements and outlined its various teams' capabilities. In
particular, DHS highlighted its teams' response times following recent
storms. DHS also reported that it is developing standardized doctrine,
policies, response metrics, and operating procedures to support its new
rapidly deployable response teams.
Our response: We considered all of the information provided by DHS on
the capacity and readiness of its disaster response teams. DHS did not
provide us with evidence that it has yet developed readiness indicators
for most of its disaster response teams, which indicates that DHS
cannot yet ensure the capacity and readiness of those teams. More
broadly, DHS did not provide us with documentation of its teams'
readiness and capacity, such as documentation on the results of
exercises, tests, or after-action reports on the small-scale disasters
in which the teams have been used. On the basis of our methodology and
as DHS did not provide us with evidence verifying its disaster teams'
readiness and capacity, we concluded that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 7: Establish a single, all-hazards national
response plan;
DHS's comments: DHS believes that we did not properly
recognize the current National Response Plan, issued in 2004, and its
annexes and Catastrophic Incident Supplement. DHS noted that the
National Response Plan is being used daily to respond to incidents and
is a "living document that will be regularly reviewed and revised." DHS
also commented that the existing National Response Plan will be
implemented in response to incidents that occur before the issuance of
a revised plan and that there will be a transition process used in
conjunction with issuance of any revised plan. DHS noted that our view
that the National Response Plan will negatively impact the ability to
fully train, exercise, and develop new implementation plans is flawed.
Our response: In our assessment for this performance expectation, we
recognize DHS's issuance of the National Response Plan and its
Catastrophic Incident Supplement. However, the lack of clarity and
understanding of key roles and responsibilities under the plan was a
major cause of many of the problems experienced in the response to
Hurricane Katrina, and the changes made to the plan in 2006 only
partially addressed these issues. Until the final revised plan is
issued, federal, state, and local agencies cannot complete and test
through exercises their operational plans for implementing any revised
roles and responsibilities under the plan. For example, the Red Cross
has said that its revised role in mass care and shelter will not take
place until the National Response Plan review process is complete and
all changes are approved. Moreover, the Secretary's recent designation
of Principal Federal Officials and Federal Coordinating Officers raised
new questions in Congress and among state and local officials regarding
the roles and responsibilities of these officials and to whom they
report and are responsible. In early August 2007 DHS circulated a
revised version of the National Response Plan, now called the National
Response Framework, but the Framework has not yet been formally
circulated to state and local stakeholders for review and comment.
Thus, it is still uncertain when the revision will be finalized.
Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 8: Coordinate implementation of a single all-
hazards response plan;
DHS's comments: DHS believes that we have not given the department
credit for the progress it has made in coordinating implementation of
the existing National Response Plan. DHS commented that there has been
extensive training, exercises, and planning efforts with federal,
state, and local partners on implementation of the plan. DHS also noted
that the coordinated responses to 97 major disaster declarations since
Hurricane Katrina have allowed for greater coordination in the
implementation of the National Response Plan.
Our response: Although DHS has said that it has coordinated responses
to 97 major disaster declarations since Hurricane Katrina, none of
these have been disasters of the scope of a major hurricane or
catastrophic disaster. DHS did not provide us documentation on how
coordination has been improved and assessed, how its training programs
have contributed to more effective coordination, and how its improved
coordination efforts can be applied to large-scale disasters. Absent
this documentation and given concerns regarding the status of the
revised National Response Plan, we concluded that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 13: Develop the capacity to provide needed
emergency assistance and services in a timely manner;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that its critical services, such as
improved logistics tracking and capacity; increased disaster victim
registration; and robust fraud, waste, and abuse protection, are in
place and fully functional. DHS noted that it has established and
tested initiatives in logistics tracking and capacity, such as the
Total Asset Visibility initiative, and has worked closely with state
and local partners to identify and address their needs for disaster
response. DHS also noted that it has engaged in disaster planning
efforts to identify challenges that would result from major disasters
in various areas of the nation. Overall, DHS commented that the
majority of information it provided to us on this performance
expectation was designed specifically to address catastrophic
situations that are nearly impossible and very costly to simulate and
that, in our assessment, we stated that it is difficult to assess DHS-
FEMA's initiatives regarding this performance expectation.
Our response: In our assessment, we reported that DHS does not appear
to have tested its various initiatives on a scale that reasonably
simulates a major or catastrophic disaster and that, as a result, it is
difficult to assess the results of DHS's various initiatives to improve
its response to a major catastrophic disaster. However, as the basis
for our assessment we noted that DHS did not provide us with
documentation verifying that its emergency assistance capabilities are
in place and capable of providing needed services in a timely manner
following any incident. For example, DHS did not provide us with
documentation on how it determined requirements for prepositioning
disaster supplies to assess whether DHS has achieved its intended
capacity, and DHS's optimization planning efforts for improvements to
its logistics capabilities are still in the preliminary stages.
According to our methodology, in the absence of documentation verifying
DHS's actions, we concluded that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 14: Provide timely assistance and services to
individuals and communities in response to emergency events;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that it continues to develop and expand
capabilities to provide timely assistance and services to individuals
and communities in response to emergency events. For example, DHS
reported undertaking initiatives and agreements to improve shelter
management, support targeted registration assistance, and enable
improved targeting of resources where needed. DHS reported that through
its Public Assistance Program post-Katrina, DHS has obligated 80
percent of estimated assistance within an average of 150 days after
declaration compared to 203 days prior to Katrina and exceeding DHS's
goal of 180 days. DHS also noted that we did not recognize its
achievements in updating policies, guidance, and training for debris
removal and establishing a nationwide list of debris removal
contractors. In addition, DHS commented that it has successfully
responded to 107 major disasters, 15 emergencies, and 130 fires since
Hurricane Katrina.
Our response: During our review, DHS did not provide us with
documentation verifying the actions it has taken to provide timely
assistance to individual and communities in response to emergency
events. Moreover, DHS did not provide us with the results of tests or
exercises of its emergency assistance and service capabilities. In the
absence of such documentation verifying DHS's claims of actions taken
to improve its capabilities, we concluded that DHS has generally not
achieved this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 15: Implement a program to improve
interoperable communications among federal, state, and local agencies;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment does not fully credit
the department for progress made by its Office of Emergency
Communications and Office for Interoperability and Compatibility in
improving federal agencies' interoperable communication capabilities.
DHS outlined several initiatives aimed at developing programs related
to interoperable communications, highlighting its Integrated Wireless
Network to provide the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and
Treasury with a consolidated federal wireless communications service.
DHS noted that this network is aimed particularly at improving federal
interoperability. DHS also noted that our report did not consider the
practical realities associated with developing a communications system
that will accommodate more than 50,000 emergency response agencies and
where nearly 90 percent of the communications infrastructure is owned
at the local level.
Our response: We considered all of the information and documentation
provided by DHS on its efforts to implement a program to improve
interoperable communications among federal, state, and local agencies.
However, DHS is in the process of evaluating federal agencies'
interoperable communications capabilities and did not provide us with
documentation on its actions to improve interoperability between
federal agencies and state and local agencies, which we believe is a
key part of communications interoperability. In addition, as previously
reported, the Integrated Wireless Network is mostly focused on
improving interoperability among federal agencies, and the level of
interoperability that state and local agencies will have with federal
first responders on this network has not yet been decided. In our
assessment, we reported that until a more concerted effort is made
promote federal interoperability, overall progress in improving
communications interoperability would remain limited.
Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 17: Increase the development and adoption of
interoperability communications standards;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment for this performance
expectation does not fully recognize the significant progress made by
the department and appears to be based on shifting criteria used to
evaluate DHS's progress. DHS outlined actions it has taken to increase
the development and adoption of interoperability communications
standards, including partnering with various entities to accelerate the
Project 25 standards to develop and generate interoperable and
compatible voice communications equipment irrespective of the
manufacturer. DHS noted that our assessment is premature and
inconsistent with the language of the performance expectation to
increase the development and adoption of interoperability
communications standards.
Our response: Our criteria for evaluating whether or not DHS has
generally achieved this performance expectation did not change. DHS has
taken actions to increase the development and adoption of
interoperability communications standards, but more work needs to be
done. In addition to completing undefined subsets of the standards,
ambiguities in the defined subsets must be resolved in order to enable
interoperability with radios built to these standards.
Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 20: Provide guidance and technical assistance
to first responders in developing and implementing interoperable
communications capabilities;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment does not fully credit
the department for progress made by its Office of Emergency
Communications and Office for Interoperability and Compatibility. In
its comments, DHS outlined several initiatives aimed at developing
guidance and technical assistance related to interoperable
communications, including the Interoperable Communications Technical
Assistance Program. DHS noted that our assessment regarding SAFECOM's
guidance and tools was based largely on limited feedback from four
states and selected localities and that its experience suggests that
numerous other entities have had success in using SAFECOM's guidance
and tools.
Our response: As the basis for our assessment, we noted that (1)
several states and localities were not aware of SAFECOM tools and
guidance or did not find them useful and (2) DHS is in the process of
developing measures to assess the extent of the use of its tools and
guidance, but has not yet developed those measures. In addition, DHS
did not provide us with documentation on states' and localities' use of
guidance and tools or on the extent to which states and localities have
found the guidance and tools useful. In accordance with our methodology
and in the absence of such documentation, we concluded that DHS has
generally not achieved this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 21: Provide assistance to state and local
governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that it has provided meaningful
assistance to state and local governments to develop all-hazards plans
and capabilities and outlines examples of this assistance in its
comments. For example, DHS commented that our assessment largely relies
on outdated GAO and DHS IG reports and does not reflect the
department's recent efforts to include language in grant guidance to
supports state and local governments' development of all-hazards plans
and capabilities. DHS also commented that we reported that the
department has been focused on funding terrorism preparedness rather
than natural or all-hazards preparedness. DHS noted that while its
National Planning Scenarios have focused in large part on terrorist
events, this predominance is due to the fact that their unique and
exacting capability requirements make them critical planning tools in
the national effort to develop a truly all-hazards preparedness model.
DHS also noted that in 2007 it has focused on multi-hazard mitigation
with state and local governments and is engaged in efforts that develop
state and local all-hazards capabilities.
Our response: DHS did not provide us with documentation on the extent
to which its assistance to state and local governments has focused on
all-hazards, nor on the extent to which it has helped state and local
governments develop all-hazards capabilities. In accordance with our
methodology and in the absence of such documentation verifying DHS's
actions, we concluded that DHS has generally not achieved this
performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Emergency preparedness and response;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 24: Develop a system for collecting and
disseminating lessons learned and best practices to emergency
responders;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment does not reflect the
substantial progress the department has made in developing the Lessons
Learned Information Sharing Web site nor does it consider the practical
difficulties associated with developing an online system. DHS reported
making continuous improvements to the system, based on user feedback,
and noted that additional improvements under development will address
most, if not all, of the issues we previously raised about the system.
Our response: In our assessment, we recognize that DHS has developed
and implemented the Lessons Learned Information Sharing System. In
prior work, we identified various issues with the system. DHS has
reported taking actions to address these issues, but these actions are
not yet complete. In addition, it is unclear whether the system is
actually collecting and disseminating lessons learned and best
practices to emergency responders.
Mission/management area: Critical infrastructure and key resources
protection;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 3: Improve and enhance public/private
information sharing involving attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities;
DHS's comments: DHS stated that it has made significant progress in
information sharing. The department highlighted a number of efforts it
has made in this area, such as the establishment of the Technical
Resource for Incident Prevention system (TRIPwire) and the National
Coordinating Center for Telecommunications. Further, DHS stated that we
did not include an assessment of the private sector utilization of the
Homeland Security Information Network. The department also stated that
we relied largely on previous reports that do not account for its
recent successes and noted that the DHS IG found that five
recommendations from its report Homeland Security Information Network
Could Support Information Sharing More Effectively (OIG-06-38) are
considered resolved.
Our response: We reviewed DHS's updated information and considered the
material it provided. While DHS demonstrated that it has created a
number of information sharing programs, the department did not provide
evidence demonstrating that these programs have actually improved
information sharing. Specifically, DHS did not provide any metrics
indicating that these programs have resulted in improved information
sharing with federal, state, and local government or the private
sector. In conducting our analysis we reviewed past and recent GAO and
DHS IG reports concerning information sharing. Our April 2007 report,
Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to Support
Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and
Local Information-Sharing Initiatives (GAO-07-455), found that DHS had
not effectively coordinated the Homeland Security Information Network
with key state and local initiatives and consequently faced the risk
that information sharing is not occurring. We made four recommendations
in this report. DHS concurred with three and indicated that it was
taking actions to address each of them. In May 2007 we concluded that
until DHS completes these efforts, such as developing an inventory of
key state and local initiatives and fully implementing and
institutionalizing key practices for effective coordination and
collaboration, the department will continue to be at risk that
information is not being effectively shared and that the department is
duplicating state and local capabilities. Further, while the DHS IG
stated in a July 11, 2007 letter that it considered resolved the five
recommendations in its report OIG-06-38, it also stated that the
recommendations would remain open until it received supporting
documentation from the department. DHS identified actions it has taken
to address the DHS IG's recommendations, and the DHS IG stated that
these actions would satisfy its recommendations. However, the DHS IG
stated that it needed evidence verifying DHS's activities before it
could consider its recommendations closed.
Mission/management area: Critical infrastructure and key resources
protection;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 4: Develop and enhance national analysis and
warning capabilities for critical infrastructure;
DHS's comments: DHS stated that we do not give the department credit
for advances it has made in achieving this performance expectation,
particularly with regard to cyber critical infrastructure. DHS
commented that in the area of cyber infrastructure, we inaccurately
suggested that the department has provided no evidence of enhanced
national warning capabilities. DHS also noted that our assessment does
not consider the progress made by its National Cyber Security Division
to develop and enhance cyber analysis, watch and warning, and
collaboration with the private sector. DHS described efforts the U.S.
Computer Readiness Team has made to conduct analysis, issue warnings,
and collaborate with the public and private sector. The department also
stated that its National Communications System and fusion centers have
contributed to its analysis and warning efforts.
Our response: Our response: In previous GAO work, we reviewed the U.S.
Computer Emergency Readiness Team and other DHS cyber security efforts.
We reported that DHS through the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team
had made progress in providing analysis and warning capabilities, but
had not resolved longstanding challenges concerning strategic analysis
and warning capabilities, including methodological and data issues.
Further, in the updated information and the response, DHS discussed
several initiatives related to its analysis and warning capabilities.
For example, it discusses a draft concept of operations for the private
sector to handle incidents; however, until it is finalized and
implemented, it is unclear whether the U.S. Computer Emergency
Readiness Team's analysis and warning capabilities have been enhanced.
Further, in the updated information DHS provided, the department
described the Critical Infrastructure Warning Network as an essential
component of its warning capabilities, but the department did not
provide any documentation demonstrating it has improved those
capabilities. The department also stated that the National
Communication System and DHS's State and Local Fusion Center Program
had analytical capabilities, but did not provide documentation
demonstrating that they have enhanced national analysis and warning
capabilities. In the absence of documentation verifying the
accomplishments of theses efforts, we concluded that DHS has generally
not achieved this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Science and technology;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 1: Develop a plan for departmental research,
development, testing, and evaluation activities;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment for this performance
expectation understates the significance of the department's June 2007
Science and Technology Strategic Plan. DHS noted that the plan
describes yearly milestones and deliverables/goals for every project
within the Science and Technology Directorate. DHS also commented that
our assessment does not give the department credit for the strategic
plan's description on the Science and Technology Directorate's
organizational framework and risk-based research portfolio management
strategy.
Our response: Our assessment recognizes the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate's various plans, including its June 2007 strategic plan. As
noted in our assessment, this performance expectation is based on the
requirement in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 for the department to
develop a strategic plan for identifying priorities, goals, objectives,
and policies for, and coordinating the federal government's civilian
efforts to identify an develop countermeasures to chemical, biological,
and other emerging terrorist threats. According to the department, the
June 2007 strategic plan does not address this requirement; therefore
we concluded that DHS has generally not achieved this performance
expectation.
Mission/management area: Science and technology;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 2: Assess emerging chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats and homeland security
vulnerabilities;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment for this performance
expectation does not account for the fact that the department's efforts
to assess emerging vulnerabilities will always be ongoing and are not
designed to reach a final end-goal completion. DHS outlined its efforts
to assess threats and vulnerabilities, such as its completion of the
Bio-Terrorism Risk Assessment in 2006, and noted that these ongoing
efforts reflect real and meaningful progress by the department.
Our response: In our assessment we recognize those assessments that the
department has completed as well as those that are underway.
Specifically, while DHS has completed assessments on biological and
chemical threats, other assessments for the chemical, radiological, and
nuclear sectors are underway, and we believe that DHS's assessment
efforts overall appear to be in the early stages. In addition, we
recognize that DHS will be assessing threats and vulnerabilities on a
regular basis; however, as this report provides an assessment of
progress made by DHS during its first 4 years, we believe that it is
appropriate to reach a conclusion that DHS has not yet generally
achieved this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Science and technology;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 3: Coordinate research, development, and
testing efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to address
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging
terrorist threats;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment for this performance
expectation does not account for the fact that the department's efforts
to develop countermeasures will always be ongoing and are not designed
to reach a final end-goal completion. DHS outlined its various efforts
to coordinate the research and development of countermeasures,
highlighting, for example, its collaboration with other agencies and
roles and responsibilities as part of interagency committees.
Our response: In our assessment we discuss DHS's activities to
coordinate the research and development of countermeasures. However, we
have identified concerns regarding DHS's coordination efforts. For
example, we reported that DHS has not always comprehensively collected
and shared testing information on radiation portal monitors. In
addition, we believe that until DHS more fully completes its
assessments of threats and vulnerabilities, it may not fully know what
technologies or countermeasures and associated requirements are needed
to address identified threat and vulnerabilities.
Mission/ management area: Human capital management;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 8: Implement training and development programs
in support of DHS's mission and goals;
DHS's comments: DHS stated that the assessment of "generally not
achieved" highlights the problems in using a binary standard to assess
a multi-year program. The department stated that the Human Capital
Operational Plan is a two year endeavor and that DHS has been meeting
its targets within the plan. The department described several of its
training and development efforts, such as DHScovery and the
establishment of the National Capital Region Homeland Security
Academy.
Our response: While we understand that the implementation of training
and development programs is in process, our report is intended to
provide an assessment of DHS's progress after 4 years. The Human
Capital Operational Plan identifies 20 goals in its learning and
development section, and DHS has met the 3 goals with deadlines earlier
than June 1, 2007. The Human Capital Operational Plan contains 4 goals
with deadlines that fall between June 1, 2007 and the release of this
report, but we do not have information as to whether they were
achieved. However, as the Human Capital Operational Plan indicates, the
majority of department's learning and development goals--the remaining
13--are yet to be implemented. Given this, we concluded that DHS had
not yet achieved this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Information technology management;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 5: Develop a comprehensive enterprise
architecture;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that we based our assessment on a belief
that DHS had not fully implemented elements of our Enterprise
Architecture Management Maturity Framework and that we disregarded its
extensive consultation with stakeholders in developing its
architecture. The department further commented that our original
assessment of "generally not achieved" was not consistent with the
Office of Management and Budget's rating of the latest version of the
department's architecture, referred to as DHS EA 2007, as a 4.3 on a
scale from 1 to 5 for completeness.
