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Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness' which was released on 
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on 
National Security and International Relations, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

January 2007: 

Reserve Forces: 

Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment 
Requirements and Readiness: 

Reserve Forces: 

GAO-07-60: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-60, a report to the Ranking Minority Member, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Ranking Minority 
Member, Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, 
House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The high use of the National Guard for federal overseas missions has 
reduced equipment available for its state-led domestic missions, at the 
same time it faces an expanded array of threats at home. The massive 
state-led, federally funded response to Hurricane Katrina illustrates 
the Guard’s important role in responding to the effects of large-scale, 
multistate events as well as the difficulty of working with multiple 
state and federal agencies. To address congressional interest in the 
Guard’s domestic preparedness, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the 
Guard’s domestic equipment requirements have been identified, (2) the 
Department of Defense (DOD) measures and reports to Congress the 
equipment readiness of non-deployed Guard forces for domestic missions, 
and (3) DOD actions address the Guard’s domestic equipping challenges. 
GAO examined the National Guard’s plans and equipment status and 
included case studies in California, Florida, New Jersey, and West 
Virginia. 

What GAO Found: 

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to 
respond to large-scale terrorist events and natural disasters have not 
been fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies 
that would have roles in responding to such events have not completed 
and integrated their plans. The Homeland Security Council has developed 
15 catastrophic scenarios to guide federal and state governments in 
planning their response activities. While DOD is responsible for 
equipping the Guard for its federal missions and states plan for the 
National Guard’s activities within their borders, neither is 
comprehensively planning for the Guard’s role in responding to events 
like the national planning scenarios that may involve more than one 
state and be federally funded. Such planning has not been completed 
primarily because there is no formal mechanism for facilitating 
planning for the Guard’s role in large-scale events. As a liaison 
between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National Guard 
Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning for National 
Guard forces. The bureau has facilitated some limited interstate 
planning for multistate events, although neither its charter nor its 
civil support regulation identifies this activity as its 
responsibility. Until the bureau’s charter and its civil support 
regulation are revised to define its role in facilitating state 
planning for multistate events, such planning for the National Guard’s 
role in these events may remain incomplete, and the National Guard may 
not be prepared to respond as efficiently and effectively as possible. 

DOD does not routinely measure or report to Congress the equipment 
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions. 
DOD’s legacy readiness reporting system and its annual National Guard 
equipping report to Congress address warfighting readiness but do not 
address the Guard’s domestic missions. While DOD has recognized the 
need for greater visibility over the Guard’s domestic capabilities, its 
process and measures for assessing the Guard’s domestic readiness have 
not yet been fully defined. Until DOD reaches agreement on a specific 
approach for measuring readiness for domestic missions and requirements 
are defined, it will remain unclear whether the Guard is equipped to 
respond effectively to the consequences of a large-scale terrorist 
attack or natural disaster. 

DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment 
challenges but the extent to which these actions will improve the 
Guard’s domestic capabilities is uncertain because DOD has not 
finalized specific plans to implement and fund several initiatives. 
Some officials in case study states expressed concerns about the 
adequacy of equipment for nondeployed units under current Army plans. 
For example, until the Army defines the types and amounts of equipment 
that nondeployed Army National Guard units can expect to retain on hand 
within the United States, National Guard officials in the states may be 
hampered in their ability to plan and train for responding to large-
scale domestic events. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends updating the National Guard Bureau’s charter and civil 
support regulation and improved reporting of the Guard’s domestic 
readiness. DOD partially agreed to report on plans to assess domestic 
readiness but disagreed with our other recommendations. GAO reiterates 
the need for changes in matters for congressional consideration. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Janet A. St. Laurent at 
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

National Guard Equipment Requirements for Domestic Missions Not Fully 
Identified: 

DOD Is Taking Some Steps to Measure National Guard Preparedness for 
Domestic Missions, but Efforts Are Not Yet Complete: 

DOD Has Some Efforts Under Way to Address National Guard Equipment 
Challenges, but Long-term Effect on Domestic Preparedness Is Unclear: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: National Planning Scenarios: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Appendix V: Related Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles: 

Table 2: The 10 Core Capabilities Identified by the National Guard 
Bureau as Essential to Support Domestic Missions: 

Table 3: Number and Percent of State and Territory National Guards 
Reporting Adequate and Inadequate Capabilities to Respond to Typical 
State Missions: 

Table 4: Examples of Army National Guard Dual-Use Equipment Items where 
the National Inventory is 15 Percent or Less of the Amount Authorized 
for Warfighting Missions, Including Substitutes: 

Table 5: Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios and 
Summary Descriptions: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Average Inventory Level of Dual-Use Equipment, Including 
Substitutes, Available to Nondeployed Army National Guard Forces as of 
November 3, 2006: 

Figure 2: The Army's Proposed Force Generation Model: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

January 26, 2007: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The global security environment has changed significantly since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the nation now faces 
adversaries who are committed to attacking American interests both 
overseas and at home. The National Guard with its dual federal and 
state roles has been in demand to meet both evolving overseas 
operations and emerging homeland security[Footnote 1] requirements. 
Since the launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the National Guard has 
experienced the largest activation of its forces since World War II. At 
the same time, the Guard's domestic missions have expanded from routine 
duties, such as responding to hurricanes and forest fires, to include 
activities such as flying armed air patrols over U.S. cities, providing 
radar coverage for the continental United States, protecting critical 
infrastructure against terrorist threats, and securing U.S. borders. 

Multiple state and federal agencies have roles in planning the response 
to the broad range of domestic events to which the National Guard may 
be called with the federal government providing more than 90 percent of 
the Guard's funding. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for 
planning for the Guard's use and the services for equipping its units 
for federal missions performed under the command of the President. In 
addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense has 
been established to supervise DOD's homeland defense activities and the 
U.S. Northern Command is responsible for planning, organizing, and 
executing DOD's civil support missions within the continental United 
States. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for 
developing a system to integrate federal, state, and local domestic 
emergency response and provides grants to the states to build their 
emergency response capabilities. Also at the federal level, the 
President's Homeland Security Council[Footnote 2] provides strategic 
guidance on terrorism prevention and has developed 15 national planning 
scenarios to guide federal, state, and local planning for catastrophic 
events (see app. I). States are responsible for planning for National 
Guard missions performed under the command of the governors. National 
Guard units are generally expected to perform their state missions 
using the equipment DOD has provided for federal missions. However, the 
National Guard's equipment inventories in the United States have 
significantly decreased because of overseas operations, particularly in 
the Army National Guard, at a time when the nation faces an increasing 
array of threats at home. 

We have previously reported that the high pace of operations has caused 
a strain on the Army National Guard's equipment inventories that could 
be used for domestic missions and that planning for the military's 
response to large-scale, catastrophic events is not complete. In 
October 2005, we reported that nondeployed Army National Guard units 
had only about one-third of the equipment they needed for their 
overseas missions.[Footnote 3] We also reported on the National Guard's 
response to help manage the consequences of Hurricane Katrina, a large- 
scale catastrophic event.[Footnote 4] Over 50,000 National Guard 
members from all 50 states were activated to assist in the Katrina 
response effort, demonstrating the pivotal role National Guard forces 
play in responding to large-scale, multistate events. However, we noted 
a number of serious deficiencies in planning for such events on the 
federal and state levels. Two significant shortfalls of DOD's pre- 
Katrina planning were that (1) the capabilities DOD could be called 
upon to provide had not been assessed and (2) planning did not fully 
address the division of tasks between National Guard resources under 
the governors' control and federal resources under presidential 
control. DOD is now considering steps to address some of the 
deficiencies identified in Hurricane Katrina lessons learned reports. A 
list of related GAO products is included at the end of this report. 

Because of the National Guard's important role in homeland security, 
you asked us to assess whether the National Guard has the equipment it 
needs to train and maintain readiness for the full range of its 
domestic missions. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) 
the National Guard's equipment requirements for domestic missions have 
been identified using an analytically based process, (2) DOD measures 
and reports to Congress the equipment readiness of nondeployed National 
Guard forces for domestic missions, and (3) DOD actions address the 
National Guard's domestic equipment challenges. 

To determine the extent to which the National Guard's equipment 
requirements for domestic missions have been identified using an 
analytically based process, we reviewed the status of requirements 
planning for National Guard forces. We also conducted case studies in 
four states--California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia--which 
face a range of homeland security threats to understand the status of 
the National Guard's equipment and state planning efforts for the 
National Guard's state missions. We also met with U.S. Northern 
Command, National Guard Bureau, and Department of Homeland Security 
officials to discuss planning processes for the Guard's missions. To 
assess the extent to which DOD measures and reports on the equipment 
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions, 
we reviewed documentation on DOD's readiness reporting systems and its 
annual report to Congress on National Guard equipping, analyzed the 
inventory status of equipment items determined by the Army National 
Guard as having a high value for domestic missions, reviewed state 
assessments of domestic capability shortfalls, and discussed these 
issues with state National Guard officials in four case study states. 
Further, we reviewed documentation on DOD, Army, Air Force, and 
National Guard Bureau actions to address National Guard equipping 
challenges to determine the extent to which they were derived from 
approved requirements and focused on high-priority needs. We conducted 
our review from December 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards and determined that 
the data used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. The scope 
and methodology used in our review are described in further detail in 
appendix II. 

Results in Brief: 

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to 
perform its domestic missions have not been fully identified using an 
analytically based process, particularly for large-scale, multistate 
natural disasters and terrorist attacks, because states and federal 
agencies have not completed an integrated set of plans identifying the 
capabilities the National Guard would be expected to provide in 
response to events like those described in the Homeland Security 
Council's 15 national planning scenarios. The Department of Homeland 
Security, through the National Response Plan, has established a 
framework for federal, state, and local agencies to use in planning for 
domestic emergencies. While DOD is developing plans for the use of 
federal military forces in domestic missions, it assumes that the 
National Guard will respond to large-scale, multistate events such as 
Hurricane Katrina under the command of the governors and therefore does 
not prepare plans for the Guard's use in those types of events. States 
plan for the National Guard's use in the missions they will lead within 
their borders, such as responding to wildfires and floods. However, 
neither the states nor DOD have comprehensively planned and identified 
requirements for the National Guard's role in responding to events such 
as the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios that may 
involve more than one state and be federally funded. Such planning has 
not been completed in part because there is no formal mechanism for 
facilitating state planning across borders for the Guard's role in 
large-scale events. As the response to Hurricane Katrina illustrated, 
the National Guard Bureau can play a significant role in facilitating 
National Guard support among states. As the liaison between the Army, 
the Air Force, and the states' National Guard forces, the bureau is 
well positioned to facilitate interstate planning for the use of 
National Guard forces in large-scale, multistate events. However, 
neither the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its regulation on 
military support to civil authorities specifically defines a role for 
it in working with the states to facilitate the kind of comprehensive, 
pre-event planning that is needed for a coordinated, efficient, and 
effective response to large-scale, multistate events. Moreover, neither 
the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its regulation on military 
support to civil authorities has been updated to reflect the post- 
September 11, 2001, security environment, including the bureau's role 
with respect to new organizations such as the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense, and the U.S. Northern Command. Unless the National Guard 
Bureau's charter and regulation on military support to civil 
authorities are revised to address the expanded set of homeland 
security issues the National Guard faces, the extent to which the 
National Guard Bureau will continue or expand its efforts to assist 
states with planning for and responding to these events will likely 
remain uneven. As a result, planning that fully identifies the Guard's 
requirements for domestic missions and is integrated with plans for 
using other military and civilian forces is likely to remain 
incomplete, and the National Guard may not be prepared to respond to 
domestic events, such as those described in the national planning 
scenarios, as efficiently and effectively as possible. We are 
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of 
the Army and Air Force to (1) revise the National Guard Bureau's 
charter to clearly define its roles in facilitating interstate planning 
for the National Guard's role in large-scale, multistate events, such 
as those contained in the national planning scenarios, and monitoring 
the Guard's status to perform those missions, and (2) update the 
National Guard's civil support regulation. We are also recommending 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army and 
Air Force to direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination 
with DOD, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and 
other civilian authorities, to facilitate and coordinate interstate 
National Guard planning to identify the capabilities and equipment the 
National Guard would need to respond to large-scale, multistate events, 
consistent with the Homeland Security Council's national planning 
scenarios and state and federal plans. 

