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entitled 'Railroad Bridges and Tunnels: Federal Role in Providing 
Safety Oversight and Freight Infrastructure Investment Could Be Better 
Targeted' which was released on August 30, 2007. 

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

August 2007: 

Railroad Bridges And Tunnels: 

Federal Role in Providing Safety Oversight and Freight Infrastructure 
Investment Could Be Better Targeted: 

Railroad Bridges and Tunnels: 

GAO-07-770: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-770, a report to congressional requesters 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Freight railroads account for over 40 percent (by weight) of the 
nation’s freight on a privately owned network that was largely built 
almost 100 years ago and includes over 76,000 railroad bridges and over 
800 tunnels. As requested, GAO provides information on this 
infrastructure, addressing (1) the information that is available on the 
condition of railroad bridges and tunnels and on their contribution to 
railroad congestion, (2) the federal role in overseeing railroad bridge 
and tunnel safety, (3) the current uses of public funds for railroad 
infrastructure investments, and (4) criteria and a framework for 
guiding any future federal role in freight infrastructure investments. 
GAO reviewed federal bridge safety guidelines and reports, conducted 
site visits, and interviewed federal, state, railroad, and other 
officials 

What GAO Found: 

Little information is publicly available on the condition of railroad 
bridges and tunnels and on their contribution to congestion because the 
railroads consider this information proprietary and share it with the 
federal government selectively. Major (Class I) railroads maintain 
detailed repair and inspection information, while other (Class II and 
III) railroads vary, from keeping detailed records, to lacking basic 
condition information. Despite their age, bridges and tunnels are not 
the main cause of congestion, although some do constrain capacity. 
Because bridge and tunnel work is costly, railroads typically make 
other investments to improve mobility first. 

The federal role in overseeing the safety of railroad bridges and 
tunnels is limited because FRA has determined that most railroads are 
sufficiently ensuring safe conditions. FRA has issued bridge management 
guidelines, makes structural observations, and may take enforcement 
actions to address structural problems. However, FRA bridge specialists 
use their own, not a systematic, consistent, risk-based, methodology to 
select smaller railroads for safety surveys and therefore may not 
target the greatest safety threats. 

Federal funds are used to meet many different goals, but are not 
invested under any comprehensive national freight strategy, nor are the 
public benefits they generate aligned with any such strategy. Some 
state investments are structured to produce state and local economic 
and safety benefits, and public-private partnerships have facilitated 
investments designed to produce public and private benefits. 

GAO has identified critical questions that can serve as criteria for 
reexamining the federal role in freight investments—including railroad 
bridge and tunnel investments—and a framework for implementing that 
role that includes identifying national goals, clarifying stakeholder 
roles, and ensuring that revenue sources and funding mechanisms achieve 
maximum national public benefits. The Department of Transportation’s 
draft Framework for a National Freight Policy takes a step forward, but 
more is needed to guide the implementation of a federal role in freight 
transportation investments. 

Figure: FRA Bridge Safety Survey and Double-Stack Train in Modified 
Tunnel. 

Source: left to right: GAO and BNSF Railway 9 (used with permission). 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOT (1) develop a systematic, risk-based 
methodology for selecting railroads for bridge safety surveys and (2) 
ensure that its Framework for a National Freight Policy identifies 
national goals, stakeholder roles, and funding mechanisms and revenue 
sources to maximize the national public benefits of federal freight 
infrastructure investments. DOT agreed with the first recommendation 
and said that it would consider the second recommendation. 

[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-770]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact JayEtta Z. Hecker at 
(202) 512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Little Information Is Publicly Available on Bridge and Tunnel 
Conditions and Congestion, Although Major Railroads Collect, Maintain, 
and Use This Information to Prioritize Investments: 

The Federal Role in Overseeing Railroad Bridge and Tunnel Safety Is 
Limited: 

Federal Investments in Freight Railroad Infrastructure Are Typically 
Not Targeted to Maximize National Benefits, Whereas Some State and 
Private Investments Are Strategically Targeted: 

Federal Funding for Freight Railroad Infrastructure Is Not Guided by a 
National Freight Strategy and Is Generally Not Targeted to Maximize 
National Benefits: 

Examining Critical Questions and Implementing a Framework That 
Identifies Goals, Stakeholder Roles, Revenue Sources, and Funding 
Mechanisms Could Guide a Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure 
Investments: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Examples of Bridge and Tunnel Maintenance, Component and 
Structural Replacement Costs on Selected Railroads: 

Appendix III: Considerations of Funding Sources and Mechanisms 
Available for Federal Funding of Freight-Related Infrastructure: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Examples of Federal Funding Mechanisms That Support Freight 
Railroad Infrastructure: 

Table 2: GAO's Critical Factors and Questions for Determining the 
Appropriateness of a Federal Role in Freight-Related Transportation: 

Table 3: Three Components of GAO's Framework Applied to Federal 
Involvement in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investments: 

Table 4: Names and Headquarters Locations of Entities Contacted: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Annual Train-Miles per Track-Mile for Class I Railroads, 1978 
to 2004: 

Figure 2: Class I Railroad Annual Ton-Miles per Route-Mile Owned: 

Figure 3: Howard Street Tunnel (Baltimore, Maryland) West entrance 
(left) and East entrance: 

Figure 4: Range of Railroad Infrastructure Improvement Costs (Dollars 
in thousands per linear foot): 

Figure 5: Structural Failure of a Bridge in Mississippi: 

Figure 6: Barge Navigating through the Narrow Channel of a Moveable 
Railroad Bridge Eligible for Truman-Hobbs Funding on the Mississippi 
River in Iowa: 

Figure 7: Kansas City Flyovers: 

Abbreviations: 

AAR: Association of American Railroads: 
AASHTO: American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials: 
ASLRRA: American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association:  
CBO: Congressional Budget Office: 
CREATE: Chicago Region Environmental and Transportation Efficiency: 
program: 
DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 
DOD: Department of Defense: 
DOT: Department of Transportation: 
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 
FHWA: Federal Highway Administration: 
FRA: Federal Railroad Administration: 
RRIF: Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing:  
STRACNET: Strategic Rail Corridor Network: 
TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

August 6, 2007: 

The Honorable James L. Oberstar: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John L. Mica: 
Ranking Republican Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings: 
House of Representatives: 

Freight railroads have been an important part of the U.S. 
transportation network for over 150 years and account for over 40 
percent of the ton-miles[Footnote 1] of the intercity freight 
transported in the United States. Much of the current U.S. freight 
railroad network was originally built by private corporations in the 
late 1800s and early 1900s and is still privately owned, including most 
of the nation's over 76,000 railroad bridges and over 800 railroad 
tunnels. While many parts of the railroad infrastructure, such as 
signals and track, have been replaced and upgraded, bridges and 
tunnels, which are the single most expensive railroad infrastructure 
components, have not been replaced and are still being used, some long 
after their originally predicted useful life. In the future, however, 
with projected increases in railroad traffic and further aging, these 
expensive components may need replacement, presenting funding 
challenges to private railroads. 

This report responds to your request for information on issues related 
to bridges and tunnels on the national freight railroad network. 
Specifically, this report addresses the following questions: 

(1) What information is available on the condition of railroad bridges 
and tunnels and on the contribution of this infrastructure to railroad 
network congestion? 

(2) What is the federal role in overseeing railroad bridge and tunnel 
safety? 

(3) How are public funds currently used for freight railroad 
infrastructure capital investments, including those for bridges and 
tunnels? 

(4) What criteria and framework could be used to guide the future 
federal role, if any, in freight-related capital investments, including 
those for railroad bridges and tunnels? 

Our overall approach to addressing these topics was to (1) review 
federal legislation, regulations, and guidance; transportation planning 
literature; and forecasts of future freight railroad demand and 
capacity from private railroads, public agencies, and industry 
organizations; (2) interview a wide variety of representatives; and (3) 
review pertinent documentation from railroads of various sizes; 
federal, regional, state, and local governments; and industry groups. 
In particular, we interviewed representatives from six Class I 
railroads, two Class II railroads, and nine Class III 
railroads.[Footnote 2] At the federal and state levels, we interviewed 
officials from six federal agencies that have some relationship dealing 
with railroad bridges and tunnels on the freight railroad network-- 
including officials in the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA), which has primary responsibility for 
overseeing the safety of the nation's freight railroad network--as well 
as officials in nine state DOTs. We selected the railroads and the 
state and local government agencies for interviews to include a cross 
section of characteristics, including geographic diversity, the 
presence of noteworthy public-private partnerships between the 
railroads and government agencies, and state DOTs that actively 
participated in planning or funding railroad infrastructure projects. 
We conducted our review from June 2006 through July 2007 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix I 
for further details about our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

Little information is publicly available on the condition of railroad 
bridges and tunnels, and on their contribution to congestion, but 
private freight railroads collect and maintain this information to 
varying degrees and use it to set investment priorities. This 
information will be increasingly important to the railroads as the 
demand for freight transportation grows, aggravating existing freight 
railroad congestion problems and further straining the railroads' 
infrastructure, which includes aging and expensive bridges and tunnels. 
Class I freight railroads collect and maintain detailed information on 
the condition of their bridges and tunnels--including inspection 
reports, condition information, structural ratings, design drawings, 
and maintenance and repair histories--and on the extent to which these 
structures contribute to network congestion. Class II and III railroads 
vary in the amount of information they collect and maintain on their 
bridges and tunnels, with some maintaining the same level of detailed 
information as the Class I railroads and others lacking the information 
needed to produce a complete list of their bridges, having no 
maintenance records, and keeping inaccurate or incomplete records of 
inspection, according to our review of FRA records. Freight railroads 
of all classes view condition and congestion information as proprietary 
and share it with the federal government selectively; and the 
government plays a limited role in collecting such information because 
there are no FRA regulations governing railroad bridges and tunnels. 
Furthermore, according to FRA's Chief Structural Engineer, the expense 
of collecting and maintaining the information may not be justified by 
the potential safety benefits. While most bridges and tunnels are not 
the main cause of freight railroad congestion, some structures are 
chokepoints and do constrain capacity. For example, opening a movable 
bridge operated by a Class I railroad over the Mississippi River for 
more than an hour during peak periods can delay that railroad's traffic 
all the way to the West Coast. Freight railroads use bridge and tunnel 
condition and network congestion information, along with other 
information, to set investment priorities to generate the greatest 
private return on their investment. According to several Class I 
railroad representatives, railroad bridge replacement typically has a 
lower rate of return on investment, making it more likely that 
railroads would invest in other enhancements before rehabilitation or 
replacement of railroad bridges. 

The federal role in overseeing railroad bridge and tunnel safety is 
limited because FRA has determined that railroads responsible for 
bridges and tunnels are sufficiently ensuring these structures' 
stability. Historically, FRA track personnel have provided bridge and 
tunnel safety oversight. Under the authority originally granted by the 
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, FRA has the authority to enforce 
railroad safety; and in the 1970s and early 1980s, FRA had considered 
issuing bridge safety regulations. However, FRA determined that 
railroads were already inspecting bridges using industry standards. As 
a result, in 1995 FRA decided to issue guidelines instead of 
regulations to guide railroad bridge management programs, and hired 
bridge specialists to make observations about bridge and tunnel 
conditions under these guidelines. If FRA identifies a structural 
concern, it attempts to work cooperatively with the railroad and takes 
enforcement action only if there is an immediate concern for safety. 
Other federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security's 
(DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast 
Guard, also have limited roles in railroad bridge and tunnel safety 
related to their particular missions. FRA bridge specialists have 
conducted safety surveys of all seven Class I railroads' bridge 
management programs and assessed those programs using FRA guidelines. 
These specialists also conduct 25 to 35 safety surveys per year of 
Class II and III railroads, covering a small portion of the nation's 
549 Class II and III railroads. The specialists use their own criteria 
to select these railroads. FRA has not established a systematic, 
consistent risk-based methodology for selecting the Class II and III 
railroads for bridge safety surveys; and as a result, FRA may not be 
targeting those whose bridges or tunnels are most likely to present 
safety risks. We are therefore recommending that FRA implement such a 
methodology for selecting Class II and III railroads for bridge safety 
surveys. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOT and FRA officials 
agreed with the need for a consistent, risk-based selection 
methodology; and FRA officials noted that it had already begun to 
implement our recommendation. 

Public funds may currently be used for a variety of capital investments 
in freight railroad infrastructure, including bridges and tunnels, but 
federal investments are typically not targeted to maximize national 
public benefits, whereas some state and public-private partnership 
investments are strategically targeted to achieve specific state, 
local, and private benefits. Overall, the current federal investment in 
freight railroad infrastructure is small compared with the railroads' 
own investment. For example, in calendar year 2006, Class I, II, and 
III railroads invested an estimated $9 billion in freight railroad 
infrastructure while the federal government provided an estimated $263 
million during fiscal year 2006. A number of federal agencies make 
federal funding available for freight-related infrastructure projects 
through different funding mechanisms to achieve certain transportation 
goals. However, the extent to which these mechanisms have been used for 
freight railroad infrastructure is generally limited, and much of the 
funding has gone for projects that primarily benefit localities or 
regions, such as railroad-highway grade crossing improvements or 
infrastructure improvements for Class II and III railroads, rather than 
projects that would maximize national public benefits, such as capacity-
enhancing improvements to bridges and tunnels on major freight routes. 
DOT has taken an important step toward targeting federal freight-
related transportation investments by issuing a draft Framework for a 
National Freight Policy;[Footnote 3] however, the objectives of this 
framework are not always clear, and the document does not explicitly 
identify criteria for federal investment, opportunities to incentivize 
more private investment, or opportunities to leverage private and other 
public funds to add freight transportation capacity. At the state 
level, some states target investments in freight railroad 
infrastructure to produce various state and local benefits. For 
example, the Kansas DOT administers a loan program for short 
line[Footnote 4] railroads in the state that haul locally produced 
agricultural products. Public-private partnerships have also 
facilitated investments designed to produce both public and private 
benefits. Although the current federal investment in freight railroad 
infrastructure is relatively small, growing congestion--resulting from 
the aging of the nation's freight transportation infrastructure and 
projected increases in demand for freight transportation--is expected 
to spur calls for a greater federal role in freight transportation, 
especially greater federal funding for freight-related infrastructure 
such as expensive railroad bridges and tunnels that constrain capacity 
on key freight routes. Federal funding is, however, constrained by the 
nation's long-term fiscal imbalance; and, as we have reported, federal 
funding mechanisms favor truck and marine transport over railroad 
transport and distort competition in freight transportation. 

In our past work reexamining the federal role in transportation and 
other policy areas, we identified a number of critical factors and 
questions--involving the relevance and purpose of the federal role, 
performance measurement, targeting of benefits, affordability, and cost 
effectiveness--that could be used as criteria to examine the future 
federal role in freight-related transportation investments, including 
investments in railroad bridges and tunnels.[Footnote 5] These factors 
underscore the need for a federal role that promotes equitable, mode- 
neutral investments of scarce federal funds in projects designed to 
achieve national goals and produce national benefits. While DOT's draft 
Framework represents an important step toward determining the federal 
role in freight transportation, it lacks several components that we 
have identified as key to such an approach, including setting national 
goals for federal investment in freight-related infrastructure across 
all modes; clearly defining federal and other stakeholder roles; and 
identifying cost-effective revenue sources and funding mechanisms that 
can be applied to maximize the national benefits of federal 
investments.[Footnote 6] Accordingly, we are recommending that DOT 
ensure that its draft Framework includes clear national goals, 
establishes roles, and identifies funding mechanisms for federal 
freight-related infrastructure investments, including freight railroad 
investments. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOT officials 
said they are considering this recommendation. 

