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entitled 'Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's
Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges' which was released
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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2007:
Military Personnel:
Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and
Retention Challenges:
GAO-07-224:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-224, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Accessing and retaining high-quality officers in the current
environment of increasing deployments and armed conflict may be two of
the all volunteer force’s greatest challenges. The military services
use three programs to access officer candidates: (1) military
academies, (2) the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), and (3)
Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). In addition to accessing new officers,
the services must retain enough experienced officers to meet current
operational needs and the services’ transformation initiatives.
GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the services are accessing
and retaining the officers required to meet their needs. GAO also
identified steps that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services
have taken and the impediments they face in increasing officers’
foreign language proficiency. For this report, GAO examined actual
accession and retention rates for officers in fiscal years (FYs) 2001,
2003, and 2005 as well as projections for later years. Also, GAO
reviewed documents on foreign language training and plans.
What GAO Found:
The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for
newly commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing
enough officers to meet its needs. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air
Force met their overall FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession
needs, but are experiencing challenges accessing specific groups, like
flight officers and medical professionals. Moreover, the Army did not
meet its needs for officers in FY 2001 and FY 2003 and expects to
struggle with future accessions. To meet its officer accession needs,
the Army’s traditional approach has been to rely first on its ROTC and
academy programs and then compensate for shortfalls in these programs
by increasing its OCS accessions. Between FYs 2001 and 2005, the Army
nearly doubled the number of OCS commissioned officers due to (1)
academy and ROTC shortfalls,(2) decreased ROTC scholarships, and (3) a
need to expand its officer corps. But OCS is expected to reach its
capacity in FY 2007, and resource limitations such as housing and
classroom space may prevent further expansion. In addition, the Army’s
three accession programs are decentralized and do not formally
coordinate with one another, making it difficult for the Army, using
its traditional approach, to effectively manage risks and allocate
resources across programs in an integrated, strategic fashion. Without
a strategic, integrated plan for determining overall annual accession
goals, managing risks, and allocating resources, the Army’s ability to
meet its future mission requirements and to transform to more
deployable, modular units is uncertain.
All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall
officer retention needs. The Army, which continues to be heavily
involved in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, faces many
retention challenges. For example, the Army is experiencing a shortfall
of mid-level officers, such as majors, because it commissioned fewer
officers 10 years ago due to a post-Cold War force reduction. It
projects a shortage of 3,000 or more officers annually through FY 2013.
While the Army is implementing and considering initiatives to improve
officer retention, the initiatives are not integrated and will not
affect officer retention until at least 2009 or are unfunded. As with
its accession shortfalls, the Army does not have an integrated
strategic plan to address its retention shortfalls. While the Army is
most challenged in retaining officers, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air
Force generally met their retention needs in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005;
but each experienced challenges in occupational specialties such as
medical officers.
DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language
proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome
to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior
officers. For example, academy and ROTC officer candidates already have
demanding workloads and ROTC does not control curricula at host
institutions. The services recognize these impediments and are drafting
plans to implement DOD’s foreign language objectives.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Army develop and implement a strategic plan to
address its emerging officer accession and retention problems. DOD
partially concurred with GAO’s recommendation.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-224].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek Stewart at (202)
512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
This Report is Temporarily Restricted Pending Official Public Release:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Services Generally Met Most Accession Needs for Newly Commissioned
Officers Despite Some Challenges, but Army Faces Unique Problems with
Future Accessions:
All Services Except Army Generally Met Past Officer Retention Needs,
but All Face Challenges Retaining Certain Officer Groups:
Steps Are Being Taken to Improve the Foreign Language Proficiency of
Junior Officers, but Many Impediments Could Slow Progress:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Army Commissioned Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and
2005, by Commissioning Program:
Table 2: Marine Corps Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005,
by Commissioning Program:
Table 3: Navy Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by
Commissioning Program:
Table 4: Air Force Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by
Commissioning Program:
Table 5: Physician Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Table 6: Physician Scholarships Awarded Compared to Service Goals for
Selected Years, by Service:
Table 7: Dentist Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Table 8: Nurse Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Table 9: Percent of Officer Accessions by Race and Ethnicity for Each
Military Service:
Table 10: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Army Commissioned
Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal Years and Key
Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Table 11: Army's Projected Percentages of Overfilled and Underfilled
Positions for Majors in Specified Specialty Areas in FY 2007:
Table 12: Service-Specific Continuation Pays and Incentives Awarded to
Officers in FY 2005:
Table 13: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Marine Corps
Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal
Years and Key Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Table 14: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Navy Commissioned
Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal Years and Key
Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Table 15: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Air Force
Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal
Years and Key Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Table 16: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent for African-
American and White Officers for Selected Fiscal Years:
Table 17: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent for Hispanic
and Non-Hispanic Officers for Selected Fiscal Years:
Table 18: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent by Gender for
Selected Fiscal Years:
Table 19: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary
Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to Officer Accessions:
Table 20: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary
Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to Officer Retention:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOPMA: Defense Officer Personnel Management Act:
FY: fiscal year:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:
OCS: Officer Candidate School:
OTS: Officer Training School:
OUSD (P&R): Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel &
Readiness:
ROTC: Reserve Officers' Training Corps:
USAFA: U.S. Air Force Academy:
USMA: U.S. Military Academy:
USNA: U.S. Naval Academy:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 19, 2007:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Ensuring the availability of sufficient numbers of trained, high-
quality personnel in an environment of increasing deployments and armed
conflict may prove to be one of the greatest personnel challenges faced
by the U.S. military since the inception of the all volunteer force in
1973. Unlike the civilian sector, the military recruits, accesses, and
trains all of its own leaders. Therefore, today's policy decisions and
efforts on officer recruiting influence the future availability of
officers. In addition, all of the services must retain sufficient
numbers of experienced, skilled, and qualified officers to meet their
current and future needs.
Before officers can be commissioned at the most junior level,
candidates must complete training programs, some of which take up to 4
years. The military services use three types of programs that award
commissions to officer candidates after they graduate from a program:
(1) military academies, (2) Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC),
and (3) Officer Candidate School (OCS) for the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps or Officer Training School (OTS) for the Air Force.
* Military academies: The U.S. Military Academy (USMA), U.S. Naval
Academy (USNA),[Footnote 1] and U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) each run
4-year programs that provide successful candidates with bachelor's
degrees and commissions as military officers. In addition to completing
their academic courses, the approximately 12,000 officer candidates who
attend the academies each year participate in rigorous military
training activities and mandatory athletic activities. In return for
their free education, the graduates must serve on active duty for 5
years after graduation.
* ROTC: The services' ROTC units are located at civilian colleges and
universities throughout the country, with some academic institutions
offering ROTC from more than one service. Currently, Army ROTC is
located at 273 academic institutions, Navy ROTC at 71, and Air Force
ROTC at 144. Officer candidates enrolled in ROTC programs must meet all
graduation requirements of their academic institutions and complete
required military training to receive commissions as officers, usually
after 4 years. All officers who received Army or Navy ROTC scholarships
and all Air Force officers who graduated from ROTC must typically
commit to 4 years of active duty military service after graduation,
while Army and Navy officers who did not receive ROTC scholarships must
serve 3 years on active duty.
* OCS/OTS: These officer commissioning programs are designed to augment
the services' other commissioning programs. Because these programs
focus only on military training, they are short, ranging from 6 weeks
(Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program) to 14 weeks (Army
OCS). Many, but not all, graduates have prior undergraduate degrees and
are obligated to serve a minimum of 2 years on active duty as officers.
Compared to the other services, the Marine Corps makes more extensive
use of its OCS commissioning program.
The general approach that the services use to meet their accession
needs has been to first depend on the service academy and ROTC program.
When these programs are unable to meet a service's needs for newly
commissioned officers, the service turns to its OCS/OTS program to
bridge the gap. Conversely, during periods of drawdown, all of the
commissioning sources may cut back on their numbers of officer
candidates, but the OCS/OTS program provides the most immediate means
for achieving the downsizing. Unlike the academy and ROTC programs that
take up to 4 years to produce an officer, the OCS/OTS program can
quickly expand or retract. In addition, under Title 10, each service
directly commissions officers with particular professional skills, like
physicians, dentists, nurses, lawyers, and chaplains who do not need to
attend the major commissioning programs.
Since its enactment in 1980, the Defense Officer Personnel Management
Act (DOPMA)[Footnote 2] as codified in Title 10 of the U.S. Code has
provided the basis for the services' officer career management systems.
