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entitled 'Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful 
for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be 
Systematically Reassessed' which was released on February 28, 2007. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

February 2007: 

Aviation Security: 

TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff among 
Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be Systematically Reassessed: 

GAO-07-299: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-299, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has identified the 
transportation security officer (TSO) workforce as its most important 
asset in securing commercial aviation. TSOs screen passengers and 
baggage to prevent dangerous items onboard aircraft. In response to an 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requirement to 
develop standards for TSO staffing, TSA developed a staffing model to 
guide its TSO allocations across airports. The act also required GAO to 
analyze TSA’s staffing standards. 

GAO analyzed (1) how TSA ensures its model provides a sufficient TSO 
staff to perform screening and (2) how TSA deploys its TSOs and factors 
that affect deployment. GAO analyzed data and reviewed documentation 
about the model and discussed it with TSA headquarters officials and 
TSA officials at 14 airports. 

What GAO Found: 

TSA aims to ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a 
sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage 
screening by: (1) building assumptions into its allocation model that 
are designed to calculate the necessary levels of TSOs to ensure 
security and minimize wait times, and (2) employing multiple monitoring 
mechanisms for the sufficiency of the model’s outputs. However, Federal 
Security Directors (FSD)—the ranking TSA authorities responsible for 
leading and coordinating security activities at airports—and our own 
analysis identified concerns with some of the fiscal year 2006 model 
assumptions. Although TSA officials said they plan an annual review of 
select assumptions and based changes for fiscal year 2007 on such a 
review of selected fiscal year 2006 assumptions, TSA does not have a 
mechanism for prioritizing its review and for assuring that all 
assumptions are periodically validated to help ensure that they reflect 
operating conditions. Without periodic validation, TSA risks basing its 
allocations on assumptions that do not reflect operating conditions. 
For example, TSA acknowledged that it had not assessed the assumption 
that its method of calculating screening demand provides sufficient 
surplus staff to account for time away from screening for leave, 
training and operational support. Some FSDs told GAO their allocations 
did not include sufficient surplus in fiscal year 2006. Moreover, 
although TSA officials stated that the fiscal year 2007 model will 
include an allowance for time spent on operational support duties, TSA 
has not determined under what circumstances it is appropriate to use 
TSOs to perform operational support functions or provided FSDs with 
guidance on when TSOs can be used this way. Without establishing such 
guidance, FSDs may over rely on TSOs to perform operational support 
functions. 

TSA has vested its FSDs with responsibility for managing their TSO 
allocations in light of local circumstances and challenges. 
Nevertheless, factors outside the model’s determination of overall 
staffing levels can affect scheduling effectiveness. For example, FSDs 
face scheduling challenges including injuries, absenteeism, and time 
spent away from primary screening duties for training and operational 
support. Officials described initiatives underway to address some of 
these issues. However, it is too soon to assess the effectiveness of 
these initiatives. 

Figure: Annual TSA Allocation Process: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA Staffing Allocation Model. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) direct the Assistant Secretary for Transportation 
Security to (1) establish a mechanism to ensure periodic assessment of 
model assumptions and (2) establish a policy for when TSOs can be used 
to provide operational support. DHS reviewed a draft of this report and 
concurred with GAO’s findings and recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-299]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-
4523, leporeb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

TSA Relies on the Assumptions in Its Staffing Allocation Model, along 
with Mechanisms for Monitoring Them, to Help Ensure Sufficient TSO 
Staffing Levels, but Some Key Assumptions Do Not Reflect Operating 
Conditions: 

TSA's FSDs Are Responsible for Deploying TSO Allocations at their 
Airports, but Face Workforce and Other Challenges to Effective 
Deployment: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Objectives: 

Scope and Methodology: 

Data Reliability: 

Appendix II: Development and Description of TSA's Staffing Allocation 
Model: 

TSA's Development of Its Staffing Allocation Model: 

Staffing Allocation Model Components: 

TSA's Use of the Staffing Allocation Model: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Examples of Differences in Screening Operations, at Selected 
Airports We Visited, That Resulted in Differing TSO Allocations: 

Table 2: Average Peak Wait Times in Minutes, by Airport Category, 
Fiscal Years 2004-2006: 

Table 3: Summary of Changes to the Staffing Allocation Model 
Implemented in Fiscal Year 2007: 

Table 4: National Human Resource Initiatives by TSA for Its TSO 
Workforce: 

Table 5: Airports Visited during Design Phase: 

Table 6: Airports Visited after the Design Phase: 

Table 7: Staffing Allocation Model Assumptions for Fiscal Year 2007: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Commercial Airports by Airport Security Category, as of April 
2006: 

Figure 2: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Operation: 

Figure 3: Checked Baggage Screening Operation: 

Figure 4: TSA's Use of the Staffing Allocation Model for Annual TSO 
Allocations and Scheduling of TSOs for Airports: 

Figure 5: Total TSO Allocation, by Airport Category, for Fiscal Years 
2004 through 2007: 

Figure 6: Percentage of Part-Time TSOs by Airport Category, Fiscal 
Years 2004 through 2006: 

Figure 7: Percent of TSOs Used for Operational Support Functions, along 
with Average Hours Spent by Them on These Functions, by Airport 
Category for a 2-Week Period--September 17, 2006, through September 30, 
2006: 

Figure 8: Airports' On-Board Status, by Airport Category, Compared to 
TSO Staffing Allocation, in Full-Time-Equivalent TSOs, as of September 
30, 2006: 

Figure 9: Attrition Rates for Full-Time and Part-Time TSOs, Fiscal 
years 2004 to 2006: 

Figure 10: Average Rate of TSO Absenteeism per 100 TSOs, by Airport 
Category, for Fiscal Years 2004 - 2006: 

Figure 11: TSA Workman's Compensation Claims for Calendar Years 2004 - 
2006, through June 2006: 

Figure 12: TSO Overtime Hours as a Percentage of Total Hours Worked, by 
Airport Category, during Fiscal Years 2004 - 2006: 

Abbreviations: 

ADASP: Aviation Direct Access Screening Program: 

BAO: Bomb Appraisal Officer: 

BDO: Behavior Detection Officer: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DTW: Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport: 

EDS: Explosive Detection System: 

ETD: Explosive Trace Detection: 

ETP: Explosives Trace Portal: 

FSD: Federal Security Director: 

FTE: full-time equivalent: 

IND: Indianapolis International Airport: 

MCO: Orlando International Airport: 

N/A: not available: 

OSR: on-screen resolution: 

SNA: John Wayne Airport: 

SPOT: Screening Passengers by Observation Technique: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

TSO: Transportation Security Officer: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

February 28, 2007: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Co-Chairman: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable James L. Oberstar: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John Mica: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

Over 600 million people travel by air each year in the United States, 
and the screening of airline passengers and their carry-on and checked 
baggage is vital to securing our transportation security system. The 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001, 
established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and 
significantly changed how passenger and checked baggage screening is 
conducted in the United States.[Footnote 1] This act removed screening 
responsibility from air carriers and the contractors who conducted 
screening for them, and placed this responsibility with TSA. As a 
result, TSA hired and deployed about 55,000 federal passenger and 
baggage Transportation Security Officers (TSO)--formerly known as 
screeners--to more than 400 airports nationwide based largely on the 
number of screeners that the air carrier contractors had employed. 
Since August 2002, however, TSA has been statutorily prohibited from 
exceeding 45,000 full-time equivalent positions available for 
screening.[Footnote 2] 

TSA's mission is to protect the nation's transportation systems while 
also ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. To help 
accomplish its security mission, TSA has established standard operating 
procedures to ensure that every airline passenger and checked bag 
undergoes some level of scrutiny to help ensure that objects and 
devices that may threaten public safety are not taken onboard aircraft. 
Although, according to TSA officials, these security duties are the 
primary objective of its screening efforts, it also attempts to 
minimize the effect on the movement of people and commerce by seeking 
to keep wait times at airport checkpoints reasonable. 

TSA has identified its most important asset in accomplishing its 
mission as the TSO workforce. TSA deploys TSOs to screen passengers and 
checked baggage at the nation's more than 400 commercial airports. 
TSOs, for example, monitor passengers as they walk through metal 
detectors, examine carry-on items on X-ray machines, and conduct more 
thorough inspections of passengers selected for additional scrutiny at 
screening checkpoints. The rapid changes in procedures stemming from 
the alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives 
onboard multiple commercial aircraft departing from the United Kingdom 
and bound for the United States highlights the challenge TSA faces in 
balancing security with customer service and the vital role TSOs play 
in ensuring the security of our commercial aviation system. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted 
in December 2004, required TSA to develop and submit to the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House of 
Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
standards for determining the aviation security staffing for all 
airports at which TSA provides or oversees screening services by March 
2005.[Footnote 3] These standards are to provide the necessary levels 
of aviation security and ensure that the average aviation security 
related delay experienced by passengers is minimized. TSA submitted 
these standards, which form the basis of TSA's Staffing Allocation 
Model on June 22, 2005. The purpose of this optimization 
model,[Footnote 4] as identified by TSA, is to estimate the most 
efficient balance of TSOs needed to ensure security and minimize wait 
times. Models, in general, are expected to approximate the real world. 
These approximations must be validated to assure model users that their 
predictions are credible within the bounds of specific situations, 
environments, and circumstances. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also mandated that 
we conduct an analysis of TSA's staffing standards. In particular, the 
congressional committees to which TSA submitted the staffing standards 
were interested in how TSA is using the Staffing Allocation Model to 
identify the number of TSOs needed across the more than 400 commercial 
airports and how the model ensures that TSA has the right number of 
TSOs at the right checkpoints at the right times. 

This report addresses the following questions: (1) How does TSA ensure 
that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of TSOs 
to perform passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and 
what challenges has it faced while implementing the model? (2) How does 
TSA deploy its TSO allocation and what factors affect the model's 
effectiveness in helping TSA accomplish this deployment? 

To address our objectives, we reviewed TSA's report to the specified 
congressional committees on its staffing standards and technical 
materials detailing the staffing allocation model's 
assumptions,[Footnote 5] and analyzed relevant legislation. We analyzed 
screening performance and TSO workforce data, such as passenger wait 
times, TSO absenteeism rates, TSO attrition rates, TSO overtime usage, 
TSO injury rates, number of TSOs devoted to administrative duties, and 
the level of usage of part-time TSOs. We assessed the reliability of 
these data for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 and concluded that the data 
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. We also 
interviewed officials from various TSA headquarters offices to 
ascertain the methodology used in developing the Staffing Allocation 
Model. We reviewed TSA's previous staffing model, examined methods used 
by TSA for allocating TSOs to the nation's airports, and reviewed TSA's 
approach to monitoring the performance of the Staffing Allocation Model 
and obtaining feedback from Federal Security Directors--the top ranking 
TSA authority responsible for security at each of the nation's 
commercial airports--on their staffing allocations. We visited 14 
airports selected by nonprobability sampling during our 
review.[Footnote 6] We visited 6 of the 14 airports during the design 
phase of our review based on several factors including geographic 
location and airport category.[Footnote 7] After completing the design 
phase of our study, we visited eight additional airports including two 
airports from each of categories X, I, II, and III. We selected the two 
airports in each category because they had a similar number of annual 
passenger boardings, yet had different TSO allocations as determined by 
the Staffing Allocation Model. We visited each pair of airports in 
order to determine why the model treated seemingly similar airports 
differently. At all 14 airports we visited, we met with Federal 
Security Directors (FSD) and their staffs to discuss their views on how 
well the airport's TSO staffing allocation takes into account the 
unique characteristics of the airport and the TSO workforce and to 
observe passenger and checked baggage screening operations. We also met 
with representatives from the airport governing authority and at least 
one of the larger airline operators, based on passenger 
enplanements,[Footnote 8] to obtain their perspectives on TSA's 
implementation of the Staffing Allocation Model and other relevant 
workforce issues. Because we selected a nonprobability sample of 
airports to visit, the information we obtained from interviews in our 
visits to different airports cannot be generalized to all Federal 
Security Directors, airport managers, and air carriers. We also met 
with representatives from aviation industry associations to obtain 
their perspectives on relevant TSA workforce issues. 

We conducted our work from January 2006 through January 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More 
details about the scope and methodology of our work are presented in 
appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

TSA aims to ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a 
sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage 
screening by: (1) building assumptions into its allocation model that 
are designed to calculate the necessary levels of TSOs to ensure 
security and minimize wait times, and (2) employing multiple monitoring 
mechanisms (both headquarters and field driven) for the sufficiency of 
the model's outputs. However, TSA faces some challenges to effective 
implementation of the model, primarily in ensuring that the model's key 
assumptions reflect operating conditions across airports. The model 
determines the annual TSO allocation for each airport by first 
considering the workload demands unique to each airport based on an 
estimate of each airport's peak passenger volume. This input is then 
processed against certain TSA assumptions about screening passengers 
and checked baggage--including expected processing rates, required 
staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment based on standard 
operating procedures, and historical equipment alarm rates.[Footnote 9] 
Among the model's key assumptions is that establishing TSO allocations 
at a level adequate to respond to screening demand on a representative 
week during each airports' busiest month should allow most passengers 
on most days to experience 10 minutes or less wait time and should 
provide enough surplus staffing on lower-volume days to sufficiently 
account for leave, training, and other nonscreening duties during less 
busy times.[Footnote 10] Another key assumption is that the appropriate 
ratio of full-time to part-time TSO staff, expressed in full-time 
equivalents, is 80 percent to 20 percent; which, in TSA's view, will 
allow FSDs to schedule TSOs to respond to fluctuating passenger volumes 
by scheduling part-time TSOs to work only during peak periods--e.g., 
most business travelers fly in the early morning or late afternoon and 
are the biggest contributors to these peak volumes. To monitor the 
sufficiency of the model's allocation outputs, TSA has both field and 
headquarters-driven mechanisms in place. For example, TSA has 
established a process for FSDs to request revisions to the assumptions 
used for their individual airports. According to TSA officials, during 
the first 2 years of the implementation of the Staffing Allocation 
Model, TSA granted some, but not all, of FSDs' requests to modify the 
assumptions used for their individual airports. In addition, TSA plans 
to conduct an annual review of certain assumptions in the Staffing 
Allocation Model. Based on the review conducted in 2006, TSA made 
several changes to the assumptions in the staffing model for fiscal 
year 2007, including allowances for various forms of leave and training 
in addition to a variable part-time assumption for each airport. TSA 
headquarters officials responsible for the model stated that in 
deciding which assumptions to review in 2006--the first annual review 
of the model--they considered input they received from FSDs regarding 
operational conditions at their airports that may not be adequately 
reflected in the model, along with other data and events that may have 
a bearing on the validity of the assumptions. However, TSA does not 
have a mechanism, such as a documented plan, for selecting and 
prioritizing which assumptions to review each year and for assuring 
that all assumptions are periodically reviewed to help ensure that they 
are current with and reflect actual operating conditions. Without a 
plan for periodically validating all of the assumptions, TSA is at risk 
of assumptions becoming outdated, which could result in TSO allocations 
that do not reflect operating conditions. TSA officials responsible for 
the staffing model acknowledged that while they had a general idea of 
how they plan to approach future annual reviews of the model, a 
documented plan would help provide assurance that the assumptions are 
periodically reviewed and validated. Although at the airports we 
visited, FSDs reported that the model is a more accurate predictor of 
staffing needs than TSA's prior staffing model, which took into account 
fewer factors that affect screening operations, the FSDs and our own 
analysis identified some assumptions used in the fiscal year 2006 
staffing model that did not reflect operating conditions. For example, 
many airports did not achieve a 20 percent part-time TSO workforce in 
the first 2 years of the model's implementation. TSA has addressed this 
problem in fiscal year 2007 by implementing a variable part-time goal 
based on each airport's part-time to full-time TSO ratio. In addition, 
some FSDs we visited stated that demand assumptions (using a 
representative week of airports' busiest months) did not sufficiently 
provide enough time for leave, training, and other operational support 
(nonscreening) duties. TSA officials acknowledged that they had not 
performed analysis to determine the reliability of this assumption. 
Also, FSDs stated the model for fiscal year 2006 did not specifically 
account for time away from screening to perform operational support 
duties, such as payroll processing. Although TSA officials told us that 
they have included an allowance for operational support duties in the 
2007 Staffing Allocation Model, TSA has not determined under what 
circumstances it is appropriate to use TSOs to perform operational 
support functions or provided FSDs with guidance on when TSOs can be 
used this way. Without establishing such guidance, FSDs may over rely 
on TSOs to perform operational support functions. Overreliance on TSO 
staff for operational support could undermine TSA's investment in their 
specialized screening skills, reduce their on-the-job training 
opportunities, and constrain flexibility in scheduling them for the 
most efficient use of available resources. 

TSA has vested its FSDs with responsibility for deploying and managing 
to their TSO allocation in light of local circumstances, including 
those that might affect scheduling and pose challenges to most 
efficiently deploying their resource allocations. Specifically, FSDs 
are responsible for ensuring that the right number of TSOs are deployed 
to the right screening areas at the right times to meet airport 
screening needs. These needs can vary widely throughout the day because 
some airports experience greater levels of air traffic at some times of 
the day as compared with other times. After receiving the annual 
staffing allocation from TSA headquarters, FSDs must prepare work 
schedules, which may include use of the Staffing Allocation Model's 
optional scheduling tool, to deploy TSO staff to meet screening demand. 
However, FSDs we interviewed identified several challenges they faced 
in deploying their TSO workforce. These challenges involve factors 
outside the model's determination of overall TSO staffing levels and 
affect FSDs' ability to effectively deploy their TSO staff regardless 
of their allocation. Specifically, FSDs cited difficulties in achieving 
a 20 percent part-time TSO workforce, which the model has identified as 
the optimal ratio for scheduling efficiency; recruiting and retaining 
sufficient TSOs (both full-time and part-time) to reach their full 
allocations as determined by the model; staffing checkpoints 
appropriately given that some TSOs are unavailable due to absenteeism 
and injuries; and managing competing demands on TSOs' time, 
particularly with regard to operational support functions sometimes 
performed by TSOs and TSO training requirements. FSDs also had to 
manage around physical infrastructure limitations at some airports, 
such as lack of room for additional lanes or baggage check areas 
despite demand levels that would justify such added capacity. TSA 
headquarters officials and FSDs we interviewed reported having several 
efforts underway to help address challenges they face in deploying the 
TSO workforce. For example, TSA headquarters has several nationwide 
efforts underway to address hiring and retention of TSO staff 
(including part-time), absenteeism, injuries, and competing demands on 
TSO time. TSA officials at individual airports we visited are also 
working to address these challenges. For example, 6 of the 14 FSDs we 
interviewed said they implemented local initiatives, such as injury 
prevention committees and safe lifting demonstrations to help reduce 
the number of on-the-job injuries. Given that many of TSA's workforce 
initiatives were only recently implemented or are in the planning 
stages, we could not assess the extent to which these initiatives 
achieved the intended results. TSA human capital officials told us that 
they plan to evaluate the effects of their workforce initiatives and 
use the results of the evaluations to make any needed changes to their 
approach. 

To assist TSA in its efforts to identify TSO staffing levels that 
reasonably reflect the operating conditions at individual airports and 
to help ensure that TSOs are effectively utilized, we are recommending 
that TSA (1) establish a formal, documented plan for reviewing all of 
the assumptions in the Staffing Allocation Model on a periodic basis to 
ensure that the assumptions result in TSO staffing allocations that 
accurately reflect operating conditions that may change over time; and 
(2) establish a policy for when TSOs can be used to provide operational 
support. 