Background: 

Currently, seven Class I railroads own and maintain over 61,000 bridges 
and over 800 tunnels, and 40 Class II and 509 Class III railroads own 
and maintain over 15,000 bridges.[Footnote 7] According to FRA 
documents, in 2002, the U.S. railroad network contained approximately 
one bridge for every 1.4 miles of track. Class I railroads operate on 
approximately 70 percent of the total route miles in the United States 
and generate 90 percent of total railroad revenues. Class II and III 
railroads also play a critical role in the national freight railroad 
network, serving as feeders to Class I main lines. According to the 
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), Class 
II and III railroads handle one out of every four carloads moved on the 
U.S. freight railroad system. 

Between 1978 and 2004, railroad traffic on Class I railroads increased 
dramatically while the number of railroad track miles decreased, as 
evidenced by an increase in the ratio of train-miles to track-miles 
(see fig. 1).[Footnote 8] In addition, freight volumes increased, as 
evidenced by a 105 percent increase in ton-miles per route- 
mile[Footnote 9] since 1990, from 8.63 million in 1990 to 17.70 million 
in 2005 (see fig. 2). These changes have focused more and heavier 
traffic over fewer core lines, thereby increasing both the strain on 
and the importance of key bridges and tunnels, such as those over the 
Mississippi River and underneath Baltimore. 

Figure 1: Annual Train-Miles per Track-Mile for Class I Railroads, 1978 
to 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Congressional Budget Office. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 2: Class I Railroad Annual Ton-Miles per Route-Mile Owned: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Association of American Railroads (AAR). 

[End of figure] 

Bridges and tunnels on the freight railroad network are aging and are 
susceptible to a variety of conditions that may cause wear or 
deterioration. Railroad bridges are constructed from timber, steel, 
masonry or concrete, or a combination of these materials. According to 
an FRA bridge survey completed in 1993, more than half of the nation's 
railroad bridges were built before 1920.[Footnote 10] This survey, 
which FRA's Chief Structural Engineer told us is largely applicable 
today, found that 36 percent of railroad bridges were made of timber, 
32 percent of steel, and 20 percent of masonry; the remaining 12 
percent of bridges were not identified by bridge type. Increased weight 
and traffic can cause fatigue in timber and steel bridges. Timber 
bridges are also susceptible to decay from weather and insects, and 
steel bridges near salt water may be susceptible to high rates of 
corrosion. Masonry bridges are more vulnerable to the effects of time 
and nature than to the weight of traffic, but reinforced concrete 
bridges are susceptible to the effects of traffic loads. According to 
FRA, from 1998 through 2006 a total of 22 train accidents, involving 
one injury and no fatalities, were attributed to bridge structural 
failures. The most recent fatality resulting from a bridge structural 
failure occurred in 1957. Likewise, very few major railroad tunnels 
have been built within the last 50 years, according to FRA's Chief 
Structural Engineer, although some have undergone maintenance or 
capacity expansion in recent years. Some tunnels are driven directly 
through rock; some are lined with brick or stone masonry, concrete, or 
timber; and many tunnels include two or more types of construction. 
Tunnels do not take stress from train traffic in the same way that 
bridges do, but they are susceptible to drainage issues, and timber- 
lined tunnels are particularly susceptible to fires. According to FRA, 
from 1982 through 2006 there were five reportable train accidents whose 
cause could have been related to the tunnel structure. One of these 
accidents resulted in two injuries, and none of the accidents resulted 
in a fatality. 

Many railroad bridges and tunnels were designed to have long useful 
life-spans, but were built for use by different types of trains. Until 
recent years, stress from locomotives and cars did not exceed the 
original design loads for bridges. For example, steel bridges built 
between 1895 and 1916 were engineered for steam locomotives that 
inflicted greater stress on bridges than today's locomotives. However, 
because of their increased weight, freight cars are approaching the 
design load limits of older bridges. Railcar weight standards have 
increased from 263,000 pounds to 286,000 pounds, and some cars now 
weigh as much as 315,000 pounds; however, approximately 45 percent of 
Class II and III railroad lines are not equipped with track capable of 
handling 286,000 pound cars, according to ASLRRA. In addition, freight 
cars have increased in height as increased intermodal freight traffic 
has led to double-stacking intermodal containers on railroad cars. Some 
bridges and tunnels do not have the clearance needed to accommodate 
these double-stack intermodal trains. 

The majority of the freight railroad network is privately owned, and 
federal economic regulation of freight railroads has decreased since 
the federal government deregulated the railroad industry in 1980. All 
seven Class I railroads are privately owned, and according to ASLRRA, 
approximately 95 percent of Class II and III railroads are privately 
owned, with the rest owned by government entities. Private railroads 
have an incentive to maintain their infrastructure in order to maintain 
business operations, and most railroads privately finance their 
infrastructure maintenance and improvement projects. 

Railroads invest large amounts in fixed assets such as track, signals, 
bridges, and tunnels. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) 
estimates that in calendar year 2006 Class I railroads alone invested 
over $8 billion in "capital commitments," that is, expenditures for 
capital projects and operating leases. Compared with other industries, 
railroads invest a higher percentage of revenue in their 
infrastructure. For example, in 2000, the average U.S. manufacturer 
spent 3.7 percent of revenue on capital spending, while railroads spent 
17.8 percent--almost five times as much, according to an analysis of 
U.S. Census data prepared by the American Association of State Highway 
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO).[Footnote 11] As railroads take 
steps to increase their capacity--by increasing the size or weight of 
railroad cars or by adding track--some of their bridges and tunnels may 
require alterations. A bridge's configuration and condition dictates 
weight restrictions, and most bridges and tunnels cannot accommodate 
the additional track, if needed, without replacement or significant 
reconstruction. Similarly, the dimensions of some bridges and tunnels 
restrict railroad car height and width. Because bridges and tunnels are 
the most expensive pieces of railroad infrastructure, with replacement 
and construction costs ranging from 11 to 550 times as much per linear 
foot as regular track, capacity expansion projects involving bridge and 
tunnel work require significant capital investment. 

While the freight railroad industry is projected to grow substantially 
with expected increases in freight traffic, the industry's ability to 
fund this projected growth, including making needed capital 
infrastructure investments in railroad bridges and tunnels, is largely 
uncertain. For private companies seeking to maximize returns to 
stakeholders, railroad investment poses a substantial risk. A railroad 
contemplating an infrastructure investment must be confident that the 
market demand for that infrastructure will hold up for 30 to 50 years. 
Furthermore, while railroads own and maintain their own infrastructure, 
some other modes of transportation, such as the trucking and maritime 
barge industries, use infrastructure that is owned and maintained by 
the government, providing them with a competitive price advantage over 
railroads. We have previously reported that railroad investment is 
critical to freight mobility and economic growth, and investments in 
railroad projects can produce public benefits, such as (1) reducing 
highway congestion, (2) strengthening intermodal connections and the 
efficiency of the publicly owned transportation system, and (3) 
enhancing public safety and the environment.[Footnote 12] (See the list 
of related GAO products at the end of this report.) However, even when 
the public benefits of freight projects may be sufficient to warrant 
public funding, federal funding mechanisms may not be well tailored to 
freight projects. Whereas freight projects are frequently intermodal, 
most federal funding mechanisms are focused on one mode. In addition, 
freight projects generate private benefits, raising questions about 
whether and how to provide public support for them. 

Little Information Is Publicly Available on Bridge and Tunnel 
Conditions and Congestion, Although Major Railroads Collect, Maintain, 
and Use This Information to Prioritize Investments: 

Major railroads[Footnote 13] collect and maintain detailed information 
on the condition of their bridges and tunnels and on the extent to 
which these structures contribute to network congestion, but less is 
known about how much information Class II and III railroads collect. 
Freight railroads generally consider this information proprietary, 
citing concerns over security and liability, and they selectively share 
bridge and tunnel information with the government. Meanwhile, the 
federal government plays a limited role in collecting information on 
railroad bridges and tunnels because they are privately owned and 
maintained. In addition, FRA has no regulations or standards for 
railroad bridges and tunnels; and, in FRA's view, the safety benefits 
that might accrue from collecting and maintaining information on their 
condition would not justify the expense. Various other federal agencies 
collect some information on railroad bridges and tunnels that pertain 
to their mission. While most bridges and tunnels are not the main cause 
of freight railroad congestion, some structures are chokepoints and do 
constrain capacity. Freight railroads set maintenance and investment 
priorities by considering bridge and tunnel information, together with 
comparable information on other components of their network 
infrastructure, and identify those repairs and improvements that will 
improve safety, provide the highest return on investment, and increase 
capacity. A bridge or tunnel is likely to cost more to repair--and much 
more to replace--than other components of railroad infrastructure 
networks, such as track or signals. As a result, railroads of all 
classes are more likely to invest in other components sooner and to 
consider extensive bridge or tunnel repair or replacement as one of 
their last investment options. 

Railroads Collect and Maintain Information on the Condition of Their 
Bridges and Tunnels to Varying Degrees: 

Class I railroads, which own over 75 percent of U.S. railroad bridges 
and over 800 tunnels, maintain detailed information on the condition of 
their bridges and tunnels and generally have the resources to invest in 
a robust maintenance and inspection regime; however, less is known 
about the information Class II and III railroads collect on bridge and 
tunnel conditions, according to FRA's Chief Structural Engineer. 
Officials from five of six Class I railroads with whom we spoke said 
they maintain bridge and tunnel information electronically in 
databases--including data on location, age, and other characteristics 
of the structures; inspection reports; condition information, 
maintenance histories, design drawings or construction documents; and 
other pertinent information.[Footnote 14] While Class I railroad bridge 
departments vary in size, these departments all have in-house bridge 
inspectors, engineers, and maintenance-of-way crews that conduct 
inspections, carry out maintenance and repair activities, and may also 
design and construct bridges. Class I railroads use in-house bridge 
inspectors to conduct inspections at least once a year on all bridges 
and tunnels to monitor safety and assess current conditions.[Footnote 
15] For example, one Class I railroad we interviewed has over 100 
personnel dedicated to bridge inspections on their network. 

According to the limited data we have, Class II and III railroads 
collect and maintain less information on their bridges and tunnels, and 
the reliability of the data collected may be poor. Based on our 
discussions with two Class II and nine Class III railroads, and on the 
documentation of 43 bridge safety surveys of Class II and III railroads 
that FRA completed from January 2004 through March 2007,[Footnote 16] 
Class II and III railroads collect less information on the condition of 
their bridges and tunnels, generally contract out bridge and tunnel 
inspection and repair work, and have less in-house bridge expertise. 
For example, 18 of the 43 Class II and III railroads reviewed by FRA 
since January 2004 could not produce some critical documentation 
related to the safety of their bridges, including past bridge 
inspection reports, design documents, or complete bridge inventories. 
Furthermore, only 16 of 43 Class II and III railroads, surveyed by the 
FRA inspect their bridges at least once a year. Also, according to FRA 
officials, many Class II and III railroads lack the in-house bridge 
expertise to conduct their own bridge inspections and rely instead on 
outside consultants. For example, according to the 43 FRA bridge safety 
surveys of Class II and III railroads, 26 of the railroads contracted 
out bridge inspections, 7 did not conduct bridge inspections, 4 did not 
mention who conducted the railroad's bridge inspections, 4 conducted 
inspections in-house, 1 had an informal inspection arrangement, and 1 
was found to have no bridges. In addition, 8 bridge safety surveys 
provided to us by FRA either found inconsistencies between bridge 
inspection reports and actual bridge conditions or found insufficient 
detail in inspection reports. 

One Class III railroad representative with whom we spoke stated that 
the true condition of that railroad's bridges, all of which were built 
by railroads not in existence today, is unknown because the railroad 
does not have design or construction documents, lacks past maintenance 
and inspection records, and has never conducted a complete engineering 
study to determine its bridges' load-carrying capacity. FRA officials 
stated that, based on the limited data they have, they believe that 
some Class III railroads do not have the training or experience needed 
to recognize critical structural deficiencies or even understand the 
severity and urgency of identified bridge or tunnel defects. However, 
FRA officials also stated that some Class II and III railroads have 
very good bridge management practices because they use qualified 
outside consultants to perform safety and inspection processes. 

The Federal Government Does Not Have Comprehensive Data on the Nation's 
Railroad Bridges and Tunnels: 

The federal government's efforts to collect data on railroad bridges 
and tunnels are limited in scope, and the data are not updated 
regularly. FRA collects railroad traffic information and maintains 
geographic data on U.S. freight railroad lines; however, this 
information does not show the location of bridges or tunnels on these 
routes. FRA maintains records of railroad accident and incident 
reports, some involving bridges and tunnels, dating back to 1982, but 
the information collected is limited to accident descriptions, repair 
costs, structure locations, and information about the train, crew, and 
track involved in the accidents and does not show bridge or tunnel 
condition, age, structure type, or design documents. In addition, as 
part of the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) 
loan application process,[Footnote 17] FRA's Office of Railroad 
Development hires independent engineering firms to verify the condition 
of the infrastructure and the feasibility of proposed infrastructure 
improvements. These assessments may provide detailed information on 
specific railroad infrastructure, including bridges and tunnels; 
however, the data are limited to the projects submitted in the RRIF 
loan application process. Furthermore, while FRA collects and updates 
data on track defects from its track inspections, it collects less 
information on bridges and tunnels, because the FRA has regulations 
detailing track standards but only guidelines for bridges. 

Although FRA has authority to obtain records related to the safety of 
railroad operations, including those involving bridges and tunnels, FRA 
officials expressed concern about the agency becoming a repository for 
railroad bridge and tunnel data. In addition, FRA's Chief Structural 
Engineer stated that the expense of collecting and maintaining a 
comprehensive railroad bridge and tunnel inventory could not be 
justified from a safety standpoint because railroads already maintain 
inventories of their own bridges and tunnels, which FRA officials 
review. 

No comprehensive inventory exists on the nation's railroad bridges and 
tunnels; however, through unrelated initiatives over the years, FRA has 
obtained some information on bridges and tunnels, although, in some 
cases, this information has not been updated regularly. For example, in 
1993, FRA compiled a list of railroad bridges over navigable waterways 
based on data from the U.S. Coast Guard. However, the list has not been 
regularly updated. Other federal agencies collect some information on 
railroad infrastructure as it pertains to their mission, but this 
information is not comprehensive or exclusive to railroad structures. 
This information is mainly collected by Department of Defense (DOD), 
DHS, TSA, the Coast Guard, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency and centers on either security or 
construction permitting functions. 

Railroad Bridges and Tunnels Are Aging but Are Not Generally the Main 
Cause of Freight Railroad Congestion, Although Some Are Chokepoints: 

While railroad bridges and tunnels are aging, their condition is not 
the main cause of freight railroad congestion; however, some critical 
bridges and tunnels are chokepoints on the freight railroad 
network.[Footnote 18] According to FRA officials and railroad 
representatives with whom we spoke, many of these structures are 
reaching or have exceeded their originally estimated useful life. For 
example, an FRA bridge survey completed in 1993 found that more than 
half of the nation's railroad bridges were built before 1920 and, 
according to FRA's Chief Structural Engineer, very few railroad tunnels 
have been built within the last 50 years. As a bridge ages, it 
undergoes natural deterioration, including corrosion, and weather- 
related stresses. In addition, fatigue may occur in some components of 
older bridges because of stress resulting from repeated heavy freight 
train operations. FRA's Chief Structural Engineer told us that, as 
bridges and other components of railroad infrastructure age and their 
condition worsens, the railroads may need to increase their investment 
in inspection, maintenance, and replacement to keep existing railroad 
lines serviceable. One Class I railroad representative said his 
railroad has a growing inventory of about 300 to 400 older bridges that 
are deteriorating and therefore need additional inspections and 
assessments. Quantifying the future maintenance and replacement needs 
of the freight railroad network is difficult, since private railroads 
do not make information on the condition of railroad bridges and 
tunnels publicly available because of concerns over sharing proprietary 
information and losing competitive advantage. However, the American 
Society of Civil Engineers gave railroad infrastructure a "C-" grade in 
its 2005 assessment of the nation's infrastructure, noting that limited 
capacity on the freight railroad network has created significant 
chokepoints and delays.[Footnote 19] 

Although officials at a few railroads with whom we spoke expressed some 
concerns about the effect of aging bridges on congestion, they were 
more concerned about the effect of increased train traffic on 
congestion. Demand for freight railroad capacity has increased over the 
last decade with some Class I railroads reaching record traffic levels, 
especially in ethanol, coal, and intermodal traffic. The demand for 
such capacity is expected to continue increasing. For example, the DOT 
has projected a 55 percent increase in freight railroad traffic from 
2000 to 2020. Increased train traffic places additional stress on 
existing infrastructure, especially railroad bridges; requires capacity 
expansion investments in rolling stock, infrastructure, and personnel; 
and increases congestion on the railroad network. 

