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entitled 'Business Systems Modernization: DOD Needs to Fully Define 
Policies and Procedures for Institutionally Managing Investments' which 
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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

May 2007: 

Business Systems Modernization: 

DOD Needs to Fully Define Policies and Procedures for Institutionally 
Managing Investments: 

GAO-07-538: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-538, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 1995, GAO first designated the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 
business systems modernization program as “high-risk,” and continues to 
do so today. In 2004, Congress passed legislation reflecting prior GAO 
recommendations for DOD to adopt a corporate approach to information 
technology (IT) business system investment management. To support GAO’s 
legislative mandate to review DOD’s efforts, GAO assessed whether the 
department’s corporate investment management approach comports with 
relevant federal guidance. In doing so, GAO applied its IT Investment 
Management framework and associated methodology, focusing on the 
framework’s stages related to the investment management provisions of 
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD has established the management structures needed to effectively 
manage its business system investments, but it has not fully defined 
many of the related policies and procedures that GAO’s IT Investment 
Management framework defines. Specifically, the department has defined 
four of nine practices that call for project-level policies and 
procedures, and one of the five practices that call for portfolio-level 
policies and procedures (see below). For example, DOD has established 
an enterprisewide IT investment board responsible for defining and 
implementing its business system investment governance process, 
documented policies and procedures for ensuring that systems support 
ongoing and future business needs, developed procedures for identifying 
and collecting information about these systems to support investment 
selection and control, and assigned responsibility to an individual or 
a group for managing the development and modification of the business 
system portfolio selection criteria. However, DOD has not fully 
documented business system investment policies and procedures for 
directing investment board operations, selecting new investments, 
reselecting ongoing investments, integrating the investment funding and 
the investment selection processes, and developing and maintaining a 
complete business system investment portfolio(s). 

Regarding project-level investment management practices, DOD officials 
said that these are performed at the component level, and that 
departmental policies and procedures established for overseeing 
components’ execution of these practices are sufficient. For portfolio-
level practices, however, these officials stated that they intend to 
improve departmental policies and procedures for business system 
investments by, for example, establishing a single governance 
structure, but plans or time frames for doing so have not been 
established. Until DOD fully defines departmentwide policies and 
procedures for both individual projects and portfolios of projects, it 
risks selecting and controlling these business system investments in an 
inconsistent, incomplete, and ad hoc manner, which in turn reduces the 
chances that these investments will meet mission needs in the most cost-
effective manner. 

Table: Policies and Procedures for Project-level and Portfolio-Level 
Management: 

Stage 2: Building the investment foundation: Instituting the investment 
board; 
Key practices executed: 1/2; 
Stage 3: Developing a complete investment portfolio: Defining the 
portfolio criteria; 
Key practices executed: 1/2. 

Stage 2: Building the investment foundation: Meeting business needs; 
Key practices executed: 1/1; 
Stage 3: Developing a complete investment portfolio: Creating the 
portfolio; 
Key practices executed: 0/1. 

Stage 2: Building the investment foundation: Selecting an investment; 
Key practices executed: 0/3; 
Stage 3: Developing a complete investment portfolio: Evaluating the 
portfolio; 
Key practices executed: 0/1. 

Stage 2: Building the investment foundation: Providing investment 
oversight; 
Key practices executed: 0/1; 
Stage 3: Developing a complete investment portfolio: Conducting 
postimplementation reviews; 
Key practices executed: 0/1. 

Stage 2: Building the investment foundation: Capturing investment 
information; 
Key practices executed: 2/2; 
Stage 3: Developing a complete investment portfolio: [Empty]; 
Key practices executed: [Empty]. 

Stage 2: Building the investment foundation: Overall; 
Key practices executed: 4/9; 
Stage 3: Developing a complete investment portfolio: Overall; 
Key practices executed: 1/5. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD fully define the project and portfolio 
management policies and procedures discussed in GAO’s framework. DOD 
agreed with GAO’s overall conclusions and partially agreed with five of 
GAO’s recommendations. However, DOD disagreed with the remaining four 
recommendations, stating that the department is, among other things, 
already meeting the intent of these recommendations. GAO does not 
agree; its recommendations focus on fully defining policies and 
procedures that satisfy key practices in its framework. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-538]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Randolph C. Hite at (202) 
512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Has Established the Structures Needed to Effectively Manage 
Business System Investments, but Has Not Fully Defined Many of the 
Related Policies and Procedures: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: DOD Business Investment Management System Entities' Roles, 
Responsibilities, and Composition: 

Table 2: DOD's Investment Tiers: 

Table 3: Stage 2 Critical Processes--Building the Investment 
Foundation: 

Table 4: Summary of Policies and Procedures for Stage 2 Critical 
Processes--Building the Investment Foundation: 

Table 5: Stage 3 Critical Processes--Developing a Complete Investment 
Portfolio: 

Table 6: Summary of Policies and Procedures for Stage 3 Critical 
Processes--Developing a Complete Investment Portfolio: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Simplified DOD Organizational Structure: 

Figure 2: The Five ITIM Stages of Maturity with Critical Processes: 

Figure 3: Working Relationships among DOD Business Investment 
Management System Governance Entities: 

Figure 4: Simplified Process Flow of Certification Reviews and 
Approvals: 

Figure 5: Simplified Process Flow of Annual Reviews: 

Abbreviations: 

ASD(NII)/CIO: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information 
Integration)/Chief Information Officer: 

BEA: business enterprise architecture: 

BMA: business mission area: 

BTA: Business Transformation Agency: 

DAS: Defense Acquisition System: 

DBSAE: Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive: 

DBSMC: Defense Business Systems Management Committee: 

DITPR: DOD Information Technology Portfolio Repository: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

IRB: Investment Review Board: 

IT: information technology: 

ITIM: Information Technology Investment Management framework: 

JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System: 

MAIS: Major Automated Information System: 

MDAP: Major Defense Acquisition Programs: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

PCA: pre-certification authority: 

PPBE: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution: 

USD(AT&L): Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics): 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 11, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

For decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been challenged in 
modernizing its timeworn business systems.[Footnote 1] In 1995, we 
designated DOD's business systems modernization program as high risk, 
and we continue to designate it as such today.[Footnote 2] As our 
research on public and private sector organizations shows, one 
essential ingredient to a successful systems modernization program is 
having an effective institutional approach to managing information 
technology (IT) investments. 

In May 2001, we recommended that the department establish a corporate 
approach to investment control and decision making.[Footnote 3] Between 
2001 and 2005, we reported that the department's business systems 
modernization program was still not being effectively managed,[Footnote 
4] and we made additional investment-related recommendations. Congress 
subsequently included provisions in the Ronald W. Reagan National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005[Footnote 5] that 
reflected our recommendations, including those for establishing and 
implementing effective business system investment management structures 
and processes. 

Between 2005 and 2006,[Footnote 6] we reported that DOD had made 
important progress in establishing and implementing these structures 
and processes, but that much remained to be accomplished relative to 
the act's requirements. For example, we reported that the department's 
business system investment approach was not institutionalized at all 
levels of the department. 

To support GAO's legislative mandate to review DOD's annual report on 
its business systems modernization program, and as agreed with your 
offices, the objective of this review was to determine whether DOD's 
corporate investment management approach comports with relevant federal 
guidance. To accomplish our objective, we analyzed documents and 
interviewed agency officials to determine whether DOD has developed the 
structures, policies, and procedures associated with executing those 
key practices in our IT Investment Management (ITIM) framework that 
assist organizations in complying with the investment management 
provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.[Footnote 7] This framework 
provides a hierarchical maturity model for IT investment management and 
a method for evaluating and assessing the maturity of an agency's 
investment management. We performed our work at DOD headquarters in 
Arlington, Virginia, from August 2006 through April 2007 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Details on our 
objective, scope, and methodology are contained in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD has established the management structures needed to effectively 
manage its business system investments, but it has not fully defined 
many of the related policies and procedures that our framework defines. 
Specifically, DOD has fully defined four of nine key practices that 
call for project-level policies and procedures, and one of the five 
practices that call for portfolio-level policies and procedures. For 
example, regarding project-level investment, the department has (1) 
established an enterprisewide investment board and subordinate boards 
that are responsible for business system investment governance, (2) 
documented policies and procedures for ensuring that systems support 
ongoing and future business needs, (3) developed procedures for 
identifying and collecting information about these systems to support 
investment selection and control, and (4) assigned responsibility for 
ensuring that the information collected during project identification 
meets the needs of the investment management process. Regarding 
portfolio-based investment, DOD has assigned responsibility to the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
for managing business system portfolio selection criteria. 

However, DOD has not fully documented business system investment 
policies and procedures related to five key project-level management 
practices. For example, policies and procedures do not (1) define how 
the investment selection, acquisition, and funding processes are 
coordinated; (2) specify how the full range of cost, schedule, and 
benefit data accessible by the Investment Review Boards (IRB) are to be 
used in making selection (i.e., certification) decisions; (3) specify 
how reselection decisions at the corporate level (i.e., annual review 
decisions) consider investments that are in operations and maintenance; 
(4) describe how funding decisions are integrated with the process of 
selecting an investment at the corporate level; and (5) provide 
sufficient oversight and visibility into component-level investment 
management activities, including component reviews of systems in 
operations and maintenance. Furthermore, DOD does not have documented 
policies and procedures for (1) defining the portfolio criteria, (2) 
creating the portfolio, (3) evaluating the portfolio, and (4) 
conducting postimplementation reviews for all business systems. 

Regarding project-level investment management practices, DOD officials 
stated that these are performed at the component level, and that 
departmental policies and procedures established for overseeing 
execution of these practices by components are sufficient. Regarding 
portfolio-level practices, however, these officials stated that they 
intend to improve departmental policies and procedures for business 
system investments by, for example, establishing a single governance 
structure, but plans or time frames for doing so have not been 
established. According to our ITIM framework, adequately documenting 
both the policies and the associated procedures that govern how an 
organization manages its IT investment portfolio(s) is important 
because doing so provides the basis for having rigor, discipline, and 
repeatability in how investments are selected and controlled across the 
entire organization. Until DOD fully defines departmentwide policies 
and procedures for both individual projects and portfolios of projects, 
it risks selecting and controlling these business system investments in 
an inconsistent, incomplete, and ad hoc manner, which in turn reduces 
the chances that these investments will meet mission needs in the most 
cost-effective manner. 

To strengthen DOD's business system investment management capability, 
we are recommending that the department fully define the policies and 
procedures associated with project-level and portfolio-level investment 
management as discussed in our guidance for IT investment 
management.[Footnote 8] 

In written comments on a draft of this report, signed by the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation) and reprinted in 
appendix II, the department stated that it agreed with the report's 
overall conclusions, and it described efforts under way and planned 
that it said would address many of the gaps identified in the report. 
In this regard, the department partially concurred with five of the 
report's recommendations, adding that our recommendations and feedback 
are helpful in guiding DOD's business transformation and related 
improvement efforts. 

However, the department disagreed with the remaining four 
recommendations for two primary reasons. First, it stated that its 
existing investment management structure already satisfies the intent 
of these recommendations. For example, it stated that its policies 
already require the provision of cost, schedule, and funding data as 
part of investment certifications and annual reviews, and that a 
linkage currently exists among the investment selection, acquisition, 
and funding processes. We do not agree with this reasoning. Our 
recommendations are not intended to address whether existing policies 
or guidance provide for the use of cost, schedule, and funding data, or 
whether they state that investment selection, acquisition, and funding 
decision making are linked. Rather, our recommendations address the 
definitions of policy, guidance, and supporting procedures that fall 
short of satisfying the best practices embodied in our ITIM framework. 
In the case of the above examples, while we do not question whether 
investment data are provided to investment decision-making bodies, the 
department's policies and procedures do not include specific decision 
criteria that explain how these data are to be used to make consistent, 
repeatable selection and reselection decisions across all investments. 
Furthermore, while we do not question that existing guidance contains 
an illustration depicting a link between investment certification and 
review and other DOD decision support processes, including the funding 
process, neither this guidance nor supporting procedures define how 
this linkage is executed (i.e., how investment funding decisions are in 
fact integrated with investment selection decisions). 

