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Chief Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership' 
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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

September 2007: 

Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success Requires a Chief 
Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership: 

Defense Business Transformation: 

GAO-07-1072: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-1072, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2005, GAO added the Department of Defense’s (DOD) approach to 
business transformation to its high-risk list because (1) DOD’s 
improvement efforts were fragmented, (2) DOD lacked an integrated and 
enterprisewide business transformation plan, and (3) DOD had not 
designated a senior official at the right level with the right 
authority to be responsible for overall business transformation 
efforts. This report assesses (1) the progress DOD has made in setting 
up a management framework for overall business transformation efforts 
and (2) the challenges DOD faces in maintaining and ensuring the 
success of those efforts. GAO conducted this work under the Comptroller 
General’s authority to conduct evaluations under his own initiative. In 
conducting its work, GAO compared DOD’s actions to key practices of 
successful transformations. 

What GAO Found: 

Although DOD has made progress toward establishing a management 
framework for overall business transformation, the framework currently 
focuses on business systems modernization and does not fully address 
broader business transformation efforts. In 2005, DOD set up the 
Defense Business Systems Management Committee to review and approve the 
business enterprise architecture—a transformation blueprint—and new 
business systems modernization investments. It also established the 
Business Transformation Agency, which currently reports to the Vice 
Chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, to 
coordinate and lead business transformation across the department. 
Despite these steps, DOD has not clearly defined or institutionalized 
interrelationships, roles and responsibilities, or accountability for 
establishing a management framework for overall business 
transformation. For example, differences of opinion exist within DOD 
about the roles of various senior leadership committees. Until DOD’s 
business transformation management framework is institutionalized and 
encompasses broad responsibilities for all aspects of business 
transformation, it will be challenging for DOD to integrate related 
initiatives into a sustainable, enterprisewide approach to successfully 
resolve weaknesses in business operations that GAO has shown are at 
high risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. 

DOD also must overcome two critical challenges, among several others, 
if it is to maintain and ensure success. Specifically, DOD does not 
have (1) a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide plan or set of 
linked plans, supported by a planning process that sets a strategic 
direction for overall business transformation efforts, prioritizes 
initiatives and resources, and monitors progress, and (2) a full-time 
leadership position at the right level dedicated solely to the 
planning, integration, and execution of overall business transformation 
efforts. A broad-based consensus exists among GAO and others, including 
the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Defense Business Board, that 
the status quo is unacceptable and that DOD needs a CMO to provide 
leadership over business transformation efforts. In a May 2007 letter 
to Congress, however, DOD stated its view that a separate position is 
not needed as the Deputy Secretary of Defense can fulfill the CMO role. 
Although the Deputy Secretary may be at the right level with 
appropriate authority to transform business operations, the demands 
placed on this position make it difficult for the Deputy Secretary to 
focus solely on business transformation—nor does the position have the 
necessary term of appointment to sustain progress across 
administrations. Further, DOD plans to leave the assignment of the CMO 
role to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. In GAO’s view, 
codifying the CMO position in statute as a separate, full-time position 
at the right level with an extended term is necessary to provide 
sustained leadership, further DOD’s progress, and address challenges 
the department continues to face in its business transformation 
efforts. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD: 
(1) institutionalize an expanded management framework and (2) develop a 
planning process that results in an integrated and enterprisewide plan 
or set of plans. Congress should consider enacting legislation to 
establish a chief management officer (CMO) at DOD. DOD generally agreed 
with GAO’s recommendations, but did not agree with the matter for 
Congress. GAO continues to believe that DOD needs a CMO, established in 
statute, to provide focus and sustained leadership. 

[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1072]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Has Made Progress in Establishing a Management Framework upon Which 
to Develop Overall Business Transformation, but the Framework Focuses 
on Business Systems Modernization: 

Two Critical Challenges Affect DOD's Success in Maintaining and 
Furthering Its Progress in Overall Business Transformation: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Table: 

Table 1: Years When Specific DOD Areas on GAO's 2007 High-Risk List 
Were First Designated as High Risk: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

September 5, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars to maintain 
key business operations intended to support the warfighter, including 
systems and processes related to the management of contracts, finances, 
the supply chain, support infrastructure, and weapons systems 
acquisition. However, we have reported for years that weaknesses in 
these business operations result in billions of dollars being wasted, 
reduced efficiencies, ineffective performance, inadequate 
accountability, and lack of transparency.[Footnote 1] Currently, DOD 
bears responsibility, in whole or in part, for 15 of the federal 
government's 27 programs or activities that we have identified as being 
at high risk of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. Specifically, 
in 2005, we identified DOD's approach to overall business 
transformation as a high-risk area because (1) DOD's improvement 
efforts and control over resources are fragmented, (2) DOD lacks an 
integrated and enterprisewide business transformation plan, and (3) DOD 
has not designated a senior official at the right level with the right 
authority to be responsible and accountable for business 
transformation. Accordingly, DOD's business area weaknesses result in 
inadequate accountability to Congress and the American people, wasting 
billions of dollars each year at a time when DOD is competing for 
resources in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment. Our 
nation is not only threatened by external security threats but also 
from within by growing fiscal imbalances primarily due to our aging 
population and rising health care costs. As a result, it is important 
that DOD get the most from every dollar it invests. 

We have long advocated the need for a chief management officer (CMO) at 
DOD with significant authority and experience and a term of office that 
would focus the necessary attention on enterprisewide business 
transformation and sustain progress across administrations. Within DOD, 
business transformation is broad, encompassing people, planning, 
management, structures, technology, and processes in several key 
business areas. Our previous work has shown that two key practices--a 
comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide plan and focused and 
sustained leadership--are at the center of successful organizational 
transformation.[Footnote 2] These practices can serve as a basis for 
federal agencies such as DOD, which seek to transform their cultures 
and business operations, to become more results-oriented, customer- 
focused, and collaborative in nature. The Deputy Secretary of Defense 
establishes the overall strategic direction and priorities for business 
transformation, according to a DOD directive. Recent initiatives 
started under the Deputy Secretary's leadership hold potential to 
improve DOD's business operations; however, concerns remain about DOD's 
ability to sustain and ensure the success of overall business 
transformation efforts and related management reform initiatives across 
administrations in the absence of a CMO who is focused full time and 
over the long term on defense business transformation efforts. 

The Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act directed DOD to 
commission one or two studies on the feasibility and advisability of 
establishing a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management to serve as a 
CMO at DOD, and required the results of each study to be reported to 
Congress.[Footnote 3] The studies were to examine the effects of 
establishing a CMO, the appropriate relationship between the CMO and 
other defense officials, and the appropriate term of service. The 
Institute for Defense Analyses and the Defense Business Board conducted 
CMO studies at the behest of DOD and concluded that a CMO in some form 
was needed at the department to focus on integration and enterprisewide 
business transformation. In a May 11, 2007, letter to Congress, 
however, DOD recommended that the Deputy Secretary of Defense serve as 
the CMO for the department and further stated that DOD would formalize 
the Deputy Secretary's CMO role and transformation duties in a DOD 
directive. As of July 2007, both the House and Senate Armed Services 
Committees had introduced legislation that would require DOD to provide 
increased leadership and direction over its business transformation 
efforts. While each committee has taken a different approach, both 
committees agree that the status quo at DOD is unacceptable. 

We performed this review under the authority of the Comptroller General 
to conduct evaluations on his own initiative to contribute to the 
ongoing discussion on the need for overall business transformation and 
a CMO at DOD. Specifically, our two objectives were to assess (1) the 
progress DOD has made in establishing a management framework for 
overall business transformation and (2) the challenges DOD faces in 
maintaining and ensuring the success of those efforts. 