Class I railroads consider congestion a networkwide problem whereas 
officials of the Class II and III railroads with whom we spoke said 
they generally experience congestion around crossings, yards, and 
interchanges with Class I railroads. Although officials from four of 
the nine Class II and III railroads with whom we spoke said they 
currently experience congestion on their entire networks, generally, 
those railroads were more concerned about upgrading existing 
infrastructure to handle the heavier railcars and longer trains being 
demanded by Class I railroads than they were with increasing capacity. 
The American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association estimates 
that out of the 48,000 miles of track owned by Class II and III 
railroads, 20,000 to 25,000 miles need to be upgraded to handle the 
heavier railcars that are becoming the industry standard. ASLRRA 
estimated these upgrades would cost $7 billion to $11 billion. 
Officials at seven of the nine Class II and III railroads with whom we 
spoke said the railroads had completed or needed to complete track or 
bridge upgrades to accommodate heavier railcars. 

Several factors contribute to congestion on freight railroad networks, 
including grade crossings and passenger trains, both of which can 
decrease freight railroad capacity and cause freight train delays. 
Bridges or tunnels may also cause network congestion. For example, 
single-track bridges and tunnels constrain capacity on double-track 
lines, as do low clearances that do not accommodate double-stack 
intermodal trains, bridges that open for marine traffic,[Footnote 20] 
and other structural characteristics such as sharp curves and steep 
grades that require slower train speeds. Deteriorated bridge and tunnel 
conditions can also contribute to congestion by requiring reduced train 
speeds, closures, and increased time out of service for maintenance. 
Where repairs or improvements to bridges and tunnels may not be 
financially viable or sufficiently profitable, railroads may institute 
slow orders or shut down lines and reroute traffic. In some cases, 
especially for Class III railroads, a bridge or tunnel closure can 
isolate a shipper and cripple a railroad's entire network. 

Although FRA officials estimated that 10 percent or less of freight 
railroad congestion is attributable to capacity constraints caused by 
railroad bridges and tunnels, railroad officials whom we spoke with 
identified some key bridges and tunnels as chokepoints on their 
networks. For example, one chokepoint is a moveable bridge that is one 
of only a few bridges across the Mississippi River owned by a Class I 
railroad. According to railroad officials, during peak periods, the 
bridge must open up to 15 times per day for river traffic while 
accommodating between 65 and 70 trains per day. Each opening for river 
traffic generally takes an average of 25 to 30 minutes, although the 
bridge is sometimes open for more than an hour, causing train delays as 
far as the West Coast. In addition, this bridge is closed for routine 
maintenance for over an hour several times a week. Another chokepoint 
is the 1.7 mile Howard Street Tunnel (see fig. 3), constructed in 1895 
under downtown Baltimore, Maryland, which is the largest and most 
expensive obstacle to transporting double-stack railcars from Baltimore 
to Chicago. The tunnel regularly causes passenger and freight train 
delays in the Baltimore area and beyond because it is a single-track 
tunnel with insufficient clearance for double-stack railcars on a 
double-track main line. Grades in and curves near the Howard Street 
tunnel also contribute to congestion, constraining freight traffic to 
25 miles per hour through the tunnel. In addition, during a fire in the 
tunnel in 2001, freight traffic was rerouted, resulting in 18-to 36- 
hour delays. 

Figure 3: Howard Street Tunnel (Baltimore, Maryland) West entrance 
(left) and East entrance: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Railroads Use Condition and Congestion Information with Other 
Information to Prioritize Investment, Including Projects Designed to 
Address Deterioration and Congestion: 

Freight railroad officials with whom we spoke consider information on 
bridge and tunnel conditions and congestion, along with information on 
demand, cost, and other factors, to set infrastructure maintenance and 
investment priorities. According to all of the Class I railroad 
officials with whom we spoke, maintaining or increasing safety is one 
of their highest investment priorities, along with return on 
investment. Hence, most Class I railroad officials with whom we spoke 
said the railroads consider immediate safety concerns first, ongoing 
maintenance and asset replacement next, and capacity expansion last 
when prioritizing bridge and tunnel projects. 

Bridge and tunnel rehabilitation or replacement is expensive, and the 
costs are highly variable, depending on the complexity of the 
structure's design, the length and location of the structure, the 
construction materials, and the type of replacement structure. The cost 
of replacing a bridge can range from $600,000 for a small timber 
trestle bridge on a lightly trafficked Class III railroad line to $100 
million to replace a large steel bridge with a 2,500-foot moveable span 
located on a Class I railroad's main line. See appendix II for more 
examples of railroad bridge and tunnel costs. Because replacement costs 
are high, railroads prefer to use asset extension programs and replace 
components rather than replacing entire structures to address 
deterioration and extend the useful life of their bridges and tunnels. 
Often, an individual component of a bridge may deteriorate faster than 
other components; therefore, replacing the component could 
significantly extend the life of the entire bridge. 

Bridge and tunnel replacement is typically one of the last options 
railroads choose to address infrastructure deterioration and mitigate 
congestion. Railroads typically try to improve their processes before 
enhancing infrastructure to mitigate congestion. Process improvements 
and other strategies generally cost less and are more cost effective 
than infrastructure enhancements. Class I railroads have used a number 
of process improvements to mitigate congestion, including updating 
their operating plans to reflect changes in business volume and traffic 
mix, increasing train lengths and the number of fully loaded cars per 
train, double-stacking trains, decreasing car cycle times, increasing 
service, hiring more train crews, and using pricing strategies to shape 
demand. 

When process improvements can no longer reduce congestion, railroads 
use infrastructure enhancements to expand the capacity of their 
networks. Infrastructure enhancements include adding sidings or track, 
expanding yards and terminals, upgrading signal systems, and 
rehabilitating or replacing bridges and tunnels. Per linear foot, 
bridge and tunnel replacement costs more than other infrastructure 
improvements, as shown in figure 4. Moreover, according to several 
Class I railroad representatives with whom we spoke, bridge replacement 
typically has a lower return on investment than other infrastructure 
improvements. Consequently, railroads invest in other enhancements 
before rehabilitating or replacing bridges. 

Figure 4: Range of Railroad Infrastructure Improvement Costs (Dollars 
in thousands per linear foot): 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis based on interviews with railroad and industry 
association officials and estimates from other rail infrastructure 
studies. 

[A] Generally timber bridges are not being replaced with another timber 
bridge, but rather they are being replaced by either culverts or 
bridges with concrete and steel components. The low-end example 
represents a timber bridge replaced by a culvert and the high-end 
example represents a timber bridge replaced by a steel and concrete 
structure. 

[End of figure] 

While bridge and tunnel work is expensive for all freight railroads, 
railroads vary in their ability to make these investments. Class I 
railroads generally have more resources than Class II and III railroads 
to invest in bridge and tunnel inspection, maintenance, rehabilitation, 
and replacement. According to AAR, in 2006, the seven Class I railroads 
spent an average of $1.2 billion each for capital investments, while 
all the Class II and III railroads surveyed by ASLRRA spent an average 
of over $795,000 each in 2004. Class II and, to a greater extent, Class 
III railroads face challenges in funding bridge and tunnel 
rehabilitation or replacement efforts because they may have limited 
funds, lack in-house bridge and tunnel expertise, and own bridges and 
tunnels purchased from Class I railroads on lines that those railroads 
had disinvested in. When repairs or improvements to bridges or tunnels 
are not financially feasible for Class II or III railroads, the 
railroads may instead modify their operations--by, for example, 
reducing train speeds over bridges or in tunnels. According to ASLRRA, 
some railroads may even stop operating on routes when bridge or tunnel 
repairs are both unavoidable and unaffordable. As a result, according 
to FRA officials, fewer serious problems are found on bridges and in 
tunnels owned by Class I railroads than on bridges or in tunnels owned 
by smaller railroads. Nonetheless, in response to several accidents 
caused by bridge failures, near accidents involving bridges, and 
results from its bridge safety surveys, FRA is developing a formal rail 
safety advisory on railroad bridges, to be released in late 2007, that 
will urge all railroads to increase their attention on bridge safety 
and bridge management programs. 

The Federal Role in Overseeing Railroad Bridge and Tunnel Safety Is 
Limited: 

Freight railroads are responsible for the structural safety of their 
bridges and tunnels; moreover, the federal government does not regulate 
railroad bridge and tunnel inspection requirements or conditions. In 
1995, after determining that railroads were already inspecting bridges 
according to detailed industry standards, FRA decided to issue advisory 
guidelines for railroad bridge management instead of regulations. 
Because FRA has general authority over railroad infrastructure safety, 
it may make observations of and assess bridge and tunnel conditions, 
but it does not routinely inspect these structures to monitor their 
condition. FRA bridge specialists may make observations while 
investigating complaints, following up on track inspectors' concerns, 
and conducting bridge safety surveys. If an FRA bridge specialist 
determines that there is a safety problem, FRA attempts to work 
cooperatively with the railroad to correct the problem rather than shut 
down the railroad's operations. FRA has taken enforcement action to 
protect public safety when there is a documented problem of immediate 
concern over a structure's stability. Other federal agencies also have 
limited roles in railroad bridge and tunnel safety. FRA's bridge safety 
oversight has evolved; however, bridge specialists individually apply 
different criteria in their selection of railroads for bridge safety 
surveys. FRA has not established a systematic, consistent risk-based 
approach to selecting Class II and III railroads for bridge safety 
surveys. As a result, FRA may not be selecting the railroads whose 
bridges or tunnels are most likely to present safety issues. 

Federal Railroad Bridge and Tunnel Safety Efforts Are Limited Because 
FRA Has Determined That Railroads Are Sufficiently Ensuring Structural 
Stability: 

Historically, the federal role in railroad bridge and tunnel safety has 
been narrow. The federal government does not routinely inspect railroad 
bridges or tunnels and does not regulate their condition. After a 
highway bridge collapsed in 1967, Congress debated instituting bridge 
inspection standards that would apply to railroad bridges, but 
railroads were already inspecting their bridges according to their 
established industry standards. In 1968, Congress required national 
inspection standards for highway bridges; however, current law does not 
regulate railroad bridge conditions or establish inspection standards. 
Under the authority originally granted to it by the Railroad Safety Act 
of 1970[Footnote 21] to issue safety regulations as necessary, from 
1975 to 1981 FRA considered establishing bridge safety regulations 
based on industry standards created by the American Railway Engineering 
and Maintenance of Way Association. However, according to FRA, these 
standards are actually recommendations for a thorough bridge management 
program, including very detailed specifications for particular types of 
bridges, rather than minimum inspection standards. In light of the 
industry's detailed safety standards and the low frequency of accidents 
caused by structural conditions on bridges or in tunnels, FRA 
determined that regulating bridge or tunnel structural conditions or 
requiring inspections would not be cost-effective to FRA when 
considering the cost of implementation and enforcement. Additionally, 
while establishing minimum standards might improve some railroads' 
structural management policies and procedures, it could also influence 
some railroads to reduce the frequency or effectiveness of their 
inspections. 

FRA observes and assesses bridge and tunnel conditions, but does not 
inspect these structures to regulate their condition. Although FRA does 
not regulate bridge and tunnel conditions, it does regulate track 
conditions, and it uses track inspectors, as well as bridge 
specialists, to identify potential bridge and tunnel safety issues. 
Historically, FRA track personnel have overseen bridge and tunnel 
safety.[Footnote 22] Under the authority originally granted by the 
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, an FRA track inspector may take 
action to address a structural concern identified on a bridge or in a 
tunnel, such as a visible crack in a steel beam, to ensure the safety 
of the public and railroad employees. Additionally, in 1992, FRA's 
Office of Safety established the position of Bridge Engineer (currently 
filled by FRA's Chief Structural Engineer) to assist track personnel in 
identifying and resolving issues of bridge structural integrity and to 
oversee standards regulating the safety of railroad bridge 
workers.[Footnote 23] After completing a bridge survey in 1993, FRA 
concluded that most railroads were inspecting bridges to a higher 
standard than would be required by any FRA-issued minimum standards, 
which prompted FRA to issue guidelines for bridge management rather 
than regulations. In 1995, FRA began implementing these guidelines as 
part of its Bridge Safety Assurance Program. FRA has hired five full- 
time bridge specialists since 2000 to implement this program.[Footnote 
24] These specialists provide expertise to track personnel and work 
with them to relieve some of the track personnel's inspection workload 
related to railroad structures as well as carry out other activities to 
promote bridge safety. Besides the Chief Structural Engineer, the 
program now includes one bridge specialist at FRA headquarters[Footnote 
25] and four bridge specialists in the field. Each field bridge 
specialist is responsible for all of the passenger and freight railroad 
infrastructure in two FRA regions and one or two Class I railroads 
(whose infrastructure usually spans multiple FRA regions). In addition 
to addressing bridge structural concerns, FRA bridge specialists 
address tunnel structural concerns. However, FRA's involvement in 
tunnels is not as extensive as its involvement in bridges, since 
bridges are more affected by stress from trains moving over them than 
tunnels are from trains moving through them.[Footnote 26] In addition, 
there are many more railroad bridges in the United States than there 
are tunnels. 

In observing bridge conditions, FRA bridge specialists use FRA advisory 
guidelines for railroad bridge management programs.[Footnote 27] These 
guidelines recommend, among other things, that organizations 
responsible for the safety of a bridge ensure that a qualified engineer 
determines the weight-bearing capability of a bridge; collect bridge 
design, construction, maintenance, and repair records; and have a 
competent inspector periodically inspect structures. The guidelines do 
not pertain to tunnels or other types of structures on railroad 
property. FRA encourages, but does not require, that railroads comply 
with these guidelines because the railroads are responsible for 
inspecting, maintaining, and ensuring the safety of bridges and tunnels 
that carry their track. However, when a bridge or tunnel owner fails to 
resolve a structural problem, FRA can use legal means, including 
emergency orders, to ensure safety.[Footnote 28] 

Federal Enforcement of Bridge and Tunnel Structural Safety Is Primarily 
Limited to Addressing Immediate Safety Concerns: 

FRA is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing the safety 
and structural integrity of railroad bridges and tunnels. FRA bridge 
specialists perform both enforcement and nonregulatory activities aimed 
at ensuring the safety of railroad structures. Other federal agencies 
have more limited roles in railroad bridge and tunnel safety related to 
their particular missions. 

FRA bridge specialists play a number of roles[Footnote 29] intended to 
promote bridge and tunnel safety, most of which involve responding to 
identified safety issues. One of their principal roles is to alert 
FRA's Chief Structural Engineer when they encounter an immediate bridge 
or tunnel safety concern so that an emergency order may be issued if 
necessary. These safety concerns may be identified in response to a 
track inspector's findings, in response to an accident or a complaint, 
or through independent observation of a railroad's bridges or tunnels. 
Each bridge specialist has numerous safety responsibilities as part of 
the Bridge Safety Assurance Program. In particular, the FRA bridge 
specialists are involved in the following activities: 

* Enforcement. If a bridge specialist notices a track defect on or near 
a bridge or tunnel, the specialist typically first recommends remedial 
actions, such as a reduction in train speeds over the affected track 
segment. If conditions warrant, the FRA Administrator may issue an 
emergency order. However, FRA prefers to seek cooperative solutions 
with railroads and has issued only three emergency orders for bridges 
and none for tunnels since 1970. 

