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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee 
on Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

June 2007: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Analysis of Processes Used to Evaluate Active Protection Systems: 

GAO-07-759: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-759, a report to Subcommittee on Air and Land 
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Active Protection Systems (APS) protect vehicles from attack by 
detecting and intercepting missiles or munitions. In 2005, the lead 
systems integrator for the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program 
sought proposals for an APS developer and design and to deliver APS 
prototypes on vehicles by fiscal year 2009. Raytheon was chosen the APS 
developer. At the same time, the Department of Defense’s Office of 
Force Transformation (OFT) evaluated near-term APS for potential use in 
Iraq. 

GAO was asked to review the Army’s actions on APS/FCS: (1) the process 
for selecting the subcontractor to develop an APS for FCS and if 
potential conflicts of interest were avoided; (2) the timing of the 
trade study and if it followed a consistent methodology to evaluate 
alternatives, and the results; (3) the role the Army and Boeing played 
in selecting the developer; and (4) the process followed to provide a 
near-term APS solution for current forces. 

What GAO Found: 

In selecting the APS developer, the Army and Boeing--the FCS lead 
systems integrator--followed the provisions of the FCS lead systems 
integrator contract, as well as the Federal Acquisition Regulation, in 
addressing organizational conflicts of interest. No officials from the 
offering companies participated in the evaluation and all offerors were 
evaluated based on the same criteria. Four proposals were evaluated and 
three were determined to be comparable in terms of cost and schedule. 
The winner—Raytheon—was chosen on technical merit, as being more likely 
to meet APS requirements although its design had less mature 
technology. 

The APS development contract required the source selection winner to 
perform a trade study to assess alternatives and select the best design 
for development, and the Raytheon design was chosen. The trade study 
applied a consistent methodology to all alternatives before selecting 
Raytheon’s vertical launch design. While the role played by Raytheon in 
the trade study was in accordance with its contract, the rationale for 
having the trade study follow the source selection is not entirely 
clear. The purpose of the trade study was to select the best concept; 
yet the source selection process that preceded it had, in fact, chosen 
Raytheon primarily on the technical merits of its vertical launch 
design concept. Although the vertical launch technology is not mature, 
the Army estimated that it could be available for prototype delivery to 
current force vehicles in fiscal year 2009 and tested on a FCS vehicle 
in 2011. This may be an optimistic estimate, as the FCS vehicle is yet 
to be fully developed. 

The Army and Boeing were extensively involved in APS source selection 
and the trade study. FCS officials actively participated and concurred 
in the final selection of the APS developer. FCS officials and 
technical experts from Army research centers took part in the trade 
study and helped choose the vertical launch design. Boeing officials 
took part in various ways and, with the Army’s concurrence, selected 
Raytheon as the APS developer, participated in the trade study, and 
recommended the vertical launch approach. 

In its pursuit of a different APS concept, OFT was responding to an 
urgent need statement issued by the Central Command with potential for 
near-term fielding. This evaluation centered on the results of physical 
testing of the most technically mature candidate system, the Trophy. 
Decisions on how to proceed with Trophy involved disagreement between 
OFT and the Army. While the Trophy tests were successful, the Joint 
Rapid Acquisition Cell decided to defer fielding the APS system, based 
in part on the recommendation of Army officials, who believed that 
testing had not been realistic and integrating it on the platform would 
delay fielding other useful capabilities. OFT officials proposed 
additional testing of Trophy to answer these questions, but funding for 
further OFT testing of this system was discontinued after the Joint 
Rapid Acquisition Cell’s decision. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense support additional testing 
and demonstration of APS systems to help develop tactics, techniques, 
procedures, and concepts of operations for active protection systems 
and provide useful data on the use of APS. DOD did not agree to support 
such testing. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-759]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Paul Francis at (202) 512-
4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

APS Source Selection Avoided Organizational Conflicts of Interest: 

Trade Study Used Consistent Method in Reaffirming Vertical Launch 
Concept: 

Army and Lead Systems Integrator Had Extensive Roles in APS 
Subcontractor Selection and Trade Study: 

OFT Process for Evaluating APS Was More Test-Based and Near-Term 
Oriented: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Composition of APS Trade Study Technical Team: 

Table 2: Composition of APS Trade Study Stakeholders: 

Table 3: APS Concepts Considered in Trade Study: 

Table 4: Top-Level Criteria and Associated Weights: 

Table 5: Technology Maturity Levels of APS Alternatives as of May 2006: 

Table 6: APS Candidate Systems and Developers: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: FCS APS Major Players: 

Figure 2: Timelines for OFT and Army Processes for Evaluating Active 
Protection Systems: 

Abbreviations: 

APS: Active Protection System: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation: 

FCS: Future Combat System: 

JUON: Joint Urgent Operational Need: 

RFP: Request for Proposal: 

OFT: Office of Force Transformation: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

SAIC: Science Applications International Corporation: 

TRL: Technology Readiness Level: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 8, 2007: 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jim Saxton: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

An Active Protection System (APS) is intended to protect a vehicle from 
attack by detecting and intercepting missiles or munitions before they 
hit the vehicle. It has significant possibilities for offering light 
vehicles some of the protection that armor gives, without the extra 
weight. In April 2005, BAE, a subcontractor for the Army's Future 
Combat System (FCS) program, issued a draft request for proposals to 
choose the developer for an APS for FCS and current force manned ground 
vehicles. To avoid an organizational conflict of interest, the lead 
systems integrator, the Boeing Company, ultimately reissued the draft 
request for proposals, after BAE decided to submit its own bid on this 
contract. Raytheon was eventually chosen as the APS developer and a 
subsequent trade study reached the conclusion that Raytheon's vertical 
launch concept was the optimal solution to meet the APS requirements. 
Also, in April 2005, the U.S. Central Command issued an urgent 
operational need statement to field a combination of near-term 
technologies, including a different APS, on a modified Stryker vehicle, 
the Full-Spectrum Effects Platform, for demonstration and potential use 
in Iraq. The effort made in response to this need was managed by the 
Office of Force Transformation (OFT), which reported to the Secretary 
of Defense. After evaluating six candidate APS, the OFT chose to test 
the Trophy APS because they considered it to be the most technically 
mature. In June 2006, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell decided to defer 
fielding the APS system. 