We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its 
written comments, concurred with our findings and recommendations, and 
stated that the findings and recommendations are constructive and 
useful. DHS described some actions TSA has initiated to implement these 
recommendations, including working to develop a policy that would 
define when TSOs might be used to provide operational support. The full 
text of DHS's comments, as well as additional comments from TSA 
regarding the agency's workforce management initiatives, is included in 
appendix III. 

Background: 

Our Nation's Commercial Airports: 

There are more than 400 airports in the United States at which TSA 
provides or oversees passenger and checked baggage screening. These 
airports, often referred to as the nation's "commercial" airports, each 
contain one or more passenger screening checkpoints, and each 
checkpoint is composed of one or more screening lanes.[Footnote 11] In 
addition, airports have one or more baggage screening areas, either in 
airport lobbies or baggage makeup areas where baggage is sorted for 
loading onto aircraft. As of October 31, 2006, the nation's commercial 
airports contained a total of 761 checkpoints and 2,002 screening lanes 
at which passengers are screened. These airports can vary dramatically, 
not just in terms of passenger and flight volume, but in other 
characteristics, including physical size and layout. Figure 1 
identifies the number of commercial airports by airport security 
category, as of April 2006. 

Figure 1: Commercial Airports by Airport Security Category, as of April 
2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

[End of figure] 

Federal Security Directors (FSD) are the ranking TSA authorities 
responsible for leading and coordinating TSA security activities at the 
nation's commercial airports. TSA had 122 FSD positions at commercial 
airports nationwide, as of October 2006. Although an FSD is responsible 
for security at every commercial airport, not every airport has an FSD 
dedicated solely to that airport. Most category X airports have an FSD 
responsible for that airport alone. Other smaller airports are arranged 
in a "hub and spoke" configuration, in which an FSD is located at or 
near a hub airport but also has responsibility over one or more spoke 
airports of the same or smaller size. 

Performance of Screening Functions at Commercial Airports: 

Passenger screening is a process by which authorized personnel inspect 
individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any 
unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item 
aboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.[Footnote 12] Passenger 
screening personnel must inspect individuals for prohibited items at 
designated screening locations.[Footnote 13] There are four screening 
functions at passenger screening checkpoints. As shown in figure 2, the 
four passenger screening functions are: 

* X-ray screening of property, 

* walk-through metal detector screening of individuals, 

* hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and: 

* physical search of property and trace detection for explosives. 

Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their 
carry-on items and screening by the walk through metal detector. 
Passengers who set off the alarm on the X-ray machine or the walk 
through metal detector or who are designated as selectees--that is, 
passengers selected by a computer-assisted passenger prescreening 
system[Footnote 14] or another TSA-approved process to receive 
additional screening--are screened by hand-wand or pat-down and have 
their carry-on items screened for explosives traces, or they are 
physically searched. 

Figure 2: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Operation: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO and Nova Development Corporation. 

Note: Bomb Appraisal Officers are available to respond to unresolved 
alarms at the checkpoint that involve possible explosive devices. The 
Bomb Appraisal Officer may contact appropriate law enforcement or Bomb 
Squad officials if review indicates possible or imminent danger, in 
which case the officer ensures that the security checkpoint is cleared. 
The officer approves reopening of security lane(s) if no threat is 
posed. 

[A] Behavior Detection Officers are TSOs specially trained to detect 
suspicious behavior in individuals approaching the checkpoint. Should 
the BDO observe such behavior, he or she may refer the individual for 
individual screening or to a law enforcement officer. 

[B] The hand-wand or pat-down is conducted if a passenger is identified 
or randomly selected for additional screening because he or she met 
certain criteria or alarmed the walk-through metal detector. 

[C] Manual or ETD searches of accessible property occur if the 
passenger is identified or randomly selected for additional screening 
or if the TSO identified a potential prohibited item on X-ray. 

[End of figure] 

Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security 
screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and 
prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or 
weapon onboard an aircraft. As shown in figure 3, checked baggage 
screening is accomplished through the use of explosive detection 
systems[Footnote 15] or explosive trace detection systems,[Footnote 16] 
and through the use of alternative means, such as manual searches, 
canine teams, and positive passenger bag match,[Footnote 17] when the 
explosive detection or explosive trace detection systems are 
unavailable. 

Figure 3: Checked Baggage Screening Operation: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO and Nova Development Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

History of TSO Staffing Levels and Staffing Models: 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act mandated that TSA assume 
responsibility for passenger and checked baggage screening at the 
nation's airports using federal employees within 1 year of 
enactment.[Footnote 18] By November 2002, TSA had fully deployed a 
federal passenger and checked baggage TSO workforce of about 55,000 
full-time equivalents to the nation's commercial airports. This level 
of TSOs needed to conduct passenger and checked baggage screening was 
identified by a consultant, relying largely on the number of private 
sector screeners that had been in place prior to TSA. Subsequently, TSA 
decided to develop a staffing model to more effectively determine the 
appropriate number of TSOs needed at the nation's airports. TSA 
developed a demand driven model--a model based on flight schedules, 
connecting flight data, passenger loads,[Footnote 19] passenger arrival 
distribution curves,[Footnote 20] and number of passenger bags along 
with throughput rates for processing the passengers and bags--in an 
effort to make screening operations more efficient.[Footnote 21] This 
model identified a TSO staffing level of 49,600 full-time equivalents 
based, in part, on the need for 5.5 TSOs per passenger screening lane. 
The DHS Appropriations Act, 2004, enacted in October 2003, however, 
imposed a 45,000 full-time-equivalent cap specific to the number of 
TSOs.[Footnote 22] 

In May 2003, TSA set out to develop a tool to better define aviation 
security staffing requirements at airports nationwide by accounting for 
changes in screening technology, operating conditions, and airline 
operations. The result of this effort is the Staffing Allocation Model-
-an optimization model that seeks, within certain TSA 
constraints,[Footnote 23] to estimate the most efficient balance of 
TSOs needed to ensure security and minimize wait times. 

As shown in figure 4, TSA uses the staffing allocation model to 
generate (1) an annual full-time-equivalent total for each airport, 
known as an "annual allocation run," and (2) TSO work schedules 
throughout the course of the year, known as a "production, or 
scheduling, run." To determine the annual full-time-equivalent total 
for each airport, FSDs must first provide input to the model on their 
airports' passenger and checked baggage screening configuration. FSDs 
also provide input to the model on their airports' busiest month for 
screening demand based on originating passenger load factors. This 
"peak month" determination forms the basis of one of the model's key 
operating parameters used to compute each airport's full-time- 
equivalent staffing allocation. Specifically, for determination of an 
airport's annual full-time equivalent level, the model assumes a 
screening demand based on the average demand day during the airport's 
peak month. This assumption is linked to TSA's 10-minute wait time goal 
for processing passengers and baggage through security. According to 
TSA officials, the use of the average peak demand day is intended to 
ensure that, on an annual basis, 85 percent or more of the total 
passengers screened in U.S. airports will not have to wait more than 10 
minutes to be screened. Once the peak month is selected for each 
airport, TSA performs the annual allocation run on a representative 
week within the peak month. 

Figure 4: TSA's Use of the Staffing Allocation Model for Annual TSO 
Allocations and Scheduling of TSOs for Airports: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO, based on discussions with TSA officials. 

[A] Use of the model's scheduling component is optional, and some FSD 
offices create detailed work schedules using other methods. 

[End of figure] 

After receiving and reviewing the inputs and assumptions for each 
airport, TSA runs the Staffing Allocation Model to determine each 
airport's full-time equivalent level for the upcoming year.[Footnote 
24] During the run, the model takes each airport's configuration and 
peak month screening demand input, combines it with the assumptions 
regarding baggage and passenger processing, and uses these factors to 
simulate the flow of passengers and baggage through an airport's 
screening areas to provide work force requirements. Then it calculates 
the total number of TSOs required (expressed in full-time equivalents) 
for the year based on the results of running the model for the 
representative week of the peak month. This representative week FTE 
level is used to calculate the annual FTE estimate for the airport. 

After receiving their annual full-time-equivalent allocation, TSA staff 
at individual airports may periodically run the model throughout the 
year. As shown in figure 4, during these "scheduling" runs, FSD staff 
may use the model's optional scheduling tool to determine work 
schedules for TSO staff that will satisfy screening demand on a day-to- 
day basis.[Footnote 25] Similar to the annual allocation runs, TSA also 
inputs various historic data into the model during the scheduling runs. 
This input includes originating passenger load factors, estimates of 
number of bags per passenger, and passenger arrival distribution 
curves. 

In order to formulate TSO work schedules, the model monitors the 
passenger arrival patterns and recommends opening and closing lanes at 
passenger checkpoints to accommodate the demand. The optional 
scheduling software recommends a mix of full-time and part-time TSOs to 
satisfy the workforce requirements based on projected screening demand. 

According to TSA officials responsible for the staffing allocation 
model, TSA first ran the Staffing Allocation Model in August 2004 for 
fiscal year 2005. The model, which did not yet contain complete data on 
each airport, identified a TSO full-time-equivalent level of 47,865 
across all airports. To reach the congressionally-mandated limit of 
45,000 full-time-equivalent TSOs, TSA applied a 7 percent reduction to 
the staffing levels identified by the model across all airport 
categories. TSA officials stated that they subsequently questioned this 
approach given that smaller (category III and IV) airports have 
significantly fewer TSOs and, therefore, were more significantly 
impacted by the 7 percent reduction in full-time equivalent positions. 

According to TSA officials, because the Staffing Allocation Model was 
not centrally hosted[Footnote 26] and did not contain complete data, 
the model may have over-estimated the required FTEs for fiscal year 
2005. TSA determined that in August 2005, the Staffing Allocation Model 
contained complete and accurate data on each airport and the agency 
used it to identify TSO FTE allocations for each airport, and the 
output reflecting the total number of FTEs required--42,303--required 
no adjustment to fall within the congressionally-mandated limit of 
45,000 TSO FTEs. According to TSA officials, when TSA ran the model, it 
did so without imposing a limitation on the maximum number of full- 
time-equivalent TSOs, including either the 45,000 congressional limit 
or any budgetary limits. TSA informed FSDs of their TSO full-time- 
equivalent allocations in October 2005. Figure 6 shows the total TSO 
allocation, by airport category, for fiscal year 2004--the year prior 
to implementation of the staffing allocation model--through fiscal year 
2007. 

Figure 5: Total TSO Allocation, by Airport Category, for Fiscal Years 
2004 through 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: The allocations in this figure reflect federal TSOs only and do 
not include private screeners employed at the 6 airports across the 
nation utilizing these personnel. 

[End of figure] 

FSDs, air carrier representatives, and airport operators we interviewed 
at the 14 airports we visited stated that TSA's efforts to allocate a 
sufficient number of TSOs to screen passengers and checked baggage and 
minimize wait times have improved over the years. These officials 
stated that passenger and checked baggage screening has become more 
efficient as TSA has matured and gained a better understanding of the 
airport operating environment, and frequent travelers have become more 
familiar with the screening process. 

TSA's Use of the National Screening Force, Reserve TSO Full-Time 
Equivalents, and Private Screeners for Certain Screening Needs: 

TSA sets aside TSO full-time equivalents for needs outside of those 
considered by the Staffing Allocation Model in the annual allocation 
run for all airports. In order to handle short-term extraordinary needs 
at airports, TSA has established the National Screening Force of 615 
TSOs who can be sent to airports to augment local TSO staff during 
periods of unusually high passenger volume. In addition, certain 
airports may, during the course of the year, experience significant 
changes to their screening operations (e.g., arrival of a new airline, 
opening of a new terminal, etc.) For these airports, TSA established a 
reserve of 329 TSO full-time equivalents for fiscal year 2006 that can 
be used to augment the existing force. This allocation approach allowed 
TSA to stay within the 43,000 full-time-equivalent TSO budgetary limit 
for fiscal year 2006--a staffing level that TSA's Assistant Secretary 
stated is sufficient to provide passenger and checked baggage 
screening.[Footnote 27] 

Lastly, TSA allows certain airports to hire private contract screeners 
in lieu of TSOs. Under the Screening Partnership Program,[Footnote 28] 
six airports have applied to TSA and received approval to hire private 
contract screener forces as of fiscal year 2006. Despite the fact that 
these airports do not use federal screeners, TSA still used the 
Staffing Allocation Model to determine the full-time equivalent 
screening staff at each of these airports for fiscal year 2006. These 
staffing levels, as determined by the model, served as a limit on the 
number of private screeners that the private screening contractors 
could employ. According to TSA, the 1,702 total full-time equivalent 
staffing allocation at these airports does not count against TSA's 
nationwide ceiling of 45,000 full-time equivalents for TSO staff. 

TSA Relies on the Assumptions in Its Staffing Allocation Model, along 
with Mechanisms for Monitoring Them, to Help Ensure Sufficient TSO 
Staffing Levels, but Some Key Assumptions Do Not Reflect Operating 
Conditions: 

TSA aims to ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a 
sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage 
screening by: (1) building assumptions into its allocation model that 
are designed to calculate the necessary levels of TSOs to ensure 
security and minimize wait times, and (2) employing multiple monitoring 
mechanisms for the sufficiency of the model's outputs. TSA's staffing 
allocation model determined the fiscal years 2005 and 2006 TSO staffing 
level for each airport based on built-in assumptions designed to ensure 
the necessary levels of security and to minimize wait times--such as 
assumptions regarding processing of passengers and baggage through 
security checkpoints and information about each airport's baseline 
configuration--e.g., physical infrastructure. During the first 2 years 
of the Staffing Allocation Model's use, TSA established several 
mechanisms to monitor the sufficiency of the model's outputs and make 
adjustments in key model assumptions that do not fully reflect 
operating conditions for some airports. For example, TSA established a 
process for FSDs to request revisions to the assumptions used for their 
individual airports. In fiscal year 2006, TSA granted some, but not 
all, requests. TSA headquarters also started an assessment to evaluate 
selected Staffing Allocation Model assumptions, an assessment it 
expects to perform annually, varying the assumptions it examines each 
year. However, TSA does not have a mechanism for selecting and 
prioritizing which assumptions to review each year and for assuring 
that all assumptions are periodically reviewed. Additionally, FSDs and 
our own analysis identified concerns with the appropriateness of some 
of the assumptions for the fiscal year 2006 model. For example, some 
FSDs stated that TSA's method of calculating screening demand (the 85th 
percentile day) to also account for TSO absences from screening did not 
provide them with sufficient surplus staffing. In addition, the model 
assumed a ratio of 20 percent part time to 80 percent full time 
(expressed in full-time equivalents), even in airports that have 
consistently been unable to achieve a 20 percent part-time TSO 
workforce; and the model had no mechanism to account for use of TSOs to 
perform operation support functions. 

TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Seeks to Determine the Optimal TSO 
Staffing Levels for Each Airport, Relying on Assumptions that Are 
Designed to Help Ensure Necessary Levels of Security and to Minimize 
Passenger Wait Times: 

TSA's Staffing Allocation Model determined the fiscal years 2005 and 
2006 TSO staffing level for each airport using several built-in 
assumptions regarding security and wait times, in addition to data that 
reflect each airports' baseline configuration--e.g., permanent 
infrastructure and type of screening equipment. 

The key built-in assumptions are adjustable and designed to help ensure 
the necessary levels of security while minimizing wait times and 
include: 

* The minimum number of TSOs needed to staff each passenger screening 
checkpoint or baggage screening area based on the standard operating 
procedures for screening passengers and checked baggage and throughput 
rates for passenger and checked baggage screening equipment (see app. 
II). 

* A 10-minute maximum wait time for processing passengers and checked 
baggage.[Footnote 29] 

* Originating passenger and baggage load factors by airport based on a 
representative week during each airport's peak month (the 85th 
percentile assumption), which TSA expects will give FSDs some time 
during less busy periods to allow TSOs to obtain required training, 
perform operational support functions, and take annual or other forms 
of leave.[Footnote 30] 

* A desired ratio of 80 percent full-time to 20 percent part-time TSO 
staff, expressed as full time equivalents, at each category X, I, and 
II airport to allow for heavier staffing during busier periods (e.g., 
the hours when business travelers typically depart) and to minimize 
overstaffing during less busy periods, times during which part-time 
TSOs would not be scheduled to work. 

* Nonpassenger throughput rate of 4 percent.[Footnote 31] 

* Rates at which screening equipment have historically signaled the 
possibility of a threat object and the consequent need for additional 
screening. 

The Staffing Allocation Model used these assumptions, along with other 
inputs such as each airport's baseline configuration--e.g., the number 
and type of checkpoints, security lanes, baggage screening areas, and 
screening equipment at each airport--to determine TSO staffing 
allocations for the nation's commercial airports for fiscal years 2005 
and 2006. TSA officials stated that the assumptions used in the 
staffing allocation model and the other inputs collectively determine 
the TSO full-time-equivalent allocation for each airport. For this 
reason, airports with similar screening demand but different checkpoint 
configurations and types of screening equipment may receive different 
allocations. For example, TSA officials identified two category I 
airports that have similar screening demand, yet one airport received 
almost 50 percent more full-time equivalent TSOs in fiscal year 2006 
due to the physical infrastructure differences at these airports. 
Specifically, one airport has one terminal building, with three 
concourses, which generally enables passengers to be efficiently routed 
through one checkpoint in that one terminal. In contrast, the other 
airport has two separate terminals that prevent passengers from being 
routed through common checkpoints. This airport's separate terminals 
make sharing TSOs among the various checkpoints more challenging, 
creating a need for additional TSOs, thus the larger TSO allocation. 
Additionally, we visited category X and I airports with similar 
passenger volumes and differing TSO full-time-equivalent allocations 
for fiscal year 2006. According to TSA, in the case of the category X 
airports, while the passenger volumes for the two airports were 
similar--17.4 and 16.5 million, respectively--the difference in the 
type of passengers and the type of baggage screening equipment resulted 
in one of these airports receiving 26 percent more full-time-equivalent 
TSOs. Table 1 provides a summary of the various factors that influenced 
full-time-equivalent TSO allocations for fiscal year 2006 at some of 
the airports we visited. 

Table 1: Examples of Differences in Screening Operations, at Selected 
Airports We Visited, That Resulted in Differing TSO Allocations: 

Airport Category: X; 
Airports visited: Detroit (DTW); 
FY 2006 model allocation: 734; 
FY 2005 total enplanements: 17,433,663; 
Differences in screening operations resulting in differing allocation: 
* Orlando has more originating passengers than Detroit, which results 
in more passengers to screen. Detroit has more connecting flights whose 
passengers have already been screened at their originating airport; 
* Detroit has a partial in-line baggage screening system, which 
requires fewer TSOs, and Orlando does not have an in-line system.[A]. 

Airports visited: Orlando (MCO); 
FY 2006 model allocation: 925; 
FY 2005 total enplanements: 16,502,499. 