The original objectives for DOPMA were to "maintain a high-quality,
numerically sufficient officer corps, [that] provided career
opportunities that would attract and retain the numbers of high-caliber
officers needed, [and] provide reasonably consistent career opportunity
among the services."[Footnote 3] While DOPMA and other provisions of
Title 10 outline requirements for managing the officer corps, the
services' manpower and reserve affairs offices use additional types of
data--including historical continuation rates[Footnote 4] and projected
changes in the services' size and missions--to identify officer
accession and retention needs. In addition, the services attempt to
attract an officer corps that reflects the racial and ethnic
composition of the United States. Finally, a new emphasis for officer
training is the focus on foreign language and cultural skills. As
outlined in the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and
other Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, the department aims to
develop a broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding,
which it identified as critical in prevailing in the Global War on
Terrorism and meeting 21ST century challenges.
Within the last decade, DOD has experienced both downsizing and
increases in the size of the forces, including officers. During the
1990s, each service decreased its number of officers as the Cold War
came to a close. However, post-September 11, 2001, operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan and assignments to other homeland and global
commitments have placed strains on the all volunteer force. In
recognition of the demands placed on the Army and Marine Corps, which
have provided the majority of forces for recent operations, Congress
increased the authorized end strength of the Army by 30,000 since 2004
and the Marine Corps by more than 7,000 since 2002. While these
services' OCS programs offer a means for increasing the numbers of
newly commissioned officers in a relatively short period to address a
change in end strength, it takes years to grow experienced leaders,
which presents a different officer career management challenge--officer
retention.
We have issued a number of reports that provide policymakers with
information for making informed decisions about the all volunteer
force. For example, in September 2005, we reported on the demographics
of servicemembers in the active and reserve components; and in November
2005, we reported on challenges DOD faces in recruiting and retaining
sufficient numbers of enlisted personnel.[Footnote 5] In response to
your request, this report assesses the extent to which the services are
(1) accessing the numbers and types of commissioned officers required
to meet their needs, and (2) retaining the numbers and types of
officers they need. We also identified steps that DOD and the services
have taken and the impediments that they face as they attempt to
increase foreign language proficiency among junior officers.
We limited the scope of our work to the four active duty DOD services:
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Also, we examined actual
accession and continuation rates for fiscal years (FY) 2001, 2003, and
2005 as well as projections for FY 2006, the year when we began our
work, and later years. FY 2001 data represented the situations present
immediately before the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and FY
2005 data represented the most recent fiscal year for which the
services had complete data. FY 2003 data provided information on
interim conditions and allowed us to examine the data for trends and
other patterns. To accomplish our work, we reviewed reports, laws, and
DOD-wide and service-specific officer management guidance--including
DOPMA and other provision of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, defense
authorization acts, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and policies
and directives--to gain a comprehensive understanding of officer
recruitment, commissioning, training, and retention. We obtained
documents and met with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD [P&R]), the services'
headquarters, personnel and manpower commands, service academies, ROTC
commands, and OCS/OTS commands to obtain an integrated understanding of
the three officer-related issues that we were asked to evaluate. We
obtained and analyzed accessions and continuation data from DOD's
Defense Manpower Data Center, but our assessment of the data's
reliability identified incorrect information that was severe enough to
prevent those data from being used for this report.[Footnote 6] As a
result, we subsequently obtained accession and continuation information
from the services. While we did not conduct independent analyses using
the services' databases, our assessment of their data's reliability,
including a review of relevant documentation, and a comparison of
service-provided information to similar information from other sources
and for other time periods. We determined that the service-provided
data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. For our
assessment of officer accessions, we examined information showing the
numbers of officers commissioned from the services' officer programs
during FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 for trends and other patterns and
compared the numbers of officers produced to the staffing needs of the
services' occupational specialty areas. We found that the services
determined their accession needs for each general category of specialty
but did not develop a servicewide total accession goal for each year.
Also, we reviewed internal service documents to identify potential
causes and effects of staffing gaps. In our examination of officer
retention, we performed similar analyses of quantitative continuation
information and reviews of documents to identify patterns, gaps, and
potential causes and effects. Our continuation analyses focused on four
key points in officers' careers--years 3, 4, 5, and 10--that service-
retention experts helped us to identify as when retention decisions are
most likely to occur. Additionally, we met with a number of DOD
officials, including representatives at the officer commissioning
programs, and received a wide variety of reports and other documents to
obtain an understanding of efforts to improve foreign language
training. We then used the information to identify challenges the
services face in providing additional training in their officer
commissioning programs. We assessed the reliability of the data we used
and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
our report. We conducted our review from September 2005 through
November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Appendix I contains more detail on our scope and
methodology.
Results in Brief:
The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for
newly commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing
enough officers to meet its future needs. Each service must commission
enough junior officers from its major commissioning programs
(academies, ROTC, and OCS/OTS) each year to meet the requirements of
current and future operations while striving to maintain an officer
corps that reflects the racial and ethnic composition of the nation's
population. The Army did not meet its need for newly commissioned
officer in FY 2001 and 2003 because it did not commission enough
officers in its basic branches, or specialty areas, such as infantry
and signal officers. However, the Army did meet its needs in FY 2005.
In contrast, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force met their overall
FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession needs, but each experienced
challenges accessing specific officer groups, for example, flight
officers. The services have also struggled to access enough physicians,
dentists, and nurses. In addition, the services have been challenged to
access officers of racial and ethnic minorities, particularly African
Americans and Hispanics. Moreover, the Army expects to struggle with
future accessions. The Army's current approach is to first focus on its
ROTC program and academy to meet its officer accession needs, and then
compensate for accession shortfalls in these programs by increasing OCS
accessions. However, the Army has not been accessing enough officers
from ROTC and USMA. Army officials stated that to meet their current
ROTC goal they need at least 31,000 participants in the program, but in
FY 2006 they had 25,100 participants in the program. Fewer Army ROTC
participants may reflect the decrease in Army-awarded scholarships to
officer candidates in recent years, an outcome that Army officials
attribute to budget constraints. Additionally, USMA's class of 2005
commissioned 912 graduates, short of the Army's goal of 950, while the
class of 2006 commissioned 846 graduates, missing its goal of 900
graduates. Commissioning shortfalls at USMA and in the Army ROTC
program, as well as the Army's need to expand its new officer corps,
have required OCS to rapidly increase the number of officers it
commissions. However, OCS is expected to reach its capacity in FY 2007,
and resource limitations (such as housing, classroom space, and base
infrastructure) may prevent its further expansion, limiting the
viability of the Army's traditional approach of using OCS to compensate
for shortfalls in the other officer accession programs. In addition,
officer accession programs are decentralized and do not formally
coordinate with one another, preventing the Army from effectively
compensating for the shortfalls in some officer accession programs. For
example, while Army personnel officials attempt to ensure that any
commissioning shortfalls (program outputs) are covered through
alternative commissioning sources such as OCS, the Army does not
coordinate its recruiting efforts (the input to these programs) to
ensure that officer accession programs meet Army needs. The Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993[Footnote 7] and the Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government[Footnote 8] provide federal
agencies with a results-oriented framework that includes developing a
strategic plan that incorporates overall goals, risk analysis, and
resource utilization. A strategic plan would give the Army greater
visibility over its decentralized accession programs and improve its
ability to address officer shortfalls. However, the Army has not
developed a strategic plan to manage its shrinking accessions pipeline
at a time when the force is expanding and its needs for commissioned
officers are increasing. Without such a plan, the Army's ability to
meet future mission requirements and achieve its transformation
initiatives is uncertain.
All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall
officer retention needs, but each service encountered retention
challenges for certain specialties and ranks. The Army, which continues
to be heavily involved in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
faces multiple retention challenges, particularly among junior officers
who graduated from its academy or received ROTC scholarships. For
example, USMA's continuation rate in FY 2005 was 62 percent, which was
20 to 30 percentage points lower than the other service academies'
continuation rates for the same fiscal year. Since officers who
received ROTC scholarships are eligible to leave after 4 years of
service and that group represents the largest number of officers
commissioned into the Army, that career point had the lowest or next to
the lowest continuation rate for Army officers in all 3 of the fiscal
years that we examined. Furthermore, the Army is experiencing a
shortfall of mid-level officers because it commissioned fewer officers
10 years ago due to a post-Cold War force reduction. While Army
officials told us that the current levels of retention among junior
officers are consistent with historical trends, the Army projections
show that it will have a shortage of 3,000 or more officers annually
through FY 2013 because of actions such as recent measures to expand
the size of the Army. These shortages suggest that the Army might have
to retain officers at higher than historical levels to address this
shortfall. Moreover, the Army projects that it will have 83 percent of
the majors that it needs in FY 2007, and likewise, projects that the
positions for majors in 14 Army general specialty areas (termed
branches by the Army) will be filled at 85 percent or less--a level
that the Army terms a critical shortfall. While the Army has identified
steps to improve officer retention, these will have no immediate effect
on retention. For example, the Army has offered new officers their
choice of specialty area in exchange for longer service commitments,
but this incentive does not affect officers who are able to separate.
