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entitled 'Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government 
Has not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks' which 
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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

September 2007: 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: 

Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic 
Benchmarks: 

Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: 

GAO-07-1195: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-1195, a report to Congressional Committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1, 
2007, on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks 
contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of these 
benchmarks. The benchmarks stem from commitments first articulated by 
the Iraqi government in June 2006. In comparison, the Act requires the 
administration to report in July and September 2007 on whether 
satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not 
whether the benchmarks have been met. To complete our work, we reviewed 
government documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies; the 
UN; and the government of Iraq. We also made multiple visits to Iraq 
during 2006 and 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 
Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003. 

What GAO Found: 

The January 2007 U.S. strategy seeks to provide the Iraqi government 
with the time and space needed to help Iraqi society reconcile. Our 
analysis of the 18 legislative, security and economic benchmarks shows 
that as of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 
4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. (See next page). Overall, 
key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is 
unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in 
reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous 
efforts of coalition forces. 

The Iraqi government has met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the 
rights of minority political parties in Iraq’s legislature are 
protected. The government also partially met one other benchmark to 
enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law 
was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 
2008. Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, 
a review committee has not completed work on important revisions to 
Iraq’s constitution. Further, the government has not enacted 
legislation on de-Ba’athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial 
elections, amnesty, or militia disarmament. The Administration’s July 
2007 report cited progress in achieving some of these benchmarks but 
provided little information on what step in the legislative process 
each benchmark had reached. 

Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq’s 
government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad 
security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security 
Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of 
providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and 
eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have 
not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of 
local security, eliminated political intervention in military 
operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army 
units capable of independent operations, or ensured that political 
authorities made no false accusations against security forces. It is 
unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased—a key security 
benchmark--since it is difficult to measure the perpetrator’s intent 
and other measures of population security show differing trends. 
Finally, the Iraqi government has partially met the economic benchmark 
of allocating and spending $10 billion on reconstruction. Preliminary 
data indicates that about $1.5 billion of central ministry funds had 
been spent, as of July 15, 2007. As the Congress considers the way 
forward in Iraq, it must balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi 
benchmarks with the military progress, homeland security, foreign 
policy, and other goals of the United States. Future administration 
reporting to assist the Congress would be enhanced with adoption of the 
recommendations we make in this report. 

Figure:

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and Iraqi data. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

In future reports to Congress on the benchmarks, we recommend that the 
Secretaries of State and Defense: (1) specify clearly what step in the 
Iraqi legislative process each draft law has reached; (2) identify 
trends in sectarian violence together with broader measures of 
population security; and (3) better identify the operational readiness 
of Iraqi security forces. State and DOD concurred with our 
recommendations but disagreed with our assessment of certain benchmarks 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
GAO-07-1195. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 
512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter1: 

Results in Brief: 

Legislative Benchmarks: 

Security Benchmarks: 

Economic Benchmark: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Benchmark 1 - Constitutional Review: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix II: Benchmark 2 - De-Ba'athification Reform: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix III: Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix IV: Benchmark 4 - Semi-Autonomous Regions: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix V: Benchmark 5 - Electoral Legislation: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix VI: Benchmark 6 - Amnesty Legislation: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix VII: Benchmark 7 - Militia Disarmament: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix VIII: Benchmark 8 - Baghdad Security Plan Committees: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix IX: Benchmark 9 - Iraqi Brigades: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix X: Benchmark 10 - Commander's Authority: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix XI: Benchmark 11 - Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the 
Law: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix XII: Benchmark 12 - Safe Havens: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix XIII: Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix XIV: Benchmark 14 - Joint Security Stations: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix XV: Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Forces Operating 
Independently: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix XVI: Benchmark 16 - Minority Party Rights: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix XVII: Benchmark 17 - Allocating and Spending Iraqi Revenues: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix XVIII: Benchmark 18 - False Accusations: 

Issue: 

Status: 

Appendix XIX: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks: 

Appendix XX: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 
2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment Report: 

Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix XXIII: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix XXIV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative 
Benchmarks: 

Figure 2: GAO's Assessment of Whether the Iraqi Government Has Achieved 
Security Benchmarks: 

Figure 3: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the 
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007): 

Figure 4: Location of Joint Security Stations and Coalition Outposts in 
Baghdad: 

Figure 5: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the 
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007): 

Figure 6: Map of Joint Security Stations in Baghdad, as of August 9, 
2007: 

Figure 7: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

September 4, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

Over the last 4 years, the United States has provided thousands of 
troops and obligated nearly $370 billion to help achieve the strategic 
goal of creating a democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself 
and be an ally in the War on Terror. These troops have performed 
courageously under dangerous and difficult circumstances. The U.S. 
Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007[Footnote 1] (the Act) 
requires GAO to submit to Congress by September 1, 2007,[Footnote 2] an 
independent assessment of whether or not the government of Iraq has met 
18 benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement 
of the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed 
to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of 
the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and 
promote economic well-being. The benchmarks contained in the Act were 
derived from benchmarks and commitments articulated by the Iraqi 
government beginning in June 2006. (See appendix XIX for information on 
the origin of these benchmarks.) 

The January 2007 U.S. strategy, The New Way Forward in Iraq, is 
designed to support the Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence and 
foster conditions for national reconciliation. The U.S. strategy 
recognizes that the levels of violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts 
to achieve political reconciliation by fueling sectarian tensions, 
emboldening extremists, and discrediting the Coalition and Iraqi 
government. Amid such violence, it became increasingly difficult for 
Iraqi leaders to make the compromises necessary to foster 
reconciliation through the passage of legislation aimed at 
reintegrating former Ba'athists and sharing hydrocarbon revenues more 
equitably, among other steps. Thus, the new strategy was aimed at 
providing the Iraqi government with the time and space needed to help 
address reconciliation among the various segments of Iraqi society. 

As required by the Act, this report provides 1) an assessment of 
whether or not the Iraqi government has met 18 key legislative, 
security, and economic benchmarks, and, 2) provides information on the 
status of the achievement of each benchmark. Among these 18 benchmarks, 
eight address legislative actions, nine address security actions, and 
one is economic-related. In comparison, the Act requires the 
administration to report in July and September 2007 on the status of 
each benchmark, and to provide an assessment on whether satisfactory 
progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the 
benchmarks have been met. In order to meet our statutory 
responsibilities in a manner consistent with GAO's core values, we 
decided to use "partially met" criteria for selected benchmarks. See 
appendices I-XVIII for information on our assessment and the status of 
the achievement of each benchmark, and appendix XX for a comparison of 
GAO's assessment with the administration's July 2007 initial benchmark 
assessment report. We are also issuing a separate, classified report on 
selected benchmarks. 

To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and 
interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the 
Treasury; the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate 
commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence 
Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. 
These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and 
General David H. Petraeus, Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF- 
I). We also reviewed translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with 
officials from the government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of 
this work, we made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most 
recently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by 
approximately 100 Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have 
completed since May 2003.[Footnote 3] We provided drafts of the report 
to the relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment. We received 
formal written comments from State and Defense and technical comments 
from the Central Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Council 
which we incorporated as appropriate. This letter and each appendix 
describe the detailed criteria we used in making our assessments of the 
18 benchmarks. As required by the mandate, we made a determination of 
whether all 18 benchmarks had been met. For 14 of the 18 benchmarks, we 
developed criteria for assessing whether the benchmark was "partially 
met." For the remaining 4 benchmarks, we determined that they should be 
judged as "met" or "not met" because the nature of the individual 
benchmarks did not lend themselves to a "partially met" assessment. 

Although we analyzed classified data, including the August 2007 
National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, this report only contains 
unclassified information, as of August 30, 2007. We conducted our 
review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Appendix XXI contains a detailed description of our scope 
and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and 
did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall we found that: 

* The constitutional review process is not complete, and laws on de- 
Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, and amnesty 
have not passed; 

* Violence remains high, the number of Iraqi security forces capable of 
conducting independent operations has declined, and militias are not 
disarmed; and: 

* Funding for reconstruction has been allocated but is unlikely to be 
spent. 

As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance 
the achievement of the 18 Iraqi government benchmarks with the military 
progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the 
United States. In addition, future administration reports on the 
benchmarks would be more useful to Congress if they depicted the status 
of each legislative benchmark, provided data on broader measures of 
violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and assessed the performance 
and loyalties of Iraqi security forces. 

Legislative Benchmarks: 

Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met one of the eight 
legislative benchmarks and partially met another.[Footnote 4] 
Specifically, the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi 
legislature are protected through existing provisions in the Iraqi 
Constitution and Council of Representatives' by-laws; however, 
minorities among the Iraqi population are vulnerable and their rights 
are often violated. In addition, the Iraqi government partially met the 
benchmark to enact and implement legislation on the formation of 
regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be 
implemented until April 2008.[Footnote 5] 

Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. The benchmark 
requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not been met. 
Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the constitutional 
review process, such as expanded powers for the presidency, the 
resolution of disputed areas (such as Kirkuk), and power sharing 
between federal and regional governments over issues such as 
distribution of oil revenue. In addition, five other legislative 
benchmarks have not been met. Figure 1 highlights the status of the 
legislative benchmarks requiring legislative enactment and 
implementation. 

Figure 1: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative 
Benchmarks: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, UN, 
and Iraqi government data. 

[A] The Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts. 

[B] The Iraqi Constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from 
following the Presidency Council's ratification process that is set out 
in Article 138 of the Constitution. 

[C] The draft deals with broader federal versus provincial powers, 
according to UN. 

[D] According to State, the Iraqi government may not need a law to set 
the election date, though to date this is unclear. 

[End of figure] 

As figure 1 shows, legislation on de-Ba'athification reform has been 
drafted but has yet to be enacted.[Footnote 6] Hydrocarbon legislation 
is in the early stages of legislative action; although three key 
components have been drafted, none are under active consideration by 
the Council of Representatives.[Footnote 7] Although the government of 
Iraq has established an independent electoral commission and appointed 
commissioners, the government has not implemented legislation to 
establish provincial council authorities, provincial elections law, or 
a date for provincial elections. No legislation on amnesty or militia 
disarmament is being considered because the conditions for a successful 
program, particularly the need for a secure environment, are not 
present, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials. 

Prospects for additional progress in enacting legislative benchmarks 
have been complicated by the withdrawal of 15 of 37 members of the 
Iraqi cabinet. According to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report, 
this boycott ends any claim by the Shi'ite-dominated coalition to be a 
government of national unity and further undermines Iraq's already 
faltering program of national reconciliation. In late August, Iraq's 
senior Shi'a, and Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a 
Unity Accord signaling efforts to foster greater national 
reconciliation. The Accord covered draft legislation on de- 
Ba'athification reform and provincial powers laws, as well as setting 
up a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held without 
charges. However, these laws need to be passed by the Council of 
Representatives. (See appendices I-VII, and XVI for further information 
on these legislative benchmarks). 

The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some 
of these legislative benchmarks but provided little information on what 
step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Future 
reporting should provide this important detail, as we display in figure 
1. 

Security Benchmarks: 

Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met two of the nine 
security benchmarks. Specifically, it has established political, 
communications, economic, and services committees[Footnote 8] in 
support of the Baghdad security plan and, with substantial coalition 
assistance, 32 of the planned 34 Joint Security Stations[Footnote 9] 
across Baghdad. Of the remaining 7 benchmarks, the Iraqi government 
partially met 2 and did not meet five. (see fig. 2): 

Figure 2: GAO's Assessment of Whether the Iraqi Government Has Achieved 
Security Benchmarks: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and Iraqi data. 

[End of figure] 

The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark of providing three 
trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations.[Footnote 10] 
Since February 2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army 
battalions equaling three brigades for 90-day rotations to support the 
Baghdad Security Plan. The administration's July 2007 report to 
Congress noted problems in manning the Iraqi brigades, but stated that 
the three brigades were operating in support of Baghdad operations. Our 
classified report provides additional information on the readiness 
levels and performance of these units, which supports our assessment of 
this benchmark. 

The Iraqi government also partially met the benchmark of ensuring that 
the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws 
regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation.[Footnote 11] 
Even though the Baghdad Security Plan is aimed at eliminating safe 
havens, and U.S. commanders report satisfaction with the coalition's 
ability to target extremist groups, opportunities for creating 
temporary safe havens exist due to the political intervention of Iraqi 
government officials (see discussion in appendix X) and the strong 
sectarian loyalties and militia infiltration of security forces. 

The Iraqi government has not met the benchmark to reduce sectarian 
violence and eliminate militia control of local security.[Footnote 
12]As discussed in appendix XIII, militia control of local security 
forces remains a problem. Several U.S. and UN reports have found that 
militias still retain significant control or influence over local 
security in parts of Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. 

On trends in sectarian violence, we could not determine if sectarian 
violence had declined since the start of the Baghdad Security Plan. The 
administration's July 2007 report stated that MNF-I trend data 
demonstrated a decrease in sectarian violence since the start of the 
Baghdad Security Plan in mid-February 2007. The report acknowledged 
that precise measurements vary, and that it was too early to determine 
if the decrease would be sustainable. Measuring sectarian violence is 
difficult since the perpetrator's intent is not always clearly known. 
Given this difficulty, broader measures of population security should 
be used in judging these trends. The number of attacks targeting 
civilians and population displacement resulting from sectarian violence 
may serve as additional indicators. For example, as displayed in figure 
3, the average number of daily attacks against civilians remained about 
the same over the last six months. The decrease in total average daily 
attacks in July is largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition 
forces rather than civilians. 

Figure 3: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the 
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007): 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data, 
July 2007. 

[End of figure] 

While overall attacks declined in July compared to June, levels of 
violence remain high. Enemy initiated attacks have increased around 
major religious and political events, including Ramadan and 
elections.[Footnote 13] For 2007, Ramadan is scheduled to begin in mid- 
September. Our classified report provides further information on 
measurement issues and trends in violence in Iraq obtained from other 
U.S. agencies. The unclassified August 2007 National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) on Iraq reported that Coalition forces, working with 
Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some Sunni insurgents, have reduced 
al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) capabilities and restricted its freedom of 
movement. However, the NIE further noted that the level of overall 
violence, including attacks on and casualties among civilians remains 
high and AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks. 