Airport Category: I; 
Airports visited: Indianapolis (IND); 
FY 2006 model allocation: 292; 
FY 2005 total enplanements: 4,211,461; 
Differences in screening operations resulting in differing allocation: 
* Indianapolis has more originating passengers than Orange County. 
Indianapolis is a mid-west airport with more connecting passengers that 
do not need to be screened; 
* Orange County has a full in-line baggage system, and Indianapolis has 
a partial in-line system serving only 3 airlines. As a result, Orange 
County has a reduced need for baggage- screening TSOs.[A]; 
* Orange County has 2 checkpoints in its terminal building that are 
close enough to one another to allow transferring of TSOs back and 
forth as screening demand dictates. This ease of sharing TSOs between 
the checkpoints results in a reduced number of TSOs than that called 
for by the model. In contrast, Indianapolis has 4 concourses with 3 
checkpoints and less ease of movement among them, which the model 
recognizes, thus requiring more TSOs. 

Airports visited: Orange County (SNA); 
FY 2006 model allocation: 217; 
FY 2005 total enplanements: 4,791,100. 

Source: TSA and GAO observations at airports. 

Note: The fiscal year 2005 enplanements data are only a rough indicator 
of actual screening demand. However, at the time we selected the 
airports to visit, enplanements data were the best available data. 

[A] An in-line baggage screening system integrates explosive detection 
systems with an airport's existing baggage handling system, requiring 
less human intervention (and, correspondingly, less TSO staff) than 
stand-alone systems that are not integrated into existing baggage 
systems. In a partial in-line system, the airport has some explosive 
detection systems integrated with the conveyor belts of the airport's 
existing baggage handling system while others are in a stand-alone 
setup. An airport with a full in-line system has all of its explosive 
detection systems integrated with the baggage handling system. 

[End of table] 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required 
TSA to develop staffing standards that provide for the necessary levels 
of security and minimize delays for passengers. According to TSA 
officials responsible for the Staffing Allocation Model, the model 
ensures that the staffing allocations provide for the necessary levels 
of security because the model is based on TSA's standard operating 
procedures for screening passengers and their carry-on items and 
checked baggage and on the technology available at the passenger 
checkpoints and baggage screening areas. For example, the passenger 
checkpoint standard operating procedures require that a minimum of one 
TSO be staffed for each of the screening functions at a checkpoint. The 
staffing model includes an assumption (for larger airports) of at least 
5.5 TSOs per screening lane--which responds to the need for one TSO per 
function at every checkpoint and includes a value for supervisors that 
typically oversee two lanes.[Footnote 32] In addition, the staffing 
model provides an allocation for each airport based, in part, on the 
screening technology at the airport. In addition, the model includes 
assumptions on alarm rates for various types of passenger and baggage 
screening equipment and determines the sufficient number of TSOs needed 
to resolve the alarms at the projected rate to be able to achieve the 
model's wait time standard of 10 minutes for processing passengers and 
checked baggage.[Footnote 33] 

Regarding minimizing passenger delays, a key assumption in the staffing 
allocation model is that wait times for screening passengers and 
checked baggage will not exceed 10 minutes when the model is set at a 
level referred to as the airport's 85th percentile day, which TSA 
calculates by estimating screening demand at the level required for a 
representative week of each airport's busiest month. TSA officials 
stated this assumption is based on a goal that was established when TSA 
was first created within the Department of Transportation. 
Specifically, the Secretary of the Department of Transportation 
established a goal that passengers be processed through passenger 
screening checkpoints in 10 minutes or less--a standard considered 
appropriate to meet the dual needs of ensuring security while 
maintaining national mobility. TSA officials stated that they 
determined that basing the Staffing Allocation Model's demand level on 
the representative demand week of each airport's peak month, coincided 
with screening 85 percent of passengers within 10 minutes. TSA 
officials told us that some passengers will still have to wait longer 
than 10 minutes at certain airports at certain times due, at least in 
part, to the fact that about 7 percent of an airport's travel days 
(about 25-30 days) during the year are expected to exceed the 85 
percentile demand day. 

As shown in table 2, TSA data for fiscal years 2004 through 2006 show 
that the nation's smaller airports (categories II, III, and IV) had 
shorter average wait times than the standard, overall, with a wait time 
during peak periods averaging less than 10 minutes, although wait times 
exceeded this level at certain airports on certain days.[Footnote 34] 
Average peak wait times at the nation's larger airports (category X and 
I) generally exceeded the wait time standard, overall, although wait 
times were less than 10 minutes at certain airports on certain days. 
According to TSA headquarters officials, if airports are consistently 
exceeding the 10 minute wait time goal, it is the responsibility of the 
Area Directors to reach out to the FSDs at those airports in an effort 
to determine whether the root cause relates to staffing, equipment, 
capacity, or some other issue and to take appropriate remedial 
action.[Footnote 35] 

Table 2: Average Peak Wait Times in Minutes, by Airport Category, 
Fiscal Years 2004-2006: 

Average peak wait times in minutes. 

FY04; 
All categories: 9.4; 
Category X: 13.0; 
Category I: 11.8; 
Category II: 8.5; 
Category III: 9.1; 
Category IV: 8.6. 

FY05; 
All categories: 8.9; 
Category X: 12.0; 
Category I: 11.2; 
Category II: 8.3; 
Category III: 8.7; 
Category IV: 8.2. 

FY06; 
All categories: 8.2; 
Category X: 12.6; 
Category I: 10.4; 
Category II: 7.7; 
Category III: 8.0; 
Category IV: 7.2. 

Source: TSA. 

[End of table] 

TSA officials cited capacity issues as a factor that contributed to 
category X airports generally exceeding the 10-minute wait time goal 
during peak periods, as shown in table 2. These airports have higher 
screening demand than smaller airports and sometimes lack the capacity, 
with regard to space available for additional passenger lanes and 
baggage screening areas, to process passengers and baggage quickly 
enough to have lower wait times. Smaller airports are more likely to 
have a number of passenger lanes and baggage screening areas that are 
more commensurate with their screening demand than some larger airports 
that have higher screening demand. 

TSA Has Four Mechanisms in Place to Monitor the Sufficiency of Its TSO 
Allocations and Is Formalizing Its Process for Revising the Model's 
Assumptions: 

TSA has four mechanisms in place to monitor the sufficiency of the TSO 
allocations. First, at individual airports, FSDs and the industrial 
engineers assigned to their airports are responsible for monitoring 
their passenger and checked baggage screening operations to ensure that 
the staffing allocation model's inputs are reliable.[Footnote 36] A 
process currently exists to enable FSDs to request revisions to the 
assumptions used for their individual airports when they believe that a 
model assumption is unrealistic. As part of this process, FSDs are to 
submit empirical data to support requests to alter assumptions. Based 
on TSA's review of the data, TSA may send an "optimization team" to the 
airport in an effort to identify the cause of the staffing 
problem.[Footnote 37] Optimization teams are composed of experts in 
passenger and baggage screening operations and procedures, the staffing 
allocation model, and TSO scheduling. These teams observe screening 
operations and seek to maximize efficiencies by applying practices 
learned at other airports. The reviews are used to help improve the 
design of passenger and baggage checkpoints, evaluate staffing and 
scheduling practices, determine compliance with the standard operating 
procedures, validate the TSO staffing model at the airport, and make 
adjustments to model assumptions, if necessary. TSA officials stated 
that they are formalizing a process for systematically collecting 
information on best practices identified by optimization teams so that 
this information can be disseminated across airports. TSA's 
solicitation of input from FSDs regarding changes that need to be made 
to the assumptions that guide their TSO allocations is consistent with 
our standards for internal control, which call for management to ensure 
effective internal communications, for example, by establishing 
mechanisms for employees to recommend improvements in 
operations.[Footnote 38] 

During the first 2 years of the implementation of the Staffing 
Allocation Model, TSA granted some, but not all, of FSDs' requests to 
modify the assumptions used for their individual airports. TSA provided 
several examples of these requests and the final outcome. For example, 
an FSD requested a change to passenger screening throughput rates at 
some of the passenger lanes in the international terminal due to the 
amount and type of carry-on items passengers tended to carry through 
this checkpoint. After reviewing the FSD's request and sending an 
optimization team to assess the validity of the request, TSA changed 
the model's assumption about the passenger throughput rate for this 
checkpoint from 200 to 165 passengers per hour at these lanes. TSA 
officials told us that, in situations like this, the model will 
recommend opening more lanes and adding TSOs, if deemed warranted, to 
offset a reduction in the number of passengers screened per hour. In 
another example, an FSD requested a change in its non-passenger--flight 
crew and airport employees--throughput rate based on data collected at 
the checkpoint that showed a higher percentage of nonpassenger 
throughput than the model assumes. TSA headquarters officials denied 
the request because the higher percentage of nonpassenger throughput 
was primarily occurring during off-peak periods and would not have 
changed the model's results for that airport. 

TSA headquarters officials told us that they did not document all the 
previous requests that they received from FSDs, potentially limiting 
the agency's ability to learn from past circumstances. TSA officials 
acknowledged that it would be helpful to fully document the requests 
they receive from FSDs and the outcome of these requests to help ensure 
consistency in their decision making, to provide a basis for management 
and decision makers to review and evaluate the decision-making process 
for potential improvements, and to replicate successful practices when 
similar circumstances arise at other airports. Officials stated that 
TSA is formalizing its process for revising assumptions based on 
airport-specific circumstances. In August 2006, TSA developed and 
distributed to FSDs a draft standard form to use when requesting 
deviations from the Staffing Allocation Model's standard assumptions. 
The form, finalized as of January 2007, captures information such as 
the date of the request; the airport for which the request is being 
made; the justification for the request; and approvals at various 
levels, such as the industrial engineer and TSA headquarters. TSA 
stated that FSDs were previously made aware of the draft form and 
provided instructions on using this form through various communication 
mechanisms, including written instructions provided to FSDs and FSD 
conferences held in September 2006. TSA is also developing a database 
to record and track the requests made by FSDs, decisions on whether to 
approve or deny requests, and the basis for the decisions. TSA 
officials stated that they expect the database to be completed by April 
30, 2007. 

Regarding the second mechanism to monitor the sufficiency of the 
model's outputs, TSA headquarters officials said it is the 
responsibility of individual FSDs and the industrial engineers assigned 
to their airports to ensure that the staffing allocation model reflects 
the configuration of and operating conditions at their airports. 
Therefore, TSA officials stated that, just prior to the model's annual 
allocation run for fiscal year 2006, they systematically solicited 
input from the industrial engineers assigned to the more than 400 
commercial airports to determine whether the model contains correct 
information regarding the configuration of each airport.[Footnote 39] 
TSA expects this process to occur annually in order to help ensure the 
reliability of the data inputs. 

As a third mechanism to monitor the sufficiency of the model's outputs, 
TSA headquarters officials stated that they continually monitor 
performance data reported by individual airports to identify any 
anomalies that may require further investigation such as high wait 
times over an extended period of time, lower than expected throughput 
at passenger lanes, high overtime rates (in excess of 4 percent), and 
airports with onboard TSO staff consistently below their staffing 
allocation. In some cases, anomalies identified by TSA may result in an 
optimization team visit to an airport in an effort to determine their 
cause. For example, TSA headquarters officials stated that an airport 
with consistently high wait times (generally greater than 40 minutes 
during peak periods) may prompt such a visit. During the visits, the 
optimization teams perform analyses (with the assistance of the 
staffing allocation model) to determine the causes of the problems the 
airport is having and suggest to the local FSD ways to increase 
efficiency in the passenger and baggage screening operations to 
overcome the problems. In some cases, the optimization team may 
conclude that a change to the Staffing Allocation Model's baseline 
assumptions for the airport is necessary. For example, the airport may 
have lower throughput rates at some of its passenger or baggage 
screening areas than the Staffing Allocation Model assumes, due to 
different types of screening equipment or the physical layout of the 
airport security checkpoints. 

Finally, according to TSA officials, in September 2006, TSA completed 
its first annual review of certain assumptions in the Staffing 
Allocation Model. This review included an assessment of whether the 
assumptions under review are still realistic, including assumptions 
related to screening procedures, technology, screening throughput, and 
nonpassenger alarm rates; and whether adjustments to the model are 
needed to make the full-time-equivalent allocation reflect actual 
operating conditions at airports. As a result, as shown in table 3, TSA 
has changed some assumptions and added others to more realistically 
reflect actual operating conditions.[Footnote 40] For example, TSA 
headquarters officials responsible for the model stated the fiscal year 
2007 model will provide 4.25 TSOs per passenger checkpoint screening 
lane rather than the 5.5 TSOs per lane provided in the fiscal year 2006 
model--a change TSA officials attributed to the model directly 
accounting for collateral duties performed by TSOs, TSO time paid but 
not worked,[Footnote 41] and TSO training requirements. 

Table 3: Summary of Changes to the Staffing Allocation Model 
Implemented in Fiscal Year 2007: 

Staffing constants; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Security checkpoint 
staffing set at 5.5 for category X, I, and II airports; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Security checkpoint 
staffing set at 4.25 for category X, I, and II airports. 

Staffing constants; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: EDS machine staffing set at 
3; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: EDS machine staffing set at 
2. 

TSO paid-not-worked hours (annual, sick, and military leave, comp time, 
and injury time off); 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Not directly accounted for; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Each airport has a 14.5 
percent annual FTE allowance for time paid not worked. 

Operational support functions; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Not directly accounted for; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Airports in categories X, 
I, and II have a 5 percent collateral duties FTE credit. 

TSO training; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Not directly accounted for; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Each airport has a 2 
percent annual FTE allowance for training that cannot be completed 
during operational down times. 

Part-time TSOs; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Set at 20 percent of total 
FTEs for all category X, I, and II airports; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: TSA has implemented a 
variable part-time goal based on each airport's individual part-time to 
full- time ratio. 

Baggage/passenger screening equipment processing rates; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: ETD machine baggage 
processing rates (depending on type of equipment and internal/external 
screening methodology) set at 60, 90, or 180 seconds); 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: ETD baggage processing 
rates set at 55, 98, or 238 seconds. 

Baggage/passenger screening equipment processing rates; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: CTX 2500 EDS machine 
screening rate set at 90 bags per hour; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: CTX2500 set at 115 bags per 
hour. 

Baggage/passenger screening equipment processing rates; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: CTX5500 EDS screening rate 
set at 160 bags per hour; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: CTX5500 EDS screening rate 
set at 200 bags per hour. 

Baggage/passenger screening equipment processing rates; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: [Empty]; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: CT80 machine added with 
processing rate of 80 bags per hour. 

Baggage/passenger screening equipment processing rates; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: [Empty]; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Explosives Trace Portal 
(ETP) machine added with processing rate of 175 passengers per hour. 

Baggage arrival distributions; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Included 6 different 
baggage distributions; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Number of baggage 
distributions reduced to 2. 

New security initiatives; 
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: [Empty]; 
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Added line item allocation 
for SPOT,[A] BAO,b and ADASPc security initiatives. 

Source: TSA. 

[A] TSA's Screening Passengers by Observation Technique program is 
designed to detect individuals who exhibit behavior that indicates they 
may be a threat to aviation and/or transportation security. 

[B] TSA's Bomb Appraisal Officer initiative designates TSOs to receive 
specialized training in the detection of improvised explosive devices 
and apply this knowledge at security checkpoints. 

[C] TSA's Aviation Direct Access Screening Program involves TSOs 
performing security screening for explosives, incendiaries, weapons, 
and other prohibited items or improper airport identification media. 
This security screening will occur at direct access points to include 
secured areas, sterile areas, or aircraft operating areas outside of 
TSA's security screening checkpoints. 

[End of table] 

TSA officials responsible for the staffing allocation model stated that 
in deciding which assumptions to review for the fiscal year 2007 model, 
they considered input they received from FSDs regarding operational 
conditions at their airports that may not be adequately reflected in 
the model, along with other data and events that may have a bearing on 
the validity of the assumptions. However, TSA does not have a 
mechanism, such as a documented plan, for selecting and prioritizing 
which assumptions to review each year and for assuring that all 
assumptions are periodically reviewed. Without a plan for periodically 
validating the assumptions, the agency is at risk of assumptions 
becoming outdated, which could result in TSO allocations that do not 
reflect actual operating conditions. Moreover, given the ongoing 
personnel changes in TSA, a documented plan would help provide future 
decision makers with information on which assumptions had historically 
been assessed and which ones TSA planned to assess in the 
future.[Footnote 42] TSA officials responsible for the staffing model 
acknowledged that while they had a general idea of how they plan to 
approach future annual reviews of the model, a documented plan would 
help provide assurance that the assumptions are periodically reviewed 
and validated, and are current with actual operating conditions. 

Some Key Assumptions Used in the Fiscal Year 2006 Staffing Allocation 
Model Did Not Reflect Operating Conditions at Individual Airports: 

FSDs we interviewed reported that the screening allocation model is a 
more accurate predictor of their overall staffing needs than previous 
models that took into account fewer factors affecting screening 
operations. However, these FSDs and our own analysis identified that 
some of the key assumptions used in the staffing allocation model, 
during the first 2 years of its implementation, did not reflect actual 
operating conditions. Specifically, the FSDs identified five weaknesses 
in the model for fiscal year 2006. 

First, 11 of the 14 FSDs identified concerns related to TSA's basing 
its estimate of demand levels for the Staffing Allocation Model on a 
representative week of each airport's peak screening demand month to 
allow excess time for training, leave, and other factors not directly 
considered by the staffing allocation model. Regarding training, 9 of 
the 14 FSDs expressed concern that the model did not specifically 
account for the training requirement of 3 hours per week averaged over 
a fiscal year quarter. Three of these FSDs said they faced challenges 
in meeting the minimum training requirements. With respect to annual 
and sick leave, 5 of the 14 FSDs stated that in their view the model 
did not adequately account for this leave. Two FSDs stated that the use 
of the peak demand month to account for training and leave, though 
sound in principle, is particularly difficult for smaller airports 
because they do not have as much fluctuation between their peak period 
and their non-peak period, which leaves little cushion in the 
allocation to accommodate TSO absences from screening duties such as 
training and annual leave. 

TSA headquarters officials stated that TSA determined that using the 
85th percentile day concept would more than account for training, 
leave, and other factors related to TSOs not being available for work 
because, according to TSA, on only about 7 percent of days do passenger 
volumes exceed it. Thus, according to TSA officials, the Staffing 
Allocation Model is set at a high enough demand level to cover 
screening demand for most days during the year and allow for the extra 
time needed for necessary nonscreening time needed by TSOs such as 
training, leave, and other duties. TSA officials told us that they 
believe this method of calculating demand provides the necessary level 
of security and, secondarily, reflects their responsibility to be good 
financial stewards of taxpayer dollars, as using even higher volume 
days would result in higher costs and perhaps lower overall 
productivity. Regarding the need for an additional allowance for 
various forms of TSO leave needs, TSA had included an allowance, for 
fiscal year 2007, in the Staffing Allocation Model for additional full- 
time equivalents (14.5 percent full-time-equivalent allowance) to cover 
annual, sick, comp, injury, and military leave. 

Additionally, TSA headquarters officials have included an allowance in 
the fiscal 2007 Staffing Allocation Model (an additional 2 percent full-
time equivalent allowance) for training that cannot be completed during 
operational down times. TSA specifically intended this allowance to 
provide additional assurance that TSOs complete the required training 
each month on detecting improvised explosive devices--which TSA has 
identified as the highest threat to commercial aviation security. 

TSA officials involved in developing the staffing model stated that 
they did not plan to assess the extent to which the representative week 
of screening demand during each airport's peak month does, in fact, 
represent actual screening demand for that week. However, officials 
acknowledged that such an assessment could help verify that, for 
purposes of the model's annual allocation run, the resulting allocation 
provides TSO staffing levels adequate to allow for 85 percent of 
airline passengers at the nation's commercial airports to wait 10 
minutes or less at security checkpoints. 