Both the Army's FCS program and the OFT effort were looking for APS 
applications for current Army forces, but with somewhat different 
objectives in mind. Although the primary focus of the APS subcontractor 
selection and trade study was to pick a developer and a design for the 
FCS APS, another objective was to field an APS on current force combat 
vehicle platforms in the 2009 time period.[Footnote 1] On the other 
hand, the OFT worked on a separate objective aimed at providing these 
capabilities sooner to forces currently in theater, to provide a nearer-
term demonstration of APS. 

This letter is to respond to your request for a review of the process 
that led to the Army's decision to pursue a new APS system under the 
FCS program. You asked us to review this process because of uncertainty 
surrounding the facts that led to the Army's decision to pursue a 
vertical launch APS concept. Specifically, this report addresses: 

1. The process for selecting the subcontractor to develop an APS for 
FCS and whether potential conflicts of interest were avoided. 

2. The timing of the trade study, whether it followed a consistent 
methodology to evaluate all the alternatives, and the results. 

3. The role the Army and the lead systems integrator played in 
selecting the APS developer. 

4. The process followed for evaluating a near-term APS solution for 
current forces. 

In conducting our work, we held discussions with FCS, Army, and other 
DOD officials. We reviewed documents relevant to the decision the Army 
made about which APS system to pursue and held discussions with key 
officials about various decisions that have been made in pursuing this 
technology. We conducted our work between October 2006 and June 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix I further discusses our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

In choosing the developer for the APS system, the FCS lead systems 
integrator ran a competition, with Army participation in the process 
and concurrence in the selection. The contractor followed the 
organizational conflict of interest clause developed in accordance with 
the FCS contract and applicable to all subcontract tiers under the FCS 
contract, as well as the applicable Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) provisions. According to these terms, subcontractors cannot 
conduct or participate in a subcontract source selection if any part of 
its organization submits a proposal. Since BAE was the integrator of 
the hit avoidance system--of which the APS is a subset--and was 
submitting a proposal to be the APS developer, the lead systems 
integrator, Boeing Company, issued the final request for proposals and 
completed the source selection without BAE's involvement. The lead 
systems integrator chose the APS developer--the Raytheon Company--after 
all offerors were evaluated based on the same criteria contained in the 
request for proposals. Proposals from three companies were evaluated in 
the subcontractor selection process and all three were found to be 
comparable in the areas of cost, management/schedule, and past 
performance. The primary discriminating factor became technical merit. 
Based on input from the source selection evaluation team and source 
selection advisory council, the source selection executive decided that 
the Raytheon vertical launch concept would be more likely to meet all 
the APS requirements, even though it was based on less mature 
technology than other proposals. In March 2006, the APS contract was 
awarded to Raytheon. 

The APS development contract required the winner of the subcontractor 
selection to perform a trade study that would identify and assess APS 
alternatives and select the best design for further development from 
among the competing alternatives. Even though the role played by 
Raytheon in the trade study was in accordance with its contract, the 
rationale for having the trade study follow the source selection is not 
entirely clear. While the trade study applied a consistent methodology 
to all alternatives before selecting Raytheon's preferred design as the 
best solution, this was a likely outcome given that the selection of 
Raytheon as the APS developer was based largely on this design concept. 
According to the study documentation, only one of the seven 
alternatives evaluated was less technologically mature than the 
vertical launch concept at the time the study was conducted. However, 
in assessing it against the weighted criteria, vertical launch scored 
the highest in all categories except risk. The study concluded that the 
vertical launch concept would be a high-payoff approach, albeit at a 
high risk. The Army estimated that, despite the immaturity of this APS, 
it could be available for prototype delivery to current force vehicles 
in fiscal year 2009 and tested on a FCS manned ground vehicle in 2011. 
This may be an optimistic estimate as the FCS manned ground vehicles 
are in the early stages of development. 

Both the Army and the lead systems integrator were extensively involved 
in the APS subcontractor selection and the trade study. The Army FCS 
program officials were active participants in the source selection 
evaluation team and source selection advisory council and concurred in 
the final selection of the APS developer. Army FCS officials, as well 
as technical experts from Army research centers, were members of the 
trade study technical team and also concurred in the choice of the 
vertical launch design. Lead systems integrator officials were members 
of the source selection evaluation team and, with the Army's 
concurrence, made the source selection of Raytheon as the APS 
developer. In addition, the lead systems integrator participated in the 
trade study and was one of the trade study members who recommended the 
vertical launch approach. 

The process followed by OFT to meet the urgent needs of the Central 
Command included a simpler evaluation of active protection systems with 
potential for near-term fielding and then centered on the results of 
physical testing of the most mature of the candidate APS systems, the 
Trophy. Decisions on how to proceed with the Trophy system involved 
considerable disagreement between OFT and the Army. While the testing 
of Trophy had a high success rate, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 
recommended that the Central Command defer fielding the Trophy, based 
in part on the recommendations of the Army, which believed that the 
testing was not realistic and the Trophy's integration on the platform 
would delay fielding of other useful capabilities by at least 6 to 14 
months. Further, the Army estimated that it would take 5 years to 
integrate and field Trophy on other current force manned ground 
vehicles. OFT officials recommended that additional testing of Trophy 
be conducted to answer the questions raised by the Army, but the Joint 
Rapid Acquisition Cell funding for further testing of the Trophy by OFT 
ceased after the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell decision. 

Because of the likelihood that the Army will introduce APS into its 
forces, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense support additional 
testing and demonstration of near-term APS systems on the Full Spectrum 
Effects Platform or similar vehicles to, at a minimum, help develop 
tactics, techniques, procedures, and concepts of operations for both 
near-term and long-term active protection systems. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD did not agree with our 
recommendation that it support additional testing and demonstration of 
near-term active protection systems on the Full Spectrum Effects 
Platform that could respond to the Central Command's need. It stated 
that there are no active protection systems mature enough at this time 
to integrate on this vehicle, regardless of any additional testing and 
demonstration efforts. DOD also stated that it continues to pursue 
active protection, citing its efforts with the vertical launch system 
for use on the FCS, among other things. However, we believe that 
testing near term active protection systems on the Full Spectrum 
Effects Platform or similar vehicles is valuable for answering 
remaining questions about such systems and future systems. This is 
particularly important given the likelihood that the Army will field 
some form of APS to its forces. We have broadened our recommendation to 
capture the value of continued testing of near-term APS for tactics, 
techniques and procedures and concepts of operations. 