* Accident Investigation. When an accident occurs on a bridge or in a 
tunnel, one or more bridge specialists may conduct an on-site 
investigation. In the case of a bridge or tunnel structural failure, 
the bridge specialist may identify the individual component that caused 
the failure, although the entire structure may need to be replaced 
after the accident (see fig. 5). 

Figure 5: Structural Failure of a Bridge in Mississippi: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: FRA. 

[End of figure] 

* Complaint Investigation. Bridge specialists are responsible for 
addressing and investigating almost all formal complaints concerning 
bridges and tunnels filed by the general public, Members of Congress, 
and railroad employees. According to FRA, most formal bridge complaints 
from the public are related to aesthetic issues rather than the 
stability or safety of a structure. Bridge specialists may also conduct 
structural evaluations in response to concerns identified by FRA track 
personnel or as part of a complaint investigation. 

* Monitoring Compliance Agreements. In response to systemic safety 
concerns that FRA identifies on a railroad through the bridge 
specialists' or track personnel's activities, FRA may work with the 
railroad to implement a compliance agreement to improve safety across 
the entire railroad. FRA often initiates a compliance agreement to 
avoid issuing an emergency order for the railroad to cease operations 
on a bridge. FRA has found that compliance agreements can be an 
effective tool to address systemic weaknesses in a railroad's bridge 
management practices, while emergency orders usually address serious 
safety problems on specific bridge structures. 

* Training. At FRA conferences, the bridge specialists teach FRA track 
inspectors about bridge conditions. This training supports 
communication between FRA track staff and bridge specialists and is 
designed to increase the number of FRA personnel that can detect 
immediate safety concerns on bridges. 

* Conducting Bridge Safety Surveys. During a bridge safety survey, a 
bridge specialist interviews railroad bridge staff and uses FRA 
guidelines as criteria for reviewing a railroad's bridge management 
policies, procedures, and records. After reviewing the railroad's 
records and policies, the bridge specialist observes a sample of the 
railroad's bridges and compares the results of the sample observation 
with the railroad's bridge inspection reports to determine the 
inspection reports' reliability. The bridge specialist documents the 
findings and follows up with the railroad to document any necessary 
repairs to structures or improvements to bridge management procedures. 

Besides FRA, several federal agencies have responsibilities related to 
railroad bridges and tunnels in areas such as security and clearance 
for maritime traffic. Within DHS, TSA has issued freight railroad 
security action items in cooperation with the railroad industry, but 
compliance with these action items is voluntary. Much as FRA monitors 
compliance with its guidelines, TSA security inspectors assess a 
railroad's compliance with TSA's action items and may make 
recommendations if the railroad does not comply with certain items. 
Additionally, TSA issued a proposed rule in December 2006 that would 
require freight railroads and other transportation entities to allow 
TSA and DHS to enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, and 
records relevant to railroad security. Also within DHS, the U.S. Coast 
Guard is responsible for overseeing all bridges over navigable 
waterways and for assessing obstructions to maritime traffic. The Coast 
Guard regulates movable bridge schedules and prescribes bridge lighting 
for navigational safety. Within the DOD, the Transportation Engineering 
Agency designates STRACNET, a network of railroad lines that form the 
minimum railroad network required to meet the transportation needs of 
the military. The Transportation Engineering Agency does not directly 
oversee the condition of bridges or tunnels on this network. 

FRA Is Not Using a Systematic, Consistent, Risk-Based Methodology to 
Target Bridge Safety Surveys to Class II and III Railroads: 

FRA's field bridge specialists monitor bridges and tunnels in a large 
area and have not been able to assess the bridge policies or the 
bridges and tunnels of many of the Class II or Class III railroads in 
the specialists' assigned areas. Furthermore, as previously discussed, 
the railroads share information on the condition of their bridges and 
tunnels with the federal government selectively. As a result, the 
structural conditions of some bridges and tunnels and the practices 
used to inspect and maintain them, particularly on Class III railroads, 
are largely unknown to the federal government. According to ASLRRA, 
there are 549 Class II and III railroads in the United States. Although 
FRA has conducted bridge safety surveys on all of the Class I 
railroads, FRA officials estimate that they have conducted, on average, 
approximately 25 to 35 bridge safety surveys per year on Class II and 
III railroads since the introduction of the field bridge specialists in 
2004. As we mentioned earlier, our analysis of FRA's completed bridge 
safety surveys during this period showed that some of the surveyed 
Class II and III railroads had sound bridge management practices and 
records, but most did not. The limited number of bridge safety surveys 
that the FRA bridge specialists have been able to accomplish relative 
to the number of Class II and III railroads could indicate potential 
bridge and tunnel safety concerns on railroads that FRA has not 
surveyed. 

According to FRA, the goal of the Bridge Safety Assurance Program is 
not to monitor all railroads, but rather to identify railroads whose 
bridge management policies and bridge conditions may lead to safety 
threats. However, the FRA bridge specialists do not select Class II and 
III railroads for bridge safety surveys using a consistent methodology 
based on a comprehensive, prioritized assessment of safety issues that 
could focus FRA's inspection and enforcement resources on those 
railroads that could have the greatest safety risks. Each field bridge 
specialist uses individually developed criteria, based on personal 
experience and other available information--such as whether a 
railroad's bridges carry passenger traffic--to help identify Class II 
and III railroads as candidates for bridge safety surveys. This is in 
contrast to how FRA implements its National Inspection Plan to target 
inspections of other railroad safety areas. This plan provides guidance 
to each FRA regional office on how its inspectors should divide their 
work, by railroad and by state, on the basis of trend analyses of 
available accident, inspection, and other data. Before implementing 
this plan, FRA had a less structured, less consistent, and less data 
driven approach to planning inspections, under which each region 
prepared its own inspection plan, on the basis of judgments and 
available data. The use of data was not consistent from region to 
region, and individual inspectors had greater discretion to select 
sites for inspection using their own knowledge of their inspection 
territories. 

In our previous work, we have noted that risk management can help to 
improve safety by systematically identifying and assessing risks 
associated with various safety hazards, prioritizing them so that 
resources may be allocated to address the highest risk first, and 
ensuring that the most appropriate alternatives to prevent or mitigate 
the effects of hazards are designed and implemented.[Footnote 30] FRA's 
safety oversight role in other areas, such as operating practices and 
track, includes inspections that focus on compliance with minimum 
standards; however, these inspections do not attempt to determine how 
well railroads are managing safety risks on their systems. In contrast, 
by examining how railroads manage safety risks during its bridge safety 
surveys, FRA is, in part, addressing risk-management issues, even 
though it has not established a systematic, risk-based methodology to 
select Class II and III railroads that may need additional oversight. 
For example, one bridge specialist is contacting all Class III 
railroads in one region to obtain specific information on their bridge 
management policies, such as whether a railroad has regular inspections 
by a qualified civil engineer and how the railroad records and uses the 
bridge inspection data, to better identify railroads for bridge safety 
surveys. Additionally, FRA's Chief Structural Engineer is considering a 
research project that would use new technology to measure the stress 
trains inflict on timber bridges. If this project were implemented, FRA 
would analyze stress data that might indicate bridge problems and a 
need for monitoring problematic bridges. 

Federal Investments in Freight Railroad Infrastructure Are Typically 
Not Targeted to Maximize National Benefits, Whereas Some State and 
Private Investments Are Strategically Targeted: 

Federal, state, and local governments make limited investments in 
freight railroad infrastructure, including bridges and tunnels, in an 
effort to enhance the public benefits associated with freight and 
passenger transportation. However, federal investments in all modes of 
freight-related infrastructure are not aligned with a national freight 
policy or with a strategic federal freight transportation plan. DOT has 
developed a draft Framework for a National Freight Policy, but it lacks 
a strategic federal component that specifies federal goals, roles, and 
revenue sources and funding mechanisms. In contrast, some states 
structure their investments in freight railroad infrastructure to 
produce public benefits at the state and local levels, and some public- 
private partnerships have facilitated investments designed to produce 
public and private benefits. Freight congestion and demand are expected 
to increase, and given the highly constrained fiscal environment, the 
federal government may be challenged to increase the efficiency of the 
national multimodal freight transportation system. 

Federal Funding for Freight Railroad Infrastructure Is Not Guided by a 
National Freight Strategy and Is Generally Not Targeted to Maximize 
National Benefits: 

While the private sector is largely responsible for investing in the 
freight railroad infrastructure that it owns and maintains--an 
estimated $9 billion during calendar year 2006--the federal government 
invests some public funds in this infrastructure as well--an estimated 
$263 million during fiscal year 2006. The federal government funds 
freight railroad infrastructure investments through the General Fund 
and the Highway Trust Fund, and funding mechanisms include loans, 
grants (such as formula grants and legislative earmarks), and tax 
expenditures (such as tax credits). However, these funding mechanisms 
are (1) targeted toward individual transportation modes and address 
different transportation safety and economic issues, (2) are 
administered by different agencies that have different missions, and 
(3) are not coordinated by a strategic federal multimodal freight 
transportation policy to maximize specific national public freight 
transportation benefits[Footnote 31] (see table 1). For example, in 
accordance with its mission to protect maritime economic interests, the 
U.S. Coast Guard administers the Truman-Hobbs program to alter railroad 
and highway bridges that obstruct maritime traffic (see fig. 
6).[Footnote 32] While this program can enhance maritime, railroad, and 
highway freight mobility, it is targeted toward maritime traffic and is 
not coordinated with other DOT freight mobility investments. 

Table 1: Examples of Federal Funding Mechanisms That Support Freight 
Railroad Infrastructure: 

Funding mechanism: Loan; 
Revenue source: General Fund; 
Example: RRIF loans can be used by railroads, state and local 
governments, and other entities to finance certain activities such as 
track and bridge rehabilitation; 
Federal agency: FRA. 

Funding mechanism: Grant[A]; 
Revenue source: General Fund; 
Example: The Truman-Hobbs program funds the alteration of railroad and 
highway bridges that are deemed hazards to maritime navigation; 
Federal agency: U.S. Coast Guard. 

Funding mechanism: Grant [A]; 
Revenue Source: Highway Trust Fund; 
Example: Legislative earmarks have been used to fund federally 
designated Projects of National and Regional Significance that include 
railroad components, such as the Heartland Corridor Project, which will 
increase tunnel clearances to accommodate double-stacked trains.
Federal agency: Federal Highway Administration.

Funding mechanism: Tax expenditure; 
Revenue source: General Fund revenue forgone; 
Example: The Railroad Track Maintenance Credit is available to Class II 
and III railroads for 50 percent of their qualified track maintenance 
expenses during a taxable year; 
Federal agency: Internal Revenue Service. 

Source: GAO analysis of programmatic and fiscal year 2006 financial 
data from FHWA, FRA, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Joint Committee on 
Taxation. 

[A] Examples of other federal grant programs that also fund, to some 
extent, freight railroad infrastructure investments include High 
Priority Projects, Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality, 
Transportation Improvements, Public Lands Highways, and Railway- 
Highway Crossings (Section 130). 

[End of table] 

Figure 6: Barge Navigating through the Narrow Channel of a Moveable 
Railroad Bridge Eligible for Truman-Hobbs Funding on the Mississippi 
River in Iowa: 

[See PDF for image]

Source: GAO.  

[End of figure] 

Today's federal investments in freight railroad infrastructure are not 
guided by a clear federal freight strategy. In 2006, DOT attempted to 
move beyond the traditional modal approach to freight transportation by 
developing a draft Framework for a National Freight Policy, which, 
among other things, incorporates some previously established federal 
freight railroad infrastructure funding mechanisms. Although this draft 
Framework represents an important step toward developing a national 
intermodal freight transportation policy, it does not go far enough, in 
our view, toward delineating a clear federal role and strategy for 
carrying out that policy. DOT describes its draft Framework as a living 
document and emphasizes that the nation's freight transportation 
challenges are of such a nature and magnitude that governments at all 
levels and the private sector must work together to address them. We 
agree, and we note that as the draft Framework evolves, DOT and other 
stakeholders will have an opportunity to clarify their respective 
freight strategies. 

As we have reported, the federal approach to a given transportation 
strategy should include clearly and consistently defined goals, roles, 
revenue sources, and funding mechanisms to ensure that federal 
investments in the nation's intermodal freight transportation 
infrastructure will maximize national public benefits.[Footnote 33] 
DOT's draft Framework sets forth some "objectives" for freight 
transportation, together with strategies and tactics for achieving 
them; acknowledges that a variety of public and private stakeholders 
play important roles in freight transportation; and identifies some 
funding mechanisms and other tools that the federal government can use 
to support freight infrastructure. However, in some instances, these 
objectives are vague, and federal and other stakeholders' roles and 
funding mechanisms are not clearly and consistently defined. For 
example, one DOT draft Framework objective is to "add physical capacity 
to the freight transportation system in places where investment makes 
economic sense," with supporting strategies and tactics that include 
focusing on facilitating regionally based solutions for freight 
gateways and projects of national or regional significance and 
utilizing and promoting new and expanded financing tools, such as RRIF, 
to incentivize private sector investment. To implement this objective, 
DOT would need to define "economic sense" and develop criteria--as the 
draft Framework says--to identify specific freight gateways and 
projects of national or regional significance; and determine whether 
federal revenues should be used to help subsidize any project 
components and, if so, which federal funding mechanisms would be most 
appropriate. 

As we have also reported, federal investments should be directed to 
maximize national public benefits. Allocating benefits and their costs 
among beneficiaries is difficult[Footnote 34] and may be subject to 
interpretation. Hence, it will be important for DOT to define national 
benefits and to establish criteria for determining whether federal 
investments are warranted. DOT's draft Framework suggests, but does not 
explicitly identify as such, certain criteria for federal investment, 
such as a project's national or regional significance, opportunities to 
incentivize more private investment in transportation infrastructure, 
and opportunities to leverage private and other public funds to add 
freight transportation capacity. 

Without a federal freight strategy, the existing federal freight 
funding mechanisms are not designed to maximize national public 
benefits. For example, although all railroads may apply for RRIF loans, 
the only freight railroads that have been awarded loans have been Class 
II and III railroads, whose operations tend to be more regional and 
local. Also, the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Section 130 
grant program mainly benefits localities by improving or eliminating 
railroad-highway grade crossings and the public safety benefits of the 
program are more local than national. Benefits from the Truman-Hobbs 
program's investments directly accrue primarily to private maritime 
shipping and secondarily to railroad companies by improving each mode's 
infrastructure, thereby enhancing the efficiency of freight 
transportation. On the other hand, depending on the project, 
legislative earmarks can generate public and private benefits that 
could be national, regional, and local in scope; however, these 
projects do not compete for funding against other alternatives. For 
example, through the Projects of National and Regional Significance 
program, Congress earmarked funds to support the Chicago Region 
Environmental and Transportation Efficiency (CREATE) project, which is 
mainly designed to reduce railroad congestion in the nation's largest 
railroad hub[Footnote 35]--the effects of which, among other things, 
could improve the mobility of the national freight railroad network, 
improve local commuter railroad service, and reduce railroad-highway 
grade crossing hazards and congestion. Finally, Class II and III 
railroads can use the Railroad Track Maintenance Credit--a tax credit-
-to offset capital investment expenditures, but as previously stated, 
individual Class II and III railroad operations tend to benefit the 
private and local sectors more than the nation as a whole. 