The Army has not formulated a strategic plan to address retention
issues. However, based on its analysis of a survey of junior officers,
which identified factors that might improve retention, the Army is
considering a menu of incentives to increase retention of junior
captains. Despite those analyses, the Army has not made a final
decision on these incentives and, therefore, has not approved the
approaches or strategies needed to meet its long-term objectives, an
essential element in a strategic plan. While the Army is challenged in
retaining officers, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met
their retention needs in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; and they often had
higher continuation rates from the academies and ROTC programs.
Although the Navy and Air Force currently have additional flexibilities
in filling positions due to their current downsizing efforts, all
services faced retention challenges within certain officer branches or
communities and ranks. Finally, while the services had high retention
rates for African American and Hispanic officers, they did not do as
well retaining women. For example, overall, the services had lower
continuation rates among female officers when compared with male
officers for the fiscal years and years of service studied.
DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language
proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome
to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior
officers. During the last 2 years, DOD has issued overall guidance to
achieve greater linguistic capabilities and cultural understanding
among officers in documents such as the 2005 Defense Language
Transformation Roadmap. Two of DOD's broad objectives include
developing a recruiting plan for attracting university students with
foreign language skills and requiring that junior officers complete
added language training by 2013. To address DOD's objectives, the
Marine Corps developed a foreign language training plan, while the
other services are still drafting their plans. In addition, the service
academies, among other things, have requested additional funding and
teaching positions to improve foreign language training. However, there
are a number of impediments that could affect progress, including an
already demanding academic workload for academy and ROTC officer
candidates and the ROTC's inability to control curricula at the
colleges and universities that host ROTC units. For example, each
service academy requires its officer candidates to complete at least
137 semester credit hours over 4 years, in contrast to the
approximately 120 credit hours required to graduate from many other
colleges. Also, ROTC programs do not control the languages offered at
the colleges where their officer candidates attend classes and thus
cannot ensure that candidates are offered languages such as Arabic,
Chinese, and Persian Farsi that DOD has deemed critical for national
security. Service officials recognize these impediments and are in the
process of developing their foreign language training plans.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army to develop and implement a strategic plan to address
current and projected Army officer accession and retention challenges.
In its review of a draft of our report, DOD partially concurred with
our recommendations. DOD's comments and our evaluation of them are
discussed at the end of the letter.
Background:
For over 30 years, the United States has relied on an all volunteer
force to defend the nation at home and abroad. Before that, the nation
relied on the draft to ensure that it had enough soldiers, sailors,
Marines, and airmen in wartime. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks on the United States, DOD has launched three major operations
requiring significant numbers of military servicemembers: Operation
Noble Eagle, which covers military operations related to homeland
security; Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes ongoing military
operations in Afghanistan and certain other countries; and Operation
Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in Iraq and
the Persian Gulf area. These operations have greatly increased overseas
deployments. Moreover, they are the first long-term major overseas
combat missions since the advent of the all volunteer force in 1973.
To ensure that sufficient forces are available for the services to
accomplish their missions, Congress authorizes an annual year-end
authorized personnel level for each service component. To function
effectively, the services must, among other things, access and retain
officers at appropriate ranks and in the occupational specialties
needed to enable its units to contribute to the services' missions. The
services rely on monetary and nonmonetary incentives, where needed, to
meet their accession and retention needs.
The careers of military officers are governed primarily by Title 10,
which has incorporated the DOPMA legislation, giving the services the
primary authority to recruit, train, and retain officers. Title 10
specifies the active duty and reserve service obligations for officers
who join the military:
* graduates of the service academies must serve a minimum of 5 years on
active duty; and up to an additional 3 years on active duty or in the
reserves;
* ROTC scholarship recipients must serve a minimum of 4 years on active
duty and an additional 4 years on active duty or in the reserves; and:
* other types of officers have varying service obligations (for
example, pilots must serve 6 to 8 years on active duty, depending on
the type of aircraft, and navigators and flight officers must serve 6
years on active duty).
Similarly, Title 10 authorizes the services to directly commission
medical specialists and other professionals to meet their needs.
Services Generally Met Most Accession Needs for Newly Commissioned
Officers Despite Some Challenges, but Army Faces Unique Problems with
Future Accessions:
The services generally met most their past needs for newly commissioned
officers;
but the Army faces some unique problems accessing enough officers to
meet its needs and has not developed a strategic plan to address these
challenges. The Marine Corps, Navy, and the Air Force generally met
their needs for accessing newly commissioned officers in FYs 2001,
2003, and 2005. However, all services experienced problems recruiting
enough medical professionals in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; and most had
problems accessing racial and ethnic minorities to diversify their
officer corps.
Services Generally Met Most Overall Accession Needs for Newly
Commissioned Officers But Some Shortfalls Found for Each Service:
Our analysis of documentary evidence confirmed[Footnote 9] the
services' reports that their accession programs generally met their
officer needs in selected recent years, but each experienced some
shortfalls in certain ranks and specialties. The services do not
develop overall yearly goals for the total number of commissioned
officers needed. Instead, they adjust the enrollment in OCS/OTS
throughout the year to meet higher or lower than expected demands for
newly commissioned officers by the various occupational specialty
groups of importance to the service. The Army and the Marine Corps are
increasing their numbers of newly commissioned officers because of
their growing end strengths, whereas the Navy and the Air Force are
accessing fewer officers because they are reducing their end strengths.
The Army did not meet its overall accession needs for newly
commissioned officers in FYs 2001 and 2003, though it met its needs in
2005. The Army has two distinct types of commissioned officers. Most
officers are commissioned in its basic branches or specialty areas,
such as infantry or signal, and are commissioned through major
accession programs. The second type of officers are and those who are
directly commissioned, such as medical professionals. In FY 2001, the
Army needed 4,100 of these officers in its basic branches and instead
it commissioned 3,791, in FY 2003 it needed 4,500 and instead
commissioned 4,433. In FY 2005, it exceed it goal of commissioning
4,600 of and instead accessed 4,654 in it basic branches.
During those years it was increasing the number of commissioned
officers entering the service (see table 1). Specifically, the Army
commissioned 5,540 officers in FY 2001, 5,929 in FY 2003, and 6,045 in
FY 2005. In each of the examined fiscal years, the Army's ROTC program
accounted for around half of all newly commissioned officers, with
nearly 1,000 of those officers being accessed annually into the Army
despite not being awarded a scholarship. The Army increased total
accessions from FY 2001 to FY 2005 by nearly doubling the number of
officers commissioned through OCS.
Table 1: Army Commissioned Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and
2005, by Commissioning Program:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Academy[B]: 930;
ROTC[A]: Scholarship: 2,017;
Nonscholarship: 938;
OCS: 752;
Direct/ other[C]: 903;
Total: 5,540.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Academy[B]: 878;
ROTC[A]: Scholarship: 2,132;
Nonscholarship: 935;
OCS: 1,060;
Direct/ other[C]: 924;
Total: 5,929.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Academy[B]: 954;
ROTC[A]: Scholarship: 2,069;
Nonscholarship: 998;
OCS: 1,352;
Direct/ other[C]: 672;
Total: 6,045.
Source: United States Army.
[A] While Army ROTC provides officers to both the active and reserve
components, the information listed here reflects only the officers
commissioned into the active duty Army from ROTC.
[B] This category includes graduates from other service academies, such
as the Merchant Marine and Coast Guard academies, who are commissioned
into the Army.
[C] This category includes direct commissioned officers such as medical
professionals, chaplains, and lawyers, as well as interservice
transfers, returns to active duty, and officers whose accession sources
are unknown.
[End of table]
Our independent review and analysis of data and other materials from
the commissioning sources found that the Army does not recruit officers
to fill a specific specialty, and instead, officers are placed in
general specialty areas based on the needs of the Army. Some general
specialty areas are more popular than others, and the Army attempts to
match an officer candidate's preference to the needs of the Army.
However, the service's needs prevail, and some officers may be placed
in specialty areas outside of their preferences if shortfalls are
present.
In contrast, the Marine Corps met its overall accession needs for newly
commissioned officers for the examined fiscal years, while increasing
the number of officers it commissioned in FY 2005 (see table 2).
Increasing accessions by 241 from FY 2003 to FY 2005 represents about
an 18 percent increase in the number of newly commissioned officers.
Relative to the other services, the Marine Corps commissioned a larger
percentage of its officers through programs other than the academy or
ROTC program. For example, in FY 2005, 76 percent of the Marine Corps's
newly commissioned officers came from OCS or other sources. However,
the Marine Corps has also been increasing the number of officers
commissioned from USNA. The Marine Corps does not have a separate ROTC
program and instead, commissions officers through the Navy ROTC
program.