To assess the progress DOD has made in its business transformation 
efforts, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents and plans, 
interviewed key DOD senior leaders and defense experts, and reviewed 
current literature about the department's business transformation 
efforts. These included DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, updates 
to DOD's enterprise transition plan, DOD's annual reports on business 
transformation to Congress, and meeting minutes and briefing documents 
from various DOD boards and committees. To assess the challenges DOD 
faces in maintaining and building upon this progress, we reviewed 
documentation and interviewed DOD officials involved in DOD's business 
transformation efforts. We also compared DOD progress against key 
practices we have found to be at the center of successful 
organizational mergers and transformations.[Footnote 4] See appendix I 
of this report for a more detailed discussion of our scope and 
methodology. We conducted our work from September 2006 through July 
2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

Results in Brief: 

Although DOD has made progress toward establishing a management 
framework upon which to develop overall business transformation, the 
framework currently focuses on business systems modernization and does 
not fully address broader business transformation efforts. As part of 
its progress, the department has established new entities and developed 
various tools and plans for these entities to use in managing its 
business systems modernization efforts. For example, DOD established 
the Defense Business Systems Management Committee to review and approve 
the defense business enterprise architecture--a transformation 
blueprint--and the obligation of funds for defense systems 
modernization. Further, DOD established the Business Transformation 
Agency to support the committee by, for example, coordinating and 
leading business transformation across the department. Despite these 
steps, DOD has not clearly defined or institutionalized 
interrelationships, roles and responsibilities, or accountability for 
establishing a management framework for overall business 
transformation. For example, differences of opinion within DOD exist 
regarding which of the various senior leadership committees within the 
department will function as the primary body responsible for overall 
business transformation. Until DOD's business transformation management 
framework is institutionalized and encompasses broad responsibilities 
for all aspects of business transformation, it will be challenging for 
DOD to integrate related initiatives into a sustainable, enterprisewide 
approach and to successfully resolve weaknesses in business operations 
that we have shown are at high risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. 

DOD must overcome two critical challenges if it is to maintain and 
build upon the progress it has made toward achieving overall business 
transformation. First, DOD does not have a comprehensive, integrated, 
and departmentwide plan or set of linked plans supported by a planning 
process that sets a strategic direction for overall business 
transformation. This plan or set of plans should cover all key business 
functions and contain results-oriented goals, measures, and 
expectations that link organizational, unit, and individual performance 
goals, and also clearly link to DOD's overall investment plans. Second, 
DOD lacks a full-time leadership position at the right level dedicated 
solely to the planning, integration, and execution of business 
transformation efforts. Without this dedicated leadership, DOD's 
progress on business transformation is at risk of not being able to 
sustain and ensure the success of overall business transformation 
efforts across administrations. A broad-based consensus exists among 
GAO and others, including the Institute for Defense Analyses and the 
Defense Business Board, that the status quo is unacceptable and that 
DOD needs a CMO to provide leadership over business transformation 
efforts, although there are different views concerning the 
characteristics of a CMO, such as whether the position should be 
codified in statute, established as a separate position from the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, designated as Executive Level II or Level III, 
subject to a term appointment, or supported by a deputy CMO. In a May 
2007 letter to Congress, however, DOD outlined its position that the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense be designated as the CMO and plans to 
formalize this in a DOD directive. The department's letter also stated 
that codifying the CMO duties would restrict the flexibility of future 
Presidents and Secretaries of Defense to build an integrated management 
team. Although the Deputy Secretary may be at the right level with 
appropriate authority to transform business operations, the demands 
placed on this position make it difficult for the Deputy to focus 
solely on business transformation--and the position does not have the 
necessary term in office to sustain progress across administrations. 

We recommend that DOD institutionalize in directives the roles, 
responsibilities, and relationships among various business-related 
entities and committees and expand its management framework to capture 
overall business transformation efforts, rather than just business 
systems. In official comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed 
with this recommendation and stated that the department is a strong 
advocate for institutionalizing in directives the functions, 
responsibilities, authorities, and relationships of its principal 
officials and the management processes they oversee. We also recommend 
that DOD develop a comprehensive, strategic planning process for 
business transformation that results in a comprehensive, integrated, 
and enterprisewide plan or set of plans. DOD partially concurred with 
this recommendation, stating that the department has already begun to 
expand the scope of the enterprise transition plan to become a more 
robust enterprisewide planning document and to evolve this plan into 
the centerpiece strategic document for transformation. 

DOD did not agree with the matter for congressional consideration 
regarding the creation of a separate CMO position at DOD, stating that 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense is to be designated as the CMO, and 
that an internal directive is being revised to that effect. Among other 
things, DOD stated that the Deputy Secretary has sufficient officials 
available to help manage the department and the authority necessary to 
refine DOD's management structure to continue business management 
reform and integrate transformation activities. Further, DOD stated 
that establishing an additional official at the under secretary level 
to lead business transformation would generate dysfunctional 
competition among the five other Under Secretaries by creating 
confusion and redundancy in their roles and responsibilities. We 
recognize that the Deputy Secretary has officials and institutional 
structures available to support the transformation process; however, 
transformation cannot be achieved through a committee approach. 
Ultimately, a person at the right level, with the right type of 
experience, in a full-time position with a term appointment, and with 
the proper amount of responsibility, authority, and accountability, is 
needed to lead the effort. Further, contrary to DOD's view, we believe 
the establishment of a separate CMO position would bring leadership, 
accountability, focus and direction to the department's efforts rather 
than creating competition and causing confusion. The CMO would not 
assume the responsibilities of the Under Secretaries of Defense or any 
other officials. Rather, the CMO would be responsible and accountable 
for planning, integrating, and executing the department's overall 
business transformation effort, and would be able to give full-time 
attention to business transformation. We believe DOD's position 
essentially represents the status quo and will, in fact, not adequately 
address the long-standing management weaknesses in DOD's business 
operations. In the interest of the department and American taxpayers, 
DOD needs a CMO to help transform its key business operations and avoid 
billions of dollars in waste each year. We, therefore, continue to 
believe that Congress should consider enacting legislation to establish 
a CMO to provide full-time focus and sustained leadership attention to 
DOD's business transformation efforts, and have retained the matter in 
our report. DOD's comments and our evaluation are discussed in detail 
in a later section of this report, and the department's comments are 
reprinted in appendix II. 

Background: 

DOD is perhaps the largest and most complex organization in the world 
and spends billions of dollars each year to maintain key business 
operations intended to support the warfighter, including systems and 
processes related to the management of contracts, finances, the supply 
chain, support infrastructure, and weapons systems acquisition. We have 
reported for years that inefficiencies in these business operations 
result in reduced efficiencies, ineffective performance, inadequate 
accountability, and lack of transparency. Despite various reform 
initiatives, DOD continues to face weaknesses in business operations 
that not only adversely affect the reliability of reported financial 
data, but also the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DOD's 
operations. 

To address long-standing management problems, we began our "high-risk" 
program in 1990 to identify and help resolve serious weaknesses in 
areas that involve substantial resources and provide critical services 
to the public. Historically, high-risk areas have been designated 
because of traditional vulnerabilities related to their greater 
susceptibility to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. As our high- 
risk program has evolved, we have increasingly used the high-risk 
designation to draw attention to areas associated with broad-based 
transformation needed to achieve greater economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness, accountability, and sustainability of selected key 
government programs and operations. For example, we first added DOD's 
overall approach to business transformation to our high-risk list in 
2005 because DOD had not taken the necessary steps to achieve and 
sustain business reform on a broad, strategic, departmentwide, and 
integrated basis. Furthermore, DOD continues to dominate the high-risk 
list. Specifically, DOD currently bears responsibility, in whole or in 
part, for 15 of our 27 high-risk areas. Of the 15 high-risk areas, the 
8 DOD-specific high-risk areas cut across all of DOD's major business 
areas. Table 1 lists the 8 DOD-specific high-risk areas. Also, as shown 
in table 1, many of these management challenges have been on the high- 
risk list for a decade or more. In addition, DOD shares responsibility 
for 7 governmentwide high-risk areas.[Footnote 5] Collectively, these 
high-risk areas relate to most of DOD's major business operations that 
directly support the warfighter, including how servicemembers get paid, 
the benefits provided to their families, and the availability and 
condition of the equipment they use both on and off the battlefield. 

Table 1: Years When Specific DOD Areas on GAO's 2007 High-Risk List 
Were First Designated as High Risk: 

Area: DOD approach to business transformation; 
Year designated as high risk: 2005. 