Our response: We disagree that our assessment does not consider the
department's progress in satisfying the Enterprise Architecture
Management Maturity Framework or its consultation with stakeholders in
developing its architecture. In particular, we recognized that DHS had
fully implemented 24 of the 31 core elements of the Enterprise
Architecture Management Maturity Framework, and that it solicited
comments from its architecture stakeholders. However, we also
recognized that key Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity
Framework core elements had nevertheless not been completely
implemented and that the latest version of the architecture that we had
received and evaluated (i.e., DHS EA 2006) did not fully address
stakeholder comments and recommendations that we had previously made
aimed at adding missing architecture content. Moreover, we found that
stakeholder commentary on this version was limited (e.g., major DHS
organizations such as the Transportation Security Agency and Coast
Guard did not even provide comments). Notwithstanding this, we also
recognize that the department has since released a newer, more current
version of its architecture (i.e., DHS EA 2007), which it provided to
us in June 2007, and that the department reports that this version
addresses many of our prior concerns and has been recently rated by the
Office of Management and Budget as 4.3 on a scale of 1 to 5 for
completeness. Because of the considerable time and resources necessary
to evaluate an architecture as large and complex as DHS's, we have not
had an opportunity to validate DHS's statements about this latest
version. Moreover, we have not evaluated either the Office of
Management and Budget's enterprise architecture assessment methodology
or how it applied the methodology in assessing DHS EA 2007. As a
result, we do not have a basis for concluding whether this more recent
version of DHS's architecture does or does not generally achieve this
performance expectation. Accordingly, we have modified our assessment
of this performance expectation to "no assessment made".
Mission/management area: Information technology management;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 6: Implement a comprehensive enterprise
architecture;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment relied on an
"allegation" that the department's information technology investments
have not been fully aligned with its architecture. The department
further commented that it had provided us with documentation of its
methodology for assessing information technology investments relative
to its enterprise architecture but that it appeared that we did not
consider it. In addition, DHS commented that it has already implemented
a comprehensive enterprise architecture as evidenced by the Office of
Management and Budget's rating of DHS EA 2007 as a 4.5 on a scale from
1 to 5 for architecture use; Our response: We disagree that our
assessment relied on an allegation and did not consider documentation
the department provided to us. First, our work was performed in
accordance with professional auditing standards, and thus it in no way
cites or relies on allegations. Rather, it is based on facts and
evidence, or in this case the absence thereof. More specifically, our
assessment is based on analyses that we conducted between 2003 and 2007
related to major information technology investments (e.g., US-VISIT) in
which DHS did not provide sufficient documentation and verifiable
analysis demonstrating these investments' alignment to any version of
the DHS architecture. We further disagree that we did not consider
documentation that the department provided us that it characterized in
its comments as describing its methodology for assessing information
technology investments relative to its enterprise architecture. In
point of fact, we analyzed the documents the department provided and
determined that they described a process that required information
technology investment compliance with the enterprise architecture but
did not include a methodology with detailed compliance criteria. In our
view, the existence and application of such criteria is necessary to
implementing an enterprise architecture. As we have previously reported
and as is reflected in federal guidance and best practices, both a
methodology and explicit criteria for determining an investment's
alignment with an enterprise architecture are essential to
understanding the risk associated with areas of noncompliance.
Accordingly, we have open recommendations to the department for
establishing and applying both, as well as for disclosing the risks on
major investments of not having done so. With respect to the
department's claim that the Office of Management and Budget's rating on
its architecture's use is evidence that it has already implemented a
comprehensive architecture, we have no basis for commenting on the
rating. However, our view is that it is not possible to effectively
implement any enterprise architecture without an architecture
compliance methodology and criteria. Accordingly, we have not changed
our assessment of this performance expectation.
Mission/management area: Information technology management;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 7: Develop a process to effectively manage
information technology investments;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment does not accurately
reflect the department's progress and that it has developed processes
to effectively manage information technology investments. Specifically,
DHS stated that it had developed and distributed the Periodic
Reporting, Earned Value Management, and Operational Analysis guidance
documents for improving the tracking and reporting of investment costs,
schedules, and performance variances. DHS also noted that it had issued
a management directive that provides the DHS Chief Information Officer
with the authority to review and approve the Department's entire
information technology budget.
Our response: We disagree that our assessment does not accurately
reflect DHS's progress in developing processes to effectively manage
information technology investments. In fact, our assessment is based,
among other things, on the guidance documents that DHS cited and is
reflected in our April 2007 report in which we concluded that DHS had
established the management structure to effectively manage its
investments but had yet to fully define 8 of the 11 related policies
and procedures that are defined in the GAO Information Technology
Investment Management Framework. For example, DHS's procedures for
selecting investments did not cite either the specific criteria or
steps for prioritizing and selecting new information technology
proposals. In written comments on our April report, DHS agreed with our
report. In addition, we agree that DHS issued a directive expanding the
authority of the Chief Information Officer, as we recognized in
assessing the Chief Information Officer's roles and responsibilities as
generally achieved. However, this directive does not affect our
findings and conclusions relative to the 8 policies and procedures in
our framework that were not satisfied. As a result, our assessment
remains as generally not achieved.
Mission/management area: Information technology management;
Summary of DHS's comments and our response:
Performance expectation 8: Implement a process to effectively manage
information technology investments;
DHS's comments: DHS commented that our assessment does not accurately
reflect the department's progress. In particular, the department stated
that it has implemented an information technology acquisition review
process to improve the alignment of information technology purchases to
the department's homeland security mission and architecture. In
addition, DHS reported that its information technology portfolio
management program incorporates specific management processes to
improve the balance of investments to more effectively meet
departmental goals and objectives; Our response: We disagree that
our assessment does not accurately reflect DHS' progress in
implementing processes to effectively manage information technology
investments. Our assessment is based on our April 2007 report in which
we concluded that DHS had not fully implemented any of the key
practices in the GAO Information Technology Investment Management
Framework associated with actually controlling investments at either
the project or the portfolio level. For example, we reported that the
investment review boards had not conducted regular reviews of
investments and that while control activities were sometimes performed,
they were not performed consistently across information technology
projects. In commenting on our report, DHS agreed with our findings and
recommendations. As a result, our assessment remains as generally not
achieved.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until
30 days after the date of this report. At that time, we will send
copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and appropriate
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff has any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777, or rabkinn@gao.gov. Contact points for
each mission and management area are listed in appendix I. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on this last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Norman J. Rabkin:
Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Key GAO Contacts for DHS Mission and Management Areas:
Border Security:
Richard Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 202-512-8816:
Jess Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, 202-512-4128:
Immigration Enforcement and Immigration Services:
Richard Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 202-512-8816:
Aviation Security:
Cathleen Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 202-512-
3404:
Surface Transportation Security:
Cathleen Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 202-512-
3404:
Katherine Siggerud, Director, Physical Infrastructure, 202-512-2834:
Maritime Security:
Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 202-512-
9610:
Emergency Preparedness and Response:
William O Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 202-
512-8757:
Linda Koontz, Director, Information Technology, 202-512-7487:
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection:
Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 202-512-
8777:
David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues,
202-512-9286:
John R. Stephenson, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, 202-
512-3841:
Science and Technology:
Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, 202-512-3841:
Keith Rhodes, Chief Technologist, 202-512-6412:
Acquisition Management:
John P. Hutton, Director, Acquisition Management and Sourcing, 202-512-
4841:
William T. Woods, Director, Acquisition Management and Sourcing, 202-
512-4841:
Financial Management:
McCoy Williams, Director, Financial Management and Assurance, 202-512-
9095:
Human Capital Management:
J. Christopher Mihm, Managing Director, Strategic Issues, 202-512-6806:
Information Technology Management:
Randolph Hite, Director, Information Technology, 202-512-3439:
Gregory Wilshusen, Director, Information Technology, 202-512-6244:
Real Property Management:
Mark Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure, 202-512-2834:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
July 20, 2007:
Mr. David Walker:
Comptroller General:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Comptroller General Walker:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and provide comments on the draft report submitted by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) entitled Department of Homeland
Security, Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and
Management Functions (GAO Report). As you know, this report looks at
the Department's first four years although GAO has repeatedly observed
that "successful transformations of large organizations, even those
faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at least
five to seven years to achieve."
To conduct its broad study, GAO devised 171 individual performance
expectations, categorized into 14 mission and management areas. GAO
assessed DHS as having "Generally Achieved" 78 of those performance
expectations. We were pleased to see that GAO recognized our progress
in these areas. We disagree, however, with many of GAO's remaining
assessments (including those discussed in the Enclosure). While we
disagree with many of the conclusions reached by GAO and with the
methodological approach that was used, we are very appreciative of the
frank and open communication with GAO that has been established during
recent months and the final stages of GAO's work on this report. We
look forward to continuing this cooperative approach. We continue to
believe, however, that the GAO Report is based on a flawed methodology
that results e an inaccurate representation of the Department's
progress and fails to accurately reflect the Department's progress in
many specific program areas. This is not the first time that the
Department has expressed concerns over the methodology and content of
the GAO Report.
In late February 2007, GAO provided the Department an initial Statement
of Facts. which evaluated the Department's progress over its first four
years. GAO officials relied almost exclusively on previous, outdated
reports to rate the Department's performance on a subjective, binary
scale of "Generally Addressed" or "Generally Not Addressed " GAO
indicated that an assessment of "Generally Addressed" was given where
analysts determined that DHS had "taken steps to effectively satisfy,
most of the key elements of the performance expectation." GAO neither
defined "effectively satisfy," nor identified the key elements or
criteria associated with each performance expectation. Accordingly, the
initial Statement of Facts and its assessments provided little insight
into how GAO had evaluated the Department's activities.
After personally reviewing the initial Statement of Facts, Secretary
Chertoff wrote to you on March 7, 2007 expressing his concerns and
offering to work with GAO "to ensure the final GAO statement fully
reflect[ed] the Department's achievements over the past four years."
Shortly thereafter, the Department provided GAO with thousands of pages
of documents explaining how key programs were on track and a detailed
100-plus-page explanation of the Department's overall progress, Over
many weeks, the Department continued to provide additional
documentation and meet with GAO officials to demonstrate how DHS was
addressing various program areas and performance expectations.
In late May 2007, GAO officials submitted a Revised Statement of Facts
which altered the standard for judging the Department's progress
without prior warning or consultation with the Department.
Specifically, the Revised Statement of Facts indicated that the
Department's progress would now be rated as "Generally Achieved" or
"Generally Not Achieved." rather than as "Generally Addressed" or
"Generally Not Addressed." The practical differences between these
standards go well beyond semantics, as the change reflects a difference
in how the performance expectations would be perceived- "addressed"
suggests that a program is on track, whereas "achieved" indicates final
completion. In addition, GAO still did not articulate the "key
elements," end-goals to be "achieved," how these goals were set and by
whom.
Based on this new standard, GAO downgraded its assessments of the
Department in 28 performance expectations to "Generally Not Achieved."
In 24 such instances, the Department went from Assessment Made" to
"Generally Not Achieved." These changes were particularly surprising in
light of the extensive documentation and materials describing the
Department's progress and the success of its programs and activities
that were provided to GAO. As discussed below and in the Enclosure, we
believe the downgraded assessments are not supported by the facts.
The binary "Achieved"/"Not Achieved" standard ultimately adopted by GAO
is particularly ill-equipped to evaluate the Department's progress
accurately in a multi-year endeavor, especially when DHS is only a few
years into the project. For example, although GAO officials have
indicated that the Department's Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is "on a
trajectory" towards achievement, the Department received a score of
"Generally Not Achieved" in this performance expectation because it had
not yet fully completed the goals of the entire SBI program. GAO's
assessments of multi-year programs are thus at odds with GAO's own
disclaimer that its assessments are "not meant to imply that DHS should
have fully achieved the performance expectation by the end of its
fourth year."
We are also concerned with the apparent shifting of the already
nontransparent criteria for the performance expectations used by, GAO
to assess the Department. In many instances where the Department
provided GAO with supplemental information which we believe directly
addressed specific criteria discussed in the initial or Revised
Statement of Facts, GAO acknowledges DHS's new information, yet either
does not fully consider its significance, or includes additional
criteria for that performance expectation that were not previously
provided to the Department. In some cases. this new criteria contained
in the GAO Report goes beyond the scope of the performance expectation
itself. For instance, GAO's assessment of the Department's efforts to
implement a strategy to detect and interdict ills a flows of cargo,
drugs, and other items illustrates this point. The Revised Statement of
Facts indicated that GAO's assessment was based in part on GAO's belief
that the Department had not established or met milestones for achieving
relevant goals. Amer GAO was provided with information to the contrary,
GAO simply dropped its reference to those criteria and added language
regarding new criteria, including the criticism that the Securing
America's Borders at the Ports of Entry Strategic Plan was "in the
early stages of implementation." Notably - where the performance
expectation asks whether the Department has "implemented" a strategy -
GAO's observation actually supports an assessment of "Generally
Achieved" rather than the assessment given by GAO.
Moreover, there appears to have been no effort to "normalize" the
process by which GAO officials made assessments across the entire
spectrum of 171 performance expectations. As a result, GAO analysts in
various mission and management areas could have evaluated the
Department's performance differently. The vague descriptions of
"Generally Addressed" - and subsequently of "Generally Achieved"-- do
not appear to provide detailed guidance to support these
determinations. Therefore it is difficult to understand the level of
consistency applied in evaluating the performance expectation criteria
or the assessments based upon them.
Furthermore, the GAO Report treats all of the performance expectations
as if they were of equal significance. While all of the 171 performance
expectations included in the GAO Report are important, they are not of
the same priority when it comes to securing the nation's homeland. GAO
admits that it did not weigh the relationship between each performance
expectation with the Department's overall priorities and mission, In
contrast, the Department uses a risk-based approach to consider its
overall priorities and mission in choosing where to focus its limited
resources. The GAO Report indicates that DHS has made the greatest
progress in several areas that it identified as priorities. For
example, the Secretary has focused the Department's resources on
securing transportation modes given the nature of the September 11,
2001 attacks. The GAO Report recognizes that the Department has indeed
made great strides. giving the Department an assessment of "Generally
Achieved" in 37 out of 50 performance expectations in that area.
In addition to these methodological concerns, we further belies e that
many of the specific assessments do not reflect the significant
progress made by the Department over the past four years. Prime
examples include:
* The GAO Report's assessment that the Department has "Generally Not
Achieved" the goal of detecting and identifying illegal border
crossings understates the importance of our successful efforts to
deploy 6,000 National Guard agents to the border, to increase Border
Patrol staffing by 30 percent since 2001. and to begin implementation
of the comprehensive SBI Program. U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(DHS-CBP) Border Patrol apprehensions for the first three quarters of
FY 2007 are down 24 percent compared to the previous year along the
southwest border, indicating a significant decline in illegal cross-
border activity between ports of entry. The Yuma, Arizona, and Del Rio,
Texas, sectors experienced the greatest declines, with decreases of 68
percent and 51 percent, respectively. The number of other-than-Mexican
alien apprehensions dropped 48 percent along the southern border. The
decrease in other-than-Mexican apprehensions reduces the time agents
spend transporting and processing, and increases the time spent
patrolling the border. Moreover, we have ended the practice of "catch
and release" for other-than-Mexican apprehensions along the border.
* The assessment that the Department has not established standards and
procedures for effective airport perimeter security and to control
access to secured areas similarly do no give proper consideration to
the extensive documentation provided to GAO by the Department's
Transportation Security Administration which demonstrates its
substantial progress in these areas. As a result. the report does not
give DHS proper credit in the development of the Aviation Inspection
Plan to implement the Aviation and Transportation Security Act; and
disregards the detailed action plan addressing all GAO recommendations
from its 2004 audit. he report also does not reflect the many processes
already in place to improve airport perimeter security and access
controls.
* The report's assessment that the Department has "Generally Not
Achieved" the goal of establishing, coordinating, and implementing a
single, all hazards national response plan does not take into account
the Department's achievements in this area. In fact, the Department
issued the National Response Plan (NRP) December of 2004. With regard
to implementation. the Department has actively trained Federal, state
and local government and non-governmental leadership and first
responders since the plan's release through a formal roll-out process,
an on-line training course, workshops. and regular exercises. The NRP
is an organic document and is currently being reviewed and potentially
revised to reflect lessons learned. In the meantime, however. the
existing NRP continues to serve as a single. all-hazards national
response plan.
The Enclosure contains a more detailed discussion of these and other
particularly problematic assessments contained in the GAO Report. The
Department went to great lengths to provide GAO with information
related to these and other performance expectations, taking the
initiative to provide GAO with the detailed 100-plus-page response and
other supplemental information referred to above. "The Department's
cooperation in this instance reflects our continued efforts to provide
GAO with appropriate access to information in a timely manner.
We are committed to strengthening DHS's management and operational
capabilities. and I hope your final report will capture that
commitment. We are proud of what DHS has accomplished in the face of
the many challenges we face. Thank you for this opportunity to comment.
We look forward to continuing the cooperative approach that was
followed in preparing this report.
Sincerely,
{Signed by}
Paul A. Schneider:
Under Secretary for Management:
Enclosure
{End of section}
COMMENTS FROM DHS: DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PROGRESS REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF MISSION AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS:
In addition to disagreeing with the methodology used by GAO, the
Department disagrees with many specific assessments made in the GAO
Report. This Attachment focuses on the major areas of concern for the
Department.
Border Security:
The Department has made great strides toward achieving its goal of
securing our Nation's borders. Unfortunately, some assessments do not
accurately reflect the total progress made by the Department.
Performance Expectation 4: Implement a program to detect and identify
illegal border crossings between ports of entry. The assessment of
"Generally Not Achieved" highlights the methodological flaw in using a
binary standard to assess what the GAO Report acknowledges is "a multi-
year program." The Department's Customs and Border Protection (DHS-CBP)
is well on its way toward implementing the Secure Border Initiative
(SBI), a comprehensive program to detect and identify illegal border
crossings. The SBI is currently being carried out through SBInet and
other programs. The GAO Report states that "DHS has taken actions to
implement the initiative"; but still rates this performance expectation
as "Generally Not Achieved."
The mission of the SBI is to promote border security strategies that:
(a) prevent terrorist attacks and other transnational crimes; (b)
coordinate DHS efforts to ensure the legal entry and exit of people and
goods moving across our borders; and (c) enforce U.S. laws at our
borders. SBInet is the component of the SBI charged with developing and
installing technology and tactical infrastructure solutions to gain
"effective control" of our Nation's borders in accordance with the
mission of the SBI. Effective control is the consistent ability to
detect illegal entries into the United States and to identify,
classify, and respond to illegal entries efficiently and effectively.
GAO officials stated that the report provides an assessment of
"Generally Not Achieved," because SBInet has not been fully deployed.
GAO officials, however, acknowledged in an exit conference that SBI is
"on a trajectory" towards achieving this comprehensive program to
detect and identify illegal border crossings. In addition, the report's
criticism of the Department's progress in implementing SBInet is
surprising in light of the GAO's previous concern that the Department
was implementing SBInet too quickly. A February 2007 GAO Report (GAO-07-
309) recommended that DHS-CBP reduce the extent to which different
aspects of SBInet were being implemented concurrently, thus lengthening
the implementation process and delaying full implementation of the
program.
The GAO Report also justifies its assessment of "Generally Not
Achieved" by asserting that the progress that has been made on the
implementation of SBInet is "unclear." However, according to the
definitions of the assessment standards repeated throughout the GAO
Report, a rating of "No Assessment Made" is appropriate when "the
information DHS provided did not enable [GAO] to clearly assess DHS's
progress in achieving the performance expectation." Thus, it appears
that GAO officials did not follow their own ratings system or were
unable to do so because the standards were never sufficiently defined.
Furthermore, the GAO Report mentions, but does not adequately consider
the Department's implementation of other programs and initiatives which
have yielded significant results related to preventing illegal border
crossings and securing the border. For example, 6,000 National Guard
members were deployed to the southwest border as part of Operation Jump
Start and the President's initiative to secure the border. In addition,
Border Patrol agent staffing has increased by over 30 percent since
2001. Moreover, we have ended the practice of "catch and release" for
other-than-Mexican apprehensions along the border. Results to date have
been promising. DHS-CBP Border Patrol apprehensions for the first three
quarters of Fiscal Year 2007 are down 24 percent compared to the
previous year along the southwest border, indicating a significant
decline in illegal cross-border activity between ports of entry. The
Yuma, Arizona, and Del Rio, Texas, sectors experienced the greatest
declines, with decreases of 68 percent and 51 percent, respectively.