DOD does not routinely measure the equipment readiness of nondeployed 
National Guard forces for domestic civil support missions or report 
this information to Congress. The Secretary of Defense is required by 
law to establish a comprehensive readiness reporting system with which 
DOD can measure in an objective, accurate and timely manner the 
military's capability to carry out the National Security Strategy, 
defense planning guidance, and the National Military Strategy. Until 
recently, it has been assumed that the National Guard could perform its 
typical state missions with the equipment it had on hand for its 
federal missions. However, the equipment demands for overseas 
operations have decreased the supply of equipment available to 
nondeployed National Guard units, particularly in the Army National 
Guard. DOD has recognized the need to have more visibility over the 
capability that the National Guard has for its domestic missions and 
has begun to collect data on units' preparedness; however, these 
efforts are not yet fully mature. DOD is implementing a new readiness 
reporting system that will include readiness information on the Guard's 
federally funded state-led missions, but this system is not fully 
operational and it is not clear how equipment readiness will be 
assessed without fully identified domestic mission requirements. The 
National Guard Bureau has developed a database to collect domestic 
capability assessments from the states, but in the absence of fully 
identified requirements for domestic missions the system relies on the 
subjective assessments of state National Guard officials and does not 
provide detailed information on National Guard equipping for large- 
scale, multistate events. Our analysis of these data found that a 
majority of state National Guard leaders assessed the capability of 
resources within their states to respond to typical state missions as 
adequate, although the Army National Guard has shortages of some 
equipment, such as generators and trucks, which could be useful for 
domestic events. In addition, National Guard officials in states we 
visited expressed concerns about whether they would have enough 
equipment to respond to large-scale natural or manmade disasters such 
as Hurricane Katrina or those described in the Homeland Security 
Council's national planning scenarios. Until DOD's efforts to improve 
its readiness measures and reports are mature, decision makers will 
lack information on whether the National Guard has the equipment it 
needs to respond effectively to the consequences of a large-scale, 
multistate event. Further, Congress will have limited information 
making it more difficult to mitigate risks and prioritize investments 
for the Guard's missions. We are recommending actions intended to 
improve congressional visibility over DOD's efforts to assess the 
readiness of National Guard forces for their domestic missions. In 
addition, we are suggesting for congressional consideration the 
revision of the annual National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report 
requirements to include an assessment of the Guard's equipping 
preparedness to provide support to civil authorities, the risks to 
those missions associated with any shortfalls, and mitigation 
strategies and investment priorities. 

DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment 
challenges; however, it is not clear how these initiatives will affect 
the Guard's preparedness for domestic missions since some of the 
initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and specific 
plans are still being developed. DOD plans to procure additional Army 
National Guard and Air National Guard equipment, such as trucks and 
communications gear, using $900 million that Congress provided in the 
2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act. In addition, the 
National Guard Bureau has begun implementing several initiatives, such 
as establishing joint force headquarters within each state and 
expanding chemical and biological response capabilities. However, these 
initiatives were recently approved by DOD and have not yet been 
included in DOD's Future Years Defense Program. The Army has also 
budgeted $21 billion for fiscal years 2005 through 2011 to modernize 
the Army National Guard and augment its equipment inventory. However, 
this equipment may be deployed to meet overseas demands and the Army 
has not specified how much equipment will remain in the United States 
to be available for domestic missions because it has not finalized 
plans for allocating equipment to nondeployed units under its new 
cyclical readiness and deployment model. In the absence of a specific 
plan that outlines how Army National Guard equipment will be allocated 
among nondeployed units, state National Guards may be hampered in their 
ability to plan for responding to large-scale domestic events. We are 
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 
Army to develop a plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed 
Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. 

In reviewing a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with our 
recommendation to report to Congress on its plans for assessing 
National Guard domestic readiness, but disagreed with our 
recommendations to update the National Guard Bureau's charter and civil 
support regulation for the new security environment, to direct the 
National Guard Bureau to facilitate and coordinate interstate planning 
for the use of Guard forces in large-scale, multistate events, and for 
the Army to provide a plan and funding strategy for providing baseline 
equipment sets to nondeployed Army National Guard units. DOD stated 
that the National Guard Bureau's existing charter authorizes a planning 
role for the bureau for large-scale, multistate events. However, 
because we found that planning for multistate events is currently 
uneven and the charter does not clearly define the bureau's role in 
planning, we believe that clarifying the language in the charter to 
highlight the importance of these activities would improve preparedness 
for such emergencies. Further, DOD stated that it did not see a need to 
update its civil support regulation and that it is not appropriate for 
the National Guard Bureau to coordinate directly with other federal 
agencies because this is the responsibility, if required, of the 
Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders and would infringe on 
the authority of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and the 
governors. Our recommendation was not intended to designate the 
National Guard Bureau as the DOD entity to coordinate with other 
federal agencies or infringe on the governor's role in coordination 
with federal agencies. However, the current regulation does not 
specifically address how coordination with organizations established 
since September 11, 2001, should occur or how new planning tools should 
be used, and we believe that updating the regulation is an important 
step in strengthening pre-event planning and minimizing confusion about 
the use of National Guard forces. DOD further stated in its comments 
that it does not see a need for a report to Congress on the Army's 
plans to equip nondeployed Army National Guard units, and it did not 
specify any actions the department would take to measure and report to 
Congress on the National Guard's equipment readiness for domestic 
missions. We continue to believe that the actions we recommend are 
important to improve interstate planning and visibility of National 
Guard readiness for domestic missions. Therefore, we are suggesting 
that Congress consider amending the statute prescribing the National 
Guard Bureau's charter to include coordinating and facilitating 
interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, 
multistate events such as those contained in the national planning 
scenarios and requiring DOD to revise the National Guard Bureau's civil 
support regulation to reflect this change. In addition, to provide 
information on what equipment will be available for the National 
Guard's domestic missions under the Army's force generation model, we 
are also suggesting that Congress consider requiring the Secretary of 
Defense to include in the 2009 National Guard and Reserve Equipment 
Report a plan and funding strategy for providing baseline equipment 
sets to nondeployed Army National Guard units. DOD's comments and our 
evaluation are discussed in detail in the Agency Comments and Our 
Evaluation section of this report. 

Background: 

The National Guard performs a range of domestic and overseas missions 
in its dual roles as a federal reserve of the Army and Air Force and as 
a state militia. DOD is responsible for planning and equipping the 
National Guard for its federal missions conducted under the command and 
control of the President. Within DOD, the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense[Footnote 5] supervises DOD's 
homeland activities, including the execution of domestic military 
missions and military support to U.S. civil authorities, and develops 
policies, conducts analyses, provides advice, and makes recommendations 
for these activities to the Under Secretary for Policy and the 
Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense is also the DOD office responsible for coordinating with the 
Department of Homeland Security. While the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense supervises DOD's homeland 
activities, U.S. Northern Command is the unified military command 
responsible for planning, organizing, and executing DOD's homeland 
defense and federal military support to civil authorities' missions 
within the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial 
waters.[Footnote 6] 

The services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping 
military forces, including the National Guard. The Army and the Air 
Force have different strategies for structuring and providing resources 
for their Guard components that reflect each service's planned use and 
available resources. Using DOD planning guidance, Army National Guard 
units are provided varying levels of equipment according to their 
unit's priority for resources, which generally increases as a unit 
nears availability for overseas deployment. Prior to the beginning of 
current overseas operations, the majority of the Army National Guard's 
combat forces were supplied with 65 to 79 percent of their required 
equipment. Our prior work (see Related GAO Products) has shown that in 
order to fully equip units deploying overseas to Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the Army National Guard had to transfer large quantities of items from 
nondeployed units, which depleted the inventories of equipment 
available for the Guard's domestic missions. In addition, operational 
requirements to leave equipment overseas for follow-on forces and DOD's 
lack of approved plans to replace these items have further compounded 
the Army National Guard's equipment shortages and threaten its ability 
to maintain readiness for future missions. In contrast, the Air 
National Guard has been integrated into the Air Force's operational 
force and is maintained at readiness levels comparable to its active 
component counterparts. This approach enables the Air National Guard 
units to be ready to deploy on short notice and its units have not been 
as negatively affected by recent overseas operations as Army National 
Guard units. 

As a state militia, the National Guard responds to domestic events 
under the command and control of a state governor. When not 
participating in DOD's federal missions, National Guard members and 
equipment are available to their respective state governors to perform 
state missions, such as responding to emergencies, disasters, civil 
disturbances, and other events authorized by state laws. National Guard 
state-unique equipment requirements are funded by the state. In some 
circumstances, National Guard personnel can also perform duty under 
state control that is federally funded.[Footnote 7] Since September 11, 
2001, the President has authorized federal funding for several National 
Guard domestic missions conducted under the command of the governors, 
such as providing security at the nation's airports in the immediate 
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, assisting the Gulf 
Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and providing security 
along the southwest border in 2006. Table 1 compares some differences-
-including differences in command and control responsibility, where the 
National Guard has been deployed, and how the National Guard was 
funded--in its different state and federal roles. 

Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles: 

Command and control entity; 
State role: State funded: Governor; 
State role: Federally funded: Governor; 
Federal role: Federally funded: President. 

Mobilization authorities used; 
State role: State funded: In accordance with state law; 
State role: Federally funded: Title 32 (32 U.S.C 502(f)); 
Federal role: Federally funded: Various Title 10 authorities. 

Where deployed; 
State role: State funded: In accordance with state law; 
State role: Federally funded: United States; 
Federal role: Federally funded: Worldwide. 

Mission types; 
State role: State funded: In accordance with state law; 
State role: Federally funded: Training and other federally authorized 
missions; 
Federal role: Federally funded: Overseas training and as assigned after 
mobilization. 

Examples of domestic missions; 
State role: State funded: Forest fires, floods, civil disturbances; 
State role: Federally funded: Post-9/11 airport security, Hurricane 
Katrina, southwest border security; 
Federal role: Federally funded: Air sovereignty, missile defense, 
guarding DOD infrastructure. 

Support law enforcement activities; 
State role: State funded: Yes; 
State role: Federally funded: Yes; 
Federal role: Federally funded: As limited by Posse Comitatus[A]. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[A] The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385, prohibits the direct 
use of federal military troops for domestic civilian law enforcement 
except where authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. This 
act applies to the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, 
which are reserve components of the armed forces under 10 U.S.C. 
§10101. 

[End of table] 

Although it is equipped by the Army and the Air Force for its federal 
role, the National Guard can use its equipment and capabilities, such 
as airlift, transportation, engineering, communications, logistics, 
medical, maintenance, and security capabilities, to support state and 
local officials in its domestic role. For example, in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard supported response and recovery 
operations in a number of ways. Among other activities, National Guard 
units performed helicopter search-and-rescue missions, augmented 
security efforts, supplied satellite phone communications, and provided 
humanitarian and medical treatment for victims of the disaster. The 
National Guard also can provide capabilities for responding to domestic 
weapons of mass destruction events, such as detection, assessment, and 
decontamination capabilities. 

In its domestic role, the National Guard works with the multiple state 
and federal agencies that have responsibilities for different aspects 
of homeland security. The National Guard works with state emergency 
management agencies to provide military support to state civilian 
authorities. In addition, the states have entered into mutual 
assistance agreements to provide cross-border assistance, including 
National Guard forces, when an event exceeds a state's capacity to 
respond. The National Guard Bureau, established by statute[Footnote 8] 
as a joint bureau of the Army and the Air Force, is responsible for the 
administration of the National Guard, including participating with Army 
and Air Force staff in developing and coordinating policies, programs, 
and plans affecting Army National Guard and Air National Guard 
personnel, and it serves as the channel of communication between the 
Army and the Air Force and the National Guard in the several states. 
The Secretaries of the Army and Air Force are directed by statute to 
jointly develop and prescribe a charter for the National Guard Bureau 
that sets out the bureau's responsibilities.[Footnote 9] The Chief of 
the National Guard Bureau has overall responsibility for the National 
Guard's military support to civil authorities programs. As was 
demonstrated in the response to Hurricane Katrina, during civil support 
missions the National Guard Bureau provides policy guidance and 
facilitates National Guard assistance to the executing adjutants 
general who lead National Guard forces within the states under the 
command and control of the governors. National Guard forces also have 
some federal domestic missions, such as air and missile defense 
activities, that are federally funded and conducted under the command 
of the President. 