Area: DOD personnel security clearance program; 
Year designated as high risk: 2005. 

Area: DOD support infrastructure management; 
Year designated as high risk: 1997. 

Area: DOD business systems modernization; 
Year designated as high risk: 1995. 

Area: DOD financial management; 
Year designated as high risk: 1995. 

Area: DOD contract management; 
Year designated as high risk: 1992. 

Area: DOD supply chain management; 
Year designated as high risk: 1990. 

Area: DOD weapons systems acquisition; 
Year designated as high risk: 1990. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Congress passed legislation that codified many of our prior 
recommendations related to DOD business systems modernization; this 
includes the establishment of various bodies and plans. Also as 
required by Congress, DOD commissioned studies examining the 
feasibility and advisability of establishing a CMO to oversee the 
department's business transformation process. As part of this effort, 
the Defense Business Board, an advisory panel, examined various options 
and, in May 2006, endorsed the CMO concept. In December 2006, the 
Institute for Defense Analyses also endorsed the need for a CMO 
position at DOD. In May 2007, DOD submitted a letter to Congress 
outlining its position regarding a CMO at DOD, stating that the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense should assume the CMO responsibilities. 

DOD Has Made Progress in Establishing a Management Framework upon Which 
to Develop Overall Business Transformation, but the Framework Focuses 
on Business Systems Modernization: 

Although DOD has made progress in establishing a management framework 
upon which to develop overall business transformation efforts, this 
framework currently focuses on business systems modernization rather 
than broader business transformation efforts. Congress included 
provisions in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 
2005 and 2006[Footnote 6] to assist DOD in addressing financial 
management and business systems modernization challenges--two of our 
high-risk areas--and DOD's leadership has taken steps to comply with 
these provisions. For example, to improve financial management, DOD 
issued the initial Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan in 
December 2005, which was last updated in June 2007, to guide financial 
improvement and financial audit efforts within the department. Also, to 
address its business systems modernization challenges, DOD has 
established the following: 

* Defense Business Systems Management Committee: The Ronald W. Reagan 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 required DOD to 
set up a committee to review and approve major updates of the defense 
business enterprise architecture--or transformation blueprint--and the 
obligation of funds for defense systems modernization. Prior to the 
enactment of this legislation, we reported that DOD had not established 
a governance structure and the process controls needed to ensure 
ownership and accountability of business systems investments.[Footnote 
7] Subsequently, Congress directed DOD to establish the Defense 
Business Systems Management Committee to oversee DOD business 
transformation. In February 2005, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
chartered the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, which 
consists of senior defense military and civilian leaders. The Deputy 
Secretary of Defense serves as the chair of this committee and the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
serves as the vice chair of the committee. The committee is intended to 
establish strategic direction and plans for DOD's business mission, 
oversee implementation of systemic performance in DOD's business 
operations, approve business transformation plans and initiatives, 
ensure that funds are obligated for defense business systems 
modernization in accordance with the law, and recommend policies and 
procedures to the Secretary of Defense that enable efficient business 
operations throughout DOD. 

* Investment review boards: The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act also required DOD to set up investment review boards 
to evaluate systems' consistency with the business enterprise 
architecture and to provide oversight of the investment review process 
for business systems. Prior to the establishment of investment review 
boards, we had reported that billions of dollars were being spent on 
business systems investments with little oversight.[Footnote 8] DOD 
established the investment review boards in 2005 to serve as the 
oversight and investment decision-making bodies for business system 
investments in their respective areas of responsibility. These boards 
assess modernization investments over$1 million and determine how the 
investments will improve processes and support the warfighter. 

* Business Transformation Agency: DOD established the Business 
Transformation Agency in October 2005 with the intent for it to support 
the Defense Business Systems Management Committee and coordinate 
business transformation by ensuring adoption of DOD-wide information 
and process standards as defined in the business enterprise 
architecture. The Business Transformation Agency reports to the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in his 
capacity as the vice chair of the Defense Business Systems Management 
Committee. The Business Transformation Agency's charter includes 
responsibilities such as identifying urgent warfighter needs that can 
be addressed by business solutions, articulating the strategic vision 
for business transformation, exercising executive oversight for DOD- 
wide programs, and implementing plans and tools needed to achieve DOD 
business transformation. 

In addition, the department has developed various tools and plans to 
enable these entities to manage its business systems modernization 
efforts. The tools and plans the Defense Business Systems Management 
Committee approves, the Business Transformation Agency implements, and 
the investment review boards use to assess compliance include the 
following: 

* Business enterprise architecture: DOD's business enterprise 
architecture is a tool or a blueprint to guide and constrain 
investments in DOD organizations and systems as they relate to business 
operations. The business enterprise architecture provides the thin 
layer of corporate policies, capabilities, standards, and rules and 
focuses on providing tangible outcomes for a limited set of enterprise- 
level (DOD-wide) priorities, and the components are responsible under 
the department's tiered accountability approach for defining their 
respective component-level architectures that are aligned with the 
corporate business enterprise architecture. According to DOD, 
subsequent releases of the business enterprise architecture will 
continue to reflect this federated approach and will define enforceable 
interfaces to ensure interoperability and information flow to support 
decision making at the appropriate levels. 

* Enterprise transition plan: DOD guidance states that the enterprise 
transition plan is intended to lay out a road map for achieving DOD's 
business transformation by implementing changes to technology, 
processes, and governance consistent with DOD's business enterprise 
architecture. According to DOD, the enterprise transition plan is 
intended to summarize all levels of transition planning information 
(milestones, metrics, resource needs, and system migrations) as an 
integrated product for communicating and monitoring progress-- 
resulting in a consistent framework for setting priorities and 
evaluating plans, programs, and investments. The enterprise transition 
plan contains time-phased milestones, performance metrics, and a 
statement of resource needs for new and existing systems that are part 
of the business enterprise architecture. Business Transformation Agency 
officials said that they see the enterprise transition plan as the 
highest level plan for DOD business transformation. DOD released its 
first enterprise transition plan in September 2005. DOD updates the 
enterprise transition plan twice a year, once in March as part of DOD's 
annual report to Congress and once in September. 

While our prior work has acknowledged this progress, we also have 
reported on limitations. For example, while the latest version of the 
business enterprise architecture focuses on DOD-wide corporate 
policies, capabilities, rules, and standards, which are essential 
elements to meeting legislative requirements, this version has yet to 
be augmented by the DOD component organizations' subsidiary 
architectures that are also essential to meeting these requirements and 
the department's goal of having a federated family of architectures. 
While the latest version of the enterprise transition plan provides 
performance measures for the enterprise and component programs, 
including key milestones (such as initial operating capability), it 
does not include other important information needed to understand the 
sequencing of these business investments and does not address DOD's 
complete portfolio of business system investments. While the department 
has established and begun implementing the investment review structures 
and processes that are consistent with legislation, it has yet to fully 
define the related portfolio-based information technology investment 
management practices.[Footnote 9] 

Furthermore, DOD's efforts have been mainly focused on business systems 
modernization. During our review, we examined key documents, such as 
DOD's enterprise transition plan, business transformation guidance, and 
minutes from the meetings of the Defense Business Systems Management 
Committee, and our analysis found that DOD has not yet expanded the 
focus beyond business systems. In addition, DOD officials stated that 
the Defense Business Systems Management Committee has mainly focused on 
providing oversight for business systems investments, rather than 
overall business transformation efforts, because this is what 
legislation has required it to do. Similarly, DOD officials stated that 
the enterprise transition plan also is focused on business systems and 
does not provide enough detail about overall business transformation. 
DOD officials added that the Business Transformation Agency is also 
limited to focusing mainly on business systems because its role is to 
support the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, which 
primarily provides oversight for business systems initiatives as 
specified in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act. 