The number of other-than-Mexican alien apprehensions dropped 48 percent
along the southern border. The decrease in other-than-Mexican
apprehensions reduces the time agents spend transporting and
processing, and increases the time spent patrolling the border.
DHS-CBP currently has effective control of 380 miles on the southwest
border, plans to achieve effective control of 642 miles by the end of
calendar year 2008, and anticipates having effective control over the
entire southwest border by 2013. Nevertheless, the GAO Report assigns
low grades to these efforts because DHS, while on target, does not yet
have effective control over the more than 6,000 miles of U.S. land
border.
The GAO Report also does not consider DHS-CBP efforts toward effective
control over the northern border. Contrary to the GAO Report's
assertion that DHS-CBP will not begin work on the northern border until
fiscal year 2009, DHS-CBP has tripled the number of agents assigned to
the northern border since Fiscal Year 2001. DHSCBP recently initiated a
Nationwide Voluntary Relocation Opportunity. which has brought
additional, experienced agents to the U.S./Canadian border. In
addition, the Department has deployed technology to provide additional
coverage along the northern border - including ground sensors, cameras,
radar, and sophisticated software packages. DHS-CBP implemented Border
Security Evaluation Teams (BSETs) in all eight northern border sectors
to secure portions of the U.S./Canadian border that were previously too
remote to have been monitored. Through a partnership with the Canadian
government, the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) enhances
border integrity and security by identifying, investigating, and
interdicting persons and organizations that pose a threat to national
security, or are engaged in other organized criminal activity.
Performance Expectation 6: Implement a strategy to detect and interdict
illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and other items into the United States.
The Department strongly disagrees with the GAO Report's assessment of
"Generally Not Achieved." The GAO Report makes this assessment while at
the same time acknowledges that DHS has taken "actions to implement
various programs to detect and interdict illegal flow of goods into the
United States."
DHS-CBP has implemented a strategy, known as the Securing America's
Borders at the Ports of Entry (SABPOE) Strategic Plan, for detecting
and interdicting illegal cargo, drugs, and other items before entering
the United States. The SABPOE Strategic Plan defines a comprehensive
national strategy and specifically outlines the Department's efforts
over the next five years to screen, detect, and interdict illegal
cargo, contraband, weapons, agricultural products and other illicit
substances. The Strategic Plan emphasizes eight core capabilities for
each port of entry:
* Identifying people and goods approaching the ports;
* Assessing the associated risk-level;
* Inspecting all people and goods according to their assessed level of
risk;
* Detecting potential threats and inadmissible people and goods;
* Enforcing the law and taking action against violators;
* Recording events at the ports of entry including crossings and
findings;
* Analyzing outcomes to address emerging threats; and
* Deterring potential violators from crossing or shipping goods through
the ports of entry.
DHS-CBP has developed a formal SABPOE Implementation Plan which
consists of inter-related programs, key activities and implementation
schedules. The SABPOE Implementation Plan establishes detailed steps
and actions required to achieve the specific goals and objectives
presented in the SABPOE Strategic Plan. In addition, DHS-CBP set up the
SABPOE Implementation Division to provide oversight and coordination in
the execution of the Strategic Plan. This Division entails senior
executive participation and active steering committee oversight. The
GAO Report acknowledges that SABPOE "will help CBP detect and interdict
illegal flows of goods into the United States," but grades the
Department's efforts as "Generally Not Achieved" because the Strategic
Plan "is still in the early stages of implementation."
DHS-CBP also set and then successfully met several milestones related
to this performance expectation in Fiscal Year 2006, as demonstrated by
the following activities:
* DHS-CBP trained and deployed over 100 human detection/narcotic canine
enforcement teams, which significantly increased the number of
containers, vehicles, and people screened for illicit items;
* DHS-CBP expanded the Container Security Initiative to five new ports
of entry which greatly added to DHS-CBP's ability to pre-screen
containers (destined for the United States) at foreign ports;
* DHS-CBP hired more than 80 additional specialists in support of the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT), resulting in
tighter control of the supply chain and reducing the risk of illegally
smuggled contraband;
* DHS-CBP established a Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit to assist in
the identification of false and fraudulent travel documents; and
* DHS-CBP expanded its Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and achieved
its statutory requirements of identifying the top 50 locations for
deployment.
The GAO Report makes reference to these implementation efforts, but we
believe does not properly credit DHS for meeting this performance
expectation.
The Department has also been working with Federal, state and local
partners to develop a strategy and implementation plan which maximizes
the efficiency of the resources that are dedicated to stopping the
entry of illegal drugs into the United States along the Southwest
Border. For example:
* The Director of the Department's Office of Counternarcotics
Enforcement (DHS-CNE) was designated by the International Drug Control
Policy Coordinating Committee (IDC-PCC) to serve as a Co-Chair for
developing an Implementation Plan for the National Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy (approved by the Deputies in March 2006).
* On August 18, 2006, DHS-CNE and the DOJ Office of the Deputy Attorney
General (ODAG) jointly submitted the National Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy and Implementation Plan to the IDC-PCC. This
classified 235-page document identifies the major goals, objectives,
and resource requirements for closing gaps in U.S. and Mexico
counternarcotics capabilities along the Southwest Border.
* CNE is currently working to update the Implementation Plan to ensure
it reflects recent developments in U.S.-Mexico relations.
The GAO Report acknowledges these counternarcotics efforts, but does
not assign what we consider to be a proper assessment on the
Counternarcotics Strategy and Implementation Plan solely because it has
"only recently been developed."
Performance Expectation 8: Implement initiatives related to the
security of certain documents used to enter the United States. The GAO
Report's assessment of "Generally Not Achieved" for this performance
expectation reflects a shifting criteria while at the same time not
taking into account external factors beyond the Department's control.
A prior draft of the Report asserted that this performance expectation
was "Generally Not Achieved" because DHS did not provide GAO with
evidence that it had addressed risks and challenges associated with the
security of travel documents. DHS responded to GAO with information
relating to the following programs and initiatives:
* The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US-VISIT) program provides the capability to biometrically compare and
authenticate travel documents issued by DHS and the Department of State
to non-U.S. citizens. Required by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act, DHS utilizes the system to verify that U.S. travel
documents are authentic and confirms non-U.S. citizen identities via
real-time fingerprint and facial recognition technology.
Documents that can be verified in this manner include State Department
issued non-immigrant visas, Border Crossing Cards (BCC) and immigrant
visas as well as DHS issued Permanent Resident Cards (PRC), refugee
travel documents, and re-entry permits.
* The US-VISIT fingerprint capability was implemented at air ports of
entry in January 2004 and has expanded to all land border ports of
entry.
* The use of digital verification and authentication of travel
documents issued to aliens by DHS allows officers to compare documents
presented at the time of issuance (including the photograph) to the
physical appearance and documents presented at the time of travel. In
this way, the officer can be assured of the authenticity of the
document. As of October 2005, DHS-CBP had implemented this capability
at all ports of entry for non-immigrant visas, immigrant visas, legal
permanent resident cards, and refugee travel documents. Four additional
examples of the use of digital verification and authentication of
travel documents include:
- e-Passports enable officers to evaluate the validity of the
biographic information and photograph stored on the e-Passport chip. In
November 2006, DHS implemented the e-Passport program for the visa
waiver countries at 200 primary inspection lanes at 33 ports of entry.
- The Consolidated Consular Database (CCD) provides additional
information on U.S. visas and passports to help determine the
documents' authenticity. As of February 2006, all U.S. ports of entry
had access to CCD information, and for the single month of May 2007,
the ports ran more than 250,000 queries in CCD, resulting in over 1,800
enforcement actions.
- The Lost/Stolen Passports Program provides DHS-CBP officers with the
capability to search passports presented by travelers against the watch
list of lost/stolen passports. DHS-CBP has utilized this system for
many years, and every primary and secondary query includes a check of
lost/stolen passports.
- The Regional Movement Alert System (RMAS) enables DHS-CBP to confirm
that certain foreign passports are not lost/stolen by comparing the
passport information against records of the issuing country. Since RMAS
was implemented in early 2006, there have been more than 1.8 million
queries for travelers to the United States.
The GAO Report acknowledges these programs but cites new issues
relating to plans for the deployment of document readers and the
development of a strategic plan for the Immigration Advisory Program.
The GAO Report further criticizes the Department for not having
extended the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) to land and
sea ports of envy. The report does not take into consideration that
Congress has delayed more extensive implementation of WHTI. DHS had
drafted a rule to implement the sea portion of WHTI at the same time as
the air rule, but Congress required that sea implementation be delayed
until the land rule could be issued and, at the same time, imposed
additional requirements before the land rule could take effect. Despite
these changes, the Department is still on track, and plans to implement
this program at land and seaports well in advance of the statutory
deadline.
Performance Expectation 12: Leverage technology, personnel, and
information to secure the border. The Department disagrees with the GAO
Report's assessment of "Generally Not Achieved." The Department. in
fact, relies upon many programs to leverage technology, personnel, and
information to secure the border.
For example, the US-VISIT program incorporates eligibility
determinations made by both DHS and the Department of State into a
continuum of security measures. In particular, US-VISIT manages systems
that operate at 283 air, sea and land ports and 210 Consular Offices
worldwide. These systems collect data and screen travelers against
existing watch lists and databases containing information about
previous DHS encounters with the traveler, verifying identities and
travel documents. The Department also captures data on individuals
attempting illegal entry into the United States between the ports of
entry, as well as individuals who are being investigated or removed
from the interior of the country. This information is then shared with
the ports of entry, Consular Offices, Border Patrol Stations,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS-ICE) Field Offices, U.S.
Citizenship Immigration Services (DHS-USCIS), and the U.S. Coast Guard
(DHS-USCG). This coordination expeditiously provides the Border
Management community with information regarding an individual who has
had previous contact with the Department.
US-VISIT also works closely with DHS-CBP on the development and
deployment of new initiatives. Such collaboration allows the Department
to take advantage of the synergy from the efforts of both entities and
leverage existing resources.
Immigration Enforcement:
The Department has significantly improved immigration enforcement in
this country as recognized by the numerous "Generally Achieved"
assessments made by GAO officials; however, the Department disagrees
with the "Generally Not Achieved" assessments in several performance
expectations related to immigration enforcement.
Performance Expectation 2: Implement a program to ensure timely
identification and removal of aliens subject to removal from the US.
The Department disagrees with the assessment of "Generally Not
Achieved." The methodology used to reach this assessment is flawed
because it dismisses tangible results in favor of potential challenges
and holds DHS accountable for factors outside the Department's control.
DHS-ICE has made significant strides to ensure the timely
identification of aliens subject to removal. As part of the Secure
Border Initiative, the Department has ended the practice of "catch and
release" along the borders. Since August 2006, all removable aliens
caught at the border have been detained until the return to their home
countries. DHS-ICE removed 192,171 illegal aliens, including 88,217
criminals, from the country in Fiscal Year 2006. This marks a 13
percent increase in total removals and a 4 percent increase in criminal
removals over the prior Fiscal Year. DHS-ICE also increased its
detention bed space by 7,500 during Fiscal Year 2006 and is funded for
additional beds in corning years.
DHS-ICE has shortened the processing and detention times for removal of
aliens through its Electronic Travel Document program. In addition, DHS-
ICE has added resources for interviewing consular officials about
removal actions, and for transporting aliens more quickly.
Yet, despite these results, the GAO Report asserts that the
Department's efforts "may not yet fully address" the "potential" risks
of not being able to remove illegal aliens.
DHS-ICE also must contend with certain variables that impede the
agency's ability to remove an alien. Although ICE has made great
strides in the international arena in such matters, expedited removal
is halted or slowed due to certain foreign countries' unwillingness to
accept their returned nationals. For example, removal frequently may he
delayed or refused by a foreign government, even when they are
presented with conclusive identity information and passports. DHS-ICE
officials have gone to considerable efforts to encourage non-
cooperating countries to issue travel documents, but still often
encounter unnecessary delays.
In other cases, the removal process may be delayed due to the lengthy
duration of removal proceedings. Aliens may present their cases to an
immigration judge, file an appeal, and seek further review in federal
courts. In some jurisdictions, the removal of aliens is automatically
stayed - or enjoined - by court order upon the alien's request.
The GAO Report specifically recognizes these impediments to timely
removal and admits that they "may be outside of DHS's control." The
Report still assesses this performance expectation as "Generally Not
Achieved."
Performance Expectation 3: Ensure removal of criminal aliens. The
assessment of "Generally Not Achieved" is unsupported by facts
regarding this performance expectation.
For example, the GAO Report undervalues the progress made by the
Department through the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), despite
acknowledging that DHS-ICE maintains a presence of officers in
approximately 2,000 federal, state, and local facilities. There is a
CAP presence in each of the 114 federal Bureau of Prisons detention
facilities. While 40 DHS-ICE operation teams presently screen foreign-
born inmates, we continue to train and hire nearly 200 additional staff
to support the CAP program and extend coverage to state and local jails
and prisons. The expansion of CAP has shown tremendous results as CAP
is on a course to double the number of criminal aliens placed in
removal proceedings in 2007.
The GAO Report criticizes the Department for not having fully
implemented the CAP in all of the more than 5,000 federal, state, and
local facilities across the country. This unrealistic expectation
reveals a marked lack of appreciation for the enormous resources that
would be required to implement such an expansion. Even if DHS-ICE were
appropriated the funds necessary to expand CAP to a single additional
institution every single day, it would take over eight years to achieve
this outcome. The GAO Report does not consider that this is an on-
going, multi-year effort.
Performance Expectation 6: Implement a program to allow for the secure
alternative detention of non-criminal aliens. The GAO Report states
that no assessment has been made for this performance expectation,
since GAO has not completed work in this area. However, information
previously provided to GAO officials by DHS-ICE demonstrates that the
Department has implemented programs for secure Alternatives To
Detention (ATD) of non-criminal aliens.
The GAO Report drastically understates the level of meaningful
participation in the ATD programs and the promising results already
shown. For example, DHS-ICE has maintained an a Electronic Monitoring
Program (EMP) whereby aliens awaiting immigration court hearings or
removal wear either a monitoring ankle bracelet or report by telephone
to a case manager. DHS-ICE maintains peak capacity at all times for the
intensive supervision of the EMP at a rolling rate of 6,500 aliens. In
addition, DHS-ICE recently initiated an effort to replace the EMP with
an Enhanced Supervision/Reporting Program (ESR) and improved management
of electronic monitoring devices.
Further, DHS-ICE maintains the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program
(ISAP) which is a voluntary pilot program available to aliens not
subject to mandatory detention, but awaiting immigration court
proceedings or removal from the United States. If participants agree to
comply with the conditions of their release, case specialists are
assigned to monitor participants using electronic monitoring
(bracelets), home and work visits and reporting by telephone. The ISAP
program is currently available in nine U.S. cities and enrolls
approximately 1,700 participants on a rolling basis. DHS-ICE aims to
expand the ISAP program by 129 percent, equating to 2,200 new ISAP
participants. ISAP has shown great promise as an effective alternative
to detention and has already achieved excellent results: the appearance
rate for [SAP participants is 98 percent at immigration hearings and 94
percent at final removal hearings. In short, ICE has implemented a
successful, growing ATD program for non-criminal aliens.
Performance Expectation 8: Implement a prioritized worksite enforcement
strategy to ensure that only authorized workers are employed. The
assessment of "Generally Not Achieved" highlights the flaw in the
binary assessment system used by GAO.
As the GAO Report acknowledges, DHS-ICE provided considerable new
information on its significant worksite enforcement efforts. GAO
appears, however, to have largely not considered these achievements,
asserting instead that the information did not demonstrate how these
efforts have resulted in "desired outcomes." This conclusion does not
comport with the evidence provided, which, as described below, reveals
that DHS-ICE's efforts have resulted in impressive outcomes, including
the increased use of employment verification systems and significant
increases in investigations and arrests.
As DHS-ICE has previously explained to GAO officials, its worksite
enforcement strategy is a comprehensive three-pronged approach aimed
at: (a) critical infrastructure projection; (b) criminal investigations
of egregious employer violators; and (c) enhanced employer compliance
and outreach through IMAGE. IMAGE is a corporate outreach program
designed to give employers tools and best practices to ensure that they
have an authorized workforce. In January 2007, eight companies and one
trade association became charter IMAGE members and made a formal pledge
to the program. DHS-ICE has conducted more than 50 IMAGE outreach
presentations to companies and to industry associations that represent
or influence thousands of U.S. employers. The IMAGE presentations
provide employers instructions on their responsibilities for employment
verification and also provide them with the tools and best practices
needed to establish and maintain an authorized workforce.
Moreover, it is important to note the significant results already
achieved through DHS-ICE worksite enforcement programs. In Fiscal Year
2006, more than 4,300 arrests and apprehensions were made from worksite
enforcement cases; this figure represents more than seven times the
arrests and apprehensions in Fiscal Year 2002 (the last full year of
operations of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service). DHS-ICE
has also completed nearly 6,000 compliance enforcement investigations
resulting in administrative arrests of more than 1,700 overstay and
status violators, a 75 percent increase over the number of
administrative arrests in Fiscal Year 2005.
Performance Expectation 10: Implement a comprehensive strategy to
interdict and prevent trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the U.S.
The assessment of "Generally Not Achieved" is not supported by the
facts provided to GAO officials regarding this performance expectation.
The Department's strategy for counteracting the trafficking and
smuggling of aliens is just one part of the larger SBI and SABPOE
Strategic Plan. In addition to the implementation of these plans by DHS-
CBP already discussed above, DHS-ICE has also made significant progress
in meeting this performance expectation in coordination with other
departmental components and federal agencies. For example, Border
Enforcement and Security Task Forces (BEST) have been created to target
cross-border criminal activity, including human trafficking. These task
forces are nationally-integrated teams comprised of resources drawn
from DHS-ICE, DHS-CBP, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, U.S. Marshals Service, as well as state, and local
representation. Since their inception, BESTs have made 430 criminal
arrests and 827 administrative arrests; seized 66,265 pounds of
marijuana, 1,462 pounds of cocaine, S8,318,324 in U.S. currency, and
155 vehicles.
Furthermore, since 2006, DHS-ICE has maintained an active and
aggressive domestic and overseas human trafficking program called the
ICE Trafficking in Persons Strategy (ICE TIPS). ICE TIPS targets
criminal organizations and individuals engaged in human trafficking
worldwide. ICE TIPS focuses on partnerships and collaboration with
other DHS agencies, foreign governments, Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOS), the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division and U.S.
federal, state and local law enforcement.
Although the draft GAO Report was also critical of the coordination
between DHSICE and DHS-CBP, there are in fact mechanisms in place for
the two components to share information related to the trafficking or
smuggling of aliens. For example, the Department has established a
Liaison Section at the DHS-CBP National Targeting Center (NTC) to
facilitate such coordination. A number of Memoranda of Understanding
between DHS-ICE and DHS-CBP have also formalized the coordination of
information between the components. For example, on November 16, 2004,
the ICE Office of Investigations (OI) and CBP's Office of Border Patrol
(CBP/BP) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that guides
CBP Chief Border Patrol Agents and ICE's Special Agents in Charge in
developing operational partnerships between the Border Patrol and OI
agents at the local level. On February 2, 2007, CBP/BP and ICE/OI
signed the addendum to the November 16, 2004 MOU, which clarified the
roles and responsibilities of each agency and discussed items such as
data sharing and co-location of Intelligence units, and encouraged
joint enforcement operations. In addition, on December 8, 2005, ICE/O1
and CBP Office of Field Operations (CBP/OFO) signed a joint memorandum
which established ICE/OI as the investigative arm for CBP/OFO and the
primary contact for investigative matters.