Second, DOD stated that our recommendations contradict the department's 
"tiered accountability" approach to investment management, in which 
responsibility and accountability for business system investment 
management is allocated between the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(corporate level) and DOD components (subsidiary levels) on the basis 
of investment size and significance. We do not agree with the 
department's reasoning. We support DOD's tiered accountability concept 
because it is consistent with the hierarchical investment structures 
described in our ITIM framework. Under the department's current 
policies and guidance, however, most DOD investments are not subject to 
corporate visibility and oversight, either because they do not involve 
development/modernization (i.e., they are in operations and 
maintenance) or because they do not exceed a certain dollar threshold. 
Our framework recognizes that effective implementation of this concept 
should include appropriate corporate visibility into and oversight of 
investments, either through review and approval of those investments 
that meet certain criteria or through awareness of a subordinate 
board's investment management activities. Moreover, this visibility and 
oversight should extend to the entire portfolio of investments, 
including those that are in operations and maintenance. To ensure that 
this occurs, applicable policies and procedures need to explicitly 
cover all such investments and need to define how this is to be 
accomplished. 

Background: 

DOD is a massive and complex organization. To illustrate, the 
department reported that its fiscal year 2006 operations involved 
approximately $1.4 trillion in assets and $2.0 trillion in liabilities, 
more than 2.9 million military and civilian personnel, and $581 billion 
in net cost of operations. To date, for fiscal year 2007, the 
department received appropriations of about $501 billion. 
Organizationally, the department includes the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
military departments, numerous defense agencies and field activities, 
and various unified combatant commands that are responsible for either 
specific geographic regions or specific functions. (See fig. 1 for a 
simplified depiction of DOD's organizational structure.) 

Figure 1: Simplified DOD Organizational Structure 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO based on DOD documentation. 

[A] The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman 
for the commanders of the combatant commands, especially on the 
administrative requirements of their commands. 

[End of figure] 

In support of its military operations, the department performs an 
assortment of interrelated and interdependent business functions, 
including logistics management, procurement, health care management, 
and financial management. As we have previously reported,[Footnote 9] 
the systems environment that supports these business functions is 
overly complex and error-prone, and is characterized by (1) little 
standardization across the department, (2) multiple systems performing 
the same tasks, (3) the same data stored in multiple systems, and (4) 
the need for data to be entered manually into multiple systems. 
Moreover, according to DOD, this systems environment is comprised of 
approximately 3,100 separate business systems. For fiscal year 2007, 
Congress appropriated approximately $15.7 billion to DOD, and for 
fiscal year 2008, DOD has requested about $15.9 billion in appropriated 
funds to operate, maintain, and modernize these business systems and 
the associated infrastructures. 

As we have previously reported,[Footnote 10] the department's 
nonintegrated and duplicative systems impair DOD's ability to combat 
fraud, waste, and abuse. In fact, DOD currently bears responsibility, 
in whole or in part, for 15 of our 27 high-risk areas.[Footnote 11] 
Eight of these areas are specific to DOD,[Footnote 12] and the 
department shares responsibility for 7 other governmentwide high-risk 
areas.[Footnote 13] DOD's business systems modernization is one of the 
high-risk areas, and it is an essential enabler to addressing many of 
the department's other high-risk areas. For example, modernized 
business systems are integral to the department's efforts to address 
its financial, supply chain, and information security management high- 
risk areas. 

IT Investment Management Is Critical to Achieving Successful Systems 
Modernization: 

A corporate approach to IT investment management is characteristic of 
successful public and private organizations. Recognizing this, Congress 
enacted the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996,[Footnote 14] which requires the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish processes to 
analyze, track, and evaluate the risks and results of major capital 
investments in IT systems made by executive agencies.[Footnote 15] In 
response to the Clinger-Cohen Act and other statutes, OMB has developed 
policy and issued guidance for the planning, budgeting, acquisition, 
and management of federal capital assets.[Footnote 16] We have also 
issued guidance in this area,[Footnote 17] which defines institutional 
structures, such as the IRBs; processes for developing information on 
investments (such as costs and benefits); and practices to inform 
management decisions (such as whether a given investment is aligned 
with an enterprise architecture). 

IT Investment Management: A Brief Description: 

IT investment management is a process for linking IT investment 
decisions to an organization's strategic objectives and business plans. 
Consistent with this, the federal approach to IT investment management 
focuses on selecting, controlling, and evaluating investments in a 
manner that minimize risks while maximizing the return of 
investment.[Footnote 18] 

* During the selection phase, the organization (1) identifies and 
analyzes each project's risks and returns before committing significant 
funds to any project and (2) selects those IT projects that will best 
support its mission needs. 

* During the control phase, the organization ensures that projects, as 
they develop and investment expenditures continue, meet mission needs 
at the expected levels of cost and risk. If the project is not meeting 
expectations or if problems arise, steps are quickly taken to address 
the deficiencies. 

* During the evaluation phase, expected results are compared with 
actual results after a project has been fully implemented. This 
comparison is done to (1) assess the project's impact on mission 
performance, (2) identify any changes or modifications to the project 
that may be needed, and (3) revise the investment management process 
based on lessons learned. 

Overview of GAO's ITIM Maturity Framework: 

Our ITIM framework consists of five progressive stages of maturity for 
any given agency relative to selecting, controlling, and evaluating its 
investment management capabilities.[Footnote 19] (See fig. 2 for the 
five ITIM stages of maturity.) This framework is grounded in our 
research of IT investment management practices of leading private and 
public sector organizations. The maturity stages are cumulative; that 
is, to attain a higher stage, an agency must institutionalize all of 
the critical processes at the lower stages, in addition to the higher 
stage critical processes. 

The framework can be used to assess the maturity of an agency's 
investment management processes and as a tool for organizational 
improvement. The overriding purpose of the framework is to encourage 
investment selection and control and to evaluate processes that promote 
business value and mission performance, reduce risk, and increase 
accountability and transparency. We have used the framework in several 
of our evaluations,[Footnote 20] and a number of agencies have adopted 
it. 

With the exception of the first stage, each maturity stage is composed 
of "critical processes" that must be implemented and institutionalized 
for the organization to achieve that stage. Each ITIM critical process 
consists of "key practices"--to include organizational structures, 
policies, and procedures--that must be executed to implement the 
critical process. It is not unusual for an organization to perform key 
practices from more than one maturity stage at the same time. However, 
our research shows that agency efforts to improve investment management 
capabilities should focus on implementing all lower-stage practices 
before addressing higher-stage practices. 

In the ITIM framework, Stage 2 critical processes lay the foundation by 
establishing successful, predictable, and repeatable investment control 
processes at the project level. At this stage, the emphasis is on 
establishing basic capabilities for selecting new IT projects; 
controlling projects so that they finish predictably within the 
established cost, schedule, and performance expectations; and 
identifying and mitigating exposure to risk. 

Stage 3 is where the agency moves from project-centric processes to 
portfolio-based processes and evaluates potential investments according 
to how well they support the agency's missions, strategies, and goals. 
This stage focuses on continually assessing both proposed and ongoing 
projects as part of complete investment portfolios-- integrated and 
competing sets of investment options. It also focuses on maintaining 
mature, integrated selection (and reselection); control; and 
postimplementation evaluation processes. This portfolio perspective 
allows decision makers to consider the interaction among investments 
and the contributions to organizational mission goals and strategies 
that could be made by alternative portfolio selections, rather than to 
focus exclusively on the balance between the costs and benefits of 
individual investments. Organizations implementing Stages 2 and 3 
practices have in place capabilities that assist in establishing 
selection, control, and evaluation structures, policies, procedures, 
and practices that are required by the investment management provisions 
of the Clinger-Cohen Act.[Footnote 21] 

Stages 4 and 5 require the use of evaluation techniques to continuously 
improve both investment processes and portfolios to better achieve 
strategic outcomes. At Stage 4, an organization has the capacity to 
conduct IT succession activities and, therefore, can plan and implement 
the deselection of obsolete, high-risk, or low-value IT investments. An 
organization with Stage 5 maturity conducts proactive monitoring for 
breakthrough technologies that will enable it to change and improve its 
business performance. 

Figure 2: The Five ITIM Stages of Maturity with Critical Processes: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Overview of DOD's Corporate Approach for Identifying, Funding, and 
Acquiring All System Investments: 

DOD's major system investments (i.e., weapon and business systems) are 
governed by three management systems--the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS); the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system; and the Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS). 

* JCIDS is a need-driven, capabilities-based approach to identify 
warfighting needs and meet future joint forces challenges. It is 
intended to identify future capabilities for DOD; address capability 
gaps and mission needs recognized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or 
derived from strategic guidance, such as the National Security Strategy 
Report[Footnote 22] or Quadrennial Defense Review;[Footnote 23] and 
identify alternative solutions by considering a range of doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, 
and facilities solutions. According to DOD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, has primary 
responsibility for defining and implementing JCIDS. 

* PPBE is a calendar-driven approach that is composed of four phases 
that occur over a moving 2-year cycle. The four phases--planning, 
programming, budgeting, and executing--define how budgets for each DOD 
component and the department as a whole are created, vetted, and 
executed. As recently reported,[Footnote 24] the components start 
programming and budgeting for addressing a JCIDS-identified capability 
gap or mission need several years before actual product development 
under DAS begins, and before OSD formally reviews the components' 
programming and budgeting proposals (i.e., Program Objective 
Memorandums). Once reviewed and approved, the financial details in the 
Program Objective Memorandums become part of the President's budget 
request to Congress. During budget execution, components may submit 
program change proposals or budget change proposals, or both (e.g., 
program cost increases or schedule delays). According to DOD, the OSD 
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Director for Program Analysis 
and Evaluation,[Footnote 25] and the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) have primary responsibility for defining and implementing 
the PPBE system. 

* DAS is described in the DOD Directive 5000.1 and the DOD Instruction 
5000.2[Footnote 26] and establishes the procedures for the Defense 
Acquisition Management Framework, which consists of three event-based 
milestones associated with five key program life-cycle phases. These 
five phases are as follows: 

1. Concept Refinement: Intended to refine the initial JCIDS-validated 
system solution (concept) and create a strategy for acquiring the 
investment solution. A decision is made at the end of this phase 
(milestone A decision) regarding whether to move to the next phase 
(Technology Development). 

2. Technology Development: Intended to determine the appropriate set of 
technologies to be integrated into the investment solution by 
iteratively assessing the viability of various technologies while 
simultaneously refining user requirements. Once the technology has been 
demonstrated in a relevant environment, a decision is made at the end 
of this phase (milestone B decision) regarding whether to move to the 
next phase (System Development and Demonstration). 

3. System Development and Demonstration: Intended to develop a system 
or a system increment and demonstrate through developer testing that 
the system/system increment can function in its target environment. A 
decision is made at the end of this phase (milestone C decision) 
regarding whether to move to the next phase (Production and 
Deployment). 

4. Production and Deployment: Intended to achieve an operational 
capability that satisfies the mission needs, as verified through 
independent operational test and evaluation, and ensures that the 
system is implemented at all applicable locations. 

5. Operations and Support: Intended to operationally sustain the system 
in the most cost-effective manner over its life cycle. 