Second, 7 of the 14 FSDs we interviewed stated that the goal of a 20 
percent part-time TSO workforce, as measured by full-time-equivalent 
TSOs, is not realistic. TSA data show that the part-time TSO full-time- 
equivalent level at 13 airports we visited,[Footnote 43] as of July 
2006, ranged from approximately 1 to 38 percent, with an average of 8 
percent. FSDs stated that the 20 percent part-time goal for TSOs has 
been difficult to achieve for most airports because of, among other 
things, economic conditions leading to competition for part-time 
workers, remote airport locations coupled with a lack of mass transit 
in some locations, TSO base pay that has not changed since fiscal year 
2002, the lack of benefits for part-time TSOs, and the large number of 
part-time TSOs who convert to full-time status when full-time positions 
become available. According to TSA, these factors have made the hiring 
and retention of part-time TSOs particularly difficult. As shown in 
figure 6, TSA data reflect that, nationwide, part-time levels of TSOs 
had not reached 20 percent in the first 2 years of implementation of 
the current staffing allocation model (fiscal years 2005 and 2006) with 
regard to the nation's larger (category X, I, and II) 
airports.[Footnote 44] For example, figure 6 also shows that in fiscal 
years 2005 and 2006, the nation's 26 category X airports had a TSO 
workforce comprised of about 9 percent part-time equivalents. TSA 
officials stated that the number of part-time TSOs had increased in 
recent months. 

TSA officials originally assumed that the 20 percent TSO part-time 
assumption provides the most efficient coverage for airports 
(especially those in categories X, I, and II) by enabling FSDs to have 
more flexibility in matching the daily peak-load workflow at 
airports.[Footnote 45] Nonetheless, figure 6 shows that, on average, 
only smaller airports (categories III and IV) came close to or exceeded 
the 20 percent part-time TSO workforce goal during fiscal years 2004 
through 2006. 

Figure 6: Percentage of Part-Time TSOs by Airport Category, Fiscal 
Years 2004 through 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private 
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these 
personnel. 

[End of figure] 

TSA has recognized that some airports cannot likely achieve a 20 
percent part-time FTE level and others (most likely smaller airports) 
may operate more effectively with other levels of part-time TSO staff. 
As a result, for fiscal year 2007, TSA has modified this assumption to 
include a variable part-time goal based on each airport's historic part-
time to full-time TSO ratio. 

Third, 5 of the 14 FSDs stated that the staffing model does not appear 
to consider new passenger screening procedures that may require 
additional TSOs at the checkpoint. For example, one FSD stated that the 
model has yet to incorporate the additional TSOs that will be required 
by TSA's new Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques program 
currently being implemented at the nation's airports.[Footnote 46] TSA 
headquarters officials acknowledged that changes to screening 
procedures could increase the number of TSOs needed at a checkpoint or, 
conversely, increase wait times at the checkpoint. Therefore, TSA has 
made changes to the staffing allocation model for fiscal year 2007 to 
include line item allocations for the new Screening Passengers by 
Observation Techniques, Bomb Appraisal Officer, and Aviation Direct 
Access Screening Program security initiatives. 

Fourth, two of the five FSDs with in-line checked baggage screening 
systems stated that in their view TSA overestimated the TSO labor 
savings that would be achieved as a result of deploying in-line baggage 
screening systems. TSA headquarters officials responsible for the 
staffing model stated that some adjustments had to be made to 
individual airports' TSO staffing levels to adequately reflect the 
configuration of the airports' in-line systems, which permit higher 
throughput rates. Specifically, some airports have full in-line 
systems, while others have partial in-line systems that are installed 
at a particular terminal or terminals. Additionally, TSA officials 
cited one example in which a category X airport received a reduction in 
TSOs in fiscal year 2005 to account for the in-line baggage screening 
system at the airport. However, TSA officials responsible for the 
staffing model later learned that the model had incorrectly assumed 
that the system was fully operational, when in fact it was still under 
construction. Officials stated that the FSD at this airport was 
consequently allocated additional TSO positions. TSA officials stated 
that the model validation process currently underway should help ensure 
that the model adequately reflects the actual operating conditions at 
the airport, which highlights the importance of a mechanism to provide 
assurance that all assumptions periodically undergo validation. 

Finally, FSDs identified that the model does not account for TSOs being 
used in operational support functions. Eleven of the 14 FSDs we 
interviewed stated that because they are not authorized to hire a 
sufficient number of mission support staff, TSOs are being routinely 
used to perform certain operational support functions such as payroll 
processing, scheduling, distribution and maintenance of uniforms, data 
entry, and workman's compensation processing. At 13 airports[Footnote 
47] we visited between January and August 2006, out of a total of 4,710 
TSOs on-board at those airports, TSA was using 242 TSOs (about 5 
percent) for operational support functions. FSDs and their staffs 
stated that these TSOs were spending varying amounts of time on 
operational support duties, some on a nearly full-time basis.[Footnote 
48] As shown in figure 7, nearly 7 percent of TSOs nationwide performed 
operational support (on at least a part-time basis) during a specific 2-
week pay period in fiscal 2006. This percentage was slightly higher for 
the smaller airport categories. Also, as shown in figure 7, the TSOs 
performing operational support functions at the nation's airports spent 
approximately half their time on these duties--38 out of 80 possible 
hours--during the 2-week period. In addition, TSOs performing 
operational support functions at Category X airports spent 
significantly more time on these duties (approximately 63 out of 80 
hours) than TSOs in the other airport categories. 

Figure 7: Percent of TSOs Used for Operational Support Functions, along 
with Average Hours Spent by Them on These Functions, by Airport 
Category for a 2-Week Period--September 17, 2006, through September 30, 
2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private 
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these 
personnel. 

[End of figure] 

In September 2006, in reporting on its review of TSA administrative 
positions, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector 
General found that TSA had not determined the precise number of FSD 
administrative positions it needs and was using TSOs to perform 
administrative work due to a lack of other personnel to perform this 
work.[Footnote 49] The Inspector General reported that during a 15-week 
period from October 2, 2005, through January 21, 2006, TSOs performed 
operational support work equivalent to 1,441 full-time-equivalent TSO 
positions, which is equivalent to about 78 percent of the 1,850 support 
staff formally assigned to do this work. Moreover, the Inspector 
General reported that TSOs were working overtime to perform these 
duties. The Inspector General recommended that, among other actions, 
TSA conduct a workforce analysis of FSD administrative staff and 
develop a staffing model to determine the number of administrative 
employees needed at airports, and take into consideration the time and 
nature of administrative work performed by TSOs when assessing its 
workforce requirements. In May 2006, TSA headquarters officials told us 
that they were conducting a survey of FSDs to identify the number of 
hours their staffs, including TSOs, spend each week on a variety of 
operational support functions. These officials stated that they will 
review the FSD responses to determine the time it takes to perform each 
function and the level of staffing needed. The number of operational 
support staff provided to each airport will be based on the types of 
administrative functions performed at the airport and the availability 
of funding. TSA headquarters officials stated that they have not made a 
decision on whether permanent operational support staff would be 
provided in the form of additional TSOs or full-time administrative 
staff. In the interim, TSA contracted with three private companies in 
September 2006 to provide temporary operational support services to 
FSDs that request this assistance from TSA headquarters. According to 
TSA, these contractors supplement FSD administrative staff so that TSOs 
performing operational support functions can return to their primary 
screening duties. 

Additionally, in order to account for additional TSO time needed for 
operational support, TSA included a "collateral duties credit" in the 
Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal year 2007. This credit will 
increase each airport's fiscal year 2007 allocation identified by the 
staffing model by 5 percent at category X, I, and II airports. TSA 
officials stated that the agency is not providing this credit to 
category III and IV airports because the extended periods of low 
screening demand at these airports offsets the need for such an 
allowance. 

TSA's use of TSOs to perform operational support functions may 
contribute to scheduling challenges because these TSOs are unavailable 
for their primary responsibilities to screen passengers and their 
checked baggage. For example, an FSD at a category X airport stated 
that he would have less of a problem scheduling checkpoints during peak 
passenger volume if he did not have to use TSOs to provide operational 
support. Additionally, the use of TSOs to perform operational support 
functions may undermine TSA's investment in training them for screening 
functions since the TSO is not performing the job for which they were 
trained. Moreover, TSA has stated that TSO performance improves with 
experience. Consequently, TSOs who are not conducting passenger or 
checked baggage screening are not gaining the additional experience to 
help enhance their performance. An FSD we interviewed at a category X 
airport stated that having to use TSOs to perform operational support 
duties at his airport has created challenges in keeping these TSOs 
proficient in screening duties. However, TSA headquarters' officials 
stated that using TSOs to perform operational support functions does 
not adversely impact TSO performance because the agency has various 
methods in place to ensure that all TSOs, including those performing 
nonscreening duties, meet minimum security standards. For example, all 
TSOs have to meet the recurrent training requirement of 3 hours of 
training per week averaged over a calendar quarter to maintain 
proficiency and remain current on procedural changes and new threat 
items and all TSOs are subject to the various components of TSA's 
performance accountability and standards system.[Footnote 50] 
Additionally, TSA officials stated that an April 2006 management 
directive requires TSOs who have not performed screening functions for 
15 or more consecutive days to complete a return to duty training 
program. Nevertheless, TSA officials acknowledged that the agency has 
not examined the impact of using TSOs to perform operational support 
duties on cost, scheduling efficiency, and TSO performance. In 
addition, TSA has not determined under what circumstances it is 
appropriate to use TSOs to perform operational support functions or 
provided FSDs with guidance on when TSOs can be used this way. Without 
establishing such guidance, FSDs may over rely on TSOs to perform 
operational support functions. 

TSA's FSDs Are Responsible for Deploying TSO Allocations at their 
Airports, but Face Workforce and Other Challenges to Effective 
Deployment: 

TSA has vested its FSDs with responsibility for managing their TSO 
allocations while considering local circumstances that can affect the 
staffing allocation model's effectiveness in deploying the TSO 
workforce. After receiving the annual FTE allocation from TSA 
headquarters, the FSD and his or her staff must prepare TSO work 
schedules, by using the staffing model's optional scheduling tool or 
some other method, to ensure that adequate numbers of TSOs are 
conducting passenger and baggage screening operations, at all times, to 
ensure adequate security and attempt to meet the 10 minute wait time 
standard. However, factors outside the model's determination of overall 
staffing levels can affect FSDs' ability to effectively schedule TSOs 
at passenger lanes and baggage check areas. For example, as previously 
discussed, few airports have been able to achieve a 20 percent FTE 
level for part-time staff as assumed by the staffing allocation model 
in its first 2 years of implementation (fiscal years 2005 and 2006)-- 
forcing FSDs to adjust the scheduling tool based on actual part-time 
TSOs on board. Also, as of September 30, 2006, approximately one-third 
of airports had less than 90 percent of their overall TSO positions 
filled, and nine of the 14 airports we visited were similarly below 
their staffing allocation. FSDs cited certain other challenges in 
scheduling TSO staff including injuries and absenteeism, in addition to 
time spent away from screening duties due to training requirements and 
operational support needs--factors that the scheduling tool did not 
directly consider in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. As previously 
discussed, to address some of these difficulties, TSA has revised some 
of the assumptions in the Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal year 
2007. To address other difficulties, TSA has implemented several human 
capital initiatives to improve hiring and retention of TSO staff, 
lessen the impact of injuries and absenteeism, and study the impact of 
training and operational support demands on TSO time. TSA has not yet 
assessed the impact of these initiatives on hiring and retention, but 
plans to do so during fiscal year 2007. 

FSDs Are Responsible for Managing to Their TSO Staffing Allocation in 
Light of Local Circumstances: 

FSDs are responsible for deploying and managing to their TSO allocation 
in light of local circumstances, including those that might affect 
scheduling and pose challenges to most efficiently deploying their 
resource allocations. At the beginning of each fiscal year, the 
staffing allocation model identifies the annual allocation of TSOs 
needed at each airport based on projected demand levels and other 
factors that make up the model. Nonetheless, this stated allocation is 
only a starting point. Throughout the fiscal year, FSDs are responsible 
for preparing TSO work schedules that adapt to changing circumstances 
at the local level. Specifically, FSDs are responsible for scheduling 
TSOs to ensure that a sufficient number of TSOs are deployed, from 
available staff, to meet airport screening needs. 

TSA has provided FSDs with an optional tool they can use to facilitate 
the management of their TSO allocation. Specifically, the Staffing 
Allocation Model includes a scheduling component that uses the various 
inputs to and assumptions of the model, including the number of 
checkpoints, lanes, and checked baggage screening machines needed to 
respond to the passenger and checked baggage load and the minimum TSO 
staffing levels identified in the standard operating procedures for 
passenger and checked baggage screening. This tool is then to produce 
daily workforce requirements and calculates a work schedule for each 
airport. The schedule identifies a recommended mix of full-time and 
part-time staff and a total number of TSO FTEs needed to staff the 
airport on a given day, consistent with a goal of 10 minutes maximum 
wait time for processing passengers and baggage. In addition, there are 
several areas where TSA adjusts the scheduling tool to most accurately 
reflect actual conditions and needs. These areas include: 

* Flight schedule changes. 

* TSO training requirements (based on available times identified by the 
scheduling tool). 

* Number of TSOs needed for operational support associated with 
operating the checkpoint and baggage screening areas. 

* New passenger and checked baggage screening procedures that affect 
TSO utilization. 

FSDs stated that because the scheduling tool does not contain this 
information, they must modify the input to the tool, or use an 
alternative scheduling tool, to deploy their TSO workforce. For 
example, FSDs and their staffs stated that the scheduling tool does not 
contain the most current flight schedule data due to the reporting 
practices of various airlines. During our airport visits, TSA 
scheduling officers reported that the scheduling tool includes data 
from as much as 90 days in advance, but some airlines provide their 
final flight schedules and anticipated passenger volume as late as 1 
week in advance--sometimes leaving FSDs little time to ensure adequate 
TSO availability. TSA officials said that in order to keep their flight 
offerings competitive, airlines seek to protect their flight data from 
public disclosure as long as possible. For this reason, TSA 
headquarters officials said they expect FSDs to work with airport 
operators and airline officials to obtain the most current data 
available on which to base their scheduling efforts and to make 
adjustments to the scheduling tool to ensure that their deployment of 
TSOs most effectively meets the screening demand. 

The nine FSDs we interviewed at category X and I airports reported that 
the scheduling tool was useful as a starting point for developing their 
schedules. However, all six FSDs who said they used the scheduling tool 
regularly reported making adjustments to the schedule output to more 
accurately reflect their local conditions primarily because, according 
to these FSDs, the scheduling tool does not automatically take into 
account the actual composition of the TSO workforce at each individual 
airport or, in some cases, unique work schedules that may be 
implemented at some airports (other than a standard 5-day work week). 
For example, the scheduling tool is based on the model's assumption of 
a 20 percent part-time force expresses as a full-time-equivalent level 
among available staff, although few of the larger airports have been 
able to achieve this level of part-time staff. Specifically, only 2 of 
the 26 category X airports had a workforce composed of at least 20 
percent part-time staff in July 2006. Because the scheduling tool 
assumes a 20 percent part-time level for TSOs, FSDs at airports we 
visited with lower levels of part-time TSOs stated that they make 
adjustments to the scheduling tool's output to more accurately reflect 
the airport's actual mix of full-time and part-time TSOs and then 
develop a work schedule accordingly. In addition, as of September 30, 
2006, TSA data showed that approximately one-third of the nation's 
airports had less than 90 percent of their annual TSO positions filled. 
According to FSDs we interviewed, however, the scheduling tool assumes 
that each airport has its full TSO allocation on board. Moreover, 
according to TSA, the scheduling tool assumes that TSOs across all 
airports have standard 5-day work weeks, although individual airports 
may require TSOs to work varying schedules. For example, an FSD for a 
category III airport told us that he requires TSOs to work a sixth day 
once every 4 weeks. However, the FSD at this airport stated that the 
scheduling tool cannot account for this schedule. 

In response, TSA headquarters officials stated that the scheduling tool 
can indeed account for the actual number of onboard TSOs, the actual 
mix of full-time and part-time TSOs, and most scheduling anomalies FSDs 
encounter.[Footnote 51] The TSA headquarters officials attributed the 
FSDs' comments to misunderstandings regarding the full capabilities of 
the scheduling tool. The officials further explained that the agency 
has done a better job recently in training field staff in the use of 
the scheduling tool than was done earlier in the Staffing Allocation 
Model's implementation.[Footnote 52] 

FSDs at the four smaller (category II and III) airports we visited 
stated that the scheduling tool was more useful for larger airports 
with more complex scheduling challenges given the size of the 
workforce, the higher passenger volumes, and the larger number of 
checkpoints and terminals. These FSDs stated that smaller airports can 
more easily predict their screening demand and generally said they did 
not believe that the staffing model's scheduling tool added value to 
their scheduling process--especially since they are dealing with small 
numbers of TSO staff and limited passenger and baggage check 
facilities, for example, having only one checkpoint with few lanes. 
Therefore, they have chosen to continue to use such locally developed 
tools, such as spreadsheets. However, TSA headquarters officials stated 
that use of the scheduling tool by all airports will eliminate 
applications, such as these spreadsheets, that are inconsistent with 
the Staffing Allocation Model and TSA's time and attendance reporting 
system, thereby enhancing efficiency in scheduling TSOs. 

While TSA headquarters officials stated that the scheduling tool is 
capable of preparing schedules for any size airport and accounting for 
all the issues noted as problems by the FSDs we visited, officials are 
currently permitting each FSD to determine whether to use the 
scheduling tool. TSA officials stated that technical improvements 
planned for the scheduling tool will improve its usefulness in 
preparing TSO schedules. For example, installation of high-speed 
internet connectivity and implementation of electronic time and 
attendance reporting will allow the scheduling tool to efficiently 
maintain up-to-date rosters of available TSO staff to schedule, 
according to TSA officials. After these technical improvements are 
made, which TSA expects to be completed in fiscal year 2007, TSA 
officials told us they may consider making the tool mandatory. 

According to TSA, electronic time and attendance will improve 
scheduling by providing connectivity between the scheduling tool and 
TSA's timekeeping system. This automation is to enable the automatic 
linking of scheduling and timekeeping information and provide planned 
schedules and actual time worked. 

FSDs Cited Challenges in Deploying Their TSO Workforce to Perform 
Screening, and Several Efforts Are Underway to Address These 
Challenges: 

All 14 FSDs we interviewed identified challenges they faced in 
deploying their TSO workforce. Nine of the 14 airports we visited were 
below their allocation for TSOs as determined by the staffing model. 
FSDs at these airports cited the inability of TSA's centralized hiring 
process to replace TSOs quickly. However, attrition, particularly by 
part-time TSOs, was also cited as a barrier to achieving and 
maintaining their TSO staffing levels. TSA has stated a goal of each 
FSD maintaining a TSO staffing level of not less than 90 percent of 
each individual airport's TSO allocation. Based on TSA data, 
approximately 53 percent (237) of commercial airports were either at, 
or no less than 10 percent below, their respective TSO allocations at 
the end of fiscal year 2006. Approximately 31 percent of airports (140) 
were below 90 percent of their allocation, and 16 percent (71) of 
airports were 110 percent or more above their allocation.[Footnote 53] 
Sixty-nine of the 71 airports above their allocation were among the 
small category III and IV airports. Conversely, as also shown in figure 
8, 131 of the 140 airports below 90 percent of their TSO allocations 
are airports in categories II, III, and IV. These smaller airports have 
correspondingly smaller numbers of TSOs; therefore, even small staff 
fluctuations have a greater impact on being above or below their TSO 
allocations. Overall, more large airports (categories X and I) have 
succeeded in meeting their TSO allocations determined by the Staffing 
Allocation Model. 