Immigration Services:
The GAO Report correctly acknowledges that the Department has achieved
several key performance expectations in the area of immigration
services. Other assessments in the GAO Report, however, are not
consistent with the results recognized both inside and outside of the
Department.
Performance Expectations 1 and 5: Eliminate the benefit application
backlog and reduce application completion times to 6 months and Develop
new programs to prevent. future backlogs from developing. The
Department disagrees with the GAO Report's assessments of "Generally
Not Achieved."
DHS-USCIS is well on its way to eliminating the application backlog.
The benefit application backlog as of last September was less than
10,000 applications. Even the GAO Report acknowledges that USCIS "has
made significant progress." Moreover, the Senate Committee on
Appropriations recently reported that "USCIS has made substantial
progress over the last several years to successfully address the
backlog of applications and petitions within its control."
While the GAO Report acknowledges that the Department's method used in
prioritizing the applications backlog may be considered "reasonable,"
it still downgrades DHS-USCIS for not including cases where information
from the applicant or another agency is pending. The Report does not
appropriately recognize external factors - including delays by other
agencies and the limitation on available visas - beyond the
Department's control is a deficiency in the methodology. It is also
inconsistent with other assessments made in the report that explicitly
limit the scope of performance expectations to "DHS's roles and
responsibilities."
The GAO Report also criticizes the Department for insufficient actions
to prevent future backlogs. The GAO Report does not give proper credit
to the Department's significant transformation efforts to increase
resources, improve customer service, and modernize business practices
relating to benefits applications. In January 2007, the Department
issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to adjust the Immigration and
Naturalization Benefit Application and Petition Schedule. As was
explained to GAO officials during an exit conference, this rule will
adjust fees collected for benefit applications, which will provide a
stable source of revenue to support a significant reduction in
processing times.
Performance Expectation 3: Establish a timetable for reviewing the
program rules, business processes, and procedures for immigration
benefit applications. The GAO Report assessment of "Generally Not
Achieved" is not supported by the facts or documents previously
provided to GAO officials.
Through an extensive program to transform its processes, DHS-USCIS
grouped the existing transactions into four major types of transactions
handled: (i) citizenship; (ii) immigrant; (iii) humanitarian; and (iv)
non-immigrant. Subsequently, DHS-USCIS developed a timetable to
implement improved processes for each of these four types of
transactions. These timetables are contained in the DHS-USCIS
Transformation Program Office FY 2007 Expenditure Plan, and articulate
the timeframes for implementation of the improved processes and
increased business capabilities. DHS-USCIS previously provided a copy
of this Expenditure Plan and the accompanying timetables to GAO yet,
GAO has not considered this.
Performance Expectations 12 and 14: Establish training programs to
reduce fraud in the benefits process and Implement a fraud assessment
program to reduce benefit fraud. The GAO Report states that DHS-USCIS
has made progress in establishing training programs to reduce fraud in
the benefits process, yet concludes that the Department has "Generally
Not Achieved" this performance expectation. This assessment does not
comport with the evidence provided to GAO officials and cited in the
GAO Report.
Contrary to the statement in the GAO Report, DHS-USCIS has developed a
uniform training course for all officers. This success was evidenced by
the complete list of topics and rosters for its training programs that
DHS-USCIS provided to GAO officials.
In addition, DHS-USCIS explained to GAO officials that it has
identified certain fraud schemes that are unique to specific
application processes and/or prevalent in geographical areas. The
Department consequently has provided specialized training to certain
officers who handle these particular types of matters or who are
stationed in certain locations above and beyond the uniform training
provided to all officers. A prior draft of the GAO Report appears to
have misunderstood data relating to these specialized and targeted
programs as evidence of inconsistent training across offices. The
current GAO Report seems to have rectified this misunderstanding,
citing specific DHS-USCIS examples of a clear nexus between locations
where fraud is centralized and specialized anti-fraud training.
However, instead of recognizing the achievements of these programs, the
GAO Report now appears to base its assessment of "Generally Not
Achieved" on the "appropriate[ness]" of the training. This appears to
be an inconsistency of methodology.
With respect to DHS-USCIS's fraud assessment efforts, a prior draft of
the GAO Report based its assessment on the fact that the Department had
not provided evidence of recently completed Benefit Fraud Assessments
(BFAs). BFAs are assessments conducted on randomly-selected cases
involving a particular benefit claim in order to identify the extent
and nature of fraud for specific immigration benefits. Most BFAs also
include field inquiries to identify fraud that cannot be discerned from
systems checks, interviews, or by reviewing files. DHS-USCIS
subsequently informed GAO officials that, in addition to the three BFAs
conducted to date, four more BFAs are scheduled to be completed before
the end of this fiscal year, and two more BFAs are to conclude in the
next fiscal year. The current GAO Report acknowledges this updated and
responsive information to the prior criticism. Nevertheless, the Report
now states that DHS-USCIS has not developed and demonstrated the
success of a strategy for conducting BFAs. In fact, the BFAs conducted
to date have provided useful baseline data to assist DHS-USCIS in
developing a comprehensive strategy, and they have already resulted in
procedural and regulatory changes to minimize certain types of fraud.
Aviation Security:
The Department has made significant progress in many facets of aviation
security, including the 17 performance areas in which the GAO Report
gave DHS an assessment of "Generally Achieved." GAO thus recognized,
for example, the Department's efforts to develop a strategic approach
for aviation security functions, processes and procedures for screening
passengers, and plans for baggage and air cargo screening. The GAO
Report is nevertheless incorrect in its assessment that DHS has
"Generally Not Achieved" key elements in several additional performance
areas, including the following.
Performance Expectations 2 and 3: Establish standards and procedures
for effective airport perimeter security and Establish standards and
procedures to effectively control access to airport secured areas. The
Department takes strong exception to the GAO Report's assessments of
"Generally Not Achieved" for these performance expectations. These
assessments do not give the Department credit for the substantial
progress made in this area by the Department's Transportation Security
Administration (DHS-TSA).
Contrary to GAO's assertion, DHS-TSA has provided documentation
outlining DHS-TSA full compliance with requirements of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), specifically as they relate to
strengthening the airport perimeters and access controls. Per ATSA
requirements, TSA has developed the "Aviation Inspection Plan," which
is based on an analytical risk-assessment process evaluating threats,
vulnerabilities, and potential consequences, and is reviewed and
updated every year.
Airports and airlines play key roles in the areas of perimeter and
access security, and share in the overall responsibility. In stating
that the Department has not provided evidence that its actions have
provided for effective airport perimeter security and access controls,
the GAO Report does not properly consider the significance of the steps
taken by the Department in conjunction with airports and airlines
including:
* Inspections of vehicles at access gates;
* Screening of airport and airline employees attempting to gain access
to secure areas (pursuant to the Aviation Direct Access Screening
Program);
* Security threat assessments before persons are issued airport
credentials or identification;
* Ongoing assessments and monitoring of new technologies;
* A comprehensive review of all airside security provisions; and
* Development of near-term and long-term plans that include enhanced
vetting and credentialing procedures, tighter controls over critical
infrastructures, and the incorporation of biometric data into
identification systems and access controls.
These processes and programs demonstrate that the Department has
established strong standards for effective airport perimeter and
secured-area security and have improved security in these areas. In
addition, DHS-TSA also furnished GAO officials with a detailed action
plan addressing all GAO recommendations from its 2004 audit, which does
not appear to have been given significant weight in the GAO Report.
Although GAO indicates that it would like to see evidence of the impact
of this improved security, it is difficult to precisely measure the
deterrent effect that the Department's measures have had.
DHS-TSA has nevertheless determined that a random, flexible, risk-based
approach provides more effective security than creating stationary
security posts. Experience shows that stationary, predictable security
measures can be the easiest to foil. DHSTSA therefore has implemented
the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP), which includes
elements of random screening of airport and airline employees,
property, and vehicles as they enter secure or sterile areas other than
through the established DHS-TSA checkpoints. During those random
screenings, Transportation Security Officers (TSO) screen for the
presence of explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and other contraband, as
well as improper airport identification documents.
Performance Expectation 14: Develop and implement an advanced
prescreening system to allow DHS to compare domestic passenger
information to the Selectee List and No Fly List. The assessment of
"Generally Not Achieved" does not recognize the Department's progress
in achieving program milestones in this multi-year effort.
In particular, GAO largely dismisses the extensive materials previously
provided to GAO by DHS-TSA, including a total of 57 documents detailing
the Secure Flight program's mission needs; concept of operations,
management plans; system requirements, acquisition plans;
testing/evaluation plans, privacy assessments, and the related
schedules; as well as more than a dozen briefings for GAO officials.
Instead, it appears GAO bases its assessment on the fact that the
Secure Flight program development efforts and implementation have not
been fully completed at present.
Performance Expectation 15: Develop and implement an international
passenger prescreening process to compare passenger information to
terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure. The GAO Report makes
an assessment of "Generally Not Achieved" because full implementation
of an integrated Secure Flight system will not occur for several years.
By doing so, GAO unfairly and prematurely assesses the Department's
progress on a long-term goal.
The Department has previously informed GAO officials that the Secure
Flight Notice of Proposed Rule Making and the Pre-Departure APIS Final
Rule are scheduled to be published in the coming months, and GAO
officials have been briefed on the content of the Secure Flight
proposed rulemaking. With these two rulemakings, the
Department is on track to implement pre-departure international
passenger screening.
The GAO Report recognizes that efforts to define functional
requirements and operations are underway in order to align the
international and domestic passenger prescreening programs.
Departmental officials have briefed GAO officials on the plans for
alignment and furnished them with a copy of the Secure Flight Concept
of Operations and the Consolidated Users Guide. In addition, the
upcoming Secure Flight Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Pre-Departure
APIS Final Rule will outline the alignment plan in greater detail.
Despite having been provided with this detailed update on this long-
term program (as well as the Department's short-term solution), it does
not appear this information was considered in the assessment.
Performance Expectation 18: Deploy checkpoint technologies to address
vulnerabilities. The Department disagrees with the assessment of
"Generally Not Achieved." This assessment does not recognize the
Department's progress in this Performance Expectation, and does not
consider the practical limitations inherent in developing and deploying
new technological solutions.
Contrary to the statement in the GAO Report, the Department is
constantly deploying existing technologies and developing new
technologies to reduce checkpoint vulnerabilities. In particular, DH
DHS-TSA continues to apply the latest improvements to existing
technologies - such as checkpoint x-ray systems, walk-through metal
detectors. and next-generation explosive trace detection systems. With
regard to developing technologies, DHS-TSA is working closely with the
DHS Science and Technology Directorate (DHS-S&T) on research and
development activities to rapidly and responsibly respond to threats
and to achieve advancements in screening technologies.
In Fiscal Year 2007, DHS-TSA and S&T explored technologies, such as
bottled liquids scanners, whole body imagers, cast and prosthetics
scanners, automated explosives detection devices, and advanced
technology screening systems for carry-on items. The development of new
technologies, however, takes time to test in the laboratory and in the
field. Such testing must be conducted to determine operational
effectiveness and suitability before new technologies can be deployed
at operating checkpoints. The safety of the Nation and its citizens is
too important to rush the deployment of untested technologies. Adequate
testing before deployment also is needed to exercise proper stewardship
of federal resources.
Furthermore, the GAO Report does not consider other efforts, in
addition to checkpoint technologies, that have effectively reduced
vulnerabilities. For example, DHS-TSA has instituted updated procedures
to detect explosives and has provided enhanced training for
Transportation Security Officers (TSO). Better educated and trained
TSOs are better equipped to recognize and deal with potentially
threatening contraband. Deployment of TSOs specifically trained in
behavioral recognition and bomb appraisal, as well as specially-trained
canines, also enhances the safety of the current checkpoint screening
procedures.
Surface Transportation Security:
Although recognizing that the Department "Generally Achieved" three of
the five performance expectations related to securing modes of surface
transportation, the GAO Report does not recognize the progress that has
been made by the Department in the remaining areas.
Performance Expectation 3: Issue standards for securing surface
transportation modes. The GAO Report assessment of "Generally Not
Achieved" is inaccurate and does not reflect the Department's
significant progress. While recognizing the Department's issuance of
standards related to mass transit and passenger and freight rail, the
Report does not take into consideration standards issued by the
Department in other modes of transportation, such as highways and
pipelines.
With respect to highways, DHS-TSA has developed draft Security Action
Items (SAIs). Copies of the draft SAIs were provided to GAO officials
in connection with a prior GAO audit on "Commercial Vehicle Security."
These SAIs contained standards addressing personnel security, access
control and en route security related to the highway modality.
With respect to pipelines, DHS-TSA issued "Pipeline Security Smart
Practices" to pipeline industries in an effort to assist them in their
security planning and implementation. These Smart Practices are drawn
from the data collected from the numerous on-site security reviews of
pipeline operators, personnel, and security measures conducted since
the Fall of 2003. The Smart Practices contain voluntary standards that
address badging and access control, physical security, vehicle
checkpoint and intrusion detection, and security incident management
planning. In addition, the Department of Transportation (DOT) issued
the Pipeline Security Information Circular and the Pipeline Security
Contingency Planning Guidance in 2002. DHS-TSA supports these
standards, as they were used as the basis for its CSRs.
Performance Expectation 4: Conduct compliance inspections for surface
transportation systems. The Department disagrees with the assessment of
"Generally Not Achieved." Although the GAO Report recognizes that the
Department has conducted compliance inspections with regard to the mass
transit, passenger rail, and freight rail modes, its assessment does
not appear to give DHS credit for these compliance inspections or the
progress that has been made in other areas.
In particular, the GAO Report notes that DHS-TSA provided supplemental
information regarding Surface Transportation Security Inspectors'
(STSIs) on-site assessments of the freight railroad industry and the
Department's implementation of security measures for Toxic Inhalation
Hazard (TIH) shipments. GAO's Report does not appear to consider the
impact of these assessments, however. Since the STSIs began auditing
freight railroad carriers for the Security Action Items beginning in
October 2006, they have audited more than 320 facilities. In June 2007,
STSIs also began auditing freight carriers for adherence with
Supplemental Security Action Items. These audits will assist in
achieving the goal of reducing risk from TIH rail shipments by 50
percent by the end of next year.
GAO does not give the Department credit for the Baseline Assessment and
Security Enhancement (BASE) reviews that have been completed on 38
transportation systems. In addition, there are 6 more reviews currently
in progress. The BASE program is designed to collect detailed
information regarding the security posture of a transit system in order
to assess the implementation of recommended security measures. During a
BASE review, STSIs assess the security posture of a transit system
based upon 17 Security and Emergency Preparedness Action Items. The
goal is to complete BASE assessments on the top 50 transit agencies by
the end of 2007.
Maritime Security:
The Department is proud of the tremendous progress we have made in the
area of Maritime Security, as demonstrated by the 17 ratings of
"Generally Achieved." The Department disagrees, however, with the
assessment in the area of developing a long range vessel-tracking
system.
Performance Expectation 16: Develop a long-range vessel-tracking system
to improve maritime domain awareness. Although the GAO Report
acknowledges the significant progress that has been made by the DHS-
USCG to develop a long-range vessel-tracking system, it nevertheless
gives the Department an assessment of "Generally Not Achieved." The
assessment is another example of the report's propensity to rate the
ongoing development and implementation of multi-year programs on the
basis of whether total implementation has been achieved today.
As recognized by GAO, the Nationwide Automatic Identification System
(NAIS) is presently providing vessel-tracking information for vessels
in U.S. waters. By the end of 2007, DHS-USCG will receive
identification and tracking information for vessels in U.S. waters in
the vicinity of 55 critical ports and 9 coastal areas. When fully
implemented, the NAIS project will provide tracking capabilities for
all U.S. waters and up to 2,000 miles offshore. DHS-USCG anticipates
initial long-range tracking capability later this year.
In addition, DHS-USCG is working to establish a Long Range
Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system to provide a global tracking
capability. LRIT is an International Maritime Organization regulation
requiring vessels on international voyages, passenger and cargo ships
of 300 gross tons and above, to carry working LRIT transponders. This
LRIT system will give the United States a system that is compatible and
interoperable with the global maritime community. LRIT will provide for
global information on all U.S. flagged vessels required to carry
transponders, and information on all U.S.-bound vessels regardless of
flag state within 1000 miles.
Furthermore, there are other vessel-tracking programs that currently
fulfill the requirement for a long-range vessel tracking system;
however, these systems cannot be detailed here due to their sensitive
nature. In conjunction with the sources described above, long-range
vessel tracking is currently being achieved to obtain MDA. It appears
GAO does not consider this information and the significant progress
that has been made with respect to the NAIS and LRIT systems.
Emergency Preparedness and Response:
The Department is proud of the progress that has been made in the area
of emergency preparedness and response in light of the many challenges
recognized by GAO that have arisen in this area, including the recent
reorganization required by the Congress following Hurricane Katrina. As
GAO also recognized, the Department has made progress in the areas of
developing a national incident management system and with respect to
federal grants to first-responders and state and local governments. The
Department, disagrees with several other assessments made by GAO.
Performance Expectation 4: Ensure the capacity and readiness of
disaster response teams. The Department disagrees with the assessment
of "Generally Not Achieved," which does not give sufficient
consideration to the disaster response team capacity and readiness
improvements already implemented by the Department.
DHS currently manages multiple disaster response operations centers,
teams, and assets through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS-
FEMA). The Department has a tiered disaster response framework, with
several disaster response teams ready to provide varying levels of
response depending on the circumstances and related requirements. The
capacity and readiness of these teams arc constantly being refined and
improved based on lessons learned and ongoing assessments.
* The Federal Incident Response Support Teams (FIRSTs) were formed in
2003 to provide preliminary on-scene federal management and important
situational awareness for the Department. The mission of FIRSTs is to
support the state and local response by expediting the delivery of life-
saving federal assistance. FIRSTs also provide initial situation
assessments for local, state, and federal officials, determine federal
support requirements, and integrate federal assets into the state and
local response. FIRSTs' on-site capabilities include several command
vehicle and communications capabilities through the into-net,
satellites, computers, mobile radios and GPS units. FIRSTs are self-
sufficient for up to five days. Based on recent refinements to their
readiness standards, FIRSTs can now deploy within two hours of notice
and arrive on scene in 12 hours or less.
* Advanced elements of Emergency Response Teams (ERT-As) are regional
disaster response teams that can be deployed in the event of a
disaster. Because FIRSTs arc essentially forward extensions of the
larger ERT-As, an ERT-A will continue to provide the federal response
capabilities described above once it arrives on scene. Under current
readiness standards, ERT-As can be deployed within six hours of notice
of an event and arrive within 12 hours.
* The National Emergency Response Teams (ERT-Ns) are national disaster
response teams. They provide similar response capacities to the ERT-As.
ERT-Ns can be activated and deploy within 12 hours of notice and arrive
on-scene within 24 hours.
* Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments are specialized
response teams. They are designed to provide mobile telecommunications,
life support, logistics, operational support and power generation.
Under current readiness standards, MERS detachments can deploy within
four hours of notification of an event.
The Department's responses to recent storms and tornadoes have
demonstrated the capacity and readiness of these teams. In response to
Tropical Storm Ernesto, for example, the FIRST arrived approximately
seven hours after being deployed. In response to the recent tornadoes
in Florida and Alabama, FIRSTs arrived the same day that the storms
struck. The ERT-A showed a similar rapid response following the recent
Greensburg, Kansas tornado, when it arrived within seven hours of being
deployed. The MERS deployment arrived on scene a few hours later. These
real-life examples contradict the assertion in the GAO Report that the
Department can offer no evidence that the current levels of readiness
and capabilities have improved since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Fortunately, there has been no opportunity to deploy DHS disaster
response teams in response to an event of the magnitude of Katrina or
Rita. That fortuity does not diminish, however, the Department's recent
successes.