A key principle of DAS is that investments are assigned a category, 
where programs of increasing dollar value and management interest are 
subject to more stringent oversight. For example, Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAP)[Footnote 27] and Major Automated 
Information Systems (MAIS)[Footnote 28] are large, expensive programs 
subject to the most extensive statutory and regulatory reporting 
requirements and, unless delegated, are reviewed by acquisition boards 
at the DOD corporate level. Smaller and less risky acquisitions are 
generally reviewed at the component executive or lower levels. Another 
key principle is that DAS requires acquisition management under the 
direction of a milestone decision authority.[Footnote 29] The milestone 
decision authority--with support from the program manager and advisory 
boards, such as the Defense Acquisition Board[Footnote 30] and the IT 
Acquisition Board[Footnote 31]--determines the project's baseline cost, 
schedule, and performance commitments. The Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) has primary 
responsibility for defining and implementing DAS. 

DOD Business System Investments Are Subject to a Fourth Management 
System: 

DOD's business system investments are also governed by a fourth 
management system that addresses how these investments are reviewed, 
certified, and approved for compliance with the business enterprise 
priorities and activities outlined by the business enterprise 
architecture (BEA). For the purposes of this report, we refer to this 
fourth management system as the Business Investment Management System. 
This fourth management system is described in the following text in 
terms of governance entities, tiered accountability, and business 
system investment certification reviews and approvals. According to 
DOD, these four management systems are the means by which DOD selects, 
controls, and evaluates its business system investments. 

Business System Investment Roles and Responsibilities: 

In 2005, the department reassigned responsibility for providing 
executive leadership for the direction, oversight, and execution of its 
business systems modernization efforts to several entities. These 
entities and their responsibilities include the following: 

* The Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) serves as 
the highest-ranking governance body for business systems modernization 
activities. 

* The Principal Staff Assistants serve as the certification authorities 
for business system modernizations in their respective core business 
missions. 

* The IRBs are chartered by the Principal Staff Assistants and are the 
review and decision-making bodies for business system investments in 
their respective areas of responsibility.[Footnote 32] 

* The component pre-certification authority (PCA) is accountable for 
the component's business system investments and acts as the component's 
principal point of contact for communication with the IRBs. 

* The Business Transformation Agency (BTA) is responsible for leading 
and coordinating business transformation efforts across the department. 
The BTA is organized into seven directorates, one of which is the 
Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive (DBSAE)--the component 
acquisition executive for DOD enterprise-level (DOD-wide) business 
systems and initiatives. This directorate is responsible for 
developing, coordinating, and integrating enterprise-level projects, 
programs, systems, and initiatives--including managing resources such 
as fiscal, personnel, and contracts for assigned systems and programs. 

Table 1 lists these entities and provides greater detail on their 
roles, responsibilities, and composition. Figure 3 provides a 
simplified illustration of the relationships among these entities. 

Table 1: DOD Business Investment Management System Entities' Roles, 
Responsibilities, and Composition: 

Entity: DBSMC; 
Roles and responsibilities: 
* Serves as approving authority for business system certifications; 
* Establishes policies and approves the business mission area (BMA)[A] 
strategic plan, the transition plan for implementation for business 
systems modernization, the transformation program baseline, and the 
BEA; 
Composition: Chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense; vice chair is 
the USD(AT&L). Includes senior leadership in OSD; the military 
departments' secretaries; and defense agencies' heads, such as the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information 
Integration)/Chief Information Officer (ASD(NII)/CIO), the Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of the U.S. 
Transportation Command and the Joint Forces Command. 

Entity: Principal Staff Assistants/; Certification Authorities; 
Roles and responsibilities: 
* Support the DBSMC's management of enterprise business IT investments; 
* Serve as the certification authorities accountable for the obligation 
of funds for respective business systems modernization within 
designated core business missions.[B]; 
* Provide the DBSMC with recommendations for system investment 
approval; 
Composition: Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics; Comptroller; and Personnel and Readiness. 

Entity: IRBs; 
Roles and responsibilities: 
* Serve as the oversight and investment decision-making bodies for 
those business capabilities that support activities under their 
designated areas of responsibility; 
* Recommend certification for all business system investments costing 
more than $1 million that are integrated and compliant with the BEA; 
Composition: Includes the Principal Staff Assistants, Joint Staff, 
ASD(NII)/CIO, core business mission area representatives, military 
departments, defense agencies, and combatant commands. 

Entity: Component PCA; 
Roles and responsibilities: 
* Ensures that component-level investment review processes integrate 
with the investment management system; 
* Identifies those component systems that require IRB certification and 
prepares, reviews, approves, validates, and transfers investment 
documentation as required; 
* Assesses and precertifies architecture compliance of component 
systems submitted for certification and annual review; 
* Acts as the component's principal point of contact for communication 
with the IRBs; 
Composition: Includes the Chief Information Officer from the Air Force; 
the Principal Director of Governance, Acquisition, and Chief Knowledge 
Office from the Army; the Chief Information Officer from the Navy; and 
comparable representatives from other defense agencies. 

Entity: BTA; 
Roles and responsibilities: 
* Serves as the day-to-day management entity of the business 
transformation effort at the DOD enterprise level; 
* Provides support to the DBSMC and the IRBs; 
* Operates under the authority of the USD(AT&L) under the direction of 
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation and 
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Financial Management; 
Composition: Comprised of seven directorates (DBSAE, Enterprise 
Integration, Transformation Planning and Performance, Transformation 
Priorities and Requirements, Investment Management, Warfighter Support 
Office, and Chief of Staff). 

Source: GAO based on DOD documentation. 

[A] According to DOD, the BMA is responsible for ensuring that 
capabilities, resources, and materiel are reliably delivered to the 
warfighter. Specifically, the BMA addresses areas such as real property 
and human resources management. 

[B] DOD has five core business missions: Human Resources Management, 
Weapon System Lifecycle Management, Materiel Supply and Services 
Management, Real Property and Installations Lifecycle Management, and 
Financial Management. 

[End of table] 

Figure 3: Working Relationships Among DOD Business Investment 
Management System Governance Entities: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO based on DOD documentation. 

[End of figure] 

Tiered Accountability: 

According to DOD, in 2005 it adopted a tiered accountability approach 
to business transformation. Under this approach, responsibility and 
accountability for business investment management is allocated between 
the DOD corporate (i.e., OSD) and the components on the basis of the 
amount of development/modernization funding involved and the 
investment's "tier." DOD corporate is responsible for ensuring that all 
business systems with a development/modernization investment in excess 
of $1 million are reviewed by the IRBs for compliance with the BEA, 
certified by the Principal Staff Assistants, and approved by the DBSMC. 
Components are responsible for certifying development/modernization 
investments with total costs of $1 million or less. All DOD development 
and modernization efforts are also assigned a tier on the basis of the 
acquisition category or the size of the financial investment, or both. 
According to DOD, a system is given a tier designation when it passes 
through the certification process. Table 2 describes the four 
investment tiers and identifies the associated reviewing and approving 
entities. 

Table 2: DOD's Investment Tiers: 

Tier 1; 
Tier description: MAIS and MDAPs; 
Reviewing/Approving entities: IRB and DBSMC. 

Tier 2; 
Tier description: Exceeding $10 million in total development/ 
modernization costs, but not designated MAIS or MDAPs; 
Reviewing/ Approving entities: IRB and DBSMC. 

Tier 3; 
Tier description: Exceeding $1 million and up to $10 million in total 
development/modernization costs; 
Reviewing/Approving entities: IRB and DBSMC. 

Tier 4; 
Tier description: Investment funding required up to $1 million; 
Reviewing/Approving entities: Component-level review only (unless the 
system or line of business it supports is designated as special 
interest by the Certification Authority). 

Source: DOD. 

[End of table] 

Business Investment Certification Reviews and Approvals: 

DOD's business investment management system includes two types of 
reviews for business systems: certification and annual reviews. 
Certification reviews apply to new modernization projects with total 
cost over $1 million. This review focuses on program alignment with the 
BEA and must be completed before components obligate funds for 
programs. The annual review applies to all business programs. The focus 
for the annual review is to determine whether the system development 
effort is meeting its milestones and addressing its IRB certification 
conditions. 

Certification reviews and approvals: Tiers 1 through 3 business system 
investments are certified at two levels--component-level 
precertification and corporate-level certification and approval. At the 
component level, program managers prepare, enter, maintain, and update 
information about their investments in the DOD IT Portfolio Repository 
(DITPR),[Footnote 33] such as regulatory compliance reporting, an 
architectural profile, and requirements for investment certification 
and annual reviews. The component PCA validates that the system 
information is complete and accessible on the IRB Portal, reviews 
system compliance with the BEA and enterprise transition plan, and 
verifies the economic viability analysis. The PCA asserts the status 
and validity of the investment information by submitting a component 
precertification letter to the appropriate IRB for its review. 

At the corporate level, the IRB reviews the system information and 
precertification letter submitted by the PCA to determine whether to 
recommend investment certification. On completion of its review, a 
certification memorandum is prepared and signed by the designated 
certification authority[Footnote 34] that documents the IRB's system 
certification decisions and any related conditions. The memorandum is 
then forwarded to the DBSMC, which either approves or disapproves the 
IRB's decisions and issues a memorandum containing its decisions. If 
the DBSMC disapproves a system investment, it is up to the component 
PCA to decide whether to resubmit the investment after it has resolved 
the relevant issues. Figure 4 provides a simplified overview of the 
process flow of certification reviews and approvals. 

Figure 4: Simplified Process Flow of Certification Reviews and 
Approvals: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO based on DOD documentation. 

[End of figure] 

Annual reviews: Tiers 1 through 4 business system investments are 
annually reviewed at two levels--the component level and the corporate 
level. At the component level, program managers review and update 
information on all tiers of investments, both in modernization and 
operations and maintenance, on an annual basis in DITPR. The updates 
for Tiers 1 through 3 with system development/modernization include 
cost, milestone, and risk variances and actions or issues related to 
certification conditions. The PCA then verifies and submits the 
information for Tiers 1 through 3 systems in development/modernization 
for IRB review in an annual review assertion letter. The letter 
addresses system compliance with the BEA and the enterprise transition 
plan, and includes investment cost, schedule, and performance 
information.[Footnote 35] 

At the corporate level, the IRBs annually review certified Tiers 1 
through 3 investments in development/modernization. These reviews focus 
on program compliance with the BEA, program performance against cost 
and milestone baselines, and progress in meeting certification 
conditions. The IRBs can revoke an investment's certification when the 
system has significantly failed to achieve performance commitments 
(i.e., capabilities and costs). When this occurs, the component must 
address the IRB's concerns and resubmit the investment for 
certification. Figure 5 shows a simplified overview of the process flow 
of annual reviews. 

Figure 5: Simplified Process Flow of Annual Reviews: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO based on DOD documentation. 

[End of figure] 

DOD Has Established the Structures Needed to Effectively Manage 
Business System Investments, but Has Not Fully Defined Many of the 
Related Policies and Procedures: 

According to our ITIM framework, organizations should establish the 
management structures needed to manage their investments and build an 
investment foundation by having defined policies and procedures for 
selecting and controlling individual projects (Stage 2 capabilities), 
and organizations also should manage projects as a portfolio of 
investments according to defined policies and procedures, treating them 
as an integrated package of competing investment options and pursuing 
those that best meet the strategic goals, objectives, and mission of 
the agency (Stage 3 capabilities). These Stages 2 and 3 capabilities 
assist agencies in complying with the investment management provisions 
of the Clinger-Cohen Act. 

The department has defined four of nine practices that call for project-
level policies and procedures (see table 4) and one of the five 
practices that call for portfolio-level policies and procedures (see 
table 6). Specifically, it has established the management structures 
contained in our ITIM framework, but it has not fully defined many of 
the related policies and procedures. 