For the remaining four unmet security benchmarks, we found that: 

* The Iraqi government has not always allowed Iraqi commanders to make 
tactical and operational decisions without political intervention, 
resulting in some operational decisions being based on sectarian 
interests.[Footnote 14] 

* The government had not always ensured that Iraqi security forces were 
providing even-handed enforcement of the law, since U.S. reports have 
cited continuing sectarian-based abuses on the part of Iraqi security 
forces.[Footnote 15] 

* Instead of increasing, the number of Iraqi army units capable of 
independent operations had decreased from March 2007 to July 
2007.[Footnote 16] 

* Iraqi political authorities continue to undermine and make false 
accusations against Iraqi security force personnel. According to U.S. 
government officials, little has changed since the administration's 
July 2007 report.[Footnote 17] 

(See appendices VIII-XV, and XVIII for further information on these 
security benchmarks). 

Economic Benchmark: 

The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to allocate and spend 
$10 billion because it allocated $10 billion in reconstruction funds 
when it passed its 2007 budget in February, 2007. The New Way Forward 
in Iraq cited Iraq's inability to spend its own resources to rebuild 
critical infrastructure and deliver essential services as an economic 
challenge to Iraq's self-reliance. Iraqi government funds represent an 
important source of financing for rebuilding Iraq since the United 
States has obligated most of the $40 billion provided to Iraq for 
reconstruction and stabilization activities since 2003. 

However, it is unclear whether the $10 billion allocated by the Iraqi 
government will be spent by the end of Iraq's fiscal year, December 31, 
2007.[Footnote 18] Preliminary Ministry of Finance data reports that 
Iraq's central ministries spent about $1.5 billion, or 24 percent, of 
the approximately $6.5 billion in capital project funds allocated to 
them through July 15, 2007. The remaining funds from the $10 billion 
were allocated to the provinces and the Kurdish region. (See appendix 
XVII for further information on the economic benchmark): 

Conclusions: 

As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and 
did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. The Iraqi government has not 
fulfilled commitments it first made in June 2006 to advance 
legislative, security, and economic measures that would promote 
national reconciliation among Iraq's warring factions. Of particular 
concern is the lack of progress on the constitutional review that could 
promote greater Sunni participation in the national government and 
comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that would distribute Iraq's vast 
oil wealth. Despite Iraqi leaders recently signing a unity accord, the 
polarization of Iraq's major sects and ethnic groups and fighting among 
Shi'a factions diminishes the stability of Iraq's governing coalition 
and its potential to enact legislation needed for sectarian 
reconciliation. 

Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While the 
Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, 
measuring such violence may be difficult since the perpetrator's intent 
is not clearly known. Other measures of violence, such as the number of 
enemy-initiated attacks, show that violence has remained high through 
July 2007. 

As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance the 
achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military progress, 
homeland security, foreign policy and other goals of the United States. 
Future administration reports on the benchmarks would be more useful to 
the Congress if they clearly depicted the status of each legislative 
benchmark, provided additional quantitative and qualitative information 
on violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and specified the 
performance and loyalties of Iraqi security forces supporting coalition 
operations. 

Recommendations: 

In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase 
transparency on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we 
recommend that: 

1. The Secretary of State provide information to the President that 
clearly specifies the status in drafting, enacting, and implementing 
Iraqi legislation; 

2. The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other appropriate 
agencies, provide information to the President on trends in sectarian 
violence with appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative and 
qualitative measures of population security, and: 

3. The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other appropriate 
agencies, provides additional information on the operational readiness 
of Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad security plan, 
particularly information on their loyalty and willingness to help 
secure Baghdad. 

As discussed below, State and DOD concurred with these recommendations. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 
Defense, the National Intelligence Council, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. The National Intelligence Council and the Central 
Intelligence Agency provided technical comments, which we incorporated 
as appropriate. 

The Department of State provided written comments, which are reprinted 
in appendix XXII. State also provided us with technical comments and 
suggested wording changes that we incorporated as appropriate. State 
agreed with our recommendation to provide the President with additional 
information on the specific status of key Iraqi legislation in 
preparing future reports to Congress. State suggested that we note the 
standards we used in assessing the 18 benchmarks differ from the 
administration's standards. The highlights page and introduction of our 
report discuss these differing standards. State also suggested that we 
take into consideration recent political developments in Iraq, such as 
the communiqué released by Iraqi political leaders on August 26, 2007. 
We added additional information to the report about this communiqué and 
related developments. 

The Department of Defense also provided written comments, which are 
reprinted in appendix XXIII. DOD also provided us with technical 
comments and suggested wording changes that we incorporated as 
appropriate. Defense agreed with our recommendations to provide, in 
concert with other relevant agencies, information to the President on 
trends in sectarian violence with appropriate caveats, as well as 
broader quantitative and qualitative measures of security. Defense also 
agreed to provide the President with additional information on the 
operational readiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad 
security plan. 

DOD also provided additional oral comments. DOD disagreed with our 
conclusion in the draft report that trends in sectarian violence are 
unclear. Further information on DOD's views, and our response, are 
contained in our classified report. However, the additional information 
that DOD provided did not warrant a change in our assessment of "not 
met." We note that the unclassified August 2007 NIE stated that the 
overall violence in Iraq, including attacks on and casualties among 
civilians, remains high, Iraq's major sectarian groups remain 
unreconciled, and levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will 
remain high over the next six to twelve months. 

DOD disagreed with our initial assessment of "not met" for the training 
and readiness of the Iraqi brigades supporting operations in Baghdad 
and provided additional information on this issue. While acknowledging 
that some of these Iraqi units lacked personnel, fighting equipment, 
and vehicles, the U.S. commander embedded with the units attested to 
their fighting capabilities. Based on this additional information, and 
our classified and unclassified information, we changed our rating from 
"not met" to "partially met." 

DOD did not agree with our initial assessment that the benchmark 
related to safe havens was not met. DOD provided additional information 
describing MNF-I efforts to conduct targeted operations in Sadr City. 
For example, from January to August 2007, Coalition forces and Iraqi 
security forces conducted over eighty operations that span each sector 
of Sadr City. However, due to sectarian influence and infiltration of 
Iraqi security forces, and support from the local population, anti- 
coalition forces retain the freedom to organize and conduct operations 
against coalition forces. Based on this additional information, we 
changed this assessment to "partially met." 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate Members of 
Congress. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me on (202) 512-5500 or Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director, 
International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8979. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
included in appendix XXIV. 

Signed by: 

David M. Walker: 
United States Comptroller General: 

Enclosures: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Judd Gregg: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Lantos: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey: 
Chairwoman: 
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Benchmark 1 - Constitutional Review: 

Forming a constitutional review committee and completing the 
constitutional review. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 19] 

Issue: 

Iraq's Constitution was approved in a national referendum in October 
2005, but did not resolve several contentious issues, such as claims 
over disputed areas including oil-rich Kirkuk. Amending the 
Constitution is critical to reaching national agreement on power 
sharing among Iraq's political blocs and furthering national 
reconciliation, according to Iraqi leaders, U.S. officials, and the 
Iraq Study Group report. 

Status: 

Although the Iraqi legislature formed a Constitutional Review Committee 
(CRC) in November 2006, the review process is not yet 
complete.[Footnote 20] First, the review committee's work is not 
finished. In a May 23, 2007 report, the CRC recommended a package of 
constitutional amendments to the Iraq Council of Representatives. 
However, the package did not resolve the powers of the presidency; 
disputed territories, including Kirkuk; and the relative powers of the 
regions versus the federal government. The CRC received an extension 
until the end of August 2007 to help resolve the outstanding issues, 
but, according to the chairman of the CRC, Iraq's major political 
groups need to reach agreement on these issues. Second, once resolved, 
the Iraqi legislature must approve the package of amendments by an 
absolute majority vote. Finally, if a package of amendments is 
approved, the Iraqi people will need to vote on the amendments in a 
referendum within 2 months after the legislature approves them. 

Completion of the Constitutional Review First Requires Political 
Accommodation: 

To complete a package of necessary amendments to the Constitution, 
Iraq's major political groups need to reach agreement on the following 
three contentious issues. 

* Power of the presidency. The Deputy Chairman of the CRC, a member of 
the Sunni bloc, believes that the presidency should have greater power. 
The Constitution gives the presidency such powers as accrediting 
ambassadors. It also gives the presidency council the power to approve 
or disapprove legislation in the current electoral term.[Footnote 21] 
However, the legislature can adopt any disapproved legislation by a 
three-fifths majority vote. In contrast, the prime minister, selected 
from the legislature's largest political bloc, is commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces, names the ministers for each ministry, and directs 
the Council of Ministers. The Council directs the work of all 
government ministries and departments, develops their plans, and 
prepares the government budget. The high-ranking Sunni official said 
that giving the presidency more power could allow for better power 
sharing among Iraq's political groups. 

* Disputed areas, particularly Kirkuk. Article 140 of the Constitution 
addresses the issue of disputed areas. It requires a census and a 
referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed areas by December 31, 2007 to 
determine the will of its citizens. According to the Kurdistan Regional 
Government's (KRG) prime minister, Kirkuk represents the Kurdish region 
and must be returned to Kurdistan. Under the former regime's policy of 
Arabization--removing Kurdish families from Kirkuk and replacing them 
with Arab families--areas of Kirkuk were given to other governorates, 
according to a Kurdish committee. KRG officials want the referendum 
held by the date specified in the Constitution. Other Iraqi legislators 
believe that the Kirkuk referendum should be deferred because of the 
disputes over the borders of Kirkuk and continuing displacement of 
people in the area. 

* Power of the federal government versus regions. The CRC proposed 
several amendments to the Constitution to clarify the powers of the 
federal government and the shared powers with the regions, but has not 
achieved compromise among major political factions on these amendments. 
In particular, the CRC proposed amending Article 111 of the 
Constitution to clearly state that the federal government shall collect 
oil revenues and distribute them equally to all Iraqis in accordance 
with the national budget law. According to the United Nations, this 
amendment would provide the federal government exclusive authority for 
oil revenues. In contrast, the existing constitutional framework is 
widely interpreted as allowing regions to define how and whether they 
share locally generated oil revenues.[Footnote 22] For this reason, the 
Kurdish bloc opposes the CRC-proposed amendment. 

Procedural and Logistical Challenges Confront Completion of the Review: 

If agreement is reached on a package of constitutional amendments, the 
Iraqi legislature must vote on the package. The amendments will be 
considered approved if an absolute majority of the legislature votes 
for the package. One challenge is simply holding a vote. 

Despite Iraqi leaders signing a unity accord, as of August 29, 2007, 
several Iraqi parties were boycotting the government, including Iraq's 
largest Sunni bloc. Although the other parties in the legislature could 
form an absolute majority to pass a package of amendments, it would 
defeat the purpose of trying to reach a broad political accommodation. 

If the legislature approves the constitutional amendments, the 
government must hold a national referendum within 2 months of approval. 
According to the United Nations, before a referendum can occur, the 
Iraq Electoral Commission must develop a valid voting roster, educate 
the public about the proposed amendments, print referendum ballots, and 
locate and staff polling places. In a July 2007 report, the Iraq High 
Electoral Commission stated that it faced challenges to developing a 
valid voting roster because of the large movement of displaced persons--
an estimated 800,000 since February 2006.[Footnote 23] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Benchmark 2 - De-Ba'athification Reform: 

Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification reform. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 24] 

Issue: 

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 1 dissolved the Ba'athist 
party, removed Ba'athist leaders and senior party members from 
government, and banned them from future employment in the public 
sector. The CPA further provided for investigation and removal of even 
junior members of the party from upper-level management in government 
ministries, universities, and hospitals. Most of Iraqi's technocratic 
class was pushed out of government due to de-Ba'athification and many 
Sunni Arabs remain angry about policies to de-Ba'athify Iraqi society, 
according to the Iraq Study Group report. 

Status: 

Although Iraqi leaders have drafted several pieces of legislation to 
reform de-Ba'athification, none has sufficient support among Iraq's 
political factions to have a first reading in the Iraqi legislature, 
according to U.S. officials. No consensus exists on reforming the 
current de-Ba'athification policy and many Iraqis are concerned by the 
prospects of former Ba'athist tormenters returning to power. However, 
according to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report, Iraq's senior 
Shi'a and Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a Unity 
Accord, including consensus on draft legislation on de-Ba'thification 
reform. Such a law would need to be drafted, passed by the Council of 
Representatives, and implemented. 

According to U.S. officials, reforms to the law would more likely 
promote reconciliation if the reforms target Ba'athists who had command 
responsibility within the party or committed human rights violations or 
other crimes.[Footnote 25] Removing individuals based purely on party 
membership increases the chances that segments of the Iraqi public will 
see the system as unfair, according to these officials. Draft 
legislation on de-Ba'athification reform, dated July 2007 before the 
Unity Accord, provides for a special commission, a panel of judges to 
make decisions, and the right to appeal the panel's decisions. The 
draft legislation also specifies that the commission will be dissolved 
6 months after the law is passed. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation: 

Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable 
distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without 
regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and 
implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq 
benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an 
equitable manner. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 26] 

Issue: 

The importance of oil revenues for the Iraqi economy is widely 
recognized, as is the need to create a new legal framework for the 
development and management of the country's oil sector. The oil sector 
accounts for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and over 90 
percent of its revenues. The timely and equitable distribution of these 
revenues is essential to Iraq's ability to provide for its needs, 
including the reconstruction of a unified Iraq. 

Status: 

The government of Iraq has not enacted and implemented any of the four 
separate yet interrelated pieces of legislation needed to ensure the 
equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources. As of August 2007, the 
Iraqi government had drafted three pieces of legislation: (1) 
hydrocarbon framework legislation that establishes the structure, 
management, and oversight for the oil sector; (2) revenue-sharing 
legislation; and (3) legislation restructuring the Ministry of Oil. 
However, none of the legislation is currently under consideration by 
Iraq's parliament (Council of Representatives). A fourth piece of 
legislation establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) has not 
been drafted, according to State officials. 