Background: 

The FCS concept is designed to be part of the Army's Future Force, 
which is intended to transform the Army into a more rapidly deployable 
and responsive force that differs substantially from the large division-
centric structure of the past. The FCS family of weapons is now 
expected to include 14 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air 
vehicles, sensors, and munitions that will be linked by an advanced 
information network. Fundamentally, the FCS concept is to replace mass 
with superior information--allowing soldiers to see and hit the enemy 
first rather than to rely on heavy armor to withstand a hit. The Army 
envisions a new way of fighting that depends on networking the force, 
which involves linking people, platforms, weapons, and sensors 
seamlessly together in a system of systems. 

Within the FCS program, eight types of manned ground vehicles are being 
developed, each having a common engine, chassis, and other components. 
One of the other common components is a hit avoidance system that 
features a set of capabilities to detect, avoid, and/or defeat threats 
against the manned ground vehicles. One of its subsystems is the APS, 
which is intended to protect a vehicle from attack by detecting a 
threat in the form of an incoming round or rocket propelled grenade 
(threat) and launching an interceptor round from the vehicle to destroy 
the incoming weapon. An APS system consists of a radar to detect the 
incoming weapon, a launcher, an interceptor or missile, and a computing 
system. 

The Army has employed a management approach for FCS that centers on a 
lead systems integrator to provide significant management services to 
help the Army define and develop FCS and reach across traditional Army 
mission areas. Boeing, along with its subcontractor, the Science 
Applications International Corporation (SAIC), serves as the lead 
systems integrator for the FCS system development and demonstration 
phase of acquisition, which is expected to extend until 2014. The lead 
systems integrator has a close partner-like relationship with the Army 
and its responsibilities include requirements development, design, and 
source selection of major system and subsystem subcontractors. In the 
case of APS, the first-tier subcontractors are the manned ground 
vehicle integrators, BAE and General Dynamics Land Systems, who are 
responsible for developing individual systems. BAE was designated the 
hit avoidance integrator, a role that covers more than active 
protection, and was responsible for awarding the subcontract to the APS 
developer. This subcontract has three elements: a base contract, option 
A to support the current force (the short-range solution) and option B 
to support the FCS manned ground vehicles (short-and long-range 
solution). Figure 1illustrates these relationships. 

Figure 1: FCS APS Major Players: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Army (data); GAO (presentation). 

[End of figure] 

A separate initiative involving active protection resulted from a Joint 
Urgent Operational Needs Statement,[Footnote 2] issued by Central 
Command and the Multi-National Corps in Iraq in April of 2005, which 
requested 14 special-equipped vehicles with a host of distinctive 
capabilities, one of which was an APS. The need statement called for a 
capability to field a combination of near-term technologies that would 
be useful in conducting force protection missions, reconnaissance and 
crowd control in Iraq and an evaluation of an active protection 
capability against rocket-propelled grenades as part of this suite of 
capabilities. To respond to this need statement, the Joint Rapid 
Acquisition Cell, a group within the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) that seeks solutions to urgent needs and focuses on near-term or 
off-the-shelf equipment to meet these needs, provided funding to the 
Army, which worked with the OFT to evaluate various technologies, 
including an APS, for inclusion on the vehicles. The OFT was also an 
office within the OSD, and its role was to examine unanticipated needs 
and experiment with innovative technologies that could be used to meet 
warfighter needs. 

Both the process for evaluating APS sources and concepts to meet FCS 
needs and the urgent needs of the Central Command occurred nearly 
simultaneously, as shown in figure 3. 

Figure 2: Timelines for OFT and Army Processes for Evaluating Active 
Protection Systems: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Army and OFT (data); GAO (presentation and analysis). 

[End of figure] 

As can be seen in figure 3, many events took place at the same time. 
The lead systems integrator for FCS completed its subcontractor 
selection for APS shortly before decisions were made on the near term 
system being considered to meet the Central Command need. The Trophy 
system was evaluated as a candidate system in both processes. 

APS Source Selection Avoided Organizational Conflicts of Interest: 

In choosing the developer for the APS system, the FCS lead systems 
integrator, with Army support and concurrence, conducted a source 
selection and followed the FCS lead systems integrator subcontract 
provisions for avoiding organizational conflicts of interest. The 
purpose was to select the subcontractor for the APS that would be best 
able to develop the overall APS architecture to address the FCS 
requirements to defeat the short-and long-range antiarmor threats as 
well as meet the current force needs for defeating short-range rocket- 
propelled grenade attacks. The subcontractor selected would support the 
hit avoidance integrator in integrating APS technology into the FCS 
manned ground vehicles and also apply this architecture to the Army's 
current force. The contract included two options that were to supply 
the specific design for the APS system: Option A for the short-range 
APS for the current force; and Option B for the short-and long-range 
solution for the FCS. These options would be awarded later, based on 
the results of trade studies subsequently performed. 

To protect against organizational conflicts of interest, contracts 
between the FCS lead systems integrator and its subcontractors preclude 
a subcontractor from conducting or participating in a source selection 
for other FCS subcontracts if any part of its organization submits a 
proposal.[Footnote 3] Under normal circumstances, since the APS would 
be part of the hit avoidance system of the FCS manned ground vehicles, 
the hit avoidance integrator, BAE, would have had the primary 
responsibility to issue the requests for proposals, conduct the source 
selection evaluation, and award the contract. In this capacity, BAE 
issued a draft request for proposals for the APS in April 2005. When 
the firm subsequently decided to submit a proposal on the APS 
subcontract, it was required, under the FCS lead systems integrator 
subcontract organizational conflict of interest provisions, to notify 
the lead systems integrator, Boeing, of its intention. BAE did so and 
the lead systems integrator reissued the request for proposals for APS 
in September 2005 and assumed the source selection responsibilities. 
BAE submitted its proposal but then had no further role in the 
evaluation of proposals or the actual source selection. After the 
source selection was complete, the lead systems integrator transferred 
contract responsibility to BAE, and BAE assumed the responsibility for 
awarding and administering the APS contract. 