With respect to project-level investment management practices, DOD 
officials stated that these are performed at the component level, and 
that departmental policies and procedures established for overseeing 
components' execution of these practices are sufficient. With respect 
to portfolio-level practices, however, these officials stated that they 
intend to improve departmental policies and procedures for business 
system investments by, for example, establishing a single governance 
structure, but plans or time frames for doing so have not been 
established. According to our ITIM framework, adequately documenting 
both the policies and the associated procedures that govern how an 
organization manages its IT investment portfolio(s) is important 
because doing so provides the basis for having rigor, discipline, and 
repeatability in how investments are selected and controlled across the 
entire organization. Until DOD fully defines departmentwide policies 
and procedures for both individual projects and the portfolios of 
projects, it risks selecting and controlling these business system 
investments in an inconsistent, incomplete, and ad hoc manner, which in 
turn reduces the chances that these investments will meet mission needs 
in the most cost-effective manner. 

DOD Has Begun to Build a Foundation for Project-Level Investment 
Management, but Key Policies and Procedures Are Not Fully Defined: 

At ITIM Stage 2, an organization has attained repeatable and successful 
IT project-level investment control and basic selection processes. 
Through these processes, the organization can identify project 
expectation gaps early and take the appropriate steps to address them. 
ITIM Stage 2 critical processes include (1) defining investment board 
operations, (2) identifying the business needs for each investment, (3) 
developing a basic process for selecting new proposals and reselecting 
ongoing investments, (4) developing project-level investment control 
processes, and (5) collecting information about existing investments to 
inform investment management decisions. Table 3 describes the purpose 
of each of these Stage 2 critical processes. 

Table 3: Stage 2 Critical Processes--Building the Investment 
Foundation: 

Critical process: Instituting the investment board; 
Purpose: To define and establish an appropriate investment management 
structure and the processes for selecting, controlling, and evaluating 
investments. 

Critical process: Meeting business needs; 
Purpose: To ensure that investments support the organization's business 
needs and meet users' needs. 

Critical process: Selecting an investment; 
Purpose: To ensure that a well-defined and disciplined process is used 
to select new proposals and reselect ongoing investments. 

Critical process: Providing investment oversight; 
Purpose: To review the progress of investments, using predefined 
criteria and checkpoints, in meeting cost, schedule, risk, and benefit 
expectations and to take corrective action when these expectations are 
not being met. 

Critical process: Capturing investment information; 
Purpose: To make available to decision makers information to evaluate 
the impacts and opportunities created by proposed (or continuing) 
investments. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Within these five critical processes are nine key practices that call 
for policies and procedures associated with effective project-level 
management. DOD has fully defined the policies and procedures needed to 
ensure that four of these nine practices are performed in a consistent 
and repeatable manner. Specifically, DOD has established the management 
structures by instituting an enterprisewide investment board--the 
DBSMC--composed of senior executives, including the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, with final approval authority over associated subsidiary 
investment boards. These lower-level investment boards include 
representatives from combatant commands, components, and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. In addition, DOD's business transformation and IRB 
guidance define a process for ensuring that programs support the 
department's ongoing and future business needs. DOD also has policies 
and procedures for submitting, updating, and maintaining investment 
information in DITPR and the IRB Portal. Furthermore, the department 
has assigned the component's PCA the responsibility to ensure that 
specific investment information contained in the portfolio repository 
and the IRB Portal is accurate and complete. 

However, the policies and procedures associated with the remaining five 
project-level management practices are missing critical elements needed 
to effectively carry out essential investment management activities. 
For example: 

* Policies and procedures for instituting the investment board do not 
address how investments that are past the development/modernization 
stage (i.e., in operations and maintenance) are to be governed. Given 
that DOD invests billions of dollars annually in operating and 
maintaining business systems, this is significant. While DOD officials 
stated that component-level policies and procedures address systems 
outside of development/modernization, our ITIM framework emphasizes 
that the corporate investment boards should continue to review 
important information about an investment, such as cost and performance 
baselines, throughout the investment's life cycle. In addition, the IRB 
Concept of Operations and other IRB documentation do not explicitly 
outline how the business investment management system is coordinated 
with JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS. Without clearly defined visibility into all 
investments with an understanding of decisions reached through other 
management systems, inconsistent decisions may result. 

* Procedures do not specify how the full range of cost, schedule, and 
benefit data is used by the IRBs in making selection (i.e., 
certification) decisions. According to BTA officials, each IRB decides 
how to ensure compliance and determines additional factors to consider 
when making certification decisions. However, DOD did not provide us 
with any supplemental policies or procedures for any of the four IRBs. 
Without documenting how IRBs consider factors such as cost, schedule, 
and benefits when making selection decisions, the department cannot 
ensure that the IRBs and the DBSMC consistently and objectively select 
proposals that best meet the department's needs and priorities. 
Furthermore, while the procedures specify decision criteria that 
address statutory requirements for alignment to the BEA, the criteria 
allow programs to postpone demonstrating full compliance with several 
BEA artifacts until the final phases of the acquisition process. As a 
result, programs risk beginning production and deployment before 
ensuring that a business system is fully aligned to the BEA. 

* Policies and procedures do not specify how reselection decisions at 
the corporate level (i.e., annual review decisions) consider 
investments that are in operations and maintenance. Without an 
understanding of how the IRBs are to consider these investments when 
making reselection decisions, their ability to make informed and 
consistent reselection and termination decisions is limited. 

* Policies and procedures do not specify how funding decisions are 
integrated with the process of selecting an investment at the corporate 
level. Without considering component and corporate budget constraints 
and opportunities, the IRBs risk making investment decisions that do 
not effectively consider the relative merits of various projects and 
systems when funding limitations exist. 

* Policies and procedures do not exist that provide for sufficient 
oversight and visibility into component-level investment management 
activities, including component reviews of systems in operations and 
maintenance and Tier 4 investments. According to DOD officials, 
investment oversight is implemented through tiered accountability, 
which, among other things, allocates responsibility and accountability 
for business system investments with total costs of $1 million or less 
and those in operations and maintenance to the components. However, the 
department did not provide policies and procedures defining how the 
DBSMC and the IRBs ensure visibility into these component processes. 
This is particularly important because, according to DOD's March 15, 
2007, annual report to Congress, only 285 of approximately 3,100 total 
business systems have completed the IRB certification process and have 
been approved by the DBSMC. DOD officials also stated that the 
remaining business systems have not been through the certification 
process and have not been given a tier designation. Without policies 
and procedures defining how the DBSMC and the IRBs have visibility into 
and oversight of all business system investments, DOD risks components 
continuing to invest in systems that are duplicative, stovepiped, 
nonintegrated, and unnecessarily costly to manage, maintain, and 
operate. 

Table 4 summarizes our findings relative to DOD's execution of the nine 
practices that call for the policies and procedures needed to manage IT 
investments at the project level. 

Table 4: Summary of Policies and Procedures for Stage 2 Critical 
Processes--Building the Investment Foundation: 

Critical process: Instituting the investment board; 
Key practice: 1. An enterprisewide IT investment board composed of 
senior executives from IT and business units is responsible for 
defining and implementing the organization's IT investment governance 
process; 
Rating: Executed; 
Summary of evidence: DOD has instituted an enterprisewide business 
system investment board--the DBSMC--composed of senior executives, 
including the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the ASD(NII)/CIO. This 
board is responsible for establishing and implementing policies 
governing the organization's investment process and approving lower- 
level investment board processes and procedures. 

Key practice: 2. The organization has a documented IT investment 
process directing each investment board's operations; 
Rating: Not executed; 
Summary of evidence: DOD's IRB Concept of Operations directs its IRBs 
and includes the roles and responsibilities of the boards and 
individuals involved. However, the concept of operations does not 
assign the boards accountability for programs throughout the investment 
life cycle (i.e., investments that are past the development/ 
modernization stage and in operations and maintenance). In addition, 
according to our ITIM guidance, the department's investment process 
should specify the manner in which investment-related processes will be 
coordinated with other organizational plans, processes, and documents. 
However, DOD's concept of operations does not specify how the business 
investment management system is coordinated with JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS. 

Critical process: Meeting business needs; 
Key practice: 1. The organization has documented policies and 
procedures for identifying IT projects or systems that support the 
organization's ongoing and future business needs; 
Rating: Executed; 
Summary of evidence: DOD's Business Transformation Guidance and the 
Investment Certification and Annual Review Process User Guidance define 
a process for ensuring that IT business system investments support the 
department's ongoing and future business needs. 

Critical process: Selecting an investment; 
Key practice: 1. The organization has documented policies and 
procedures for selecting a new investment; 
Rating: Not executed; 
Summary of evidence: DOD has a two- stage selection process. The first 
stage involves selection of systems using the JCIDS, DAS, and PPBE 
management systems. At this level, proposals and alternatives are 
viewed and prioritized for system selection. The second stage of 
selection involves (1) certifying and approving Tiers 1 through 3 
investments and (2) elevating certain component investments to an 
enterprisewide status using the business investment management system; 
While DOD's IRB Concept of Operations and its Investment Certification 
and Annual Review Process User Guidance define the department's 
corporate approach for certifying and approving investments, they do 
not contain a structured method defining how certification decisions 
are reached. For example, the guidance does not specify how cost, 
schedule, and benefit data are to be used in making certification 
decisions. According to our ITIM guidance, a structured selection 
method should provide investment boards, business units, and IT 
developers with a common understanding of the selection process, 
including the cost, schedule, and benefit data used to compare and 
select projects. In addition, neither the IRB Concept of Operations nor 
the Investment Certification and Annual Review Process User Guidance 
define the selection criteria used to elevate these investments to an 
enterprisewide status; Furthermore, the BEA Compliance Guidance allows 
programs to postpone demonstrating full compliance with several BEA 
artifacts until the final phases of the acquisition process. In 
addition, criteria for certifying compliance with the BEA are 
inconsistently described in DOD documentation. For example, the BEA 
Compliance Guidance provides different checkpoints for assessing 
compliance during the life cycle of a program than the Business 
Transformation Guidance. 

Key practice: 2. The organization has documented policies and 
procedures for reselecting ongoing investments; 
Rating: Not executed; 
Summary of evidence: DOD's IRB Concept of Operations and the Investment 
Certification and Annual Review Process User Guidance define the 
department's corporate approach for annually reviewing investments. 
However, these documents do not include specific criteria that describe 
how the IRBs make reselection decisions. For example, while DOD 
officials stated that a program's risk areas (i.e., cost, schedule, and 
performance) are identified and discussed by the IRB during the annual 
reviews, the guidance does not specify how this information is used in 
making annual review decisions. In addition, the guidance does not 
provide for the reselection of investments that are in operations and 
maintenance. Our ITIM guidance states that consistent qualitative and 
quantitative measures are needed for analyzing a project for 
reselection or, if necessary, termination. According to ITIM, the 
results of this analysis can help the investment board determine the 
potential risk and return of continuing to fund an ongoing project and 
to prioritize projects on the basis of decision criteria. 

Key practice: 3. The organization has documented policies and 
procedures for integrating investment funding with investment 
selection; 
Rating: Not executed; 
Summary of evidence: According to DOD officials and the Investment 
Certification and Annual Review Process User Guidance, the IRBs are 
aware of the amount of funding components have requested for a program. 
However, this guidance does not specify how funding decisions are 
integrated with the process of selecting an investment, and does not 
specify how the DBSMC and the IRBs use this information in carrying out 
decisions on system certification and approvals. 

Critical process: Providing investment oversight; 
Key practice: 1. The organization has documented policies and 
procedures for management oversight of IT projects and systems; 
Rating: Not executed; 
Summary of evidence: DOD's IRB Concept of Operations and the Investment 
Certification and Annual Review Process User Guidance do not provide 
sufficient oversight and visibility into component-level investment 
management activities, including component reviews of systems in 
operations and maintenance and Tier 4 investments. For example, while 
the components submit a list of systems reviewed at their levels, the 
list lacks important project information, including adherence to cost, 
schedule, and risk criteria. According to ITIM, to maintain adequate 
oversight, the investment board should have visibility into each 
project's performance and progress toward predefined cost and schedule 
expectations as well as each project's anticipated benefits and risk 
exposure. In addition, IRB policies and procedures do not define how 
the department's management systems, JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS, are related. 