Additionally, DOD has not clearly defined or institutionalized 
interrelationships, roles and responsibilities, or accountability for 
establishing a management framework for overall business 
transformation. For example, the Deputy Secretary of Defense chairs an 
advisory board called the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, which DOD 
officials have stated has a role in overall business transformation. 
The Deputy's Advisory Working Group started in 2006 as an ad hoc 
committee, co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Staff, to manage the planning process for DOD's 
strategic plan, the Quadrennial Defense Review.[Footnote 10] According 
to DOD officials, this working group is to provide departmentwide 
strategic direction on various issues that it chooses. Many of the same 
individuals who sit on the Defense Business Systems Management 
Committee also serve on the Deputy's Advisory Working Group. However, 
opinions differ within DOD as to whether the committee or the working 
group will function as the primary body responsible for overall 
business transformation, and the relationship between these two 
entities has not been formalized. In addition, opinions differ between 
the two entities regarding the definition of DOD's key business areas, 
with the Defense Business Systems Management Committee and the Business 
Transformation Agency using a broader definition of business processes 
than the Deputy's Advisory Working Group and its supporting 
organizations. These differences hinder DOD's ability to leverage the 
business systems modernization management framework to fully address 
broader business transformation efforts. Until the department 
institutionalizes a management framework that encompasses all aspects 
of business transformation, including establishing overall 
responsibility for and defining what is included in business 
transformation, DOD will be unable to integrate related initiatives 
into a sustainable, enterprisewide approach and to resolve weaknesses 
in business operations that we have shown are at high risk of waste, 
fraud, and abuse. 

Two Critical Challenges Affect DOD's Success in Maintaining and 
Furthering Its Progress in Overall Business Transformation: 

DOD faces two critical challenges to achieving successful business 
transformation. First, DOD does not have a comprehensive, integrated, 
and enterprisewide plan or set of linked plans supported by a planning 
process that sets a strategic direction for overall business 
transformation efforts and monitors progress. Second, DOD lacks a full- 
time leadership position dedicated solely to the planning, integration, 
and execution of business transformation efforts. Until the department 
establishes a comprehensive, integrated planning process and 
establishes full-time sustained leadership, DOD will be challenged to 
integrate related initiatives into a sustainable, enterprisewide 
approach and to resolve weaknesses in business operations that we have 
shown are at high risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. 

DOD Has Not Developed a Comprehensive, Integrated, and Enterprisewide 
Plan or Set of Plans Supported by a Planning Process for Business 
Transformation Efforts: 

DOD continues to be challenged in its business transformation efforts 
because it has not developed a comprehensive, integrated, and 
enterprisewide action plan or set of linked plans for business 
transformation that is supported by a comprehensive planning process. 
Such a plan or set of plans would help set strategic direction for 
overall business transformation efforts, prioritize initiatives and 
resources, and monitor progress through the establishment of 
performance goals, objectives, and rewards. Our prior work has shown 
that this type of plan should cover all of DOD's key business 
functions; contain results-oriented goals, measures, and expectations 
that link institutional, unit, and individual performance goals and 
expectations to promote accountability; and establish an effective 
process and related tools for implementation and oversight.[Footnote 
11] Furthermore, such an integrated business transformation plan would 
be instrumental in establishing investment priorities and guiding the 
department's key resource decisions. 

Our analysis shows that DOD does not have an integrated plan in place 
and has not fully developed a comprehensive planning process. For 
example, we analyzed the enterprise transition plan and determined that 
the goals and objectives in the enterprise transition plan were not 
clearly linked to the goals and objectives in the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, DOD's highest level strategic plan. In addition, the enterprise 
transition plan is not based on a strategic planning process. For 
example, it does not provide a complete assessment of DOD's progress in 
overall business transformation efforts aside from business systems 
modernization. Furthermore, while the enterprise transition plan 
contains goals and milestones related to business systems, the plan 
does not contain results-oriented goals and measures that assess 
overall business transformation. Finally, we determined that DOD's 
business transformation efforts are currently guided by multiple plans 
that are developed and maintained by various offices within DOD. 

DOD officials acknowledged our analysis that DOD does not have an 
integrated plan in place. Business Transformation Agency officials see 
the enterprise transition plan as the highest level plan for business 
transformation but acknowledge that it does not currently provide an 
assessment of the department's overall approach to business 
transformation. Business Transformation Agency officials also 
acknowledged that they are challenged to work across various offices to 
develop an integrated planning process and results-oriented measures to 
assess overall business transformation. These officials added that DOD 
is starting to develop a family of linked plans to guide and monitor 
business transformation. Specifically, DOD's March 2007 update to the 
enterprise transition plan includes an approach that is intended to 
align other business plans with the enterprise transition 
plan,[Footnote 12] establish working relationships among plan owners 
across DOD's major business areas, and identify interdependencies among 
their products. However, according to Business Transformation Agency 
officials and others within DOD, the alignment currently involves only 
ensuring data consistency across DOD's major business plans and does 
not yet encompass the full integration they envision. In addition, it 
is not clear from discussions with these officials which committee or 
office within DOD will be responsible for developing a family of linked 
plans and a supporting comprehensive planning process. 

The Defense Science Board,[Footnote 13] the Defense Business 
Board,[Footnote 14] and the Institute for Defense Analyses[Footnote 15] 
agree with our analysis. These organizations have issued reports 
supporting DOD's need for an integrated planning process for business 
transformation. In a February 2006 report on military 
transformation,[Footnote 16] the Defense Science Board concluded that 
DOD needed, but did not have, a multiyear business plan capable of 
relating resources to mission purposes. In addition, the report said 
that confusion existed over roles in identifying needs, proposing and 
choosing solutions, executing programs, and overseeing performance. The 
Defense Science Board concluded that an effective business plan would 
give decision makers a clear understanding of the impact of resource 
decisions. The Defense Business Board arrived at a similar conclusion. 
In a May 2006 report on governance at DOD,[Footnote 17] the Defense 
Business Board reported that a challenge facing DOD's business 
activities was the move from a hierarchical, functional approach to an 
enterprisewide, cross-functional, horizontal approach. The Defense 
Business Board recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan that 
contains clear goals and supporting objectives, including outcome-based 
metrics. In a December 2006 report about the need for a CMO at 
DOD,[Footnote 18] the Institute for Defense Analyses recommended that 
DOD adopt a planning structure that would ensure that the strategic- 
level directions and priorities drive day-to-day planning and 
execution. The Institute for Defense Analyses said that the planning 
structure should contain top-level goals, approaches, and resources and 
link these goals to the required resources within the executing 
activities. 

DOD Has Not Established a Full-time Leadership Position at the Right 
Level Dedicated Solely to Business Transformation Efforts: 

DOD continues to lack sustained leadership focused solely on business 
transformation. We have reported that as DOD and other agencies embark 
on large-scale organizational change initiatives, similar to defense 
business transformation, there is a compelling need to, among other 
things, (1) elevate attention on management issues and transformational 
change efforts, (2) integrate various key management and transformation 
efforts into a coherent and enterprisewide approach, and (3) 
institutionalize accountability for addressing transformation needs and 
leading change. Without such leadership, DOD is at risk of not being 
able to sustain and ensure the success of its overall business 
transformation efforts, and its progress is at risk of being another in 
a long line of unsuccessful management reform initiatives.[Footnote 19] 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has elevated the attention paid to 
business transformation efforts, and he and other senior leaders have 
clearly shown a commitment to business transformation and to addressing 
deficiencies in the department's business operations. For example, the 
Deputy Secretary has been actively engaged in monthly meetings of both 
the Defense Business Systems Management Committee and the Deputy's 
Advisory Working Group, and directed the creation of the Business 
Transformation Agency to support the Defense Business Systems 
Management Committee. However, these organizations do not provide the 
sustained leadership needed to successfully achieve overall business 
transformation. The Defense Business Systems Management Committee's 
representatives consist of political appointees whose terms expire when 
administrations change and the roles of the Deputy's Advisory Working 
Group have not been institutionalized in DOD directives or charters. 
Without this, the committee's very existence and role could change 
within or between administrations. 