From our review, the documentation from the APS source selection 
process shows that (1) no officials from the offering companies 
participated in the source selection process, and (2) all offerors were 
evaluated based on the same criteria contained in the request for 
proposals.[Footnote 4] In response to this request for proposals, four 
proposals were received. Three proposals were considered competitive, 
while the fourth was eliminated from consideration as it was considered 
"unsatisfactory" in technical merit and its architectural approach did 
not meet the requirements. Proposals from the remaining three 
companies--BAE, Raytheon, and General Dynamics Land Systems--were 
evaluated in the source selection process and no officials from these 
companies were on the evaluating or selecting teams. The source 
selection evaluation team consisted of 53 members, with 27 lead systems 
integrator representatives and 26 government representatives, including 
personnel from the FCS program manager's office, Army research centers, 
and the Defense Contract Management Agency. After evaluating each of 
the proposals against the criteria spelled out in the request for 
proposals, the source selection evaluation team made its recommendation 
to the lead systems integrator source selection executive, who accepted 
its recommendation. 

Our review of the documentation shows that the criteria were ranked in 
order of importance, with technical merit considered most important, 
then cost, management/schedule and finally past performance. The 
technical merit criteria were divided into six sub-factors: systems 
engineering and architecture; expertise in APS technologies; 
simulation, modeling and test; fratricide and collateral damage; 
specialty engineering; and integration capability. Cost criteria were 
based on the realism, reasonableness, completeness, and affordability 
of the proposal. Management/ schedule criteria included such areas as 
expertise and experience in key positions. The past performance risk 
rating category was based on whether the respondents' past performance 
raised doubts about their being able to perform the contract. 

Since all three proposals were deemed comparable in the areas of cost, 
management/schedule, and past performance, the primary discriminating 
factor became technical merit. According to the evaluation 
documentation, the technical merit scores were assessed based on 
whether the proposal demonstrated that the contractor understood the 
requirements and on its approach to meeting these requirements in each 
of the six technical merit sub-factors. Also, part of the technical 
score was a proposal risk evaluation, defined as the degree any 
proposal weaknesses could cause disruption of schedule, increase in 
cost, or degradation in performance. 

While the source selection's stated purpose was to choose the company 
best able to develop the APS and not a specific design, each proposal 
used a specific APS system as an "artifact" to illustrate how they 
intended to meet the requirements. Even though, in theory, one company 
could have been chosen as the APS developer while another company's 
preferred design could have been selected for development, much of the 
source selection assessment of technical merit was based on the 
"artifact" used for illustration. For example, in the technical merit 
category of APS expertise, the source selection evaluation of Raytheon 
states that "the vertical launch concept solves several design and 
integration problems." Similarly, the BAE evaluation in the criteria of 
APS expertise states that "the proposed long-range 
countermeasure…design has effectiveness against the full spectrum of 
threats." The General Dynamics Land System's evaluation discusses the 
relatively high technology readiness level (TRL)[Footnote 5] of the 
"proposed Trophy system." Therefore, while each company's proposed 
solution was not the only aspect of the proposals to be evaluated, the 
evaluation documentation shows that the technical merit category was a 
key factor in the evaluation. 

The source selection evaluation team decided that the BAE and Raytheon 
proposals had the highest technical merit. BAE had a lower-risk 
approach and its solution had been tested in a relevant environment: 
however, the source selection evaluation team stated that this low-risk 
approach could prevent BAE from considering higher-risk options that 
would enable them to meet the full range of the performance 
requirements, such as protection from top-attack weapons. In addition, 
the source selection evaluation team determined that, while both 
Raytheon and BAE could develop the design presented in the BAE 
proposal, Raytheon would have the advantage if the vertical launch 
design was chosen. The evaluation team concluded that the Raytheon 
approach would have the best chance of meeting all the requirements. 
Based on the team's recommendation, the lead systems integrator 
selected Raytheon. The integrator accepted the higher risk because it 
concluded that the Raytheon proposal had excellent technical merit and 
the firm would be better able to develop the vertical launch 
technology, if that were the design decided upon in the trade study. 

Trade Study Used Consistent Method in Reaffirming Vertical Launch 
Concept: 

The APS development contract required the winner of the source 
selection to perform a trade study identifying and assessing competing 
APS alternatives. The trade study used a methodology consistent with 
Army guidance to evaluate all alternatives, ultimately selecting 
Raytheon's vertical launch as the best design. According to the Army 
and the lead systems integrator, conducting the trade study after 
choosing the APS subcontractor could have resulted in selecting a 
different concept than Raytheon's vertical launch design. However, in 
our view, this possibility appears remote given the selection of 
Raytheon as APS developer was based largely on the technical merits of 
its vertical launch design and the fact that it would be best able to 
develop that design. 

The development contract's terms required the source selection winner 
to perform a trade study that would identify and assess APS 
alternatives and select an APS design from among competing 
alternatives. Therefore, once Raytheon won the development contract in 
March 2006, it was required to conduct the trade study rather than 
simply develop its own design. Since the trade study was not a source 
selection, FAR contract provisions regarding organizational conflicts 
of interest did not apply and Raytheon was free to participate in the 
study as the responsible contractor. The trade study's specific 
objective was to choose a single short-range APS architecture (launcher 
and interceptor) that best met active protection requirements for FCS 
manned ground vehicles, with consideration for application to the 
current force. The study was conducted in May 2006 and Raytheon's 
vertical launch concept was selected as the design. 

Based on the trade study documentation, the study was conducted using a 
methodology prescribed by Army guidance and this methodology was 
applied consistently to all APS alternatives. Seven alternatives 
survived a screening process and were then evaluated against a set of 
weighted criteria. The study concluded that Raytheon's vertical launch 
was the best design approach. 

According to general Army guidance for trade studies, steps in the 
trade study process should include such elements as incorporating 
stakeholders, identifying assumptions, determining criteria, 
identifying alternatives, and conducting comparative analyses. The APS 
trade study process consistently applied such methodology to all APS 
alternatives by using separate, independent roles for a technical team 
and stakeholders; operating under a set of assumptions; using 
validated, protected technical data on each alternative; having a 
screening process to filter out non-viable alternatives; and using a 
set of weighted criteria to assess alternatives that survived the 
screening process. 

The trade study was performed by a technical team and stakeholders-- 
each having separate roles and operating independently from one 
another. The technical team provided technical input and expertise to 
the stakeholders, who were the voting members of the study and made the 
final selection. The technical team, 21 members from industry and 
government as shown in table 1, included individuals who were subject 
matter experts as well as those from organizations participating in 
development of the short-range APS. Raytheon had 11 members on the 
technical team--the most from any single organization. The Army stated 
that this representation included administrators and observers and 
occurred because Raytheon had been designated APS developer, was thus 
required to conduct the trade study, and could gain knowledge from 
attending subject matter experts. 