Critical process: Capturing investment information; 
Key practice: 1. The organization has documented policies and 
procedures for identifying and collecting information about IT projects 
and systems to support the investment management process; 
Rating: Executed; 
Summary of evidence: DOD's Investment Certification and Annual Review 
Process User Guidance describes the procedures for submitting, 
updating, and maintaining information in DITPR and the IRB Portal, both 
of which support the business investment management system. 

Key practice: 2. An official is assigned responsibility for ensuring 
that the information collected during project and systems 
identification meets the needs of the investment management process; 
Rating: Executed; 
Summary of evidence: DOD's Investment Certification and Annual Review 
Process User Guidance assigns the component PCA the responsibility to 
ensure investment information contained in DITPR and the IRB Portal is 
accurate and complete. The guidance also assigns IRB staff 
responsibility for verifying these data. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

According to BTA officials, the IRB Concept of Operations and the 
Investment Certification and Annual Review Process User Guidance are 
not intended to describe the detailed approach that each IRB will use 
when making certification decisions, adding that the components are 
responsible for selection, annual review, budgeting, and acquisition. 
While the ITIM framework does allow for multiple entities to carry out 
investment selection, control, and evaluation, building a sound 
investment foundation requires that the enterprisewide investment 
review board has documented criteria and decision-making procedures, 
clear integration among investment decision-support systems, and 
policies to ensure board access to system information throughout the 
life cycle for all investments. Until DOD's documented IT investment 
management policies and procedures include fully defined policies and 
procedures for Stage 2 activities, specify the linkages between the 
various related processes, and describe how investments are to be 
governed in the operations and maintenance phase, DOD risks that 
investment management activities will not be carried out consistently 
and in a disciplined manner. Moreover, DOD also risks selecting 
investments that will not cost-effectively meet its mission needs. 

DOD Has Assigned Responsibility, but Has Not Defined the Policies and 
Procedures Associated with Effective Portfolio-Level Management: 

At Stage 3, an organization has defined critical processes for managing 
its investments as a portfolio or set of portfolios.[Footnote 36] 
Portfolio management is a conscious, continuous, and proactive approach 
to allocating limited resources among competing initiatives in light of 
the investments' relative benefits. Taking an agencywide perspective 
enables an organization to consider its investments comprehensively, so 
that collectively the investments optimally address the organization's 
missions, strategic goals, and objectives. Managing IT investments as 
portfolios also allows an organization to determine its priorities and 
make decisions about which projects to fund on the basis of analyses of 
the relative organizational value and risks of all projects, including 
projects that are proposed, under development, and in operation. 
Although investments may initially be organized into subordinate 
portfolios--on the basis of, for example, business lines or life-cycle 
stages--and managed by subordinate investment boards, they should 
ultimately be aggregated into enterprise-level portfolios. 

According to ITIM, Stage 3 involves (1) defining the portfolio 
criteria; (2) creating the portfolio; (3) evaluating (i.e., overseeing) 
the portfolio; and (4) conducting postimplementation reviews. Table 5 
summarizes the purpose of each of these activities. 

Table 5: Stage 3 Critical Processes--Developing a Complete Investment 
Portfolio: 

Critical process: Defining the portfolio criteria; 
Purpose: To ensure that the organization develops and maintains 
portfolio selection criteria that support its mission, organizational 
strategies, and business priorities. 

Critical process: Creating the portfolio; 
Purpose: To ensure that investments are analyzed according to the 
organization's portfolio selection criteria, and to ensure that an 
optimal investment portfolio with manageable risks and returns is 
selected and funded. 

Critical process: Evaluating the portfolio; 
Purpose: To review the performance of the organization's investment 
portfolio(s) at agreed- upon intervals, and to adjust the allocation of 
resources among investments as necessary. 

Critical process: Conducting postimplementation reviews; 
Purpose: To compare the results of recently implemented investments 
with the expectations that were set for them, and to develop a set of 
lessons learned from these reviews. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

DOD is executing one of the five practices within these four critical 
processes that call for policies and procedures associated with 
effective portfolio-level management. Specifically, DOD has issued 
departmentwide guidance[Footnote 37] that assigns responsibilities to 
the USD(AT&L) for managing and establishing business system investment 
portfolios, including leveraging or establishing a governance forum to 
oversee these business system investment portfolio activities. 

However, DOD has not fully defined the policies and procedures needed 
to effectively execute the remaining four portfolio management 
practices relative to business system investments. Specifically, DOD 
does not have policies and procedures for defining the portfolio 
criteria or for creating and evaluating the portfolio. In addition, 
while DOD has policies and procedures for conducting postimplementation 
reviews as part of DAS, these reviews do not address systems at all 
tier levels. Furthermore, there are no procedures detailing how lessons 
learned from these reviews are used during investment review as the 
basis for management and process improvements. 

Table 6 summarizes the rating for each critical process required to 
manage investment as a portfolio and summarizes the evidence that 
supports these ratings. 

Table 6: Summary of Policies and Procedures for Stage 3 Critical 
Processes--Developing a Complete Investment Portfolio: 

Critical process: Defining the portfolio criteria; 
Key practice: 1. The organization has documented policies and 
procedures for creating and modifying IT portfolio selection criteria; 
Rating: Not executed; 
Summary of evidence: DOD's IT Portfolio Management Implementation 
states that the USD(AT&L) is responsible for creating and modifying 
portfolio criteria (e.g., prioritization and investment tradeoffs) for 
business system investments. However, the USD(AT&L) has not documented 
the related policies and procedures. 

Key practice: 2. Responsibility is assigned to an individual or group 
for managing the development and modification of the IT portfolio 
selection criteria; 
Rating: Executed; 
Summary of evidence: DOD's IT Portfolio Management assigns 
responsibility for the business mission area portfolio management to 
the USD(AT&L), who leads and manages business system investments in 
coordination with the ASD(NII)/CIO, the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller), and the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and 
Readiness). 

Critical process: Creating the portfolio; 
Key practice: 1. The organization has documented policies and 
procedures for analyzing, selecting, and maintaining the investment 
portfolios; 
Rating: Not executed; 
Summary of evidence: DOD does not have policies and procedures for 
analyzing, selecting, and maintaining business system investment 
portfolios. 

Critical process: Evaluating the portfolio; 
Key practice: 1. The organization has documented policies and 
procedures for reviewing, evaluating, and improving the performance of 
its portfolio(s); 
Rating: Not executed; 
Summary of evidence: While the IRB Concept of Operations states that 
the IRBs are responsible for reviewing factors associated with 
portfolio management, such as architecture alignment and capability 
delivery, there are no policies and procedures indicating how the IRBs 
should use these factors and project indicators--such as cost, 
schedule, and risk--to review, evaluate, and improve their portfolios. 
According to our ITIM guidance for Stage 3, IRBs should use actual 
investment data, such as project cost and adherence to schedule, as the 
basis for reviewing and evaluating its portfolio(s) to ensure that the 
overall portfolio provides the maximum benefits at a desired cost and 
at an acceptable level of risk. 

Critical process: Conducting postimplementation reviews; 
Key practice: 1. The organization has documented policies and 
procedures for conducting postimplementation reviews; 
Rating: Not executed; 
Summary of evidence: While DOD requires postimplementation reviews for 
Tier 1 systems as part of DAS, there are no policies or procedures for 
conducting them for Tiers 2 or 3 systems. Moreover, there are no 
policies or procedures directing the DBSMC or IRBs, or both, which are 
accountable for corporate business system investments, to consider 
information gathered and to develop lessons learned from these 
postimplementation reviews. According to ITIM, an effective 
postimplementation review includes, among other things, how 
conclusions, lessons learned, and recommended management action steps 
are to be disseminated to executives and others. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

According to BTA officials, while portfolio management is primarily a 
component responsibility, they are working toward developing more 
effective departmentwide portfolio management processes, but plans or 
time frames for doing so have not been established. Without defining 
corporate policies and procedures for managing business system 
investment portfolios, DOD is at risk of not consistently selecting the 
mix of investments that best supports the departmentwide mission needs 
and ensuring that investment-related lessons learned are shared and 
applied departmentwide. 

Conclusions: 

Given the importance of business systems modernization to DOD's 
mission, performance, and outcomes, it is vital for the department to 
adopt and employ an effective institutional approach to managing 
business system investments. While the department has established 
aspects of such an approach and, thus, has a foundation on which to 
build, it is lacking other important elements, such as specific 
policies and procedures needed for project-level and portfolio-level 
investment management, including integration with DOD's other key 
management systems and sufficient oversight and visibility into 
operations and maintenance investments and Tier 4 investments. This 
means that DOD lacks an institutional capability to ensure that it is 
investing in business systems that best support its strategic needs, 
and that ongoing projects meet cost, schedule, and performance 
expectations. Until DOD develops this capability, the department will 
be impaired in its ability to optimize business mission area 
performance and accountability. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To strengthen DOD's business system investment management capability 
and address the weaknesses discussed in this report, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as the 
chair of the DBSMC, to ensure that well-defined and disciplined 
business system investment management policies and procedures are 
developed and issued. At a minimum, this should include project-level 
management policies and procedures that address the following five 
areas: 

* instituting the investment boards, including assigning the investment 
boards responsibility, authority, and accountability for programs 
throughout the investment life cycle and specifying how the business 
investment management system is coordinated with JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS; 

* selecting new investments, including specifying how cost, schedule, 
and benefit data are to be used in making certification decisions; 
defining the criteria used to select investments as enterprisewide; and 
establishing consistent and effective guidance for BEA compliance; 

* reselecting ongoing investments, including specifying how cost, 
schedule, and performance data are to be used in the annual review 
process and providing for the reselection of investments that are in 
operations and maintenance; 

* integrating funding with the process of selecting an investment, 
including specifying how the DBSMC and the IRBs use funding information 
in carrying out decisions on system certification and approvals; and: 

* overseeing IT projects and systems, including providing sufficient 
oversight and visibility into component-level investment management 
activities. 

These well-defined and disciplined business system investment 
management policies and procedures should also include portfolio-level 
management policies and procedures that address the following four 
areas: 

* creating and modifying IT portfolio selection criteria for business 
system investments; 

* analyzing, selecting, and maintaining business system investment 
portfolios; 

* reviewing, evaluating, and improving the performance of its 
portfolio(s) by using project indicators, such as cost, schedule, and 
risk; and: 

* conducting postimplementation reviews for all investment tiers and 
directing the investment boards, which are accountable for corporate 
business system investments, to consider the information gathered and 
to develop lessons learned from these reviews. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, signed by the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation) and reprinted in 
appendix II, the department stated that it agreed with the report's 
overall conclusions, and it described efforts under way and planned 
that it said would address many of the gaps identified in the report. 
In this regard, the department partially concurred with five of the 
report's recommendations, adding that our recommendations and feedback 
are helpful in guiding DOD's business transformation and related 
improvement efforts. Nevertheless, the department disagreed with the 
remaining four recommendations on the grounds that their intent had 
already been met through DOD's existing business system investment 
management structure and processes, or that they contradicted the 
tiered accountability concept embedded in this structure and processes. 
The department's comments relative to each of our project-level and 
portfolio-level recommendations, along with our responses to its 
comments, are provided below. 

With respect to our five project-level recommendations, the department 
stated that it partially agreed with two and disagreed with three. 

* DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to define and implement 
policies and procedures that assign the investment boards 
responsibility for programs throughout the investment life cycle and 
specify how the business investment management system is coordinated 
with JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS. In particular, it stated that under its 
tiered accountability approach to business systems investment 
management, the components are currently required to review all 
programs throughout their investment life cycles. We do not question 
this requirement, and we recognize it in our report. However, 
consistent with our ITIM framework, the corporate investment boards 
should continue to review investments that meet the defined threshold 
criteria throughout their life cycles (i.e., when they are in 
operations and maintenance). In contrast, DOD's corporate boards focus 
only on those investments that are in the development/modernization 
stage. The department also stated that a linkage is currently depicted 
in existing guidance among its investment selection, acquisition, and 
funding processes. While we do not question that this guidance contains 
an illustration depicting such a link, neither this guidance nor 
supporting procedures define how this linkage is executed (e.g., how 
investment funding decisions are in fact integrated with investment 
selection decisions). DOD's comments appear to acknowledge this point 
by stating that the department has begun to define and implement a 
Business Capability Lifecycle concept, which is intended to integrate 
the investment selection and acquisition management processes for Tier 
1 and enterprise systems into a single oversight process that leverages 
the existing IRB and DBSMC oversight framework. 

* DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to define and implement 
policies and procedures that specify how cost, schedule, and benefit 
data are to be used in making certification and annual review 
decisions; define the criteria used to select investments as 
enterprisewide; and establish consistent and effective guidance for BEA 
compliance. In particular, the department agreed that additional 
criteria are required for selecting enterprisewide investments, noting 
that initial criteria have been defined and will be incorporated in the 
investment management process. However, the department did not agree 
that cost, schedule, and BEA compliance information are not 
sufficiently used for certification and annual review decisions, adding 
that such information is required in its current policies. We do not 
agree. Specifically, while we do not question whether investment data 
are provided to the DBSMC and the IRBs, the department's policies and 
procedures do not include specific decision criteria that explain how 
these data are to be used to make consistent, repeatable selection and 
reselection decisions across all investments. In addition, while BEA 
compliance policies have been developed and are being used, the 
guidance is not fully defined. For example, the guidance allows 
programs to defer demonstrating full compliance with important BEA 
artifacts until the final phases of the acquisition process, at which 
time addressing instances of noncompliance would be more expensive and 
difficult. Furthermore, the compliance criteria are not consistently 
described in different guidance documentation. As a result, DOD risks 
beginning system production and deployment before ensuring that a 
system is sufficiently aligned to the BEA. 

* DOD did not agree with our recommendation to define and implement 
policies and procedures that provide for the reselection of investments 
that are in operations and maintenance. According to DOD, components 
are required by policy to annually review all business systems, 
including investments for which there is no planned development or 
modernization spending. We agree that the annual review process does 
require this. However, consistent with our ITIM framework, the 
corporate investment boards should continue to reselect investments 
that meet the defined threshold criteria throughout their life cycles 
(i.e., when they are in operations and maintenance). In contrast, DOD's 
corporate boards focus only on reselecting those investments that are 
in the development/modernization stage. 

* DOD did not agree with our recommendation to define and implement 
policies and procedures that specify how the corporate boards use 
funding information in carrying out decisions on system certification 
and approvals. In this regard, it stated that such information is 
required in its current policies and considered during board 
deliberations. We do not agree. Our recommendation does not address 
whether existing policies or guidance provide for the collection of 
this information; our recommendation addresses the definition of 
policy, guidance, and supporting procedures that fall short of 
satisfying the best practices embodied in our ITIM framework. 
Specifically, while we do not question whether funding data are 
provided to investment decision-making bodies, the department's 
policies and procedures do not include specific decision criteria that 
explain how these data are to be used to make consistent, repeatable 
selection and reselection decisions across all investments. 

* DOD did not agree with our recommendation to define and implement 
policies and procedures that provide for sufficient oversight and 
visibility into component-level investment management activities. In 
particular, it stated that this recommendation contradicts the 
department's "tiered accountability" approach to investment management. 
We do not agree. Under the department's current policies and guidance, 
most DOD investments are not subject to corporate visibility and 
oversight, either because they do not involve development/modernization 
(i.e., they are in operations and maintenance) or because they do not 
exceed a certain dollar threshold. Our framework recognizes that 
effective implementation of a tiered accountability concept should 
include appropriate corporate visibility into and oversight of 
investments, either through review and approval of those investments 
that meet certain criteria or through awareness of a subordinate 
board's investment management activities. Moreover, this visibility and 
oversight should extend to the entire portfolio of investments, 
including those that are in operations and maintenance. To ensure that 
this occurs, applicable policies and procedures need to explicitly 
cover all such investments and need to define how this is to be 
accomplished. 

With respect to our four portfolio-level recommendations, the 
department stated that it partially agreed with three and disagreed 
with one. 

* DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to define and implement 
policies and procedures for creating and modifying portfolio selection 
criteria for business system investments. In particular, it stated that 
while components are responsible for developing and managing their own 
portfolio management processes, upcoming initiatives, such as the 
Business Capability Lifecycle concept, will lead to revisions in the 
department's investment review policies and procedures, such as 
including portfolio selection criteria for enterprise systems that span 
components. However, while these are important steps, the concept, as 
defined by the department, does not apply to the thousands of 
investments that are not enterprisewide. 

* DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to define and implement 
policies and procedures that address analyzing, selecting, and 
maintaining business system investment portfolios. In particular, it 
stated that the implementation of the Business Capability Lifecyle 
concept will provide the corporate boards with improved visibility into 
all investments in a given portfolio and a broader set of criteria for 
analyzing, selecting, and maintaining business system investment 
portfolios. 

* DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to define and implement 
policies and procedures that address reviewing, evaluating, and 
improving the performance of its portfolio(s) by using cost, schedule, 
and risk indicators. In particular, it stated that while such 
indicators are part of the investment certification and review 
processes, efforts are now under way to better understand the nature 
and impact of program risks through application of an Enterprise Risk 
Assessment Methodology. While we recognize the role and value of such 
tools in understanding and addressing program risks, this tool is 
program-specific and not portfolio-focused. 

* DOD did not agree with our recommendation to define and implement 
policies and procedures that address conducting postimplementation 
reviews and having the corporate investment boards consider the review 
results and develop lessons learned from them. In particular, it stated 
that this process should not be managed by the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, and also stated that our recommendation is redundant with 
postimplementation reviews currently required under OMB Circular A- 
130.[Footnote 38] We do not agree with DOD's statements. Our 
recommendation does not call for the Deputy Secretary to manage the 
postimplementation review process. Rather, it provides for developing 
policies and procedures for performing postimplementation reviews for 
all tiers of business systems and having the DBSMC and IRBs, which are 
the corporate investment boards, consider the information gathered from 
these reviews and develop lessons learned. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the 
Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Networks and Information Integration)/Chief Information 
Officer; the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness); and 
the Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service. Copies of this 
report will be made available to other interested parties upon request. 
This report will also be available at no charge on our Web site at 
http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions on matters discussed in this 
report, please contact me at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Randolph C. Hite: 
Director, Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objective was to determine whether the Department of Defense's 
(DOD) corporate investment management approach comports with relevant 
federal guidance. Our analysis was based on the best practices 
contained in GAO's Information Technology Investment Management (ITIM) 
framework, and the framework's associated evaluation methodology, and 
focused on DOD's establishment of departmental-level policies and 
procedures for business system investments needed to assist 
organizations in complying with the investment management provisions of 
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (Stages 2 and 3). It did not include case 
studies to verify the implementation of established policies and 
procedures. 

To address our objective, we asked DOD to complete a self-assessment of 
its corporate investment management process and provide the supporting 
documentation. We then reviewed the results of the department's self- 
assessment of Stages 2 and 3 organizational commitment practices-- 
meaning those practices related to structures, policies, and 
procedures--and compared them against our ITIM framework. We also 
validated and updated the results of the self-assessment through 
document reviews and interviews with officials, such as the Director of 
Investment Management and the Defense Business Systems Acquisition 
Executive. In doing so, we reviewed written policies, procedures, and 
guidance and other documentation providing evidence of executed 
practices, including the Defense Acquisition System guidance, the 
Investment Review Board (IRB) Concept of Operations and Guidance, the 
Business Enterprise Architecture Compliance Guidance, IRB charters and 
meeting minutes, and the Business Transformation Guidance. 

We compared the evidence collected from our document reviews and 
interviews with the key practices in ITIM. We rated the key practices 
as "executed" on the basis of whether the agency demonstrated (by 
providing evidence of performance) that it had met all of the criteria 
of the key practice. A key practice was rated as "not executed" when we 
found insufficient evidence of all elements of a practice being fully 
performed or when we determined that there were significant weaknesses 
in DOD's execution of the key practice. In addition, we provided DOD 
with the opportunity to produce evidence for the key practices rated as 
"not executed." 

We conducted our work at DOD headquarters offices in Arlington, 
Virginia, from August 2006 through April 2007 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 

May 3 2007: 

Mr. Randolph Hite: 
Director, Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Hite: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report 07-538, "Business Systems Modernization: DoD Needs to Fully 
Define Policies and Procedures for Institutionally Managing 
Investments," dated March 30, 2007, (GAO Code 310636). 

The Department welcomes GAO's insight and suggestions as we continue to 
strive toward meeting our shared goals of transforming defense business 
practices. GAO provides valuable feedback on the Department's 
achievements, highlights areas where we can improve, and helps keep our 
effort on track toward achieving quality outcomes. 

Attached are the Department's responses to the GAO's recommendations to 
draft report GAO-07-538. The Department partially concurs on five and 
non-concurs with four of the recommendations because we believe that 
the existing structure established by the Department already meets the 
overall intent of several of GAO's recommendations. 

However, we agree with GAO's overall conclusions that DoD should 
continue to improve upon its existing investment management policies 
and procedures for individual business systems and programs. In fact, 
the Department is now developing and implementing changes in its 
investment management practices that address many of the gaps 
identified by GAO in this audit report. These efforts, in the totality, 
address many of the issues and illustrate preplanned BTA efforts to 
ameliorate the concerns. Recent enterprise-level improvements include: 

* Risk mitigation. Five of the ten business enterprise-level business 
programs defined as Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) have 
been or are scheduled soon for an Enterprise Risk Assessment 
Methodology (ERAM) evaluation of execution risk and alignment with 
enterprise capability goals. The remainder of these 10 business MAIS 
will be brought under ERAM by the end of FY 2007. 

* Enterprise standards. The BTA is currently "rationalizing the 
enterprise" and identifying systems as "enterprise" or "non- 
enterprise". Following the initial declaration, the programs assigned 
to the "enterprise" will be under the direction of Defense Business 
Systems Acquisition Executive (DBSAE) and "non-enterprise" programs 
will be further assigned to the appropriate component, thus examining 
and assigning the programs to comport with the DoD tiered 
accountability structure. While this effort is in its infancy, it 
provides increased insight into programs, and the appropriate level of 
portfolio management. 

* Management framework. We are developing specific policy guidance to 
amend the non-statutory portions of the DoD 5000 series of acquisition 
regulations and the JCS 3170 to adopt a management structure tailored 
to the business mission area. This framework, called the Business 
Capability Lifecycle (BCL), is beginning implementation. BCL is being 
designed to directly address acknowledged shortfalls in how DoD 
develops and fields MAIS and enterprise-level business systems. We 
expect to fully implement BCL early in FY 2008. 

At the component level, the tiered accountability concept remains the 
foundation for implementing portfolio management for the business 
mission area. Although we agree that at an enterprise level we need to 
establish the appropriate guidance and infrastructure for business 
transformation, we strongly believe that delegating certain investment 
management responsibilities to the component organizations provides for 
a more efficient investment management process. Tiered accountability 
has been embraced across DoD. This includes improving DoD's ability at 
an enterprise level to maintain the appropriate level of visibility 
into the component's operations. 

GAO continues to be a valuable and constructive partner in the 
Department's business transformation efforts. The recommendations and 
feedback provided will help to further guide DoD's process of continual 
improvement. We welcome GAO's insights and look forward to your 
participation in our future efforts. 