Hydrocarbon framework legislation was approved by the Iraqi cabinet 
(Council of Ministers) in February 2007, and sent to the Oil and Gas 
Committee of Iraq's parliament for review in July 2007. However, before 
the legislation was submitted to the parliament, the Iraqi government 
amended the draft to address substantive changes made by the Shura 
council. According to State, the Shura council reviews draft 
legislation to ensure constitutionality and to avoid contradictions 
with Iraq's legal system, including Islamic law. The Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) did not agree to the council's revisions. Accordingly, 
the Oil and Gas Committee chairman is taking no legislative action 
until the Iraqi cabinet and the KRG agree on a new draft, according to 
State. It is not clear if this legislation will include annexes 
intended to allocate the control of particular oil fields and 
exploration areas to either the central or regional governments. 
According to the Iraqi government, the annexes remain under 
consideration. 

Revenue-sharing legislation is intended to ensure the equitable 
distribution of Iraq's financial resources, including oil and gas 
revenues. The central government and the KRG agreed on draft revenue- 
sharing legislation[Footnote 27] in June 2007. However, the Iraqi 
cabinet has not yet approved the legislation and submitted it to Iraq's 
parliament for consideration. 

This draft legislation is linked to proposed amendments to the Iraqi 
Constitution regarding the role of the federal government and regions 
and the management of oil revenues. Under the existing Constitution, if 
there is a contradiction between regional and national law with respect 
to a matter outside the exclusive authority of the federal government, 
regional law takes priority and regional powers have the right to amend 
the application of the national legislation within that region. As oil 
revenue sharing is not a power exclusively reserved for the federal 
government in the existing Constitution, according to officials, 
regions may determine how and whether they share locally generated oil 
revenues with the remainder of Iraq, regardless of what is stated in 
the federal law.[Footnote 28] In response, the Iraqi Constitutional 
Review Committee has proposed amendments to the Constitution that would 
provide for the national collection and distribution of oil revenues. 

Legislation restructuring the Ministry of Oil has been drafted but has 
not yet been submitted to the Council of Ministers, according to State. 

Legislation establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) is being 
drafted, according to State. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Benchmark 4 - Semi-Autonomous Regions: 

Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi- 
autonomous regions. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met[Footnote 29] 

Issue: 

Iraq's Constitution requires the Council of Representatives to enact a 
law that defines the executive procedures needed to form regions within 
6 months of the date of its first session. Some Iraqi legislators 
believe that the right to form regions, with authority similar to the 
Kurdistan region, would help protect their rights. 

Status: 

In October 2006, the Iraqi legislature passed a law establishing 
procedures to form regions, but the law delays implementation for 18 
months.[Footnote 30] According to U.S. officials, this means that no 
steps to form regions, such as holding provincial referendums, can be 
taken before April 2008. According to State, this is in the best 
interests of Iraq as it will allow the government to deal with some 
outstanding issues. The United Nations has identified two issues that 
may impact implementation of this law--the ongoing review of Iraq's 
Constitution and the capacity of new regional governments. 

According to members of Iraq's Constitutional Review Committee (CRC), 
the law on procedures to form regions was delayed for 18 months to 
allow the constitutional review process to be completed. Some of the 
proposed amendments to the constitution would clarify the powers of the 
federal government versus regions and governorates For example, 
according to the United Nations, the CRC proposed amendments that would 
give federal law priority over regional law with respect to water, 
customs, ports, and oil and revenue sharing. Other proposed amendments 
would give the federal government exclusive power over electricity 
generation, railways, and pension funds.[Footnote 31] Moreover, the 
constitutional review could also help resolve the status of disputed 
areas, which could impact regional boundaries. Until the constitutional 
review is completed and the constitutional referendum is held, 
residents in areas considering regional formation may not have all the 
information they need to make decisions. 

The capability of the regions to govern themselves will also impact 
implementation of the law. Article 121 of the Constitution accords 
significant executive, judicial, and management authorities to the 
regions. The regions have responsibility for maintaining their internal 
security forces, administering allocations from national revenues, and 
maintaining representational offices in embassies and consuls. 
Moreover, the law on formation of regions provides that once formed, 
the regions must undertake to create elected provisional legislative 
councils. According to the United Nations, this will require a 
substantial investment of resources and significant management 
responsibility. GAO has reported on significant shortages of competent 
personnel in national ministries charged with delivering services to 
the Iraqi people; moreover, these shortages are greater at the 
provincial level of government, according to State and USAID officials. 
We have also reported that the poor security situation and high levels 
of violence have contributed to the continued and accelerating "brain 
drain" of professional Iraqis that would be needed to manage the new 
regional administrations[Footnote 32].

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Benchmark 5 - Electoral Legislation: 

Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High 
Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council 
authorities, and a date for provincial elections. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 33] 

Issue: 

When provincial elections were first held on January 2005, many Sunnis 
boycotted the election, resulting in largely Shi'a and Kurd provincial 
councils in provinces with majority Sunni populations. To redress the 
under-representation of Sunnis in provincial councils, Iraq needs to 
hold new provincial elections, but must first establish an electoral 
commission, write provincial election laws, define provincial powers so 
voters know the stakes, and set a date for elections. 

Status: 

Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented legislation 
establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), it has 
not enacted and implemented legislation establishing a provincial 
elections law, provincial council authorities, or a date for provincial 
elections. 

* Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented 
legislation to establish an IHEC, certain steps still remain in 
establishing the commission. According to the U.S. government, the 
Council of Representatives (COR) passed the IHEC Law on January 23, 
2007, and subsequently appointed the nine IHEC Commissioners, as 
required under the law, in a process the UN deemed in compliance with 
international standards. However, a provision in the IHEC law requires 
the COR to nominate and the Board of Commissioners to appoint the 
directors of the Governorate Electoral Offices in each province. Twelve 
of these positions are vacant, but, according to State, the process of 
appointing the directors is progressing. The law also requires the IHEC 
to establish and update a voter registry in collaboration with the 
Governorate and Regional Electoral Offices. However, before they can 
complete an update of the voter registry (which was last updated in mid-
2005), an election law must be enacted that defines the residency and 
voter eligibility requirements. Finally, the IHEC still needs a budget 
to fund its activities. 

* Iraq has not enacted and implemented legislation for provincial 
elections. According to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Prime 
Minster's office is drafting legislation governing provincial 
elections, including setting a date for elections to occur. However, 
according to the Embassy, some key political parties are hesitant to 
hold provincial elections due to concerns that they will lose 
representation, potentially to more extreme parties. Additionally, 
several parties are demanding that any election law ensure that 
eligible refugees and internally displaced persons be allowed to vote. 

* Provincial powers legislation, which will define the authorities and 
structures of local governments, has not been enacted and implemented. 
According to the U.S. government, the draft legislation has been 
approved and submitted to the Council of Representatives, where it has 
had two of the three required readings. However, the U.S. government 
reported in July 2007 that changes were being considered, particularly 
related to the powers of the governor and the authority of the federal 
government at the local level. The U.S. Embassy cited key issues with 
the draft, including that it cedes most power to the provinces. The 
United Nations pointed out that the draft fails to clarify the role of 
the governorate and that the draft law does not deal adequately with 
the effective delivery of public goods and services in the 
governorates. According to the U.S. Embassy, on July 8, 2007, the 
relevant COR committee presented a report outlining suggested changes 
to the law, some of which the Embassy supported. 

* The government of Iraq has not set a date for provincial elections. 
The Iraq Study Group emphasized the need for provincial elections at 
the earliest possible date. The Embassy is urging the Iraqi government 
to take the legislative and administrative action necessary to ensure 
timely and fair elections. According to the U.S. Embassy, it is 
intensively engaged with the Iraqi government and the COR at all levels 
to expedite legislation or amendments to existing legislation that will 
allow provincial elections to take place and secure funding for 
elections. 

In comments on this appendix, State said that this benchmark should be 
partially met since the Iraq High Electoral Commission has been 
established and the benchmark calls only for its establishment. 
However, the benchmark requires more than the establishment of the 
IHEC, and Iraq has not enacted and implemented a provincial elections 
law, provincial council authorities, or a date for provincial 
elections, as required by the benchmark. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Benchmark 6 - Amnesty Legislation: 

Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 34] 

Issue: 

Iraqi government officials believe that amnesty for insurgents and 
others who have not committed terrorist acts is an important tool to 
promote reconciliation and could help pacify insurgents. In addition, 
the Iraqi government and coalition forces hold thousands of detainees, 
some of whom could be eligible for an amnesty program when conditions 
are right. 

Status: 

The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on amnesty, according 
to U.S. officials, and the conditions for a successful program are not 
present. As figure 2 in the cover letter shows, many steps remain in 
the legislative process, including drafting the legislation and 
obtaining approval in the Iraqi cabinet and Council of Representatives. 
However, the government of Iraq is not pressing for the development of 
amnesty legislation. 

Little Progress Made in Considering Amnesty Legislation: 

Although amnesty was proposed as part of the Prime Minister's national 
reconciliation plan in June 2006, little progress has been made. The 
plan called for issuing amnesty to prisoners not involved in crimes 
against humanity or terrorist acts. At that time, the Iraqi government 
announced that it would release 2,500 detainees; 2,500 prisoners were 
subsequently released. According to U.S. officials in Baghdad, no large-
scale releases have been made since 2006, and there has been little 
discussion of amnesty since then. However, the Prime Minister's office 
and Iraq's Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Committee 
sponsored a workshop on amnesty in May 2007. The workshop recommended 
that amnesty should not proceed, but rather should result from national 
reconciliation and that the government's military has to be superior to 
armed groups as a condition for offering amnesty. 

The scope of an amnesty program is also an issue. The United Nations 
takes the position that in considering the categories of perpetrators 
to be included or excluded in amnesty, international law does not allow 
amnesty to be granted to those who committed genocide, crimes against 
humanity, or other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law. In addition, Iraqi government officials have recommended that an 
amnesty program consider all detained individuals held by Iraq and by 
coalition forces. There are currently thousands of detainees, including 
over 24,000 held by coalition forces. According to multinational force 
officials, there could be considerably more detainees in the future as 
the Baghdad security plan progresses. The Coalition's Task Force 134 is 
building and expanding prison facilities to accommodate additional 
detainees. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Benchmark 7 - Militia Disarmament: 

Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia 
disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable 
only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 35] 

Issue: 

Militias contribute to the high levels of violence in Iraq, are 
responsible for sectarian killings, fuel ongoing corruption, and have 
heavily infiltrated the Iraqi army and national police. Efforts to 
dissolve or bring militias under control have been ongoing since 2004. 
In March 2007, 77 percent of Iraqis in a nationwide poll agreed that 
militias should be dissolved. 

Status: 

The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on disarming militias. 
CPA Order 91, issued in 2004, prohibited armed forces and militias 
within Iraq, except for those allowed under the Order.[Footnote 36] 
Multiple steps are needed to enact and implement further legislation to 
disarm militias. More importantly, according to U.S. officials, 
conditions are not right for a traditional disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration program (DDR); accordingly, there is currently no 
momentum in the government of Iraq for such a program. Thus, militias 
pose a severe challenge to stability and reconciliation in Iraq. 

Militias Pose a Challenge, but Little Progress Has Been Made in 
Demobilizing Them: 

Militias have contributed to the high levels of violence in Iraq. 
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, the Jayash al- 
Mahdi (the militia associated with Muqtada al Sadr), often operates 
under the protection or approval of Iraqi police to detain and kill 
suspected Sunni insurgents and civilians. A June 2007 Defense 
Department report further notes that many Jayash al-Mahdi fighters have 
left Baghdad as a result of expanded coalition and Iraqi presence. They 
now engage in ethnic and sectarian violence in northern and central 
Iraq and have increased conflict with the Badr Organization in southern 
Iraq leading to a significant increase in attacks against the coalition 
in Basrah. The June 2007 report also states that Shi'a militia 
infiltration of the Ministry of Interior is a problem. Militia 
influence impacts every component of the Ministry, particularly in 
Baghdad and other key cities. 

Despite the challenge the militias pose, little progress has been made 
to disarm and demobilize them. Nine parties, with militias numbering an 
estimated 100,000 fighters, agreed to a transition and reintegration 
process in 2004. The Coalition Provisional Authority estimated that 90 
percent of these fighters would complete the transition and 
reintegration process by January 2005. However, according to the 
administration's July 15, 2007 report, no armed group has committed to 
disarm. Moreover, according to U.S. officials in Baghdad, the Iraqi DDR 
commission has not developed a plan for DDR and has not received 
funding for its work. 

Conditions for Traditional DDR Do Not Exist: 

A May 2007 UN assessment on DDR for Iraq states that minimum 
requirements for a successful DDR program in Iraq include a secure 
environment, the inclusion of all belligerent parties, an overarching 
political agreement, sustainable funding, and appropriate reintegration 
opportunities. GAO's reports and analysis show that these conditions do 
not exist in Iraq. For example: 

* As figure 2 in the cover letter shows, the overall level of attacks 
against Iraqi civilians, coalition personnel, and Iraqi security forces 
has risen since 2003, creating a poor security environment. Classified 
and unclassified GAO reports provide further information on security in 
Iraq.[Footnote 37] 

* In June 2006, the prime minister sought to include insurgent groups 
as part of his reconciliation plan. However, according to 
administration and DOD reports, efforts at reconciliation have stalled. 
In addition, Iraqi officials reject terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda 
in Iraq, and a report done for the U.S. Embassy comments that some 
groups cannot be reconciled. Also, the support of external actors is an 
important element of disarmament and demobilization, but according to 
U.S. reports, some external groups are not helpful. For example, Iran's 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard provides deadly arms and funding to Iraq's 
militias and contributes to the ongoing instability. 

The Iraqi government provided $150 million for DDR in its 2007 budget 
and the Congress has made available up to $156 million from the Iraq 
Security Forces fund, to be used to assist the government of Iraq for 
this purpose. However, Iraq has prepared no plan for DDR and has not 
made progress in enacting legislation. Thus, it is uncertain whether 
such funding is needed at this time. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: Benchmark 8 - Baghdad Security Plan Committees: 

Establish supporting political, media, economic, and services 
committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met[Footnote 38] 

Issue: 

The U.S. and Iraqi governments began the current Baghdad security 
plan[Footnote 39] in mid-February 2007 to stem the violence in Baghdad 
and surrounding areas. During the summer of 2006, MNF-I and the Iraqi 
security forces implemented two other plans to secure Baghdad, but 
these operations failed to reduce violence for a variety of reasons. 
Unlike the earlier operations, the current Baghdad Security Plan 
encompasses political, economic, and security activities that the Iraqi 
government needed to coordinate at the national level. 