Table 1: Composition of APS Trade Study Technical Team: 

Industry: Boeing/SAIC (1);
Government: U.S. Army Program Manager, FCS (1). 

Industry: BAE (1); 
Government: U.S. Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center (1). 

Industry: General Dynamics Land Systems (3); 
Government: U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (1). 

Industry: Raytheon (11); 
Government: Department of Energy - Idaho National Lab (2). 

Source: Army (data), GAO (presentation and analysis). 

[End of table] 

The stakeholders made the final selection. The composition and number 
of stakeholders are shown in table 2. The stakeholders were program 
leads from the Army, lead systems integrator, and subcontractors 
responsible for integrating the FCS manned ground vehicles. According 
to the Army, Raytheon's APS program manager was included as a 
stakeholder because Raytheon as developer had responsibility for 
developing the design chosen by the trade study process. 

Table 2: Composition of APS Trade Study Stakeholders: 

Industry: Raytheon (1); 
Government: U.S. Army Program Manager, FCS (1). 

Industry: BAE (2); 
Government: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (1). 

Industry: General Dynamics Land Systems (2); 
Government: U.S. Army Program Executive Office for Ground Combat 
Systems (1). 

Industry: Boeing/SAIC (1); 
Government: [Empty]. 

Source: Army (data), GAO (presentation and analysis). 

[End of table] 

The technical team and stakeholders operated the trade study under 
assumptions that set parameters for screening and evaluating each 
alternative. These assumptions were tied to such areas as performance 
and threat. Additionally, they conducted the study using data that was 
previously validated and remained protected throughout the study's 
course. The primary source of the data was the Army Research, 
Development, and Engineering Command's APS database, which contained 
data gathered and validated by the Command's subordinate labs. This 
data was protected by third parties, including the Department of 
Energy's Idaho National Lab, to ensure it was not changed during the 
study. 

The technical team used initial screening processes to eliminate four 
alternatives and identify seven viable alternatives for further 
assessment. The screening process filtered out the four alternatives 
that could not meet one or both of two criteria: (1) ability to grow to 
meet 360-degree hemispherical requirements, and (2) ability to be 
procured within a program schedule that would meet the need for 
prototype delivery of a short-range solution to the current force in 
fiscal year 2009. The seven alternatives that survived the screening 
process are shown in table 3, along with the respective government 
organizations and industry associated with each. 

Table 3: APS Concepts Considered in Trade Study: 

Government organization/industry: U.S. Army Aviation and Missile 
Research, Development, and Engineering Center/Boeing; 
Alternative: Close-In Active Protection System. 

Government organization/industry: U.S. Army Aviation and Missile 
Research, Development, and Engineering Center/Boeing; 
Alternative: Close-In Active Protection System II. 

Government organization/industry: U.S. Army Tank and Automotive 
Research, Development, and Engineering/BAE; 
Alternative: Close-In Countermeasure. 

Government organization/industry: U.S. Army Tank and Automotive 
Research, Development, and Engineering/Chang Industries; 
Alternative: Full Spectrum Close-In Layered Shield. 

Government organization/industry: U.S. Army Tank and Automotive 
Research, Development, and Engineering/BAE and Northrup Grumman; 
Alternative: Integrated Army Active Protection System. 

Government organization/industry: Israel/Rafael and General Dynamics 
Land Systems; 
Alternative: Trophy. 

Government organization/industry: U.S. Army Program Manager, FCS/ 
Raytheon; 
Alternative: Vertical Launch. 

Source: Army (data), GAO (presentation and analysis). 

[End of table] 

The technical team assessed the seven alternatives against a set of 
five weighted criteria. According to the Army, these were the same top- 
level criteria mandated in all FCS trade studies, and their weights 
were assigned by FCS chief engineers. Table 4 defines each of the 
criteria and provides information on respective weights. 

Table 4: Top-Level Criteria and Associated Weights: 

Criteria: Performance; 
Description: Survivability, logistics, and reliability; 
Weight: 35%. 

Criteria: Cost; 
Description: Average unit production cost for fitting 500 vehicles; 
Weight: 25%. 

Criteria: Burdens; 
Description: Includes signature, weight, volume, power, and integration 
complexity; 
Weight: 20%. 

Criteria: Risk; 
Description: Technical, schedule, and cost risk; 
Weight: 15%. 

Criteria: Growth potential; 
Description: System growth potential to counter full spectrum of 
threats; 
Weight: 5%. 

Source: Army (data), GAO (presentation and analysis). 

[End of table] 

The vertical launch concept scored highest in every category of 
criteria except risk. The Army indicated that the concept had about one-
third better overall weighted performance than the other alternatives. 
Army officials described the vertical launch design as having technical 
advantages over the other alternatives--including the need for less 
space, weight, and power--as well as cost benefits. 

The Army and lead systems integrator officials told us that the trade 
study could have resulted in the selection of a design other than 
Raytheon's. They also stated that, had this occurred, Raytheon as APS 
developer would have been required to develop this design rather than 
the vertical launch. While in theory the APS source selection chose a 
developer and the trade study chose the design to develop, in reality 
it is difficult to separate the trade study results and the source 
selection decision. In our view, in both the source selection and trade 
study, criteria related to technical aspects of the designs were 
deciding factors. Considering that the source selection evaluation 
relied on artifacts representing specific systems--and Raytheon won the 
source selection based in large part on the technical merit of its 
artifact--it seems unlikely that the APS trade study would have 
resulted in the selection of any system other than Raytheon's vertical 
launch. 

Although the trade study concluded that vertical launch was a high- 
payoff approach, it also noted that it was a high risk due to its low 
technology maturity. At the time of the trade study, as shown in table 
5, the vertical launch was less technologically mature than the other 
alternatives except for one. 

Table 5: Technology Maturity Levels of APS Alternatives as of May 2006: 

Alternative: Close-In Active Protection System; 
Technology maturity: 6. 

Alternative: Close-In Active Protection System II; 
Technology maturity: 3. 

Alternative: Close-In Countermeasure; 
Technology maturity: 6. 

Alternative: Full Spectrum Close-In Layered Shield; 
Technology maturity: 6. 

Alternative: Integrated Army APS; 
Technology maturity: 6. 

Alternative: Trophy; 
Technology maturity: 6. 

Alternative: Vertical Launch; 
Technology maturity: 5. 

Source: Army (data), GAO (presentation and analysis). 