A broad-based consensus exists among GAO and others that the status quo 
is unacceptable and that DOD needs a CMO to provide leadership over 
business transformation efforts, although there are different views 
concerning the characteristics of a CMO, such as whether the position 
should be codified in statute, established as a separate position from 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, designated as Executive Level II or 
Level III, subject to a term appointment, or supported by a deputy CMO. 
As required by Congress, DOD commissioned studies of the feasibility 
and advisability of establishing a deputy secretary of defense for 
management to oversee the department's business transformation process. 
As part of this effort, the Defense Business Board, an advisory panel, 
examined various options and, in May 2006, endorsed the CMO concept. 
Furthermore, in December 2006, the Institute for Defense Analyses 
issued a study that reported on various options for the creation of a 
CMO position and recommended that a CMO is needed at DOD. In response 
to the Institute for Defense Analyses report, DOD submitted a letter to 
Congress in May 2007 outlining the department's position on a CMO at 
DOD. However, this position does not adequately address the key 
leadership challenge that we discuss in this report--that is, the lack 
of a senior leader, at the right level, with appropriate authority, to 
focus full time on overall business transformation. In summary, DOD is 
proposing to Congress that the role of a CMO be assigned to the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense. While the Deputy Secretary may be at the right 
level, with the appropriate authority and responsibility to transform 
business operations, we have testified that the demands placed on him 
and other senior leaders make it difficult for them to maintain the 
oversight, focus, and momentum needed to resolve business operational 
weaknesses, including the high-risk areas. Finally, DOD does not agree 
with codifying the CMO role in legislation, stating that doing so would 
restrict the flexibility of future Presidents and Secretaries of 
Defense to build an integrated management team. DOD would rather leave 
the assignment of the CMO role to the discretion of the Secretary of 
Defense, and DOD plans to formalize the Deputy Secretary's CMO and 
business transformation duties in a DOD directive. 

Because of the complexity and long-term nature of business 
transformation, we have long advocated the establishment of a CMO 
position at DOD with significant authority and experience and a term 
that would provide sustained leadership and the time to integrate the 
department's overall business transformation efforts. Major 
transformation initiatives often take at least 5 to 7 years in large 
private and public sector organizations. Codifying a separate, full- 
time CMO position in statute would ensure continuity and help to create 
unambiguous expectations and underscore congressional desire to follow 
a professional, nonpartisan, sustainable, and institutional approach to 
this position. Without formally designating responsibility and 
accountability for results, reconciling competing priorities among 
various organizations and prioritizing investments will be difficult 
and could impede the department's progress in addressing deficiencies 
in key business areas. A full-time and separate CMO position could 
devote the necessary time and effort to further and sustain DOD's 
progress and would be accountable for planning, integrating, and 
executing the department's overall business transformation efforts. 
Further, we believe that the CMO should be at Executive Level II and 
report directly to the Secretary of Defense so that the position has 
the stature needed to successfully address integration challenges, 
address DOD's high-risk areas with a strategic and systematic approach, 
and prioritize investments across the department. By subsuming the CMO 
duties within the Deputy Secretary of Defense position as DOD 
advocates, the CMO would be at level II, but not subject to a term or 
able to focus full-time attention on business transformation. Finally, 
we advocate an extended term appointment for the CMO of at least 5 to 7 
years so that the position could span administrations to sustain 
business transformation when key personnel changes occur. 

Conclusions: 

DOD's efforts at business transformation consist of various entities 
whose interrelationships are not clearly articulated and numerous plans 
that are not integrated across the department. Currently, there is no 
single individual, office, or integrated plan within DOD to provide a 
complete and focused assessment of the department's business 
transformation efforts. DOD continues to face formidable challenges, 
both externally with its ongoing military operations and internally 
with the long-standing problems of fraud, waste, and abuse. Pervasive, 
decades-old management problems related to its business operations 
affect all of DOD's major business areas. While DOD has taken positive 
steps to address these problems, our previous work has shown a 
persistent pattern of limited scope of focus and a lack of integrated 
planning and sustained leadership. In this time of growing fiscal 
constraints, every dollar that DOD can save through improved economy 
and efficiency of its operations is important to the well-being of our 
nation and the legitimate needs of the warfighter. DOD can no longer 
afford to address business transformation as it has in the past. Unless 
DOD elevates and integrates its efforts, billions of dollars will 
continue to be wasted every year. Furthermore, without strong and 
sustained leadership, both within and across administrations, DOD will 
likely continue to have difficulties in maintaining the oversight, 
focus, and momentum needed to implement and sustain the needed reforms 
to its business operations. In this regard, we continue to believe that 
a CMO whose sole focus is to integrate and oversee the overall 
transformation of the department's business operations remains key to 
DOD's success. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To ensure successful and sustained business transformation at DOD, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: 

* Institutionalize in directives the roles, responsibilities, and 
relationships among various business-related entities and committees, 
such as the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, investment 
review boards, the Business Transformation Agency, and the Deputy's 
Advisory Working Group, and expand the management framework to capture 
overall business transformation efforts, rather than limit efforts to 
modernizing business systems. 

* Develop a comprehensive strategic planning process for business 
transformation that results in a comprehensive, integrated, and 
enterprisewide plan or set of interconnected functional plans that 
covers all key business areas and provides a clear strategic direction, 
prioritizes initiatives, and monitors progress across the department. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Given DOD's view that the Deputy Secretary of Defense should be 
assigned CMO duties, Congress should consider enacting legislation to 
establish a separate, full-time position at DOD with the significant 
authority and experience and a sufficient term to provide focused and 
sustained leadership and momentum over business transformation efforts. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred 
with our recommendations that the department institutionalize a 
management framework and develop a comprehensive strategic planning 
process for business transformation, and disagreed with our matter for 
congressional consideration that Congress enact legislation to 
establish a separate, full-time CMO position. The department's comments 
are reprinted in appendix II. In its overall comments, DOD expressed 
concern about what it characterized as GAO's belief that the department 
placed improper emphasis on business systems modernization to the 
detriment of overall business transformation efforts. In particular, 
DOD stated that business systems modernization is a critical step in 
achieving overall business transformation, and that lessons learned and 
governance structures developed for modernizing business systems 
acquisition processes are being evaluated for implementation beyond the 
business side. It further stated that the Deputy's Advisory Working 
Group and the Defense Business Systems Modernization Committee both 
focus more broadly on defense business transformation. DOD also 
believed we had overstated the nature of "broad-based consensus" 
between GAO, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Defense 
Business Board about the need for a CMO in DOD, noting that the 
Institute for Defense Analyses had examined four alternate methods for 
institutionalizing the roles of the CMO and ultimately supported the 
department's position that those duties be vested in the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense. 

We disagree with DOD's characterization of our report with respect to 
the emphasis of the department's efforts and the nature of the broad- 
based consensus on the need for a CMO. The report specifically gives 
DOD credit for progress to date on setting up an overall framework for 
broader business transformation, and in no way suggests that any 
specific steps taken regarding modernizing business systems are 
detrimental to this progress. Rather, we note that the framework, as 
currently structured and implemented, focuses on business systems, is a 
foundation to build upon, and needs to be expanded to more fully 
address broader transformation issues. The report also recognizes the 
establishment of the Deputy's Advisory Working Group and the Defense 
Business Systems Modernization Committee. While DOD suggests these two 
groups focus more broadly on business transformation, our work shows 
that DOD has not clearly defined or institutionalized 
interrelationships, roles and responsibilities, or accountability for 
broader business transformation among these entities. Also, differences 
of opinion exist within DOD about the roles and scope of the various 
entities. Further, contrary to DOD's view, we did not overstate the 
nature of the "broad-based consensus" regarding the need for a CMO. In 
fact, the Defense Business Board, Institute for Defense Analyses, and 
the department are on record in their support for establishing a CMO at 
DOD. Specifically, the board endorsed the CMO concept in a study 
completed in May 2006, the Institute for Defense Analyses identified 
the need for a CMO in its study completed in December 2006, and DOD, in 
a May 2007 letter, informed Congress of its view that the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense should assume CMO responsibilities. The Institute 
for Defense Analyses also recommended that Congress establish a new 
deputy CMO position with an Executive Level III term appointment of 7 
years to provide full-time support to the Deputy Secretary in 
connection with business transformation issues. We believe these 
actions demonstrate a broad-based consensus regarding the need for a 
CMO and, therefore, that the status quo is unacceptable. 
Notwithstanding these positions, we also recognize, as stated in the 
report, that there are different views concerning the characteristics 
of a CMO, such as whether the position should be codified in statute, 
established as a separate position from the Deputy Secretary, 
designated as Executive Level II or Level III, or subject to a term 
appointment. As stated in this report and numerous testimonies, we 
believe the CMO position should be codified in statute as a separate 
and full-time position, designated as Executive Level II, and subject 
to an extended term appointment. 