DHS is also currently developing the next generation of rapidly
deployable response teams - Incident Management Assistance Teams
(IMATs). The IMATs will have the ability to establish an effective
federal presence on-scene within 12 hours of notification to support
the state, coordinate federal activities, and provide initial
situational awareness. These teams will be self-sufficient for a
minimum of 48 hours so as not to drain potentially scarce local
resources. These IMATs are being designed to incorporate the best
practices, design factors, and performance metrics from the existing
teams along with next-generation technologies. Standardized doctrine,
policies, response metrics, and operating procedures are being
developed to support these new teams, ensuring that DHS response team
assets will be further strengthened to meet the incident needs of the
future.
Performance Expectation 7 and 8: Establish a single, all hazards
national response plan; and Coordinate implementation of a single, all
hazards response plan. The Department strongly disagrees with the
assessments of "Generally Not Achieved" for these performance
expectations because they do not properly recognize the current
National Response Plan (NRP) that was implemented in 2004.
Contrary to the assessment made. GAO acknowledges that "DHS has
established a single all-hazards national response plan." The current
all-hazards NRP includes appropriate annexes as well as a Catastrophic
Incident Supplement. The review and revision of the NRP currently
underway does not change the fact that a single, all-hazards NRP
remains in place and is being used daily to respond to a multitude of
incidents across the Nation. The GAO Report does not appear to consider
the reality that the NRP is a living document that will be regularly
reviewed and revised as long as it is in existence: when the current
revision effort is completed the process of identifying potential
improvements for the next revision will already be underway. There can
never be an all-hazards national response plan that will be set in
stone.
Similarly, the GAO Report's concern that the Department's ongoing
efforts to review and revise the NRP will negatively impact the ability
to fully train, exercise and develop new implementation plans for the
NRP is flawed. The existing NRP will be implemented in response to
incidents that occur before the issuance of a revised plan, and there
will be a thoughtful transition process executed in conjunction with
the issuance of any revised plan.
GAO also does not give the Department credit for the progress that has
been made in coordinating implementation of the existing NRP. There has
been extensive coordination of the NRP implementation through training,
exercises, and planning efforts with our Federal, state and local
partners. The Department has also engaged in special hurricane
preparedness initiatives in the major hurricane-prone areas of the
Nation. As a result of the successful creation and coordination of the
NRP, more than 6 million Federal, state, local, private sector and non-
governmental organization employees have been trained on Incident
Command System and National Incident Management System concepts that
form the basis for effective response efforts. Over six million people
across the private and public sectors within the United States have
taken such courses and now are able to understand and implement the
Department's National Response Plan. In addition, the coordinated
responses to 97 major disaster declarations since Katrina have allowed
for greater coordination in the implementation of the NRP. These
efforts all indicate the progress that has been made by the Department
since Katrina.
Performance Expectation 13: Develop the capacity to provide needed
emergency assistance and services in a timely manner. DHS strongly
disagrees with GAO's assessment. Critical services, such as improved
logistics tracking and capacity, increased disaster victim
registration, and robust fraud, waste and abuse protections are in
place and fully functional. For example, the Total Asset Visibility
(TAV) initiative has resulted in improved logistics tracking, while
interagency agreements with the Defense Logistics Agency, pre-scripted
mission assignments, and a strengthened stand-alone Logistics
Directorate have resulted in greater logistical capacity.
Contrary to GAO's statement, the Department has established and tested
initiatives in this area. The TAV system has been tested in numerous
recent disaster response situations including the response to severe
winter storms. For instance, in January 2007 during the severe winter
storms in Oklahoma, the TAV system accurately and seamlessly tracked
over 70 truckloads of supplies through changes in location. During
powerful tornadoes in Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Kansas, the TAV
system tracked both truckloads of supplies and Mobile Disaster Response
Centers, providing FEMA Leadership with the accurate and current
location of assets, as well as the projected time of arrival. This
system enabled effective logistics and planning decisions for efficient
use of resources when they arrived in the disaster area.
FEMA has also engaged in outreach to other Federal agencies to ensure
the smooth and responsive coordination of Federal support when it is
needed. The most visible demonstration of this coordination is the
array of Federal capabilities contained in the "playbook" of pre-
scripted mission assignments. This playbook represents an examination
of the range of Federal capabilities and support and includes advance
inter-agency coordination to ensure the timely delivery of such
capabilities in times of need. At present, we have developed and
coordinated 187 pre-scripted mission assignments with as many as 21
Federal agencies. Up to an additional 40 mission assignments are
currently under review. This support ranges from heavy-lift helicopters
from DOD, to generators from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to
Disaster Medical Assistance Teams from HHS and Emergency Road Clearing
Teams from the U.S. Forest Service. These pre-scripted mission
assignments will result in more rapid and responsive delivery of
Federal support to States. FEMA also has established contracts with
private-sector suppliers to provide additional needed support in a
major disaster.
FEMA has worked closely with our state and local partners in an
"engaged partnership" to identify and address their needs, recognizing
that disaster response is not a "one-size fits all" proposition. For
example, FEMA has been working closely with highest risk hurricane
states on a gap analysis initiative that helps them identify and
address their strengths and weaknesses. This allows the identification
of areas where the specific states are likely to need Federal support
and the development of plans to address those needs. FEMA is supporting
major planning efforts in the Gulf Coast states to address evacuation
needs should another major disaster strike that area. There are also
catastrophic planning efforts underway in other areas to identify the
challenges that would result from major disasters in other areas of the
nation including those susceptible to flooding and earthquakes. All of
these efforts help develop the capacity at the Federal, state and local
levels to provide needed emergency assistance and services in a timely
manner.
FEMA has also significantly strengthened its internal capacity to
respond effectively. A focused effort to fill agency vacancies has
resulted in FEMA reaching the point where 95 percent of its full-time
employee slots are filled, including a major restructuring of key
leadership positions such as the ten regional administrators who are
all in place and highly qualified for their positions with decades of
experience in emergency management.
The majority of information DHS provided to GAO on this performance
expectation is designed specifically to address catastrophic situations
which are nearly impossible and very costly to simulate. The GAO Report
acknowledges that it is therefore "difficult to assess" DHS-FEMA's
initiatives regarding this performance expectation yet rates the
performance expectation as "Generally Not Achieved."
Performance Expectation 14: Provide timely assistance and services to
individuals and communities in response to emergency events. DHS
strongly disagrees with GAO's assessment.
DHS continues to develop and expand capabilities to provide timely
assistance and services to individuals and communities in response to
emergency events. A number of initiatives and agreements have been
undertaken to improve shelter management, including FEMA/Red Cross
agreements to initiate the National Shelter System -- a web-based data
system designed to provide information concerning shelter populations
and available capacity, support targeted registration assistance, and
enable improved targeting of resources where needed. Deployable Mobile
Registration Intake Centers have been developed to support timely
registration at congregate shelters and other locations with
concentrations of disaster victims. The ability of these Intake Centers
to respond in a timely manner has been successfully tested both through
exercises and in response to real events. The capacity to register
disaster victims has been doubled to more than 200,000 registrations a
day, and FEMA has entered into an MOU with the IRS to provide surge
call center support until a contract with a private sector vendor is
signed this fall. Several MOUs have been developed to share information
that could assist in the location of missing children and support
family reunification during a disaster.
FEMA has undertaken a number of improvements for the provision of
temporary housing to streamline the determination of applicant
eligibility and speed the provision of assistance. The agency has also
developed new policies to ensure all types of temporary housing options
are available to displaced applicants with disabilities. FEMA
coordinated with the U.S. Access board to develop new specifications
for temporary housing and group sites construction to accommodate
applicants with physical disabilities.
To combat fraud, waste and abuse, automated checks are in place to
detect duplicate registrations, identify applicant addresses that are
not residential, and verify social security numbers, addresses and
occupancy requirements. Automated systems also now ensure that no
payments are made until flagged applications are reviewed. FEMA has
also expanded its home inspection capacity to 20,000 homes per day and
has added third party evaluation of inspections to improve the speed
and accuracy of determinations of the level of assistance to be
provided to the victim.
The GAO Report criticizes DHS for not providing tangible evidence of
its successes in this area. However, through the Public Assistance
program, post-Katrina, DHS has obligated 80 percent of estimated
assistance within an average of 150 days after declaration compared to
203 days prior to Katrina. This performance is ahead of our goal which
is to obligate 80 percent of funding within 180 days. For the important
debris removal mission, FEMA has issued updated policies, guidance and
training to support more equitable and timely assistance, and
established a nationwide list of debris removal contractors for use by
state and local communities as they plan for, and respond to, debris
removal requirements. The GAO Report does not recognize these
achievements.
Furthermore, DHS has successfully responded to 107 major disasters, 15
emergencies and 130 fires since Hurricane Katrina. These were not
catastrophic disasters, but they demonstrated that the Department can
successfully provide timely assistance and services to individuals and
communities.
Performance Expectations 15 and 20: Implement a program to improve
interoperable communications among federal, state, and local agencies;
and Provide guidance and technical assistance to first responders in
developing and implementing interoperable communications capabilities.
The assessments of "Generally Not Achieved" in these areas do not fully
credit the Department for the progress that has been made by the
Department's Office of Emergency Communications (DHS-OEC) and Office
for Interoperability and Compatibility (DHS-OIC) within the National
Protection and Programs Directorate (DHS-NPPD), particularly with
regard to improving federal agencies' interoperable communication
capabilities.
The Department oversees several programs aimed at developing programs,
guidance, and technical assistance related to interoperable
communications:
* SAFECOM is a communications program within the DHS-OIC that works to
improve emergency response through more effective and efficient
interoperable wireless communications. SAFECOM provides research,
development, testing and evaluation, guidance, tools, and templates on
communications-related issues to local, tribal, state, and federal
emergency response agencies. SAFECOM also participates in the Federal
Partnership for Interoperable Communications, a partnership of 44
Federal entities and more than 200 participants focused on wireless
communications interoperability.
* The Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP)
is administered by DHS-OEC. The purpose of ICTAP is to enhance
interoperable communications between federal, state, and local
emergency responders and public safety officials. ICTAP works with
states as well as the Urban Area Working Groups (UAWG) to assess the
current communications infrastructure and determine technical
requirements needed to design an interoperable communications system.
* The Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) is also administered by DHS-
OEC. IWN is a collaborative effort by the Departments of Justice,
Homeland Security, and the Treasury to provide a consolidated Federal
wireless communications service. The IWN supports law enforcement,
first responder, and homeland security requirements with integrated
communications services in a wireless environment. The IWN will
implement solutions to provide Federal agency interoperability with
state, local, and tribal public safety and homeland security entities.
The GAO Report suggests that the Department's programs have focused on
improving interoperability with regard to state and local entities to
the exclusion of improving interoperability with other federal
agencies. The IWN effort is aimed particularly at improving federal
interoperability.
DHS-OEC is also establishing uniform policies, approaches, guidelines,
and methodologies for integrating these programs and their activities,
as well as metrics to demonstrate their success in improving
interoperable communications. Many of the specific assessments in the
GAO Report do not consider the practical realities associated with
developing a communications system that will accommodate more than
50,000 emergency response agencies and where nearly 90 percent of the
communications infrastructure is owned at the local level.
For example, DHS-OEC completed the National Interoperability Baseline
Survey last December. This survey of 22,400 randomly selected emergency
responders represents the first large-scale, statistically-significant
study to measure interoperable capabilities across the nation. Among
the many key findings of the study, approximately two-thirds of
emergency responders report using some interoperable communications in
their operations. By providing a clear representation of national
capacities, the survey allows the Department to make informed decisions
about strategies regarding the implementation of programs, procedures,
and capabilities for effective interoperable communications. The
Department is currently undertaking a National Communications Baseline
Assessment to evaluate interoperable capabilities for all Federal
agencies, as well as state and local emergency responders and the
emergency response community at large.
Through the ICTAP, DHS has provided assistance in development of
Tactical Interoperable Communication Plans for 65 Urban/Metropolitan
Areas and participated in the exercise validation of 75 more. In the
areas of technical guidance, the Department has developed and provided
assistance to jurisdictions in using the Communication and Asset Survey
Mapping Tool and otherwise provided ongoing assistance to 65 sites.
Due in large measure to the Department's progress in this area, all
states and territories are required to develop and adopt Statewide
Communications Interoperability Plans by the end of Fiscal Year 2007.
SAFECOM developed the Statewide Interoperability Planning Guidebook,
which outlines criteria for the development of the robust
interoperability plans. DHS-OEC will be reviewing, providing feedback
on, and approving the statewide Plans in consultation with the
Department's National Protection and Programs Directorate and the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration.
GAO's criticism regarding the SAFECOM guidance and tools is based
largely on limited feedback from just four states and selected
localities. Such a small sample size is hardly statistically
significant in a population made up of 56 states and territories and
over 50,000 emergency response agencies. The Department's experience
suggests that numerous other entities have had success using SAFECOM's
guidance and tools. By way of just one of such example, SAFECOM
recently worked with the Commonwealth of Kentucky in the Regional
Communications Interoperability Pilot (RCIP) project; this was a
successful collaborative effort. In addition, the SAFECOM
Interoperability Continuum is widely used as the model framework by the
emergency response community across the nation.
Performance Expectation 17: Increase the development and adoption of
interoperability communications standards. The assessment of "Generally
Not Achieved" is incorrect because it does not fully recognize the
significance of the progress made by the Department and appears to be
based on shifting criteria used to evaluate the Department.
Although the GAO Report acknowledges that the Department does not have
authority to unilaterally set standards for interoperability
communications, DHS has made significant progress in partnering with
the Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), the private sector and the emergency response
community to accelerate the "Project 25" (P25) standards. "P25" is an
initiative that will develop and generate interoperable and compatible
voice communications equipment, irrespective of the manufacturer. DHS-
OIC has established a vision and communicated key priorities for these
interoperability standards. As a result, the private-sector industry
has dramatically accelerated the development of key standards for four
of the eight major system interfaces associated with Project 25. These
four key interfaces should be completed within the next 18-24 months.
OIC is also working with NIST on a Compliance Assessment Program to
validate that P25 standardized systems are P25-compliant and that
equipment from different manufacturers are compatible.
Recognizing these successes, the GAO Report nevertheless assesses the
performance expectation as "Generally Not Achieved" because "the
effectiveness of these efforts is unclear." That assessment is not only
premature, but also inconsistent with the language of the performance
expectation at issue which asks whether the Department has increased
the development and adoption of interoperability communication
standards. The Department has unquestionably achieved the goals
described in the original performance expectation.
Performance Expectation 21: Provide assistance to state and local
governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities. DHS
disagrees with GAO's assessment of "Generally Not Achieved," because it
is contrary to strong evidence demonstrating that DHS has in fact
provided meaningful assistance to state and local governments to
develop all-hazard plans and capabilities.
For example, the GAO Report largely relies on outdated GAO and OIG
reports and does not reflect the Department's recent efforts to include
language in grant guidance documents to support state and local
government efforts to develop all-hazard plans and capabilities.
Notably, the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) guidance documents
have changed dramatically since most of those outdated reports were
conducted. For the sake of comparison, the Fiscal Year 2005 HSGP Grant
Guidance contained 29 percent more references to terror and terrorist
tactics than to all-hazard and capabilities planning. In contrast,
references to all-hazard and capabilities-based planning in the Fiscal
Year 2007 HSGP Grant Guidance exceeded references to terror and
terrorist tactics by 29 percent - reflecting a dramatic shifting in
priorities over that two-year period. Nor does the GAO Report reflect
the moving of the Department's Office of Grants and Training into DHS-
FEMA as part of the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006
reorganization. As these changes indicate, recent DHS grant cycles have
continued to develop and encourage a deliberative and measured all-
hazards approach to preparedness.
The GAO Report also cites an alleged perception that the Department has
been focused on funding terrorism preparedness rather than natural or
all-hazards funding. This "perception" is again drawn largely from old
GAO and OIG reports and is out of date. While the National Planning
Scenarios - referred in the GAO Report - focus in large part on
terrorist events, the predominance is due to the fact that their unique
and exacting capability requirements make them critical planning tools
in our national effort to develop a truly all-hazards preparedness
model. Moreover. DHS-FEMA has focused in 2007 on multi-hazard planning
in conjunction with state and local governments and is engaged in
efforts that develop state and local all-hazards capabilities. For
example:
* The Hurricane Gap Analysis Program is a joint effort between state
emergency management representatives and DHS-FEMA regional
representatives in 18 hurricane-prone States (plus Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands and Washington, D.C.) to better understand
vulnerabilities by conducing gap analyses. This program, developed in
coordination with the State of New York Emergency Management Office and
New York City Office of Emergency Management, will help DHS-FEMA and
its partners at the state and local levels to determine the level of
Federal support potentially needed during a category 3 hurricane.
Through structured discussions with DHS-FEMA and state emergency
management representatives, local jurisdictions will be able to better
understanding potential disaster response asset gaps in critical areas
such as debris removal, evacuation. sheltering, interim housing,
healthcare facilities, commodity distribution, communications, and
fuel, and to ask specific questions of federal and state officials. Our
efforts have seen a steady decrease in the initial shortfalls and
vulnerabilities identified in areas such as debris removal contracts,
transportation contracts, identification of potential shelters and
evacuation routes, identifying points of distribution, provision of
specific commodities such as tarps. generators, cots, and so on.
Although the Department's initial use of this program is being applied
for the upcoming hurricane season, this process is applicable to all
hazards.
* Through the Gulf Coast State Evacuation Plan, DHS-FEMA is helping
Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama develop an evacuation plan that
extends to adjacent states who may host Gulf Coast evacuees. In order
to synchronize separate state evacuation plans to create a more jointly
organized effort, the Department is engaging with each state to first
identify requirements and capabilities, and then develop a plan that
integrates shelter and transportation planning. The result will be a
timelier, better organized and coordinated evacuation by those with
their own transportation and those who need assistance to evacuate by
bus or air.
* Several Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiatives are also underway.
The Department is working with 13 southeastern Louisiana parishes
(including the City of New Orleans) vulnerable to hurricane disasters
to plan and prepare for the 2007 hurricane season. DHS is also using
two-phased, scenario-driven workshops to enhance the State of Florida's
capability to respond to a Category 5 Hurricane making landfall in
Southern Florida. Phase l focuses on developing regional response and
recovery plans, including evacuation planning, for the counties and
communities surrounding Lake Okeechobee in the event of failure of the
Herbert Hoover Dike. Phase 2 will address the effects of a Category 5
hurricane striking south Florida and result in standardized and
comprehensive catastrophic Category 5 hurricane disaster functional
response and recovery plans for the State of Florida and responding
federal agencies.
These recent efforts by the Department to shift the focus of its grant
program and documents and to engage in efforts that assist state and
local governments in developing their all-hazard capabilities are not
reflected in the GAO Report.
Performance Expectation 24: Develop a system for collecting and
disseminating lessons learned and best practices to emergency
responders. The assessment of "Generally Not Achieved" does not reflect
the substantial progress the Department has made in developing the
Lessons Learned Information Sharing website (LLIS.gov). The GAO Report
does not appear to consider the practical difficulties associated with
developing an online system, and unfairly downgrades the Department
despite its on-going efforts to constantly improve that system based on
user feedback.