Figure 8: Airports' On-Board Status, by Airport Category, Compared to 
TSO Staffing Allocation, in Full-Time-Equivalent TSOs, as of September 
30, 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private 
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these 
personnel. 

[End of figure] 

According to TSA officials, airports that are above their allocation 
must reduce their TSO staffing levels by either (1) attrition or (2) 
transferring their excess TSOs to airports that are below their 
allocation. TSA officials also stated that airports grouped together 
under TSA's "hub and spoke" organizational structure often share TSO 
resources as needs dictate.[Footnote 54] 

FSDs we interviewed cited various reasons for attrition, including 
limited advancement opportunities, need for higher paying job, work 
hours, difficulty of work, and job dissatisfaction. At the same time, 
as shown in figure 9, TSO attrition rates, for both full-time and part- 
time staff, decreased from approximately 24 percent to 21 percent from 
fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2006. However, as previously discussed, 
the part-time TSO attrition rate remains considerably higher than the 
rate for full-time personnel (approximately 46 percent versus 16 
percent for fiscal year 2006). 

Figure 9: Attrition Rates for Full-Time and Part-Time TSOs, Fiscal 
years 2004 to 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private 
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these 
personnel. 

[End of figure] 

According to the Office of Personnel Management, an important principle 
behind maintaining a quality workforce is employee retention, and an 
analysis of workforce trends is essential to determine what factors 
most affect retention. To this end, in August 2005, TSA hired a 
contractor to administer exit surveys during fiscal year 2006 to 
employees who voluntarily separated from TSA. While the response rate, 
as of July 2006, was too low (15 percent) to draw overall conclusions 
about the results, TSA stated that the most common reasons cited by 
TSOs for separating from TSA include better job opportunities, 
dissatisfaction with TSA leadership, and personal reasons. For part- 
time TSOs, the most common reasons were better job opportunity, 
personal reasons, dissatisfaction with their supervisor and undesirable 
work schedule. TSA plans to conduct further analysis of the responses 
based on whether the TSO was a full-time or part-time employee in an 
effort to determine the unique issues facing each group. TSA officials 
stated that nearly half (47%) of the survey respondents said that they 
would consider returning to TSA.[Footnote 55] TSA has acknowledged that 
the high attrition rates drive up hiring and training costs. TSA 
officials stated that it costs about $10,000 to assess, hire, and train 
a TSO. Officials estimated that for every 2,500 TSOs that TSA retains, 
including part-time TSOs, TSA could save about $25 million. 

Five of the 14 the FSDs we interviewed cited either generally high 
levels of absenteeism[Footnote 56] or injuries as factors that affect 
their ability to schedule TSOs to passenger lanes and baggage screening 
areas. The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA has also 
identified high absenteeism and injury rates as major causes of 
staffing shortages. While absenteeism and injuries remain prevalent 
among the TSO workforce, TSA data indicate overall improvement in these 
problem areas. As shown in figure 10, TSO absenteeism rates, across all 
airport categories, have improved from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 
2006. 

Figure 10: Average Rate of TSO Absenteeism per 100 TSOs, by Airport 
Category, for Fiscal Years 2004 - 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private 
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these 
personnel. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, as shown in figure 11, TSO injuries (as represented by 
workman's compensation claims) have improved over the same period 
(fiscal year 2004 to 2006). TSA headquarters officials attributed this 
improvement to the agency's initiatives to reduce injuries among the 
TSO workforce. 

Figure 11: TSA Workman's Compensation Claims for Calendar Years 2004 - 
2006, through June 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Department of Labor data. 

Note: The data in this figure include all workman's compensation claims 
received by the Department of Labor from TSA and are not limited 
exclusively to TSOs. However, TSA officials stated that the vast 
majority of these claims are from their TSO workforce. 

[End of figure] 

Despite the acknowledgement of problems with attrition and absenteeism, 
TSA headquarters officials stated that, nationwide, excessive use of 
overtime has not been a problem and is mostly used to address 
attrition, one-time events, unexpected delays, and holidays. Figure 12 
shows that TSA's use of overtime, which does not count against the full-
time-equivalent rate at airports, has remained relatively stable-
-4 to 5 percent--during fiscal years 2004 through 2006 with larger 
airports generally having higher overtime rates each year. 

Figure 12: TSO Overtime Hours as a Percentage of Total Hours Worked, by 
Airport Category, during Fiscal Years 2004 - 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private 
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these 
personnel. 

[End of figure] 

FSDs we spoke to cited a need to use TSOs for various operational 
support functions on either a full-time or part-time basis due to a 
lack of sufficient administrative staff to perform these functions. As 
previously noted, these functions included such activities as payroll 
and workman's compensation processing, various data input related to 
screening operations, uniform management and control, and managing and 
distributing supplies for the checkpoints. As a result of devoting at 
least a portion of their time to these activities, FSDs could not rely 
on these TSOs to perform all of their other passenger and baggage 
screening activities during these periods. 

Another challenge to using the model to deploy TSOs, according to TSA 
headquarters officials and FSDs, is that some airports have physical 
infrastructure configurations that limit their capacity for processing 
passengers and checked baggage that cannot necessarily be accounted for 
in the Staffing Allocation Model. At these airports, longer wait times 
are due, at least in part, to limitations on the number of screening 
lanes available, a limitation imposed by the layout of the checkpoint. 
TSA officials stated that in some of these instances, airports have 
made capital improvements to increase capacity and help minimize wait 
time. Of the 14 airports we visited, 7 had made, or were in the process 
of making, capital improvements to expand the passenger processing 
capacity of their security screening checkpoints. For example, during 
the period of October 2004 to June 2005, a category I airport 
experienced wait times exceeding 40 minutes on 40 separate occasions. 
TSA determined that wait times could not be reduced at the airport, 
even if it deployed more TSOs, due to the physical construction of the 
checkpoint, which only allowed for four screening lanes. In June 2005, 
the airport removed a wall to enable the installation of additional 
screening lanes. As a result of the additional lanes staffed with TSOs 
during peak periods, the airport only experienced one instance of a 
reported wait time exceeding 40 minutes as of October 2006. 

In addition to airports making capital improvements to help address 
capacity issues, airports and air carriers have also taken action to 
assist with increasing the efficiency of the screening process. For 
example, an air carrier at a category X airport was concerned about 
wait times at the airport. The air carrier established a security 
process improvement team consisting of representatives of TSA, air 
carriers, and the airport authority to examine checkpoints and suggest 
ways to make the screening process more efficient. One initiative that 
resulted from this effort is that the air carrier provided staff at 
passenger screening checkpoints to assist passengers in removing cell 
phone, keys, change, and other metal objects from their person before 
going through the walk through metal detector. According to the air 
carrier, it spent about $15,000 to $18,000 of its own money each month 
in personnel costs to staff the checkpoints over a 12-hour period most 
days. In another case, a representative of an airport board for a 
category X airport told us that in response to concerns about high wait 
times--wait times exceeding 30 minutes--the airport board spent $1 
million to hire a consultant to simulate existing checkpoint 
configurations and conditions to determine where and how improvements 
could be made to increase passenger throughput, thereby reducing wait 
times. As a result of this effort, several improvements were made, 
including posting a TSO at the front of each checkpoint to facilitate 
the screening process, posting signage at checkpoints to explain the 
items that passengers should remove from their person; adding space at 
end of the x-ray screening belt so that passengers can easily pick up 
their items without holding up the line; and providing more room for 
passengers to remove items from their person before they get to the x- 
ray machines. According to this airport official, these improvements 
collectively resulted in an increase in passenger throughput from 175 
to 200 passengers per hour at relatively low cost. However, the 
official expressed concern that most airports are not in a position to 
fund similar projects because they do not have the resources. 

TSA Reported Several Efforts Underway to Help Address Challenges in 
Deploying the TSO Workforce: 

TSA headquarters officials and FSDs we interviewed reported having 
several efforts underway to help address some of the challenges they 
face in deploying the TSO workforce. For example, to allow FSDs to more 
efficiently address staffing needs, TSA has shifted responsibility for 
hiring TSOs from TSA headquarters to FSDs at individual airports and, 
according to TSA officials, provided contractor support to assist in 
this effort. TSA data show that since local hiring began in March 2006, 
TSA has increased the number of new hire TSOs from approximately 180 
per pay period in February 2006 to nearly 450 each pay period under the 
local hiring initiative. Additionally, TSA officials stated that prior 
to the implementation of the local hiring initiative, TSA was able to 
support hiring at only about 30 airports during any given period 
compared to more than 100 airports each pay period since the local 
hiring initiative was implemented. Table 4 provides a summary of the 
national human resource-related initiatives intended to help increase 
TSO retention, utilization, and effectiveness. 

Table 4: National Human Resource Initiatives by TSA for Its TSO 
Workforce: 

Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of 
TSO staff (including part-time); 
TSA initiative: Local hiring; 
Description: In March 2006, TSA shifted responsibility for hiring TSOs 
from TSA Headquarters to the FSDs at individual airports. TSA 
headquarters has provided contract personnel to assist airports in all 
aspects of the hiring process. 

Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of 
TSO staff (including part-time); 
TSA initiative: TSO Career Progression Program; 
Description: Recognizing that the screener workforce had few upward 
mobility opportunities within their profession, TSA reclassified the 
agency's 43,000 screeners as TSOs. This new classification gives TSOs 
an opportunity for career progression and to apply for DHS law 
enforcement positions. Through this program, TSA has implemented new 
pay bands that broaden TSO career opportunities and include "technical" 
and "leadership" career track options for the TSOs. 

Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of 
TSO staff (including part-time); 
TSA initiative: Performance-based pay; 
Description: In April 2006, TSA deployed a pay-for-performance system. 

Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of 
TSO staff (including part-time); 
TSA initiative: Retention incentive payments; 
Description: During fiscal year 2006, TSA offered bonus payments in 
installments to TSOs who stay with the agency for a certain period of 
time. TSA is also providing a $500 separate retention incentive for 
full-time TSOs at 22 hard-to-hire airports. TSA made the first of these 
payments in May 2006. 

Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of 
TSO staff (including part-time); 
TSA initiative: Full-time to part-time conversion bonus; 
Description: In fiscal year 2006, TSA provided bonus payments in May 
and September to full-time TSOs who decided to convert to part-time 
status by May 1, 2006. 

Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of 
TSO staff (including part-time); 
TSA initiative: TSO Incentive Awards; 
Description: In fiscal year 2006, TSA provided monetary support to FSDs 
to assist them in retaining TSOs with good performance records. During 
the year, FSDs received $20 million to be paid to TSOs' to reward 
superior performance. 

Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of 
TSO staff (including part-time); 
TSA initiative: Part-time health benefits pilot; 
Description: TSA has implemented a pilot program at 6 airports 
providing part-time TSOs with the same benefits as full-time TSOs . 

Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of 
TSO staff (including part-time); 
TSA initiative: Career coaching/skills inventory; 
Description: TSOs can speak one-on-one with a career counselor and 
complete a self-assessment to determine their needs for advancement. 

Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of 
TSO staff (including part-time); 
TSA initiative: Lifecare; 
Description: TSA offers this service, free- of-charge, to TSOs to 
assist them with eldercare, daycare, or other issues that can affect 
their work life and keep them from performing effectively. 

Human resource challenge: Absenteeism; 
TSA initiative: Performance- based pay; 
Description: TSO pay based, in part, on attendance. 

Human resource challenge: Absenteeism; 
TSA initiative: TSO Career Progression Program; 
Description: By enhancing the motivation of TSOs, TSA believes this 
program will help improve attendance. 

Human resource challenge: Injuries; 
TSA initiative: Nurse case management program; 
Description: TSA acknowledged that TSO injuries were a significant 
drain in its workforce and responded by creating an agencywide nurse 
case management program based on the recommendations of the TSO Injury 
Task Force. This program assists TSOs in getting the medical attention 
they need to return to work as soon as possible. 

Human resource challenge: Injuries; 
TSA initiative: Industrial engineer visits to problem airports; 
Description: TSA Headquarters is in the process of sending teams of 
industrial engineers to evaluate the 25 airports with the worst injury 
rates and make recommendations for improvements, including simple 
configuration changes and small equipment purchases (like roller tables 
and floor mats) that could significantly reduce injury rates. . 

Source: TSA. 

[End of table] 

In addition to these workforce initiatives, TSA also continues to use 
TSOs from the national screening force to address short-term needs at 
individual airports nationwide. According to TSA, the national 
screening force is generally deployed only to those airports 
experiencing significant staffing shortfalls associated with increased 
seasonal traffic or when a special event--such as a Super Bowl or a 
large national conference--occurs requiring an immediate influx of 
additional, though temporary, TSO support. Of the 14 FSDs we 
interviewed, 6 stated that they had used the national screening force 
at least once. All but one of these FSDs told us that the national 
screening force was used to meet short-term screening demand associated 
with special events and unexpected circumstances, such as heavy 
passenger loads stemming from hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In the other 
instance, at a category X airport, the FSD stated that, because of 
challenges in hiring and retaining TSOs for this airport, he has had to 
rely on about 60 members of the National Screening Force deployed to 
his airport since 2004. However, in November 2006, TSA officials stated 
that as of November 1, 2006, there were no National Screening Force 
TSOs assigned to this airport, which they attributed to TSA's local 
hiring initiative. 

TSA officials stated that they are examining methods for addressing 
hiring and retention challenges at specific airports where these 
problems are particularly acute. For example, as shown in table 4 
above, TSA has implemented a $500 retention incentive for TSOs at 22 
"hard-to-hire" airports who were on-board as of April 15, 2006. As also 
shown in the table, to help with hiring and retention of part-time 
TSOs, TSA is piloting a program that offers full health benefits to 
part-time TSOs at six airports. At these airports, part-time TSOs 
receive the same health benefits as full-time TSOs. At all other 
airports, part-time TSOs do not receive health benefits. In addition to 
incentives and expanding health benefits, TSA is considering other 
options for attracting and retaining TSOs. For example, these options 
include (1) parking allowances, (2) child care, (3) elder care, and (4) 
tuition assistance. 

In addition to the national initiatives underway, several FSDs at the 
14 airports we visited were implementing their own local initiatives to 
address some of the staffing challenges they faced at their airports. 
For example, after receiving local hiring authority under the 
nationwide local hiring initiative, one FSD we spoke to stated that he 
puts brand-new TSO hires out on the passenger lanes as "helpers" so 
that they may better understand what the job entails. He expects that 
this will cut down on attrition at his airport and help reduce wasted 
training resources for TSOs who leave within short periods of being 
hired. Regarding absenteeism, all the FSDs we spoke to stated that they 
monitored unscheduled absences and counseled TSOs as needed. To help 
reduce the number of on the job injuries, 6 of the 14 FSDs we 
interviewed said they had local initiatives, such as injury prevention 
committees and detailed instruction on safe lifting techniques. To help 
mitigate inadequate numbers of part-time TSOs, two TSA managers we 
interviewed said that they asked some of their full-time TSOs to work 
"split" shifts to cover demands in peak periods that would normally go 
to part-time TSOs, one of whom might work the first peak period shift 
and another who might work the second peak period shift. The result was 
that it eliminated the staffing of full-time TSOs during non-peak 
periods when they were most likely to be idle. The experience of these 
managers illustrates an attempt at an efficient use of TSOs and also 
the primary reason that TSA has tried to achieve a mix of 20 percent 
part-time to 80 percent full-time TSOs. Specifically, using part-time 
TSOs can help to permit adequate staffing during peak periods while 
avoiding the consequent overstaffing stemming from having the same 
number of TSOs on duty during non-peak periods. Additionally, to 
maximize the flexibility in staffing passenger and checked baggage 
screening checkpoints, 3 of the 10 FSDs whose TSOs were not all dual- 
trained stated that they were working to increase the number of dual- 
trained TSOs--TSOs trained and certified in both passenger and checked 
baggage screening. Four of the 14 airports we visited already had dual- 
trained TSOs at the time of our visits. 

Given that many of TSA's workforce initiatives were only recently 
implemented or are in the planning stages, we could not assess the 
extent to which these initiatives achieved the intended results. TSA 
human capital officials told us that they plan to establish performance 
metrics to use in evaluating their workforce initiatives and use the 
results of the evaluations to make any needed changes to their 
approach. 

Conclusions: 

TSA's use of a staffing allocation model to help allocate its finite 
TSO resources in a manner that ensures security and minimizes wait 
times has helped guide its allocation of resources. While we recognize 
the difficulty in developing precise assumptions given the dynamic 
nature of the aviation industry, the assumptions used in the staffing 
allocation model should reasonably reflect actual operating conditions. 
We are encouraged that TSA has established several mechanisms to 
monitor the sufficiency of the model's outputs and make adjustments in 
key model assumptions, for specific airports, that are not accurate for 
those airports. We also recognize that TSA has reviewed and changed 
several key assumptions for fiscal year 2007 that affect all the 
nation's airports. While TSA has taken steps in the right direction, 
without a management control for selecting and prioritizing which 
assumptions to systematically review each year and for assuring that 
all assumptions are periodically reviewed--a particular concern 
considering the dynamic nature of the aviation industry and the ongoing 
personnel changes experienced by the agency--TSA is missing an 
opportunity to increase its assurance that the model reflects actual 
operating conditions over time. 

Given the extent to which TSOs have been used to perform operational 
support functions at airports, TSA has directly accounted for this for 
the first time in the staffing allocation model for fiscal year 2007. 
We recognize that FSDs may have to rely on TSOs to perform operational 
support duties at some times. However, overreliance on TSOs for 
operational support limits the availability of TSOs to perform the 
functions they were hired to perform, contributes to challenges in 
scheduling TSOs so that the right number of TSOs are at the right 
checkpoints at the right times, undermines the investment TSA has made 
in training them in screening functions, and could over time limit on- 
the-job training opportunities. Therefore, it is important for TSA to 
determine under what circumstances it is appropriate to use TSOs to 
perform operational support functions and to provide FSDs with guidance 
on when TSOs can be used this way. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To assist TSA in its efforts to identify TSO staffing levels that 
reasonably reflect the operating conditions at individual airports and 
to help ensure that TSOs are effectively utilized, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for 
Transportation Security to take the following two actions: 

* Establish a formal, documented plan for reviewing all of the 
assumptions in the Staffing Allocation Model on a periodic basis to 
ensure that the assumptions result in TSO staffing allocations that 
accurately reflect operating conditions that may change over time. 

* Establish a policy for when TSOs can be used to provide operational 
support. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On 
February 26, 2007, we received written comments on the draft report, 
which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS concurred with our 
findings and recommendations and stated that the findings and 
recommendations are constructive and useful. 