Some State Investments in Freight Railroad Infrastructure Are Targeted 
to Achieve State and Local Benefits: 

In contrast to the federal government, some states that invest in 
freight railroads administer various goal-oriented and criteria-based 
programs that are funded through a mixture of state and federal 
resources specifically to produce anticipated state and local benefits. 
Some states have been helping short line railroads maintain track in 
their jurisdictions for almost 20 years. For example, the Tennessee DOT 
provides approximately $8 million in grants annually to 18 of 20 Class 
III railroads in the state to fund track and bridge work, including 
bridge inspections and rehabilitation projects. As we have previously 
reported, governments at all levels--including states--have 
increasingly been providing support for freight railroad improvement 
projects that offer potential public benefits, and over 30 states have 
published freight plans that describe their goals and approach to 
freight-related investments.[Footnote 36] The scope of state- 
administered freight railroad programs includes railroad infrastructure 
improvements, construction of intermodal facilities, elimination of 
public railroad-highway grade crossings, and inspection of bridges. For 
example, the Pennsylvania DOT administers a matching grant program--
funded at $10.5 million as of October 2006--to support freight railroad 
maintenance and construction costs; and eligible recipients include 
freight railroads, transportation organizations, municipalities, 
municipal authorities, and other eligible users of freight railroad 
infrastructure. 

Officials from three of the nine state DOTs whom we interviewed are 
developing and implementing multimodal freight policies. However, such 
initiatives may be limited by state and federal funding criteria that 
restrict most state transportation spending to highway infrastructure. 
As we have reported, efforts to improve freight mobility are hampered 
by the highly compartmentalized structure and funding of federal 
transportation programs--often by transportation mode--that gives state 
and local transportation agencies little incentive to systematically 
compare the trade-offs between investing in different transportation 
alternatives to meet mobility needs because funding is tied to certain 
programs or types of projects.[Footnote 37] Officials from several 
state agencies and oversight organizations whom we interviewed stated 
that funding available for freight projects, regardless of mode, would 
be more useful than "stovepiped" funding that would be available only 
for investment in certain transportation modes. 

Officials at six of the state agencies and oversight organizations whom 
we interviewed administer freight railroad programs that have 
identified programmatic goals, eligibility criteria, and funding 
sources aimed at generating state and local benefits. For example, 
officials from the Kansas DOT told us that the goals of its loan 
program for local and regional railroads are to improve railroad lines, 
enhance railroads' customer service to shippers, limit the number of 
trucks on highways, and increase state and local economic vitality by 
transporting local agricultural products. While officials from some 
state agencies that we interviewed acknowledged that public benefits 
are difficult to quantify for any public investments, six state 
agencies and oversight organizations we interviewed were trying to 
quantify them. For example, the Kansas DOT sponsored a study which 
found that the short line railroad system saves the state an estimated 
$49 million annually in pavement damage costs. 

The scope of state freight railroad programs may be either broad, 
including infrastructure investments of all kinds for railroads of all 
sizes, or narrow, focusing on eligible projects and award recipients. 
For example, the Pennsylvania DOT has two broad grant programs for 
freight railroads and shippers, both of which may be used to fund 
maintenance and new construction projects. In contrast, the Tennessee 
DOT makes funds available specifically to Class III railroads by 
allocating funds for track and bridge rehabilitation. State freight 
railroad initiatives have supported investments in track rehabilitation 
and other infrastructure improvements, railroad acquisition and line 
preservation assistance, intermodal facility construction and increased 
industrial access to railroads, and road and railroad-highway crossing 
safety enhancements. 

Some of the state entities we interviewed reported using a number of 
funding mechanisms for their freight railroad programs. Specifically, 6 
of the 12 said they provide grants and long-term below-market rate 
loans, and one state reported issuing tax-exempt bonds. Some of these 
states require that entities applying for loans or grants secure 
matching funds. States fund freight railroad programs through state 
general funds, user fees, federal Section 130 and other grants, and 
other sources. Some states have taken an innovative approach to funding 
freight railroad infrastructure. For example, Tennessee created a user- 
fee based Transportation Equity Fund to support investments in 
nonhighway infrastructure, including short line freight railroad track 
and bridge rehabilitation. The fund is financed through the revenue 
from state sales taxes on diesel fuel paid by railroad, air, and water 
transportation modes; and the portion available for the Tennessee Short 
Line Railroad Rehabilitation Track and Bridge grant program is 
typically $7 million to $8 million annually. The program's purpose is 
to preserve freight railroad service and thereby contribute to the 
state's economic development. Construction grants are funded at a 90 
percent state and 10 percent local (nonstate) matching share. Each 
grant can be matched with in-kind work, cash contributions or both. 

Public-Private Partnerships Have Supported Some Freight Railroad 
Investments Designed to Produce Both Public and Private Benefits: 

States, localities, and railroads have used public-private partnerships 
as a strategic approach to develop freight-related transportation 
solutions that benefit both sectors.[Footnote 38] In using this 
approach to resolve freight issues, public and private participants of 
the partnerships we reviewed identified common goals, individual roles, 
and funding sources and mechanisms, which have affected partnership 
outcomes. In some cases, these partnerships have supported railroad 
bridge and tunnel projects. A well-structured partnership balances the 
various strengths, limitations, and respective contributions of both 
the public sector--federal, state, local, and regional--and private 
sector participants in order to secure specific public and private 
freight-related benefits. 

Both the public and the private sectors have initiated freight railroad 
public-private partnerships. For example, according to AASHTO 
representatives we interviewed, in 2002 the Delaware DOT approached a 
Class I railroad to reopen the Shellpot Bridge, which had been out of 
service since 1994. The state associated the abandonment of this bridge 
with increased congestion on the Northeast Corridor and saw it as a 
threat to the competitiveness of the Port of Wilmington in attracting 
freight traffic. The state and the railroad jointly developed the 
project's goals, roles, and funding mechanisms. The state agreed to 
finance the approximately $13.5 million cost of restoring the bridge by 
contributing $5 million in state grant appropriations and funding the 
remainder by issuing tax-exempt bonds. The railroad agreed to 
compensate the state over a 20-year period by paying a fee for each 
train car that uses the bridge. In another public-private partnership, 
members of the Kansas City Terminal Railway Company[Footnote 39]and 
their project designer approached the state of Missouri and the Unified 
Government of Kansas City/Wyandotte County, Kansas, to propose 
assisting in financing the construction of two flyovers and the 
rehabilitation of a bridge. The purpose of these three infrastructure 
improvement projects was to separate freight trains from different 
railroads at several points where they came together to form what 
amounted to four-way stops for trains in the Kansas City region and 
caused a significant chokepoint on the U.S. freight railroad network 
(see fig. 7). The railroads had already determined the goals of their 
proposed public-private partnership and came to the bargaining table 
with proposed roles and funding mechanisms. The railroads acknowledged 
that they could pursue the project using strictly private market 
resources; however, a wholly private project would have taken longer to 
complete. The state and county saw value in relieving their communities 
of the grade-crossing congestion this chokepoint caused, determined the 
project risk was acceptable, and each agreed to issue tax-exempt bonds 
that totaled over $190 million, which will be repaid by the railroads 
through user fees. In both the Delaware and Kansas City cases, the 
entities that initiated the partnership brought well-defined goals, 
identified stakeholder roles, and guaranteed a set amount of funding to 
the public-private partnership over a period of years. 

Figure 7: Kansas City Flyovers: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: BNSF (used with permission) and GAO digitally altered. 

[End of figure] 

Public-private partnerships can make funds available and define goals 
and roles for all stakeholders for large, expensive freight railroad 
projects when it is difficult for a public or private entity to fund 
the entire project on its own, or when a project is not part of a 
railroad's strategic plan, but would be beneficial to a locality's or a 
region's quality of life. For example, public and private players bring 
various strengths and limitations to the partnerships. The private 
sector often can bring a more global view of freight needs to the 
project planning process, help identify and implement projects, 
contribute significant funds, and promote efficient use of 
infrastructure. The public sector can offer various public financing 
tools, such as low-interest loans and private activity bonds,[Footnote 
40] to create incentives for private investments in freight railroads 
that would not otherwise be made and to generate anticipated public 
benefits. 

Public-private partnerships also present certain challenges. As we 
heard from both public and private freight railroad stakeholders, the 
extent to which the public sector can engage the private sector, 
identify anticipated public benefits from railroad investments, and 
provide funding that is commensurate with those benefits, affects 
partnership outcomes. Our past work has shown that an integral part of 
public-private partnerships is ensuring that sound analytical 
approaches are being applied locally and meaningful data are available, 
not only to evaluate and prioritize infrastructure investments but also 
to determine whether public support is justified in light of a wide 
array of social and economic costs and benefits.[Footnote 41] Moreover, 
as private entities that own most of the nation's railroad 
infrastructure, freight railroads typically have not worked with the 
public sector because of concerns about the requirements and 
regulations associated with federal funding.[Footnote 42] These 
railroads need to be convinced that a proposed infrastructure project 
will yield financial returns for the company. Still another challenge 
is to reconcile the lengthy planning and construction time associated 
with public infrastructure projects with the shorter planning and 
investment horizons of private companies. 

Growing Freight Congestion and Demands May Challenge the Federal 
Government to Strategically Invest Limited Funds to Maximize National 
Public Benefits: 

Overcoming congestion and improving mobility is one of the biggest 
transportation challenges facing the nation. Congestion increases 
delays and creates economic losses that cost Americans roughly $200 
billion a year, according to DOT estimates.[Footnote 43] As we have 
previously reported, increases in freight traffic on all modes over the 
next 10 to 15 years are expected to put greater strain on ports, 
highways, airports, and railroads.[Footnote 44] In addition, we have 
found that this increase in freight transportation demand seems to be 
particularly acute on highways, since trucks transport over 70 percent 
of all freight tonnage nationally and freight truck traffic on urban 
highways more than doubled from 1993 through 2001. The increased 
congestion, coupled with long lead times for completing infrastructure 
projects (5 to 15 years), may put pressure on all stakeholders, 
including the federal government, to find other more effective 
investments to increase freight mobility. 

Increasing the capacity of the nation's freight railroad network could 
be one way to meet future growth in freight transportation demand. 
However, as mentioned previously, aging railroad bridges and tunnels 
present physical constraints to meeting this projected increased demand 
for freight railroad transportation on key routes, thereby constraining 
capacity. For example, as we previously mentioned, 100-year-old bridges 
and tunnels that are currently in use--such as the moveable bridge over 
the Mississippi River and the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore--create 
chokepoints on the freight railroad network due to their operating 
conditions or outdated design. Currently, freight railroads are 
investing billions of dollars in freight railroad infrastructure to 
increase capacity, but because they invest in projects that will 
maintain or increase safety or provide the highest return on its 
investment, other investments may take priority over their most 
expensive pieces of infrastructure, bridges and tunnels. In addition, 
we have found that the railroads' long-term ability to meet the 
projected growth in demand for freight railroad transportation is 
uncertain, which may increase pressure for public investment in private 
railroad infrastructure. 

As we have previously reported, Congress is likely to receive further 
requests for funding and face additional decisions about how to invest 
in the nation's freight railroad infrastructure.[Footnote 45] However, 
Congress's ability to respond to these requests may be limited by (1) 
federal funding constraints and increased demand for infrastructure 
investment in other transportation modes, (2) differences in federal 
funding for different transportation modes, and (3) the lack of a 
strategic federal freight transportation plan to guide federal 
investments in freight transportation infrastructure. 

Revenue from current federal transportation sources may not be 
sustainable. Because revenue from traditional transportation funding 
mechanisms such as the Highway Trust Fund may not keep pace with the 
increase in transportation demand, we designated transportation 
financing as a high-risk area in January 2007.[Footnote 46] The 
recently enacted transportation funding authorization, the Safe, 
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act - A Legacy 
for Users (SAFETEA-LU), is expected to outstrip the growth in trust 
fund receipts. As a result, the Department of the Treasury and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) are forecasting that the trust fund 
balance will steadily decline and be negative by the end of fiscal year 
2011. In addition, the nation's long-term fiscal challenges will 
constrain decision makers' ability to use other funding mechanisms, 
such as grants and tax expenditures, for transportation needs. 

Differences in federal funding for different transportation modes have 
created a competitive disadvantage for freight railroads. Because the 
federal government has an interest in an efficient national freight 
transportation system, the federal role in freight transportation needs 
to recognize that the freight transportation system encompasses many 
modes that operate in a competitive marketplace and are owned, funded, 
and operated by both the private and the public sectors. However, 
current federal transportation policy treats each freight 
transportation mode differently, thereby creating competitive 
advantages for some modes over others. For example, trucking companies 
and barges use infrastructure that is owned and maintained by the 
government, while railroads use infrastructure that they pay taxes on, 
own, and maintain. Trucking and barge companies pay fees and taxes for 
the government-funded infrastructure they use, but their payments 
generally do not cover the costs they impose on highways and waterways. 
The federal subsidy that makes up the difference between the 
government's costs and users' payments gives trucking and barge 
companies a competitive advantage over the railroads.[Footnote 47] CBO 
has observed that if all modes do not pay their full costs, the result 
is inefficient use of roads and waterways and greater government 
spending than otherwise would be necessary if capacity investments are 
made in anticipation of demand that does not occur. 

Examining Critical Questions and Implementing a Framework That 
Identifies Goals, Stakeholder Roles, Revenue Sources, and Funding 
Mechanisms Could Guide a Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure 
Investments: 

As noted earlier in this report, the federal government lacks a 
strategic freight transportation plan to guide its involvement in 
freight-related capital infrastructure investments. DOT's draft 
Framework for a National Freight Policy represents an initial step 
toward such a plan, but it assumes a federal role without indicating 
whether federal involvement is appropriate or, when appropriate, what 
the goals of federal investment should be, what specific roles the 
federal government and other stakeholders should play, and what federal 
revenue sources and funding mechanisms should be used to support 
freight-related investments. As we have previously reported, critical 
factors and questions can be used as criteria for determining the 
appropriateness of a federal role and a framework with components that 
we believe would be helpful in guiding any future federal freight- 
related investments. Implementing this GAO framework would include 
setting national goals for federal investment in freight-related 
infrastructure, clearly defining federal and other stakeholder roles, 
and identifying sustainable revenue sources and cost-effective funding 
mechanisms that can be applied to maximize the national public benefits 
of federal investments. 

GAO's Critical Questions and Framework Could Guide Future Federal 
Investment in Freight-Related Infrastructure: 

In light of the federal government's long-term fiscal imbalance, it is 
important for federal policy makers to determine how the federal 
government can support efficient, mode-neutral, transparent, and 
sustainable investments in freight-related infrastructure. In our 
report on 21st century challenges facing the federal government, we 
defined critical factors and questions that are useful as criteria for 
determining the appropriate federal role in a government program, 
policy, function, or activity.[Footnote 48] These critical factors and 
questions are designed to address the legislative basis for a program, 
its purpose and continued relevance, its effectiveness in achieving 
goals and outcomes, its efficiency and targeting, its affordability and 
sustainability, and its management. The factors and questions can be 
used as criteria for determining the appropriateness of federal 
involvement in freight-related transportation, including freight 
railroad projects, as shown in table 2. 

Table 2: GAO's Critical Factors and Questions for Determining the 
Appropriateness of a Federal Role in Freight-Related Transportation: 

Factors: Relevance and purpose of the federal role; 
Questions: Are some freight transportation issues of nationwide 
interest? If so, is a federal role warranted based on the likely 
failure of private markets or state and local governments to address 
underlying freight problems or concerns? Does current federal 
involvement in freight infrastructure encourage or discourage the 
private and other public sectors from investing their own resources to 
address the problem?. 