LLIS.gov has been available to the first responder community since
2004, and system enhancements have been - and will continue to be -
continuously made. LLIS.gov launched significant system upgrades in
December 2006 based on user feedback, which resulted in dramatic
improvements in the ability of first responders to access and share
valuable information on all aspects of emergency response and homeland
security. Upgrades included enhancements to the search engine that
combined full-text searching with sorting and filtering tools;
redesigning the homepage to deliver more information directly to
members in fewer clicks; adding a "Recent Incidents" box highlights the
latest homeland security news with links directly to related content;
providing an interactive, clickable map enabling users to view both
LLIS.gov members and documents by state; and adding topic-specific
pages to serve as "one-stop shops" for information on emergency
response and homeland security topics including mass evacuation to
pandemic influenza, community preparedness, and emergency planning for
persons with disabilities and other special needs.
Other recent improvements allow the latest LLIS.gov content to be
delivered directly to member inboxes through the LLIS Dispatch feature.
Additional improvements are under development and will address most, if
not all, of the issues previously raised by GAO. Migration to a new
hosting platform will allow the implementation of an improved search
engine. The new search engine will include search-term highlighting in
the text of both abstracts and documents; weighted relevancy algorithm
to ensure key documents appear first in search results; and upgraded
indexing to ensure that all published documents are indexed immediately
and available to users in their search results. This new search engine
is expected to be available within a few months.
Increased usage of LLIS.gov is a testament to the Department's success
in developing a system for collecting and disseminating lessons learned
and best practices that is actually useful to emergency responders.
April 2007 was the third highest month both in terms of the number of
visits and visitors to LLIS.gov. LLIS.gov has also seen a 55 percent
increase in visits and a 50 percent increase in visitors for the first
four months of 2007, resulting in an average of 27,133 visits and 9,973
visitors per month. These numbers contradict GAO's assessment that the
Department has not achieved this performance expectation.
Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets Protection:
The Department has made significant progress in the area of protecting
critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR), as recognized by
GAO's assessments of "Generally Achieved" in the areas of developing a
comprehensive national plan and partnerships for protecting CI/KR and
identifying, assessing and supporting efforts to reduce threats and
vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure. The Department feels that
several other assessments, does not adequately reflect the Department's
progress related to CI/KR.
Performance Expectation 3: Improve and enhance public/private
information sharing involving attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities.
The Department disagrees with the assessment of "Generally Not
Achieved" for this performance expectation, as the assessment does not
reflect the progress the Department has made.
The Department has made significant progress in its CI/KR protection
capabilities, particularly in the area of information sharing. For
example, the Office of Infrastructure Protection (DHS-OIP), within
NPPD, completed Sector Specific Plans (SSPs) within the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). In completing the SSPs, DHS
worked with the private sector to implement tailored protective
measures, including site-assistance visits and transforming feedback
into educational reports that owners and operators can use to identify
vulnerabilities. DHS-OIP also created the Chemical Terrorism
Vulnerability Information Sharing Task Force, comprised of state and
local officials. The Department also worked with the private sector to
develop more than 800 Buffer Zone Protection Plans (BZPP) to enhance
security around critical infrastructure sites. To further disseminate
information to the private sector, more than 150 training courses on
increasing terrorism awareness were provided to private security guards
last year and increasing use was made of the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN). Additionally, the TRIPwire program
mentioned in the GAO Report provides situational awareness on
improvised explosive devices to a broad swath of security stakeholders,
including representatives of 40 Federal departments and agencies; 28
military units; 365 state and local agencies; and 35 private sector
companies and organizations. Since its release, TRIPwire has recorded
more than 4 million site hits. On June 29, 2007, in response to the
bombing events in London, TRIPwire recorded approximately 200 percent
more hits than its average for that month. This included 6,219 page
views and 40,130 hits.
Other achievements in the area of information-sharing related to CI/KR
vulnerabilities include the NIPP Sector Partnership Model, which is
currently in full operation. This model has been and will continue to
he an essential mechanism for the exchange of strategic information at
an unprecedented level between the Government and the owners and
operators of CI/KR. The National Infrastructure Coordinating Center
(NICC) also routinely shares a wide range of information products
containing warning, threat, and CI/KR protection information via the
HSIN. During the last year, the NICC has posted more than 900
information products to HSIN for use by CI/KR owners and operators. The
Department is also currently deploying professional intelligence and
operations officers to state fusion centers and installing the Homeland
Security Data Network for communicating classified information.
The National Coordinating Center (NCC) for Telecommunications is
another Departmental model for successful information sharing. The NCC
provides a forum through which the Federal government and the private
sector communications companies can interact on a daily basis. Numerous
Federal departments and agencies provide full time detailees to the NCC
and several industry members provide cleared personnel who maintain
full time offices at the NCC. These cleared personnel have access to
classified read binders and can interact with the NCC Watch on a 24-
hour basis. Additionally, the NCC conducts weekly conference calls
where members interact with those Federal departments and agencies with
the most significant communications responsibilities and requirements.
Moreover, explicitly excluded is an assessment of the private sector
utilization of the HSIN. Consequently, the GAO Report does not
accurately reflect the current deployment approach for the HSIN in the
CI/KR sectors. Nine of the CI/KR sectors or major sub-sectors have
signed memoranda of understanding with DHS to deploy Homeland Security
Information Network-Critical Sectors (HSIN-CS) to their sectors.
Also, DHS strategic, operational, and policy initiatives have taken
into account the critical role the private sector plays in protecting
the Homeland. DHS has taken steps to designate a DHS Coordinator for
Private Sector Security within DHS, who develops internal cross-cutting
processes for synchronizing DHS efforts to support Private Sector
security interests, and develop a way forward to expand and sustain the
DHS/Private Sector partnership.
It appears the GAO Report largely relies on previous reports that do
not account for the achievements discussed above and other recent
successes. For example, in making its "Generally Not Achieved"
assessment, the GAO Report cites assessments in an OIG report entitled,
Homeland Security Information Network Could Support Information Sharing
More Effectively (OIG-06-38). However, in a letter dated July 11, 2007
from the OIG regarding the compliance follow-up to OIG-06-38, the
Assistant Inspector General, Information Technology stated that five
recommendations from the OIG report "are considered resolved." The OIG
has also indicated that it is satisfied with DHS's efforts to mitigate
problems outlined in the OIG-06-38 report.
Performance Expectation 4: Develop and enhance national analysis and
warning capabilities for critical infrastructure. The GAO Report -
which focuses its assessment primarily on cyber critical
infrastructure - does not give the Department credit for the
significant advances it has made in achieving this performance
expectation. In the area of cyber infrastructure, the GAO Report
inaccurately suggests that the Department has provided no evidence of
enhanced national warning capabilities. This assessment does not
consider the tremendous progress by the Department's National Cyber
Security Division (DHS-NCSD), within the Office of Cyber Security and
Communications (DHS-CS&C), to develop and enhance cyber analysis, watch
and warning, and collaboration with the private sector.
The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) within DHS-NCSD
provides a 24-hour, 7 day-a-week watch center to conduct daily analysis
and situational monitoring in order to provide information on cyber
incidents and other events. For example, US-CERT's Einstein program
enables the rapid detection of current and pending cyber attacks
affecting agencies and provides federal agencies with early incident
detection. The information gathered by the Einstein program is analyzed
and then used to provide actionable and timely alerts and reporting
regarding current and impending cyber attacks. The program also provides
indications and warnings of actual and potential intrusions to Federal
government computer security teams. To date, Einstein has assisted in
the identification of more than 300 potential malicious incidents that
would have otherwise gone undetected.
US-CERT's near real-time data collection and information sharing
increases awareness among public and private sector stakeholders and
reduces cyber infrastructure vulnerabilities. US-CERT notifies public
and private partners through a variety of products that encompass the
National Cyber Alert System (NCAS). USCERT established a vulnerability
remediation process and the NCAS in order to collect, mitigate, and
disseminate vulnerability information. NCAS is the first cohesive
national cyber security system for identifying, analyzing, and
prioritizing emerging vulnerabilities and threats. NCAS delivers
targeted, timely, and actionable information for technical and non-
technical audiences to enhance security. NCAS reports are made
available through the NCAS. Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
(ISACs), and on the US-CERT public website. For Fiscal Year 2005,
USCERT issued 338 alerts, bulletins, and vulnerability notes to
stakeholders through the public website and for Fiscal Year 2006 US-
CERT issued 490 alerts, bulletins, and vulnerability notes. Information
from US-CERT is also provided to the National Vulnerability Database
(NVD), also sponsored by DHS-NCSD. Approximately 400 vulnerabilities
are published to the NVD web site each month based upon newly
discovered issues.
US-CERT also produces Critical Infrastructure Information Notices (DIN)
which are intended to provide information about a cyber security
incident and make recommendations for avoiding or mitigating risks. The
CHN is specifically written to notify private sector organizations and
Federal agencies about efforts to protect critical infrastructure. For
Fiscal Year 2006, US-CERT produced 15 CINNs, which are provided to key
stakeholders on a secure internet portal.
US-CERT is actively working to formalize processes and procedures for
collaboration with the private sector. These processes undercut the
concern expressed in the GAO Report that a lack of collaboration
challenges the Department's ability to gather and share information. To
the contrary, US-CERT has developed a draft concept of operations for
Private Industry Cyber Security Incident Handling which addresses
information sharing, communication, and coordination with the private
sector, including the ISACs.
The National Communications System (NCS) has also been deeply engaged
in analysis and warning functions. The NCS has developed multiple
programs to ensure that the Federal government can still communicate
during times of crisis. Additionally, the NCS also has a significant
analytical capability dedicated to conducting analyses and assessments
of the public communications network. This capability, only possible
through robust and deep information sharing with the private sector,
has proven invaluable in initiatives such as the Department's Pandemic
Influenza Planning and cross sector dependency analyses.
Furthermore, DHS is conducting outreach to the private sector at the
state and Local levels through fusion centers designed to push and pull
information that directly relates to threats within a geographic region
containing critical infrastructure. The DHS State and Local Fusion
Center Program has also provided technical assistance to state and
local jurisdictions responsible for critical infrastructure to ensure
that partnerships between local authorities and the private sector are
in place in every state. Despite the fact that the response to these
efforts has been overwhelmingly positive, the GAO Report largely
dismisses these achievements.
Science and Technology:
The Department strongly disagrees with the assessments in the Science
and Technology (S&T) mission area. Many of the concerns with GAO's
methodology are particularly applicable here, where the relevant
performance expectations are - by their very nature and necessity -
continuous processes, rather than programs with specific endpoints or
deadlines. Further, we were disappointed when our performance was
downgraded in four areas from "No Assessment Made" to "Generally Not
Achieved" - even after the Department provided extensive documentation
demonstrating DHS-S&T's significant progress.
DHS-S&T projects are executed in support of the Department, its
operational components, and the Nation's first responders. The four-
year lifetime of the Department is a relatively short period of time in
terms of the maturation process for science and technology programs.
The Department believes that many of the assessments in this mission
area are, at a minimum, premature.
Performance Expectation 1: Develop a plan for departmental research,
development, testing, and evaluation activities. The assessment of
"Generally Not Achieved" understates the significance of the
Department's Science and Technology Strategic Plan delivered to
Congress on June 26, 2007. As the GAO Report recognizes, this Strategic
Plan incorporates a five-year Research and Development Plan that
includes information on milestones for fiscal years 2007 through 2011.
The GAO Report asserts that the Strategic Plan does not contain
sufficient goals and measures. However, the Strategic Plan describes
yearly milestones and deliverables/goals for every project within S&T,
including Test and Evaluation. The Strategic Plan reflects the highest
level objectives for internal departmental activities, and provides
overarching guidance for addressing the science and technology needs
within each homeland security mission area. Detailed performance goals
for all programs are included in the five year Research and Development
Plan, progress is reviewed annually in developing the annual budget
request. GAO's suggestion that each individual project sponsored by DHS-
S&T does not include specific goals, measures and milestones is
incorrect. These metrics are extremely important to DHSS&T in its
evaluations of these projects.
Furthermore, the GAO Report does not give the Department credit for the
Strategic Plan's description of the S&T Directorate's organizational
framework and risk-based research portfolio management strategy. Nor
does GAO acknowledge that the Strategic Plan also addresses the
importance of developing a strong homeland security science and
technology national workforce by developing professional S&T employees.
The Plan also maintains research and educational opportunities that
will foster the long-term homeland security intellectual base. By not
placing proper emphasis on the significance of the Strategic Plan, GAO
understates the Department's progress in this area.
Performance Expectations 2 and 3: Assess emerging chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats and homeland security
vulnerabilities; and Coordinate research, development, and testing
efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to address chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist
threats. The Department disagrees with the assessments of "Generally
Not Achieved." These assessments again highlight the flaws in the
Report's methodology, as the Department's efforts to assess emerging
vulnerabilities and develop countermeasures will always be ongoing and
are not designed to reach a final end-goal completion.
The GAO Report does not adequately recognize and assign credit for the
tremendous strides that DHS-S&T has made in assessing threats and
vulnerabilities, as well as identifying and developing countermeasures.
In 2006, the Department conducted the Bio-Terrorism Risk Assessment
(BTRA). This risk assessment evaluated hundreds of thousands of
scenarios relating to 28 high-priority agents, eight classes of release
(e.g., indoor, outdoor, food, water, and human vector), and varying
terrorist capabilities. The BTRA has been very useful in prioritizing
research and developing countermeasures against these agents. In
addition, the BTRA helps DHS-S&T to understand and resolve associated
uncertainties, and to prioritize emerging biological threats and
homeland security vulnerabilities.
Based on the results of the BTRA, DHS has issued nine Material Threat
Determinations (MTDs). For each material threat, DHS has conducted a
Material Threat Assessment (now referred to as Population Threat
Assessments) that provides an in-depth look at the exposed populations
and related impacts from plausible biological terrorism scenarios.
These MTDs and their associated assessments have been used by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in formulating the Public
Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise strategy, and to
ensure that there are adequate supplies of medical countermeasures in
the national stockpile.
Based on the success and impact of the BTRA, DHS-S&T is developing an
integrated Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Risk
Assessment. This risk assessment will analyze and evaluate
vulnerabilities and the impacts of CBRN threats, and can be used to
determine priorities and resource allocations regarding the development
of countermeasures.
For the GAO Report to assign a low rating to the Department's progress
in assessing emerging vulnerabilities to chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats because "substantial more work
remains for DHS" does not take into account the practical reality that
the Department will never be done assessing such vulnerabilities. The
Department must continually work to identify and assess new and
emerging vulnerabilities to constantly evolving threats. These
completed and ongoing efforts discussed above, and acknowledged by GAO,
reflect real and meaningful progress by the Department that is not
reflected in GAO's assessment.
The Department has also undertaken to coordinate and develop
countermeasures with other Government agencies and stakeholders. For
example, DHS-S&T's Biological Surveillance and Detection Research and
Development Program works to develop next-generation detectors for
biological threat agents. The program also develops the assays
(signatures or fingerprints of biological agents) that detectors need
to recognize a biological agent, and as well as detection systems to
protect agriculture and food products and industries. The Chemical
Detection Program develops technology for warning and notification of a
chemical threat release, including technologies responders need to
survey potentially contaminated scenes, while limiting their exposure
to chemical agents. In response to the recent liquid explosives plot
discovered in the United Kingdom, DHS-S&T established a Rapid Response
Team composed of Department of Energy laboratories, the DHS Centers of
Excellence, and the Transportation Security Laboratory. Based on this
work, DHSTSA was able to issue a rule allowing approximately three
ounces of liquids in carry-on luggage within two months. DHS-S&T and
TSA continue to work toward the ability to detect home-made explosives,
including liquids, gels, pastes, and other explosive compounds derived
from commonly available materials.
In addition, DHS is an ex officio member of the HHS Executive
Governance Board for the development of medical countermeasures. The
DHS-S&T risk assessments referenced above play a major role in defining
national strategies and implementation plans and in prioritizing
countermeasures. Further, DHS is a co-chair of the National Science and
Technology Council's (NSTC) Subcommittee on Decontamination Standards
and Technologies, which has developed draft guidelines for restoration
following a biological and chemical attack and a supporting five-year
R&D plan. Moreover, DHS is a co-chair of the Foreign Animal Disease
Threat subcommittee of the NSTC, which also published a five-year
integrated R&D strategy. Through these inter-agency committees, DHS-S&T
has made real progress in coordinating the identification and
development of meaningful countermeasures to address emerging homeland
security vulnerabilities.
Human Capital Management:
The GAO Report does not present a full picture of the significant
progress the Department has made in the area of Human Capital
Management. Indeed, the GAO Report consistently acknowledges that DHS
"is on track," "is in the process of," and "has made progress in"
achieving the performance expectations many of which involve multi-year
efforts. Yet, the assessments do not reflect this progress.
Performance Expectation 8: Implement training and development programs
in support of DHS's mission and goals. The Department strongly
disagrees with the assessment of "Generally Not Achieved." The GAO
Report does not accurately reflect the information previously provided
to GAO officials.
The GAO Report suggests that most of the DHS training programs
referenced within the Human Capital Operational Plan has not been
achieved. These assertions are not accurate. The Human Capital
Operational Plan is a two year endeavor, and DHS has been meeting its
targets within the plan. The assessment of "Generally Not
Achieved" highlights the problems in using a binary standard to assess
what the GAO Report acknowledges is "a multi-year program."
Indeed, the Department has successfully launched an information system
for the training programs. DHScovery, a learning management system, is
an initiative offering a comprehensive catalog of 2,000 online courses
and electronic books, in areas such as leadership and information
technology. DHScovery serves multiple purposes. For instance, it is a
means to consolidate training systems across the Department. Therefore,
DHScovery eliminates redundancies, achieves economies of scale, and
establishes a common delivery environment. DHScovery also aligns the
DHS Learning and Development Strategy, the Human Capital Operations
Plan, and the President's Management Agenda.
With regard to the development of terminology, the DHS Training Leaders
Council - a group of training representatives from DHS components -
created a Training Glossary that is used throughout the Department.
This Training Glossary provides a common language and terminology for
all human capital offices throughout the entire Department, and
enhances the clarity and precision of communications among such
components. The Training Glossary was previously provided to GAO
officials, but apparently was not considered in the GAO Report.
In addition, the Department previously provided information to GAO
officials regarding other significant DHS training and development
programs. For example, the Department's Chief Human Capital Office (DHS-
CHCO) submitted information about the Department's establishment of the
National Capital Region Homeland Security Academy. This new Academy
offers a fully accredited graduate degree in Homeland Security Studies.
When combined with the existing Master's Degree program currently
offered by the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval
Post Graduate School, the two programs will matriculate 200 students
annually.
In order to provide additional development programs which support the
Department's mission and goals, DHS is also conducting academic and
outreach partnerships with the National Defense University,
institutions, colleges and universities that serve historically
underrepresented groups, and educational consortiums, such as the
National Security Education Consortium and the Homeland Security and
Defense Education Consortium. These programs provide additional
training to DHS employees as well as state and local officials.
Information Technology Management:
Performance Expectation 5: Develop a comprehensive enterprise
architecture. The assessment of "Generally Not Achieved" is not
supported by the facts. In particular, the GAO Report appears to have
wrongly based its assessment on a belief that DHS had not fully
implemented elements of the GAO Enterprise Architecture Management
Maturity Framework (EAMMF).
The Department has made great strides in developing an Enterprise
Architecture (EA) that substantially meets each of the EAMMF elements.
Indeed, an August 2006 GAO report (GAO-06-831) found that DHS fully
satisfied 24 out of 31 applicable EAMMF elements, and partially
satisfied four additional elements. Since that time, DHS has
taken additional steps to identify and/or address the final three
elements. Products related to the EA are now required to undergo
independent verification and validation (IV&V) which will ensure
interoperability, compatibility, and efficiency within the larger
structure. DHS has also worked to centralize information technology
(IT) processes and avoid unnecessary duplication, by requiring
adherence to the EA for all IT investments over $2.5 million.