Table 2: Marine Corps Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005,
by Commissioning Program:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Academy: 168;
ROTC: Scholarship: 166;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 21;
OCS[A]: 499;
Other[B]: 495;
Total: 1,349.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Academy: 178;
ROTC: Scholarship: 187;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 10;
OCS[A]: 240;
Other[B]: 705;
Total: 1,320.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Academy: 213;
ROTC: Scholarship: 148;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 12;
OCS[A]: 460;
Other[B]: 728;
Total: 1,561.
Source: United States Marine Corps.
[A] OCS includes Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program and
Officer Candidate Course.
[B] This category does not include direct commissioned officers in the
Marine Corps, though it does include officers commissioned through the
Marine Corps's Platoon Leader's Class, interservice transfers, returns
to active duty, and officers whose accession sources are unknown. The
Marine Corps does not directly commission officers;
instead, it relies on the Navy to provide it with the types of
professionals--such as chaplains, physicians, dentists, and nurses--who
receive direct commissions.
[End of table]
Our independent review and analysis of data and other materials from
the commissioning sources and Marine Corps headquarters identified some
areas where the Marine Corps was challenged to access newly
commissioned officers for some occupational specialties. While the
Marine Corps officials stated that they were challenged in accessing
enough naval flight officers because officer candidates were not
familiar with the position (which involves assisting pilots with
aircraft and weapons systems), the service still recruited the number
it needed based upon our examination of the data.
The Navy also reported meeting its overall needs for commissioned
officers during FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. Since FY 2001, the total
number of newly commissioned officers decreased from 4,784 to 3,506, a
decline of nearly 27 percent (see table 3). A large portion of that
decrease was accomplished by reducing the number of officers being
commissioned through OCS, the program that can most easily and quickly
be altered to reflect changing demands for producing commissioned
officers.
Table 3: Navy Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by
Commissioning Program:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Academy: 760;
ROTC: Scholarship: 670;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 217;
OCS: 1,281;
Direct/other[A]: 1,856;
Total: 4,784.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Academy: 812;
ROTC: Scholarship: 841;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 73;
OCS: 1,018;
Direct/other[A]: 1,295;
Total: 4,039.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Academy: 749;
ROTC: Scholarship: 756;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 69;
OCS: 586;
Direct/other[A]: 1,346;
Total: 3,506.
Source: United States Navy.
[A] This category includes direct commissioned officers such as medical
professionals, interservice transfers, returns to active duty, and
officers whose accession sources are unknown.
[End of table]
Despite generally meeting its overall accession needs for newly
commissioned officers, the Navy experienced accession challenges in
some specialty areas. Our independent review and analysis of data and
other materials from the commissioning sources, Navy headquarters, and
accession programs identified some areas where there were gaps between
the numbers of newly commissioned officers needed and the numbers
supplied to specialties by some of the commissioning programs. For
example, USNA did not meet its quota for submarine officers in FY 2005,
but other commissioning programs were able to compensate for the
shortfall. Like the Marine Corps, the Navy faced a challenge in
accessing enough naval flight officers, but the Navy met its overall
need for newly commissioned officers by shifting the number of officers
sent to that specialty by some commissioning sources. For example, Navy
ROTC met its goal for naval flight officers in FY 2005 but not FY 2001
and FY 2003. The Navy's OCS made up the difference in those years.
According to Navy officials, some officers who may previously have gone
into this specialty because of poor eyesight have their vision
surgically corrected and instead become pilots.
Like the Marine Corps and the Navy, the Air Force generally met its
overall officer accession needs for FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. As with
the Navy, the Air Force decreased the number of newly commissioned
officers in FY 2005 (see table 4). Specifically, the Air Force
commissioned over 1,000 fewer officers in FY 2005 than it did in FY
2003, and it is working toward a plan to have about 9,000 fewer
officers servicewide by FY 2011. The recent decrease in the number of
newly commissioned Air Force officers was largely accomplished by
commissioning fewer officers from OTS. Overall, the Air Force relied on
its ROTC scholarship program for most of its officers and provided
scholarships for the vast majority of the ROTC officer candidates.
Table 4: Air Force Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by
Commissioning Program:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Academy: 890;
ROTC: Scholarship: [B];
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 281;
OTS: 1,628;
Direct/other[A]: 2,473;
Total: 5,922.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Academy: 996;
ROTC: Scholarship: 2,211;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 159;
OTS: 1,593;
Direct/other[A]: 1,150;
Total: 6,109.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Academy: 918;
ROTC: Scholarship: 2,330;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 61;
OTS: 790;
Direct/other[A]: 891;
Total: 4,990.
Source: United States Air Force.
[A] This category includes direct commissioned officers such as medical
professionals, interservice transfers, returns to active duty, and
officers whose accession sources are unknown.
[B] Air Force officials stated that the original data provided to GAO
for this year did not reflect the actual commission rates for ROTC and
have asked that we not use this data.
[End of table]
Despite meeting its overall needs for newly commissioned officers, the
Air Force encountered challenges in some specialties. Our analyses and
discussions with Air Force accessions officials identified air battle
manager as an area where the Air Force has been challenged. USAFA
expected to provide the Air Force with 10 air battle managers in FY
2005, but instead, three USAFA graduates became air battle managers.
The other seven positions were filled by Air Force ROTC.
All Services Had Problems Accessing Officers for Medical Occupations:
All of the services have experienced problems accessing enough medical
professionals, including physicians, medical students, dentists, and
nurses. The Army, Navy (which supplies the Marine Corps), and Air Force
provide direct commissions to medical professionals entering the
service.
Physicians. All of the services had difficulties meeting their
accession needs for physicians (see table 5) in at least 2 of the 3
fiscal years that we examined. The Army and the Navy achieved 91 or
more percent of their goals in each year studied, while the Air Force
achieved 47 to 65 percent of its goal during the same 3 years. For each
year, the Air Force had a higher goal than the other two services but
accessed fewer physicians.
Table 5: Physician Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Army: Goal: 391;
Army: Accessed: 376;
Army: Percent of goal: 96;
Navy[A]: Goal: 391;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 395;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 101;
Air Force: Goal: 547;
Air Force: Accessed: 313;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 57.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Army: Goal: 389;
Army: Accessed: 355;
Army: Percent of goal: 91;
Navy[A]: Goal: 354;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 338;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 96;
Air Force: Goal: 663;
Air Force: Accessed: 313;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 47.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Army: Goal: 419;
Army: Accessed: 416;
Army: Percent of goal: 99;
Navy[A]: 317;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 295;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 93;
Air Force: 429;
Air Force: Accessed: 280;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 65.
Source: GAO analysis of data from services' medical personnel offices.
[A] The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine
Corps.
[End of table]
Our review of the numbers of medical students participating in the
services' Health Professions Scholarship Program showed that additional
physician-accession problems may appear in future years (see table 6).
The services set their goals for awarding the scholarships based on
their needs for fully trained medical professionals in the future. A
medical student who accepts a scholarship will be commissioned into a
military service upon completion of graduate school. While each service
awarded scholarships to a sufficient number of the medical students who
began their 4-year training in FY 2003 and will be ready for an officer
commission upon graduation in FY 2007, the Army and Navy did not
achieve their goals for awarding scholarships in FY 2005, and they may
not access enough physicians in FY 2009.
Table 6: Physician Scholarships Awarded Compared to Service Goals for
Selected Years, by Service:
Fiscal year training began: 2001;
Army: Goal: 270;
Army: Accessed: 271;
Army: Percent of goal: 100;
Navy[A]: Goal: 300;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 300;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 100;
Air Force: Goal: 226;
Air Force: Accessed: 247;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 109.
Fiscal year training began: 2003;
Army: Goal: 284;
Army: Accessed: 319;
Army: Percent of goal: 112;
Navy[A]: Goal: 290;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 289;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 100;
Air Force: Goal: 201;
Air Force: Accessed: 225;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 112.
Fiscal year training began: 2005;
Army: Goal: 307;
Army: Accessed: 237;
Army: Percent of goal: 77;
Navy[A]: Goal: 291;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 162;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 56;
Air Force: Goal: 191;
Air Force: Accessed: 224;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 117.
Source: GAO analysis of data from services' medical personnel offices.
[A] The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine
Corps.
[End of table]
Dentists. Similar to the situation with physicians, the services have
been challenged to access enough dentists in recent years (see table
7). No service met its goals for recruiting dentists in FYs 2001, 2003,
or 2005. Both the Army and the Air Force, however, accessed more
dentists in FY 2005 than they had 2 years before, and the Air Force
showed improvement in FY 2005 over their FY 2003 accessions.