Factors: Measuring success; 
Questions: Do current federal funding mechanisms and programs for 
freight-related infrastructure have outcome-based performance measures 
and are all applicable costs and benefits considered?. 

Factors: Targeting benefits; 
Questions: Are current funding mechanisms for freight-related 
infrastructure targeted to generate national benefits in areas with the 
greatest needs and the least capacity to meet those needs?. 

Factors: Affordability and cost effectiveness; 
Questions: Do current revenue sources and funding mechanisms for 
federal freight-related infrastructure encourage state and local 
governments and the private sector to invest their own resources? Are 
these revenue sources sustainable and are the funding mechanisms 
affordable in the long term? Do these funding mechanisms use the most 
cost-effective or net beneficial approaches when compared with other 
tools and program designs?. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

If federal policy makers determine that there is an appropriate role 
for the federal government in freight infrastructure investments, 
including those related to railroads, the implementation of that role 
should have several components. From our past work on transportation 
investment--in such areas as intercity passenger rail, intermodal 
transportation, and marine transportation--we have defined a systematic 
framework that can also guide the implementation of any future federal 
role in freight-related infrastructure investments.[Footnote 49] Our 
framework's components include setting national goals, establishing 
clear stakeholder roles, and providing sustainable funding (see table 
3). 

Table 3: Three Components of GAO's Framework Applied to Federal 
Involvement in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investments: 

Component: Set national goals; 
Description: These goals, which would establish what federal 
participation in the freight transportation system is designed to 
accomplish, should be specific, measurable, achievable, and outcome-
based. 

Component: Establish and clearly define stakeholder roles, especially 
the federal role relative to the roles of state and local governments 
and private railroads; 
Description: The federal government is one of many stakeholders 
involved in freight-related investments, including those involving 
freight railroads. Others include state and local governments, port 
authorities, shippers, and the railroads themselves. Given the broad 
range of beneficiaries, it is important to gain consensus on what the 
transportation system is to achieve and to help ensure that the federal 
role does not negatively affect the participation or role of other 
stakeholders. 

Component: Determine which revenue sources and funding mechanisms will 
maximize the impact of any federal expenditures and investment; 
Description: This component can help expand the ability to provide 
funding resources and to promote cost-sharing responsibilities. Given 
the current budgetary environment and the long-range fiscal challenges 
confronting the nation, federal funding for future freight-related 
transportation projects, including those involving freight railroads, 
will require a high level of justification and should be prioritized to 
maximize national public benefits. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

In conjunction with GAO's framework, it would also be important to 
evaluate freight investments periodically to determine the extent to 
which expected benefits are being realized. Evaluations also create 
opportunities for periodically reexamining established goals, 
stakeholder roles, and funding approaches, and provide a basis for 
modifying them as necessary.[Footnote 50] In addition, evaluations help 
to ensure accountability and provide incentives for achieving results. 
Encouraging or requiring the identification of all project costs and of 
all parties who will bear the costs can help ensure that the costs are 
apportioned among all stakeholders equitably.[Footnote 51] Leading 
private and public organizations that we have studied in the past have 
stressed the importance of developing performance measures and then 
linking investment decisions and their expected outcomes to overall 
strategic goals and objectives.[Footnote 52] 

Goals of a Future Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure 
Investment Should Be Structured to Maximize National Benefits: 

The first component of GAO's framework for guiding the federal role in 
freight-related infrastructure investment is a set of clearly defined 
national goals.[Footnote 53] Such goals can help chart a clear 
direction, establish priorities among competing demands, and specify 
the desired results of any federal investment. Since many stakeholders 
are involved in the freight transportation system, the achievement of 
national goals for the system hinges on the federal government's 
ability to forge effective partnerships with nonfederal entities. 
Decision makers need to balance national goals with the unique needs 
and interests of all nonfederal stakeholders in order to leverage the 
resources and capabilities of state and local governments and the 
private sector. National goals should be structured in a way that 
allows for reliably estimating and comparing national public benefits 
and national public costs. As we have previously reported,[Footnote 54] 
quantifying public benefits can be difficult, yet an effort should be 
made to determine that the anticipated public benefits are sufficient 
to justify the proposed levels of public investment.[Footnote 55] For 
example, at the state level, the Pennsylvania DOT evaluates and 
justifies freight railroad investments, in part, by estimating the wear 
and tear imposed by trucks on highways. 

The primary goal of federal investments in freight infrastructure 
should be to maximize the national public benefits of the investments. 
One way to focus these goals could be through federally designated 
Projects of National and Regional Significance, a program that has been 
designed to address critical national economic and transportation needs 
and has funded highway and railroad infrastructure projects. For 
example, one goal could be to improve intermodal freight mobility-- 
which encompasses air, railroad, water, and highway facilities and 
infrastructure--at designated ports of national significance that serve 
multistate regions and/or large populations. 

Federal policy makers and other stakeholders could define their 
respective roles in many different ways once the goals for the federal 
role in freight transportation infrastructure have been established. 
However, the key elements in defining the federal and other stakeholder 
roles would be to create incentives for collaboration, secure benefits, 
and promote equity for all stakeholders, both public and private, that 
invest in freight-related infrastructure projects. Defining these 
elements is especially important for the federal role in freight 
railroad infrastructure investments because, while most of that 
infrastructure is privately owned, investments to improve safety and 
increase capacity may benefit stakeholders at all levels (national, 
regional, state, local and private sector). 

Public and Private Stakeholder Roles for Future Involvement in Freight- 
Related Infrastructure Investments Should Be Clearly Defined: 

In our prior work, we have found that, in defining stakeholder roles, 
it is important to match capabilities and resources with appropriate 
goals.[Footnote 56] This is important for federal participation because 
other stakeholders may want to emphasize other priorities and use 
federal funds in ways that may not achieve national public benefits. 
This can happen if other stakeholders seek to (1) transfer a previously 
local function to the federal arena or (2) use federal funds to reduce 
their traditional levels of commitment. One aim of federal 
participation in infrastructure investments is to promote or supplement 
expenditures that would not occur without federal funding--to avoid 
substituting federal funding for funding that would otherwise have been 
provided by private or other public investors.[Footnote 57] 

Further refinements to DOT's draft Framework could help to define 
stakeholder roles in two ways, first by acknowledging that the 
interests of federal, state, and local entities may compete, and second 
by recognizing where public and private sector interests meet and 
diverge. When the federal government invests in freight railroad 
infrastructure, it could justify its involvement by establishing 
criteria for projects that (1) are based on national freight goals, (2) 
are designed to capture national freight transportation benefits, and 
(3) direct funds to state, local, and private entities that would spend 
the funds in accordance with the national goals. For example, the 
federal government might justify its investment in a project that had 
national goals of improving interstate freight mobility, reducing 
pollution and congestion, and enhancing safety on a multistate railroad 
and highway transportation corridor. In contrast, states and localities 
seek public benefits that accrue within their jurisdictions, such as 
improved automobile safety at grade crossings and reduced air pollution 
within a regional attainment area, and are able to channel state, 
local, and discretionary federal funds accordingly. When examining 
public versus private interests, public stakeholders must recognize 
that railroads are privately owned and invest resources to maximize 
shareholder returns and enhance the efficiency and capacity of their 
operations. Some railroad infrastructure projects have spillover 
effects that produce public benefits, such as more efficient goods 
movement. Yet other railroad infrastructure projects that could benefit 
the public do not meet railroads' internal return-on-investment 
criteria, and therefore the railroads would not invest in them, and the 
public would not realize the benefits. 

One possible way of defining stakeholder roles could be through public- 
private partnerships. As we have stated earlier, public-private 
partnerships create a forum for bringing diverse stakeholders together 
around an issue of mutual interest to determine how best to share 
resources, identify stakeholder responsibilities, and achieve public 
and private benefits. Encouraging public-private partnerships to 
provide efficient solutions to freight transportation needs could 
increase the likelihood that the most worthwhile improvements would be 
implemented and that projects would be operated and maintained 
efficiently.[Footnote 58] One example of a public-private partnership 
that addresses various private and public stakeholder interests in 
railroad infrastructure is the CREATE project in the Chicago area. The 
drive to make significant investments in the Chicago area's railroad 
infrastructure came from public and private railroad stakeholders 
because of their concern over the heavy railroad congestion in that 
area.[Footnote 59] Under the CREATE project, stakeholders established 
individual roles that included owning and managing specific projects 
and assuming joint financial obligations. The railroads initially 
invested $100 million to begin addressing their interests, the federal 
government has added $100 million by designating CREATE as a Project of 
National or Regional Significance, and the state of Illinois and the 
city of Chicago have pledged $100 million and $30 million, 
respectively, to begin addressing passenger railroad projects. CREATE 
stakeholders also plan to leverage other federal, state, and private 
funds over the lifetime of the project. The Alameda Corridor Program in 
the Los Angeles area provides another example of how effective 
partnering allowed the capabilities of the various stakeholders to be 
more fully utilized. Called the Alameda Corridor because of the street 
it parallels, the program created a 20-mile, $2.4 billion railroad 
express line connecting the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to the 
transcontinental railroad network east of downtown Los Angeles. The 
express line eliminates approximately 200 street-level railroad 
crossings, relieving congestion and improving freight mobility for 
cargo. This project made substantial use of local stakeholders' ability 
to raise funds. While the federal government participated in the cost, 
its share was about 20 percent of the total. In addition, about 80 
percent of the federal assistance is in the form of a loan rather than 
a grant. 

Future Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investments 
Should Meet Federal Goals While Recognizing Federal Financial 
Constraints: 

A well-designed and strategic national freight transportation policy-- 
of which there is a federal component--can help encourage investment by 
other public and private stakeholders and maximize the application of 
limited federal dollars for freight-related infrastructure.[Footnote 
60] While it is important to ensure that such a policy promotes federal 
investments in freight infrastructure that generate national public 
benefits, especially when those investments are in privately owned and 
operated freight railroad infrastructure, it is also important to note 
that any federal investments will face federal financial constraints. 
Although federal investments could be crucial to securing the national 
public benefits of certain freight-related infrastructure projects that 
would not otherwise proceed, the scarcity of federal funds puts a 
premium on justifying and targeting the use of federal funds for these 
projects to address critical needs and maximize benefits. 

As we have previously reported, determining the scope of government 
involvement in transportation investments entails three major steps: 
(1) determining that the project is worthwhile by applying a rigorous 
cost-benefit analysis or similar study; (2) justifying government 
involvement on the basis of known criteria; and (3) deciding on the 
level of public subsidy consistent with local, state, regional, or 
national interests and benefits.[Footnote 61] Currently, most federal 
freight investments come from the fiscally constrained General Fund and 
Highway Trust Fund; and typically these investments are not subject to 
a thorough benefit-cost analysis or to the consistent application of 
project criteria, nor are they funded with the assurance that the 
funding provided by public and private beneficiaries is commensurate 
with the benefits these parties receive. 

Federal investments in freight infrastructure must be justified and 
meet objective criteria to maximize the impact of federal funds. 
Justifying government involvement in freight infrastructure projects 
involves identifying and quantifying project costs and public and 
private benefits, and having clear guidelines specifying the conditions 
under which public involvement is warranted. Given constraints on 
federal, state, and local funding, we have advocated that public 
entities implement project justification tools such as benefit-cost 
analysis to better assess proposed transportation investments and 
accordingly target limited funds.[Footnote 62] Results-oriented 
assessments can be used to determine what is needed to obtain specific 
national outcomes.[Footnote 63] In October 2006, we recommended that 
DOT, as it continues to draft the Framework for a National Freight 
Policy, consider strategies to create a level playing field for all 
freight modes and recognize the highly constrained federal fiscal 
environment by developing mechanisms to assess and maximize public 
benefits from federally financed freight transportation 
investments.[Footnote 64] Furthermore, as we testified in March 2007, 
the federal government should make ensuring accountability for results, 
as well as maximizing benefits, high priorities in deciding on federal 
investments in transportation infrastructure.[Footnote 65] 
Unfortunately, we have found that formal analyses are not often used in 
deciding among alternative projects, evaluations of outcomes are not 
typically conducted, and the evaluations that are done show that 
projects often do not produce anticipated outcomes. The public sector 
faces many challenges in quantifying national, regional, state, and 
local benefits, while railroads are more able to determine the monetary 
and operational benefits of proposed infrastructure projects and can 
invest accordingly. For example, railroads can assess how much each 
hour of train delay costs them, but public entities cannot easily 
quantify the environmental benefits of faster freight railroad 
transport and less truck traffic.[Footnote 66] Representatives of three 
state DOTs we interviewed acknowledged the difficulty of quantifying 
public benefits, which may make it difficult to judiciously allocate 
scarce transportation funds to those projects that may accrue the 
highest public benefits. 

According to the Transportation Research Board (TRB), public support 
for freight infrastructure projects must be established on a project- 
by-project basis to determine if a project produces certain benefits, 
such as reductions in the external costs of transportation, 
efficiencies in the transportation system beyond those recognized by 
the private sector, or improvements in public safety.[Footnote 67] TRB 
stated that if government involvement cannot be justified on one of 
these grounds, the private sector should undertake the project. One 
federal program that awards funds using project justification criteria 
is the Federal Transit Administration's discretionary New Starts 
program. This program is the federal government's primary source of 
funds for capital investment in locally planned, implemented, and 
operated transit. Potential New Starts projects must meet certain 
project justification criteria (e.g., mobility improvements and 
operating efficiencies) and demonstrate adequate local financial 
support (e.g., the ability of the sponsoring agency to fund the 
operation and maintenance of the entire system once the project is 
built). A comparable approach could be designed so that freight 
railroad infrastructure investments--proposed by state or local 
governments, private railroads, or public-private partnerships--meet 
appropriate project justification criteria, demonstrate public and 
private support, and provide the lowest cost to the federal government. 
Different funding mechanisms and revenue sources could also be used to 
implement any future federal role in freight infrastructure 
investments. See appendix III for a more complete discussion of these 
revenue sources and funding mechanisms. 

Conclusions: 

Projected increases in freight transportation demand will likely 
increase the importance of the nation's freight railroad 
infrastructure. Bridges and tunnels are critical and expensive parts of 
infrastructure. Because most of the freight railroad network is 
privately owned, the railroads have a keen financial interest in 
maintaining and investing in their bridges and tunnels. The federal 
role in overseeing the public safety of these structures, and in 
funding improvements to them, has been limited. 

Concerning the safety area, we have found in our prior work that a risk-
management approach to oversight of companies' overall management of 
safety risks provides an additional assurance of safety in conjunction 
with inspections. FRA has adopted this risk-management approach in 
applying its guidelines for bridge management during its bridge safety 
surveys of individual railroads. However, a more consistent and 
systematic approach in selecting railroads for bridge safety surveys 
based on data about railroads' bridge management programs, such as 
whether or not the railroads have regular inspections by a qualified 
civil engineer and how they record and use that bridge inspection data, 
could enhance the effectiveness of the FRA's limited resources 
available for bridge and tunnel safety. This approach could help target 
FRA's limited bridge inspection resources toward railroads that present 
the greatest safety risk, especially numerous short lines that may have 
more deteriorated infrastructure and less technical and financial 
resources to maintain their bridges and tunnels. 

With respect to the federal role in freight-related infrastructure, 
including railroad bridges and tunnels, the federal approach to such 
investments needs to be better structured to maximize achieving 
national public benefits such as increased freight mobility, reduced 
congestion, and improved environmental quality. Although the current 
federal structure of loans, credits, and grants administered by 
different agencies with different missions from disparate funding 
sources may attain some national public benefits, that structure is not 
guided by a national freight strategy and may miss opportunities for an 
even higher return of national public benefits for federal 
expenditures. DOT has taken a first step in the direction of 
articulating such a strategy by developing its Framework for a National 
Freight Policy, but we believe that the agency needs to go further in 
developing a true national freight transportation strategy that can 
help organize and unify the current structure to achieve that higher 
return. Our past work on public investments in transportation has found 
that such a strategy should focus on national freight transportation 
related goals, involve all public and private stakeholders, and 
distribute costs equitably across all public and private beneficiaries. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

* To enhance the effectiveness of its bridge and tunnel safety 
oversight function, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation 
direct the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration to 
devise a systematic, consistent, risk-based methodology for selecting 
railroads for its bridge safety surveys to ensure that it includes 
railroads that are at higher risk of not following the FRA's bridge 
safety guidelines and of having bridge and tunnel safety issues. 