Signed for: 

Paul A. Brinkley: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation): 

GAO Draft Report Dated March 30, 2007 GAO-07-538 (GAO Code 310636): 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to institute the investment 
boards, including assigning the investment boards responsibility, 
authority, and accountability for programs throughout the investment 
life cycle and specifying how the business investment management system 
is coordinated with Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS), Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
and Defense Acquisition System (DAS) to ensure that well-defined and 
disciplined business system investment management policies and 
procedures are developed and issued. (p. 34/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD Response: Partially-Concur - The Department believes that the IRB/ 
DBSMC process and tiered accountability with the Components currently 
supports accountability for programs throughout the investment 
lifecycle. Further, the Department believes a linkage currently exists 
between the IRB certification and review processes and many other DOD 
decision support processes including JCIDS, PPBE, and Acquisition, as 
depicted in the figure below from the 13 December 2006 Business 
Transformation Guidance. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

This linkage is also addressed in the IRB Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) (previously provided to GAO), dated 29 August 2006, in section 
7.2, page 9. To further the alignment between the three processes, the 
DoD has begun to implement the Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL) 
concept which is scheduled to be fully implemented by FY08 and included 
in the DoD 5000 and JCS 3170 rewrites scheduled for the fall of FY08. 
The BCL will integrate the JCIDS and DAS, for Tier 1 and Enterprise 
systems, into a single oversight process leveraging the existing IRBs 
and DBSMC oversight framework. As stated in the March 2007 Annual 
Report to the Congressional Defense Committees, the BCL has three 
phases: 

* Definition - The BCL approach requires the PSA and the functional 
sponsor to collaborate to identify and clearly describe the root cause 
of a business problem, long before a vendor is involved in the process. 
The PSA and functional sponsor are asked to clearly explain why solving 
the problem will benefit the Department and (importantly) validate 
there is no existing solution. This problem statement and supporting 
justification become the basis of the business case for the proposed 
capability, which will be reviewed and approved by the appropriate MR 
It is during this phase of the BCL that the Defense Acquisition 
Executive decides whether a new program start will be approved for 
funding, based on the recommendations of the IRB and members of the 
DBSMC. 

* Investment - After the decision is made to fund a program start, the 
business case for the capability is expanded by the functional sponsor 
and the candidate program office to identify the scope of the materiel 
capabilities needed to solve the problem. The business case will also 
define the desired outcomes for the capability, including objectives 
and metrics, solution constraints and dependencies. A detailed analysis 
of alternatives is conducted during this phase and included in the 
business case document, which is augmented by a proposed acquisition 
approach and contracting strategy. 

* Execution - During the execution phase, responsibility for developing 
and fielding the capability is formally assumed by the program manager. 
However, the BCL concept requires that the functional sponsor remain 
heavily engaged with the program office to address any issues, requests 
or changes to the scope. In particular, the BCL requires that the 
functional sponsor re-validate the business case (including problem 
definition, expected outcomes, metrics, and costs) before each 
acquisition milestone or investment decision point, such as an initial 
test or the completion of the definition of a program baseline. 

We are developing specific policy guidance to amend the non-statutory 
portions of the DoD 5000 series of acquisition regulations and the JCS 
3I70 to incorporate BCL. 

Under Tiered Accountability and as system owners, Components are 
responsible for: 

* Overseeing program progress through the JCIDS and DAS: 

* Advocating for program resources in the PPBE process. 

* Coordinating with the IRBs when system certification for development/ 
modernization is required at key milestones in the Acquisition process. 

* Managing systems that are past the development/modernization stage 
through the PPBE process and the annual review process as documented in 
the IRB Guidance. 

The IRB CONOPS and the IRB User Guidance state that Components are 
required to annually review all business systems, including those that 
are in sustainment, suggesting that they perform this review as part of 
an existing process such as the annual Program / Budget Formulation 
phase of PPBE.The IRBs review, at least annually all business system 
investments that have been previously been certified for &development 
and modernization efforts over $I million dollars as required by the 
FY2005 NDAA. The result is that all business systems, whether they are 
under development/modernization or have been placed in sustainment, are 
reviewed annually throughout their lifecycles. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to select new investments, 
including specifying how cost, schedule, and benefit data are to be 
used in making certification decisions; defining the criteria used to 
select investments as enterprise-wide; and establishing consistent and 
effective guidance for business enterprise architecture (BEA) to ensure 
that well-defined and disciplined business system investment management 
policies and procedures are developed and issued. (p. 35/GAO Draft 
Report): 

DOD Response: Partially Concur: 

Partially Concur: 

The BTA has defined initial criteria for selecting enterprise-wide 
investments and is in the process of applying this criterion to the 
enterprise systems under the Defense Business Systems Acquisition 
Executive (DBSAE). This effort is defining a framework that articulates 
the set of specific characteristics that are appropriate for an 
enterprise-level solution. 

This initiative which is referred to as "Rationalizing the Enterprise" 
is scheduled to be finalized this summer and will be incorporated into 
the investment management process to help the IRBs and Components 
determine which business capabilities should be implemented at the 
Business Mission Area (BMA) enterprise level versus those that should 
be implemented at the Component level. 

Non-concur: 

IRB/DBSMC Policies do require cost, schedule and benefit data for 
certification decisions and annual review IRB assessments. This 
information is included on both the annual review and certification 
dashboards. Cost, schedule and performance is assessed as "green", 
"yellow" or "red" based on specified thresholds defined in policy and 
benefit is assessed through non-financial and financial metrics 
substantiated with an economic viability analysis. IRB decisions are 
not based on any one item but a combination of factors, some of which 
are measurable, and some less tangible. Cost, schedule, and performance 
are the basis upon which annual reviews are conducted. 

Non-Concur: 

BEA Compliance policies were released April I0, 2006, which describe 
the process for assessing compliance to the architecture and define the 
requirements for an architecture compliance plan. This guidance has 
also been enabled through the Architecture Compliance and Requirements 
Traceability Tool which creates a semi-automated process for assessing 
compliance and generating a Compliance Plan. It also provides metrics 
which show the degree of alignment to the BEA and number of 
"compliant", "non-compliant" and "compliance pending" instances. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to reselect ongoing 
investments, including specifying how cost, schedule, and performance 
data are to be used in the annual review process and providing for the 
reselection of investments that are in operations and maintenance to 
ensure that well-defined and disciplined business system investment 
management policies and procedures are developed and issued. (p. 35/GAO 
Draft Report): 

DOD Response: Non-Concur: 

As stated above, cost, schedule and performance data are used in the 
annual review process. 

Per the IRB CONOPS, dated 29 August 2006, in section 8.0, page 13: 

* Components are required to annually review all business systems, 
regardless of investment Tier, including systems for which there is no 
planned development or modernization spending. 

* At a minimum, as part of the annual reviews Components should make 
sure that systems are assessed against the DoD BEA, ensure systems are 
included in the Component or Enterprise Transition Plan, and that all 
required information regarding each system has been updated in the 
Department's global business systems inventory. 

* Components are required to submit a letter to the IRBs on a semi-
annual basis, on a schedule consistent with the Enterprise Transition 
Plan update cycle, listing all business systems that have been 
reviewed. These internal Component reviews, coupled with notification 
of these reviews to the CA / IRB, meet the FY 2005 NDAA annual review 
requirement. 

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to integrate funding with the 
process of selecting an investment, including specifying how the 
Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) and the 
Investment Review Board (IRB) use funding information in carrying out 
decisions on system certification and approvals to ensure that well- 
defined and disciplined business system investment management policies 
and procedures are developed and issued. (p. 35/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD Response: Non-Concur: 

Funding information is integrated into the current IRB/DBSMC process; 
funding information for every investment is presented to the IRB 
membership and documented on both the certification and annual review 
dashboards and PCA letters. Funding is an important element of the 
process and is taken into consideration along with other information 
(e.g. risk, benefit) during IRB/DBSMC deliberations. When there are 
funding issues associated with a particular investment, they are 
addressed during the IRB process, particularly during the annual review 
process. If they are related to poor management/execution, the IRB/ 
DBSMC may recommend reprogramming actions to support better alignment 
of budget to the needs of the portfolio. Each IRB decision is based on 
a review of available information and unfunded requests are handled on 
a case by case basis. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to oversee information 
technology (IT) projects and systems, including providing sufficient 
oversight and visibility into component-level investment management 
activities to ensure that well-defined and disciplined business system 
investment management policies and procedures are developed and issued. 
(p. 35/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD Response: Non-Concur - The Department's investment management 
process for business systems is predicated on the tiered accountability 
approach, under which DoD Components are responsible for managing their 
IT investments and IT portfolios with the proviso that the cognizant 
IRBs and the DBSMC provide oversight over those investments to ensure 
compliance with I0 U.S.C. 2222, as added by Section 332 of the Ronald 
W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, and 
other applicable laws, regulations, and policies. Under this statute 
the IRBs and the DBSMC have visibility of all systems that receive in 
excess of one million dollars in modernization funding. 

The Department believes the GAO's recommendation contradicts the tiered 
accountability approach in recommending that the Department, from a 
corporate perspective, oversee Component development and issuance of 
business system investment management policies and procedures. While 
the Department does oversee Component business system investment 
management decisions to the degree defined in the IRB CONOPS and has 
issued guidance on portfolio management processes to the Components, in 
accordance with tiered accountability, it does not guide or direct the 
Components in the formulation of the Component-level policies and 
procedures by which their investment decisions are reached. 

Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to create and modify IT 
portfolio selection criteria for business system investments. (p. 35/ 
GAO Draft Report): 

DOD Response: Partially Concur - The Department continues to move in 
the direction of maturing its portfolio management processes. Under 
Tiered Accountability, each Component is responsible for developing and 
managing its own portfolio management process; however, when it is in 
the best interest of DoD for a portfolio to span Components, the 
appropriate IRB can establish an "Enterprise Portfolio." To date, DoD 
has stood up the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) Portfolio which looks 
at distribution processes and supporting business systems across all 
DoD Components. The DPO is chaired by USTRANSCOM. 

With the implementation of BCL, all the IRB charters, CONOPs, and 
Guidance are under revision. The revised versions will clearly 
articulate the criteria necessary for establishing a "Enterprise 
Portfolio." 

Additionally, the Department has implemented the Department of Defense 
Instruction (DoDD) 8115.01 - "Information Technology Portfolio 
Management", which defines the responsibilities for the management of 
DoD IT investments as portfolios within the DoD Enterprise (to include 
Mission Areas, Sub-portfolios, and Components). 

Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to analyze, select, and 
maintain business system investment portfolios. (p. 35/GAO Draft 
Report): 

DOD Response: Partially Concur - The Department continues to move in 
the direction of maturing its portfolio management processes. Under 
Tiered Accountability, each Component is responsible for developing and 
managing its own portfolio management process; however, when it is in 
the best interest of DoD for a portfolio to span Components, the 
appropriate IRB can establish an "Enterprise Portfolio." To date, DoD 
has stood up the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) Portfolio which looks 
at distribution processes and supporting business systems across all 
DoD Components. The DPO is chaired by USTRANSCOM. 

The implementation of the BCL will allow the IRBs significantly 
improved visibility of all investments being made in given portfolios. 
Since each investment will be accompanied by a business case, the IRBs 
will have the opportunity to make investment decisions with a much 
broader set of criteria than is possible at the current time. 

Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to review, evaluate, and 
improve the performance of its portfolio(s) by using project indicators 
such as cost, schedule, and risk. (p. 35/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD Response: Partially Concur - Under existing IRB and DBSMC process 
and procedure Ms and DBSMC currently review cost and schedule data as 
part of the investment certification and annual review processes. In an 
effort to understand project risk and the impact of risk on the 
delivery of business capability the Department has implemented the 
Enterprise Risk Assessment Methodology (ERAM). ERAM is currently being 
executed on five of the ten business MAIS programs. The output of the 
risk assessments will provide an analysis of the risks, impacts and 
mitigation strategies for given portfolio investments enabling the IRB 
to weigh risk impact along with cost, schedule and performance further 
improving investment decisions. 