TSA also provided comments on our draft report, which are also 
reproduced in full in appendix III. In its comments, TSA stated that 
the conclusions of our study are valuable, but TSA wants to ensure that 
a full and current picture of the state of its workforce management is 
portrayed. TSA highlighted several of the workforce management 
initiatives it has implemented. These initiatives were already 
discussed in the draft report provided to DHS and TSA for comment. 

Regarding our recommendation that TSA establish a formal, documented 
plan for reviewing all of the assumptions in the Staffing Allocation 
Model on a periodic basis, DHS concurred and stated that TSA has 
already begun implementing this recommendation as part of its review of 
the Staffing Allocation Model assumptions for fiscal year 2007. DHS 
also stated that TSA has begun developing a formal and systematic 
process that would identify and prioritize the staffing model 
assumptions for periodic review. We are encouraged that, as part of 
this process, TSA plans to use formal studies and empirical data to 
validate the staffing model's assumptions--methods that should enhance 
the validity of TSA's efforts. TSA also plans to document this new 
assumption validation process and have it approved by senior 
leadership. 

DHS also concurred with our recommendation to establish a policy for 
when TSOs can be used to provide operational support. DHS stated that 
TSA's Offices of Security Operations and Human Capital are working 
together to develop a policy that would define when TSOs might be used 
to provide operational support. DHS also stated that TSA expects that 
the final policy will provide a greater degree of structure and 
guidance to FSDs concerning the use of TSOs in operational support 
positions. 

We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security; the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for 
Transportation; and interested congressional committees as appropriate. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Brian J. Lepore: 
Acting Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Objectives: 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted 
in December 2004, required the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) to develop and submit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, and the House of Representatives Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure, standards for determining the 
aviation security staffing for all airports at which TSA provides or 
oversees screening services by March 2005.[Footnote 57] These standards 
are to provide the necessary levels of aviation security and ensure 
that the average aviation security-related delay experienced by 
passengers is minimized. This provision of the act also mandated that 
we conduct an analysis of TSA's staffing standards. To assess TSA's 
efforts in developing a staffing allocation model that ensures that it 
provides the necessary levels of aviation security and that the average 
aviation security-related delay experienced by passengers is minimized, 
we addressed the following questions: 

* How does TSA ensure its Staffing Allocation Model provides a 
sufficient number of Transportation Security Officers (TSO) to perform 
passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and what 
challenges has it faced while implementing the model? 

* How does TSA deploy its TSO allocation and what factors affect the 
model's effectiveness in helping TSA accomplish this deployment? 

Scope and Methodology: 

Our work generally focused on the two major components of TSA's 
determination of TSO staffing at the nation's airports. First, at the 
TSA headquarters level, we interviewed (and reviewed documentation 
provided by) officials responsible for the development, implementation, 
and ongoing monitoring of the Staffing Allocation Model and its 
determination of the annual allocation of TSOs to each of the nation's 
commercial airports. Second, at the field level, we interviewed TSA 
staff at selected airports who were responsible for working within 
their allocation to deploy sufficient TSO staff to their airports' 
passenger and checked baggage screening operations. 

During our design phase, we visited six airports selected based on 
location, airport category,[Footnote 58] and participation in TSA's 
Screening Partnership Program.[Footnote 59] Table 5 provides 
information on the airports we visited during the design phase. 

Table 5: Airports Visited during Design Phase: 

Geographic location: Texas: 
1. Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport; 
Airport category: X; 
Screening Partnership program participation: No. 

Geographic location: Texas: 
2. William P. Hobby Airport; 
Airport category: I; 
Screening Partnership program participation: No. 

Geographic location: Texas: 
3. Waco Regional Airport; 
Airport category: III; 
Screening Partnership program participation: No. 

Geographic location: Washington, D.C. (Metro): 
1. Washington-Dulles International Airport; 
Airport category: X; 
Screening Partnership Program participation: No. 

Geographic location: Washington, D.C. (Metro): 
2. Washington-Reagan National Airport; 
Airport category: X; 
Screening Partnership Program participation: No. 

Geographic location: California: 
1. San Francisco International Airport; 
Airport category: Yes; 
Screening Partnership Program participation: Yes. 

Source: GAO review of TSA data. 

[End of table] 

After completing the design phase of our study, we visited eight 
additional airports, shown in table 6, representing a geographic mix of 
large and small airports. We selected these airports by choosing two 
airports in each of categories X, I, and II with a similar number of 
annual passenger enplanements,[Footnote 60] but which have 
significantly different passenger wait times and full time equivalent 
allocations under the Screening Allocation Model. We also selected two 
additional airports in category III based solely on their geographic 
proximity to two of the airports we visited in the larger airport 
categories. All of the nation's airports in the categories we selected 
(categories X, I, II, and III) to visit collectively comprise more than 
90 percent of TSA's total TSO allocation nationwide. 

Table 6: Airports Visited after the Design Phase: 

Geographic location: Florida: Orlando International; 
Airport category: X; 
2005 total enplanements: 16,502,499; 
2006 SAM allocation: 925.1; 
2006 average peak wait time: 16.98. 

Geographic location: Michigan: Detroit Metro Wayne County; 
Airport category: X; 
2005 total enplanements: 17,433,663; 
2006 SAM allocation: 733.9; 
2006 average peak wait time: 7.85. 

Geographic location: Indiana: Indianapolis International; 
Airport category: I; 
2005 total enplanements: 4,211,461; 
2006 SAM allocation: 292.1; 
2006 average peak wait time: 8.27. 

Geographic location: California: John Wayne; 
Airport category: I; 
2005 total enplanements: 4,791,100; 
2006 SAM allocation: 217.4; 
2006 average peak wait time: 17.99. 

Geographic location: South Carolina: Columbia Metropolitan; 
Airport category: II; 
2005 total enplanements: 725,267; 
2006 SAM allocation: 58.9; 
2006 average peak wait time: 16.18. 

Geographic location: Maine: Portland International; 
Airport category: II; 
2005 total enplanements: 734,084; 
2006 SAM allocation: 101.4; 
2006 average peak wait time: 7.49. 

Geographic location: Georgia: Augusta Bush Field MBS; 
Airport category: III; 
2005 total enplanements: 155,146; 
2006 SAM allocation: 24.9; 
2006 average peak wait time: 7.22. 

Geographic location: Michigan: Saginaw International; 
Airport category: III; 
2005 total enplanements: 213,595; 
2006 SAM allocation: 21.0; 
2006 average peak wait time: 3.08. 

Source: GAO based on review of TSA data. 

[End of table] 

In total, since we selected a limited nonprobability sample of 14 
airports, the information and results obtained cannot be generalized to 
all airports nationwide. Rather, the results from our airport visits 
were designed to help identify aspects of the Screening Allocation 
Model that may not be adequately addressing unique airport 
characteristics. Also, on a year-to-year basis, TSA may change the data 
inputs and assumptions used to calculate TSO allocations nationwide and 
at individual airports. 

In reviewing TSA's Staffing Allocation Model, we did not (1) review the 
statistical algorithm used in the model, (2) verify the model's 
computer programming, or (3) run test data through the model. 

More details about the scope and methodology of our work regarding each 
of the objectives are presented in the following sections, 
respectively. 

Objective One: Use of the Staffing Allocation Model to Provide a 
Sufficient Number of TSOs to Perform Passenger and Checked Baggage 
Screening at Each Airport and Challenges Faced While Implementing the 
Model: 

To determine how TSA ensures its Staffing Allocation Model provides a 
sufficient number of Transportation Security Officers (TSO) to perform 
passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and what 
challenges it has faced while implementing the model, we first sought 
to obtain an understanding of how the Staffing Allocation Model works 
to provide the appropriate number of TSO staff at the nation's 
airports. We interviewed key officials in TSA headquarters responsible 
for the development and implementation of the model about the inputs 
and assumptions to the model and how these elements are used to 
determine appropriate TSO staffing levels. We also reviewed 
documentation, provided by these officials, on the design and operation 
of the model. Additionally, we interviewed Federal Security Directors 
(FSD) and their staff at the 14 airports about how the Staffing 
Allocation Model considers factors unique to their airports in 
determining the allocation of TSOs to perform passenger and baggage 
screening functions. In addition, we asked FSDs and staff about the 
adequacy of their allocation and their ability to make changes to the 
model input, for their airport, if necessary. During the visits to 
category X, I, and II airports, we also interviewed representatives of 
each airport's governing authority and one or more of each airport's 
significant airline operators, to obtain their perspectives on the 
adequacy of TSA's staffing allocations and TSO scheduling practices at 
the respective airports. In addition, we interviewed representatives of 
two airline industry associations--the Air Transport Association and 
the Regional Airline Association--about their perspectives on TSO 
staffing levels at the nation's commercial airports. 

We also met with TSA headquarters officials to ascertain the 
methodology used in developing the Screening Allocation Model-- 
including the extent of input from FSDs and other airport stakeholders-
-and compared/contrasted the model to previous staffing models and 
methods used by TSA for allocating TSOs to the nation's airports. We 
interviewed these same officials to determine details on the 
functioning of the Screening Allocation Model, the various data inputs 
and assumptions built into the model, how the model uses these factors 
to determine specific TSO staffing at individual airports, and what 
feedback, if any, is obtained from FSDs regarding their allocations. In 
addition, we reviewed relevant documentation from TSA regarding the 
Screening Allocation Model's assumptions, requirements, and components, 
along with TSA's policies and procedures guiding the allocation of TSO 
staff at airport passenger checkpoints and checked baggage screening 
areas. We also obtained data on the changes in nationwide TSO 
allocations since 2004 and examined how TSA, using the model, ensures 
that it has a sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and 
checked baggage screening. 

We also examined how TSA ensures the model complies with statutory 
requirements--specifically, whether the model (1) provides the 
necessary levels of passenger and baggage security, (2) minimizes 
average passenger wait times, and (3) ensures that TSA remains in 
compliance with the congressionally mandated full-time-equivalent TSO 
cap. To that end, we interviewed TSA headquarters officials and 
reviewed Screening Allocation Model-related documentation to ascertain 
TSA's approach to monitoring performance of the model. We also analyzed 
TSA's airport-specific performance data to determine how, if at all, 
various workforce indicators have changed since the model was 
implemented. These indicators include passenger wait times, TSO 
absenteeism rates, TSO attrition rates, TSO overtime usage, TSO injury 
rates, number of TSOs devoted to administrative duties, level of usage 
of part-time TSOs, and use of the National TSO force. 

At the 14 airports, we met with FSDs and other TSA officials to 
determine details on the extent to which they participated in the 
development of the Staffing Allocation Model and their level of input 
into the model's annual TSO allocation process. During our discussions 
with the FSDs, we discussed how well the airport's allocation, as 
determined by the model, takes into account the unique characteristics 
of the airport and the TSO workforce. These characteristics include 
airport layout, passenger checkpoint configuration, and passenger and 
baggage screening procedures and equipment. We also examined how the 
Staffing Allocation Model addresses changes in air traffic and airport 
layout, changes in security screening procedures, and changes in 
screening equipment. 

In addition to the discussions with FSDs and other TSA officials, 
during our airport visits we also physically observed the airport's 
passenger checkpoints and baggage screening areas in order to better 
understand any unique situations or airport characteristics that affect 
screening operations and assessed the impact of these situations on the 
model's allocation of TSOs to the airport. 

During the visits to the two similar airports in each of categories X, 
I, and II, we attempted to determine (1) why one airport received a 
larger TSO allocation under the Screening Allocation Model, (2) reasons 
for differences in passenger wait times, and (3) how the SAM 
allocations at these two airports affected the FSD's ability to 
schedule TSOs to perform required security screening 
activities.[Footnote 61] 

Objective Two: TSA's Deployment of Its TSO Allocation at Individual 
Airports and Factors That Impact the Allocation Model's Effectiveness 
in Helping TSA Accomplish This Deployment: 

To determine how TSA deploys its allocation of TSOs at individual 
airports and addresses other factors affecting the deployment, we 
interviewed TSA staff at headquarters and at the airports we visited, 
regarding TSO scheduling and workforce-related factors that can affect 
these efforts. We also obtained and reviewed various TSO workforce- 
related data from TSA headquarters pertaining to these factors than can 
affect TSA's scheduling efforts at individual airports. These data 
include airport-specific information on the number of part-time TSOs, 
absenteeism rates, attrition, overtime, workman's compensation injury 
claims, and number of TSOs being used for operational support. In 
addition, we interviewed TSA headquarters officials, and FSDs at 
individual airports, about various human capital initiatives TSA is 
implementing to address TSO workforce issues (e.g., TSO attrition, lack 
of sufficient part-time staff, TSO absenteeism, injuries, etc.) that 
affect the deployment of TSOs allocated to individual airports. 

At the 14 airports we visited, we met with FSDs and other TSA officials 
to determine details on their methods for scheduling TSOs allocated to 
them by the model and their use of the model for this purpose. During 
our discussions with the FSDs, we discussed challenges they face in 
scheduling the required number of TSOs to perform screening functions. 
These challenges include airport layout and associated physical 
infrastructure limitations, type of passenger and baggage screening 
procedures employed and type of equipment available, number and mix of 
available full-time/part-time TSOs, number of TSOs unavailable for work 
(including those on leave, absent, injured, in training, or performing 
administrative duties), and experience level of TSOs. We also examined 
how each airport's scheduling operation addresses changes in air 
traffic and airport layout, changes in security screening procedures, 
and changes in screening equipment. 

We also analyzed certain TSA airport-specific performance data to 
determine how these factors impact FSDs' ability to effectively 
schedule their TSO allocation. Finally, we interviewed TSA airport and 
human capital officials to determine workforce actions TSA has taken to 
improve or enhance the Screening Allocation Model's ability to 
effectively allocate TSOs to the nation's airports and what other 
efforts, if any, TSA has underway to enhance its ability to deploy 
TSOs--specifically with respect to the indicators noted above. 

Data Reliability: 

In addressing our objectives, we obtained the following data from TSA: 

* Staffing by airport, in full-time equivalents, as of September 30, 
2006. 

* TSO staffing allocation, by airport, for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 
2006. 

* TSO full-time and part-time full-time equivalents levels for fiscal 
years 2004, 2005, and 2006. 

* TSO absenteeism for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006. 

* Workman's compensation historical claims activity for calendar years 
2004, 2005, and first half of 2006. 

* TSO attrition data for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006. 

* TSO overtime rates for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006. 

* Number and percentage of TSOs used for operational support for 2-week 
period ending September 30, 2006. 

* Deployment of the National Screening Force TSOs as of October 10, 
2006. 

* Airport passenger wait times for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006. 

We discussed the sources of the data with the appropriate TSA officials 
and obtained written responses to questions about TSA data quality 
control efforts for several of these data sets. We determined that the 
data for all were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
report. 

We conducted our work from January 2006 through January 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Development and Description of TSA's Staffing Allocation 
Model: 

TSA's Development of Its Staffing Allocation Model: 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001, 
significantly changed how passenger and checked baggage screening is 
conducted in the United States.[Footnote 62] ATSA removed screening 
responsibility from air carriers and the contractors who conducted 
screening for them, and placed this responsibility with TSA. As a 
result, TSA hired and deployed approximately 55,000 federal passenger 
and baggage Transportation Security Officers (TSO) (formerly known as 
screeners) to more than 400 airports nationwide. This initial 
deployment was based on input from a contract consultant and the number 
of private sector screeners that had been in place prior to TSA. After 
this initial roll-out of TSOs, TSA developed a demand-driven staffing 
model called the "GRA" model in order to improve screening operations 
and make them more efficient. To derive a TSO staffing allocation for 
each airport, the GRA model used flight schedules, load 
factors[Footnote 63] and connecting flight data, passenger arrival 
distribution curves, and the number of passenger baggage. However, 
according to TSA, the GRA model did not provide flexibility to react to 
dynamic changes in the transportation industry. An initial run of the 
GRA model in 2003 called for an overall staffing level of 49,600 
despite a congressionally imposed 45,000 full-time-equivalent cap on 
the number of TSOs TSA could hire. As a result, TSA had to impose a 7 
percent TSO reduction across the board to comply with the congressional 
cap by the end of the year. TSA decided it needed to improve its 
existing demand-driven staffing model--the GRA model--to create a more 
dynamic model that takes into account information about each airport's 
configuration,[Footnote 64] as well as assumptions about passenger and 
baggage processing. 

TSA developed its new model, the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), with 
the assistance of a contractor, Regal Decisions (the model was 
originally called the "Regal" model). As part of the contract 
requirements, Regal staff and TSA industrial engineers visited airports 
and met with their Federal Security Directors (FSD) to collect baseline 
information such as number of lanes, and number of checked baggage 
processing nodes, along with unique characteristics (physical 
configuration) of the airports. FSDs had some input (mostly 
verification of the model input data specific to their airports) into 
the process, but were not directly involved in creating the 
model.[Footnote 65] Overall, it took Regal and TSA almost a year to get 
the new Staffing Allocation Model stabilized and ready for initial roll-
out. TSA obtained data for,[Footnote 66] developed, and began deploying 
the model for testing in the summer of 2004 and first used it for the 
fiscal year 2005 TSO staffing allocation for the nation's airports. The 
latest TSO staffing numbers based on the model (for fiscal year 2006) 
were sent out to the field in October 2005. TSA was in the process of 
developing allocations for fiscal year 2007 at the time of our report. 

Staffing Allocation Model Components: 

The Staffing Allocation Model consists of three different components. 
The first is the "GRA" flight data, which provides information to the 
model on flight schedules and passenger and baggage volume. These data 
are fed into the "Regal" software (from Regal Decision Systems), which 
is a simulation model that replicates each airport's configuration and 
screening process. Finally, the "Sabre" software is a scheduling tool 
that takes the Regal output, expressed in numbers of TSOs needed to 
staff security checkpoints in 5-minute increments during the day, and 
produces an FTE requirement and corresponding TSO work schedules for 
each airport. Below is a detailed description of the three components 
that combine to make up TSA's Staffing Allocation Model. 

GRA Flight Data: 

The GRA flight data uses historical data[Footnote 67] to determine 
screening demand at each airport. These historical data include baggage 
volume, flight and passenger distribution curves, size/type of 
aircraft, and load factors. The GRA firm obtains these data mainly from 
the various airport authorities and from published sources such as the 
Official Airlines Guide. The guide's flight schedules are provided to 
the airports 60-90 days in advance. This allows airports enough time to 
react to potential changes in their passenger flow, and for the FSDs to 
make any needed changes to the flight schedules listed in the model, so 
as to account for last minute scheduling changes or added flights that 
were not originally published in the guide. The updated flight 
schedules and passenger loads (which represent the screening demand) 
from the GRA model serve as the input for the Regal software, which 
determines the number of open lanes and the amount of baggage equipment 
needed. 

Regal Software: 

The annual staffing allocation for each airport is based on the peak 
month demand level (derived by reviewing historical flight and 
passenger/baggage load data available from the GRA software) input into 
the Regal software, together with data on airport configurations and 
assumptions about passenger and baggage processing (that were not a 
part of the old GRA demand-driven model). The Regal software uses these 
input data to simulate the actual flow of passengers and baggage 
through the airport. The final output--each airport's requirements (in 
number of TSO staff for all passenger lanes and baggage pods, expressed 
in 5 minute increments throughout the day)--is determined based on the 
various assumptions outlined in table 7 and discussed as follows: 

* Nonpassenger screening demand--This is the additional demand for 
personnel screening checkpoints created by nonpassengers (e.g., airline 
crews, concession staff, and airport vendors). Based on discussions 
with TSA leadership and estimates by industrial engineers, the model 
constant for nonpassenger screening demand was set at 4 percent of 
passenger lane volume. 