[End of table] 

The Army expects the design to reach TRL 6 (system model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment) by August or September 2007. 
The Army expects the vertical launch concept to be available for 
prototype delivery to current force combat vehicles in fiscal year 2009 
and for testing on a FCS vehicle in 2011. These estimates appear 
optimistic. At a TRL 5, the vertical launch will require additional 
technology development and demonstration before it is ready for either 
application. Also, the FCS vehicles have not been fully developed yet. 
Assuming all goes as planned, most FCS vehicle prototypes are expected 
to be available in 2011 for developmental testing. As we noted in our 
March 2007 report,[Footnote 6] the Army has in general been accepting 
significant risks with immature technologies for the FCS program, 
coupled with compressed schedules for testing and evaluating 
prototypes. 

Army and Lead Systems Integrator Had Extensive Roles in APS 
Subcontractor Selection and Trade Study: 

The Army and the lead systems integrator were both extensively involved 
in preparing for and conducting the APS subcontractor selection and the 
trade study. Prior to the selection, FCS program officials assisted in 
APS requirements development and reviewed and approved the scope of 
work, schedule, and evaluation criteria for the request for proposals. 
After the proposals were received, FCS program officials, technical 
experts from various Army research centers, representatives of the Tank-
Automotive and Armaments Command and the Training and Doctrine Command 
were active participants in the selection evaluation team and reviewed 
the proposals along with the lead systems integrator members. The 
Source Selection Advisory Council, who advise the Source Selection 
Executive, provided oversight to the evaluation team and also had 
representatives from the FCS program manager's office and the Army 
research community. Similarly, Army FCS officials, as well as technical 
experts from Army research centers, were members of the trade study 
technical team and also concurred in the choice of the vertical launch 
concept. The co-lead of the trade study was an FCS official. The lead 
systems integrator's office assumed responsibility for the selection 
process, was the selection executive, and made the final choice of an 
APS developer. In addition to its lead role in the APS subcontractor 
selection, the lead systems integrator was represented on the trade 
study technical team and was one of the stakeholders. 

As our previous body of work on the FCS program has shown, the Army's 
participation in the APS subcontractor selection and trade study is 
consistent with the Army's general approach to FCS. Army leadership set 
up the FCS program in such a way that it would create more competition 
and have more influence over the selection of suppliers below the lead 
systems integrator. In setting up FCS, Army leadership noted that 
traditionally, once the Army hired a prime contractor, that contractor 
would bring its own supplier chains. The Army was not very involved in 
the choice of the suppliers. In FCS, the Army called for the lead 
systems integrator to hold a competition for the next tier of 
contractors. The Army had veto power over these selections. In 
addition, the Army directed that the lead systems integrator employ 
integrators at lower levels in the program, for high-cost items such as 
sensors and active protection systems and the Army has been involved 
with these selections. These integrators were also to hold competitions 
to select suppliers for those systems. This strategy was designed to 
keep the first tier of contractors from bringing their own supplier 
chains and pushed competition and Army visibility down lower in the 
supplier chain. The fact that the decisions on the APS subcontractor 
selection and trade study lend themselves to after-the-fact examination 
is due in part to the Army's focus on competition at lower supplier 
levels on FCS. 

OFT Process for Evaluating APS Was More Test-Based and Near-Term 
Oriented: 

The process followed by OFT to meet the urgent needs of the Central 
Command was characterized by a simpler evaluation of active protection 
systems with potential for near term fielding, followed by actual 
physical testing of the APS candidate system that the OFT considered 
most technically mature, the Trophy. The Army's Program Manager's 
Office for Close Combat Systems was also involved in this evaluation. 
While the testing of Trophy had a high success rate, the Joint Rapid 
Acquisition Cell decided to defer fielding the Trophy based, at least 
in part, on the recommendations of the Army that the testing was not 
realistic and the Trophy's integration on the platform would delay 
fielding of other useful capabilities. OFT officials did not agree with 
the Army's position and thought the system's success in testing 
indicated it should be further evaluated. 

To meet the Central Command's need, OFT began an effort, the Full- 
Spectrum Effects Platform, to incorporate and test various improvements 
for potential application to existing military vehicles such as the 
Stryker. The platform itself is a modified Stryker vehicle.[Footnote 7] 
The program was divided into spirals: spiral 0 was to evaluate the 
synergy of the different systems, including the APS, on the vehicle and 
to compile lessons learned to aid in future concepts of operations, 
development and integration. Spiral 1 was intended to field a limited 
number of such systems to current forces in-theater in 2007, for 
purposes of an operational assessment of the various capabilities. The 
Full Spectrum Effects Platform is not part of or associated with FCS. 

OFT, in association with the Naval Surface Warfare Center, evaluated 
six candidate APS systems. Army representatives from the Program 
Manager, Close Combat Systems were also involved in this evaluation. 
The six candidate systems evaluated are shown in table 6. 

Table 6: APS Candidate Systems and Developers: 

Candidate: Close-in Active Protection System; 
Developer: Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering 
Center. 

Candidate: Close-in Countermeasure; 
Developer: British Aerospace (formerly United Defense). 

Candidate: Canister-Launched Area Denial System; 
Developer: Northrop Grumman. 

Candidate: Tactical Rocket-Propelled Grenade Airbag Protection System; 
Developer: Innovative Survivability Technologies. 

Candidate: Full-Spectrum Close-in Layered Shield; 
Developer: Chang Industries. 

Candidate: Trophy; 
Developer: Rafael/General Dynamics Land Systems. 

Source: OFT. 

[End of table] 

These systems were evaluated because the OFT and Navy and Army 
officials considered them to be the most promising APS solutions 
available within the required schedule. They evaluated each system 
based on such criteria as the feasibility of the operational concept, 
its cost and schedule factors, as well as its weight, size, and power 
requirements. Trophy was selected as the most promising system because 
it was the most technically mature system and was being developed by 
Israeli defense forces that had done initial work to integrate it on a 
light armored vehicle. 

OFT subsequently sponsored tests of the Trophy APS as part of the Full- 
Spectrum Effects Platform at Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, 
Virginia. A representative from the Army's Program Manager, Close 
Combat Systems, was part of the oversight team for these tests. In 
these test firings, the Trophy APS did well, destroying 35 of 38 
incoming rocket-propelled grenades. However, the process for deciding 
how to proceed based on the test results was not agreed to in advance. 
A disagreement subsequently arose between OFT and the Army Close Combat 
System officials on how best to proceed from the testing. 