Table 7: Dentist Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Army: Goal: 120;
Army: Accessed: 101;
Army: Percent of goal: 84;
Navy[A]: Goal: 147;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 120;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 82;
Air Force: Goal: 188;
Air Force: Accessed: 97;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 52.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Army: Goal: 107;
Army: Accessed: 98;
Army: Percent of goal: 92;
Navy[A]: Goal: 145;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 103;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 71;
Air Force: Goal: 184;
Air Force: Accessed: 123;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 67.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Army: Goal: 125;
Army: Accessed: 105;
Army: Percent of goal: 84;
Navy[A]: Goal: 90;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 81;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 90;
Air Force: Goal: 204;
Air Force: Accessed: 142;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 70.
Source: GAO analysis of data from services' medical personnel offices.
[A] The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine
Corps.
[End of table]
Nurses. All of the services have struggled to access enough nurses (see
table 8). Although the Navy exceeded its goal for accessing nurses in
2001, no service achieved its goal for any other period. In FY 2005,
the services accessed a total of 738 of the 975 nurses (about 76
percent) that they needed.
Table 8: Nurse Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Fiscal year Accessed: 2001;
Army: Goal: 333;
Army: Accessed: 288;
Army: Percent of goal: 86;
Navy[A]: Goal: 256;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 274;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 107;
Air Force: Goal: 349;
Air Force: Accessed: 228;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 65.
Fiscal year Accessed: 2003;
Army: Goal: 373;
Army: Accessed: 323;
Army: Percent of goal: 87;
Navy[A]: Goal: 235;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 218;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 93;
Air Force: Goal: 366;
Air Force: Accessed: 265;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 72.
Fiscal year Accessed: 2005;
Army: Goal: 375;
Army: Accessed: 312;
Army: Percent of goal: 83;
Navy[A]: Goal: 243;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 223;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 92;
Air Force: Goal: 357;
Air Force: Accessed: 203;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 57.
Source: GAO analysis of data from services' medical personnel offices.
[A] The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine
Corps.
[End of table]
While some service officials have stated that medical professional
recruiting is challenging because of concerns over overseas
deployments, other service officials told us that it is also affected
by the lack of income parity compared to the civilian sector. As part
of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Congress approved an increase in the recruiting bonus for fully
trained physicians and dentists, allowed the services to detail
commissioned officers to attend medical school, extended the authority
for undergraduate student loan repayment for medical professionals,
increased the financial benefits student may receive as part of the
Health Professions Scholarship Program, and required the services to
report to Congress on this program and their success in meeting the
scholarship program's goals.[Footnote 10] Another step that DOD has
taken to reduce the medical professional shortfalls is to convert
uniformed medical positions to positions occupied by civilian medical
professionals.[Footnote 11] In addition, DOD is considering asking for
legislative authority to shorten the service commitment for medical
professionals from the required 8 years of service on active or reserve
duty, to encourage more medical professionals to join the military.
However, these efforts have not yet been funded and their effect on
medical recruiting is uncertain.
All Services Had Problems Accessing Newly Commissioned Officers from
Some Racial and Ethnic Groups:
All services had problems accessing newly commissioned minority
officers to meet DOD's goal of maintaining a racially and ethnically
diverse officer corps.[Footnote 12] For every service, African
Americans were a smaller percentage--by either 1 or 2 percentage
points--of the accessed officers in FY 2005 than they were in FY 2003,
but the representation of Asians/Pacific Islanders increased between
the same two periods for every service except the Navy (see table 9).
As points of comparison, we noted in a September 2005 report[Footnote
13] that the representation of African Americans in the officer corps
DOD-wide was about 9 percent, as was the representation of African
Americans in the college-educated workforce. Therefore, the percentages
shown in the table indicate that only the Army met or exceeded the
African-American DOD-wide and college-educated-workforce representation
levels.
Table 9: Percent of Officer Accessions by Race and Ethnicity for Each
Military Service:
Army;
Services, by FY: 2001;
Race: White: 76;
Race: African American: 13;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 4;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: <1;
Race: Other[A]: 7;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: 5;
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic: 95.
Army;
Services, by FY: 2003;
Race: White: 74;
Race: African American: 13;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 5;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: <1;
Race: Other[A]: 8;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: 6;
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic: 94.
Army;
Services, by FY: 2005;
Race: White: 74;
Race: African American: 11;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 6;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: 1;
Race: Other[A]: 9;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: 6;
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic: 94.
Navy;
Services, by FY: 2001;
Race: White: 81;
Race: African American: 9;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 5;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: 1;
Race: Other[A]: 5;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: 6;
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic: 94.
Navy;
Services, by FY: 2003;
Race: White: 81;
Race: African American: 9;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 4;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: <1;
Race: Other[A]: 6;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: 6;
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic: 94.
Navy;
Services, by FY: 2005;
Race: White: 80;
Race: African American: 8;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 4;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: 1;
Race: Other[A]: 7;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: 6;
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic: 94.
Marine Corps;
Services, by FY: 2001;
Race: White: 80;
Race: African American: 6;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 5;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: 1;
Race: Other[A]: 1;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: 7;
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic: 93.
Marine Corps;
Services, by FY: 2003;
Race: White: 85;
Race: African American: 5;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 3;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: 1;
Race: Other[A]: 1;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: 6;
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic: 94.
Marine Corps;
Services, by FY: 2005;
Race: White: 82;
Race: African American: 4;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 4;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: 1;
Race: Other[A]: 1;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: 7;
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic: 93.
Air Force;
Services, by FY: 2001;
Race: White: 78;
Race: African American: 8;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 3;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: <1;
Race: Other[A]: 8;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: 2;
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic: 98.
Air Force;
Services, by FY: 2003;
Race: White: 78;
Race: African American: 6;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 3;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: <1;
Race: Other[A]: 13;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: 4;
Ethnicity: Non- Hispanic: 81[B].
Air Force;
Services, by FY: 2005;
Race: White: 70;
Race: African American: 6;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 5;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native: <1;
Race: Other[A]: 20;
Ethnicity: Hispanic: [C];
Ethnicity: Non- Hispanic: [C].
Source: GAO analysis of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force data.
[A] For the Army and the Marine Corps, "other" consists of those who
declined to respond or were recorded as undefined.
[B] 15 percent of Air Force officers did not identify themselves as
either Hispanic or non-Hispanic.
[C] In FY 2005, the Air Force reported that 41 percent of Air Force
officers did not identify themselves as either Hispanic or non-
Hispanic. We did not report FY 2005 Air Force ethnic data because data
which includes a 41 percent unknown figure is not sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of this report.
[End of table]
Similarly, recruiting Hispanic officers has presented challenges to the
services. In FY 2005, the Marine Corps accessed a higher percentage of
Hispanic officers than the other services. While the Air Force accessed
a lower percentage than the other services in each of the 2 fiscal
years reported, it doubled its percentage of newly commissioned
Hispanic officers from FY 2001 to FY 2003. However, this percentage of
Hispanic officers accessed is smaller than the percentage of Hispanics
in the United States at the time of the 2000 census (about 13 percent)
and the percentage of Hispanics in the U.S. college population (about 9
percent).
Some ambiguity is present in interpreting the findings for racial and
ethnic groups because of the data. For example, the Air Force findings
show large numbers of officers for whom some data were not available.
Despite these data limitations, service officials explained that many
of their challenges relate to the need for the services to recruit
minority officers from the military-eligible segment of the college
population. Navy and Air Force officials stated that their officer
commissioning programs have more stringent entrance requirements than
the other services and emphasize mathematics and science skills needed
for the high-technology occupations found in their services. Officials
from the commissioning programs in each service further noted that only
a small segment of the African-American college population meets these
entrance requirements. Each service operates a preparatory school in
association with its academy to increase the pool of qualified
applicants to enter its academy, giving primary consideration to
enrolling enlisted personnel, minorities, women, and recruited
athletes.[Footnote 14] Moreover, all officer commissioning programs,
particularly the service academies, must compete with colleges and
universities that do not require a postgraduation service commitment.