Status: 

In February 2007, the Iraqi government created the Executive Steering 
Committee (the executive committee) and six subcommittees to coordinate 
political, economic and military activities and make decisions in 
support of the Baghdad Security Plan. According to a Department of 
State official, the executive committee's major objective was to 
increase the coordination and capacity of the Iraqi government to 
improve the quality of life of Baghdad's population as part of the 
Baghdad Security Plan. Each of the subcommittees addresses one of six 
issues related to the plan's implementation: economics, services, 
political, communication, popular mobilization, and security. The 
executive committee and subcommittees meet on a weekly basis. 

The committees consist of Iraqi and U.S. participants. The Iraqi Prime 
Minister chairs the executive committee, while senior-level Iraqi 
ministry officials chair the various subcommittees. For example, a 
deputy prime minister chairs the economic subcommittee and the services 
subcommittee. Representatives from the relevant Iraqi ministries serve 
on each subcommittee. Two senior U.S. officials are observers to the 
executive committee and attend its weekly meetings. A senior MNF-I or 
U.S. embassy official is also assigned to each subcommittee. This 
official provides advice on the subcommittees' agendas and other 
support when called upon. 

According to a Department of State official, the executive committee 
and subcommittees have worked to ensure that the Iraqi government 
provided sufficient Iraqi forces to assist MNF-I in implementing the 
Baghdad Security Plan. For example, when the Iraqi Army provided 
brigades that were not at full strength, the executive committee and 
security subcommittee identified forces from other parts of the country 
to move to Baghdad. The committees also found ways to house and feed 
the Iraqi troops supporting the security plan. In addition, the 
communication subcommittee has helped publicize the security plan's 
goals and the other subcommittees' efforts to get resources to Baghdad 
districts that have been cleared of insurgents. 

We did not assess the effectiveness of the executive committee or 
subcommittees in providing overall coordination and supporting the 
implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan. However, the 
administration's July 2007 report to Congress stated that the 
effectiveness of each committee varied. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IX: Benchmark 9 - Iraqi Brigades: 

Provide three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad 
operations. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met[Footnote 40] 

Issue: 

During the summer of 2006, a large number of Iraqi security forces 
refused to deploy to Baghdad to conduct operations in support of the 
previous Baghdad Security Plans. In January 2007, the President said 
that the Iraqi government had agreed to resolve this problem under the 
current plan and had committed three additional Iraqi brigades to 
support the new plan. 

Status: 

Since February 2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army 
battalions equaling three brigades for 90-day rotations to support the 
Baghdad Security Plan. In the July 2007 report, the administration 
stated that the Iraqi government had difficulty deploying three 
additional army brigades to Baghdad at sufficient strength. In 
commenting on our draft report, DOD stated that current present for 
duty rates for deployed units is 75 percent of authorized strength. 
However, the July 2007 administration report stated that the government 
has deployed battalions from multiple Iraqi Army divisions to provide 
the required three brigade-equivalent forces to support the Baghdad 
security plan. After the initial deployment of the required brigades, 
the Iraqi government began the rotation plan. 19 units have currently 
deployed in support of the Baghdad security plan. Several of these 
units voluntarily extended, and others were rotated every 90 days in 
accordance with the plan. In addition, all of the Iraqi units had pre- 
deployment training to support operations in Baghdad. The 
administration's July 2007 report states that progress toward this 
benchmark has been satisfactory, and the overall effect has been 
satisfactory in that three brigades are operating in Baghdad. 

However, in commenting on this report, DOD stated that performance of 
the units currently supporting Baghdad operations has been varied. Some 
units had performed exceptionally well, proven themselves and raised 
their readiness ratings. Others had marked time and slowly regressed 
over their 90-day deployment. Of the 19 Iraqi units that had supported 
operations in Baghdad, 5 units had performed well while the remaining 
had proven to be problematic for several reasons: lack of personnel, 
lack of individual fighting equipment and lack of vehicles to conduct 
their assigned missions. We obtained classified information that 
indicates other problems with these Iraqi army units. Our classified 
briefing report provides more information on this benchmark. 

[End of section] 

Appendix X: Benchmark 10 - Commander's Authority: 

Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan 
and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with 
U.S commanders, without political intervention, to include the 
authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and 
Shi'ite militias. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 41] 

Issue: 

As stated in the President's January 10, 2007, speech on the Baghdad 
security plan, previous Baghdad security plans failed, in part, because 
Iraqi political and sectarian interference prevented forces from taking 
action against militias. According to the administration's initial 
assessment, Iraq's Prime Minister stated that political or sectarian 
interference in the affairs of the Iraqi security forces will not be 
tolerated, and actions have been taken to address political 
intervention. 

Status: 

In July 2007, the administration reported that the government of Iraq 
has not made satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders 
with all authorities to execute the Baghdad security plan and to make 
tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. commanders 
without political intervention. The report noted that political 
intervention in the conduct of some security operations continues even 
though new rules of engagement for the Baghdad Operational Command have 
come into effect and commanders have been given the authority to attack 
insurgents and militias. 

According to U.S. officials and other experts, sectarian and political 
interference in the conduct of military operations continues. Tribal 
and ethno-sectarian loyalties remain strong within many Iraqi military 
units, hindering efforts to take actions against militias. These 
loyalties are often the basis for relationships between key officers in 
units and higher-level authorities who are not always in the direct 
chain of command. For example, sectarian militias control many local 
police. Additionally, some army units sent to Baghdad have mixed 
loyalties, and some have had ties to Shi'a militias making it difficult 
to target Shi'a extremist networks. Further, according to DOD, evidence 
exists of target lists emanating from the Office of the Commander in 
Chief that bypassed operational commanders and directed lower-level 
intelligence officers and commanders to make arrests, primarily of 
Sunnis. In addition, sectarian bias in the appointment of senior 
military and police commanders continues, giving rise to suspicions 
that political considerations may drive Iraqi commanders' decisions 
about which operations to undertake or support. 

In commenting on this benchmark, DOD noted that all 9 of the brigade 
commanders and 17 of the 27 national police battalion commanders have 
been replaced for failure to command or enforce non-sectarian 
operations. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XI: Benchmark 11 - Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the 
Law: 

Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed 
enforcement of the law. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 42] 

Issue: 

During 2006, according to a Department of State human rights report, 
the Iraqi security forces committed serious human rights violations in 
Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. These actions added to the increasing 
violence against the civilian population during 2006. In support of the 
Baghdad security plan, the Iraqi Prime Minister pledged to provide even-
handed enforcement of the law. 

Status: 

According to U.S. reports, the government of Iraq has not ensured that 
the Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the 
law. In May 2007, the U.S. Commission on International Religious 
Freedom[Footnote 43] reported that Iraq's Shi'a-dominated government 
bears responsibility for engaging in sectarian-based human rights 
violations, as well as tolerating abuses committed by Shi'a militias 
with ties to political factions in the governing coalition. According 
to the commission, the Iraqi government through its security forces has 
committed arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without due process, 
targeted executions, and torture against non-Shi'a Iraqis. In 
committing these abuses, the security forces target Sunnis on the basis 
of their religious identity, as well as terrorists and insurgents. 

Furthermore, the commission reported that the Iraqi government 
tolerates and fails to control religiously motivated attacks and other 
abuses carried out by Shi'a militias, specifically Jayash al-Mahdi and 
Badr Organization. These militias have targeted Sunnis on the basis of 
their religious identity and have committed such abuses as abductions, 
beatings, targeted killings, intimidation, forced resettlement, murder, 
rape, and torture. According to the commission's report, relationships 
between these militias and leading Shi'a factions within Iraq's 
ministries and governing coalition indicate that the Jayash al- Mahdi 
and Badr Organization are parastate actors operating with impunity or 
even with governmental complicity. 

In mid-August 2007, Department of State officials stated that the Iraqi 
government and security forces continue to engage in sectarian-based 
abuses. State's March 2007 human rights report[Footnote 44] cited 
widely reported incidents of unauthorized government agent involvement 
in extrajudicial killings throughout the country. These incidents 
included Shi'a militia members wearing police uniforms and driving 
police cars in carrying out killings and kidnapping in the southern 
city of Basra. In addition, death squads affiliated with the Ministry 
of Interior targeted Sunnis and conducted kidnapping raids in Baghdad 
and its environs, largely with impunity. 

The administration's July 2007 report stated that the Iraqi government 
and many Iraqi security force units are still applying the law on a 
sectarian basis when left on their own. The report attributed any 
progress made by the security forces in enforcing the law more even- 
handedly to the presence of coalition units and embedded training 
teams, rather than to the Iraqi government. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XII: Benchmark 12 - Safe Havens: 

Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said 
"the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any 
outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation." 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met[Footnote 45] 

Issue: 

As stated in the President's January 10, 2007, speech on the Baghdad 
security plan, previous plans to secure Baghdad have failed, in part, 
because political and sectarian interference and rules of engagement in 
place for those plans prevented Iraqi and coalition forces from 
entering neighborhoods that are safe havens to those fueling the 
sectarian violence. On January 6, 2007, the Iraqi Prime Minister 
stated, "The Baghdad security plan will not offer a safe shelter for 
outlaws regardless of their ethnic and political affiliations, and we 
will punish anyone who hesitates to implement orders because of his 
ethnic and political background." 

Status: 

Although the Iraqi government has allowed MNF-I to conduct operations 
in all areas of Baghdad, temporary safe havens still exist due to 
strong sectarian loyalties and militia infiltration of security forces. 
According to State, terrorist safe havens are defined as ungoverned, 
under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country and non-physical 
areas where terrorists that constitute a threat to U.S. national 
security interests are able to organize, plan, raise funds, 
communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because 
of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both. 

U.S. commanders report overall satisfaction with their ability to 
target any and all extremist groups. In commenting on our draft report, 
DOD stated that coalition forces and Iraqi security forces conducted 
over eighty operations that span each sector of Sadr City from January 
to August 2007. According to DOD, the surge has resulted in significant 
reductions in safe havens for al Qaeda in Iraq inside Baghdad and in al 
Anbar and Diyala provinces. In previous Baghdad operations, the Iraqi 
government prevented Iraqi and coalition forces from going into Sadr 
City. Although MNF-I conducts operations in Sadr City, MNF-I and Iraqi 
security forces maintain only one Joint Security Station on the border 
of Sadr City, with none within the city itself (see fig. 4). In 
addition to Joint Security Stations, MNF-I established about 30 
coalition outposts throughout Baghdad, including one on the border of 
Sadr City. 

Figure 4: Location of Joint Security Stations and Coalition Outposts in 
Baghdad: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Multinational Division-Baghdad. 

[End of figure] 

However, due to sectarian influence and infiltration of Iraqi security 
forces and support from the local population, anti-coalition forces 
retain the freedom to organize and conduct operations against coalition 
forces. Thus temporary safe havens still exist in Baghdad, which 
supports a rating of partially met. A June 2007 DOD report describes 
some of the conditions that allow safe havens to exist. For example, 
the Shi'a militia continues to function as the de facto government in 
Sadr City. Further, militia influence impacts every component of the 
Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, particularly in Baghdad and several 
other key cities, according to the DOD report. 

Our classified briefing report provides more information on the 
existence of safe havens. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XIII: Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control: 

Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating 
militia control of local security. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 46] 

Issue: 

During 2006, according to State and UN reports,[Footnote 47] 
insurgents, death squads, militias, and terrorists increased their 
attacks against civilians, largely on a sectarian basis. In addition, 
the number of internally displaced persons in Iraq sharply increased 
following the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra mosque, primarily as 
a result of sectarian intimidation and violence that forced many people 
from their homes. By the end of 2006, according to the UN, many Baghdad 
neighborhoods had become divided along Sunni and Shi'a lines and were 
increasingly controlled by armed groups claiming to act as protectors 
and defenders of these areas.[Footnote 48] In January 2007, the 
President announced that the United States would increase force levels 
in Iraq to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to reduce sectarian 
violence and bring security to Baghdad. 

Status: 

While it is not clear if sectarian violence has been reduced, militia 
control over security forces has not been eliminated and remains a 
serious problem in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. 

According to the administration's July 2007 report to Congress, MNF-I 
data showed a decrease in sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, 
since the start of the Baghdad security plan. MNF-I counts sectarian 
incidents and murders in determining trends in sectarian 
violence.[Footnote 49] The administration's July 2007 report concluded 
that the Iraqi government, with substantial coalition assistance, had 
made satisfactory progress toward reducing sectarian violence. The 
report acknowledged that precise measurements vary, and it was too 
early to determine if the decrease would be sustainable. 

GAO cannot determine whether sectarian violence in Iraq has been 
reduced because measuring such violence requires understanding the 
perpetrator's intent, which may not be known. The number of attacks 
targeting civilians and population displacement resulting from 
sectarian violence may serve as additional indicators. For example, as 
displayed in figure 5, the average number of daily attacks against 
civilians remained about the same over the last six months. The 
decrease in total average daily attacks in July is largely due to a 
decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than civilians. 

Figure 5: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the 
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007): 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data, 
July 2007. 

[End of figure] 

While overall attacks declined in July compared with June, levels of 
violence remain high. Enemy initiated attacks have increased around 
major religious and political events, including Ramadan and 
elections.[Footnote 50] For 2007, Ramadan is scheduled to begin in mid- 
September. 

The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq[Footnote 51] 
(NIE) also reports that the level of overall violence in Iraq, 
including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high. 
Further, the NIE states that Iraq's security will continue to improve 
modestly, but that levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will 
remain high over the next 6 to 12 months. Similarly, recent March and 
June 2007 United Nations reports state that attacks against civilians 
persist and the continuing systematic, widespread attacks against the 
civilian population in Iraq are tantamount to crimes against humanity 
and violate the laws of war. 

The violence in Iraq has resulted in a large number of Iraqis displaced 
from their homes. A report by the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization found 
that internally displaced persons increased from about 499,000 in 
February 2007 to about 1,128,000 in July 2007. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that an additional 1.8 
million Iraqi citizens were displaced to nearby countries, primarily to 
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Egypt. The UNHCR predicted that 
40,000 to 50,000 people will continue to be displaced each month even 
if the security plan succeeds in solving the displacement problem. 
Currently, the number of displaced persons is increasing at an average 
of 80,000 to 100,000 each month, according to the Red Crescent. 