As stated in the March 2007 Annual Report to the Congressional Defense 
Committees, ERAM is a collaborative review process, bringing the 
functional sponsors, the program office, and experts from the 
acquisition community together. An ERAM team begins by reviewing 
existing program documentation, and then conducts face-to-face 
interviews with a cross-section of key program stakeholders and 
managers. Based on this information, the ERAM team evaluates program 
risk in seven key areas and delivers a risk mitigation plan as quickly 
as possible (ideally, within five to six weeks). The seven risk areas 
are: 

* Strategy: 

* Scope/Requirement: 

* Contract: 

* Technical: 

* People: 

* Process: 

* External: 

The quick turnaround is important, because the goal is to give the 
sponsor and program manager targeted, actionable advice in time for 
them to act to keep the program focused on delivering capability. 

ERAM adheres to DoD Directive 5000 Series principles that govern 
Defense acquisition activities. Ultimately, it is expected that ERAM 
will help the Department improve its acquisition of capabilities by 
achieving several key outcomes: 

* Providing the right information needed to make sound optimized 
investment decisions. 

* Creating a clear path for the rapid delivery of capability. 

* Reducing (or removing) burdensome Overarching Integrated Process Team 
(OIPT) documentation and meeting requirements. 

* Identifying program risks early enough so they can be avoided or 
mitigated. 

* The overall vision for ERAM is to provide a common vehicle for 
collaboratively managing program risk with a focus on rapid delivery of 
capability at reduced cost and schedule. 

RECOMMENDATION 9: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to conduct post implementation 
reviews for all investment tiers and direct the investment boards who 
are accountable for corporate business system investments, to consider 
the information gathered and to develop lessons learned from these 
reviews. (p. 36/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD Response: Non-Concur -The Department disagrees that this process 
should be managed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Requiring the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense to perform post-implementation reviews is 
redundant with The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A- 
130, Chapter 8 b.(1).(d) that requires the agency "Conduct post- 
implementation reviews of information systems to validate estimated 
benefits and document effective management practices for broader use." 
The Department will capture and leverage the lessons learned and best 
management practices from these component level reviews and make them 
available to the IRBs and across the Components. This also aligns with 
DoD's tiered accountability approach. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Randolph C. Hite, (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact person named above, key contributors to this 
report were Neil Doherty, Nalani Fraser, Nancy Glover, Michael Holland, 
Neelaxi Lakhmani (Assistant Director), Jacqueline Mai, Sabine Paul, 
Niti Tandon, and Jennifer Stavros-Turner. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Business systems are information systems that include financial and 
nonfinancial systems and support DOD's business operations, such as 
civilian personnel, finance, health, logistics, military personnel, 
procurement, and transportation. 

[2] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2007). 

[3] GAO, Information Technology: Architecture Needed to Guide 
Modernization of DOD's Financial Operations, GAO-01-525 (Washington, 
D.C.: May 17, 2001). 

[4] See, for example, GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Long- 
standing Weaknesses in Enterprise Architecture Development Need to Be 
Addressed, GAO-05-702 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005); DOD Business 
Systems Modernization: Billions Being Invested without Adequate 
Oversight, GAO-05-381 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005); DOD Business 
Systems Modernization: Limited Progress in Development of Business 
Enterprise Architecture and Oversight of Information Technology 
Investments, GAO-04-731R (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004); DOD Business 
Systems Modernization: Important Progress Made to Develop Business 
Enterprise Architecture, but Much Work Remains, GAO-03-1018 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003); Business Systems Modernization: 
Summary of GAO's Assessment of the Department of Defense's Initial 
Business Enterprise Architecture, GAO-03-877R (Washington, D.C.: July 
7, 2003); Information Technology: Observations on Department of 
Defense's Draft Enterprise Architecture, GAO-03-571R (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 28, 2003); DOD Business Systems Modernization: Improvements to 
Enterprise Architecture Development and Implementation Efforts Needed, 
GAO-03-458 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2003); and GAO-01-525. 

[5] Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 332, 118 Stat. 1811, 1851-1856 (Oct. 28, 
2004) (codified in part at 10 U.S.C. § 2222). 

[6] GAO, Defense Business Transformation: A Comprehensive Plan, 
Integrated Efforts, and Sustained Leadership Are Needed to Assure 
Success, GAO-07-229T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2006); Business 
Systems Modernization: DOD Continues to Improve Institutional Approach, 
but Further Steps Needed, GAO-06-658 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006); 
and DOD Business Systems Modernization: Important Progress Made in 
Establishing Foundational Architecture Products and Investment 
Management Practices, but Much Work Remains, GAO-06-219 (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 23, 2005). 

[7] GAO, Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework for 
Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, GAO-04-394G (Washington, 
D.C.: March 2004). 

[8] GAO-04-394G. 

[9] GAO-06-658. 

[10] See, for example, GAO, DOD Travel Cards: Control Weaknesses 
Resulted in Millions of Dollars of Improper Payments, GAO-04-576 
(Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004); Military Pay: Army National Guard 
Personnel Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay 
Problems, GAO-04-89 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2003); and Defense 
Inventory: Opportunities Exist to Improve Spare Parts Support Aboard 
Deployed Navy Ships, GAO-03-887 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 29, 2003). 

[11] GAO-07-310. 

[12] These 8 high-risk areas include DOD's (1) overall approach to 
business transformation, (2) business systems modernization, (3) 
financial management, (4) personnel security clearance program, (5) 
supply chain management, (6) support infrastructure management, (7) 
weapon systems acquisition, and (8) contract management. 

[13] The 7 governmentwide high-risk areas are (1) disability programs, 
(2) ensuring the effective protection of technologies critical to U.S. 
national security interests, (3) interagency contracting, (4) 
information systems and critical infrastructure, (5) information- 
sharing for homeland security, (6) human capital, and (7) real 
property. 

[14] The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, 40 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11704. This act 
expanded the responsibilities of OMB and the agencies that had been set 
under the Paperwork Reduction Act with regard to IT management. See 44 
U.S.C. 3504(a)(1)(B)(vi) (OMB); and 44 U.S.C. 3506(h)(5) (agencies). 

[15] We have made recommendations to improve OMB's process for 
monitoring high-risk IT investments; see GAO, Information Technology: 
OMB Can Make More Effective Use of Its Investment Reviews, GAO-05-276 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2005). 

[16] This policy is set forth and guidance is provided in OMB Circular 
A-11 (Nov. 2, 2005) (section 300), and in OMB's Capital Programming 
Guide, which directs agencies to develop, implement, and use a capital 
programming process to build their capital asset portfolios. 

[17] See, for example, GAO-04-394G; GAO, Information Technology: A 
Framework for Assessing and Improving Enterprise Architecture 
Management (Version 1.1), GAO-03-584G (Washington, D.C.: April 2003); 
and Assessing Risks and Returns: A Guide for Evaluating Federal 
Agencies' IT Investment Decision-making, GAO/AIMD-10.1.13 (Washington, 
D.C.: February 1997). 

[18] GAO-04-394G; GAO/AIMD-10.1.13; GAO, Executive Guide: Improving 
Mission Performance Through Strategic Information Management and 
Technology, GAO/AIMD-94-115 (Washington, D.C.: May 1994); and Office of 
Management and Budget, Evaluating Information Technology Investments, A 
Practical Guide (Washington, D.C.: November 1995). 

[19] GAO-04-394G. 

[20] GAO, Information Technology: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services Needs to Establish Critical Investment Management 
Capabilities, GAO-06-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 2005); Information 
Technology: HHS Has Several Investment Management Capabilities in 
Place, but Needs to Address Key Weaknesses, GAO-06-11 (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 28, 2005); Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment 
Management Capabilities in Place, but More Oversight of Operational 
Systems Is Needed, GAO-04-822 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004); Bureau 
of Land Management: Plan Needed to Sustain Progress in Establishing IT 
Investment Management Capabilities, GAO-03-1025 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 12, 2003); Information Technology: Departmental Leadership 
Crucial to Success of Investment Reforms at Interior, GAO-03-1028 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2003); United States Postal Service: 
Opportunities to Strengthen IT Investment Management Capabilities, GAO- 
03-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2002); and Information Technology: DLA 
Needs to Strengthen Its Investment Management Capability, GAO-02-314 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002). 

[21] The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, 40 U.S.C. §§ 11311-11313. 

[22] The National Security Strategy Report required by 50 U.S.C. 404a 
is a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the 
United States submitted by the President to Congress. 

[23] See 10 U.S.C. 118. The Quadrennial Defense Review is a 
comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force 
structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and 
other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States 
with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of 
the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 
years. 

[24] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach 
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes, 
GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007). 

[25] The Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation is the principal 
staff assistant who conducts independent analysis for, and provides 
independent advice on, all DOD program and evaluation matters to the 
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

[26] DOD Directive 5000.1, May 12, 2003 and DOD Instruction 5000.2, May 
12, 2003. 

[27] A MDAP is an acquisition program that is estimated by the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to 
require an eventual total expenditure for research, development, and 
test and evaluation of more than $365 million (fiscal year 2000 
constant dollars) or, for procurement, of more than $2.190 billion 
(fiscal year 2000 constant dollars). 

[28] A MAIS is a program or initiative that is so designated by the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)/ 
Chief Information Officer or that is estimated to require program costs 
in any single year in excess of $32 million (fiscal year 2000 constant 
dollars), total program costs in excess of $126 million (fiscal year 
2000 constant dollars), or total life-cycle costs in excess of $378 
million (fiscal year 2000 constant dollars). 

[29] According to DOD, the milestone decision authority is the 
designated individual who has overall responsibility for an investment. 
This person has the authority to approve an investment's progression in 
the acquisition process and is responsible for reporting cost, 
schedule, and performance results. For example, the milestone decision 
authority for a MDAP program, when not delegated to the component 
level, is the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, and the milestone decision authority for a MAIS system 
is the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information 
Integration)/Chief Information Officer or a designee. 

[30] The Defense Acquisition Board, chaired by the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, conducts reviews 
for MDAPs at major program milestones and documents the decision(s) 
resulting from the review in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum. 

[31] The IT Acquisition Board, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Networks and Information Integration)/Chief Information 
Officer, conducts reviews for MAIS at major program milestones and 
documents the decision(s) resulting from the review in an Acquisition 
Decision Memorandum. 

[32] The four IRBs are for (1) Financial Management, established by the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Financial Management; (2) Weapon 
Systems Lifecycle Management and Materiel Supply and Services 
Management; (3) Real Property and Installations Lifecycle Management, 
both established by the USD(AT&L); and (4) Human Resources Management, 
established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness. 

[33] DITPR is DOD's authoritative repository for certain information 
about DOD's business systems, such as system names and the responsible 
DOD components, that are required for the certification, approval, and 
annual reviews of these business system investments. 

[34] The certification authority is the designated Principal Staff 
Assistant with responsibility for review, approval, and oversight of 
the planning, design, acquisition, deployment, operation, maintenance, 
and modernization of defense business systems. 

[35] In addition, each component PCA submits a list of system names to 
the IRBs on a semiannual basis, to include Tier 4 systems and systems 
in operations and maintenance that have been reviewed at the component 
level. 

[36] Investment portfolios are integrated agencywide collections of 
investments that are assessed and managed collectively on the basis of 
common criteria. 

[37] DOD Directive 8115.01, Information Technology Portfolio 
Management, and DOD Instruction 8115.02, Information Technology 
Portfolio Management Implementation. 

[38] According to OMB Circular A-130, which establishes policy for the 
management of federal information resources, as part of the capital 
planning process, an agency must, among other things, conduct 
postimplementation reviews of information systems and information 
resource management processes to validate estimated benefits and costs; 
document effective management practices for broader use; and document 
lessons learned from the postimplementation reviews. 

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