Also at the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Homeland Security Council both have responsibilities that could affect 
the National Guard's domestic role. The Department of Homeland 
Security, which was established in 2002[Footnote 10] to reduce 
America's vulnerability to terrorism and to prevent terrorist attacks 
as well as respond to attacks that might occur, is the lead federal 
agency responsible for preventing, preparing for, and responding to a 
wide range of major domestic disasters and other emergencies. In 
December 2004, the department issued the National Response 
Plan,[Footnote 11] which provides a framework for federal, state, and 
local agencies to use in planning for domestic emergencies. To assist 
in integrating state and federal responses to domestic emergencies, the 
Homeland Security Council developed 15 national planning scenarios in 
2004 whose purpose was to form the basis for identifying the 
capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of emergencies. The 
scenarios focus on the consequences that federal, state, and local 
first responders may have to address and are intended to illustrate the 
scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic emergencies for which 
the nation needs to be prepared. The 15 scenarios include a wide range 
of terrorist attacks involving nuclear, biological, and chemical 
agents, as well as catastrophic natural disasters, such as an 
earthquake or hurricane, and a large-scale cyber attack. These 
scenarios are described in further detail in appendix I. 

National Guard Equipment Requirements for Domestic Missions Not Fully 
Identified: 

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to 
perform domestic missions have not been fully identified using an 
analytically based process, particularly for large-scale, multistate 
natural disasters and terrorist attacks, because state and federal 
agencies have not completed an integrated set of plans identifying the 
capabilities the National Guard would be expected to provide in 
response to events like those described in the Homeland Security 
Council's national planning scenarios. DOD is developing plans for the 
use of federal military forces in domestic missions, but assumes the 
National Guard will respond to large-scale, multistate events such as 
Hurricane Katrina under the command of the governors. States plan for 
the National Guard's use in missions within their borders, but have 
only planned to a limited extent for the Guard's use in large-scale, 
multistate events such as those described in the Homeland Security 
Council's national planning scenarios. While neither the National Guard 
Bureau's charter nor its civil support regulation explicitly defines 
its role in working to facilitate comprehensive and integrated planning 
for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, the 
bureau has taken steps to facilitate limited interstate planning for 
potential domestic events like hurricanes, wildfires, and an influenza 
pandemic. However, without a formal mechanism to facilitate the 
development of comprehensive plans for the National Guard's role in 
large-scale, multistate events, such plans are unlikely to be 
developed. As a result, the National Guard may not be prepared to 
respond to large-scale, multistate events as efficiently and 
effectively as possible. 

DOD and State Planning for the National Guard's Use in Domestic 
Missions Is Incomplete: 

The multiple state and federal agencies likely to be involved in the 
response to a large-scale, multistate event are a factor that 
complicates planning for how the National Guard should be used and 
equipped to respond to domestic events, particularly for events such as 
terrorist attacks and natural disasters described in the Homeland 
Security Council's national planning scenarios. DOD, Department of 
Homeland Security, and National Guard documents, as well as our prior 
work on Hurricane Katrina, indicate that comprehensive pre-event 
planning that is coordinated and integrated to take into account the 
roles of federal and state responders, including the National Guard, is 
a key step in facilitating an effective, efficient, and well- 
coordinated response to unexpected domestic emergencies. As was 
illustrated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the response to 
large-scale, multistate events may involve a combination of state and 
local civilian authorities; National Guard forces from across the 
nation operating in state status; federal civilian agencies, such as 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and federal military forces, 
such as active duty Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces 
operating under the command of the President. However, the number of 
state and federal agencies that have responsibilities for different 
aspects of emergency response combined with their divided and 
decentralized planning responsibilities complicate the task of 
comprehensive planning and identification of the equipment the National 
Guard would need for the full range of potential domestic missions. 
National Guard assistance to civil authorities is normally provided 
when an event is so severe and widespread that local and state 
governments are overwhelmed and civil resources are exhausted. As a 
result, in order to identify the capabilities the Guard will be 
expected to provide for domestic response efforts, state National Guard 
plans must be integrated with other responders' plans and account for 
the contributions expected to be made by civil authorities as well as 
federal military forces. 

DOD plans for the domestic use of federal military forces--which may 
include National Guard units in federal status--in the homeland defense 
missions it leads, such as air defense of the United States and missile 
defense, and the federal military support it provides to civil 
authorities as a result of natural or man-made disasters. The 
department, through the U.S. Northern Command, is currently developing 
a group of plans to address homeland defense missions and the missions 
federal forces may undertake in support of civilian authorities. 
However, DOD assumes that National Guard forces will respond to most 
domestic events, including large-scale, multistate events such as 
Hurricane Katrina and those described in the Homeland Security 
Council's national planning scenarios, under the command of the 
governors. Therefore, the department does not plan for the types of 
Guard units or establish equipment requirements for the National 
Guard's use under state control in responding to these types of events. 
Moreover, a DOD directive prohibits the procurement of equipment 
exclusively for providing support to civilian authorities in civil 
emergencies unless specifically directed by the Secretary of 
Defense.[Footnote 12] Consistent with this directive, DOD's 2005 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support states that DOD will 
continue to rely on forces with both warfighting and domestic mission 
capabilities for consequence management and other defense support of 
civil authorities.[Footnote 13] 

States are responsible for preparing and maintaining emergency plans 
for the employment of the National Guard in response to civil 
disturbances; natural, man-made, or technological disasters; and other 
potential emergencies within their borders, such as wildfires and 
floods. In responding to such events, states generally have relied on 
the equipment that DOD has provided to their National Guard units for 
their federal missions. The degree to which states have developed plans 
for the use of National Guard forces and identified equipment 
requirements for the range of the National Guard's missions, including 
large-scale, multistate events, varies. A recent Department of Homeland 
Security review of state emergency operations plans, which are the 
basis for state National Guard plans, found that a majority of state 
plans and planning processes are not fully adequate, feasible, or 
acceptable to manage catastrophic events.[Footnote 14] According to the 
report, many state plans are created in isolation and are 
insufficiently detailed, and the states do not conduct adequate 
collaborative planning as a part of normal preparedness efforts. 
Further, the report asserted that the lack of specificity and poorly 
defined resource requirements in state plans would hinder the timely 
identification, deployment, and employment of equipment, personnel, and 
other resources to support emergency response efforts. 

States have not completed the comprehensive and integrated planning 
necessary to identify National Guard requirements for responding to 
large-scale events that may involve more than one state and be 
federally funded, such as the Homeland Security Council's national 
planning scenarios, for a number of reasons, including limited state 
National Guard planning resources and the lack of a formal mechanism to 
facilitate planning across state borders for the Guard's role in these 
events. In some of the states we visited, National Guard officials 
stated that their planning resources are limited, and this affects 
their ability to develop detailed, integrated plans for the Guard's use 
in domestic events. For example, the West Virginia National Guard had a 
single planning officer who was tasked with other duties, while 
California National Guard officials stated they lacked funding for full-
time planners. States must work with each other to conduct planning for 
the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events and have 
done so to a limited extent for events like hurricanes and wildfires. 
In some cases, states have used mutual assistance agreements to 
supplement their National Guard forces when such events occur. However, 
there is no formal mechanism to facilitate comprehensive interstate 
planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale domestic events 
that is integrated with the plans of the multiple federal and state 
agencies expected to be involved in response efforts. In the absence of 
such a mechanism, planning is likely to remain incomplete and the 
Guard's full equipment requirements for domestic missions will remain 
unknown. 

National Guard Bureau Charter and Civil Support Regulation Do Not 
Clearly Define National Guard Bureau's Role in Facilitating 
Comprehensive Planning for the Guard's Domestic Roles: 

While the National Guard Bureau is charged with performing a liaison 
function between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, neither its 
charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities 
specifically defines its role in working with the states to facilitate 
comprehensive and integrated planning for the National Guard's use in 
large-scale, multistate events, such as those described in the Homeland 
Security Council's national planning scenarios. 

The National Guard Bureau's charter, signed by the Secretaries of the 
Army and the Air Force in 1995, assigns the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau responsibility for facilitating and supporting the training of 
members and units of the National Guard to meet state requirements, as 
well as responsibility for facilitating and coordinating with the 
Departments of the Army and the Air Force on the use of National Guard 
personnel and resources for several functions, including natural 
disasters and military support to civil authorities.[Footnote 15] The 
National Guard Bureau's regulation on military support to civil 
authorities, last updated in 1996, describes the Chief of the National 
Guard Bureau's overall responsibility for National Guard civil support 
programs and for issuing planning guidance on the National Guard's role 
in providing military support to civil authorities. The regulation also 
provides guidance to the states on preparing emergency plans for the 
use of National Guard forces in a civil support role, including 
coordination for external assistance beyond state 
capabilities.[Footnote 16] In its role as a liaison between the Army, 
the Air Force, and the states and territories on National Guard issues, 
the National Guard Bureau played a significant role in facilitating 
Guard support among states during Hurricane Katrina. For example, the 
bureau acted as a conduit for communicating requirements for assistance 
in Louisiana and Mississippi to state National Guard leaders in the 
rest of the country. 

In line with these existing roles, the National Guard Bureau is well 
positioned to facilitate state planning for the use of National Guard 
forces in large-scale, multistate events. However, neither the bureau's 
charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities 
specifically defines a role for it in working with the states to 
facilitate comprehensive and integrated pre-event planning for the use 
of National Guard forces in responding to large-scale, multistate 
events. Moreover, neither the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its 
regulation on military support to civil authorities has been updated to 
reflect the post-September 11, 2001, security environment or how the 
state National Guards and the National Guard Bureau will work with new 
organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S. 
Northern Command in facilitating planning for the National Guard's 
response to domestic events. In addition, the bureau's regulation on 
military support to civil authorities does not provide guidance on how 
the National Guard state leadership and the National Guard Bureau 
should use the new planning tools that have been developed since 2001, 
to facilitate national preparedness, such as the National Response Plan 
and the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios. 

In the absence of clearly defined responsibilities for facilitating 
state planning, the National Guard Bureau has taken some steps to 
facilitate limited interstate planning for the use of National Guard 
forces and equipment in large-scale, multistate events. For example, 
according to state and National Guard Bureau officials, during the past 
year the National Guard Bureau has helped facilitate a conference of 
southeastern states to discuss how those states can cooperate and share 
equipment in response to a hurricane as well as a similar conference of 
western states to address response efforts for the wildfire season. The 
National Guard Bureau has also facilitated state planning for the 
Guard's role in an influenza pandemic, and is coordinating the 
development of state National Guard plans to support U.S. Northern 
Command's new homeland defense plan and providing general planning 
guidance. While we believe these are positive steps, they do not 
provide the comprehensive and integrated planning that would help 
identify the specific equipment the National Guard would need to 
respond to the types of events described in the Homeland Security 
Council's national planning scenarios. Unless the National Guard 
Bureau's charter and its regulation on military support to civil 
authorities are revised to address the expanded set of homeland 
security issues the National Guard faces and the roles the bureau will 
play in facilitating state planning for and the Guard's response to 
large-scale, multistate events, the extent to which the National Guard 
Bureau will continue or expand its efforts to assist states with 
planning for and responding to large-scale, multistate events will 
likely remain uneven. As a result, comprehensive planning that fully 
identifies equipment requirements for the National Guard's use in 
domestic missions and is integrated with plans for using other military 
and civilian forces may remain incomplete. 

DOD Is Taking Some Steps to Measure National Guard Preparedness for 
Domestic Missions, but Efforts Are Not Yet Complete: 

DOD's legacy readiness reporting system and its annual report to 
Congress on National Guard equipment provide information about the 
National Guard's readiness for its warfighting missions, but do not 
include reporting on its preparedness for its domestic missions. While 
DOD is taking steps to better assess the National Guard's preparedness 
for its domestic missions, these efforts are not yet complete and are 
limited by the lack of fully identified requirements for the Guard's 
domestic missions. Although DOD cannot quantify the degree to which the 
National Guard has the equipment it needs to respond to domestic 
missions, our analyses of the limited data collected by the department 
and the National Guard Bureau on the National Guard's capability for 
domestic missions found that most state National Guard leaders assessed 
their forces' capability as adequate to respond to typical state 
missions. National Guard officials in the four states we visited 
expressed views that were consistent with our analyses, but some 
officials expressed concern about whether they have sufficient 
equipment to respond to large-scale, multistate events. Until the 
National Guard's equipment requirements for domestic missions are fully 
identified and DOD collects and reports information that compares 
equipment on hand to those requirements, the department cannot provide 
Congress with detailed information on the National Guard's equipment 
status for its domestic missions, and decision makers lack information 
to both assess whether the National Guard is appropriately equipped to 
respond to a large-scale domestic event and to target resources to 
assist the National Guard in mitigating any shortfalls. 