The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq stated that 
population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues, 
imposing burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states. 
As the International Organization for Migration and the UN recently 
reported, most of Iraq's internally displaced persons are moving from 
mixed areas[Footnote 52] to seek refuge in homogeneous areas, largely 
because of direct threats or forcible displacement from their homes due 
to their religious and sectarian identities. Where population 
displacements have led to significant sectarian separation, according 
to the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, conflict levels have 
diminished to some extent because warring communities find it more 
difficult to penetrate communal enclaves. 

Our classified report provides further information on trends associated 
with violence in Iraq. 

Militia control over local security forces - the second part of the 
benchmark--has not been eliminated. Numerous U.S. and UN reports have 
stated that militias still retain significant control or influence over 
local security in parts of Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. For 
example, in July 2007, the administration reported that militia 
presence is still strong and will likely remain so until the security 
situation begins to stabilize. The report stated that the Iraqi 
government has made unsatisfactory progress towards eliminating militia 
control of local security, which continues to negatively affect the 
public perception of the authority and fairness of the Iraqi 
government. In addition, DOD's June 2007 report to Congress called 
militia influence of local police a significant problem and added that 
some security forces remain prone to intimidation by, or collusion 
with, criminal gangs. Further, the Department of State's human rights 
report characterized Iraqi police effectiveness as seriously 
compromised by militias and sectarianism, with rampant corruption and a 
culture of impunity. Finally, in March 2007, the United Nations 
reported cases of possible collusion between armed militia and Iraqi 
security forces in raids and security operations, as well as the 
failure of these security forces to intervene and prevent kidnapping 
and murder and other crimes. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XIV: Benchmark 14 - Joint Security Stations: 

Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in 
neighborhoods across Baghdad. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met[Footnote 53] 

Issue: 

Past Baghdad security plans failed, in part, because the coalition and 
Iraqi forces did not hold neighborhoods after clearing them of 
insurgents. The current Baghdad security plan and the related increase 
of U.S. and Iraqi forces into Baghdad is intended to clear insurgents, 
militias, and organized criminal gangs from neighborhoods; maintain a 
security presence in those areas; and provide for follow-on assistance 
efforts. As part of this effort, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces are 
establishing Joint Security Stations across Baghdad to improve 
population protection by providing a continuous presence in Baghdad's 
neighborhoods. 

Status: 

As of August 9, 2007, the Iraqi government, with substantial coalition 
assistance, had established 32 of the 34 planned Joint Security 
Stations in Baghdad (see fig. 6). This figure includes Joint Security 
Stations that had achieved initial or full operational capability. 

Figure 6: Map of Joint Security Stations in Baghdad, as of August 9, 
2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Multinational Division-Baghdad. 

Note: Figure 6 shows the 28 joint security stations that were located 
in Baghdad's security districts as of August 9, 2007. Three additional 
joint security stations are located in Baghdad but are outside of the 
security districts, and another joint security station has been 
transferred to Iraqi control. 

[End of figure] 

Joint Security Stations are staffed by Iraqi local police, national 
police, and army personnel, as well as coalition forces. According to 
the administration's July 2007 report, the security stations are 
designed to improve population protection by providing a 24-hour 
security presence in Baghdad neighborhoods. They also allow greater 
oversight of Iraqi security forces by U.S. military personnel. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XV: Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Forces Operating 
Independently: 

Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of 
operating independently. 

GAO Assessment: Not met[Footnote 54] 

Issue: 

In August 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the Iraqi 
military and began the process of rebuilding the Iraqi military and 
police. Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion 
to train and equip about 350,000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers, in 
an effort to develop Iraqi security forces, transfer security 
responsibilities to them and the Iraqi government, and ultimately 
withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq. The coalition began embedding 
transition teams with Iraqi security forces in 2005 to help develop 
their ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. These teams use 
the Operational Readiness Assessment process to evaluate the readiness 
of Iraqi security force units to conduct operations with or without 
coalition support.[Footnote 55] 

Status: 

While the Iraqi security forces have grown in size and are increasingly 
leading counterinsurgency operations, the number of Iraqi army units 
operating independently decreased between March 2007 and July 
2007.[Footnote 56] According to the administration's July 2007 report, 
an Iraqi unit can be considered independent if it has achieved an 
Operational Readiness Assessment rating of level 1, which means it is 
capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency 
operations.[Footnote 57] 

Manning shortages as well as logistics and sustainment shortfalls have 
contributed to the decrease in the number of Iraqi battalions capable 
of operating independently, according to DOD reports. Sectarian and 
militia influences further complicate the development of Iraqi forces. 
In June 2007, DOD reported that while coalition forces are the target 
of most enemy attacks, Iraqi security forces and civilians account for 
the majority of casualties, contributing to the decline in the 
readiness of some Iraqi units. Attrition also has affected the Iraqi 
security forces. Annual attrition is estimated to be between 15 and 18 
percent for the Iraqi army and between 20 and 22 percent for the 
police. In addition, according to a June 2007 report from DOD to 
Congress, only about 65 percent of authorized Iraqi personnel are in 
the field at any given time due to a liberal leave policy and absences 
without leave. To increase the number of soldiers on hand for 
operations, the Iraqi government and MNF-I decided that they will 
increase manning to 120 percent of authorization levels.[Footnote 58] 

Due to Iraq's immature logistics systems, many Iraqi military and 
police units will continue to depend on MNF-I for key sustainment and 
logistics support until December 2008. DOD reports that the Iraqi 
forces' limited capacity in these areas hinders their ability to assume 
missions from MNF-I and requires continued development in some key 
areas through the end of 2008. For instance, DOD has set a December 
2008 goal for the Iraqi government to provide day-to-day items such as 
food, water, and electricity to the Ministry of Defense's National 
Depot. In addition, the Ministry of Interior aims to become self 
sufficient in procuring and managing repair parts by the end of 2008. 

MNF-I and the Iraqi government continue to struggle with sectarian and 
militia influences while trying to develop the Iraqi security forces. 
Because of the sectarian leaning of some national police units, MNF-I 
is providing continuing oversight of Iraqi security forces. In 
addition, militia influence affects every component of the Ministry of 
the Interior, especially in Baghdad and other key cities, according to 
DOD. This influence, along with corruption and illegal activity, 
constrains progress in the development of Ministry of Interior forces. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XVI: Benchmark 16 - Minority Party Rights: 

Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi 
legislature are protected. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met[Footnote 59] 

Issue: 

Minority parties or groups had no rights under the former Ba'athist 
regime. Ensuring the rights of minority parties was a key Iraqi goal to 
ensure broad representation and fairness in the new Iraq. 

Status: 

The rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are 
protected through provisions in the Iraqi Constitution and the Council 
of Representatives' by-laws. However, in practice, the rights of 
minorities throughout Iraq remain unprotected. 

Rights of Minority Political Parties in the Legislature Are Protected: 

The Iraqi Constitution and the Council of Representatives' by-laws 
include provisions to ensure the full participation of minority 
political parties within the Iraqi Council of Representatives. These 
provisions include: 

* Article 39 of Iraq's Constitution, which guarantees the freedom to 
form and join associations and political parties and also prohibits 
forcing any person to join in any party, society, or political entity 
or to continue membership in it. 

* Article 3 of the Council of Representatives by-laws, which guarantees 
the freedom of expressions, opinions, and thoughts of all members of 
the Council of Representatives. This guarantee is made regardless of a 
representative's party or political affiliation in a way that does not 
contradict the provisions of the Constitution, including the freedom of 
objective opposition, constructive criticism, and achieving cooperation 
between the Council of Representatives and other constitutional 
institutions. 

According to Iraqi legislators from minority parties, their rights in 
the legislature are protected and they are not physically intimidated. 
The legislators also said that they have the right to speak before 
Parliament, and to offer legislation even though they are often not 
consulted on legislative issues. According to the U.S. government, the 
electoral system--provincial proportional representation--that was used 
to elect the current Council was chosen in 2005 to balance a number of 
factors, including the ability of women and small minority parties to 
gain representation. The Council of Representatives elected in December 
2005 includes members from the Shi'a, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkmen, Chaldo-
Assyrian Christian, and Yazidi communities. 

Human Rights of Iraqi Minorities Across Iraq Remain Unprotected: 

Although the rights of minority parties are protected in the 
legislature, widespread violence across Iraq has seriously compromised 
the government's ability to protect human rights. According to the 
United Nations, attacks against religious and ethnic minorities 
continued unabated in most areas of Iraq, prompting these communities 
to seek ways to leave the country.[Footnote 60] The conflicts 
reportedly bear the mark of sectarian polarization and "cleansing" in 
neighborhoods formerly comprised of different religions.[Footnote 61] 
According to a non-governmental organization, all of Iraq's minority 
communities have suffered violations that include destruction and 
defacement of religious buildings; mass murder of congregations 
gathered in and around them; abduction, ransoming, and murder of 
religious and civic leaders and individuals including children; and 
forced conversion to Islam using tactics such as death threats, rape, 
and forced marriage.[Footnote 62] 

In comments on this benchmark, State wrote that GAO should not refer to 
the general human rights problems of Iraqi minorities because to do so 
goes beyond the scope of the benchmark and State addresses these 
problems in other reports. We disagree. We assessed this benchmark as 
met based on our interpretation of the benchmark and our criteria. 
However, we believe it is important to provide some context of minority 
rights in Iraq. Iraqi legislators we interviewed insisted that the 
situation in their communities has a direct bearing on their work in 
the legislature, their freedom of movement to and from the legislature, 
and their ability to engage fully in Iraq political life. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XVII: Benchmark 17 - Allocating and Spending Iraqi Revenues: 

Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for 
reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services on an 
equitable basis. 

GAO Assessment: Partially met[Footnote 63] 

Issue: 

The President's New Way Forward in Iraq identified Iraq's inability to 
fully spend its own resources to rebuild its infrastructure and deliver 
essential services as a critical economic challenge to Iraq's self- 
reliance. Iraqi government funds are a necessary source of financing 
for Iraq's rebuilding effort, particularly since the United States has 
obligated most of the $40 billion it provided to Iraq for 
reconstruction since 2003. However, the government of Iraq has had 
difficulty spending its resources on capital projects. In 2006, the 
government spent only 22 percent of its non-provincial capital projects 
and reconstruction budget. Furthermore, in the critical oil sector, 
which provides over 90 percent of Iraq's revenues, the government spent 
less than 3 percent of the $3.5 billion allocated for oil 
reconstruction projects in 2006. In its 2007 budget, Iraq committed to 
spending $10 billion on capital projects and reconstruction. 

Status: 

The government of Iraq allocated $10 billion of its revenues for 
capital projects and reconstruction when it passed its 2007 budget in 
February 2007, including capital funds for the provinces based on their 
populations. However, available data from the government of Iraq and 
analysis from U.S. and coalition officials show that, while spending 
has increased compared with spending in 2006, a large portion of Iraq's 
$10 billion capital projects and reconstruction budget in fiscal year 
2007 will likely go unspent.[Footnote 64] Iraq's Financial Management 
Law generally requires budgeted funds to be spent by the end of the 
fiscal year. The Ministry of Oil and the provinces (excluding the 
Kurdistan region) were allocated almost half of the government's 2007 
capital projects and reconstruction budget; however, they are unlikely 
to spend a large share of their budgets in 2007, according to U.S. and 
coalition officials. We are conducting a review of U.S. efforts to help 
Iraq spend its budget and will issue a separate report at a later date. 

Iraq's Ministries Have Increased Spending in 2007, but Are Unlikely to 
Spend a Large Share of their 2007 Capital Projects and Reconstruction 
Budgets: 

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad reported that Iraqi government ministries 
spent about $1.5 billion, or 24 percent, of the $6.25 billion allocated 
to their capital projects and reconstruction budgets through July 15th, 
just over half-way through the fiscal year.[Footnote 65] This level of 
spending already exceeds the $1.4 billion spent in 2006. However, Iraqi 
ministries have less than 6 months left in the year to spend the 
remaining 76 percent of their budgets. In its July 2007 report, the 
administration cited satisfactory progress with this benchmark because 
the Ministry of Finance was releasing funds to ministries and 
provinces. The U.S. Embassy reported that the Ministry of Finance 
released 25 percent and 10 percent of 2007 capital project and 
reconstruction budget funds to ministries and provinces, respectively, 
in the first 5 months of the year. However, funding releases are not 
expenditures and may not be a reliable indicator of future spending by 
ministries and provinces. The administration's report noted that 
capacity constraints and security problems may affect Iraq's ability to 
accelerate its spending and procurement activities. 

Ministry of Oil and Provinces Are Unlikely to Spend a Large Share of 
Their 2007 Capital Projects and Reconstruction Budgets: 

The Ministry of Oil's capital project and reconstruction budget for 
2007 is $2.4 billion, almost a quarter of the government's total. The 
ministry has already surpassed last year's spending total; however, 
U.S. officials stated that the ministry is not likely to spend a large 
share of its capital projects and reconstruction budget due to a 
variety of challenges, including a difficult security environment and 
burdensome and complex procurement rules. According to U.S. officials, 
the ministry has undertaken reform efforts to eliminate bottlenecks in 
the budget execution process. The U.S. Embassy reported that the 
Ministry of Oil had spent $500 million through July 15, 2007, or 21 
percent of its budget for the year. However, the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction reported statements by U.S. officials 
that the ministry may not have spent all of these funds, but instead 
shifted them to its subsidiaries, such as the State Oil Marketing 
Organization, which have responsibility for spending much of the Oil 
Ministry's capital projects and reconstruction budget.[Footnote 66] 

In addition, the government provided over $2 billion, or over 20 
percent of the 2007 capital projects and reconstruction budget, to the 
provinces (not including the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region) based on 
their populations.[Footnote 67] These funds are in addition to $2 
billion 2006 provincial funds for capital projects, most of which had 
not been transferred to the provinces until November and December of 
2006.[Footnote 68] U.S. and foreign officials stated that the provinces 
have little experience planning and executing infrastructure projects 
and are likely to spend little of their 2007 capital projects and 
reconstruction budgets. According to information collected and reported 
by Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the provinces had committed 44 
percent of their 2007 allocation to contracts for capital projects, as 
of July 15, 2007.[Footnote 69] However, it is not clear whether the 
value of committed contracts is a reliable indicator of actual 
spending. Given the capacity and security challenges currently facing 
Iraq, many committed contracts may not be executed and, therefore, 
would not result in actual expenditures.[Footnote 70] The Government of 
Iraq is undertaking a number of initiatives, including budget execution 
training sessions, to help provincial officials spend their capital 
budgets, according to U.S. officials. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XVIII: Benchmark 18 - False Accusations: 

Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or 
making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces. 

GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 71] 

Issue: 

According to U.S. government reporting, qualified Iraqi officers may be 
discouraged from operating in a professional, non-sectarian manner if 
Iraq's political authorities undermine or make false accusations 
against members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). 

Status: 

Iraq's political authorities continue to undermine and make false 
accusations against members of the ISF. According to U.S. government 
officials, little has changed since the U.S. Administration's July 2007 
Initial Benchmark Assessment. Each month the U.S. government receives 
reports alleging wrongdoing by ISF members considered by MNF-I to be 
non-sectarian in their approach to security. The U.S. assessment 
further stated that in most cases the U.S. government was unable to 
determine the validity of these allegations but believed them to be 
untrue. The assessment concluded that these accusations undermine the 
independence and non-sectarianism of the ISF and that the Iraqi 
government does not adequately address the accusations. According to 
MNF-I officials in Baghdad, some cases resulted in detention of 
military officers, but the cases did not provide justification or 
specific charges against the officers. Further information is 
classified. 

The U.S. government further reported that anecdotal evidence suggests 
that Iraqi political authorities may not be pursuing allegations even- 
handedly. According to U.S. government reporting, the de- 
Ba'athification Commission fabricated charges to cleanse Sunni officers 
from military units, and the Office of Commander in Chief has issued 
questionable judicial warrants as a more recent technique to target 
Sunni commanders. In addition, the ISF's formal command structure is 
compromised by influential sectarian leaders linked to the security 
ministries. These actions have reportedly led to the arrest and 
detention of several military officials. According to U.S. officials, 
this tactic is primarily used against Sunni Ministry of Defense 
officials and does not occur at the predominantly Shi'a Ministry of 
Interior. The U.S. government also reported that some Sunni politicians 
have made unsubstantiated claims against ISF officials. Moreover, Iraqi 
government support for the ISF has been uneven. Some members of the 
Council of Ministers and Council of Representatives have publicly 
supported ISF leaders while behind the scenes they continue to ignore 
sectarian activities, according to the U.S. government. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XIX: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks: 

Figure 7: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, and 
Iraqi government data. 

[A] Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of 
political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline 
in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on 
October 16, 2006. 

[B] In December 2006, MNF-I and the government of Iraq agreed to 
establish joint security stations. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix XX: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 
2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment Report: 

Figure: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administrations July 2007 
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] According to the U.S. State Department, conditions are not present 
for these benchmarks. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007[Footnote 72] (the Act) 
requires GAO to submit to Congress by September 1, 2007, an independent 
assessment of whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 
benchmarks contained in the Act and the status of the achievement of 
the benchmarks. This report (1) provides an assessment of whether or 
not the Iraqi government has met 18 legislative, security, and economic 
benchmarks, and (2) provides information on the status of the 
achievement of each benchmark. These benchmarks address 8 legislative, 
9 security and 1 economic-related action. 

To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and 
interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the 
Treasury; the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate 
commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence 
Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. 
These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and 
General David H. Petraeus, Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF- 
I). We also reviewed translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with 
officials from the government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of 
this work, we made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, 
including a visit from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were 
enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have completed 
since May 2003.[Footnote 73] We provided drafts of the report to the 
relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. Although we analyzed classified data, this report only 
contains unclassified information, as of August 30, 2007. We conducted 
our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

Legislative Benchmarks: 

To determine if the Iraqi government is completing actions related to 
review of the Iraqi Constitution; enacting and implementing legislation 
on de-Ba'athification, the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon 
resources, procedures to form semi-autonomous regions, the independent 
high electoral commission, provincial elections, provincial council 
authorities, amnesty, and militia disarmament; and ensuring that the 
rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are 
protected, we took a number of actions. Specifically, we interviewed 
and reviewed documentation from the Iraqi government, Iraqi legislators 
in Baghdad, UN, U.S. Institute for Peace, IFES[Footnote 74], the 
Independent High Electoral Commission, non-governmental organizations, 
and the Departments of Defense and State in Washington, D.C. and 
Baghdad, Iraq. The documents reviewed included the administration's 
July 2007 initial benchmark assessment, the Iraqi Constitution, draft 
laws related to each of the benchmarks, the International Compact with 
Iraq 2007 Mid-Year Progress Report, and UN analyses of the laws 
addressed by the benchmarks. 

For our assessment of the status of the hydrocarbon legislation, we 
relied on prior GAO reporting[Footnote 75] and updated information 
where appropriate. We interviewed and reviewed documentation from the 
Iraqi government, UN, U.S. Institute for Peace, and State Department in 
Washington, D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq. We compared central government 
draft oil laws with the Iraqi Constitution and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government Oil and Gas law. 

Additionally, to determine if the Iraqi government is ensuring that the 
rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are 
protected, we obtained and reviewed the Administration's report on 
progress in Iraq, the Iraqi constitution, and the Council of 
Representatives Bylaws. We interviewed Iraqi legislators in Baghdad, 
Iraq, including the leader of the Iraqi Minority Council. We also 
reviewed human rights reports from nongovernmental organizations, the 
United Nations, and the U.S. government to determine whether the rights 
of minorities throughout Iraq are protected. 

Security Benchmarks: 

To determine if the Iraqi government is (1) establishing supporting 
political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the 
Baghdad Security Plan; (2) providing three trained and ready Iraqi 
brigades to support Baghdad operations; (3) providing Iraqi commanders 
with all authorities to execute the Baghdad Security Plan without 
political intervention; (4) ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are 
providing even-handed law enforcement; (5) eliminating safe havens; (6) 
reducing the level of sectarian violence and eliminating militia 
control of local security; (7) establishing all planned joint security 
stations; (8) increasing the number of security units capable of 
operating independently; and (9) ensuring that Iraq's political 
authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against 
members of the Iraqi Security Forces, we took a number of actions. 

Specifically, we examined U.S. Department of State cables and other 
documents that discussed the establishment of the supporting 
committees. We reviewed classified and unclassified documents and 
reports showing the Iraqi Army units that had deployed to Baghdad and 
analyzed the U.S. Department of Defense Operational Readiness 
Assessments (ORA) formerly known as Transitional Readiness Assessments, 
for these units. In addition, we reviewed classified and unclassified 
assessments of the authorities granted to unit commanders, the level of 
sectarian influence and levels of militia infiltration of army and 
police units, and reports of incidents where Iraqi officials interfered 
with the chain of command. 

To understand the range of methodological issues associated with 
measuring levels of sectarian violence, and to collect information 
related to broader trends in population security, we interviewed 
officials from the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense 
in Washington, D.C., and Baghdad, Iraq; the Central Intelligence 
Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence 
Council; the United Nations; and the International Organization for 
Migration in Washington, D.C., Baghdad, Iraq, and Amman, Jordan. We 
also met with these officials to discuss the other benchmarks. 

Economic Benchmark: 

To assess the extent to which the government of Iraq is allocating and 
spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, 
including delivery of essential services on an equitable basis, we 
interviewed U.S. government officials and contractors, and obtained and 
analyzed supporting documents. We interviewed officials in Washington 
D.C. and Baghdad with the Departments of Defense, State, and the 
Treasury; the U.S. Agency for International Development; the Embassy 
Iraq Transition Assistance Office; and consultants to the Ministry of 
Finance. To assess progress in allocating and spending Iraqi revenues 
we reviewed official Iraqi Ministry of Finance capital budget and 
expenditure data for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 provided by the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, and unofficial Ministry of Planning and 
Development Cooperation data on capital expenditures reported by 
Multinational Force-Iraq. 

We also reviewed unofficial unreconciled data on capital budget 
execution by the provinces in 2006 and 2007 collected by U.S. 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We compared 2007 capital allocations 
to the provinces with their populations to assess the equity of capital 
funding allocations. We discussed the reliability of allocation and 
expenditure data with U.S. Treasury officials and contractors advising 
the Ministry of Finance. We also reviewed relevant reports by DOD and 
State, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, World 
Bank, IMF, public accountants and Iraqi government budget 
implementation documents. We found that these data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purpose of showing trends in budget expenditures. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management: 
and Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

August 29, 2007: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Securing, 
Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most 
Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks," GAO Job Code 320511. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
William Cavness, Iraq Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at 
(202) 647-5211. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 
Bradford R. Higgins

cc: GAO – Judy McCloskey: 
NEA – C. David Welch: 
State/OIG – Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Securing, Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met 
Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks (GAO-07-1195, GAO 
Code 320511):  

Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to 
comment on the draft report "Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: 
Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic 
Benchmarks." 

General Comments: 

Different standards of evaluation:  

As noted in the draft report (p.3, para 1), the legislation requiring 
the GAO and administration reports sets different standards for the two 
reports: the GAO is required to assess whether the Iraqi government has 
met 18 key benchmarks, while the administration is required to assess 
whether the Iraqi government is making "satisfactory progress" toward 
meeting the benchmarks. The GAO refines this further with its 
definitions of legislative benchmarks as "met," "partially met," or 
"not met" (footnote 4, pp. 4-5). 

As a result, the GAO assessment in some cases differs from the 
administration's assessment focusing on "satisfactory progress." For 
example, on benchmark (v) regarding the Independent High Electoral 
Commission (IHEC) and provincial elections, Embassy Baghdad and State 
assess the first component (establishment of the IHEC) as 
"satisfactory." The law creating the IHEC has been passed, members have 
been appointed and approved, and the process of recruiting and training 
provincial staff is' underway. Because the process is not complete, 
however, GAO assesses this component "not met." 

We believe that it is important for the GAO to highlight the differing 
standards and the effect of this on its conclusions. 

Timing of the report: 

The GAO report states that its information will be current as of August 
30, 2007. It should therefore take into consideration recent political 
developments, such as the communique released by Iraqi political 
leaders on August 26, 2007. The communique included compromises on a 
number of key issues, e.g., de- Ba'athification, provincial powers, and 
power sharing. 

Treatment of hydrocarbons and revenue management legislation:  

The omission of any mention by the GAO of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government's (KRG) new oil law could be misconstrued as a tacit U.S. 
government approval of that KRG initiative. In fact, U.S. government 
policy seeks to achieve unified national hydrocarbons and revenue 
management legislation. We are suggesting amended language to that 
effect in the attached matrix. 

Budget execution: 

In our view, GAO's focus on unspent funds in Iraq's reconstruction 
budget ignores the progress that Iraq has made in this important area. 
This is another area in which the GAO's different standard of 
assessment leads to an outcome than State's view of "satisfactory 
progress." We will provide GAO with detailed comments on its assessment 
of benchmark (xvii). 

Treatment of human rights: 

Benchmark (xvi) deals only with protection of minority political 
parties in the Council of Representatives. There is no basis for 
including other human rights issues in this report, and that language 
should be removed. 

Response to Recommendation(s) Recommendation: 

In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase 
transparency on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we 
recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense provide information 
to the President that: 

(1) Clearly specify the status in drafting, enacting and implementing 
Iraqi legislation.

Response: 

The Department of State provides information on the status of key 
legislation in various reports to the Congress, and can provide 
additional details on the drafting, enacting, and implementing of that 
legislation in future reports. 

Department of State: 

Unclassified GAO Draft Report: 

Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met 
Most Legislative, Security and Economic Benchmarks: 

Comment Resolution Matrix: 

Page #: 1; 
Paragraph #: [Empty]; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal; 
Recommendations: Status chart benchmark xvi refers to citizens' rights; 
Comment/Rational: The benchmark legislation refers only to rights of 
minority parties in the Council of Representatives. This reference to 
citizens' rights should be eliminated, along with all other language in 
the report related to minority rights not specifically referring to 
minority parties in the Council of Representatives; 

Page #: 4; 
Paragraph #: (3); 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal; 
Recommendations: GAO makes general reference to minority rights in 
Iraq; 
Comment/Rational: See comment above for p.1. GAO should eliminate 
reference to minority rights; 

Page #: 11; 
Paragraph #: (1); 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal; 
Recommendations: First and second bullets make categorical statements 
about government interference ans bias; 
Comment/Rational: The judgment as written are too sweeping and are 
therefore inaccurate. We recommend for the first bullet "has not always 
allowed" and for the second bullet "has not always assured"; 

Page #: 15; 
Paragraph #: [Empty]; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal; 
Recommendations: (i) GAO evaluated status as "not met"; 
Comment/Rational: The July report gives the status as "Satisfactory 
progress," based on the formal establishment of the CRC and the 
operational definition of "satisfactory progress" we are using, i.e., 
"present trend data demonstrates positive trajectory." We stand by our 
July assessment; 

Page #: 21; 
Paragraph #: [Empty]; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal; 
Recommendations: (iii) GAO evaluated status as "not met"; 
Comment/Rational: The GAO report does not mention that the Khurdish 
National Assembly passed an oil law in August that is at variance with 
important provisions of the framework law and oil revenue management 
law under consideration by the Council of Representatives. The United 
States continues to believe that Iraq's interests are better served by 
the adoption of a single set of national oil and gas laws, which will 
help foster national unity and promote reconciliation; 

Page #: 24; 
Paragraph #: (1); 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal; 
Recommendations: (iv) GAO comments on attitude of Iraq's political 
leaders toward regions law; 
Comment/Rational: The wording of the last sentence in para (1) implies 
that all Iraqi political leaders support the right to form regions. 
This is not the case, and was a factor in delaying the implementation 
of the legitimate for 18 months. This sentence should be deleted;  

Page #: 26; 
Paragraph #: [Empty]; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal; 
Recommendations: (v) GAO evaluated status as "not met" and, of 
particular note, progress on establishing IHEC as "not met"; 
Comment/Rational: The July report rates part one of benchmark 
(establishment of IHEC) as "satisfactory" and "not satisfactory" on the 
other three parts. The IHEC has been established, and while it may not 
have completed all tasks assigned to it, e.g., appointment of directors 
of directors of provincial Government Election Officers, this does not 
merit the GAO's "not met: assessment. The benchmark calls only for 
establishment of the IHEC. Selection/training of the new election 
officers has been underway for some time. In our view, the GAO 
assessment on this element of the benchmark could therefore be 
"partially met." GAO assessments on remaining three elements of this 
benchmark track with our assessments; 

Page #: 28; 
Paragraph #: (1); 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal; 
Recommendations: (v) No legislation setting date for elections; 
Comment/Rational: CHange to "The government has not set a date for 
provincial elections." Rationale: Setting a date for election foes not 
require legislation; 

Page #: 31; 
Paragraph #: (2); 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal; 
Recommendations: (vii) GAO evaluated DDR status as "not met" with "no 
momentum in the government of Iraq" toward DDR; 
Comment/Rational: Change sentence in first para to read "Conditions are 
not right for a traditional disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration program, according to U.S. and U.N. officials, and 
accordingly, there is no momentum for such a program at present." 
Rationale: There is no program because the conditions are no present, 
bot because there is no government momentum. We object to the GAO's 
characterization of State's evaluation as "N/A." See additional not for 
p. 64; 

Page #: 35; 
Paragraph #: (2); 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal; 
Recommendations: (viii) GAO commented that the committees worked to 
provide forces for Baghdad Security Plan, found ways to house and feed 
troops in Baghdad, etc.; 
Comment/Rational: The executive committee and subcommittee may have 
engaged in these activities early in the course of the Baghdad Security 
Plan, but no longer do so. The entire paragraph should be omitted; 

Page #: 55; 
Paragraph #: (2); 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal; 
Recommendations: (xvi) GAO evaluated status as "met" but with caveats 
related to the general human rights situation for minorities in Iraq; 
Comment/Rational: The benchmark refers only to rights of minorities 
represented in the COR, and so the GAO assessment should not refer to 
the general human rights problem of Iraqi minorities. The State 
Department addresses these problems in detail in other reports. Request 
deletion of sentence beginning, "However, this benchmark..."; 

Page #: 56; 
Paragraph #: [Empty]; 
Type * (A,S,C) (C) Formal/Informal; 
Recommendations: Selection on human rights of Iraqi minorities; 
Comment/Rational:Again, this section foes beyond the scope of the 
benchmarks report and should be deleted; 

Page #: 58; 
Paragraph #: [Empty]; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal; 
Recommendations: (xvii) GAO assesses status as "partially met; 
Comment/Rational: The July report indicates "satisfactory progress."