* Passenger processing wait time--This is the amount of time passengers 
have to wait to undergo screening at the security checkpoint. The model 
sets a threshold of a 10-minute wait before opening additional lanes, 
if available, based on passenger volumes. 

* Peak month screening demand--TSA derives the Staffing Allocation 
Model's allocations based on originating passenger load factors for the 
85th percentile day of each airport's peak month. In determining the 
85th percentile day, TSA must first determine each airport's peak month 
by reviewing historical monthly passenger load data for each month in 
the airport's year. According to TSA industrial engineers, selection of 
the peak month is based on the average demand day (based on passenger 
load) for each month with the peak month being the month with the 
highest average demand day. Since daily screening demand data are not 
reported by the airlines (and, is therefore, not available) TSA must 
approximate each month's average demand day by dividing the monthly 
passenger load data by the number of days in the month. This assumption 
is linked to TSA's 10-minute wait time goal for processing passengers 
and baggage through security. That is, according to TSA industrial 
engineers, basing the Staffing Allocation Model on the average peak 
demand day is intended to ensure that, on an annual basis, 85 percent 
or more of the total passengers screened in U.S. airports will not have 
to wait more than 10 minutes to be screened. Further, based on TSA's 
analysis, basing the model on this level of demand may result in TSA 
taking longer than 10 minutes to screen passengers during 7 percent of 
an airport's days during the year. According to TSA, these 25 to 30 
days are typically the exceptionally high travel days such as the days 
before the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays. Conversely, for 
purposes of the annual allocation, TSA industrial engineers added that 
basing the model's demand level on the average peak demand day may 
result in TSA screening passengers in 10 minutes or less during 93 
percent of the airport's days during the year (approximately 335 to 340 
travel days over the airport's year). Lastly, when determining the 
annual allocation, TSA officials run the model on a representative week 
during the peak month.[Footnote 68] 

By basing airports' staffing allocations on their peak month passenger 
volume, TSA intends to ensure that airports will have some staff to 
accommodate nonscreening activities such as training and annual leave 
during off-peak periods. In addition, the peak month-based allocation 
is intended to provide airports with excess staffing capacity to 
respond to unforeseen events such as changes in flight schedules, 
injuries, and sick leave. In addition to nonpassenger screening demand, 
passenger processing wait time, and the calculation of demand, the 
following assumptions were included in the fiscal year 2007 model: 

* Line item full-time-equivalent allocation for TSO time paid but not 
worked--In fiscal year 2007, TSA, for the first time, provided a 
separate line item allocation for the various categories of TSO time 
paid not worked. These categories include vacation, sick, comp, injury, 
and military leave. Prior to fiscal year 2007, TSO time paid not worked 
was indirectly accounted for within the peak month screening demand/ 
85th percentile day assumption. 

* Part-time staff--TSA sets the SAM to run at a staffing mix of full- 
time and part-time TSO full-time equivalents based on each airport's 
individual part-time to full-time TSO ratio. Prior to fiscal year 2007, 
TSA assumed the same part-time goal for all category X, I, and II 
airports--regardless of their actual ratios. 

* Passenger checkpoint throughput--The passenger checkpoint throughput 
is the number of passengers that are processed per security checkpoint 
lane, per hour. The model assumes this to be 200. 

* Checked baggage processing rates--The checked baggage processing rate 
is the number of bags that various types of screening equipment will 
process per hour. Table 7 shows baggage processing rates based on type 
of screening equipment and whether the baggage screening system is in- 
line[Footnote 69] or stand-alone.[Footnote 70] 

* Baggage staffing requirements--This is the number of TSO FTEs 
required to adequately staff screening equipment. As with checked 
baggage processing rates, baggage staffing requirements vary by 
screening equipment, whether the equipment is stand-alone or inline, 
and by airport category. 

* Staffing per lane by airport category--The model allocates staffing 
by airport category and by lane type. A standard checkpoint lane is a 
lane that processes only passengers who are not selectees (i.e., those 
passengers selected for more intense screening). An integrated 
checkpoint lane is a lane that processes both standard passengers and 
selectees. A dedicated checkpoint lane is a lane that processes only 
passengers who are selectees. 

* Standard alarm rates--The model assumes specific rates for alarms on 
screening equipment used at both passenger checkpoints and baggage 
check areas. The model also assumes a selectee rate for passenger 
checkpoints. 

Table 7: Staffing Allocation Model Assumptions for Fiscal Year 2007: 

[See PDF for table - did not compute] 

Source: TSA. 

Legend: EDS = explosive detection system; ETD = explosive trace 
detection; ETP = explosive trace portal; OSR = on-screen resolution; N/ 
A = not available. 

[A] Staffing is number of TSO staff per piece of equipment or passenger 
checkpoint lane. 

[B] A selectee is a passenger who meets certain criteria based on the 
Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System or some other TSA- 
approved process and is, therefore, subject to more intense screening 
such as wanding and bag checks. 

[End of table] 

In addition to the model assumptions shown in table 7, the Regal 
software also incorporates adjustments to flight schedules (increases 
or decreases), variable arrival patterns, and each airport's 
configuration including making any allowances for projected expansions 
to the airport's configuration. Regal also determines, based on input 
from the GRA software, when TSA airport officials need to open more 
passenger processing lanes in response to increased passenger flow (not 
to exceed the total number of TSOs available). An individual airport 
FSD cannot change either the model assumptions or the baseline 
configuration for their assigned airport without TSA headquarters 
approval, but can petition TSA headquarters to change assumptions and 
baseline configuration data if it is believed they are not reflective 
of his/her airport. 

Sabre Software: 

Sabre Airline Solutions, Inc., provides the commercial, off-the-shelf 
software for the staffing allocation model's scheduling tool. The Sabre 
scheduling tool has three features--Staff Admin, Staff Manager, and 
Staff Plan. (TSA did not purchase the Staff Manager component.) Staff 
Admin rosters an airport's employee group in a database (shifts, 
schedules, personal information, training, etc.) while Staff Plan 
recommends a mix of full-time and part-time TSOs and generates a daily 
work schedule based on the Regal software's staffing requirement 
output. Sabre takes the Regal output and converts it into an full-time- 
equivalent figure and it determines scheduling plans based on that 
figure (if the airport uses Sabre for scheduling) using the 80/20 full- 
time/part-time TSO mix for category X, I, and II airports. 

TSA's Use of the Staffing Allocation Model: 

TSA uses the Staffing Allocation Model in three different ways--first, 
it is run once a year to determine the staffing allocation for all 
airports (annual allocation run). Second, it is run at other times to 
perform capacity analysis for both lanes required and number and types 
of baggage equipment required. Third, it is run at other times of the 
year where airports can tweak certain aspects of the model for 
scheduling runs without approval from TSA headquarters--for example, to 
conduct "what-if" scheduling scenarios by changing different inputs, 
such as passenger flow, or flight schedules. However, they cannot do so 
for an annual allocation run unless TSA headquarters grants approval to 
change an assumption for a specific airport. The baseline for an annual 
allocation run always stays the same and cannot be changed by an 
airport without TSA headquarters approval. TSA models each airport 
according to its unique configuration--that is, no two airports are 
modeled the same because no two airports look the same (nor do they 
have the same airline traffic profile). FSDs and their staffs typically 
meet with airline carriers on a continuing basis to obtain updated 
flight schedules. The scheduling runs to determine TSO schedules 
incorporate these updated flight schedules whereas, the fiscal runs to 
determine overall full-time-equivalent allocation, using peak month 
passenger volumes from historical flight data. If the historical flight 
schedule used for an annual allocation run is significantly different 
from current flight schedules at an airport (e.g., a new airline 
carrier joins the airport), the FSD can submit an appeal to TSA 
headquarters to re-run the model using the current flight schedule in 
order to obtain a more accurate staffing allocation for his or her 
airport. (This has been done on an annual basis or when a significant 
change in the airport's flight schedule occurs.) Unlike for annual 
allocation runs, updated flight schedules are used more frequently for 
scheduling runs at the local airports without headquarters 
intervention. 

The Staffing Allocation Model can be adjusted to account for the 
uniqueness of a particular airport's security checkpoints and airline 
traffic patterns. However, FSDs are responsible for ensuring that all 
data elements and assumptions are accurate for their airports and 
bringing to headquarters' attention any factors that should be reviewed 
to determine if changes to the model for their airports may be 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

February 26, 2007: 

Mr. Brian J. Lepore: 
Acting Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G. Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Lepore: 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report GAO-07- 
299, Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for 
Allocating Staff Among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be 
Systematically Reassessed. The Department's Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) values GAO's work in planning, conducting and 
issuing this report. 

TSA appreciates GAO's conclusion that the Staffing Allocation Model 
(SAM), which allocates Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) in a 
manner that ensures security and minimizes wait times, is a useful tool 
for allocating TSO resources. TSA understands the importance of using a 
robust staffing model that effectively and efficiently manages the 
large number of TSOs at more than 400 airports. We also understand that 
any model, over time, must be continuously improved and enhanced. In 
2004, after experimenting with other systems, TSA management officials, 
industrial engineers, information management specialists, and industry 
stakeholders collaborated to develop a new SAM. This new system has 
served as the primary staffing allocation and scheduling tool and has 
been the focus of continued refinement and increasing levels of 
staffing precision. The GAO report validates these efforts by noting 
that Federal Security Directors (FSDs) believe SAM has become a more 
accurate predictor of staffing needs compared to previous models. The 
continuing challenge, for any modeling involving the dynamic aviation 
industry, will be refining model assumptions. 

TSA has a number of initiatives under way which are intended to address 
workforce staffing challenges. It is essential that TSA recruit, 
retain, and maintain a steady workforce that is highly trained, 
motivated, smart, and flexible. In 2006, TSA deployed a pay-for- 
performance system for TSOs, Lead and Supervisory TSOs, and Screening 
Managers called the Performance Accountability and Standards System 
(PASS). PASS facilitates clear expectations and understanding of 
performance standards for Security Officers and Managers. This system 
ensures that the staff knows how performance will be evaluated, and 
what rewards are associated with achieving the standards of 
performance. PASS informs staff that outstanding performance is 
required, recognized, and rewarded. It reinforces the challenge and 
seriousness of the jobs performed by TSA's frontline employees. TSA is 
fully committed to PASS and believes it will be a major factor in 
attracting and retaining a professional, high performing workforce. 

TSA is also implementing a number of other programs to help improve 
recruitment and retention. For example, TSA has developed a local, 
decentralized hiring process to give FSDs control over key aspects of 
hiring. Local hiring empowers FSDs to find the best-qualified 
candidates. FSDs and staff receive the training and tools needed to 
direct recruitment activities, serve as the primary points-of-contact 
for TSO applicants, and shepherd applicants throughout the application, 
testing, and assessment cycles. Local hiring also provides applicants 
with more site-specific information relevant to their decision to apply 
for a position. As a result, the percentage of new full-time TSOs 
leaving TSA employment voluntarily in the first 3 months after hire 
declined from 26.7 percent in the fourth quarter of FY 2005 to 11 
percent in the fourth quarter of FY 2006, a reduction of 58.8 percent. 
Also, the percentage of new part-time TSOs leaving TSA employment 
voluntarily in the first 3 months after hire declined from 27 percent 
in the fourth quarter of FY 2005 to 12.6 percent in fourth quarter of 
FY 2006, a reduction of 53.3 percent. Before implementing the local 
hiring initiative, the agency average hiring rate for new TSOs was 
about 180 each pay period. The local hiring initiative has demonstrated 
the capability to on-board 800 or more new TSOs in a single pay period, 
with an average of 350 TSOs being hired every pay period. 

These new staffing programs are also contributing to an increase in the 
number of part-time TSOs which make up the workforce. In recent months 
the average number of part-time TSOs has continued to increase and is 
now closer to TSA's operational goal of a full-time equivalent (FTE) 
workforce that is 20 percent part-time. At the 14 airports mentioned in 
the report, the average number of part-time TSO FTEs has increased from 
7 percent to 14 percent subsequent to GAO's visits. Nationally, this 
number has also increased from 15.6 percent at the beginning of FY 2007 
to 16.9 percent. While GAO reports that a 20 percent part-time mix of 
TSOs may be difficult to achieve at some airports, TSA continues to 
look at how best to utilize its personnel based upon operational 
demands. The utilization of part-time and full-time shift workers is 
critical as we move forward and refine our recruitment, retention, and 
management efforts to optimize our workforce. TSA has recognized that 
each airport may face different workforce challenges and no longer uses 
a standard 20 percent part-time SAM assumption for all airports. TSA 
now customizes SAM part-time staffing assumptions to the unique needs 
and circumstances at individual airports. Moreover, TSA is initiating 
an Optimization Program which will help FSDs identify the right mix of 
part-time and full-time TSOs needed to meet their airports' specific 
needs. The program will teach FSDs and staff the techniques and best 
practices that will maximize their efforts. For example, the 
Optimization Program will help some FSDs evaluate the utility and 
flexibility of split shifts. 

The GAO report indicates that using TSOs in operational support 
positions may undermine TSA's investment in training. TSA is vigorously 
working to reduce the number of TSOs performing operational support 
functions and has contracted with three private companies to provide 
operational support when requested by the FSD. These contractors 
supplement FSD administrative staff so that those TSOs assigned to 
these functions may return to their primary screening duties. Further, 
TSA has implemented several solutions to ensure that TSOs performing 
operational support functions maintain sharp security screening skills. 
PASS and recurrent training requirements set a very clear standard for 
acceptable TSO screening skills. 

TSA has implemented several training and certification requirements 
which require TSOs periodically to perform screening duties and 
demonstrate that their ability to detect prohibited items on passengers 
and in baggage remains at acceptable levels. As part of PASS, TSA has 
implemented a policy requiring all TSOs to perform screening functions 
every week and requires TSOs to receive at least three hours of 
screener training per week, with an additional 4 hours per month 
designated exclusively for the detection of improvised explosive 
devices. 

TSA appreciates GAO's recommendation that we should systematically and 
periodically ensure SAM assumptions continue to reflect actual 
operating conditions that may change over time. TSA considers this 
recommendation to be a validation of the direction in which we are 
already headed. As noted in the GAO report, TSA has already performed 
its first annual reassessment of select assumptions as part of SAM 
refinements for 2007. As a result of this reassessment, TSA has made 
several enhancements to the staffing model. For example, the modeling 
now provides additional TSO resources for leave (annual, sick and 
military), training, operational support, and new screening procedures. 
Also, as noted earlier, TSA now customizes SAM to match the unique part-
time/full-time TSO mix at individual airports. The next step in TSA's 
refinement of SAM is to develop and formalize a plan and prioritization 
scheme which ensures all assumptions are systematically validated on a 
periodic basis. TSA has already begun work in this area. 

The following represents our responses to the recommendations. 

Recommendation 1: Establish a formal, documented plan for reviewing all 
of the assumptions in the Staffing Allocation Model on a periodic basis 
to ensure that the assumptions result in TSO staffing allocations that 
accurately reflect operating conditions that may change over time. 

TSA Concurs. TSA has already begun implementing this recommendation. As 
part of the SAM '07 process, the Office of Security Operations (OSO) 
worked in conjunction with the Chief Technology Office (CTO) to review 
baseline Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) and Explosives Detection 
System (EDS) processing rates. TSA also conducted a detailed review of 
baggage distribution patterns. Both reviews resulted in enhancements to 
our staffing model. 

Moving forward, OSO, CTO, and other stakeholders have begun 
collaborating to develop a formal and systematic process which will 
identify and prioritize SAM assumptions for periodic review. A joint 
action team, composed of a diverse group of subject matter experts from 
different disciplines, will develop a process that includes the use of 
formalized studies and empirical data to validate model assumptions. It 
is important to note that any modeling assumption and validation 
process must include flexibilities to allow for unexpected and 
immediate changes in the security operational environment. As TSA 
develops this new process, we plan to make full use of lessons learned 
during prior year model-runs and seek and receive input from both field 
and headquarters personnel. TSA is committed to developing a final 
process that is dynamic, comprehensive, well-documented, and approved 
by OSO senior leadership. Further, TSA recognizes the importance of the 
continued use of performance metrics to determine trends across our 
network. When we identify concerns at airports, we will be able to 
determine quickly if the problem is staffing or operational and 
continue to modify the Staffing Allocation Model. 

Recommendation 2: Establish a policy for when TSOs can be used to 
provide operational support. 

TSA Concurs. OSO and the Office of Human Capital (OHC) are working 
together to develop a policy which would define when TSOs might be used 
to provide operational support. While this effort is currently in its 
beginning stages, the final policy will provide a greater degree of 
structure and guidance to FSDs concerning the use of TSOs in 
operational support positions. The policy will help the FSD decide how 
best to meet their security and operational staffing needs. Development 
of the policy will evaluate key roles and responsibilities and analyze 
appropriate situations for the use of TSOs as operational support. 

TSA is committed to implementing the report's recommendations. The 
findings and recommendations resulting from this audit are constructive 
and useful. Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this 
draft report and we look forward to working with you on future homeland 
security issues. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Steven J. Pecinovsky: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

Draft Report GAO-07-299 "TSA's Staffing Allocation Model (SAM) is 
Useful for Allocating Staff among Airports, But Its Assumptions Should 
be Systematically Reassessed." 

Executive Summary: 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has screened more 
people with a flat headcount the past 3 years and has done so with 
active workforce management. 

2006-2007 With increased enplanements and flat staffing, TSA has 
implemented and self-funded major initiatives to increase security 
through better workforce quality and performance 70,000 T 70,000,000: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Toward that end, TSA changed the entire staffing management system that 
GAO originally was asked to study and implemented a wide array of 
significant changes in its workforce management during the time that 
this GAO study was underway. This highlights the challenge for GAO 
which had to study a topic that is in the midst of major process 
change. The conclusions of the study are valuable, but TSA wants to 
ensure that a full and current picture of the state of TSA's workforce 
management is portrayed. Some of the major aspects are highlighted 
below: 

* Federal Security Directors (FSDs) now have local hiring authority and 
the tools to tailor their headcount to meet their dynamic operating 
needs - including getting the right part-time mix of Transportation 
Security Officers (TSOs). This is completely new since the study was 
commissioned. 

* FSDs now have numerous additional tools to drive better retention, 
fewer injuries, higher attendance, and better performance. Those are 
new since the study was commissioned. 

* TSA has taken the position - and provided the tools - to move TSOs 
from administrative functions where possible and deploy them to front-
line security duties. This is new since the study was commissioned. 

* The staffing methodolgy has been changed from a top-down Headquarters 
(HQ) driven model that worked from the TSO full-time equivalent (FTE) 
cap downwards to a bottoms-up approach based on airport input which 
includes actual airline operations and checkpoint and baggage 
information. That change alone eliminates many of the issues with the 
old model. 

* There were many other significant changes in the SAM including: 
building in specific time into the model for training, operational 
support, collateral duties, and leave (i.e. sick, military leave, 
annual leave); an addition of a variable part-time component; as well 
as recognizing other security initiatives, such as Bomb Appraisal 
Officers, and Screening Passengers by Observation Technique, etc. 