Current Readiness Assessments and Reports on National Guard Equipment 
Do Not Address Domestic Mission Requirements: 

The Secretary of Defense is required by law to establish a 
comprehensive readiness reporting system for DOD to use to measure in 
an objective, accurate and timely manner the military's capability to 
carry out the National Security Strategy, defense planning guidance, 
and the National Military Strategy.[Footnote 17] The Secretary is 
required to measure the capability of military units to conduct their 
assigned warfighting missions, identify any critical warfighting 
deficiencies in those units' capabilities, and measure the risk those 
shortfalls pose to the units' ability to carry out their federal 
warfighting missions. DOD's legacy readiness reporting system--the 
Global Status of Resources and Training System--contains data that 
enable DOD to assess the capability of National Guard forces to carry 
out their warfighting missions. However, the system does not contain 
data that would enable DOD to assess the preparedness of National Guard 
forces for domestic civil support missions, including the extent to 
which those forces have the equipment they need, because DOD's focus is 
on its units' readiness to perform their warfighting missions. 

The Secretary of Defense is also required to submit an annual report to 
Congress on the equipment the National Guard and reserve components 
have and how DOD plans to meet the wartime equipment requirements of 
its reserve components.[Footnote 18] The report, known as the National 
Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, is required to include: 

* recommendations on the type and quantity of major equipment items 
that should be in the National Guard's and the reserves' 
inventory;[Footnote 19] 

* a list of each type of major equipment item required by the National 
Guard and reserves, indicating their full requirement for warfighting 
missions and the amount of that equipment in the inventory, as well as 
a separate list of deployable and nondeployable substitute equipment 
for that item; and: 

* a narrative explaining the Secretary of Defense's plan to fill 
warfighting requirements for each type of major equipment. 

DOD is not currently required to include in the report information on 
the adequacy of the equipment that nondeployed National Guard forces 
have available to perform the full range of their domestic missions. 
Without this information, the report provides Congress with limited 
information to help it prioritize investments for the full range of 
National Guard missions, warfighting and domestic. The readiness of 
units for these two different types of missions might vary widely. For 
example, a National Guard armor unit might not have the tanks it 
requires to successfully perform its warfighting mission and therefore 
be assessed as not ready in the Global Status of Resources and Training 
System, but still have adequate equipment to provide support to civil 
authorities for a domestic event like a hurricane. Conversely, a 
National Guard unit may be assessed as ready for its warfighting 
missions but not have the equipment, such as trucks, generators, 
communications gear, and engineering equipment, needed for its domestic 
missions. Until recently, it has been assumed that the National Guard 
could perform its typical state missions with the equipment it had on 
hand for its federal missions. However, some Guard units, particularly 
in the Army National Guard, may be less ready for domestic missions 
than they were 2 or 3 years ago because, as we have previously 
reported, large quantities of equipment have been sent overseas to 
support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, decreasing the supply of 
equipment available to nondeployed units. 

Some Efforts Are Under Way to Better Assess National Guard Preparedness 
for Domestic Missions: 

DOD has recognized the need to have greater visibility over the 
National Guard's capabilities for domestic missions and has begun 
taking steps to assess the Guard's preparedness for those missions. In 
a September 2005 memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the Secretary of Defense called for improved visibility over the 
readiness of National Guard forces operating in state status with 
federal funds. To achieve this improved visibility, DOD has decided to 
include information on the National Guard's readiness to perform both 
its federal warfighting missions and its state-led, federally funded 
missions in the department's new Defense Readiness Reporting 
System.[Footnote 20] Additionally, the National Guard Bureau has 
developed the Joint Capabilities Database as a mechanism to collect 
information on state capabilities, including those of the National 
Guard, to respond to domestic events. Both efforts are being 
implemented and refined, but the lack of requirements for the full 
range of the National Guard's domestic missions limits their usefulness 
as a basis for identifying shortfalls and targeting future equipment 
investments. 

DOD's new readiness reporting system, which will replace the Global 
Status of Resources and Training System, is expected to be fully 
operational by the end of fiscal year 2007. In contrast to the Global 
Status of Resources and Training System, which focuses on resource 
levels, the new system reports on assessed mission capabilities. 
Commanders will use their military judgment to assess readiness based 
on unit performance as well as the availability of resources, such as 
personnel and equipment. The system will also contain measures 
describing the status of major equipment items, including the 
quantities of those items units require for their missions, the 
equipment units are authorized to have, and the equipment they have on 
hand, as well as its condition and location. DOD officials plan to use 
that information to identify equipment deficiencies. 

DOD has directed National Guard units to report in the Defense 
Readiness Reporting System on their capabilities to perform state-led 
but federally funded domestic missions, such as border security. As a 
step toward assessing these capabilities, the National Guard Bureau has 
begun to identify the essential tasks that National Guard forces need 
to be capable of performing for their domestic roles and missions. For 
example, the bureau is developing lists of essential tasks for state 
joint force headquarters, state joint task forces, and weapons of mass 
destruction civil support teams. Commanders will use these task lists 
to assess the readiness of their units to perform assigned domestic 
missions, such as counterdrug operations and hurricane response. 
However, in the absence of equipment requirements based on events like 
those described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning 
scenarios to include in the Defense Readiness Reporting System, the 
system may not enable DOD or the states to fully assess whether 
nondeployed National Guard forces have an appropriate amount of 
equipment to respond to those missions. 

In addition to the information that will be available in the Defense 
Readiness Reporting System, the National Guard Bureau has developed a 
database that captures information on state capabilities to support 
domestic missions. This unclassified database, introduced in 2005 and 
called the Joint Capabilities Database, is a voluntary reporting by the 
states' National Guard leaders to identify capability gaps in each 
state and help the states and the National Guard Bureau develop 
appropriate mitigation strategies. The database compiles subjective 
assessments from state National Guard leaders on whether their states 
have sufficient capabilities in their Army National Guard and Air 
National Guard units to effectively respond to state missions. In 
reporting on their state's capabilities for domestic missions, state 
National Guard leaders assess whether their Army National Guard and Air 
National Guard units collectively can provide adequate amounts of 10 
core capabilities the National Guard Bureau has identified as being 
essential to supporting domestic missions. Table 2 lists these 
capabilities and provides examples of the type of tasks they represent. 

Table 2: The 10 Core Capabilities Identified by the National Guard 
Bureau as Essential to Support Domestic Missions: 

Core capability: Aviation/airlift; 
Examples of tasks associated with core capability: 
* Provide aircraft to transport personnel and cargo during times of 
emergency; 
* Provide aircraft to facilitate reconnaissance, command and control, 
and communications during emergencies; 
* Support first responders using air assets. 

Core capability: Engineering; 
Examples of tasks associated with core capability: 
* Provide engineer units to assist local and state agencies in debris 
removal; construction of roads, bridges, and emergency housing; search 
and rescue; water purification and distribution; and power generation. 

Core capability: Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high- 
yield explosive; 
Examples of tasks associated with core capability: 
* Maintain a certified civil support team; 
* Identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 
explosive agents and substances; 
* Assess consequences, advise responders, and assist with requests for 
more support. 

Core capability: Communications; 
Examples of tasks associated with core capability: 
* Establish and maintain interoperable communications with local, 
state, and federal agencies, and volunteer organizations as necessary 
for domestic missions. 

Core capability: Command and control; 
Examples of tasks associated with core capability: 
* Operate a Joint Operations Center to process information and serve as 
a focal point for the National Guard response; 
* Provide reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for 
arriving forces; 
* Coordinate and act as a liaison with state and federal agencies. 

Core capability: Logistics; 
Examples of tasks associated with core capability: 
* Plan for and provide sustainment support to civil authorities to 
ensure continuity of operations; 
* Rapidly deploy and monitor movement and placement of forces and 
equipment during support operations; 
* Sustain deployed forces. 

Core capability: Medical; 
Examples of tasks associated with core capability: 
* Support civilian emergency medical system during mass casualty 
operations; 
* Assist the public health system in distributing and administering 
vaccines and antidotes to the public. 

Core capability: Maintenance; 
Examples of tasks associated with core capability: 
* Ensure equipment is available for state missions; 
* Sustain equipment during all phases of state missions. 

Core capability: Security; 
Examples of tasks associated with core capability: 
* Provide a military force capable of assisting civil law enforcement 
agencies in maintaining law and order; 
* Provide security to critical infrastructure. 

Core capability: Transportation (surface); 
Examples of tasks associated with core capability: 
* Deploy the force and support first responders using ground 
transportation assets; 
* Provide transportation assets to remove civilian personnel from 
affected areas and move supplies. 

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data. 

[End of table] 

State National Guard leaders are asked to assess the adequacy of their 
state's capabilities for two levels of events: (1) state missions that 
have been routinely conducted by the Army National Guard and Air 
National Guard in the past 10 years and (2) larger, nonroutine events 
that are expected to rapidly overwhelm state assets and require 
immediate external National Guard or federal assistance. State National 
Guard leaders' subjective assessments are to be based on the state's 
unique needs for National Guard capabilities as described in its 
emergency response plan and consider factors such as equipment on hand, 
training, and unit availability, although the assessments do not 
provide detailed information on the status of National Guard equipment. 
State National Guard leaders rate a capability as adequate if they 
think their National Guard units possess the resources and assets 
necessary to accomplish their missions; they rate a capability as 
inadequate if they do not think their National Guard units possess the 
resources and assets required to complete the mission without external 
assistance and explain the reasons why the capability is rated as 
inadequate. The National Guard Bureau has requested that state National 
Guards submit new assessments quarterly or when events change their 
capability assessment. 

Data Indicate the Majority of State National Guards Have Capability for 
Typical Missions, but Shortages Exist and Concerns Remain about Ability 
to Respond to Large-Scale, Multistate Events: 

Without analytically based equipment requirements for the National 
Guard's domestic missions to compare against the National Guard's 
current inventory of available equipment, we could not determine the 
extent to which nondeployed National Guard forces have the equipment 
they need to perform their full range of domestic missions. However, we 
collected and examined information from two sources--the National Guard 
Bureau's Joint Capabilities Database and an Army National Guard 
equipment inventory--as rough substitute measures of the adequacy of 
National Guard equipping for domestic missions. To supplement this 
information, we visited four states--California, Florida, New Jersey, 
and West Virginia--and discussed the capabilities, including equipment, 
that would be available within the states for their typical missions as 
well as large-scale, multistate events. 

National Guard Capability to Respond to Typical State Missions: 

Our analysis indicated that the majority of states report having the 
National Guard capabilities they need to respond to typical state 
missions; however, some states and territories report capability 
shortfalls in one or more areas.[Footnote 21] As of July 2006, 34 of 
the 54 states and territories (63 percent) reported having adequate 
amounts of all 10 core domestic mission capabilities for responding to 
typical state missions.[Footnote 22] Of the 20 states and territories 
(37 percent) that reported an inadequate capability, 13 reported being 
inadequate in only one capability, and 4 reported being inadequate in 
two capabilities. Table 3 shows the number and percentage of states and 
territories reporting either adequate or inadequate for each of the 
National Guard Bureau's core domestic mission capabilities. Aviation; 
engineering; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high- 
yield explosive capabilities were most frequently reported by state 
National Guards as being inadequate for responding to typical state 
missions. Most states and territories that rated their chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive capability 
as inadequate did so because their weapons of mass destruction civil 
support teams had not been certified or were in the process of being 
established.[Footnote 23] For all other capabilities, the deployment of 
units was the most common reason state National Guard leaders gave for 
rating a capability as inadequate. 

Table 3: Number and Percent of State and Territory National Guards 
Reporting Adequate and Inadequate Capabilities to Respond to Typical 
State Missions: 

Aviation; 
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 46 (85); 
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 8 (15). 

Engineering; 
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 48 (89); 
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 6 (11). 

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive; 
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 43 (80); 
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 11 (20). 

Communications; 
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 52 (96); 
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 2 (4). 

Command and control; 
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 54 (100); 
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 0 (0). 

Logistics; 
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 54 (100); 
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 0 (0). 

Medical; 
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 52 (96); 
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 2 (4). 

Maintenance; 
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 53 (98); 
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 1 (2). 

Security; 
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 53 (98); 
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 1 (2). 

Transportation; 
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 53 (98); 
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 1 (2). 