Although the tests were not designed to represent the Trophy's 
capabilities in a realistic operational environment, OFT officials 
concluded that Trophy showed enough promise that they recommended 
continued testing to demonstrate its capabilities under various 
conditions. These officials estimated that an additional $13 million 
would cover the cost for this testing. They believed that Trophy could 
be integrated in the near term on existing light-armored vehicles and 
meet the urgent need for an immediate APS capability. 

The Army officials disagreed with OFT's assessment that further testing 
of Trophy for inclusion on the Full Spectrum Effects Platform was 
justified. According to the Army officials, Trophy was not tested in a 
realistic environment for collateral damage or effectiveness. They 
believed that it would not be sufficiently tested for operational and 
safety issues within the time period required for the first spiral of 
the Full Spectrum Effects Platform. A delay in its integration on the 
Platform would delay, by at least 6 to 14 months, demonstration of 
other potentially useful capabilities,that could be immediately 
incorporated. Further, the Army estimated that it would take 5 years to 
integrate and field Trophy on other current force manned ground 
vehicles. The Army recommended to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell that 
the Trophy APS be excluded from Spiral 1 of the Full-Spectrum Effects 
Platform. In lieu of putting this technology in the field, the Army 
recommended that slat armor[Footnote 8] be incorporated on Spiral 1, 
since it has been effective in defeating the current rocket-propelled 
grenade threat. OFT officials disagreed, reasoning that although the 
use of slat armor on the current force has seemed to mitigate the 
effects of the rocket-propelled grenades currently in use, improved 
munitions will soon be available, and the slat armor will no longer be 
effective against these threats. They believed that the Trophy should 
be tested further in order to answer the questions raised by the Army 
and to provide insight into its capabilities. OFT officials based their 
position on the Trophy's success in these tests, its high level of 
technical maturity when compared to other active protection systems, 
and the criticality of the need. 

The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell presented this information to Central 
Command and recommended slipping the active protection capability to a 
later platform spiral, once it was more mature. Currently, there are no 
plans for further evaluation of active protection for future platform 
spirals. Upon the removal of the Trophy APS system from the Full- 
Spectrum Effects Platform vehicle, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 
discontinued funding for further testing and evaluation of the Trophy. 
The disagreement between Army and OFT officials notwithstanding, we did 
not find information that would challenge the decision to defer the 
introduction of the Trophy on light-armored vehicles. On the other 
hand, the 5 years the Army estimated would be needed to integrate the 
comparatively mature Trophy system on the existing Stryker vehicle does 
not appear consistent with its estimates that the less mature vertical 
launch system could be ready for prototype delivery on Strykers in 2 
years and on the yet-to-be developed FCS prototypes in 3 years. 

Conclusions: 

The FCS lead systems integrator, with support from the Army, followed a 
consistent and disciplined process in both selecting Raytheon to 
develop the APS for FCS and in conducting the trade study and followed 
the lead systems integrator subcontract and FAR provisions for avoiding 
organizational conflicts of interest. While the role played by Raytheon 
in the trade study was in accordance with its contract and thus not 
improper, the rationale for having the trade study follow the source 
selection is not entirely clear. The purpose of the trade study was to 
select the best concept; yet, the source selection process that 
preceded it had, in fact, chosen Raytheon primarily on the technical 
merits of its vertical launch design concept. It was thus improbable 
that the trade study would reach a different conclusion. Both the Army 
and the lead systems integrator were closely involved throughout the 
source selection and trade study processes and concurred in the 
selection of Raytheon's APS concept. 

The process for evaluating the Trophy system to meet the urgent needs 
of the Central Command was different. It centered more directly on the 
results of physical testing, followed a less-disciplined decision- 
making process, and was characterized by considerable disagreement 
between OFT and the Army. While the decision to defer the use of the 
Trophy on fielded vehicles appears prudent in light of the limited 
realism of the testing, the promising results of the testing likewise 
appeared to warrant additional testing of the Trophy system to either 
confirm or dispel potential risks in the use of APS capabilities. 
Discontinuing all testing of the Trophy systems may thus have been 
premature, particularly in light of the need to better understand 
tactics, techniques and procedures and concepts of operations for both 
near-term and long-term applications. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Because of the likelihood that the Army will introduce APS into its 
forces, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense support additional 
testing and demonstration of near-term APS systems on the Full Spectrum 
Effects Platform or similar vehicles to, at a minimum, help develop 
tactics, techniques, procedures, and concepts of operations for both 
near-term and long-term active protection systems. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The 
comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD did not concur with our 
recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated where appropriate. 

DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Secretary of 
Defense support additional testing and demonstration of near-term 
active protection systems on the Full Spectrum Effects Platform that 
could respond to the Central Command's need. It stated that the 
original decision in May 2006 that delayed delivering Full Spectrum 
Effects Platform capabilities due to technical development and 
performance risks remains true today. DOD added that there are no 
active protection systems mature enough at this time to integrate on a 
Full Spectrum Effects Platform regardless of any additional testing and 
demonstration efforts. This represents a much more decided opinion than 
was rendered at the time of the OFT tests. At that time, Army officials 
believed that the Trophy would not be sufficiently tested for 
operational and safety issues in time for the first spiral of the Full 
Spectrum Effects Platform. OFT officials believed that the Trophy 
should be tested further to answer the questions raised by the Army and 
to provide insight into its capabilities. Ultimately, the Joint Rapid 
Acquisition Cell recommended slipping the active protection capability 
to a later spiral of the Full Spectrum Effects Platform. This was the 
basis for our recommendation for additional testing of near-term active 
protection systems on the Full Spectrum Effects Platform. 

DOD stated that it continues to pursue active protection, citing the 
Army's vertical launch system for FCS. As stated in our report, this 
system is technically immature and the Army's estimates for testing it 
appear optimistic. According to the Institute of Defense Analysis, the 
vertical launch system is ambitious, with much enabling technology not 
yet demonstrated. Given the criticality of active protection for the 
FCS manned ground vehicles, additional testing of near-term active 
protection systems could provide valuable insights into operations and 
tactics that would benefit future applications, such as FCS. DOD noted 
that the Trophy system is being tested on the Wolf Pack Platoon 
Project, an OSD Rapid Reaction Technology Office (formerly OFT) effort. 
However, this project is not directed toward development of APS 
tactics, techniques, procedures, or concepts of operations. In 
addition, it will not include testing against live targets. 