* TSA actively evaluates the work that is done by TSOs and the way is 
the work is done with an eye toward focusing TSA resources to the 
changing security environment. Not only is the model constantly 
updated, but the underlying business processes that drive the model are 
constantly reviewed for improvement. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brian J. Lepore (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to those named above, Maria Strudwick, Assistant Director; 
David Alexander; Richard Ascarate; Philip Caramia; Kathryn Godfrey; 
Michael Harmond; Thomas Lombardi; Enemencio Sanchez; Edith Sohna; 
Pamela Valentine; Vaughn Williams; and Greg Wilmoth made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key 
Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains. GAO-07-448T. Washington, 
D.C.: February 13, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the 
Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed 
to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.: 
January 24, 2007. 

Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening 
Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: July 
28, 2006. 

Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal 
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding 
Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation 
Security Administration's Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-864T. 
Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better 
Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying 
Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage 
Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington, D.C.: April 
4, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made 
Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security 
at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T. Washington, D.C.: 
April 4, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private-Sector 
Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166. Washington, D.C.: 
March 31, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely 
Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's 
Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from 
Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: November 
28, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air 
Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005. 

Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority 
of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.: 
September 23, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. GAO-05- 
781. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully 
Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure Flight Program 
Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More 
Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of 
Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: July 
13, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement 
Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: May 
2, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but 
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356. 
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the 
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365. 
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial 
Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.: 
February 23, 2005. 

Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize 
Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to Allow 
Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services. GAO- 
05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004. 

General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but 
Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term 
Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of 
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728. 
Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004. 

Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed to 
Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 
2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04- 
785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004. 

Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to 
Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519. 
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little 
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. 
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation 
Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- 
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 17, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the 
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial 
Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington, 
D.C.: February 13, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing 
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington, 
D.C.: February 12, 2004. 

The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge- 
based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program. GAO-04-341R. 
Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen 
Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges 
of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. 
GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address 
Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003. 

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made 
and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 
2003. 

Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the 
Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security 
Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security 
Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides Opportunities 
to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T. Washington, D.C.: April 
10, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term 
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover 
Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.: 
February 25, 2003. 

Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a 
Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 
2003. 

Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's 
Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 
Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and 
Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002. 

Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has 
Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.: 
October 15, 2002. 

Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect 
Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: July 
25, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial 
Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 
Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: 
September 25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 
September 21, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts. GAO-
01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 
Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: 
September 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

[2] Beginning in August 2002 and continuing through fiscal year 2003, 
Congress prohibited TSA from recruiting or hiring personnel that would 
cause it to exceed a staffing level of 45,000 full-time-permanent 
positions. See Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820, 880 (2002); Pub. L. 
No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 386 (2003). Since fiscal year 2004, Congress 
has specifically prohibited TSA from recruiting or hiring personnel 
that would cause it to exceed a staffing level of 45,000 full-time 
equivalent screeners. See Pub L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1142 
(2003); Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298, 1304 (2004); Pub. L. No. 
109-90, 119 Stat. 2064, 2070 (2005); and Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 
1335, 1363 (2006). One full-time equivalent equals 1 work year or 2,080 
non-overtime hours. 

[3] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4023, 118 Stat. 3638, 3723-24 (2004). 

[4] An optimization model is a decision-making tool that recommends an 
answer (the goal to be optimized) based on analyses of information 
(constraints and decision variables). It consists of three components: 
(1) the goal to be optimized, (2) constraints, and (3) decision 
variables. In the case of TSA's Staffing Allocation Model, the goal to 
be optimized is the minimum number of TSOs to perform the necessary 
security functions at each airport within the stated wait time goal of 
10 minutes. The constraints include passenger and baggage volume, and 
arrival distributions. The decision variables include the configuration 
of each airport (concourses, lanes, screening equipment, etc), staffing 
requirements, etc. TSA officials can alter decision variables to allow 
the model's outcome to meet the goal. For example, more screening lanes 
can be opened to meet demand and faster screening equipment could be 
installed. Decision variables have bounds within which the model must 
operate; these include, for example, how many lanes currently exist 
that could be opened. 

[5] In the context of models, the term assumption means any value in 
the model that is based on a belief or decision rather than on actual 
data. The term assumption is generally used with models because the 
components of a model are assumed to realistically represent events 
that the model is trying to explain or predict. 

[6] Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations 
are selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using 
specific characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from 
nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a 
population because in a nonprobability sample, some elements of the 
population being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being 
selected as part of the sample. 

[7] TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States into 
one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, and IV). In 
general, category X airports have the largest number of passenger 
boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest. Categories X, I, 
II, and III airports account for more than 90 percent of the nation's 
air traffic. 

[8] Enplanements are the number of passengers who board a plane. 

[9] Alarm rates refer to the number of persons or bags per hour/day 
that set off an alarm in the screening device and consequently require 
additional screening. 

[10] Screening demand refers to the volume of passenger and 
nonpassenger traffic expected to require screening at an airport's 
checkpoint(s) within a specified time period. Screening demand does not 
include domestic passengers who board connecting flights at airports 
since they have already been screened at their airport of origin. 
Therefore, with regard to passengers, screening demand only refers to 
those who are originating at each airport. 

[11] According to TSA, the total number of commercial airports 
regulated for security in the United States varies depending on various 
factors such as the type and level of commercial operations that an 
aircraft operator conducts at that particular airport, the time of year 
or season where a particular airport is located, and the economic 
stability of that airport's region. 

[12] TSOs conduct passenger and baggage screening at all but six 
commercial airports. These six airports have opted out of federal 
screening and, instead, utilize screeners employed by private screening 
companies under contract to TSA to perform these services. 

[13] Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers are 
provided access to boarding aircraft. Access to these areas is 
controlled by screening personnel at checkpoints where they conduct 
physical screening of individuals and their accessible property for 
weapons, explosives, and other prohibited items. Screeners must deny 
passage beyond the screening location (into the sterile area) to any 
individual or property that has not been screened or inspected in 
accordance with law, regulation, and passenger screening standard 
operating procedures. 

[14] The computer-assisted passenger prescreening system is a system 
that, based on information obtained from airline reservation systems, 
identifies passengers that may pose a higher risk to aviation security. 
These higher-risk passengers and their baggage are subject to 
additional screening. 

[15] Explosive detection systems use probing radiation to examine 
objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of 
threat explosives. This equipment operates in an automated mode. 

[16] Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues 
of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with 
swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of 
explosive materials. 

[17] Positive passenger bag match requires that passengers be on the 
same aircraft as their checked baggage. According to TSA, this 
procedure is rarely used. 

[18] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 110(b)-(c), 115 Stat. at 614-16 (enacted 
on November 19, 2001). See also 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a). 

[19] According to TSA, historical data on the number of passengers on 
each flight are known as "load factors" or passenger loads. Using 
historic data on passenger load factors, TSA estimated the number of 
passengers to be screened at each airport. 

[20] According to TSA, the rate at which passengers arrive at security 
checkpoints in anticipation of specific flights, is known as "passenger 
arrival distribution curves." These distribution curves show, based on 
historical data, how many passengers will arrive for the flights at 
different intervals of time prior to the flight. 

[21] We were limited in the extent to which we could assess TSA's prior 
staffing models because the TSA personnel responsible for overseeing 
the development of the earlier model are no longer employed by TSA and 
limited documentation on the models was available. 

[22] According to TSA, private screeners do not count against the 
45,000 full-time-equivalent ceiling. TSA currently contracts private 
screening companies to perform passenger and checked baggage screening 
at six commercial airports as part of its Screening Partnership 
Program, which allows commercial airports to opt to use private 
screeners in lieu of TSOs. TSA provides private screening companies 
with their full-time-equivalent levels based on the levels identified 
by the staffing allocation model. See GAO-06-166. 

[23] Some of the constraints include the number of checkpoints and 
screening lanes at an airport, and the distribution of arriving and 
departing flights throughout the day. 

[24] TSA has established assumptions in the model that are largely 
uniform for all airports while recognizing that slight variances may 
exist due to differing conditions among airports. 

[25] FSDs may choose to use the Staffing Allocation Model's optional 
scheduling tool or an alternative method to prepare work schedules for 
their TSOs. In some cases, FSDs and their staff may choose to use the 
scheduling tool as is, modify its output, or use a scheduling method 
completely independent of the scheduling tool. 

[26] According to TSA officials, "centrally hosted" refers to the fact 
that the Staffing Allocation Model was not maintained on a database 
server accessible by both headquarters and field TSA personnel. 
Instead, in fiscal year 2005, TSA personnel at each airport ran the 
model on standalone computers. Therefore, TSA headquarters' oversight 
of inputs to the model by field personnel was not as effective prior to 
the advent of central hosting in fiscal year 2006. 

[27] Appropriations received by TSA in fiscal year 2006 were sufficient 
to employ up to 43,000 full-time equivalent TSOs. 

[28] The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA and 
assigned TSA with the responsibility of building a federal workforce to 
conduct screening of airline passengers and their checked baggage. See 
49 U.S.C. §§ 114(a), 44901(a). ATSA also required that TSA allow 
commercial airports to apply to TSA to transition from a federal to a 
private screener workforce. See § 44920. To support this effort, TSA 
created the Screening Partnership Program to allow all commercial 
airports an opportunity to apply to TSA for permission to use qualified 
private screening contractors and private screeners. There are 
currently 6 airports participating in the Screening Partnership 
Program, including Jackson Hole, Kansas City International, Greater 
Rochester International, San Francisco International, Sioux Falls 
Regional, and Tupelo Regional. 

[29] The wait time (e.g., 10, 20, or 30 minutes) set in the model will 
influence the number of lanes and baggage equipment required; and, 
therefore, the TSO staffing required to process 85 percent of the 
annual passengers in less than the wait time that is set. 

[30] TSA determines this assumption by selecting the month with the 
highest average passenger demand day (calculated by dividing total 
monthly passenger loads, reported by airlines, by the number of days in 
the month) as the peak month. According to TSA, only about 7 percent of 
an airport's days during the year will have greater passenger demand 
than this average peak demand day. TSA's industrial engineers have 
determined that running the model with a level of demand based on a 
representative week during this peak month will provide enough TSA 
staff to process 85 percent of passengers through security checkpoints 
in 10 minutes or less annually. 

[31] Examples of non-passengers going through security checkpoints 
include flight crews and other airline employees, vendors at the 
airport, and other airport personnel. 

[32] Based on their review of selected model assumptions, TSA has 
changed the number of TSOs, per lane, for fiscal year 2007 from 5.5 to 
4.25 (at category X, I, and II airports). 

[33] We currently have an ongoing review of the Department of Homeland 
Security's and TSA's efforts to research, develop, and deploy airport 
screening operations. As part of this review, we are determining the 
extent to which DHS and TSA have deployed technologies to mitigate 
terrorist threats effectively at airport passenger checkpoints while 
ensuring the efficient movement of passengers. We expect to report our 
results in August 2007. 

[34] TSA is to collect wait time data every 30 minutes during peak 
hours (e.g., weekdays between 5:00 am-8:00 am and 3:00 pm-7:00 pm and 
Sundays between 4:00-9:00 pm) and every hour during non-peak periods of 
time. During each data collection period, a TSO is to stamp wait time 
cards with the current time, provide the cards to the last three 
passengers in line during off-peak periods and the last four passengers 
during peak periods. The passengers are to give the cards to a TSO once 
they reach the front of the line and are directed to a lane for 
screening. The TSO is to record the time on the card. At the end of 
each day, a supervisory TSO is to collect the wait time cards from his 
or her checkpoint and enter the wait time data into the Performance 
Management Information System. 

[35] FSDs report to one of three Area Directors, based on their 
geographic regions, on administrative matters. The Area Directors 
oversee transportation security at airports and in other modes of 
transportation for the East Coast, Central, and Western regions, 
respectively. 

[36] TSA employs industrial engineers and assigns them to airports 
throughout the country based on the geographic region. Each of the 
industrial engineers is assigned to TSA headquarters and reports to one 
of TSA's three Area Directors. These engineers are responsible for 
assisting and monitoring airports in their use of the Staffing 
Allocation Model. 

[37] According to TSA officials, an optimization team is not sent to an 
airport in response to every FSD request for a revision to an 
assumption for their airport. For example, if TSA determines that it is 
readily apparent from the request that a change is not needed, TSA 
would not send an optimization team to visit the airport. 

[38] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 
1999); Internal Control: Internal Control Management and Evaluation 
Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001). 

[39] TSA assigns industrial engineers to assist these airports with 
their use of the staffing model based on the region of the country 
where they are located. However, TSA does not have sufficient levels of 
industrial engineers to locate one at each of these airports. As a 
result, a single industrial engineer may be responsible for assisting 
multiple airports. 

[40] According to TSA, as part of the process of reviewing the staffing 
allocation model assumptions, TSA headquarters officials responsible 
for the model held conferences with FSD staff responsible for preparing 
TSO work schedules to help ensure that they understood the model and 
the changes implemented in fiscal year 2007. 

[41] This time includes annual, sick, and military leave in addition to 
compensatory time and injury time off. 

[42] Since its inception in November 2001, TSA has had multiple 
Assistant Secretaries (originally titled Under Secretaries of 
Transportation for Security). In addition, between January 2005 and 
August 2006, TSA issued seven press releases regarding senior-level 
personnel changes within the agency. 

[43] The 14TH airport we visited, San Francisco, had private screeners 
instead of TSOs. 

[44] This ratio of part-time to full-time is based on annualized full- 
time-equivalent data. According to TSA, an annualized number represents 
an estimate of the usage of FTEs over the fiscal year assuming that the 
usage in a given pay period remains constant over all future pay 
periods. 

[45] TSA officials stated that they conducted sensitivity analysis 
around various mixes of full-time to part-time TSOs at category X 
airports and identified that no additional efficiency was gained at 
these airports with a full-time-equivalent level of part-time TSOs 
greater than about 20 percent. 

[46] The "Screening Passengers by Observation Technique" involves 
specially trained TSOs observing the behavior of passengers and 
resolving any suspicious behavior through casual conversation with 
passengers and referring suspicious passengers to selectee screening. 

[47] We excluded one airport we visited, San Francisco, from this 
discussion since it employed private contractors as screeners. TSA data 
on use of TSOs in operational support functions do not include airports 
with private screeners. 

[48] According to a TSA management directive dated December 4, 2006, 
TSOs must perform screening duties at least 8 hours per week. 

[49] Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 
Review of TSA Non-Screener Administrative Positions, OIG-06-65, 
September 2006. 

[50] TSA's performance accountability and standards system, which was 
implemented in April 2006, will be used by TSA to assess agency 
personnel at all levels on various competencies, including training and 
development, readiness for duty, management skills, and technical 
proficiency. There are three elements of the TSO technical proficiency 
component of the performance and accountability standards system: (1) 
quarterly observations of TSOs' ability to perform particular screening 
functions in the operating environment to ensure they are complying 
with checkpoint screening standard operating procedures; (2) quarterly 
quizzes given to TSOs to assess their knowledge of the procedures; and 
(3) an annual, multi-part knowledge and skills assessment (known as 
recertification testing). 

[51] TSA officials acknowledged that the scheduling tool cannot be 
adjusted to reflect more than a 5-day work week. However, other 
variations within the 5 days are possible. 

[52] We did not assess the adequacy of training of FSDs because it was 
outside the scope of our work. 

[53] Due to TSA's expectation that FSDs maintain on-board TSO staffing 
of at least 90 percent of their TSO allocation, in addition to 
significant numbers of airports falling marginally above and below 100 
percent, we used a 20 percent range (90 to less than 110 percent) to 
determine how many airports were above and below their allocation in 
terms of on-board TSOs. That is, airports with less than 90 percent of 
their allocation were "below" their allocation and airports with 110 
percent or more of their allocation were "above" their allocation. 

[54] TSA implemented its "hub and spoke" organizational structure in 
fiscal year 2006 to allow for sharing of management, TSO and 
operational support staff, and other resources among individual 
category X and I airports and other smaller airports in their 
geographic vicinity. 

[55] According to TSA, the survey respondents were from all of TSA's 
employees, not just TSOs. However, TSA did isolate certain responses by 
TSOs. 

[56] TSA defines absenteeism in terms of unscheduled absences and 
tardiness among the TSO workforce. Unscheduled absences include calling 
in sick the day of work, arriving two or more hours late, being AWOL, 
or otherwise failing to show. Absenteeism does not include those TSOs 
previously approved to be on any kind of leave or TDY such as, annual 
leave, pre-arranged sick leave, military leave, jury duty, training, 
etc. TSOs are "tardy" when they are 1 or more minutes late for their 
designated shift. TSOs who are more than 2 hours late are counted as 
unscheduled absences. 

[57] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4023, 118 Stat. 3638, 3723-24 (2004). 

[58] TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States into 
one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, and IV). In 
general, category X airports have the largest number of passenger 
boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest. 

[59] The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 
115 Stat. 597 (2001), established TSA and assigned TSA with the 
responsibility of building a federal workforce to conduct screening of 
airline passengers and their checked baggage. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(a), 
44901(a). The act also required that TSA allow commercial airports to 
apply to TSA to transition from a federal to a private screener 
workforce. See § 44920. To support this effort, TSA created the 
Screening Partnership Program to allow all commercial airports an 
opportunity to apply to TSA for permission to use qualified private 
screening contractors and private screeners. There are currently six 
airports participating in the Screening Partnership Program, including 
Jackson Hole, Kansas City International, Greater Rochester 
International, San Francisco International, Sioux Falls Regional, and 
Tupelo Regional. 

[60] Enplanements are the number of airplane passengers boarding 
planes. 

[61] We excluded category IV airports from our study because they make 
up less than 3 percent of TSOs allocated nationwide under the SAM and 
passenger boardings at these airports are much more limited and 
sporadic. 

[62] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

[63] The percentage of seats filled on a plane. For example, a plane 
with a load factor of 0.831 has 83.1 percent of its seats filled. 

[64] An airport's configuration entails the layout, design, and number 
of its checked baggage screening areas and passenger screening 
checkpoints and lanes. 

[65] FSDs we interviewed had mixed views on the extent to which they 
were provided an opportunity to provide input to the initial 
development of the staffing allocation model. Nine of the 14 FSDs we 
interviewed stated that they provided little, if any, input to the 
Staffing Allocation Model's fundamental assumptions and did not know 
how their allocations were derived. However, 10 FSDs said TSA 
headquarters did give them an opportunity to provide input specifically 
on their airports' configuration. TSA officials responsible for the 
Staffing Allocation Model acknowledged that all FSDs were not directly 
involved in creating the model. Officials stated that industrial 
engineers were responsible for visiting the airports to which they are 
assigned and meeting with FSDs, or their designated staff member, to 
obtain basic information about screening operations and any unique 
aspects of their airports. 

[66] During this period, TSA officials at individual airports provided 
data input to the model regarding their airports' profiles--including 
number of checkpoints, number of lanes, and number of checked baggage 
processing nodes. 

[67] The GRA consulting firm engages in an ongoing data collection 
effort. It gathers future flight schedules, historical passenger loads, 
and connecting percentages--all of which can be adjusted with 
appropriate approval. Passenger loads and baggage counts are purely 
historical data that can't be routinely adjusted. 

[68] TSA officials stated that, for the annual allocation run, they 
must run the model based on a full week (as if trying to schedule for 
that week) since it is not practical to run the model based on only 1 
day. 

[69] A bag screening methodology that employs the automated movement of 
a bag in and out of an explosive detection system machine. 

[70] A bag screening methodology that employs a manual (as opposed to 
an automated) movement of bag in and out of an explosive detection 
system machine. 

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