In addition, USMA officials stated that citizenship status represented
a barrier to improving the percentage of Hispanic officers. As of the
2000 census, 65 percent of Hispanics were U.S. citizens.[Footnote 15]
Army Faces Some Unique Future Officer Accession Problems:
While all of the services experienced some specialty-and diversity-
related challenges in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, based on our review the
Army faces some future officer accession problems not shared by the
other services and has not developed and implemented a strategic plan
to overcome these projected shortfalls. Our review, analyses, and
discussions with Army officials indicated that the Army may struggle to
meet its future accession needs. While all the services are
contributing forces to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is
providing most of the forces for these operations. Other unique
stressors on the Army's commissioning programs include the expansion of
the Army's officer corps as part of the congressionally authorized
30,000-soldier increase to the Army end strength and the Army's need
for higher numbers of officers as part of its ongoing transformation
effort to create more modular quickly deployable units.[Footnote 16]
Notwithstanding these needs for more officers, some of the Army's
commissioning programs are not commissioning as many officers as they
had in past years and are commissioning less than the Army had
expected. The Army's current approach is to first focus on its ROTC
program and academy to meet its officer accession needs, and then
compensate for accession shortfalls in these programs by increasing OCS
accessions. While Army OCS is currently meeting the Army's needs, Army
ROTC and USMA are not. Army ROTC, for example, experienced a decline in
its number of participants. In FY 2006, the Army calculated that 25,089
students would participate in ROTC. In contrast, 31,765 students were
involved in Army ROTC in FY 2003. Army officials stated that to meet
their current mission they need at least 31,000 participants in the
program. Moreover, the Army uses its ROTC program for commissioning
both active and reserve officers. Although the goal is 4,500 newly
commissioned officers (2,750 active and 1,750 reserve) from Army ROTC
in both FYs 2006 and 2007, Army officials project that the program will
fall short of the goal by 12 percent in FY 2006 and 16 percent in FY
2007.
Furthermore, fewer officers may be commissioned from the Army's ROTC
program in the future because fewer scholarships have been awarded
recently, which Army officials attribute to budget constraints. For
example, in FY 2003, the Army ROTC program had 7,583 officer candidates
with 4-year scholarships; in FY 2004, 7,234; in FY 2005, 6,004. Army
ROTC officials stated that fewer 4-year scholarship recipients means
fewer newly commissioned officers in the future, since scholarship
recipients are more likely to complete the program and receive their
commission. Army ROTC officials believe that while negative attitudes
toward Army ROTC are increasing on college campuses because of
opposition to operations in Iraq, concerns about financing their
education may make ROTC scholarships more attractive to officer
candidates.
In addition to challenges with its ROTC program, the Army has recently
experienced difficulties commissioning officers through USMA, and
projections for newly commissioned officers from USMA show that these
difficulties may continue in the future. In FY 2005, USMA commissioned
912 officers, fewer than its mission of 950 officers. Similarly, USMA's
class that graduated in FY 2006 commissioned 846 graduates, short of
the Army's goal of 900. While the number of officer candidates who
successfully complete the 4-year program at USMA varies, according to
USMA data 71 percent who began the program in 2002 completed it in 2006
and received their commission. In contrast, in both FY 2001 and in FY
2003, 76 percent of those who began their course of study 4 years
earlier completed the program and commissioned into the Army;
and in FY 2005, 77 percent.[Footnote 17] USMA officials told us that
the smaller graduating class in FY 2006 may be the result of ongoing
operations in Iraq. The class, which will graduate in 2010, should have
an additional 100 officer candidates to help address recent shortfalls;
however, USMA officials indicated that facilities and staff limit
additional increases.
Commissioning shortfalls at USMA and in the Army ROTC program, as well
as the Army's need to expand its new officer corps, have required OCS
to rapidly increase the number of officers it commissions;
however, its ability to annually produce more officers is uncertain. In
FY 2006, OCS was required to produce 1,420 officers, and in FY 2007,
the Army's goal for OCS is to commission 1,650 officers, more than
double the number it produced in FY 2001. OCS program officials stated
that without increases in resources and support such as additional
housing and classroom space, OCS cannot produce more officers than
1,650 officers, its FY 2007 goal, limiting the viability of this
approach.
Additionally, the Army's officer accession programs are
decentralized[Footnote 18] and lack any sort of formal coordination,
which prevents the Army from effectively balancing the results of
failure in some officer accession programs. USMA does not directly
report to the same higher-level command as ROTC or OCS. While ROTC and
OCS both report to the same overall authority, they do not formally
coordinate with one another or with USMA. For example, the Army does
not coordinate recruiting and accession efforts to ensure that
accession programs meet Army accessions goals, nor does it use risk
analysis to manage resource allocations among the programs. USMA relies
on its own full-time recruiters and Military Academy Liaison Officers-
-reservists, retirees, and alumni who meet with possible academy
recruits and hold meetings to provide information to students.
Officials from Army Cadet Command,[Footnote 19] which does not
coordinate recruiting efforts with USMA, stated that Army ROTC has a
limited advertising budget that focuses on print media, brochures, and
local print media. In addition, as we previously discussed, Army ROTC
has experienced a decrease in its scholarship funding while the Army's
needs for its graduates has increased, but the Army has not conducted a
risk-based analysis of resource allocations to Army officer accession
programs.
Shortfalls in Army officer accessions have been compounded by the
decentralized management structure for the officer accessions programs,
and the Army does not have a strategic plan to overcome these
challenges. Army personnel officials set a goal for each commissioning
program. While those officials attempt to ensure that any commissioning
shortfalls (program outputs) are covered by other commissioning
programs such as OCS, the Army does not coordinate the recruiting
efforts of its various commissioning programs (the input to these
programs) to ensure that officer accession programs meet overall Army
needs. While the Army's has identified a number of options to increase
officer accessions, it does not have a strategic plan for managing its
shrinking accessions pipeline at a time when the force is expanding and
its needs for commissioned officers are increasing. The Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)[Footnote 20] and Standards
for Internal Control in the Federal Government[Footnote 21] provide
federal agencies with a results-oriented framework that includes
developing a strategic plan.[Footnote 22] According to GPRA, a
strategic plan should include outcome-related goals and objectives.
Moreover, the Standards emphasize the need for identifying and
analyzing potential risks that could slow progress in achieving goals.
This risk assessment can form the basis for determining procedures for
mitigating risks. The Army recognizes that offering more scholarships
could improve its ROTC program accessions and has proposed increasing
available scholarships. However, this is not part of a broader
strategic plan that would realign resources to better meet the Army's
officer accession needs and minimize risk. Without such an alternative,
given the decentralized management of the officer accession programs,
and without a strategic plan that identifies goals, risks, and
resources to mitigate officer shortfalls, the Army's ability to meet
future mission requirements is uncertain.
All Services Except Army Generally Met Past Officer Retention Needs,
but All Face Challenges Retaining Certain Officer Groups:
While most of the services generally met their past officer retention
needs, the Army faces multiple retention challenges. The Army has
experienced decreased retention among officers early in their careers,
particularly among junior officers who graduated from USMA or received
ROTC scholarships. Moreover, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of
mid-level officers because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago
due to a post-Cold War reduction in both force size and officer
accessions. Despite these emerging problems, the Army has not performed
an analysis that would identify and analyze risks of near term
retention problems to determine resource priorities. Although the other
services generally met their past retention needs, each faces
challenges retaining officers in certain ranks or specialties.[Footnote
23] Furthermore, each of the services had high continuation rates among
African American and Hispanic officers, but each faces challenges
retaining female officers.
Army Faces Multiple Retention Challenges, but Other Services Are
Generally Retaining Enough Officers to Meet Their Needs:
The Army has encountered retention challenges in the last few years,
but the other services are generally retaining sufficient numbers of
officers in the fiscal years that we examined.
Army Faces Challenges to Retain Officers at Junior and Mid-level Ranks
and Certain Specialties:
Overall, the Army has experienced decreased retention among officers
early in their careers, particularly junior officers who graduated from
USMA or received ROTC scholarships.[Footnote 24] Additionally, the Army
is currently experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers and has
shortages within certain specialty areas. It is examining a number of
initiatives to improve the retention of its officers, but these
initiatives are not currently funded or will not affect officer
retention until at least FY 2009. Moreover, the Army does not have a
strategic plan to address these retention challenges.
The Army has experienced multiple retention problems in recent years
for officers commissioned through USMA and the ROTC scholarship program
and for some occupational specialties despite retaining lieutenants and
captains in FY 2006 at or above its 10-year Army-wide average. Our
comparisons of the Army continuation rates shown in table 10 to those
presented later for each of the other services revealed that the USMA
continuation rates of 68 percent for FY 2001 and 62 percent for FY 2005
were 20 to 30 percentage points lower than the other academies'
continuation rates for the same fiscal year. Caution is needed,
however, when interpreting cross-service findings because USNA and
USAFA produce a large number of pilots who incur additional obligations
that may not allow many of those officers to leave until 8 or more
years of service have been completed. Second, a comparison of the
Army's FY 2001 and FY 2005 continuation rates for ROTC scholarship
officers showed that rates decreased by 3 percentage points at years 4
and 5.