From the U.S. government perspective, the most important point in that 
the Iraqis are making steady progress, and will significantly improve 
over last year's performances on budget execution, though the exact 
amount remains unclear. Indeed, the GOI ministries have already spent 
more of their 2007 capital budget from their total spending in all of 
2006.

Provincial performance on budget execution is particularly noteworthy, 
considering that the provincial officials have little prior experience 
with planning and executing their own budgets. To date, provinces have 
committed 100 percent of the 2006 funds and 47 per cent of their 2007 
funds, with most of this work being done during 2007; 

It is difficult to make a definitive judgment in September regarding 
how much of the capital budget will be spent, given that: 

1. The budget was passed at the end of February, and there was little 
money allocated until March. 

2. Performance usually accelerates during the last half of the year. 

3. There are significant lags in the official GOI data-Ministry of 
Finance data currently go only through May. 

State will provide a detailed response on the GAO text directly to 
GAO;  

Page #: 64; 
Paragraph #: [Empty]; 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal; 
Recommendations: Summary chart, benchmarks (vi) and (vii) describes 
State assessment as "N/A"; 
Comment/Rational: GAO should use State's formula of "prerequisites not 
present" or equivalent language, but not "N/A"; 

Page #: 66; 
Paragraph #: (3); 
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal; 
Recommendations: More on human rights in Iraq; 
Comment/Rational: Request GAO delete last sentence since the statement 
goes beyond the required scope of the report. 

* A= Administrative; S= Substantive; C= Critical:

* Formal- recommends comments should be published as part of official 
State response to GAO. 

* Informal- recommends comments should be provided to GAO but not be 
published in report. 

The following are GAO's comments on the State Department's letter dated 
August 30, 2007. 

GAO Comments: 

1. We agree with State that legislation on the Iraq High Electoral 
Commission has been enacted and implemented. However, our assessment of 
"not met" on the electoral benchmark is based on the Iraqi government 
not enacting and implementing three of four components of this 
benchmark--legislation on provincial authorities, provincial elections, 
and an election date. 

5. We have highlighted the different standards of assessment between 
our report and the administration's reports. We also specify our 
assessment criteria in the cover letter and each appendix to make our 
judgments fully transparent. 

6. We have included information about the recent communiqué in the 
cover letter and appendices as appropriate. 

7. We have included information about the Kurdish Regional Government's 
new law and the U.S. position on it in the appendix on hydrocarbon 
legislation. 

8. Our report acknowledges the progress that the Iraqi government has 
made in allocating and spending $10 billion of fiscal year 2007 funds 
on capital projects and reconstruction. While these funds have been 
allocated, our report also notes that a large portion of these funds 
will likely go unspent. Consequently, we rated this benchmark as 
"partially met." 

9. We disagree with State's comment. We assessed this benchmark as 
"met." However, Iraqi legislators we interviewed insisted that the 
situation in their communities has a direct bearing on their work in 
the legislature, their freedom of movement to and from the legislature, 
and their ability to engage fully in Iraq political life. Thus we 
included additional relevant information about minority human rights in 
Iraq. 

10. See comment 6. 

11. See comment 6. 

12. We revised our text. 

13. Under our criteria, we considered the benchmark as "not met" 
because the Constitutional Review Committee was still continuing work 
on devising a package of necessary amendments, the Iraqi legislature 
had not voted on the package, and a referendum had not been held. 

14. We added information to our already existing reference to the 
Kurdish National Assembly legislation. 

15. We revised this sentence. 

16. Under our criteria, this benchmark was not met. 

17. We revised the text to reflect State's comments. 

18. We revised the text to reflect State's comments. 

19. Our paragraph provides context for the committees' work and the 
text makes it clear that these actions were in the past so we retained 
our original language. 

20. See comment 6. 

21. See comment 6. 

22. See comment 5. 

23. We revised the text. 

24. See comment 6. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XXIII: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

See States response in appendix XXII. 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
2400 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2400: 

August 30, 2007: 

Mr. Joseph Christoff: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Christoff: 

The Department of Defense appreciates the opportunity to respond to the 
GAO draft report, GAO-07-1195, "Securing, Stabilizing And Rebuilding 
Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and 
Economic Benchmarks," dated August 27, 2007 (GAO Code 320511). DoD's 
response covers the last two of the draft report's three 
recommendations. The Department of State has agreed to respond to the 
first recommendation. 

The GAO recommends that in preparing future reports to Congress and to 
help increase transparency on progress made toward achieving the 
benchmarks: 

Recommendation 2: The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other 
appropriate departments and agencies, provides information to the 
President on trends in sectarian violence with appropriate caveats, as 
well as broader quantitative and qualitative measures of security. 

DoD concurs. 

Recommendation 3: The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other 
appropriate agencies, provides additional information on the 
operational readiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad 
security plan. 

DoD concurs. 

Attached is a matrix with comments on the unclassified report. A 
comment matrix for the classified briefing will be provided under 
separate cover. 

DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment. If you have any questions 
concerning these comments, my point of contact is Mr. James Stahlman at 
703-571-2526. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 
Mark T. Kimmitt: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
for the Middle East: 

Attachments: 
As stated:

August 30, 2007:
 
Department of Defense Comments on: Unclassified GAO Draft Report: 

Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: 

Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security and Economic 
Benchmarks: 

Comment Resolution Matrix: 

Formal Comments: 

#: 1; 
Page #: 2; 
Para #: 2; 
Recommendation: Change to "help the Iraqi government achieve these 
benchmarks to "support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence and 
foster conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation; 
Comment/Rational: Accuracy. Strategy was not designed to solely achieve 
benchmarks. Benchmarks are Iraqi government inputs necessary to achieve 
strategic goals, they are not the goals; 

#: 2; 
Page #: 10; 
Para #: 3; 
Recommendation: Change "eliminating safe haven" to "ensuring that the 
Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, 
regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation";
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy. There is no benchmark for "achieving safe 
havens." Recommended change is the correct benchmark; 

#: 3; 
Page #: 11; 
Para #: bullet 1; 
Recommendations: Add "always" to make sentences read "The Iraqi 
government has not always allowed...";
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy. As written, all tactical and operational 
decisions were influenced by political intervention. This is not 
accurate;
  
#: 4; 
Page #: 47; 
Para #: Chart; 
Recommendation: Change labels to read "monthly attacks" instead of 
"average daily attacks."
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy;

#: 5; 
Page #: 48; 
Para #: 4; 
Recommendation: Add "parts of" after "influence over local security 
in";   
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy; 

#: 6; 
Page #: 53; 
Para #: 1; 
Recommendation: Delete "sectarian and militia influences" as a factor 
contributing to the decrease in the number of Iraqi battalions capable 
of operating independently. 
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy. No unit is assessed to have regressed on 
the basis of "sectarian and militia influences"; 

#: 7; 
Page #: 53; 
Para #: 1; 
Recommendation: Paragraph says,"only about 65% of authorized Iraqi 
personnel are in the field at any given time." Should say, "only about 
71% of authorized Iraqi personnel are in the field at any given time"; 
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy. Authorized Iraqi personnel in the field at 
any given time is 71%, not 65%.

GAO Comments: 

1. We have revised the text. 

2. We have revised the text. 

3. We have modified the sentence by adding not “always.” 

4. We have replaced this chart. 

5. We have qualified the sentence by adding “parts of .” 

6. We disagree with DOD’s comment. The Iraq benchmark calls for 
increasing the number of Iraqi security units capable of operating 
independently. A key impediment to Iraqi training and readiness, 
particularly of the police, is sectarian and militia influence. DOD’s 
June 2007 report to Congress states that sectarian bias has constrained 
the development of MOI forces. 

7. DOD commented that 71 percent of Iraqi authorized personnel are in 
the field at any one time, compared to 65 percent, which we report. We 
are retaining the 65 percent in our report because it is from a 
published DOD source and we do not have further documentation on the 
new figure. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XXIV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements: 

GAO Contacts: 

Joseph Christoff (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgements: 

Steve Lord, David Bruno, Howard Cott, Tim Fairbanks, Mattias Fenton, 
Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, Bruce Kutnick, Judy McCloskey, Tet 
Miyabara, and Kathleen Monahan. 

In addition, Robert Alarapon Ashley Alley, Monica Brym, Lessie M Burke- 
Johnson, Joe Carney, Miriam Carroll, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern, Debra 
Chung, Joyee Dasgupta, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Muriel 
Forster, Patrick Hickey, Michael Jenkins, Sona Kalapura, Jeremy 
Latimer, Mary Moutsos, Mimi Nguyen, Sidney Schwartz, Jena Sinkfield, 
Audrey Solis, Cynthia Taylor, and Christina Werth provided technical 
assistance. 

Footnotes: 

[1] Section 1314 of Public Law 110-28. 

[2] GAO is providing this report to Congress on September 4TH, 2007, 
the first business day following September 1st. 

[3] For example, see GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: 
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: 
January 9, 2007). See GAO's website at http://www.gao.gov for a 
complete list of GAO's Iraq-related reports. 

[4] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and 
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all 
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; 
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted 
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of 
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and 
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or 
"partially met." For the constitutional review, we would have 
considered the benchmark as met if, in accordance with Article 142 of 
the Iraqi Constitution, (1) the Constitutional Review Committee had 
been formed; (2) the Council of Representatives had voted on the 
recommendations of the review committee; and, if approved by the 
Council, (3) a national referendum had been held on the proposed 
amendments to the constitution. We would have considered the benchmark 
partially met if the first two steps of the constitutional review 
process were completed. 

[5] Because this law will not be implemented until April 2008, 
publication in the Official Gazette has been deferred, according to 
State officials, who assert that a delay in implementation is in the 
best interest of Iraq. 

[6] According to U.S. and other officials and documents, enacting 
legislation generally includes the following steps, though the process 
is evolving: The Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers have 
authority to draft laws, and the Iraqi legislature--either a committee 
or 10 members --has the authority to propose laws. Laws drafted by the 
Presidency Council or Council of Ministers are reviewed on legal 
soundness and subject matter by the Shura Council, an institution in 
the Ministry of Justice. Laws drafted by the legislature must first 
pass through its Legal Committee. The legislation then proceeds through 
three readings. The legislation is presented at the first reading. The 
relevant committee may amend the law and the Speaker's Office places it 
on the calendar. After the first reading, the legislature discusses the 
proposed law at a second reading. At the third reading, a final vote is 
taken article by article. Laws that receive an affirmative vote are 
sent to the Presidency Council, which can disapprove the law. The 
legislature can override the disapproval with a three-fifths majority. 
This ratification process only applies during the transition period 
when the Presidency Council is in existence. Final laws are published 
in the Official Gazette and become effective on the date of publication 
in the gazette unless stipulated otherwise. The Prime Minister issues 
an order to implement the law. Laws are implemented by the appropriate 
ministry, commission, or government office and implementing guidance is 
written. 

[7] For additional information on Iraq's hydrocarbon sector, see GAO, 
Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore Iraq's 
Oil Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation, GAO-07-1107T (Washington, 
D.C.: July 18, 2007). 

[8] In February 2007, the Iraqi government created the Executive 
Steering Committee and six subcommittees to coordinate political, 
economic, and military activities and make decisions in support of the 
Baghdad Security Plan. According to a State department official, the 
executive committee's major objective was to increase the coordination 
and capacity of the Iraqi government to improve the quality of life of 
Baghdad's population as part of the Baghdad security plan. We defined 
this benchmark as "met" if the committees were established in support 
of the Baghdad Security Plan; defined this benchmark as "partially met" 
if at least half of the committees were established in support of the 
Baghdad Security Plan; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if less 
than half of the committees were established in support of the Baghdad 
Security Plan. For additional information, see appendix VIII. 

[9] Joint Security Stations are staffed by Iraqi local police, national 
police, and army personnel, as well as coalition forces. According to 
the administration's July 2007 report, the security stations are 
designed to improve population protection by providing a 24-hour 
security presence in Baghdad neighborhoods. We defined this benchmark 
as "met" if nearly all of the planned Joint Security Stations were 
established. We defined this benchmark as "partially met" if half of 
the planned Joint Security Stations were established. We defined this 
benchmark as "not met" if less than half of the planned Joint Security 
Stations were established. For additional information, see appendix 
XIV. 