* To help better focus limited federal resources, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Transportation ensure that its draft Framework for a 
National Freight Policy : 

* includes clear national goals for federal involvement in freight- 
related infrastructure investments across all modes, including freight 
railroad investments; 

* establishes and clearly defines roles for all public and private 
stakeholders; and: 

* identifies funding mechanisms for federal freight-related 
infrastructure investments, including freight railroad investments, 
which provide the highest return in national public benefits for 
limited federal expenditures. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment prior 
to finalizing the report. DOT and FRA officials--including FRA's 
Associate Administrator for Safety--generally agreed with the 
information in this report, and they provided technical clarifications, 
which we have incorporated in this report as appropriate. These 
officials agreed with the recommendation related to the methodology for 
selecting railroads for bridge safety surveys and said that they are 
already taking steps to implement it, and DOT officials said that they 
would consider the recommendation concerning changes to DOT's draft 
Framework for a National Freight Policy. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the 
appropriate congressional committees and to the Secretary of 
Transportation. We will also make copies available to others upon 
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the 
GAO Web Site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff that made key contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

JayEtta Z. Hecker: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine what information is maintained by railroads on the 
condition of their bridges and tunnels, and the contribution of this 
infrastructure to congestion, we reviewed documentation from railroads 
on bridge and tunnel data management policies, inspection procedures, 
sample inspection reports, and capital improvement plans. We also 
determined the federal role in collecting and reporting information on 
railroad bridges and tunnels by interviewing officials from federal 
agencies, state agencies, freight railroads, and industry associations 
(see table 4), and by reviewing bridge and tunnel data collected and 
maintained by these federal agencies. To determine to what extent 
bridges and tunnels contribute to freight railroad congestion, we 
reviewed literature on freight railroad congestion, railroad corridor 
plans, and freight demand studies to identify current levels of freight 
railroad congestion, major factors contributing to congestion, and 
proposed solutions. We also interviewed representatives from industry 
associations and railroads to understand how this information is used, 
what challenges railroads face in maintaining and replacing railroad 
bridges and tunnels, and what strategies railroads use to enhance 
capacity and alleviate congestion. We did not independently verify the 
accuracy of public or private bridge and tunnel condition information, 
inspection reports, or congestion information. In addition, we did not 
independently assess the conditions of bridges and tunnels. 

To identify the federal role in overseeing railroad bridge and tunnel 
safety, we reviewed public laws and interviewed officials from the 
public agencies and railroads listed in table 4. In particular, we 
discussed the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) structural safety 
oversight role with FRA's Chief Structural Engineer, all five FRA 
bridge specialists, and one FRA regional track specialist, and asked 
railroads about their interactions with FRA. We reviewed examples of 
FRA's bridge safety survey documentation to determine the content of 
these surveys and what actions FRA takes after assessing a railroad's 
bridge conditions. We also accompanied an FRA bridge specialist on a 
bridge safety survey and other informal bridge and tunnel observations. 
We reviewed examples of FRA emergency orders, compliance agreements, 
and structural observation reports to determine how FRA enforces its 
oversight role. Because there are more bridges than tunnels in the 
United States and because FRA has established a policy on bridge 
safety, we reviewed more information on railroad bridges than on 
tunnels. Moreover, because we used FRA's records to understand FRA 
processes and actions, we did not independently verify the reliability 
of the data in this sample of FRA's observation records. 

To determine how public funds are currently used for railroad 
infrastructure investments, including those for bridges and tunnels, we 
interviewed the entities included in table 4 and synthesized relevant 
information from these entities, as well as from the Federal Highway 
Administration and the Joint Committee on Taxation. We did not 
independently verify the accuracy of the self-reported cost information 
provided by the railroads, public agencies, and professional 
associations. We reviewed Department of Transportation's (DOT) draft 
Framework for a National Freight Policy. We also analyzed pertinent 
legislation and analyzed and synthesized relevant information from our 
reports and other ongoing work. 

To determine what criteria and framework could be used to guide the 
future federal role in freight-related infrastructure investments, 
including those for railroad bridges and tunnels, we relied extensively 
on perspectives gained from our past work in transportation and 
infrastructure systems and federal investment strategies. We also 
reviewed DOT's Draft Framework for a National Freight Policy. We used 
our prior work and conventional economic reasoning to identify key 
considerations regarding possible revenue sources and funding 
mechanisms for federal government support for freight-related 
infrastructure investment and to evaluate potential revenue sources and 
funding mechanisms on the basis of those considerations. 

In addressing all of our objectives, we conducted five site visits to: 

* observe the conditions of selected bridges and tunnels on Class I, 
II, and III railroads; 

* understand maintenance and deterioration issues inherent in different 
geographies and structure types; 

* interview railroad and state agency personnel who manage, inspect, 
and maintain these structures; 

* interview railroad operations personnel who monitor traffic capacity 
and congestion and finance personnel who determine capital investment 
priorities and allocations; and: 

* meet with state and local transportation agency officials. 

For a complete list of all entities interviewed, including those 
interviewed as part of our site visits, see table 4. We selected our 
site visit locations--Baltimore, Maryland and Washington, D.C; Illinois 
and Iowa; Kansas and Missouri; Ohio and West Virginia; and Oregon--
based on geographic distribution and the presence of large and small 
railroads, private-public partnership stakeholders, and state DOTs 
involved in freight railroad or large freight railroad public- private 
partnerships. 

In addition to interviews conducted as part of our site visits, we 
interviewed representatives from the six largest Class I freight 
railroads in the United States;[Footnote 68] Amtrak; industry 
associations; federal, state, and local transportation officials; and 
federal agencies involved with collecting information on, overseeing, 
or providing funding for railroad bridges and tunnels. We also 
interviewed additional state agencies based on their involvement in 
railroad bridge and tunnel oversight, freight railroad funding, or 
major freight railroad public-private partnerships. Table 4 lists the 
names and locations of all railroads; federal, state, and local 
agencies; industry associations; and transportation, engineering, and 
academic experts we interviewed as part of our review. 

Table 4: Names and Headquarters Locations of Entities Contacted: 

Name: Class I freight railroads: BNSF Railway Company[A]; 
Headquarters location: Fort Worth, TX. 

Name: Class I freight railroads: Canadian National Railway[A]; 
Headquarters location: Montreal, Quebec. 

Name: Class I freight railroads: CSX Transportation[A]; 
Headquarters location: Jacksonville, FL. 

Name: Class I freight railroads: Kansas City Southern Railway[A]; 
Headquarters location: Kansas City, MO. 

Name: Class I freight railroads: Norfolk Southern[A]; 
Headquarters location: Norfolk, VA. 

Name: Class I freight railroads: Union Pacific Railroad Company[A]; 
Headquarters location: Omaha, NE. 

Name: Class I passenger railroads: National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation (Amtrak)[A]; 
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C. 

Name: Class II freight railroads: Iowa Interstate Railroad[A]; 
Headquarters location: Cedar Rapids, IA. 

Name: Class II freight railroads: Wheeling and Lake Erie Railway 
Co.[A]; 
Headquarters location: Brewster, OH. 

Name: Class III freight railroads: Albany and Eastern Railroad 
Company[A]; 
Headquarters location: Lebanon, OR. 

Name: Class III freight railroads: Belt Railway Company of Chicago[A]; 
Headquarters location: Bedford Park, IL. 

Name: Class III freight railroads: Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railway 
Co. (CRANDIC)[A]; 
Headquarters location: Cedar Rapids, IA. 

Name: Class III freight railroads: Iowa Northern Railway Company[A]; 
Headquarters location: Cedar Rapids, IA. 

Name: Class III freight railroads: Kansas City Terminal Railway Co.[A]; 
Headquarters location: Kansas City, KS. 

Name: Class III freight railroads: Ohio Central Railroad Company[A]; 
Headquarters location: Coshocton, OH. 

Name: Class III freight railroads: Port of Tillamook Bay Railroad[A]; 
Headquarters location: Tillamook, OR. 

Name: Class III freight railroads: SEMO Port Railroad[A]; 
Headquarters location: Scott City, MO. 

Name: Class III freight railroads: Watco Companies, Inc.[A]; 
Headquarters location: Pittsburg, KS. 

Name: Federal agencies: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; 
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C. 

Name: Federal agencies: U.S. Department of Defense Surface Deployment 
and Distribution Command: Transportation Engineering Agency; 
Headquarters location: Newport News, VA. 

Name: Federal agencies: U.S. Department of Energy; 
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C. 

Name: Federal agencies: U.S. Department of Homeland Security United 
States Coast Guard Transportation Security Administration; 
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C; 
Washington, D.C; 
Arlington, VA. 

Name: Federal agencies: U.S. DOT; 
Federal Highway Administration; 
Federal Railroad Administration; 
Office of Safety and Compliance[A] Office of Railroad Development 
Office of Policy and Program Development; 
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C. 

Name: Federal agencies: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; 
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C. 

Headquarters location: NameIllinois DOT[A]: [Empty]. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Illinois DOT[A]; 
Headquarters location: Springfield, IL. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Kansas DOT[A]; 
Headquarters location: Topeka, KS. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Louisiana DOT and 
Development; 
Headquarters location: Baton Rouge, LA. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Maryland DOT[A]; 
Headquarters location: Hanover, MD. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Missouri DOT[A]; 
Headquarters location: Jefferson City, MO. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Ohio DOT[A]; 
Headquarters location: Columbus, OH. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Ohio Rail Development 
Commission[A]; 
Headquarters location: Columbus, OH. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Oregon DOT[A]; 
Headquarters location: Salem, OR. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Pennsylvania DOT; 
Headquarters location: Harrisburg, PA. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Pennsylvania Public 
Utilities Commission; 
Headquarters location: Harrisburg, PA. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio[A]; 
Headquarters location: Columbus, OH. 

Name: State agencies and oversight organizations: Tennessee DOT; 
Headquarters location: Nashville, TN. 

Name: Local agencies: Chicago DOT[A]; 
Headquarters location: Chicago, IL. 

Name: Local agencies: Columbus Regional Airport Authority[A]; 
Headquarters location: Columbus, OH. 

Name: Local agencies: Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas 
City, Kansas[A]; 
Headquarters location: Kansas City, KS. 

Name: Industry associations: The American Association of State Highway 
and Transportation Officials; 
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C. 

Name: Industry associations: American Short Line and Regional Railroad 
Association; 
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C. 

Name: Industry associations: The Association of American Railroads; 
Headquarters location: Washington, D.C. 

Name: Industry associations: Dr. Kazuya Kawamura, University of 
Illinois at Chicago; 
Headquarters location: Chicago, IL. 

Name: Industry associations: National Academy of Railroad Sciences[A]; 
Headquarters location: Overland Park, KS. 

Name: Industry associations: TranSystems[A]; 
Headquarters location: Kansas City, MO. 

Name: Industry associations: URS Corporation[A]; 
Headquarters location: San Francisco, CA. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] Indicates representatives were included in a site-visit. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Examples of Bridge and Tunnel Maintenance, Component and 
Structural Replacement Costs on Selected Railroads: 

Bridge type: Maintenance: Bridge ties; 
Description of work: Replacing a bridge tie; 
Cost estimates: $450 per tie. 

Bridge type: Maintenance: Moveable steel bridge; 
Description of work: Moveable bridge annual maintenance; 
Cost estimates: $50,000 to $1 million. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Timber bridge; 
Description of work: Replaced several timber components; 
Cost estimates: $40,000 to $50,000. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Timber bridge; 
Description of work: Replacing timber approach span; 
Cost estimates: $239,000. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Timber bridge; 
Description of work: Replacing timber substructure and deck with steel 
and concrete components; 
Cost estimates: $3 - $3.5 million. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Concrete bridge; 
Description of work: Concrete bridge pier replacement; 
Cost estimates: $225,000. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Concrete bridge; 
Description of work: Abutment replacement; 
Cost estimates: $75,000. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Concrete bridge; 
Description of work: Replacing stone arches with culverts; 
Cost estimates: $50,000. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Steel bridge; 
Description of work: Upgrade steel to handle 286,000-lbs. railcars; 
Cost estimates: $100,000. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Moveable steel bridge; 
Description of work: Replacement of several steel components; 
Cost estimates: $1 million. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Moveable steel bridge; 
Description of work: Fender system replacement caused by barge strike; 
Cost estimates: $200,000 to $600,000. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Tunnel; 
Description of work: Replacing timber lining in tunnel with concrete 
lining; 
Cost estimates: $800,000. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Tunnel; 
Description of work: Upgrading ventilation system; 
Cost estimates: $3.5 million. 

Bridge type: Component replacement of repair: Tunnel; 
Description of work: Opening or "day- lighting" tunnel; 
Cost estimates: $3 million. 

Bridge type: Replacement: Timber bridge; 
Description of work: Timber bridge replacement; 
Cost estimates: $600,000 to $700,000. 

Bridge type: Replacement: Steel bridge; 
Description of work: Steel bridge replacement; 
Cost estimates: $22 - $44 million. 

Bridge type: Replacement: Moveable steel bridge; 
Description of work: Moveable swing span replacement; 
Cost estimates: $25 - $40 million. 

Bridge type: Replacement: Moveable steel bridge; 
Description of work: Replacement of a moveable swing span bridge with a 
lift span bridge; 
Cost estimates: $100 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of interviews with railroad officials. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Considerations of Funding Sources and Mechanisms 
Available for Federal Funding of Freight-Related Infrastructure: 

Different funding mechanisms and revenue sources can be used to 
implement any future federal role in freight infrastructure 
investments. Two main revenue sources are available to the federal 
government in financing freight infrastructure investments: (1) general 
revenue, which comes primarily from broad-based personal and business 
income taxes and (2) beneficiary financing revenue (such as user fees 
or fuel taxes), which comes from taxes or fees assessed to specific 
groups that would benefit from the federal investment. Revenue from 
both of these sources could be used to increase investment in freight 
railroad infrastructure beyond the level that the railroads would 
provide without federal support. We note, however, that all revenue 
sources do have opportunity costs, that is, the costs of any benefits 
forgone from alternative investments that could have been made with 
that revenue. 

As discussed earlier in this report, the federal government currently 
uses three main funding mechanisms to support freight railroad 
infrastructure: grants, loans, and tax credits.[Footnote 69] Each 
funding mechanism has its own advantages and limitations, but some 
implications would apply to each. For example, while the three 
mechanisms may make federal subsidies available for freight 
infrastructure investments, they may not necessarily increase the total 
amount of funding provided for those investments. Instead, these 
subsidies might result in the substitution of federal funds for the 
railroads' own funds for investments that they would have made 
themselves, even without federal support. Revenue sources and potential 
funding mechanisms need to be evaluated in terms of several key 
considerations--including equity, sustainability, and efficiency for 
revenue sources, and efficiency and transparency for funding 
mechanisms--as discussed below. 