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data in the Joint 
Capabilities Database as of July 2006. 

Note: Typical state missions are those missions that have routinely 
been conducted by the Army National Guard and Air National Guard of 
each individual state or territory in the past 10 years. State National 
Guard leader assessments consider factors such as equipment on hand, 
training, and unit availability. 

[End of table] 

Equipment Available for Warfighting and Domestic Missions: 

We also used the Army National Guard's equipment inventory to determine 
the extent to which the Army National Guard has particular types of 
equipment, referred to as dual-use items, which units are authorized 
for their warfighting missions but could be highly useful in responding 
to domestic events. In 2005, the Army National Guard, in coordination 
with the Army and the National Guard Bureau, used military judgment and 
historical experience to identify more than 300 of these dual-use 
items. The list of equipment the Army National Guard identified 
includes types of trucks, generators, radios, medical gear, and 
engineering equipment. 

Our analysis of the Army National Guard's equipment inventory as of 
November 2006 showed that nondeployed Army National Guard forces had 
less dual-use equipment overall than they were authorized and small 
available quantities of some specific types of dual-use equipment. 
However, since requirements have not been fully identified for the 
amount of equipment National Guard units need to respond to domestic 
events like those described in the Homeland Security Council's national 
planning scenarios, the extent to which amounts of equipment authorized 
for warfighting meet or exceed domestic requirements is unknown. 
According to Army National Guard officials, having the full amount of 
equipment authorized for their warfighting missions would leave their 
units well positioned to respond effectively to domestic events. 

As of November 2006, nondeployed Army National Guard forces nationwide 
had about 64 percent of the total amount of dual-use equipment they are 
authorized to have based on their warfighting missions.[Footnote 24] 
However, inventory levels of the different types of dual-use equipment 
varied widely, from 0 to 100 percent.[Footnote 25] The average 
inventory level by type of equipment was roughly 42 percent 
nationwide.[Footnote 26] As figure 1 illustrates, the average inventory 
level of dual-use equipment items also varied by state and territory, 
from under 40 percent in New Mexico, Washington, D.C., and Virginia to 
more than 60 percent in Georgia and Colorado. On average, states and 
territories had about 50 percent of their authorized inventory of dual- 
use equipment available for domestic missions. 

Figure 1: Average Inventory Level of Dual-Use Equipment, Including 
Substitutes, Available to Nondeployed Army National Guard Forces as of 
November 3, 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Sources: GAO analysis of Army National Guard Data, Copyright Corel 
Corp. All rights reserved; mapArt (map). 

[End of figure] 

Percentages of dual-use equipment available to nondeployed Army 
National Guard units vary significantly by equipment type. Table 4 
provides examples of some of the dual-use equipment items for which the 
national inventory is at 15 percent or less of the authorized amount 
for warfighting missions, including substitute items. Items at 15 
percent or less of their authorized amount include types of trucks, 
generators, communications equipment, and chemical protective gear. 

Table 4: Examples of Army National Guard Dual-Use Equipment Items where 
the National Inventory is 15 Percent or Less of the Amount Authorized 
for Warfighting Missions, Including Substitutes: 

Chemical biological protective shelter; 
Number of items authorized: 168; 
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 0. 

Radio set (AN/PRC-148 urban version); 
Number of items authorized: 468; 
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 0. 

Dump truck (MTV W/E); 
Number of items authorized: 733; 
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 0. 

Diesel generator set (28 volt); 
Number of items authorized: 267; 
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 2. 

Navigation set: GPS receiver; 
Number of items authorized: 25,382; 
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 5. 

Electromagnetic radiation meter (ME-513/U); 
Number of items authorized: 33; 
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 9. 

Thermal sight (AN/PAS-13A); 
Number of items authorized: 7,647; 
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 9. 

High mobility cargo trailer (3/4 ton); 
Number of items authorized: 5,656; 
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 9. 

Satellite communications terminal (AN/TSC-154); 
Number of items authorized: 40; 
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 10. 

Expanded capacity HMMWV (4x4, W/E, M1113)[A]; 
Number of items authorized: 2,591; 
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 15. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army National Guard data as of November 2006. 

Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. 

[A] A high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle is a type of utility 
truck. 

[End of table] 

However, without clearly defined requirements for the National Guard's 
domestic missions based on events like those described in the Homeland 
Security Council's national planning scenarios, there is no benchmark 
to judge how many of these items Army National Guard units need to 
effectively respond. Amounts required for domestic missions may differ 
significantly from the amounts required for the National Guard's 
warfighting missions. For example, a nondeployed National Guard force 
in a state may have only a small percentage of the amount of a type of 
truck required for its warfighting missions, reflecting a shortfall. 
However, it may still have enough of that type of truck to perform its 
domestic missions, or may have other types of trucks it could use. 

National Guard officials in California, Florida, New Jersey, and West 
Virginia generally expressed the opinion that, while stressed by 
overseas operations, their forces have the capability and equipment to 
address typical state missions. For example, New Jersey National Guard 
officials said their units had enough equipment to respond to all state 
missions that took place during the peak of the state National Guard's 
overseas deployments in 2004. Officials noted that nondeployed Army 
National Guard units continue to face equipment shortages caused by the 
need to transfer significant quantities of equipment to units deploying 
overseas.[Footnote 27] While reduced equipment levels caused by 
overseas operations complicated its response, the New Jersey National 
Guard adapted and used the equipment it had available to effectively 
respond to its missions. National Guard officials in California, 
Florida, and West Virginia expressed similar levels of confidence in 
their forces' ability to respond to typical state missions using 
currently available equipment. However, some state National Guard 
officials expressed concerns about whether they would have enough 
equipment to respond to large-scale events similar to Hurricane Katrina 
or those described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning 
scenarios. 

DOD Has Some Efforts Under Way to Address National Guard Equipment 
Challenges, but Long-term Effect on Domestic Preparedness Is Unclear: 

We have previously reported that ongoing operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have significantly decreased the amount of equipment 
available to nondeployed Guard units to respond to domestic events. 
Moreover, the Guard's experience with Hurricane Katrina helped to 
illustrate the types of equipment that are valuable in responding to 
domestic disasters. In response to these events, DOD is taking some 
actions to address National Guard equipment challenges and improve the 
Guard's preparedness for both overseas and domestic missions. However, 
the long-term effect of these initiatives is unclear because some 
initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and specific 
plans are still being developed. For example, the Army plans to procure 
additional equipment for National Guard units during the next few years 
but has not clearly defined how much equipment will be available for 
nondeployed units. 

DOD Is Procuring Items and Transforming Units to Increase National 
Guard's Equipment Readiness: 

To improve the equipment readiness of National Guard units, DOD has 
several initiatives under way. For example, DOD plans to use $900 
million Congress provided in the 2006 Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act[Footnote 28] to procure equipment for the Army 
National Guard and Air National Guard that are useful for both 
warfighting and domestic missions, such as communications gear, 
tactical vehicles, trucks, and engineering equipment. In addition, DOD 
also plans to use $290 million Congress provided in the 2007 Department 
of Defense Appropriations Act to procure additional National Guard and 
Reserve equipment.[Footnote 29] 

The National Guard Bureau has also begun implementing four initiatives 
intended to improve coordination and training of nondeployed National 
Guard units for domestic missions. These four initiatives, which 
involve both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, 
include establishing (1) a joint force headquarters in each state and 
territory to provide military command and control capabilities; (2) 12 
National Guard teams trained and equipped to deploy within 6 hours to 
respond to domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or 
high-yield explosive incidents;[Footnote 30] (3) 10 detachments--one 
for each Federal Emergency Management region--trained and equipped to 
conduct mission assessments of defense industrial-base critical 
infrastructure; and (4) at least one joint interagency training 
capability to provide training to National Guard personnel on domestic 
missions. To date, the National Guard Bureau has funded these 
initiatives on a yearly basis by reprogramming funds, but it has 
submitted formal proposals to DOD to incorporate the initiatives into 
DOD's departmentwide programming and budgeting process. At the time of 
our report, DOD had formally approved the joint force headquarters and 
the establishment of 12 National Guard chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incident response teams. 
Formal approval from DOD means that these two initiatives were approved 
by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which approves all new DOD 
requirements, and may now compete to be included in DOD's Future Years 
Defense Program. However, because DOD's priority remains its overseas 
warfighting mission, the extent to which these domestically focused 
initiatives will be funded remains uncertain. 

Army Plans for Balancing Equipment for Deployed and Nondeployed 
National Guard Units Are Not Well Defined: 

The Army has budgeted approximately $21 billion for fiscal years 2005 
through 2011 to modernize the Army National Guard and augment its 
equipment inventory. These funds are intended to facilitate the Army 
National Guard's conversion to modular brigades as well as to help fill 
long-standing equipment shortages. According to Army officials, items 
procured will be standard warfighting equipment and may be deployed to 
meet overseas demands and therefore may not always be available for 
domestic missions. The Army plans to manage all of its equipment for 
the active and reserve units using a new cyclical readiness and 
deployment model for its forces, including Army National Guard forces, 
which has implications for the National Guard's readiness for its 
homeland missions. Under this model, Army National Guard units will 
have access to three types of equipment sets over time as they prepare 
for possible deployment once every 6 years: (1) a baseline set that 
would vary by unit type and assigned mission; (2) a training set that 
would include more of the equipment units would need to be ready for 
deployment; and (3) a deployment set that would include all equipment 
needed for deployment, including theater-specific equipment and 
equipment from Army prepositioned stock. Figure 2 illustrates the 
movement of units through the reset and train, ready, and available 
phases of the force generation model. 

Figure 2: The Army's Proposed Force Generation Model: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: The Army's force generation model proposes that Army National 
Guard units will be available for deployment 1 year in every 6 years. 

[End of figure] 

Army plans call for the baseline set to provide Army National Guard 
units in the reset/train pool, at a minimum, the equipment they would 
need for their domestic missions. As of September 2006, the Army was 
still developing proposals for what would be included in each of the 
three equipment sets. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the risks or 
the ability of units in the earlier stages of the cycle to respond to 
unforeseen domestic crises, such as large-scale natural disasters or 
terrorist attacks. Although the Army has worked with the Army National 
Guard to identify warfighting equipment that is highly useful for 
domestic missions, it is not clear whether nondeployed Army National 
Guard units will have sufficient quantities of such equipment during 
the early phases of the Army's force generation model to respond 
effectively to their domestic missions. State National Guard officials 
in California and Florida expressed concerns that their Army National 
Guard units will not have enough equipment for their domestic missions 
during the first 3 years of the Army's new force generation model, 
which is when units' equipment levels would be at their lowest. The 
Army has taken some temporary actions to mitigate this concern. In 
preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, the Army directed the 
temporary transfer of equipment such as trucks, night vision goggles, 
and floodlights from active Army units to Army National Guard units in 
the coastal states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. However, these 
states' Army National Guard units were expected to return this 
equipment no later than the end of the 180-day loan period. Moreover, 
until the Army makes decisions as to what equipment should be included 
in the baseline equipment set for nondeployed Army National Guard 
units, National Guard officials in the states may be hampered in their 
ability to plan and respond to large-scale, multistate events. 

Conclusions: 

With the challenging nature of the new security environment and 
potential for large-scale, multistate events depicted in the national 
planning scenarios, the nation expects the National Guard to be 
prepared to provide an efficient and effective response to domestic 
events. Without a designated agency to serve as a mechanism to 
facilitate interstate planning for the National Guard's role in large- 
scale, multistate events, the National Guard may lack plans that are 
complete and integrated with other DOD, state, and federal plans so 
that risks are identified and mitigated efficiently. Currently, the 
National Guard Bureau has facilitated limited multistate planning, but 
comprehensive planning that identifies equipment requirements and is 
integrated with plans for using civilian and federal military forces 
may remain incomplete unless the bureau's charter and civil support 
regulation are updated to reflect this facilitation role. As a result, 
the National Guard may not be prepared to respond to domestic events, 
particularly large-scale, multistate events such as those described in 
the national planning scenarios, as efficiently and effectively as 
possible. 

DOD's current readiness measures and reports do not provide a rigorous 
assessment of the extent to which the National Guard's nondeployed 
units have the equipment they need to respond to the full range of 
their domestic missions. While DOD has begun to collect data on the 
readiness of nondeployed National Guard units using proxy measures and 
subjective assessments of military commanders, this effort is not fully 
mature and faces limitations. Without validated requirements for the 
types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs for domestic 
missions, it will be difficult to measure units' preparedness for those 
missions. Until DOD's efforts to improve its measures and reports are 
mature and the Guard's required capabilities are better defined and 
tracked, decision makers will lack information on whether the Guard has 
the equipment it needs to respond effectively to large-scale, 
multistate events. Moreover, Congress and federal and state decision 
makers will have limited information with which to mitigate risks and 
prioritize investments for the National Guard's missions. 