[10] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the Government of Iraq had 
provided three trained and ready brigades, or an equivalent number of 
battalions, to support Baghdad operations; as "partially met" if some 
of the units were trained and ready to support Baghdad security 
operations; and as "not met" if none of the units provided were trained 
and ready to support Baghdad security operations. The assessment was 
based on each unit's transition readiness assessments and intelligence 
reporting on their reliability. 

[11] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi government policy did 
not allow safe havens and none existed; defined this benchmark as 
"partially met" if Iraqi government policy prohibited safe havens yet 
some existed; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if the Iraqi 
government had no stated policy on safe havens. 

[12] We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was clear and reliable 
evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and militia 
control of local security was eliminated; defined this benchmark as 
"partially met" if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level 
of sectarian violence was reduced or if militia control of local 
security was eliminated, but not both; and defined this benchmark as 
"not met" if there was no clear and reliable evidence that the level of 
sectarian violence was reduced and that militia control of local 
security was eliminated. 

[13] Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. Over the past 
4 years, Ramadan began about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004; 
October 5, 2005; and September 24, 2006. 

[14] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi commanders did not 
face political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical 
and operational decisions. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if 
Iraqi commanders faced political intervention in executing the plan and 
making tactical and operational decisions. 

[15] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi security forces 
provided even-handed enforcement of the law. We defined this benchmark 
as "not met" if Iraqi security forces did not provide even-handed 
enforcement of the law. 

[16] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq 
increased the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of 
operating independently. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if the 
government of Iraq did not increase the number of Iraqi security 
forces' units capable of operating independently. 

[17] We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was no evidence of 
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force 
personnel. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was evidence 
of undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force 
personnel. 

[18] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the funds had been allocated 
and either they had been spent or there was a high likelihood that they 
would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We defined this benchmark 
as "partially met" if funds were allocated but it appeared questionable 
or unlikely that the funds would be spent by the end of the fiscal 
year. We defined the benchmark as "not met" if the funds had not been 
allocated. 

[19] For the constitutional review, we would have considered the 
benchmark as met if, in accordance with Article 142 of the Iraqi 
Constitution, the Constitutional Review Committee had been formed; the 
Council of Representatives had voted on the recommendations of the 
review committee; and, if approved by the Council, a national 
referendum had been held on the proposed amendments to the 
constitution. We would have considered the benchmark partially met if 
the first two steps of the constitutional review process were 
completed. See benchmark 2 for a description of the criteria for 
meeting legislative benchmarks. 

[20] The constitutional review process consists of the following: (1) 
the Council of Representatives forms a review committee, which presents 
to the Council a report on recommendations of necessary amendments that 
could be made to the Constitution; (2) the proposed amendments shall be 
presented to the Council all at once for a vote upon them and are 
approved with the agreement of an absolute majority of the members of 
the Council; and (3) the articles amended by the Council shall be 
presented to the people in a referendum within two months from the date 
of approval by the Council and the referendum will be successful if 
approved by the majority of voters and if not rejected by two-thirds of 
the voters in three or more governorates. 

[21] According to the Iraqi Constitution, in the current electoral 
term, which is 4 years, a presidency council consisting of a president 
and 2 vice-presidents is in place and exercises the powers of the 
presidency. If these constitutional provisions are not amended, at the 
start of the next electoral term, power will revert to a single 
president and the power to approve and disapprove legislation that is 
explicitly granted to the presidency council will lapse. The president 
will then have the power to ratify and issue laws passed by the 
legislature, although such laws are considered ratified 15 days after 
the president receives them. 

[22] Under the existing Constitution, if there is a contradiction 
between regional and national law with respect to a matter outside the 
exclusive authority of the federal government, regional law takes 
priority and regional powers have the right to amend the application of 
the national legislation within that region. 

[23] United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Humanitarian Briefing 
on the Crisis in Iraq, May 2007. 

[24] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and 
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all 
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; 
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted 
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of 
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and 
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or 
"partially met." 

[25] The doctrine of command responsibility holds that individuals can 
be liable for actions they did not actually commit if: (1) they issued 
orders to those who committed the human rights violations or crimes; 
(2) they should have known or should have been in a position to know 
that their subordinates were committing human rights violations or 
crimes; or (3) they did not take reasonable measures to prevent the 
human rights violations or other crimes or did not punish the 
perpetrators. 

[26] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and 
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all 
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; 
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted 
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of 
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and 
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or 
"partially met." 

[27] This legislation is also referred to as the "Law of Financial 
Resources" and the "Revenue Management Law." 

[28] The Kurdistan National Assembly (Kurdish Regional parliament) has 
passed a "Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law" (also referred to as the 
"Petroleum Law of the Kurdistan Region - Iraq"), in August, 2007, which 
conditions cooperation with the federal authorities in the oil sector 
on a set of comprehensive conditions. According to the UN, it would 
likely take time for full agreement on these arrangements to be reached 
and for implementation of national revenue sharing to begin. It is 
unclear how this will affect the national debate on revenue sharing or 
the hydrocarbon framework legislation at this time. According to the 
State Department, the United States continues to believe that Iraq's 
interests are better served by the adoption of a single set of national 
oil and gas laws, which will help foster national unity and promote 
reconciliation. 

[29] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and 
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all 
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; 
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted 
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of 
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and 
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or 
"partially met." 

[30] Iraq has 18 governorates and the Iraqi Constitution states that 
one or more governorates have the right to organize into a region. 
Article 117 of the Constitution further recognizes the region of 
Kurdistan, which consists of three provinces in northern Iraq. The 
final version of the law on executive procedures regarding the 
formation of regions states that a region consists of one province or 
more. 

[31] The lack of clarity about power sharing between federal and 
regional governments is highlighted by problems over power generation. 
As of the summer of 2007, a number of provinces have been ignoring the 
federal government's shared authority over power generation and 
distribution by failing to provide their required allocations of power 
to Baghdad, contributing to national blackouts. In August 2007, these 
provincial authorities were threatening to disconnect their local power 
generating sources from the national electricity grid. 

[32] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9. 2007); 
GAO, forthcoming Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry 
Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to 
Guide Efforts and Manage Risk, GAO-07-903 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 
2007). 

[33] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and 
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all 
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; 
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted 
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of 
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and 
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or 
"partially met." 

[34] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and 
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all 
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; 
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted 
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of 
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and 
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or 
"partially met." 

[35] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and 
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all 
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented; 
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted 
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of 
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and 
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or 
"partially met." 

[36] Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential 
Services, and Oversight Issues (GAO-04-902R, Washington, D.C.: June 28, 
2004). 

[37] GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable 
Iraqi Security Forces, GAO-07-612T) Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007); 
GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight, (GAO-07-308SP) Washington, D.C.: January 9, 
2007; GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, 
Governance, and Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, 
(GAO-06-217C) Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2005. 

[38] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the committees were 
established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; defined this 
benchmark as "partially met" if at least half of the committees were 
established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; and defined this 
benchmark as "not met" if less than half of the committees were 
established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. 

[39] The current Baghdad security plan is also known as Operation Fardh 
al-Qanoon. 

[40] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq had 
provided three trained and ready brigades, or an equivalent number of 
battalions, to support Baghdad operations; as "partially met" if some 
of the units were trained and ready to support Baghdad security 
operations; and as "not met" if none of the units provided were trained 
and ready to support Baghdad security operations. The assessment was 
based on each unit's transition readiness assessments and intelligence 
reporting on their reliability. Consequently, our determination of 
"partially met" was based largely on classified information. (see 
classified appendix). 

[41] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi commanders did not 
face political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical 
and operational decisions. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if 
Iraqi commanders faced political intervention in executing the plan and 
making tactical and operational decisions. 

[42] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi security forces 
provided even-handed enforcement of the law. We defined this benchmark 
as "not met" if Iraqi security forces did not provide even-handed 
enforcement of the law. 

[43] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 
of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (Washington 
D.C.: May 2007). The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 
was created by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) 
to monitor violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion or belief abroad, as defined in IRFA and set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international 
instruments, and to give independent policy recommendations to the 
President, Secretary of State, and Congress. 

[44] U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007). 

[45] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi government policy did 
not allow safe havens and none existed; defined this benchmark as 
"partially met" if Iraqi government policy prohibited safe havens yet 
some existed; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if the Iraqi 
government had no stated policy on safe havens. 

[46] We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was clear and reliable 
evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and militia 
control of local security was eliminated; defined this benchmark as 
"partially met" if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level 
of sectarian violence was reduced or if militia control of local 
security was eliminated, but not both; and defined this benchmark as 
"not met" if there was no clear and reliable evidence that the level of 
sectarian violence was reduced and that militia control of local 
security was eliminated. 

[47] U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007); UN Assistance Mission for Iraq 
(UNAMI), Human Rights Report (Sept. 1-Oct. 31, 2006); UNAMI, Human 
Rights Report (Nov. 1-Dec. 31, 2006). 

[48] According to State's human rights report, an overall campaign 
aimed at forcibly displacing citizens was the main reason for the 
increasing polarization of areas within and outside Baghdad during 
2006. State noted numerous reports that indicated a Shi'a militia, the 
Jayash al- Mahdi, was responsible for a growing number of raids and 
killings of Sunni citizens in Baghdad and other parts of the country 
during the year. 

[49] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, D.C.: 
June 2007). 

[50] Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. Over the past 
4 years, Ramadan began about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004; 
October 5, 2005; and September 24, 2006. 

[51] National Intelligence Council, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: 
Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive, Update to 
NIE, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead 
(Washington, D.C.: August 2007). 

[52] According to a UN report, sectarian violence was most pronounced 
in areas with diverse ethnic and religious groups or where such groups 
were located in close proximity to each other, such as in Baghdad, 
Diyala, Kirkuk, and Mosul. Anbar province, where attack levels have 
decreased significantly over the past several months, is a 
predominantly Sunni Arab province. 

[53] We defined this benchmark as "met" if nearly all of the planned 
Joint Security Stations were established. We defined this benchmark as 
"partially met" if half of the planned Joint Security Stations were 
established. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if less than half 
of the planned Joint Security Stations were established. 

[54] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq 
increased the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of 
operating independently. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if the 
government of Iraq did not increase the number of Iraqi security 
forces' units capable of operating independently. 

[55] The Operational Readiness Assessment was previously known as the 
Transitional Readiness Assessment process. 

[56] As of May 2007, the Iraqi army had established over 100 
battalions. 

[57] In 2006, MNF-I changed the definition of a level 1 unit. 
Previously, in guidance provided to coalition transition teams for use 
in evaluating Iraqi security forces, a level 1 unit was said to be 
fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent 
operations. In 2006, MNF-I removed the words "fully" and "independent" 
from the definition. DOD officials could not provide a rationale for 
the change. 

[58] The administration's July 2007 interim assessment stated that the 
number of units assessed at level 1 had decreased, in part, due to a 20-
percent increase in unit authorization levels. 

[59] We considered this benchmark as "met" if the Iraqi government had 
laws or regulations ensuring the rights of minority parties in the 
legislature and minority parties received these rights; considered this 
benchmark as "partially met" if the Iraqi government had such laws but 
did not protect these rights; and considered this benchmark as "not 
met" if the Iraqi government had no law or regulation protecting 
minority party rights. 

[60] UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report, Jan. 1-Mar. 
31, 2007. 

[61] Congressional Research Service, Iraqi Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis? (Washington D.C.: 
Mar. 23, 2007). 

[62] Preti Taneja, Minority Rights Group International, Assimilation, 
Exodus, Eradication: Iraq's Minority Communities Since 2003 (United 
Kingdom: February 2007). 

[63] We would have considered this benchmark as "met" if the funds had 
been allocated and either the funds had been spent or there was a high 
likelihood that they would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We 
would have considered this benchmark as "partially met" if funds were 
allocated but it was not clear that the funds would be spent by the end 
of the fiscal year. We would have considered the benchmark as "not met" 
if the funds had not yet been allocated or if funds were allocated but 
clearly not spent. 

[64] Iraq's fiscal year begins on January 1st. 

[65] The expenditure data presented by the U.S. Embassy are preliminary 
data provided by the Ministry of Finance and do not include figures for 
the Kurdistan region or the other provinces. In its official May 2007 
monthly report, the Ministry of Finance did not report any expenditures 
for capital projects and reconstruction. In the absence of official 
data, the information presented by the U.S. Embassy provides an 
indication of Iraq's ability to spend its capital projects and 
reconstruction budget in the first half of the year. 

[66] Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly 
Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress (Arlington, 
VA, July 30, 2007). 

[67] The Kurdistan region received a separate allocation of $1.56 
billion, or 16 percent of the total 2007 capital projects and 
reconstruction budget. U.S. officials believe the Kurdistan region is 
able to execute its budget successfully because of its years of 
experience as a semi-autonomous region. 

[68] The $2 billion in 2006 capital project and reconstruction funds 
for the provinces did not include the Kurdistan region, which received 
a separate allocation. The government of Iraq permitted the provinces 
to carry over $1.3 billion in unspent 2006 funds. Unspent 2007 capital 
funds for the provinces may not be carried over, according to U.S. 
officials. 

[69] This percentage differs from preliminary Ministry of Finance data 
provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury indicating that the 
provinces "spent and committed" 18 percent of their 2007 allocations 
for capital projects and reconstruction, as of July 15, 2007. 

[70] The term "commitment" in Iraq is similar to an obligation under 
the U.S. budget process, although the government of Iraq's official 
expenditure data, as reported by the Ministry of Finance, does not 
include commitments or obligations. 

[71] We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was no evidence of 
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force 
personnel. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was evidence 
of undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force 
personnel. 

[72] Section 1314 of Public Law 110-28. 

[73] For example, see GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: 
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: 
January 9, 2007). See GAO's website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
for a complete list of GAO's Iraq-related reports. 

[74] IFES was formally known as the International Foundation for 
Election Systems. 

[75] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore 
Iraq's Oil Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation, GAO-07-1107T 
(Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2007) and Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated 
Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity 
Sectors, GAO-07-677 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2007). 

We defined this benchmark as "met" if the funds had been allocated and 
either they had been spent or there was a high likelihood that they 
would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We defined this benchmark 
as "partially met" if funds were allocated but it appeared questionable 
or unlikely that the funds would be spent by the end of the fiscal 
year. We defined the benchmark as "not met" if the funds had not been 
allocated. 

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