In developing its EA, the Department sought significant input from and
consulted with, key stakeholders. In fact, stakeholders provided more
than 400 comments on the EA, and DHS considered each one. GAO appears
to have disregarded this extensive consultation in preparing this GAO
Report, as well as the GAO report from last May (07-564), entitled DHS
Enterprise Architecture Continues to Evolve. In 07-564, GAO
inaccurately stated that the Department failed to consult with
stakeholders. This is not the case.
In evaluating the comprehensiveness of the EA developed by the
Department, it should be noted that the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has rated the Homeland Security Enterprise Architecture (HLS EA)
2007 as a 4.3 on a 5.0 scale for completeness. This score does not
support the GAO Report's assessment.
Performance Expectation 6: Implement a comprehensive enterprise
architecture. The assessment of "Generally Not Achieved" is not
supported by the facts, because the Department has already implemented
a comprehensive EA. OMB has rated the HLS EA 2007 4.5 on a 5.0 scale
for use of its enterprise architecture which includes the elements of
governance, change management, deployment, collaboration, and Capital
Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) integration.
In support of its assessment to the contrary, the GAO Report relies
most heavily on the allegation that the Department's IT investments
have not been fully aligned with the EA. To the contrary, the DHS
Office of the Chief Information Officer (DHS-CIO) is currently aligning
all new investments to the EA. In particular, all IT investments in
Fiscal Year 2008 have already been aligned with the Department's
strategic plans, and this alignment process will continue in future
fiscal years.
The GAO Report also states that DHS does not have a repeatable
methodology for assessing potential IT investments relative to the EA.
To the contrary, DHS has developed a methodology for such assessments
based upon detailed compliance criteria, and indeed, it has assessed
all major IT investments in relation to its EA. During May 2006 and
again in February 2007, DHS supplied GAO officials with written
documentation of its methods to assess IT investments and the review
criteria It does not appear, however, that the GAO Report considered
these documents.
Performance Expectations 7 and 8: Develop a process to effectively
manage information technology investments; and Implement a process to
effectively manage information technology investments. The assessment
of "Generally Not Achieved" does not accurately reflect the
Department's progress with respect to these performance expectations.
The Department has developed and implemented processes to effectively
management IT investments. For example, the Department issued a
Management Directive earlier this year which provided the DHS Chief
Information Officer with the authority to review and approve the
Department's entire information technology budget.
The Department also requires programs to submit Periodic Reporting (PR)
information for all major investments on a quarterly basis. In
addition, the Department published and distributed PR Guidance in the
first quarter of Fiscal Year 2006 and provided associated training
courses to personnel within the DHS Program Management Office (PMO).
The Department also distributed Earned Value Management (EVM) and
Operational Analysis (OA) guidance documents throughout the Department.
These processes have led to more effective management of IT investments
by significantly improving tracking and reporting of investment costs,
schedules, and performance variances. The analysis from these processes
has been provided to GAO.
The Department is also currently deploying a business tool that will
enable DHS management to view trends of quarterly PR information. In
this way, senior DHS officials will be able to assess the performance
of the systems and enhance supervisory oversight of IT investments.
In addition, the Department has already implemented an IT acquisition
review (ITAR) process to improve the alignment of IT purchases to the
homeland security mission and Department architecture. The ITAR process
requires that the DHS-CIO review and approve IT acquisitions of $2.5
million and greater, while component CIOs are only authorized to
approve IT acquisitions of less than this value. The ITAR process has
thus improved IT management by providing the DHS-OCIO with supervisory
control over IT investments and identifying duplicative investments.
Over the first six months of its implementation, the ITAR process has
been successful in reviewing approximately $1.8 billion in IT
investments.
These management processes have also been extended into the IT
Portfolio Management process, whereby the Department has developed and
applied tools, methodologies, and techniques lo assist in IT investment
decisions based upon quantifiable measurements. The Portfolio
Management program incorporates specific management processes to
establish performance goals, transition plans, architectural targets,
and performance measures. In this way. the Department can continue to
improve the balance of investments to more effectively meet
Departmental goals and objectives. The IT Portfolio Management Process
has already been used to assist the DHS-CIO in selecting and
prioritizing IT investments in relation to the Enterprise Architecture.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Norman J. Rabkin (202) 512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Christopher Keisling, Assistant
Director; Jason Barnosky; Cathleen A. Berrick; Sharon Caudle; Virginia
Chanley; Michele Fejfar; Rebecca Gambler; Kathryn Godfrey; Stephanie
Hockman; Tracey King; Thomas Lombardi; Jan Montgomery; Octavia Parks;
and Sue Ramanathan made key contributions to this report. Other
contributors to this report included Eugene Aloise; John Bagnulo; Mark
Bird; Nancy Briggs; Kristy Brown; Stephen Caldwell; Frances Cook;
Stephen Donahue; Jeanette Espinola; Jess Ford; Amanda Gill; Mark
Goldstein; Ellen Grady; Samuel Hinojosa; Randolph Hite; Daniel Hoy;
John Hutton; William O. Jenkins, Jr; Casey Keplinger; Kirk Kiester;
Eileen Larence; Leena Mathew; Kieran McCarthy; Tiffany Mostert; Shannin
O'Neill; Bonita Oden; David Powner; Jerry Seigler; Katherine Siggerud;
Richard Stana; Bernice Steinhardt; John Stephenson; Sarah Veale; John
Vocino; Gregory Wilshusen; Eugene Wisnoksi; and William T. Woods.
[End of section]
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Border Patrol: Costs and Challenges Related to Training New Agents.
GAO-07-997T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2007.
Homeland Security: Information on Training New Border Patrol Agents.
GAO-07-540R. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Operational, Technological,
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2007.
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Planning and Management Improvements
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2007.
Homeland Security: US-VISIT Has Not Fully Met Expectations and
Longstanding Program Management Challenges Need to Be Addressed. GAO-
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Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better
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February 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
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Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
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Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248.
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Department of Homeland Security and Department of State: Documents
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at Air Ports-of-Entry From Within the Western Hemisphere. GAO-07-250R.
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7, 2006.
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Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the
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Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks
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2006.
Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa Waiver
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Intellectual Property: Initial Observations on the STOP Initiative and
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Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across
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Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across
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Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in
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Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and
Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened. GAO-06-404.
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Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere Travel
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Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase the
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644. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006.
Border Security: Reassessment of Consular Resource Requirements Could
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Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across
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Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive
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Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS's
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Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation
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Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination
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Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border
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February 22, 2006.
Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border
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February 14, 2006.
Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, but
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D.C.: January 25, 2006.
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from
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Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and
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Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department
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Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest
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22, 2005.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection
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Homeland Security: Performance of Foreign Student and Exchange Visitor
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440T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on
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202. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.
Border Security: Streamlined Visas Mantis Program Has Lowered Burden on
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Border Security: Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and DHS Needed to
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Border Security: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on
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Border Security: Consular Identification Cards Accepted within United
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Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in
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Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in
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Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies
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2003.
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the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-798. Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland
Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation
Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States From Certain
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D.C.: May 13, 2003.
Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to
Promote Better Integration and Sharing. GAO-03-322. Washington, D.C.:
April 15, 2003.
Border Security: Challenges in Implementing Border Technology. GAO-03-
546T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003.
Immigration Enforcement:
Alien Detention Standards: Telephone Access Problems Were Pervasive at
Detention Facilities; Other Deficiencies Did Not Show a Pattern of
Noncompliance. GAO-07-875. Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007.
Employment Verification: Challenges Exist in Implementing a Mandatory
Electronic Verification System. GAO-07-924T. Washington, D.C.: June 7,
2007.
Foreign Workers: Information on Selected Countries' Experiences. GAO-
06-1055. Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2006.
Information Technology: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Is
Beginning to Address Infrastructure Modernization Program Weaknesses,
but Key Improvements Still Needed. GAO-06-823. Washington, D.C.: July
27, 2006.
Immigration Enforcement: Benefits and Limitations to Using Earnings
Data to Identify Unauthorized Work. GAO-06-814R. Washington, D.C.: July
11, 2006.
Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and
Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-06-895T. Washington, D.C.: June 19,
2006.
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in
the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R. Washington,
D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS's
Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources. GAO-06-462T. Washington,
D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on Immigration
and Customs Enforcement's Infrastructure Modernization Program. GAO-
05-805. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005.
Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and
Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-05-813. Washington, D.C.: August 31,
2005.
Combating Alien Smuggling: The Federal Response Can Be Improved. GAO-
05-892T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005.
Combating Alien Smuggling: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Federal
Response. GAO-05-305. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2005.
Information on Certain Illegal Aliens Arrested in the United States.
GAO-05-646R. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005.
Department of Homeland Security: Addressing Management Challenges that
Face Immigration Enforcement Agencies. GAO-05-664T. Washington, D.C.:
May 5, 2005.
Information on Criminal Aliens Incarcerated in Federal and State
Prisons and Local Jails. GAO-05-337R. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2005.
Homeland Security: Performance of Foreign Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System Continues to Improve, But Issues Remain. GAO-05-
440T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Alien Registration: Usefulness of a Nonimmigrant Alien Annual Address
Reporting Requirement Is Questionable. GAO-05-204. Washington, D.C.:
January 28, 2005.
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in Transforming
Immigration Programs. GAO-05-81. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2004.
Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration Enforcement
Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning Requirements. GAO-05-66.
Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2004.
Homeland Security: Performance of Information System to Monitor Foreign
Students and Exchange Visitors Has Improved, but Issues Remain. GAO-04-
690. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004.
Investigations of Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Other
Financial Crimes. GAO-04-464R. Washington, D.C.: February 20, 2004.
Combating Money Laundering: Opportunities Exist to Improve the National
Strategy. GAO-03-813. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2003.
Immigration Services:
Department of Homeland Security: Adjustment of the Immigration and
Naturalization Benefit Application and Petition Fee Schedule. GAO-07-
946R. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2007.
Immigration Benefits: Sixteenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-07-796R. Washington, D.C.: April
27, 2007.
DHS Immigration Attorneys: Workload Analysis and Workforce Planning
Efforts Lack Data and Documentation. GAO-07-206. Washington, D.C.:
April 17, 2007.
Foreign Physicians: Data on Use of J-1 Visa Waivers Needed to Better
Address Physician Shortages. GAO-07-52. Washington, D.C.: November 30,
2006.
Immigration Benefits: Fifteenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-07-168R. Washington, D.C.:
November 9, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien
Files Are Located when Needed. GAO-07-85. Washington, D.C.: October 27,
2006.
Estimating the Undocumented Population: A "Grouped Answers" Approach to
Surveying Foreign-Born Respondents. GAO-06-775. Washington, D.C.:
September 29, 2006.
Executive Office for Immigration Review: Caseload Performance Reporting
Needs Improvement. GAO-06-771. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 2006.
H-1B Visa Program: More Oversight by Labor Can Improve Compliance with
Program Requirements. GAO-06-901T. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2006.
H-1B Visa Program: Labor Could Improve Its Oversight and Increase
Information Sharing with Homeland Security. GAO-06-720. Washington,
D.C.: June 22, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Circumstances under Which Petitioners' Sex
Offenses May Be Disclosed to Beneficiaries. GAO-06-735. Washington,
D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Fourteenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-06-589R. Washington, D.C.: April
21, 2006.
Information Technology: Near-Term Effort to Automate Paper-Based
Immigration Files Needs Planning Improvements. GAO-06-375. Washington,
D.C.: March 31, 2006.
International Remittances: Different Estimation Methodologies Produce
Different Results. GAO-06-210. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy
Could Enhance DHS' Ability to Control Benefit Fraud. GAO-06-259.
Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2006.
Social Security Administration: Procedures for Issuing Numbers and
Benefits to the Foreign-Born. GAO-06-253T. Washington, D.C.: March 2,
2006.
Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and
Ensure Quality of Adjudications. GAO-06-20. Washington, D.C.: November
21, 2005.
Immigration Benefits: Thirteenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-06-122R. Washington, D.C.:
October 21, 2005.
Taxpayer Information: Options Exist to Enable Data Sharing Between IRS
and USCIS but Each Presents Challenges. GAO-06-100. Washington, D.C.:
October 11, 2005.
Immigration Services: Better Contracting Practices Needed at Call
Centers. GAO-05-526. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Immigration Benefits: Twelfth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-05-481R. Washington, D.C.: April
14, 2005.
Immigrant Investors: Small Number of Participants Attributed to Pending
Regulations and Other Factors. GAO-05-256. Washington, D.C.: April 1,
2005.
Immigration Benefits: Eleventh Report Required by the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-04-1030R. Washington, D.C.:
August 13, 2004.
Taxpayer Information: Data Sharing and Analysis May Enhance Tax
Compliance and Improve Immigration Eligibility Decisions. GAO-04-972T.
Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2004.
Illegal Alien Schoolchildren: Issues in Estimating State-by-State
Costs. GAO-04-733. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2004.
Undocumented Aliens: Questions Persist about Their Impact on Hospitals'
Uncompensated Care Costs. GAO-04-472. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004.
Immigration Application Fees: Current Fees Are Not Sufficient to Fund
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Operations. GAO-04-309R.
Washington, D.C.: January 5, 2004.
Immigration Benefits: Tenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-04-189R. Washington, D.C.:
October 17, 2003.
Social Security Administration: Actions Taken to Strengthen Procedures
for Issuing Social Security Numbers to Noncitizens, but Some Weaknesses
Remain. GAO-04-12. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2003.
Social Security Numbers: Improved SSN Verification and Exchange of
States' Driver Records Would Enhance Identity Verification. GAO-03-920.
Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2003.
H-1B Foreign Workers: Better Tracking Needed to Help Determine H-1B
Program's Effects on U.S. Workforce. GAO-03-883. Washington, D.C.:
September 10, 2003.
Supplemental Security Income: SSA Could Enhance Its Ability to Detect
Residency Violations. GAO-03-724. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2003.
Immigration Benefits: Ninth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-03-681R. Washington, D.C.: April
21, 2003.
Aviation Security:
Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger
Prescreening Are Under Way, but Planning and Implementation Issues
Remain. GAO-07-346. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are
in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened. GAO-07-660. Washington,
D.C.: April 30, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA's Change to Its Prohibited Items List Has Not
Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of the
Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive. GAO-07-634R.
Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2007.
Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive
Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and
Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved. GAO-07-634.
Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007.
Aviation Security: Cost Estimates Related to TSA Funding of Checked
Baggage Screening Systems at Los Angeles and Ontario Airports. GAO-07-
445. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for
Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be
Systematically Reassessed. GAO-07-299. Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2007.
Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key
Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains. GAO-07-448T. Washington,
D.C.: February 13, 2007.
Transportation Security Administration: Oversight of Explosive
Detection Systems Maintenance Contracts Can Be Strengthened. GAO-06-
795. Washington D.C.: July 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D. C.: July
28, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, but Funding
Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006.
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation
Security Administration's Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-864T.
Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better
Management Controls Needed if Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying
Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made
Progress in Managing a Federal Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S.
Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T. Washington, D.C.: April
4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage
Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington, D.C.: April
4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private-Sector
Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166. Washington, D.
C.: March 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely
Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's
Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from
Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: November
28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air
Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority
of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.:
September 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. GAO-05-
781. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully
Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure Flight Program
Testing Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More
Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: July
13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: May
2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Impact of Using Commercial
Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.:
February 23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Prioritize
Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to Allow
Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening. GAO-05-126.
Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but
Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term
Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.
Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04-
785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Security Screening Contractors Have Little
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T.
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer-
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:
March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,
D.C.: February 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,
D.C.: February 12, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,
D.C.: February 12, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges
of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.
GAO-04-242. Washington, D. C.: November 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made
and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: September 24,
2003.
Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the
Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Address Security
Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003.
Surface Transportation Security:
Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination
Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-583T.
Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination
Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-459T.
Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination
Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-442T.
Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Leadership Needed to Prioritize and
Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-225T. Washington, D.C.: January 18,
2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk
Can Help Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-557T. Washington, D.C.: March
29, 2006.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-181T. Washington, D.C.:
October 20, 2005.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-05-851. Washington, D.C.:
September 9, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing
Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management. GAO-04-890.
Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004.
Surface Transportation: Many Factors Affect Investment Decisions. GAO-
04-744. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Rail Security: Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and Freight Rail
Security, but Significant Challenges Remain. GAO-04-598T. Washington,
D.C.: March 23, 2004.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security
Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security
Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and
Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments. GAO-03-502.
Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2003.
Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail
Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed. GAO-03-435. Washington, D.C.:
April 30, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. New York City: April 1, 2003.
Maritime Security:
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R.
Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port
Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but
Challenges Remain. GAO-07-681T. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in
Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March 28,
2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Liquefied Natural
Gas Spill Need Clarification. GAO-07-633T. Washington, D.C.: March 21,
2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Decision to Procure and Deploy the
Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by
Its Cost-Benefit Analysis. GAO-07-581T. Washington, D.C.: March 14,
2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the
National Laboratories' Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in
Support of DNDO's Testing and Development Program. GAO-07-347R.
Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on
a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07-316.
Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the
Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on
Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors'
Costs and Benefits. GAO-07-133R. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2006.
Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before
Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
Program. GAO-06-982. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.
Maritime Security: Information sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO-06-
933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations and Future
Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of
Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T.
Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation
Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain. GAO-
06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. GAO-05-
466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:
May 17, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment
Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts.
GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-
394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006
Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny
with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404. Washington,
D.C.: March 11, 2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:
January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime
Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.:
December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective
Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.:
September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate
Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868.
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning
Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing
Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March
31, 2004.
Coast Guard: Relationship between Resources Used and Results Achieved
Needs to Be Clearer. GAO-04-432. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2004.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require
Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,
D.C.: July 25, 2003.
Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor
Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions. GAO-03-544T.
Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003.
Emergency Preparedness and Response:
Preliminary Information on Rebuilding Efforts in the Gulf Coast. GAO-
07-809R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Emergency Management: Most School Districts Have Developed Emergency
Management Plans, but Would Benefit from Additional Federal Guidance.
GAO-07-609. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2007.
Emergency Management: Status of School Districts' Planning and
Preparedness. GAO-07-821T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington, D.C: May 15,
2007.
First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability. GAO-07-301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has Limitations,
and Development of a New Integrated System Will Be Challenging. GAO-07-
0411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of
Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007.
Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate
Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.: February
7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139.
Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify
Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44.
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region Strategic
Plan. GAO-06-1096T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the
Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed
to Reduce Such Problems in the Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington, D.C.:
September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery
Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2006.
Child Welfare: Federal Action Needed to Ensure States Have Plans to
Safeguard Children in the Child Welfare System Displaced by Disasters.
GAO-06-944. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance for
Health Facilities Should Be Addressed. GAO-06-826. Washington, D.C.:
July 20, 2006.
Purchase Cards: Control Weaknesses Leave DHS Highly Vulnerable to
Fraudulent, Improper, and Abusive Activity. GAO-06-957T. Washington,
D.C.: July 19, 2006.
Individual Disaster Assistance Programs: Framework for Fraud
Prevention, Detection, and Prosecution. GAO-06-954T. Washington, D.C.:
July 12, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA's
Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and
Abuse. GAO-06-655. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Improper and Potentially Fraudulent
Individual Assistance Payments Estimated to Be between $600 Million and
$1.4 Billion. GAO-06-844T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712.
Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.
U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate to
Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges
Remain. GAO-06-519. Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of
Vulnerable Populations due to Hurricanes and Other Disasters. GAO-06-
790T. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2006.
Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Could Improve Planning for
Use of Alternate Facilities and Telework during Disruptions. GAO-06-
713. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and
Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T.
Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Improving Federal Contracting Practices in Disaster
Recovery Operations. GAO-06-714T. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster
Recovery Contracts. GAO-06-622T. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed to
Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International
Assistance. GAO-06-460. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the National
Capital Region. GAO-06-559T. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006.
Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. GAO-06-461R. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:
March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA's
Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and
Abuse. GAO-06-403T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2006.
Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary
Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance. GAO-
06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Preliminary Observations on Contracting
for Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO-06-246T. Washington, D.C.:
November 8, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Recovery
Efforts. GAO-06-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Oversight and Management of the
National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-183T. Washington, D.C. October
20, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges Facing the National
Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-174T. Washington, D.C.: October 18,
2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to Enhance
Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-
06-119. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005.
Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation's Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery Activities. GAO-05-1053T. Washington, D.C.:
September 28, 2005.
Homeland Security: Managing First Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency
Preparedness in the National Capital Region. GAO-05-889T. Washington,
D.C.: July 14, 2005.
Flood Map Modernization: Federal Emergency Management Agency's
Implementation of a National Strategy. GAO-05-894T. Washington, D.C.:
July 12, 2005.
Homeland Security: DHS's Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2005.
National Flood Insurance Program: Oversight of Policy Issuance and
Claims. GAO-05-532T. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2005.
Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs and
Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-530T.
Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2005.
Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs Has
Improved, but Challenges Remain. GAO-05-121. Washington, D.C.: February
2, 2005.
Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental
Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable
Communications. GAO-04-740. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004.
Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the National
Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and
Performance Goals. GAO-04-433. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.
Project SAFECOM: Key Cross-Agency Emergency Communications Effort
Requires Stronger Collaboration. GAO-04-494. Washington, D.C.: April
16, 2004.
Flood Map Modernization: Program Strategy Shows Promise, but Challenges
Remain. GAO-04-417. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Continuity of Operations: Improved Planning Needed to Ensure Delivery
of Essential Government Services. GAO-04-160. Washington, D.C.:
February 27, 2004.
September 11: Overview of Federal Disaster Assistance to the New York
City Area. GAO-04-72. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2003.
Disaster Assistance: Information on FEMA's Post 9/11 Public Assistance
to the New York City Area. GAO-03-926. Washington, D.C.: August 29,
2003.
Flood Insurance: Challenges Facing the National Flood Insurance
Program. GAO-03-606T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection:
Information Technology: Homeland Security Information Network Needs to
Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Initiatives. GAO-07-
822T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2007.
Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to Support
Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and
Local Information sharing Initiatives. GAO-07-455. Washington, D.C.:
April 16, 2007.
DHS Multi-Agency Operation Centers Would Benefit from Taking Further
Steps to Enhance Collaboration and Coordination. GAO-07-686R.
Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure: Challenges Remain in Protecting Key Sectors.
GAO-07-626T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination
Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-583T.
Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate
Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.: February
7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/
7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies. GAO-07-89.
Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2006.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government
and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors' Characteristics. GAO-07-
39. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2006.
Information Security: Coordination of Federal Cyber Security Research
and Development. GAO-06-811. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Leadership Needed to Enhance
Cybersecurity. GAO-06-1087T. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS Is Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities,
but Additional Authority Is Needed. GAO-06-899T. Washington, D.C.: June
21, 2006.
Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint
Public/Private Recovery Plan. GAO-06-672. Washington, D.C.: June 16,
2006.
Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring the
Effectiveness of Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts. GAO-06-612.
Washington, D.C: May 31, 2006.
Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More Widespread
Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure
Information. GAO-06-383. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2006.
Securing Wastewater Facilities: Utilities Have Made Important Upgrades
but Further Improvements to Key System Components May Be Limited by
Costs and Other Constraints. GAO-06-390. Washington, D.C.: March 31,
2006.
Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies
and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but
Unclassified Information. GAO-06-385. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS Is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at Chemical
Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed. GAO-06-150. Washington,
D.C.: January 27, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Addressing
Cybersecurity. GAO-05-827T. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2005.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security
Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities. GAO-05-
434. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Protection of Chemical and Water Infrastructure: Federal Requirements,
Actions of Selected Facilities, and Remaining Challenges. GAO-05-327.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a
Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain. GAO-05-214.
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2005.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information Sharing with
Infrastructure Sectors. GAO-04-780. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2004.
Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure
Protection. GAO-04-321. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Establishing Effective Information
Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors. GAO-04-699T. Washington, D.C.:
April 21, 2004.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to Secure
Control Systems. GAO-04-628T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to Secure
Control Systems. GAO-04-354. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2004.
Posthearing Questions from the September 17, 2003, Hearing on
Implications of Power Blackouts for the Nation's Cybersecurity and
Critical Infrastructure Protection: The Electric Grid, Critical
Interdependencies, Vulnerabilities, and Readiness. GAO-04-300R.
Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2003.
Drinking Water: Experts' Views on How Future Federal Funding Can Best
Be Spent to Improve Security. GAO-04-29. Washington, D.C.: October 31,
2003.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Securing Control
Systems. GAO-04-140T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2003.
Information Security: Progress Made, But Challenges Remain to Protect
Federal Systems and the Nation's Critical Infrastructures. GAO-03-564T.
Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2003.
Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical
Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness Is Unknown. GAO-03-
439. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2003.
Science and Technology:
Department of Homeland Security: Science and Technology Directorate's
Expenditure Plan. GAO-07-868. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Decision to Procure and Deploy the
Next Generation of Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by Its Cost-
Benefit Analysis. GAO-07-581T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the
National Laboratories' Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in
Support of DNDO's Testing and Development Program. GAO-07-347R.
Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management
Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate. GAO-06-206.
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the
Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on
Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors'
Costs and Benefits. GAO-07-133R. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and
Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities
Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-1015. Washington, D.C.: September 21,
2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation
Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain. GAO-
06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination
Problem Challenge U.S. Effort to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment
to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.
Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing
Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management. GAO-04-890.
Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's Laboratories for
Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response
Technologies. GAO-04-653. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2004.
Acquisition Management:
Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and
Management and Efforts to Address Them. GAO-07-874. Washington, D.C.:
June 18, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress and Challenges in
Implementing the Department's Acquisition Oversight Plan. GAO-07-900.
Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges in Creating an
Effective Acquisition Organization. GAO-07-948T. Washington, D.C.:
June 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland
Security's Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard's Deepwater
Program. GAO-07-453T. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2007.
Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight
Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks. GAO-
06-996. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition
Organization. GAO-06-1012T. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006.
Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts.
GAO-06-764. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006.
Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Appear Sound, and Program Management
Has Improved, But Continued Monitoring Is Warranted. GAO-06-546.
Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006.
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater
Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. GAO-05-651T.
Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Create
an Effective Acquisition Organization. GAO-05-179. Washington, D.C.:
March 29, 2005.
Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Promote Successful Use of
Special DHS Acquisition Authority. GAO-05-136. Washington, D.C.:
December 15, 2004.
Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed. GAO-
04-695. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004.
Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs Increased
Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. GAO-04-380.
Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004.
Contract Management: INS Contracting Weaknesses Need Attention from the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-03-799. Washington, D.C.: July 25,
2003.
Financial Management:
Purchase Cards: Control Weaknesses Leave DHS Highly Vulnerable to
Fraudulent, Improper, and Abusive Activity. GAO-06-1117. Washington,
D.C.: September 28, 2006.
Internal Control: Analysis of Joint Study on Estimating the Costs and
Benefits of Rendering Opinions on Internal Control over Financial
Reporting in the Federal Environment. GAO-06-255R. Washington, D.C.:
September 6, 2006.
Financial Management: Challenges Continue in Meeting Requirements of
the Improper Payments Information Act. GAO-06-581T. Washington, D.C.:
April 5, 2006.
Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an Opportunity to Incorporate
Best Practices in Modernization Efforts. GAO-06-553T. Washington, D.C.:
March 29, 2006.
Financial Management Systems: Additional Efforts Needed to Address Key
Causes of Modernization Failures. GAO-06-184. Washington, D.C.: March
15, 2006.
Financial Management: Challenges Remain in Meeting Requirements of the
Improper Payments Information Act. GAO-06-482T. Washington, D.C.: March
9, 2006.
CFO Act of 1990: Driving the Transformation of Federal Financial
Management. GAO-06-242T. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005.
Financial Management: Achieving FFMIA Compliance Continues to Challenge
Agencies. GAO-05-881. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2005.
Financial Audit: The Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2004
Management Representation Letter on Its Financial Statements. GAO-05-
600R. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005.
Financial Management: Challenges in Meeting Requirements of the
Improper Payments Information Act. GAO-05-417. Washington, D.C.: March
31, 2005.
Financial Management: Effective Internal Control Is Key to
Accountability. GAO-05-321T. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2005.
Financial Management: Improved Financial Systems Are Key to FFMIA
Compliance. GAO-05-20. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2004:
Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces Significant
Financial Management Challenges. GAO-04-774. Washington, D.C.: July 19,
2004.
Department of Homeland Security: Financial Management Challenges. GAO-
04-945T. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2004.
Financial Management: Recurring Financial Systems Problems Hinder FFMIA
Compliance. GAO-04-209T. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2003:
Department of Homeland Security: Challenges and Steps in Establishing
Sound Financial Management. GAO-03-1134T. Washington, D.C.: September
10, 2003.
Human Capital Management:
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10,
2007.
Homeland Security: Information on Training New Border Patrol Agents.
GAO-07-540R. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.:
February 7, 2007.
Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations. GAO-07-139.
Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training
Important for Successful Transformation. GAO-05-888. Washington, D.C.:
September 23, 2005.
Human Capital: Observations on Final DHS Human Capital Regulations.
GAO-05-391T. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005.
Human Capital: DHS Faces Challenges In Implementing Its New Personnel
System. GAO-04-790. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004.
Human Capital: DHS Personnel System Design Effort Provides for
Collaboration and Employee Participation. GAO-03-1099. Washington,
D.C.: September 30, 2003.
Information Technology Management:
Homeland Security: DHS Enterprise Architecture Continues to Evolve but
Improvements Needed. GAO-07-564. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007.
Information Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Define and Implement
Policies and Procedures for Effectively Managing Investments. GAO-07-
424. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007.
Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified. GAO-07-278.
Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Enterprise Architecture: Leadership Remains Key to Establishing and
Leveraging Architectures for Organizational Transformation. GAO-06-
831. Washington, D.C.: August 14, 2006.
Information Technology: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Is
Beginning to Address Infrastructure Modernization Program Weaknesses,
but Key Improvements Still Needed. GAO-06-823. Washington, D.C.: July
27, 2006.
Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated
Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing Management
Challenges and New Risks. GAO-06-580. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Homeland Security Progress Continues but Challenges Remain on
Department's Management of Information Technology. GAO-06-598T.
Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006.
Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on Immigration
and Customs Enforcement's Infrastructure Modernization Program. GAO-
05-805. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005.
Information Security: Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully
Implement Its Security Program. GAO-05-700. Washington, D.C: June 17,
2005.
Information Security: Department of Homeland Security Faces Challenges
in Fulfilling Statutory Requirements. GAO-05-567T. Washington, D.C.:
April 14, 2005.
Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment
Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements Continues.
GAO-05-267. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005.
Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program. GAO-05-
202. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.
Department of Homeland Security: Formidable Information and Technology
Management Challenge Requires Institutional Approach. GAO-04-702.
Washington, D.C.: August 27, 2004.
Homeland Security: Efforts Under Way to Develop Enterprise
Architecture, but Much Work Remains. GAO-04-777. Washington, D.C.:
August 6, 2004.
Information Technology: Homeland Security Should Better Balance Need
for System Integration Strategy with Spending for New and Enhanced
Systems. GAO-04-509. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004.
Information Technology: Early Releases of Customs Trade System
Operating, but Pattern of Cost and Schedule Problems Needs to Be
Addressed. GAO-04-719. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2004.
Information Technology: OMB and Department of Homeland Security
Investment Reviews. GAO-04-323. Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2004.
Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security
Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-03-1083. Washington, D.C.: September
19, 2003.
Information Technology: A Framework for Assessing and Improving
Enterprise Architecture Management (Version 1.1). GAO-03-584G.
Washington, D.C.: April 2003.
Real Property Management:
Federal Real Property: DHS Has Made Progress, but Additional Actions
Are Needed to Address Real Property Management and Security Challenges.
GAO-07-658. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2007.
General Reports:
Homeland Security: Guidance from Operations Directorate Will Enhance
Collaboration among Departmental Operations Centers. GAO-07-683T.
Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10,
2007.
DHS Privacy Office: Progress Made but Challenges Remain in Notifying
and Reporting to the Public. GAO-07-522. Washington, D.C.: April 27,
2007.
Transportation Security: DHS Efforts to Eliminate Redundant Background
Check Investigations, GAO-07-756. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Observations on GAO Access to
Information on Programs and Activities. GAO-07-700T. Washington, D.C.:
April 25, 2007.
DHS Multi-Agency Operation Centers Would Benefit from Taking Further
Steps to Enhance Collaboration and Coordination. GAO-07-686R.
Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.:
February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-398T. Washington, D.C.:
February 6, 2007.
Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the
Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed
to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.:
January 24, 2007.
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects
on the Public. GAO-06-1031. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.
Combating Terrorism: Determining and Reporting Federal Funding Data.
GAO-06-161. Washington, D.C; January 17, 2006.
Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security
Management Challenges. GAO-05-573T. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005.
Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS's Planning Process
Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability. GAO-05-300. Washington,
D.C.: March 31, 2005.
September 11: Recent Estimates of Fiscal Impact of 2001 Terrorist
Attack on New York. GAO-05-269. Washington, D.C; March 30, 2005.
Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained Approach
Needed to Achieve Management Integration. GAO-05-139. Washington, D.C;
March 16, 2005.
Homeland Security: Observations on the National Strategies Related to
Terrorism. GAO-04-1075T. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2004.
Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance
Emergency Preparedness. GAO-04-1009. Washington, D.C.: September 15,
2004.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11
Commission's Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.:
September 14, 2004.
9/11 Commission Report: Reorganization, Transformation, and
Information Sharing. GAO-04-1033T. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2004.
The Chief Operating Officer Concept and its Potential Use as a Strategy
to Improve Management at the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-04-
876R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004.
Homeland Security: Communication Protocols and Risk Communication
Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory System. GAO-04-682.
Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004.
Transfer of Budgetary Resources to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). GAO-04-329R. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally
Chartered Commissions and GAO. GAO-04-591. Washington, D.C.: March 31,
2004.
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges,
and Key Management Issues. GAO-03-1165T. Washington, D.C.: September
17, 2003.
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges,
and Key Management Issues. GAO-03-715T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2003.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Examples of nonhomeland security functions include Coast Guard
search and rescue and naturalization services.
[2] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress,
GAO-07-235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).
[3] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2003).
[4] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005) and GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310
(Washington, D.C.: January 2007).
[5] GAO-05-207 and GAO-07-310.
[6] GAO, GAO's High-Risk Program, GAO-06-497T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
15, 2006) and GAO-07-310.
[7] GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
[8] Implemented Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 2405, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
[9] This report also addresses our mandate at section 477(d)(2) of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135,
2210-11.
[10] Our subject matter experts are individuals within GAO who have
directed and managed work related to the DHS mission and management
areas.
[11] We focused these mission areas primarily on DHS's homeland
security-related functions. We did not consider the Secret Service,
domestic counterterrorism, intelligence activities, or trade
enforcement functions because (1) GAO and the DHS Office of Inspector
General have completed limited work in these areas; (2) there are few,
if any, requirements identified for the Secret Service's mission and
for DHS's role in domestic counterterrorism and intelligence (the
Department of Justice serves as the lead agency for most
counterterrorism initiatives); and (3) we address DHS actions that
could be considered part of domestic counterterrorism and intelligence
in other areas, such as aviation security, critical infrastructure and
key resources protection, and border security.
[12] A performance goal is the target level of performance expressed as
a tangible, measurable objective against which actual achievement will
be compared. A performance measure can be defined as an indicator,
statistic, or metric used to gauge program performance.
[13] Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
[14] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[15] Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
[16] Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002).
[17] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[18] We reviewed various effective practices reports for each
management area. For acquisition management, we reviewed GAO, Best
Practices: Taking a Strategic Approach Could Improve DOD's Acquisition
of Services, GAO-02-230 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2002); GAO, 2010
Census: Census Bureau Generally Follows Selected Leading Acquisition
Planning Practices, but Continued Management Attention Is Needed to
Help Ensure Success, GAO-06-277 (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2006); and
GAO, A Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal
Agencies, GAO-05-218G (Washington, D.C.: September 2005). For financial
management, we reviewed GAO, Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an
Opportunity to Incorporate Best Practices in Modernization Efforts,
GAO-06-553T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006). For human capital, we
reviewed GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management,
GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002); GAO, Managing for
Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management to Drive
Transformational Change, GAO-02-940T (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002);
GAO, Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders,
GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington, D.C: September 2000); and GAO, Department
of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training Important for
Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23,
2005). For information technology, we reviewed GAO, Homeland Security:
Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on Department's Management of
Information Technology, GAO-06-598T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006);
GAO, Enterprise Architecture: Leadership Remains Key to Establishing
and Leveraging Architectures for Organizational Transformation,
GAO-06-831 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2006); GAO, Department of
Homeland Security: Formidable Information and Technology Management
Challenge Requires Institutional Approach, GAO-04-702 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 27, 2004); GAO, Maximizing the Success of Chief Information
Officers, GAO-01-376G (Washington, D.C.: February 2001); and GAO,
Improving Mission Performance through Strategic Information Management
and Technology, GAO/AIMD-94-115 (Washington, D.C.: May 1994).
[19] These 22 agencies, offices, and programs were U.S. Customs
Service; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; Federal
Protective Service; Transportation Security Administration; Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center; Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service; Office for Domestic Preparedness; Federal Emergency Management
Agency; Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical
System; Nuclear Incident Response Team; Domestic Emergency Support
Team; National Domestic Preparedness Office; Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures Program; Environmental
Measures Laboratory; National BW Defense Analysis Center; Plum Island
Animal Disease Center; Federal Computer Incident Response Center;
National Communication System; National Infrastructure Protection
Center; Energy Security and Assurance Program; Secret Service; and U.S.
Coast Guard.
[20] The amounts reflect total budget authority amounts as reported to
us by DHS. The amounts include annual and supplemental appropriations,
rescissions, amounts reprogrammed or transferred, fee estimates, and
mandatory amounts. The amounts do not reflect carryover or rescissions
of unobligated balances.
[21] See Pub. L. No. 109-295, §§ 601-99, 120 Stat. 1355, 1394-1463
(2006).
[22] We did not include DHS's trade enforcement functions, such as
export enforcement, in our review because we have completed limited
work in this area.
[23] DHS undertakes these efforts in accordance with the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101
et seq.
[24] The Stafford Act is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et
seq.
[25] Other departments have major roles in critical infrastructure and
key resource protection as well. For example, the Department of Defense
is active in this mission area, primarily in areas of physical security
of military and military-related activities, installations, and
personnel. The Department of Energy's role involves the development and
implementation of policies and procedures for safeguarding the nation's
power plants, research labs, weapons production facilities, and cleanup
sites from terrorists. The Department of Justice, primarily through
work done by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Computer Crime
and Intellectual Property Section of the Criminal Division, is active
in this mission area in preventing, where possible, the exploitation of
the Internet, computer systems, or networks as the principal
instruments or targets of terrorist organizations.
[26] The National Infrastructure Protection Plan defines the
responsibility of Sector-Specific Agencies as to implement the plan's
framework and guidance as tailored to the specific characteristics and
risk landscapes of each of the critical infrastructure and key
resources sectors designated in Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7.
[27] Implemented Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 2405, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
[28] The performance expectations we identified for DHS in this report
do not represent performance goals or measures for the department. We
define performance expectations as a composite of the responsibilities
or functions, derived from legislation, homeland security presidential
directives and executive orders, DHS planning documents, and other
sources, that the department is to address in implementing efforts in
its mission and management areas.
[29] The performance expectations we identified for DHS in this report
do not represent performance goals or measures for the department. We
define performance expectations as a composite of the responsibilities
or functions, derived from legislation, homeland security presidential
directives and executive orders, DHS planning documents, and other
sources, that the department is to address in implementing efforts in
its mission and management areas.
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