While DOD is taking steps to address the Army National Guard's and the 
Air National Guard's equipment challenges, the effectiveness of these 
initiatives to improve the National Guard's domestic preparedness is 
not clear. Moreover, unless DOD, in coordination with other federal and 
state agencies that will be involved in responding to large-scale 
events such as the national planning scenarios, defines the 
requirements for nondeployed National Guard forces, there is no 
benchmark with which to assess the effectiveness of the initiatives. In 
addition, because the Army has not yet defined the amount and types of 
equipment that will be available to nondeployed Army National Guard 
units, state and federal agencies lack information they could use to 
plan to respond to domestic emergencies. Specifically, they lack 
information on whether the Army National Guard will have sufficient 
quantities of equipment during the early phases of the Army's force 
generation model to respond effectively to domestic missions. Until the 
Army makes decisions as to what equipment nondeployed Army National 
Guard forces can expect to have on hand, it will remain unclear whether 
the National Guard has the equipment it needs to successfully perform 
its domestic missions, including responding to large-scale, multistate 
events. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions: 

* Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to add clarifying 
language to the National Guard Bureau's charter to clearly define its 
roles in coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the 
National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, such as those 
contained in the national planning scenarios, and monitoring the 
Guard's status to perform these missions. 

* Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the Chief, 
National Guard Bureau, to update the National Guard Bureau's 1996 civil 
support regulation to reflect the National Guard Bureau's role in 
coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for large-scale, 
multistate events. The regulation should also be updated to formalize 
procedures for coordination with organizations that have been 
established since the regulation was last updated, such as the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S. Northern Command, as well as 
for the use of new planning tools like the National Response Plan and 
the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios. 

* Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the Chief, 
National Guard Bureau, in coordination with DOD, U.S. Northern Command, 
U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and other civilian authorities, to 
take actions to facilitate and coordinate interstate National Guard 
planning to identify the capabilities, including equipment, the 
National Guard would need to respond to large-scale, multistate events, 
consistent with the Homeland Security Council's national planning 
scenarios and state and federal plans. 

* Direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
submit a report to Congress on DOD's plans for assessing and reporting 
on the readiness of National Guard units to perform domestic missions 
in response to natural disasters or terrorist events. This report 
should include: 

- DOD's progress to date in incorporating these missions into the 
Defense Readiness Reporting System; 

- the specific missions for which National Guard units will report 
their readiness; and: 

- the standards, including any equipment measures, given to National 
Guard unit commanders to consider when making their readiness 
assessments for these missions. 

* Direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a 
plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National 
Guard baseline equipment sets. Specifically, the plan should include: 

- a timeline for defining the requirements of nondeployed Army National 
Guard baseline equipment sets, 

- the analytical basis and domestic mission requirements used to 
determine the equipment required in the baseline set, 

- readiness standards and measures that will be used to track the 
status of the baseline equipment sets, and: 

- the Army's plan for funding and filling baseline equipment sets. 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

Congress should consider amending the statute prescribing the National 
Guard Bureau's charter to require language clarifying the National 
Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating interstate 
planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate 
events, such as those contained in the national planning scenarios, and 
require DOD to revise the National Guard Bureau's civil support 
regulation to reflect the clarification in the charter. 

In addition, to ensure that it is kept informed of the National Guard's 
equipment status for its domestic missions, Congress should consider 
revising the statutory requirement for the annual National Guard and 
Reserve Equipment Report to include an assessment of (1) the Guard's 
equipping preparedness to provide support to civil authorities, 
particularly for large-scale, multistate events; (2) the risks to those 
missions associated with any equipment shortfalls; and (3) mitigation 
strategies and investment priorities. Further, to provide information 
on what equipment will be available for the National Guard's domestic 
missions under the Army's force generation model, Congress should 
consider requiring the department to include in the 2009 National Guard 
and Reserve Equipment Report a plan and funding strategy for providing 
baseline equipment sets to nondeployed Army National Guard units. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written 
comments on a draft of this report. The department partially agreed 
with our recommendation that the department report to Congress on DOD's 
plans for assessing and reporting on the readiness of National Guard 
units to perform domestic missions in response to natural disasters or 
terrorist events. The department disagreed with our recommendations 
that (1) the National Guard Bureau's charter be revised to include 
language clarifying the National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating 
and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard's use in 
large-scale, multistate events, (2) the National Guard Bureau's 1996 
civil support regulation be updated to reflect the change to the 
National Guard Bureau's charter and to establish procedures for state 
National Guards and the National Guard Bureau to use to coordinate with 
new organizations and for using new planning tools, (3) the National 
Guard Bureau take actions to facilitate interstate Guard planning to 
identify capabilities the National Guard would need to respond to large-
scale, multistate events, and (4) the Secretary of the Army develop and 
submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy for resourcing 
nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. As we 
discussed in our report, state planning for the Guard's role in 
catastrophic events contained in the national planning scenarios has 
not been consistent or thorough. We continue to believe that the 
actions we recommend are important to improve interstate planning and 
visibility of the National Guard's readiness for domestic missions. 
Therefore, we have included these actions as matters for congressional 
consideration. Specifically, Congress should consider (1) amending the 
statute prescribing the National Guard Bureau's charter to include 
coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National 
Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, such as those contained 
in the national planning scenarios, (2) requiring DOD to revise the 
National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation to implement this 
change, and (3) in addition to requiring DOD to report on the National 
Guard's equipment readiness for domestic missions, require DOD to 
submit the Army's plans and funding strategy for providing equipment to 
nondeployed Army National Guard forces for domestic missions in its 
2009 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report. 

In its written comments on a draft of this report, the department 
stated that our recommendation to change the National Guard Bureau's 
charter is not needed because the current charter already authorizes 
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and 
facilitating state planning for the National Guard's use in large- 
scale, multistate events. As our report discusses in detail, the 
charter, signed by the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force in 
1995, assigns the Chief of the National Guard Bureau responsibility for 
facilitating and supporting the training of members and units of the 
National Guard to meet state requirements as well as responsibility for 
facilitating and coordinating with the Departments of the Army and the 
Air Force the use of National Guard personnel and resources for several 
functions, including natural disasters and military support to civil 
authorities. Despite the fact that the department believes that the 
Chief of the National Guard Bureau has a key role in coordinating and 
facilitating state planning for the National Guard's use in large- 
scale, multistate events, the charter does not contain language 
specifically defining this role. Since the charter was last updated, 
the security environment in which the National Guard operates has 
changed significantly, with the National Guard now being used 
extensively for overseas military operations while needing to remain 
prepared for additional threats at home. Furthermore, new planning 
tools, such as the National Response Plan and the national planning 
scenarios, have been developed to guide federal, state, and local 
planning for large-scale domestic emergencies. As the response to 
Hurricane Katrina illustrated, there is a need for detailed planning 
for the Guard's use in large-scale natural or man-made domestic 
emergencies. As we discussed in this report, planning for the National 
Guard's use in responding to events such as the national planning 
scenarios is currently uneven. Although this interstate planning role 
is not clearly defined in its charter, the National Guard Bureau has 
taken some steps to perform this role to a limited extent. Our 
recommendation to add clarifying language to the National Guard 
Bureau's charter to clearly define the bureau's role in coordinating 
and facilitating multistate planning is intended to highlight the 
importance of these activities so that the National Guard is prepared 
to respond to multistate events as efficiently and effectively as 
possible. We continue to believe that this role is important and that 
making this activity an explicit responsibility of the National Guard 
Bureau would further the goal of facilitating multistate planning and 
would increase the states' and the nation's capability to respond to 
large-scale incidents. Therefore, we have included as a matter for 
congressional consideration amending the statute prescribing the 
National Guard Bureau's charter to include language clarifying this 
role. 

The department also disagreed with our recommendation that the Chief, 
National Guard Bureau, should update the National Guard Bureau's 1996 
civil support regulation to include the National Guard Bureau's role in 
facilitating interstate planning and to address the creation of new 
organizations and planning tools. In its comments, the department 
raised two major concerns. First, the department asserted that the 
direction to update the regulation should come from the Secretaries of 
the Army and the Air Force. Therefore, we have modified our report to 
direct the recommendation to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force 
to direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to update the regulation. 
Second, the department also commented that it is not appropriate for 
the National Guard Bureau to coordinate directly with other federal 
agencies because this is the responsibility, if required, of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders--in the case of 
homeland missions, U.S. Northern Command or U.S. Pacific Command--and 
would infringe on the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Homeland Defense over homeland activities. We understand the 
responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant 
Commanders with regard to coordinating with federal agencies, and we 
understand that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
has authority over the department's homeland defense activities and 
responsibility for representing DOD on homeland defense-related matters 
in the interagency environment and for coordinating federal military 
support to civil authorities. Further, we agree with the comment that 
governors have responsibility for the coordination and use of National 
Guard forces in state status and that the governors could coordinate 
with federal agencies if necessary. Our recommendation was not intended 
to designate the National Guard Bureau as the DOD entity to coordinate 
with other federal agencies or to infringe on the governors' role in 
coordination with federal agencies. Our intent was to recommend that 
the National Guard's civil support regulation be updated in order to 
more accurately reflect the National Guard Bureau's role in 
coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National 
Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, and to formalize 
procedures for state and National Guard Bureau coordination with 
organizations established since September 11, 2001 and for the use of 
new planning tools. We have changed the language of our recommendation 
in the final report accordingly. Since September 11, 2001, many changes 
have occurred in the security environment, including the creation of 
entities such as the Department of Homeland Security as well as the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern 
Command within DOD. Planning tools have also been created, including 
the National Response Plan and the Homeland Security Council's national 
planning scenarios. The National Guard Bureau's civil support 
regulation sets out the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's overall 
responsibility for civil support programs and for issuing planning 
guidance on the National Guard's role in providing military support to 
civil authorities, and provides guidance to the states on preparing 
emergency plans for the use of National Guard forces in a civil support 
role, including coordination for assistance beyond state capabilities. 
This regulation, last updated in 1996, pre-dates the changes to the 
security environment and does not specifically address how coordination 
with these organizations should occur or how these planning tools 
should be used. The changed security environment since September 11, 
2001, has increased the need for federal, state, and local authorities 
to work together to enhance preparedness. As the response to Hurricane 
Katrina illustrated, the nation relies on the National Guard to respond 
to the effects of large-scale, multistate emergencies and the National 
Guard Bureau can play a significant role in facilitating Guard support 
among the states when such an event takes place. The Katrina response 
also showed that there is a lack of pre-event planning and 
understanding among federal and state responders about the type of 
assistance and capabilities that the National Guard can provide. 
Updating the regulation is an important step to minimize confusion 
about how the bureau and state Guard forces should work with 
organizations and planning tools established since September 11, 2001, 
how coordination of planning efforts for the Guard's use among federal, 
state, and local authorities should take place, and where the 
accountability for coordination lies. The National Guard Bureau's 
position as a channel of communication between the states and the Army 
and Air Force makes it uniquely positioned to facilitate interstate 
planning for events that may require support from multiple states or 
across state boundaries; we agree with the department that it does play 
a key role in this capacity. We continue to believe that updating the 
National Guard Bureau's regulation to reflect changes to the security 
environment and to clarify how the state National Guards and the 
National Guard Bureau will work with new organizations and use national 
planning tools to strengthen pre-event planning for large-scale, 
multistate events is needed. Therefore, we have included as a matter 
for congressional consideration a requirement for the department to 
revise the National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation. 