Table 10: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Army Commissioned
Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal Years and Key
Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Fiscal Year 2001.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 95;
ROTC: Scholarship: 96;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 86;
OCS: 85;
Other[A]: 90;
Total: 92.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 98;
ROTC: Scholarship: 74;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 78;
OCS: 90;
Other[A]: 81;
Total: 81.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 68;
ROTC: Scholarship: 85;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 90;
OCS: 97;
Other[A]: 87;
Total: 84.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 91;
ROTC: Scholarship: 95;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 95;
OCS: 97;
Other[A]: 89;
Total: 94.
Fiscal year 2003.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 99;
ROTC: Scholarship: 98;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 90;
OCS: 93;
Other[A]: 88;
Total: 94.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 98;
ROTC: Scholarship: 83;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 90;
OCS: 93;
Other[A]: 84;
Total: 88.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 80;
ROTC: Scholarship: 90;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 93;
OCS: 98;
Other[A]: 92;
Total: 90.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 95;
ROTC: Scholarship: 96;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 96;
OCS: 96;
Other[A]: 92;
Total: 95.
Fiscal year 2005.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 98;
ROTC: Scholarship: 97;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 87;
OCS: 87;
Other[A]: 90;
Total: 93.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 96;
ROTC: Scholarship: 71;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 85;
OCS: 88;
Other[A]: 83;
Total: 82.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 62;
ROTC: Scholarship: 82;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 88;
OCS: 94;
Other[A]: 90;
Total: 81.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 94;
ROTC: Scholarship: 95;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 96;
OCS: 92;
Other[A]: 91;
Total: 94.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[A] This category includes direct commissioned officers in the Army,
interservice transfers, returns to active duty, and officers from
unknown sources.
[End of table]
Our review of the continuation rates in table 10 also revealed three
other notable patterns. First, the total continuation rate for FY 2003
was higher than the rate for the other 2 years, reflecting the stop-
loss policy[Footnote 25] that prevented officers from leaving the Army.
Second, for each source and fiscal year, the lowest continuation rate
for a commissioning source typically came in the first year that
officers were eligible to leave the military--for example, year 5 for
USMA and year 4 for ROTC scholarship. Third, since (1) the ROTC
scholarship program produces more officers than any other commissioning
source and (2) scholarship officers are eligible to leave the Army at
year 4, that year of service had the lowest or next lowest total
continuation rate for all 3 of the fiscal years that we examined.
The Congressional Research Service reported that Army projections show
that its officer shortage will be approximately 3,000 line officers in
FY 2007, grow to about 3,700 officers in FY 2008, and continue at an
annual level of 3,000 or more through FY 2013.[Footnote 26] For
example, the Army FY 2008 projected shortage includes 364 lieutenant
colonels, 2,554 majors, and 798 captains who entered in FYs 1991
through 2002. The criteria that the Army uses to determine its
retention needs are personnel-fill rates for positions, based on
officers' rank and specialty. In addition to the general problem of not
having enough officers to fill all of its positions, the Army is
promoting some junior officers faster than it has in the recent past
and therefore not allowing junior officers as much time to master their
duties and responsibilities at the captain rank. For example, the Army
has reduced the promotion time to the rank of captain (O-3) from the
historical average of 42 months from commissioning to the current
average of 38 months and has promoted 98 percent of eligible first
lieutenants (O-2), which is more than the service's goal of 90 percent.
Likewise, the Army has reduced the promotion time to the rank of major
(O-4) from 11 years to 10 years and has promoted 97 percent of eligible
captains to major--more than the Army's goal. Also, the Army is
experiencing a large shortfall at the rank of major, and the shortfall
affects a wide range of branches. For FY 2007, the Army projects that
it will have 83 percent of the total number of majors that it needs.
Table 11 shows that the positions for majors in 14 Army general
specialty areas (termed branches by the Army) will be filled at 85
percent or less in FY 2007--a level that the Army terms a critical
shortfall.
Table 11: Army's Projected Percentages of Overfilled and Underfilled
Positions for Majors in Specified Specialty Areas in FY 2007:
Basic branch: Infantry;
Percent: 107.
Basic branch: Armor;
Percent: 99.
Basic branch: Finance;
Percent: 98.
Basic branch: Special forces;
Percent: 97.
Basic branch: Adjutant general;
Percent: 96.
Basic branch: Ordnance;
Percent: 88.
Basic branch: Quartermaster;
Percent: 86.
Basic branch: Signal corps;
Percent: 84.
Basic branch: Field artillery;
Percent: 79.
Basic branch: Aviation;
Percent: 77.
Basic branch: Military police;
Percent: 76.
Basic branch: Chemical;
Percent: 75.
Basic branch: Engineer;
Percent: 74.
Basic branch: Military intelligence;
Percent: 73.
Basic branch: Air defense;
Percent: 66.
Basic branch: Transportation;
Percent: 48.
Basic branch: Total;
Percent: 81.
Special branch: Medical doctor;
Percent: 99.
Special branch: Chaplain;
Percent: 91.
Special branch: Army nurse;
Percent: 86.
Special branch: Medical service;
Percent: 82.
Special branch: Veterinary corps;
Percent: 78.
Special branch: Judge advocate;
Percent: 72.
Special branch: Medical specialist;
Percent: 67.
Special branch: Dentist;
Percent: 49.
Special branch: Total;
Percent: 85.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of table]
Numerous factors may have contributed to the retention challenges
facing the Army. Among other things, Army officials noted that some of
the shortfalls originated in the post-Cold War reduction in forces and
accessions. Although Congress has increased the authorized end strength
of the Army by 30,000 since FY 2004 to help the Army meet its many
missions expanding the mid-level officer corps could prove problematic
since it will require retaining proportionally more of the officers
currently in the service, as well as overcoming the officer accession
hurdles that we identified earlier. Unlike civilian organizations, the
Army requires that almost all of its leaders enter at the most junior
level (O-1) and earn promotions from within the organization.
Additionally, as part of our September 2005 report,[Footnote 27] the
Office of Military Personnel Policy acknowledged that retention may
have suffered because of an improving civilian labor market and the
high pace of operations. Army officers may have already completed
multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan since the Army is the
service providing the majority of the personnel for those operations.
Another reason why the Army may be having more difficulty than other
services in retaining its officers could be related to its use of
continuation pays and incentives. Table 12 shows that the Army spent
less than any other service in FY 2005 on retention-related pays and
incentives for officers.
Table 12: Service-Specific Continuation Pays and Incentives Awarded to
Officers in FY 2005:
Dollars in thousands.
Service: Army;
Total: 13,591.
Service: Marine Corps;
Total: 18,707.
Service: Navy;
Total: 129,273.
Service: Air Force;
Total: 202,536.
Source: GAO analysis of OUSD (P&R) data.
[End of table]
While the Army has identified some steps that it needs to take in order
to improve officer retention, the actions that have been implemented
will have no immediate effect on retention. The Army has begun
guaranteeing entering officers their postcommission choice of general
specialty area (branch), installation, or the prospect of graduate
school to encourage retention. A number of Army officers commissioned
in FY 2006 took advantage of this initiative, and as a result, have a
longer active duty service obligation. For example, as of May 2006, 238
academy graduates accepted the offer of a longer service obligation in
exchange for the Army paying for them to attend graduate school.
Although the Army believes that these initiatives will help address
future retention problems, none will affect continuation rates until
2009 at the earliest because servicemembers are obligated to stay in
the Army for at least 3 years. The more immediate retention challenge
for the Army is keeping officers with 3, 4, or 5 years of service, as
we have identified in this report. However, these officers are not
affected by these initiatives.
While the Army staff reported that they are exploring numerous options
for addressing officer retention shortfalls, Army leadership has not
identified which options will be funded and implemented. As noted
earlier in this report, GPRA and the Standards for Internal Control in
the Federal Government provide a basis for developing a results-
oriented strategic plan. Moreover, GAO's guidance for implementing a
results-oriented strategic plan highlights the importance of for ROTC
scholarship identifying long-term goals and including the approaches or
strategies needed to meet these goals. Without a plan to address both
its accession and retention challenges, the Army will not have the
information and tools it needs to effectively and efficiently improve
its retention of officers in both the near term and beyond.
Other Services Generally Met Their Past Retention Needs but Will Face
Certain Retention Challenges in the Future:
The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met their retention
needs and had higher continuation rates from their major accession
programs than did the Army. While the Navy and Air Force are currently
undergoing force reductions that will decrease the size of their
officer corps, all three services face officer retention challenges in
certain ranks and specialties.
The Marine Corps was able to meet its overall retention needs for FYs
2001, 2003, and 2005 by generally retaining more than 9 of every 10
officers at the four career-continuation points that we examined.