* Equity - Equity is often assessed according to two principles: the 
benefit principle and the ability-to-pay principle. Equity occurs 
according to the benefit principle when those who pay for a service are 
the same as those who benefit from the service. Under the ability-to- 
pay principle, those who are more capable of bearing the burden of 
taxes or fees pay more in taxes and fees than those with less ability 
to pay, and a tax or fee structure is generally considered more 
equitable if that is the case. The use of general revenues is most 
equitable according to the benefit principle when the benefits are 
diffused across all taxpayers. Benefit financing sources (per-container 
or per-railroad-car fees or commodity-specific taxes) can be a more 
equitable funding source when the benefits are more focused on a 
locality or set of users and it is possible to collect the additional 
revenues from beneficiaries through higher fees or taxes. Either 
approach could be consistent with the ability-to-pay principle 
depending on how the revenue source is structured. A combination of 
beneficiary financing, federal general revenue, and local matching 
funds could also be used to enhance equity in order to link the amount 
of payment for an infrastructure investment to the anticipated amount 
of private, national, and local benefits gained, although these 
benefits may be hard to quantify. 

* Sustainability - Sustainability can be defined as the ability of a 
revenue source to maintain a given level of federal expenditure for an 
investment over time. Technological change or inflation could affect 
the sustainability of some beneficiary financing revenue sources by 
influencing revenue levels or their purchasing power. But these sources 
can be more sustainable if they have the flexibility to respond to 
reductions in demand or consumption and can be indexed to inflation or 
otherwise periodically adjusted. The sustainability of general revenue 
could be affected by the federal government's long-term structural 
fiscal imbalance. 

* Efficiency - Efficiency implications exist for both the choice of 
revenue source and the choice of funding mechanism. For revenue 
sources, efficiency can be assessed based on the impact of economic 
behavioral changes likely to result from use of each source and by how 
much accountability[Footnote 70] is provided. Using general revenue 
rather than beneficiary financing revenue sources is likely to cause 
smaller behavioral changes than using beneficiary financing. 
Beneficiary financing is likely to cause larger behavioral changes in 
raising a given amount of revenue because the impacts of a revenue 
increase would be more concentrated in a geographic location (for 
example, a user fee assessed for using a specific bridge or other 
structure) or on a group of beneficiaries (for example, a diesel fuel 
tax assessed only on railroads). However, these behavioral changes can 
have either negative or positive consequences on economic efficiency, 
such that in different circumstances increasing revenues from either 
funding source could be less efficient or more inefficient. In terms of 
accountability, the efficiency of a revenue source can be enhanced by 
collecting funds from the groups that are benefiting from federal 
investments in freight infrastructure. For funding mechanisms, 
efficiency can be defined as the amount of benefit gained for the 
amount of federal resources provided. Grants may generally be more 
efficient than loans in that their administrative costs may be lower. 
For tax credits, efficiency--or the benefits gained for the forgone tax 
revenue--is both difficult to calculate and difficult to control, 
because private firms often control the use of the credited funds 
rather than the government. Therefore, the government may have less 
opportunity to direct the funds toward generating specified national 
public benefits than it does for grants or loans.[Footnote 71] To 
increase the efficiency of grants, maintenance of effort 
provisions[Footnote 72] could be incorporated to decrease the 
likelihood that the funding provided through them will be substituted 
for other funds, rather than combined with other funds to increase the 
total investment. Although tax credits do not involve outlays of 
federal funds, they do have analogous costs in forgone tax revenue that 
would have to be considered in evaluating their efficiency. 

* Transparency - Transparency can be defined as the extent to which the 
costs of federal infrastructure investments are visible when using a 
funding mechanism. The commitment of federal resources is visible if 
there is a direct appropriation for a federal grant or loan program. 
With a grant or a loan, the federal government can readily demonstrate 
how much money was invested in what infrastructure. These funding 
mechanisms can also be guided by objective, transparent criteria in 
conjunction with congressional control over annual funding levels. With 
tax credits for railroad infrastructure investment, however, it is less 
visible how much the investment is costing the government through 
forgone revenue, and it is harder for Congress to make trade-offs with 
other discretionary spending programs. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

JayEtta Z. Hecker, (202) 512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Rita Grieco (Assistant 
Director); Jay Cherlow; Steve Cohen; Elizabeth Eisenstadt; Alana 
Finley; Greg Hanna; Carol Henn; Bert Japikse; Richard Jorgenson; Denise 
McCabe; Elizabeth McNally; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Josh Ormond; Laura 
Shumway; Ryan Siegel; and James Wozny made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

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Footnotes:  

[1] A ton-mile is a standard industry measure that represents 1 ton of 
freight transported 1 mile. 

[2] For 2006, the Surface Transportation Board, a bipartisan, 
independent adjudicatory agency administratively housed within DOT 
responsible for resolving railroad rate issues, has defined Class I 
railroads as railroads earning adjusted annual operating revenues of 
$319.3 million or more. Class II railroads are those earning between 
$25.5 million and $319.3 million, and Class III railroads are those 
earning less than $25.5 million. The scope of this report covers 
freight railroads of all classes. 

[3] DOT, Framework for a National Freight Policy (Draft), (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 10, 2006). 

[4] According to the American Short Line and Regional Railroad 
Association (ASLRRA), short line railroads are generally Class III 
railroads that are less than 350 miles long or provide switching and/or 
terminal services. 

[5] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal 
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005) and GAO, 
Intercity Passenger Rail: National Policy and Strategies Needed to 
Maximize Public Benefits from Federal Expenditures, GAO-07-15 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006). 

[6] GAO-07-15. GAO, Intermodal Transportation: Potential Strategies 
Would Redefine Federal Role in Developing Airport Intermodal 
Capabilities, GAO-05-727 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2005), pp. 26-27; 
and GAO, Marine Transportation: Federal Financing and a Framework for 
Infrastructure Investments, GAO-02-1033 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 
2002), p. 17. 

[7] ASLRRA does not maintain a precise count of the number of tunnels 
on Class II and III railroads. The association's General Superintendent 
of Safety and Operating Practices estimates that there are at least 30 
tunnels of or over 100 feet in length on these railroads. 

[8] A track-mile is equivalent to 1 mile of track, which includes main 
track, yard tracks, and sidings. A train-mile refers to a train 
traveling a distance of 1 mile. 

[9] A route-mile is the measure of 1 mile of aggregate roadway, which 
excludes yard tracks and sidings, and does not consider that a mile of 
roadway may include parallel tracks. 

[10] FRA survey results were reported in DOT, Office of Inspector 
General, Audit Report: FRA's Interim Statement of Policy on the Safety 
of Railroad Bridges, TR-1999-077 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 1999). 

[11] AASHTO, Transportation--Invest in America: Freight-Rail Bottom 
Line Report, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 16, 2003). 

[12] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 31, 2007), pp. 18-19. 

[13] Major railroads refers to Class I railroads. 

[14] Officials with whom we spoke from the other Class I railroad said 
the railroad is converting its paper inspection materials to an online 
database. 

[15] Some Class I railroads inspect a subset of bridges and tunnels 
more frequently--based on condition, structure type, bridge type, age, 
or traffic levels--such as requiring an inspection every 6 months for 
timber trestle bridges and pin-connected steel bridges, because of 
their increased potential for deterioration. 

[16] FRA officials told us that they conduct, on average, about 25 to 
35 bridge safety surveys per year of Class II and III railroads, but 
they retained documentation on only 43 completed bridge safety surveys 
of Class II and III railroads that they conducted from January 2004 to 
March 2007. 

[17] The RRIF program was established by the Transportation Equity Act 
for the 21st Century (TEA-21) and amended by the Safe, Accountable, 
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users. 
Under this program, FRA is authorized to provide direct loans and loan 
guarantees for the acquisition, improvement, or rehabilitation of 
intermodal or railroad equipment or facilities, including track, rail, 
bridges, yards, and buildings. 

[18] A chokepoint is a place where there is recurring congestion or 
delay. 

[19] American Society of Civil Engineers, 2005 Report Card for 
America's Infrastructure (Washington, D.C.: 2005). 

[20] 33 C.F.R. Ch. 1, Part 117. Railroad bridges over navigable 
waterways are required by law to open for marine traffic. 

[21] The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 has been codified at 49 
U.S.C. Chapter 201. Applicable civil and criminal penalties are found 
at 49 U.S.C. Chapter 213. 

[22] Prior to 1981, regional track engineers oversaw bridges and 
tunnels, but by 1982 FRA had reclassified these employees as safety 
specialists. Engineering qualifications are not required for this 
revised role, and incoming safety specialists sometimes lacked the 
bridge and tunnel knowledge of the previous regional track engineers. 

[23] 49 C.F.R. §§214.101-214.117. Bridge worker safety regulations 
include provisions such as requirements for railroads to provide 
personal protective equipment and for railroad workers to use fall 
protection systems when necessary. 

[24] FRA also has a position for a second Structural Engineer in the 
Office of Safety Headquarters. The position has been vacant for several 
months, and FRA is presently recruiting a successor. 

[25] The bridge specialist at FRA headquarters is not assigned to 
particular railroads or regions. The specialist works with field 
specialists on larger investigations that require two or more persons. 
The specialist also coordinates complaint investigations and other 
issues that come through FRA headquarters, and conducts training for 
bridge specialists and FRA track and signal inspectors. 

[26] The forces caused by the weight and movement of a train through a 
tunnel are distributed through the supporting bedrock or stable ground. 
By contrast, individual bridge components experience direct stress from 
a passing train. Therefore, bridges are more subject to degradation 
from heavier loads than are tunnels. 

[27] FRA's bridge inspection guidelines, issued in 2000, can be found 
in the Statement of Agency Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges 49 
C.F.R. §213, app. C. 

[28] 49 C.F.R. §§216.21 - 216.27. 

[29] FRA bridge specialists also have the authority to enforce FRA 
track safety standards and bridge worker safety regulations. 

[30] GAO, Rail Safety: The Federal Railroad Administration Is Taking 
Steps to Better Target Its Oversight, but Assessment of Results Is 
Needed to Determine Impact, GAO-07-149 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 
2007), p. 35. 

[31] Potential public benefits of public investment in freight railroad 
transportation include supporting economic development, enhancing 
transportation system efficiency, improving mobility and decreasing 
congestion, improving the environment and air quality, and enhancing 
safety and security. On a national scale, these benefits could accrue 
to regions of national interest whose freight flows impact multiple 
states, large urban areas, and international gateways. 

[32] 33 C.F.R. §§116.01. Alterations may include structural changes, 
replacement, or removal of a bridge. 

[33] GAO-02-1033, p. 17 and GAO-07-15, p. 90. 

[34] GAO, Highway and Transit Investments: Options for Improving 
Information on Projects' Benefits and Costs and Increasing 
Accountability for Results, GAO-05-172 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 
2005). 

[35] One-third of all freight railroad traffic in the United States 
originates, terminates, or passes through the Chicago area. 

[36] GAO, Freight Railroads: Industry Health Has Improved, but Concerns 
about Competition and Capacity Should Be Addressed, GAO-07-94 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 2006), p. 59. 

[37] For example, while passenger and freight travel occurs on all 
modes, federal funding and planning requirements focus largely on 
highways and transit, making it difficult for freight projects to be 
integrated into the transportation system. See GAO, Freight 
Transportation: Short Sea Shipping Option Shows Importance of 
Systematic Approach to Public Investment Decisions, GAO-05-768 
(Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005), p. 35. 

[38] For purposes of this report, a public-private partnership is a 
strategy that public and private entities mutually agree to use to 
implement a specific freight railroad project or group of projects. 
Some representatives of state DOTs and railroads told us that they 
consider any investment that is supported by public and private funds, 
such as a grade crossing or siding project, to be a public-private 
partnership. 

[39] The Kansas City Terminal Railway Company is made up of four Class 
I and one Class II railroads that meet in Kansas City, Missouri. 

[40] Qualified private activity bonds are tax-exempt bonds issued by a 
state or local government, the proceeds of which are used for a defined 
qualified purpose by an entity other than the government issuing the 
bonds. 

[41] GAO, Freight Transportation: Strategies Needed to Address Planning 
and Financing Limitations, GAO-04-165 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 
2003), p. 5. 

[42] GAO, Surface Transportation: Many Factors Affect Investment 
Decisions, GAO-04-744 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004), p. 32. 

[43] GAO, Performance and Accountability: Transportation Challenges 
Facing Congress and the DOT, GAO-07-545T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 
2007), p. 7. 

[44] GAO-07-545T, p. 11. 

[45] GAO-07-94, p. 5. 

[46] GAO-07-310, p. 16. 

[47] GAO-07-94, p. 62. 

[48] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal 
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005), p. 14. 

[49] See GAO-07-15, p. 90; GAO-05-727, pp. 26-27; and GAO-02-1033, p. 
17. 

[50] GAO-07-15, p. 90. 

[51] One commonly used definition of the term "equitable" is the 
principle that beneficiaries should pay for project costs, commensurate 
with the benefits they receive from projects. However, in some cases, 
the combined private and public benefits may substantially exceed the 
combined costs. For example, if the cost of a project is $100 million, 
and private benefits are $80 million and public benefits are $80 
million, then in this case, an equitable public sharing of the cost 
could be 80 percent private and 20 percent public, which would not 
displace private investments that would have occurred in the absence of 
public funding. See GAO-05-768, p. 31. 

[52] GAO-07-15, p. 90. 

[53] GAO, Marine Transportation: Federal Financing and a Framework for 
Infrastructure Investments, GAO-02-1033 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 
2002), p. 18. 

[54] GAO-04-744, p. 22. 

[55] GAO-04-165, p. 40. 

[56] GAO-02-1033, p. 22. 

[57] Ibid. 

[58] GAO-05-768, p. 31. 

[59] The Chicago area is the largest railroad hub in the nation, with 
one-third of all railroad traffic originating, terminating, or passing 
through the area. 

[60] GAO-02-1033, p. 22. 

[61] GAO-04-165, p. 42. 

[62] GAO-07-94, pp. 61 and 63. 

[63] GAO-02-1033, pp. 19-20. 

[64] GAO-07-94, p. 62. 

[65] GAO-07-545T, p. 14. 

[66] In an attempt to address this issue, in March 2005, DOT publicly 
released the Intermodal Transportation and Inventory Cost software 
model that enables users to identify the effects of traffic diverted 
from trucks to railroads. 

[67] According to TRB, external costs are borne by nonshippers or the 
general public. Examples of external costs include health and other 
damages caused by air pollution; noise generated by trucks, towboats, 
and locomotives; and the traffic delays and congestion that an 
additional truck or barge imposes on other users of roadways and 
waterways. See Transportation Research Board, Special Report 252: 
Policy Options for Intermodal Freight Transportation (Washington, D.C.: 
1998) and Transportation Research Board, Special Report 271: Freight 
Capacity for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: 2002). 

[68] We did not interview Canadian Pacific, whose railroad lines in the 
United States comprise the smallest Class I freight railroad. 

[69] Tax credits are reductions in tax liabilities based on 
preferential provisions of the tax code, resulting in forgone tax 
revenue for the federal government. 

[70] Accountability can be defined as ensuring that the beneficiaries 
of a service pay the full social cost of that service. Although this 
concept is similar to the benefit principle for assessing equity, in 
discussing the effects of accountability on efficiency, we are 
concerned with the accountability it provides rather than the fairness. 
For example, if the beneficiaries do not pay the full social cost of a 
benefit, they may seek to have more of the service provided by the 
government even when the additional amounts of that service cost more 
than their actual value to provide. 

[71] In some cases, the government controls the allocation of funds for 
certain tax credits. For example, officials from the Department of the 
Treasury (and a group of external reviewers) review and score New 
Markets Tax Credit applications and then make specific allocations of 
the Credit itself to qualified applicants. See GAO, Tax Policy: New 
Markets Tax Credit Appears to Increase Investment by Investors in Low- 
Income Communities, but Opportunities Exist to Better Monitor 
Compliance, GAO-07-296 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007) p. 7. 

[72] Maintenance of effort provisions would require the entity 
receiving the grant to maintain a certain level of spending over the 
duration of the grant in order to receive the grant. 

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