In its comments, the department also disagreed that the National Guard 
Bureau should take actions to facilitate and coordinate state National 
Guard planning to identify capabilities the Guard would need to respond 
to multistate events and asserted that the responsibility for overall 
supervision of homeland defense activities within DOD resides with the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. First, while we 
understand that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
is in charge of federal defense support to civilian authorities, the 
Assistant Secretary is not charged with planning for National Guard 
activities that will likely be conducted under the command and control 
of the state governor. We are not recommending that the National Guard 
Bureau undertake the responsibilities of the state governors, but 
rather provide a facilitating and coordinating function between states 
for those events that may involve the use of National Guard forces from 
multiple states. Second, in its comments, DOD said that the overall 
supervision of homeland defense activities within DOD is a function 
that should remain with a civilian official rather than a military 
officer. We agree and are not recommending that the National Guard 
Bureau supervise either federal or state-led forces but rather that the 
bureau facilitate and coordinate interstate planning for domestic 
emergencies that involve Guard forces from multiple states and which 
may be federally funded. Third, in its comments, DOD also stated that 
training and equipping the National Guard is the responsibility of the 
Secretaries of the Army and Air Force. As we stated in this report, DOD 
is responsible for planning for DOD's federal missions and training and 
equipping the National Guard for these missions. As mentioned, training 
for the Guard's federal missions is also federally funded. We did not 
recommend changes to the responsibilities for training and equipping 
the National Guard. Rather, our recommendation is directed to improving 
interstate planning for the use of National Guard forces for large- 
scale domestic events in their state roles that are likely to be 
federally funded. As DOD acknowledges in its comments on our first 
recommendation, the Chief, National Guard Bureau, plays a key role in 
coordinating and facilitating state-level planning for the employment 
of National Guard forces to meet large-scale disasters. We agree with 
this assessment and therefore continue to believe that the National 
Guard Bureau is well-positioned to facilitate planning and promote 
cooperation in identifying regional and national assets needed for 
response efforts so that decision makers can prioritize investments to 
mitigate risks. This recommendation is consistent with a recommendation 
we made in our previous report examining the response to Hurricane 
Katrina with which the department agreed. In that report, we 
recommended that the Chief, National Guard Bureau, should work with the 
state governors and state Guards to identify capabilities the National 
Guard will likely provide for homeland security missions and make that 
information available to other organizations with federal military 
support to civil authorities planning responsibilities.[Footnote 31] We 
have raised as a matter for congressional consideration amending the 
statute that prescribes the National Guard Bureau's charter to include 
this interstate planning role. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness submit a report to Congress on 
DOD's plans for assessing and reporting on the readiness of National 
Guard units to perform domestic missions. DOD agreed that readiness 
reporting and tracking is critical to ensuring the execution of the 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, but commented that 
this includes the readiness to perform domestic missions of all 10 
military components, not just the Army National Guard and Air National 
Guard. We agree that readiness reporting and tracking are critical and 
recognize that all 10 military components may participate in homeland 
defense and civil support missions; however, the scope of our review 
was limited to the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. 
Moreover, in recognition that the National Guard has a unique role in 
domestic response, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness' guidance for the Defense Readiness Reporting System 
specifically directed the National Guard to include assessments of its 
readiness for state-led, federally-funded missions in the new readiness 
reporting system. This information on the National Guard's domestic 
readiness would be useful to Congress as it deliberates improvements to 
national preparedness. As a result, we continue to believe that the 
department should report to Congress on the status of efforts to 
measure National Guard readiness for domestic missions. 

DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that the Army should develop 
and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy for resourcing 
nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. The department 
asserted that such a report would be unnecessary because Reserve 
component requirements are evaluated and prioritized within the 
department's budget process and presented to Congress as part of the 
department's overall budget. We did not recommend changes to the 
department's budgeting process. Rather, our recommendation that the 
Army provide Congress a separate report on nondeployed forces' 
equipment is based on the fact that Congress does not have visibility 
over the effects of the recent high use of National Guard equipment for 
overseas operations and the risks that depleted domestic equipment 
inventories pose to the National Guard's ability to respond to domestic 
missions. Because nondeployed National Guard forces rely on the 
equipment they have on hand to respond to domestic events, the 
equipment they can expect to have available at all times is of primary 
importance to the state National Guard's ability to plan for their 
domestic missions. Therefore, we continue to believe the Congress 
should be informed of the specifics of the department's plans, 
including timelines and funding strategies, to enable it to consider 
current and future risks against proposed investments. As a result, we 
have included as a matter for congressional consideration a requirement 
for the department to include in the 2009 National Guard and Reserve 
Equipment Report the Army's plan and funding strategy for providing 
equipment for nondeployed Army National Guard units. 

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the 
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it 
until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to 
the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the Air 
Force; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of 
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others 
upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge 
on the GAO website at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 
512-4402. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and 
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major 
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: National Planning Scenarios: 

The Homeland Security Council has developed 15 national planning 
scenarios, whose purpose is to form the basis for identifying the 
capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of emergencies. The 
scenarios focus on the consequences that federal, state, and local 
first responders will have to address and are intended to illustrate 
the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic events for which 
the nation needs to be prepared. Table 5 summarizes the 15 scenarios 
that have been developed to assess the emergency response and 
preparedness capabilities of federal, state, local, and tribal 
governments as well as the private sector and describes their projected 
consequences. These scenarios have not been developed to identify 
events that are likely to occur; instead, they facilitate efforts by 
all government agencies to assess the full range of needs that might be 
required if events similar to these scenarios take place. 

Table 5: Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios and 
Summary Descriptions: 

Threat: Nuclear detonation; 
Description summary: Terrorists detonate a 10-kiloton nuclear device in 
a large city; 
Projected consequences[A]: 450,000 or more evacuees, 3,000 square miles 
contaminated, and hundreds of billions of dollars in economic impact. 

Threat: Biological attack; 
Description summary: Terrorists spray anthrax spores in a city using a 
concealed spray device; 
Projected consequences[A]: 13,000 fatalities and injuries, extensive 
contamination, and billions of dollars in economic impact. 

Threat: Biological disease outbreak--pandemic influenza; 
Description summary: Natural outbreak of pandemic influenza that begins 
in China and spreads to other countries; 
Projected consequences[A]: 87,000 fatalities, 300,000 hospitalizations, 
and $70 billion to $160 billion impact. 

Threat: Biological attack--plague; 
Description summary: Terrorists release pneumonic plague into three 
areas of a large city; 
Projected consequences[A]: 2,500 fatalities, 7,000 injuries, millions 
of dollars in economic impact, and possible evacuations. 

Threat: Chemical attack--blister agent; 
Description summary: Terrorists spray a combination of blister agents 
into a crowded football stadium; 
Projected consequences[A]: 150 fatalities, 70,000 hospitalized, more 
than 100,000 persons evacuated, and $500 million in economic impact. 

Threat: Chemical attack--toxic industrial chemicals; 
Description summary: Terrorists use grenades and explosive devices at 
petroleum facilities; 
Projected consequences[A]: 350 fatalities, 1,000 hospitalizations, 50 
percent of facility damaged, and up to 700,000 persons evacuated. 

Threat: Chemical attack--nerve agent; 
Description summary: Terrorists spray Sarin into the ventilation system 
of three commercial buildings in a city; 
Projected consequences[A]: 6,000 fatalities in buildings, 350 injuries 
downwind, evacuation of unknown number of people, and $300 million in 
economic impact. 

Threat: Chemical attack--chlorine tank explosion; 
Description summary: Terrorists use explosives to release a large 
quantity of chlorine gas; 
Projected consequences[A]: 17,500 fatalities, 100,000 hospitalizations, 
up to 70,000 persons evacuated, and contamination at site and 
waterways. 

Threat: Natural disaster--major earthquake; 
Description summary: A 7.2 magnitude earthquake occurs in a major 
metropolitan area; 
Projected consequences[A]: 1,400 fatalities, 100,000 hospitalizations, 
150,000 buildings destroyed, and hundreds of billions of dollars in 
economic impact. 

Threat: Natural disaster--major hurricane; 
Description summary: Category 5 hurricane strikes a major city; 
Projected consequences[A]: 1,000 fatalities, 5,000 hospitalizations, 1 
million people evacuated, and millions of dollars in economic impact. 

Threat: Radiological attack--radiological dispersal device (RDD); 
Description summary: Terrorists detonate "dirty bombs" in three cities 
in close proximity; 
Projected consequences[A]: 180 fatalities, 20,000 detectible 
contaminations in each city, and billions of dollars in economic 
impact. 

Threat: Explosives attack--bombing using improvised explosive devise 
(IED); 
Description summary: Terrorists detonate IEDs in a sports arena, use 
suicide bombers in a public transit concourse, and in a parking 
facility; 
Projected consequences[A]: 100 fatalities, 450 hospitalizations, local 
economic impact, and minimal evacuations. 

Threat: Biological attack--food contamination; 
Description summary: Terrorists contaminate food with anthrax in 
processing facilities; 
Projected consequences[A]: 300 fatalities, 400 hospitalizations, and 
millions of dollars in economic impact. 

Threat: Biological attack--Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth 
Disease); 
Description summary: Terrorists infect livestock at specific locations; 
Projected consequences[A]: No casualties, huge loss of livestock, and 
hundred of millions of dollars in economic impact. 

Threat: Cyber attack; 
Description summary: Terrorists conduct cyber attacks on U.S. financial 
infrastructure; 
Projected consequences[A]: No casualties, millions of dollars in 
economic impact. 

Source: Congressional Research Service. 

[A] These hypothetical results are among those presented in the 
scenarios. They are intended to be illustrative to use in identifying 
the types of situations responding units should be prepared to address. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed 
documentation, and interviewed officials from the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Northern 
Command, Headquarters Department of the Army, U.S. Air Force North 
(previously First Air Force), the National Guard Bureau, the Army 
National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the Department of Homeland 
Security. We also developed case studies of four states: California, 
Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia. These states were selected 
because they had an average to high number of disaster declarations in 
the last 53 years, are geographically dispersed across the United 
States, reported varying levels of National Guard domestic response 
capability, faced a range of homeland security risks, and were involved 
in National Guard Bureau domestic capability initiatives. 

To identify the extent to which the National Guard's equipment 
requirements for its full range of domestic missions have been 
identified, we reviewed domestic operational planning documents, 
including the Department of Defense's (DOD) Strategic Planning 
Guidance, the Army Campaign Plan, planning documents provided by case 
study states, and the National Response Plan. We supplemented this 
information by interviewing officials in DOD, U.S. Northern Command, 
the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Homeland Security, and our 
case study states to review their planning processes for the full range 
of the National Guard's domestic mission. In each case study state, we 
reviewed plans for the use of National Guard forces and assessed the 
extent to which they addressed the national planning scenarios and the 
extent to which these plans identified specific equipment requirements. 
We also discussed with state National Guard leaders processes for 
planning and coordinating with multiple state and federal agencies and 
challenges to planning for large-scale, multistate emergencies. We did 
not review case study state budget documents to independently verify 
the level of planning resources available to their state National 
Guards. 

To assess the extent to which DOD measures and reports on the equipment 
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for the full range of 
their domestic missions, we reviewed documentation on DOD's readiness 
reporting system, the Global Status of Resources and Training System, 
as well as the new system DOD plans to have fully operational in late 
2007, the Defense Readiness Reporting System. We also analyzed data, 
reviewed documentation, and interviewed officials about the National 
Guard Bureau's state capability tracking system, the Joint Capabilities 
Database. Specifically, using data from the National Guard's Joint 
Capabilities Database, we determined the number of states that reported 
adequate capabilities for typical state missions, the capabilities most 
frequently reported as inadequate, and the reasons why. In addition, 
using Army National Guard data on equipment useful for both warfighting 
and domestic missions, we compared the amount of equipment available 
for Army National Guard forces by state and item against the amount 
they are authorized for warfighting missions. Further, we examined 
DOD's annual report to Congress on National Guard equipping, the 
National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report. 

To determine the extent to which DOD is taking actions to address the 
National Guard's domestic equipment challenges, we reviewed and 
analyzed information about steps being taken to enhance the National 
Guard's capabilities and increase equipment for nondeployed National 
Guard units. Information we reviewed included DOD appropriations 
documents, Army budget information, and National Guard Bureau change 
request packages. Further, we reviewed and analyzed relevant DOD, Army, 
Air Force, and National Guard equipping strategies and policies and 
discussed the impact of the Army transformation plans on nondeployed 
forces. We also reviewed Army documentation on plans for implementing 
its force generation model to determine the extent to which the plans 
define equipment available to nondeployed Army National Guard units for 
domestic missions. 

We conducted our review from December 2005 through November 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and 
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our 
objectives. For example, we interviewed data sources about how they 
ensured their own data reliability and reviewed their data collection 
methods, standard operating procedures, and other internal control 
measures. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and when 
applicable, performed computer testing to assess data validity and 
reliability. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
1500 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-1500: 

Dec 18 2006: 

Reserve Affairs: 

Ms. Janet St. Laurent: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, Northwest: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. St. Laurent: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, "Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard 
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness", dated November 21, 
2006, (GAO Code 350768/GAO-07-60). 