Testing near-term active protection systems on the Full Spectrum 
Effects Platform or similar vehicles is valuable for answering 
remaining questions about such systems and to provide insights for the 
employment of future systems. This is particularly important given the 
likelihood that the Army will field some form of APS to its forces. We 
have broadened our recommendation to capture the value of continued 
testing of near-term APS for tactics, techniques and procedures and 
concepts of operations. 

Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff has any 
questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. 

Signed by; 

Paul L. Francis: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To develop the information on the U.S. Army's decision to pursue a new 
APS system under the FCS program, we interviewed officials of the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics 
and Technology); the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command; the Joint 
Rapid Acquisition Cell; the Office of Force Transformation; the Naval 
Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren Division); the Program Manager for the 
Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); and the Future Combat 
System Lead Systems Integrator. 

We reviewed the APS subcontractor selection documentation, including 
the APS request for proposal, current force and FCS operational 
requirements documents, subcontract proposals, criteria used to rate 
those proposals, and the APS development contract to determine if 
procedures for avoiding organizational conflicts of interest were 
followed and how the APS subcontractor was selected. In addition, we 
held discussions with key Army officials and lead systems integrator 
representatives regarding this process and their roles in it. To 
determine why the trade study was conducted after source selection, we 
reviewed the trade study process and results and Army guidelines for 
conducting trade studies. To identify the roles played by both the Army 
and lead systems integrator in the selection of an APS, we reviewed 
documentation concerning their roles in these processes. We also 
reviewed these materials to determine whether consideration was given 
to a separate APS solution for current forces and, in conjunction with 
this issue, we reviewed test reports and other documentation and 
discussed the testing of an alternative APS system, the Trophy, with 
the parties involved. 

In evaluating the APS subcontractor selection and trade study 
processes, we did not attempt to determine if the best technical 
solution was chosen, but only if these processes followed lead systems 
integrator provisions for organizational conflicts of interest and used 
a consistent methodology for the trade study. We conducted our work 
between October 2006 and June 2007 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 

Jun 4 2007: 

Paul L. Francis: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548. 

Dear Mr. Francis: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-07-759, "Defense Acquisitions: Analysis of Processes Used 
to Evaluate Active Protection Systems," dated April 30, 2007 (GAO Code 
120624). 

The report recommends that the Secretary of Defense reconsider 
supporting additional testing and demonstration of near term Active 
Protection Systems' systems on the Full Spectrum Effects Platform 
(FSEP) that could respond to the Central Command's need. 

The Department non-concurs with the GAO recommendation. The original 
decision in May of 2006 that delayed delivering FSEP capabilities due 
to technical development and performance risks remains true today. Our 
comments on the recommendation are enclosed. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. Technical comments were provided separately. For further 
questions concerning this report, contact Mr. Robert Maline at (703) 
693-9414. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David G. Ahem: 
Director: 
Portfolio Systems Acquisition: 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report Dated April 30, 2007 GAO-07-759 (GAO Code 120624): 

"Defense Acquisitions: Analysis Of Processes Used To Evaluate Active 
Protection Systems" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation: 

Recommendation: We recommends that the Secretary of Defense reconsider 
supporting additional testing and demonstration of near term APS 
systems on the Full Spectrum Effects Platform that could respond to the 
Central Command's need. (p. 21/GAO Draft Report): 

DoD Response: Nonconcur. There are no Active Protection Systems (APS) 
mature enough at this time to integrate onto a Full Spectrum Effects 
Platform (FSEP) regardless of any additional testing and demonstration 
efforts. The recommendations of this report are not supported by the 
report findings. The Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, consulted 
with technical experts and U.S. Central Command before deciding that 
deferring Trophy (the Israeli Active Protection System) on the FSEP was 
a reasonable approach. 

The Department continues to pursue Active Protection. In addition to 
the work on Active Protection System development spearheaded by Future 
Combat Systems, the Rapid Reaction Technology Office (formerly the 
Office of Force Transformation) is also testing the Trophy APS as part 
of the Wolf Pack Platoon Project. Additionally, the Defense Advanced 
Research and Programs Agency is developing potential systems and the 
Foreign Comparative Test Office is monitoring active protection 
systems. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Paul Francis, (202) 512-4841: 

Acknowledgments: 

Other contributors to this report were Assistant Director William R. 
Graveline, Marie P. Ahearn, Beverly Breen, Tana Davis, Letisha Jenkins, 
Kenneth E. Patton, and Robert Swierczek. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] The Army defines its "Current Force" as including the Stryker, 
Bradley, and Abrams combat vehicles. Of the three, the Stryker is the 
only system for which the Army has definite plans to incorporate an 
APS. 

[2] A joint urgent operational need is a need that can be considered 
life or combat-mission-threatening based on unforeseen military 
requirements that must be resolved in days, weeks, or months. Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions 3470.01, Rapid Validation and 
Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of 
Execution, July 15, 2005. 

[3] The FCS lead systems integrator contract required that an 
organizational conflict of interest provision be included in the 
subcontracts under the FCS lead systems integrator contract and flowed 
down to all lower level subcontract tiers. The lead systems integrator 
developed a specific organizational conflicts of interest clause 
applicable to all subcontract tiers under this contract. Additionally, 
the lead systems integrator contract provided that pursuant to the FAR 
9.5, subcontractors could neither prepare RFP documents nor conduct or 
participate in a source selection if any part of its organization 
submits a proposal. 

[4] We reviewed the source selection documentation for reporting 
purposes and did not conduct a legal review of the evaluation or 
selection decision. 

[5] Technology readiness levels characterize the readiness of 
technologies for hand-off to project implementers. Nine levels are 
defined, representing concepts from fundamental research level (TRL 1) 
through technologies fully qualified and demonstrated (TRL 9). 

[6] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future 
Combat System, GAO-07-376 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007). 

[7] The OFT had initiated a program called Project Sheriff in 2004, 
prior to the Central Command's need statement, to address urgent 
warfighter needs for lethal and non-lethal weapons, and force 
protection. After the needs statement, this evolved into the Full- 
Spectrum Effects Platform effort. 

[8] Slat armor forms a metal frame barrier on the front of the vehicle 
that detonates the rocket-propelled grenade away from the vehicle, 
preventing it from boring through the vehicle and causing damage and 
injury. 

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