In addition to its overall comments, DOD provided detailed comments on 
our two recommendations. Specifically, DOD concurred with our first 
recommendation that the department institutionalize in directives the 
roles, responsibilities, and relationships among various business- 
related entities and committees and expand the management framework 
beyond business systems modernization to capture overall business 
transformation efforts. In fact, DOD stated explicitly in its comments 
that the department is a strong advocate for institutionalizing, in its 
DOD Directives System, the functions, responsibilities, authorities, 
and relationships of its principal officials and the management 
processes they oversee. DOD added that the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
has issued a directive-type memorandum on the management of the 
Deputy's Advisory Working Group and that a draft DOD directive has been 
prepared to define the functions of the Defense Business Systems 
Management Committee and elaborate its relationships with the Defense 
Business Transformation Agency and other key business-related entities 
in the department. We recognize that directives and memorandums, in 
some cases, do exist, and that DOD plans to finalize additional 
directives, particularly for the Defense Business Systems Management 
Committee. As noted in our report, during the course of our review, we 
found that DOD has not clearly defined or institutionalized 
interrelationships, roles and responsibilities, or accountability for 
establishing a management framework for overall business 
transformation, and that differences of opinion exist within the 
department regarding which of the various senior leadership committees 
will function as the primary body responsible for overall business 
transformation. Therefore, we encourage DOD to ensure that its efforts 
to institutionalize its management framework for business 
transformation in directives specifically address these matters, and 
once directives are finalized, to take steps to clearly communicate the 
framework and reinforce its implementation throughout the department. 

Further, DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that 
the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive strategic planning 
process for business transformation that results in a comprehensive, 
integrated, and enterprisewide plan or set of plans. Specifically, DOD 
stated that it has already begun to expand the scope of the enterprise 
transition plan to become a more robust enterprisewide planning 
document and to evolve this plan into the centerpiece strategic 
document for transformation. DOD added that as the enterprise 
transition plan evolves, it will continue to improve in aligning 
strategy with outcomes, identifying business capability gaps, 
prioritizing future needs, and developing metrics to measure 
achievement. DOD also stated that it will continue to evolve its family 
of plans to address our recommendation. While DOD's proposed actions to 
address both of our recommendations appear to be positive steps, the 
key to their success will be in the details of their implementation. 
Moreover, we continue to believe that these efforts alone will not be 
sufficient to bring about the desired transformation. More 
specifically, efforts to institutionalize and broaden the scope of a 
management framework and develop a comprehensive strategic planning 
process for business transformation will not be successful without a 
CMO to guide and sustain these efforts. 

However, DOD disagreed with our matter for congressional consideration 
that Congress consider enacting legislation to establish a separate, 
full-time CMO position at DOD to provide focused and sustained 
leadership and momentum over business transformation efforts, stating 
that no official below the Secretary of Defense, except the Deputy 
Secretary, has the rank and perspective to provide the strategic 
leadership and authoritative decision making necessary to ensure 
implementation of departmentwide business activities. DOD stated that 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense is to be designated as the CMO and that 
an internal directive is being revised to that effect. DOD also stated 
its belief that the continuity of business transformation is best 
ensured by institutionalized processes and organizations, the knowledge 
and perspective of DOD's career workforce, clear and mutually agreed to 
economy and efficiency goals, and the due diligence of future 
administrations and Members of Congress to nominate and confirm highly 
qualified executives to serve at DOD. Further, DOD stated that the 
establishment of an additional official at the under secretary level to 
lead business transformation would generate dysfunctional competition 
among the five other Under Secretaries by creating confusion and 
redundancy in their roles and responsibilities. DOD added that the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense as the CMO has sufficient officials 
available to assist in managing the department and the authority 
necessary to refine the department's management structure to continue 
business management reform and integrate business transformation 
activities with the operational work of the department. 

Because of the complexity and long-term nature of business 
transformation, we have consistently reported and testified that DOD 
needs a CMO with significant authority and experience, a term that 
would provide sustained leadership, and the time to integrate overall 
business transformation efforts. In our view, DOD's plan to subsume the 
CMO duties within the Deputy Secretary of Defense position and to 
establish this action by directive would place the responsibilities at 
the appropriate level--Executive Level II--but would result in a 
position not subject to a term or able to focus full-time attention on 
business transformation. Transformation is a long-term process, 
especially for large and complex organizations such as DOD. Therefore, 
a term of at least 5 to 7 years is recommended to provide sustained 
leadership and accountability. To ensure continuity, it should become a 
permanent position, with the specific duties authorized in statute. As 
stated in our report, we believe codifying a separate, full-time CMO 
position in statute would also help to create unambiguous expectations 
and underscore congressional desire to follow a professional, 
nonpartisan, sustainable, and institutional approach to this position. 

We recognize that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has officials and 
institutional structures available to support the transformation 
process; however, transformation cannot be achieved through a committee 
approach. Ultimately, a person at the right level, with the right type 
of experience, in a full-time position with a term appointment, and 
with the proper amount of responsibility, authority, and accountability 
is needed to lead the effort. Contrary to DOD's view, we believe the 
establishment of a separate CMO position would bring leadership, 
accountability, focus, and direction to the department's efforts rather 
than creating dysfunctional competition and causing confusion. The CMO 
would not assume the responsibilities of the Under Secretaries of 
Defense or any other officials. Rather, the CMO would be responsible 
and accountable for planning, integrating, and executing the 
department's overall business transformation effort, and would be able 
to give full-time attention to business transformation. As such, the 
CMO would be a key ally to other officials in the department in dealing 
with the business transformation process. Without formally designating 
responsibility and accountability for results, reconciling competing 
priorities among various organizations and prioritizing investments 
will be difficult and could impede progress in addressing deficiencies 
in key business areas. We believe DOD's position essentially represents 
the status quo, and that in the interest of the department and American 
taxpayers, the department needs a CMO to help transform its key 
business operations and avoid billions of dollars in waste each year. 

We are encouraged that this matter is now before Congress as it 
prepares to deliberate on pending legislation that calls for 
statutorily establishing a CMO for DOD. In particular, we believe any 
resulting legislation should include some important characteristics for 
the CMO position. Specifically, a CMO at DOD should be codified in 
statute as a separate and full-time position that is designated as an 
Executive Level II appointment and reports directly to the Secretary of 
Defense so that the individual in this position has the stature needed 
to successfully address integration challenges, adjudicate disputes, 
and monitor progress on overall business transformation across defense 
organizations. In addition, the position should be subject to an 
extended term appointment such that the CMO would span administrations 
to sustain transformation efforts when key personnel changes occur. 
Transformation is a long-term process, especially for large and complex 
organizations such as DOD. Therefore, a term of at least 5 to 7 years 
is recommended to provide sustained leadership and accountability. In 
addition, we would recommend a requirement for advance notification 
should the Secretary decide to remove an individual from the CMO 
position. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies 
available to others upon request. This report is also available at no 
charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink: http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Other staff members who made key 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by:

Sharon L. Pickup: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John S. McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable George V. Voinovich: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the 
District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the progress the Department of Defense (DOD) has made in 
setting up a management framework for business transformation, we 
reviewed and analyzed relevant documents and current literature about 
the department's business transformation and interviewed key DOD senior 
leaders and defense experts. Documents that we used for our review 
included, but were not limited to, (1) GAO reports related to DOD's 
high-risk areas, including business systems modernization, development 
of the business enterprise architecture, and organizational 
transformation; (2) DOD products, including the 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review and updates to DOD's enterprise transition plan; (3) 
DOD's annual reports on business transformation to Congress (and 
biannual updates); (4) DOD testimony to Congress on the status of 
business transformation; and (5) meeting minutes and briefing 
documents, such as those from the Defense Business Systems Management 
Committee, the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, and the Defense 
Business Board, related to DOD's business transformation, governance, 
and management reforms. We obtained testimonial evidence from officials 
representing the Business Transformation Agency, offices within the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (including the Program Analysis and 
Evaluation Directorate; Office of the Director, Administration and 
Management; and the Office of Business Transformation), the Joint 
Staff, the military departments, and defense experts. 