The Department appreciates the insightful and thorough approach that 
your team has taken with this important issue. The National Guard plays 
a critical role in performing both federal and state missions, and we 
are taking positive steps to address equipment challenges to ensure our 
soldiers are the very best equipped and trained. Thank you for the 
opportunity to provide the enclosed comments. 

The point of contact for this office is Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Burke, 
OASD/RA, at 703-693-4207. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Thomas F. Hall: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated November 21, 2006 GAO Code 350768/GAO-07-60: 

"RESERVE FORCES: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic 
Equipment Requirements and Readiness" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to revise the National 
Guard Bureau's charter to clearly define its roles in coordinating and 
facilitating state planning for the National Guard's use in large- 
scale, multistate events such as those contained in the national 
planning scenarios and monitoring the Guard's status to perform these 
missions. 

DOD Response: Non-concur. This function is already authorized in the 
existing Charter, as signed by the two Service Secretaries. The Chief 
of the National Guard Bureau, although not in command of Army or Air 
National Guard forces, does play a key role in coordinating and 
facilitating state-level planning for the employment of National Guard 
forces to meet large-scale domestic disasters. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to update the National 
Guard Bureau's civil support regulation to reflect both the National 
Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating state planning for 
large-scale, multistate events and coordinating with new organizations 
that have been established since the regulation was last updated in 
1996, such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S. Northern 
Command, as well as new planning tools like the National Response Plan 
and the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios. 

DOD Response: Non-concur. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau does 
not work for the Secretary of Defense, but for the Secretaries of the 
Army and the Air Force. Therefore, it is appropriate that any direction 
to update the National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation will 
come directly from them. 

It is not appropriate for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to 
coordinate directly with other Federal agencies. This is the 
responsibility, if required, of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Combatant Commanders. Further, this infringes on the authority of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense over the homeland 
defense activities of the Department of Defense under 10 U.S.C. 
138(b)(3). It would also infringe on the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Homeland Defense's responsibility to represent the Department of 
Defense on homeland matters, including defense support to civil 
authorities, in dealings with the Executive Office of the President, 
the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal departments and 
agencies, and State and local authorities. 

If National Guard forces are used to respond to a natural disaster or 
provide support to civil authorities in a Federal status, the National 
Guard Bureau should continue to be the channel of communications as 
currently prescribed in its charter. This is working well and need not 
be changed. If National Guard forces are used in a State duty status, 
the coordination of the use of those forces would be the responsibility 
of the governor of the State, not the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau, and the governor could coordinate with the Department of 
Homeland Security, if other federal agencies are involved. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in coordination with 
DoD, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and other 
civilian authorities, to take actions to facilitate and coordinate 
state National Guard planning to identify the capabilities, including 
equipment, the National Guard would need nationally to respond to large-
scale, multistate events, consistent with the Homeland Security 
Council's national planning scenarios and state and federal plans. 

DOD Response: Non-concur. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau plays 
a key role in coordinating National Guard domestic disaster response. 
However, by law, the responsibility for overall supervision of Homeland 
Defense activities within the Department of Defense resides with 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. As written, the 
recommendation would infringe upon the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Homeland Defense's responsibility regarding defense support to 
civil authorities. This function should remain with a civilian official 
rather than a military officer, especially here at home. The Chief of 
the National Guard Bureau already coordinates with the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense as the Assistant Secretary 
carries out his responsibilities. 

Also, by law, the responsibility for training and equipping the 
National Guard resides with the Secretaries of the Anny and the Air 
Force. These responsibilities should not be split depending upon the 
type of activity that the National Guard might perform. 

These functions should remain with the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Homeland Defense, and the Secretaries of the respective Military 
Department, in consultation with the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
submit a report to Congress on DoD's plans for assessing and reporting 
on the readiness of National Guard units to perform domestic missions 
in response to natural disasters or terrorist events. This report 
should include: 

* DoD's progress to date in incorporating these missions into the 
Defense Readiness Reporting System; 

* The specific missions on which National Guard units will report their 
readiness; and, 

* The standards, including any equipment measures, given to National 
Guard unit commanders to consider when making their readiness 
assessments for these missions. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. Readiness reporting and tracking is 
critical to ensuring the execution of the Department's Strategy for 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support. This includes the readiness to 
perform domestic missions by all ten military components, not just the 
Army and Air National Guard. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a 
plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National 
Guard baseline equipment sets. Specifically, the plan should include: 

* A timeline for defining the requirements of nondeployed Army National 
Guard baseline sets; 

* The analytical basis and domestic mission requirements used to 
determine the equipment required in the baseline set; 

* Readiness standards and measures that will be used to track the 
status of the baseline equipment sets; and: 

* The Army's plan for funding and filling baseline equipment sets. 

DOD Response: Non-concur. Another report to Congress is deemed to be 
unnecessary. The National Guard's needs and requirements are presented, 
debated, validated and prioritized right along with all organizations 
in the Department. All of the Reserve components (RCs), including the 
National Guard, are integrated into their respective parent Service's 
Planning Programming and Budgeting process. The Services all utilize a 
layered resource review process, with various boards and panels that 
rigorously prioritize funding requirements from the lower to the higher 
levels, so that in the end, those requirements deemed highest priority 
are funded above those deemed of lesser priority. At the start of the 
process, each RC is given a portion of the parent Service's top-line to 
fund their programs; such as, pay and allowances, recruiting, training, 
and equipping. Many requirements compete for funding within each RC's 
budget, and when the RC's estimates are completed, they are forwarded 
to their parent Service for review and integration with Service-wide 
priorities. 

The Services' proposals, including the RCs, are then provided to OSD 
for analysis and balancing across the Defense Department. During this 
phase, OSD reviews each Service's estimates, prioritizes with other DoD 
requirements to ensure that the Defense Department's highest priorities 
are resourced, and coordinates with OMB. The end product presented to 
the Congress is one that specifically integrates the Reserve 
components, has been reviewed at many levels, usually multiple times, 
and represents the Department's best judgment of the resources needed 
to accomplish DOD's assigned overall mission. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant 
Director; Alissa Czyz; Matthew Dove; Paul Gvoth; Nicole Harms; 
Catherine Humphries; David Marroni; Kenneth Patton; Jerome Sandau; Jay 
Smale; and Suzanne Wren made major contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Related Products: 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st 
Century Challenges. GAO-06-1109T. Washington D.C.: September 21, 2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 
D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility 
Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans. GAO-06- 
745. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but 
Accountability Funding, and Communications Need to be Clearer and 
Focused Departmentwide. GAO-06-1042 Washington, D.C.: September 21, 
2006. 

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support 
Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges. GAO-06-498. 
Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643. 
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington, 
D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment 
Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment 
Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation 
Initiatives. GAO-06-111. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2005. 

Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of 
Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. GAO-05-926. Washington, 
D.C.: September 29, 2005. 

Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All- 
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: 
July 11, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for 
Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington, D.C.: 
November 10, 2004. 

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas 
and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. Washington, 
D.C.: April 29, 2004. 

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 
Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2003. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] According to the Office of Homeland Security's National Strategy 
for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: July 2002), homeland security 
is a broad term that encompasses efforts to reduce America's 
vulnerability to terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks as well as 
respond to an attack that might occur. DOD refers to its contributions 
to the overall homeland security efforts it expects to lead as 
"homeland defense" and activities DOD will perform in support of 
efforts led by other federal, state, or local agencies as "defense 
support of civil authorities." 

[2] The Homeland Security Council is composed of cabinet-level 
officials and coordinates homeland security-related activities among 
executive departments and agencies. 

[3] GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard 
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force 
Transformation Initiatives, GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 
2005). 

[4] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide 
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

[5] The office was established by the Bob Stump National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 902 
(2002). 

[6] U.S. Pacific Command has homeland defense and civil support 
responsibilities for Hawaii and the U.S. territories in the Pacific 
Ocean. 

[7] National Guard members train for their federal missions under state 
control with federal funding. Federal laws also authorize federal 
funding for some other state-controlled missions, such as the National 
Guard's counterdrug support operations and weapons of mass destruction 
civil support teams. 

[8] 10 U.S.C. §10501. 

[9] 10 U.S.C. §10503. 

[10] The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101 
(2002). 

[11] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the Department of 
Homeland Security to consolidate existing federal government emergency 
response plans into a single integrated and coordinated national 
response plan. 

[12] DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, par. 
4.4.8.2 (Jan. 15, 1993). DOD is developing a new directive for defense 
support to civil authorities that will supersede several existing 
directives, including its current military support to civil authorities 
directive. 

[13] Two exceptions to this are the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (a 
dedicated command and control element) and the National Guard's weapons 
of mass destruction civil support teams. 

[14] Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 
Report (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). The report presents the 
results of reviews and assessments of the status of state emergency 
operations plans as well as the emergency operations plans of 75 of the 
nation's largest urban areas. For the purposes of this report, we have 
focused on report findings as they relate to state emergency operations 
plans. 

[15] Army Regulation 130-5/Air Force Mission Directive 10, Organization 
and Functions of National Guard Bureau (Jan. 30, 2002). The National 
Guard Bureau Charter, dated September 1, 1995, is contained within this 
regulation. 

[16] National Guard Regulation 500-1, Military Support to Civil 
Authorities (Feb. 1, 1996). 

[17] 10 U.S.C. § 117. 

[18] 10 U.S.C. § 10541. 

[19] Specifically, the language in the statute refers to equipment 
requirements for the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve of each 
component of the armed forces, including the Army National Guard and 
Air National Guard. The Selected Reserve includes individual 
mobilization augmentees--individuals who train regularly, for pay, with 
active component units--as well as members who participate in regular 
training as members of National Guard and Reserve units. 

[20] The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is 
responsible for overseeing the fielding of the Defense Readiness 
Reporting System. 

[21] We did not analyze state assessments in the Joint Capabilities 
Database of their National Guard capabilities for responding to larger, 
nonroutine events because National Guard Bureau officials did not 
consider these data to be fully mature at the time of our audit. 

[22] The Joint Capabilities Database includes assessments from all 50 
states as well as Washington, D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. 

[23] Civil support teams are designed to support civil authorities in 
the event of a domestic weapons of mass destruction event by 
identifying weapons of mass destruction agents and substances, 
assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response 
measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional 
support. There are 55 civil support teams--two in California and one in 
every other state as well as Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, and Guam. Thirty-six of these teams had been certified 
as fully capable as of May 2006; the remaining 19 will be certified by 
the end of fiscal year 2007. 

[24] This figure includes substitute equipment authorized by Army 
regulation. Army Regulation 700-138, Army Logistics Readiness and 
Sustainability (Feb. 26, 2004), defines substitute items as items 
authorized for issue instead of authorized standard items when the 
authorized standard items are not available for issue to the unit. 

[25] At the time of our analysis, the Army National Guard had 
identified a total of 342 types of dual-use equipment. Of these, 319 
had available data and were included in our analysis. 

[26] The Army National Guard has over 90 percent of its authorized 
amount of 19 types of dual-use equipment. For some of these types of 
equipment, such as rifles, the Guard is authorized large numbers of 
individual items. These large numbers of individual items make up 
nearly half of the Guard's inventory of dual-use equipment. When these 
large numbers are included in the Guard's inventory, the overall 
percentage of equipment available is greater than the average of many 
of the other types of equipment. 

[27] GAO-06-111. 

[28] Title IX of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-148 (2005) provided $1 billion for National Guard and 
Reserve equipment. The conference report accompanying that act 
specified that of the $1 billion, $700 million should go to the Army 
National Guard and $200 million should go to the Air National Guard. 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-359, at 483 (2005). 

[29] Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
289 (2006). The conference report accompanying the act states that the 
conferees intend for $150 million of the $290 million to go toward 
equipping the National Guard. In addition, the conferees directed that 
$2.94 billion of procurement funds provided in Title IX of the act 
shall be available for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, 
and that $500 million of these funds should be used specifically to 
meet the 10 core capabilities identified by the National Guard Bureau 
as essential to support domestic missions. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-676, 
at 223, 372 (2006). 

[30] Section 412 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163 (2006), authorized end strengths for 
reserves on active duty in support of the reserves. In the accompanying 
conference report, the conferees specified that the end strength would 
include five additional teams. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-360, at 687 
(2005). 

[31] GAO-06-643. 

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