To assess the challenges DOD faces in maintaining and ensuring success 
in its overall business transformation efforts, we compared DOD's 
efforts to key practices we found to be consistently at the center of 
successful organizational mergers and transformations, specifically, 
establishing a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide 
the transformation and ensuring that top leadership drives the 
transformation.[Footnote 20] We also reviewed relevant plans and 
related documents to assess integration among DOD's various business- 
related plans. These plans included DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review, 
Performance and Accountability Report, Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness Plan, Defense Acquisition Transformation Report to Congress, 
Supply Chain Management Improvement Plan, Focused Logistics Joint 
Functional Concept and the Focused Logistics Campaign Plan, Human 
Capital Strategy, and the Defense Installations Strategic Plan. In 
addition, we reviewed proposals for a chief management officer (CMO) at 
the department and obtained testimonial evidence from key DOD officials 
and defense experts. As part of this effort, we considered comments 
raised by several public and private sector officials during a forum 
sponsored by the Comptroller General in April 2007. The purpose of this 
forum was to discuss the merits of a CMO or chief operating officer 
concept. We also analyzed congressionally mandated CMO reports prepared 
by the Defense Business Board and the Institute for Defense Analyses 
and reviewed DOD's response to the study prepared by the Institute for 
Defense Analyses. 

We conducted our work from September 2006 through July 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

Aug 17 2007: 

Ms. Sharon L. Pickup: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548:  

Dear Ms. Pickup,: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report GAO-07-1072, "Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success 
Requires a Chief Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained 
Leadership," dated July 13, 2007, (GAO Code 350902). 

The Department appreciates GAO's interest in the progress of Defense 
Business Transformation and values our partnership as we strive to 
achieve our mutual goal of agile, effective, and efficient defense 
business operations. 

Attached are the Department's responses to GAO's recommendations in the 
draft report and comments on the Matter for Congressional 
Consideration. The Department concurs with the first recommendation and 
partially concurs with the second. However, we are concerned about 
GAO's belief that we place an improper emphasis on business systems 
modernization to the detriment of our overall business transformation 
efforts, and that GAO overstated the nature of the "broad-based 
consensus" between GAO, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and 
the Defense Business Board about the need for a Chief Management 
Officer in the DoD. The IDA report, for example, which praised the 
Department's efforts to improve its business management, examined four 
alternate methods of institutionalizing the roles of the CMO and 
ultimately supported the Department's position that those duties be 
vested in the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Business systems modernization is a critical step in achieving overall 
Defense business transformation. The lessons learned and new governance 
structures developed through the modernization of the Department's 
business systems acquisition process are already being evaluated for 
implementation beyond the business side of the Department. 

Additionally, the Deputy Secretary's Advisory Working Group and the 
Defense Business Systems Modernization Committee both focus more 
broadly on Defense business transformation than just business systems 
modernization. The Deputy Secretary's Advisory Working Group oversees 
management, integration, and performance across the Department. The 
DBSMC is integral in driving the Department's focus on process 
transformation and Continuous Process Improvement. It oversees the 
development and implementation of the Business Capability Lifecycle and 
Enterprise Risk Assessment Methodology to enable rapid delivery of 
business capabilities. It also guides the evolution of the Enterprise 
Transition Plan as it becomes a more robust and wide-reaching planning 
document. 

Finally, aligning the strategy, controls, people, processes, and 
technology to truly effect enterprise-wide change in an organization as 
large and complex as the Department of Defense is an enormous 
undertaking. However, we believe that our persistent focus on overall 
business transformation will enable continued progress. Again, the 
Department appreciates GAO's interest in the progress of Defense 
Business Transformation and values our partnership as we strive to 
achieve our mutual goal of agile, effective, and efficient defense 
business operations. 

Signed by: 

Paul A. Brinkley: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: 
(Business Transformation): 

Attachments: 

As stated: 

[End of section] 

GAO Draft Report - Dated July 13, 2007: 
GAO CODE 350902/GAO-07-1072: 

"Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success Requires a Chief 
Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership": 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:  

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
institutionalize in directives the roles, responsibilities, and 
relationships among various business-related entities and committees, 
such as the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, investment 
review boards, the Business Transformation Agency, and the Deputy 
Advisor's Working Group, and expand the management framework to capture 
overall business transformation efforts, rather than limit efforts to 
modernizing business systems. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department is a strong advocate for 
institutionalizing in its DoD Directives System the functions, 
responsibilities, authorities and relationships of its principal 
officials and the management processes they oversee. The DoD Directives 
System consists of directive-type memoranda, directives, instructions, 
and other publications. These documents are essential internal controls 
and as such are key elements of the Department's overall management 
framework. The Deputy Secretary has issued a directive-type memorandum 
on the management of the Deputy Secretary's Advisory Working Group and 
a DoD directive is drafted to definitize the functions of the DBSMC and 
elaborate its relationships with the Defense Business Transformation 
Agency and other key business-related entities in the Department. 
Additionally, both the DBSMC and the Investment Review Boards, which it 
oversees, have had detailed charters from their inception. Also, the 
DoD directive through which the Secretary of Defense assigns 
responsibilities to the Deputy Secretary is being revised to provide 
for the assignment of broad Chief Management Officer duties to the 
Deputy Secretary. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
develop a comprehensive strategic planning process for business 
transformation that results in a comprehensive, integrated, and 
enterprise-wide plan or set of interconnected functional plans that 
covers all key business areas and provides a clear strategic direction, 
prioritizes initiatives, and monitors progress across the Department. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department of Defense Enterprise 
Transition Plan (ETP), initially developed in 2005, is one of a series 
of foundation documents, including the Business Transformation 
Guidance, which outlines the strategic planning process for the 
Department's business transformation at all levels. The ETP currently 
serves as the Business Mission Area Strategic Plan and as the central 
document within the family of plans for DoD business transformation 
efforts. The ETP is reviewed and approved by the Defense Business 
Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) annually in September and updated 
annually in March. The ETP describes a systematic approach for the 
transformation of business operations within DoD and is driven by a 
clear set of priorities and a targeted set of business capabilities 
enabled by key programs. 

The Department has already begun to expand the scope of the ETP to 
become a more robust enterprise-wide planning document, including 
Continuous Process Improvement initiatives. Currently, the ETP aligns 
with the Quadrennial Defense Review and other planning papers. Near 
term publications of the ETP will ensure alignment with the 
Department's other high level strategy documents such as the 
President's Management Agenda, the National Defense Strategy, and the 
Strategic Planning Guidance to ensure accordance with the Department's 
overall strategic vision. As the ETP evolves, it will continue to 
improve in: 

* Aligning strategy with outcomes through the implementation of 
initiatives; 
* Identifying business capability gaps; 
* Prioritizing future needs; 
* Developing metrics to measure achievement. 

This process provides DoD with a repeatable process, alignment to 
Department mission and vision, and delivery of capabilities rather than 
systems. Maintaining focus on transformation allows DoD to support a 
more capable military force, more financially accountable 
organizations, and a more efficient use of taxpayer dollar. 

DoD will continue to evolve its family of plans to address GAO's 
recommendation. The ETP will continue to provide a unifying framework 
and guidance at the enterprise, component, and program levels across 
DoD as the centerpiece strategic document for transformation. The 
Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness plan, Supply Chain Management 
Improvement Plan, and others, both current and future, will augment the 
ETP and provide further details specific to their respective business 
areas. 

Matter For Congressional Consideration 

Given DoD's view that the Deputy Secretary of Defense be assigned Chief 
Management Officer (CMO) duties, Congress should consider enacting 
legislation to establish a separate, full-time position at DoD with the 
significant authority, experience, and a sufficient term to provide 
focused and sustained leadership and momentum over business 
transformation efforts. 

DOD Response: As the Deputy Secretary stated in his May 11, 2007 letter 
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House, no 
official below the Secretary, except the Deputy Secretary, has the rank 
and perspective to provide the strategic leadership and authoritative 
decision making necessary to ensure implementation and integration of 
Department-wide business activities. This position was also emphasized 
by the Institute for Defense Analyses in its December 2006 report on a 
Defense Chief Management Officer. 

The Department believes that the continuity of business transformation 
is best assured by four factors:

* Institutionalized processes and organizations that enable the diverse 
elements of the enterprise to communicate, resolve differences, and 
implement interdependent tasks;
* The knowledge and perspective of the Department's career workforce; 
* Clear, mutually agreed to effectiveness and economy goals; 
* The due diligence of future Administrations and members of Congress 
to nominate and confirm highly qualified executives to serve in the 
Department of Defense. 

The Department does not believe that creating a tenured official is an 
effective means to ensure progress in business transformation. For 
example, the establishment of an additional official at the Under 
Secretary level to lead business transformation would generate 
dysfunctional competition among the five other Under Secretaries by 
creating confusion and redundancy in their discretionarily-assigned and 
statutorily-prescribed roles and responsibilities. Additionally, it 
would accrue unnecessary administrative overhead into the headquarters 
of the Department of Defense. 

The Department's view is that the Deputy Secretary of Defense as the 
Chief Management Officer has sufficient officials available to him to 
assist in managing the Department and has the authority necessary to 
further refine the Department's management structure to continue 
business management reform and integrate business transformation 
activities with the operational work of the Department in defending the 
Nation and supporting its fighting forces.

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Sharon Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, David Moser, Assistant 
Director; Thomas Beall; Renee Brown; Donna Byers; Grace Coleman; Gina 
Flacco; Barbara Lancaster; Julia Matta; and Suzanne Perkins made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

DOD Business Systems Modernization: Progress Continues to Be Made in 
Establishing Corporate Management Controls, but Further Steps Are 
Needed. GAO-07-733. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2007. 

Business Systems Modernization: DOD Needs to Fully Define Policies and 
Procedures for Institutionally Managing Investments. GAO-07-538. 
Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2007. 

DOD Transformation Challenges and Opportunities. GAO-07-500CG. 
Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2007. 

Business Systems Modernization: Strategy for Evolving DOD's Business 
Enterprise Architecture Offers a Conceptual Approach, but Execution 
Details Are Needed. GAO-07-451. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 
2007. 

Defense Business Transformation: A Comprehensive Plan, Integrated 
Efforts, and Sustained Leadership Are Needed to Assure Success. GAO-07- 
229T. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2006. 

Department of Defense: Sustained Leadership Is Critical to Effective 
Financial and Business Management Transformation. GAO-06-1006T. 
Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2006. 

Business Systems Modernization: DOD Continues to Improve Institutional 
Approach, but Further Steps Needed. GAO-06-658. Washington, D.C.: May 
15, 2006. 

GAO'S High-Risk Program. GAO-06-497T. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006. 

Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Risk- 
Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions. GAO-06-13. Washington, 
D.C.: November 15, 2005. 

Defense Management: Foundational Steps Being Taken to Manage DOD 
Business Systems Modernization, but Much Remains to be Accomplished to 
Effect True Business Transformation. GAO-06-234T. Washington, D.C.: 
November 9, 2005. 

21ST Century Challenges: Transforming Government to Meet Current and 
Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-830T. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2005. 

DOD Business Transformation: Sustained Leadership Needed to Address 
Long-standing Financial and Business Management Problems. GAO-05-723T. 
Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2005. 

Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD 
Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005. 

Footnotes:  

[1] See for example, GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 
(Washington, D.C.: January 2007); Defense Business Transformation: A 
Comprehensive Plan, Integrated Efforts, and Sustained Leadership Are 
Needed to Assure Success, GAO-07-229T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 
2006); Department of Defense: Sustained Leadership Is Critical to 
Effective Financial and Business Management Transformation, GAO-06-
1006T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3, 2006); DOD's High-Risk Areas: 
Successful Business Transformation Requires Sound Strategic Planning 
and Sustained Leadership, GAO-05-520T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 
2005); and DOD Financial Management: Integrated Approach, 
Accountability, Transparency, and Incentives Are Keys to Effective 
Reform, GAO-02-497T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2002). 

[2] See for example, GAO-07-310, GAO-07-229T, GAO-06-1006T, and GAO-05-
520T. 

[3] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-163, § 907 (2006). 

[4] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

[5] The seven governmentwide high-risk areas that DOD shares 
responsibility for are (1) strategic human capital management, (2) 
managing federal real property, (3) protecting the federal government's 
information systems and the nation's critical infrastructures, (4) 
ensuring the effective protection of technologies critical to U.S. 
national security interests, (5) management of interagency contracting, 
(6) establishing appropriate and effective information-sharing 
mechanisms to improve homeland security, and (7) modernizing federal 
disability programs. 

[6] Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 332 (2004) (codified in part at 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 186 and 2222), and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 376 (2006). 

[7] GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Improvements to Enterprise 
Architecture Development and Implementation Efforts Needed, GAO-03-458 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2003). 

[8] GAO-03-458. 

[9] See for example, GAO, DOD Business Transformation: Lack of an 
Integrated Strategy Puts the Army's Asset Visibility System Investments 
at Risk, GAO-07-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2007); DOD Business 
Systems Modernization: Progress Continues to Be Made in Establishing 
Corporate Management Controls, but Further Steps Are Needed, GAO-07-733 
(Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2007); Business Systems Modernization: 
Strategy for Evolving DOD's Business Enterprise Architecture Offers a 
Conceptual Approach, but Execution Details Are Needed, GAO-07-451 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2007); and GAO-07-310. 

[10] Congress mandated that DOD conduct a review every 4 years to 
examine the national defense strategy, force structure, force 
modernization, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the 
defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward 
determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States. 

[11] See for example, GAO-07-310, GAO-07-229T, GAO-06-1006T, GAO-05-
520T, and GAO-02-497T. 

[12] The plans that DOD is looking to align with the enterprise 
transition plan are the (1) Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD's strategic 
plan; (2) Performance and Accountability Report that provides an 
overview of DOD's financial condition and includes an assessment of 
annual program performance; (3) Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness Plan that addresses DOD's financial management high-risk 
area; (4) Defense Acquisition Transformation Report to Congress that 
summarizes how implementation plans are used to reform DOD's 
acquisition system; (5) Supply Chain Management Improvement Plan that 
addresses DOD's supply chain high-risk area; (6) Focused Logistics 
Joint Functional Concept and the Focused Logistics Campaign Plan that 
address DOD's logistics strategy; (7) Human Capital Strategy that 
addresses changes to DOD's personnel system; and (8) Defense 
Installations Strategic Plan that addresses the evolution of the 
strategic planning process for DOD real property and installations' 
lifecycle assets. 

[13] The Defense Science Board, composed of members designated from 
civilian life by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, advises the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff on scientific, technical, manufacturing, acquisition process, and 
other matters of special interest to DOD. 

[14] The Defense Business Board provides the Secretary of Defense, 
through the Deputy Secretary of Defense, independent advice and 
recommendations on effective strategies for the implementation of best 
business practices of interest to DOD. 

[15] The Institute for Defense Analyses is a nonprofit corporation that 
administers three federally funded research and development centers to 
provide objective analyses of national security issues, particularly 
those requiring scientific and technical expertise, and conduct related 
research on other national challenges. 

[16] Defense Science Board, Defense Science Board Summer Study On 
Transformation: A Progress Assessment Volume I (Washington, D.C.: 
February 2006). 

[17] Defense Business Board, Governance-Alignment and Configuration of 
Business Activities Task Group Report (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006). 

[18] Institute for Defense Analyses, Does DOD Need a Chief Management 
Officer? (Alexandria, Va.: December 2006). 

[19] For a discussion of DOD's prior management initiatives, see GAO, 
Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Risk- 
Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions, GAO-06-13 (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005), and Highlights of a GAO Roundtable: The Chief 
Operating Officer Concept: A Potential Strategy to Address Federal 
Governance Challenges, GAO-03-192SP (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2002). 

[20] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

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