Except for the 4-year career mark, our analysis showed that the Marine
Corps's total continuation rates for all 3 fiscal years typically
exceeded 90 percent (see table 13). Officers who graduated from USNA
had the lowest continuation rates at the end of their fifth year of
service, coinciding with the minimum active duty service obligation for
that commissioning source. Likewise, officers from ROTC scholarship
programs had lower continuation rates at the end of year 4. For
example, in FY 2003, the continuation rate was 67 percent;
and in FY 2005, it was 79 percent.
Table 13: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Marine Corps
Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal
Years and Key Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Fiscal year 2001.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 100;
ROTC: Scholarship: c;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 98;
OCS[A]: 95;
Other[B]: 97;
Total: 96.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 99;
ROTC: Scholarship: 85;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 74;
OCS[A]: 87;
Other[B]: 89;
Total: 88.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 88;
ROTC: Scholarship: 83;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 100;
OCS[A]: c;
Other[B]: 94;
Total: 96.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 91;
ROTC: Scholarship: 90;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 50;
OCS[A]: 90;
Other[B]: 89;
Total: 89.
Fiscal year 2003.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 100;
ROTC: Scholarship: 100;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: c;
OCS[A]: 96;
Other[B]: 100;
Total: 98.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 99;
ROTC: Scholarship: 67;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 93;
OCS[A]: 93;
Other[B]: 96;
Total: 94.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 94;
ROTC: Scholarship: 89;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 97;
OCS[A]: 99;
Other[B]: 96;
Total: 97.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 95;
ROTC: Scholarship: 92;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 88;
OCS[A]: 90;
Other[B]: 90;
Total: 91.
Fiscal year 2005.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 100;
ROTC: Scholarship: 100;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 100;
OCS[A]: 88;
Other[B]: 99;
Total: 94.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 98;
ROTC: Scholarship: 79;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 86;
OCS[A]: 83;
Other[B]: 88;
Total: 85.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 86;
ROTC: Scholarship: 100;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 83;
OCS[A]: 93;
Other[B]: 96;
Total: 92.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 93;
ROTC: Scholarship: 91;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 100;
OCS[A]: 92;
Other[B]: 91;
Total: 92.
Source: GAO analysis of Marine Corps data.
[A] OCS includes Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program and
Officer Candidate Course.
[B] This category does not include direct commissioned officers in the
Marine Corps, though it does include officers commissioned through the
Marine Corps's Platoon Leader's Class, interservice transfers, return
to active duty, other, and unknown sources. The Marine Corps does not
directly commission officers; instead, it relies on the Navy to provide
it with the types of professionals--such as physicians, dentists, and
nurses--who receive direct commissions. A certain number of officers
are included whose accession source is unknown.
[C] The Marine Corps supplied data which exceeded 100 percent, an
impossibility. According to Marine Corps officials, they attributed
this to either missing or incorrect data entered in the first year and
then subsequently corrected in the following years.
[End of table]
With a few exceptions, the Marine Corps met its retention needs and was
able to fill critical specialties and ranks. We found that the Marine
Corps was either under or just meeting its goal for fixed wing aviators
(such as the junior officer level for the KC-130 tactical airlift
airplane commanders and the AV-8 Harrier attack aircraft), rotary wing
officers (at the junior officer level for all rotary wing occupations
except one), and mid-level and senior intelligence, administrative, and
communications officers in past fiscal years. Additional problems were
present when we examined FY 2006 continuation data for emerging
problems. Although the FY 2006 continuation rate averaged about 92
percent--excluding the fixed and rotary wing communities--the Marine
Corps experienced lower than normal retention among combat support
officers (such as administrative and financial management officers),
combat arms officers (such as infantry, field artillery, and tank
officers) as well as communications, logistics, and human source
intelligence officers.[Footnote 28] However, FY 2007 projections for
these categories of jobs averaged about a 90 percent continuation rate,
excluding fixed wing and rotary wing communities.
While the Navy generally retained sufficient numbers of officers in FYs
2001, 2003, and 2005, Navy officials and our independent review of
documents revealed some areas that were not readily apparent solely by
reviewing the continuation rates for the total Navy and officers
entering through each commissioning program. The continuation rate
among Navy junior officers commissioned from USNA or OCS was 90 percent
or better in years 3, 4, and 5 of service for all 3 fiscal years
studied (see table 14). However, officers commissioned from the Navy
ROTC scholarship program had lower continuation rates at the end of 4
and 5years of service, coinciding with their minimum active duty
service obligation. Additionally, the Navy experienced lower
continuation rates among officers, both overall and from each of the
training programs, after 10 years of service. This lower rate at the 10-
year career point may be partially explained because pilots incur
additional obligations that may not allow them to leave until 8 or more
years of service have been completed.
Table 14: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Navy Commissioned
Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal Years and Key
Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Fiscal year 2001.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 100;
ROTC: Scholarship: 99;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 86;
OCS: 97;
Other[A]: 93;
Total: 96.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 99;
ROTC: Scholarship: 85;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 96;
OCS: 93;
Other[A]: 89;
Total: 91.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 91;
ROTC: Scholarship: 85;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 91;
OCS: 90;
Other[A]: 91;
Total: 90.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 83;
ROTC: Scholarship: 79;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 81;
OCS: 86;
Other[A]: 88;
Total: 85.
Fiscal year 2003.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 100;
ROTC: Scholarship: 98;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 98;
OCS: 97;
Other[A]: 94;
Total: 97.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 99;
ROTC: Scholarship: 86;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 94;
OCS: 94;
Other[A]: 89;
Total: 92.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 91;
ROTC: Scholarship: 88;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 95;
OCS: 93;
Other[A]: 92;
Total: 92.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 85;
ROTC: Scholarship: 86;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 93;
OCS: 94;
Other[A]: 89;
Total: 88.
Fiscal year 2005.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 93;
ROTC: Scholarship: 93;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 87;
OCS: 93;
Other[A]: 94;
Total: 93.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 95;
ROTC: Scholarship: 85;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 92;
OCS: 92;
Other[A]: 89;
Total: 90.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 90;
ROTC: Scholarship: 86;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 87;
OCS: 92;
Other[A]: 92;
Total: 91.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 91;
ROTC: Scholarship: 88;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 88;
OCS: 89;
Other[A]: 90;
Total: 89.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[A] This category includes direct commissioned officers in the Navy,
interservice transfers, returns to active duty, and officers from
unknown sources.
[End of table]
The Navy's potential future retention challenges may be eased by the
flexibility that the Navy gains from not having to retain officers in
some specialties at traditional rates since it is going through
downsizing. However, our discussions with the officials who manage the
Navy general specialty areas (termed officer communities by the Navy)
and our independent analyses of retention documents revealed that the
medical, dental, surface warfare, and intelligence communities are
experiencing junior officer losses, which can later exacerbate mid-
level shortfalls. Moreover, several managers of general specialty areas
indicated that they were concerned about using individual Navy officers
(rather than Navy units) to augment Army and Marine Corps units. The
managers were unable to estimate the effect of such individual
augmentee assignments on officer retention. These deployments are
longer than the Navy's traditional 6-month deployments and sometimes
occur after officers have completed their shipboard deployment and are
expecting their next assignment to be ashore with their families.
Our review of documents for FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, as well as our
discussions with Air Force officials identified no major past retention
problems. Except for the year 3 and 4 career points in FY 2001, the Air
Force total continuation rates were 90 percent or higher (see table
15).
Table 15: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Air Force
Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal
Years and Key Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Fiscal year 2001.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 100;
ROTC: Scholarship: 88;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 91;
OCS: 93;
Other[A]: 76;
Total: 88.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 89;
ROTC: Scholarship: 90;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 93;
OCS: 94;
Other[A]: 85;
Total: 89.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 88;
ROTC: Scholarship: 92;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 94;
OCS: 95;
Other[A]: 89;
Total: 91.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 87;
ROTC: Scholarship: 92;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 89;
OCS: 91;
Other[A]: 90;
Total: 90.
Fiscal year 2003.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 99;
ROTC: Scholarship: 90;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 93;
OCS: 96;
Other[A]: 80;
Total: 92.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 91;
ROTC: Scholarship: 91;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 93;
OCS: 96;
Other[A]: 86;
Total: 91.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 93;
ROTC: Scholarship: 93;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 93;
OCS: 97;
Other[A]: 90;
Total: 93.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 92;
ROTC: Scholarship: 91;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 93;
OCS: 93;
Other[A]: 91;
Total: 92.
Fiscal year 2005.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 3;
Academy: 98;
ROTC: Scholarship: 85;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 89;
OCS: 96;
Other[A]: 84;
Total: 91.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 4;
Academy: 89;
ROTC: Scholarship: 89;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 92;
OCS: 96;
Other[A]: 87;
Total: 91.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 5;
Academy: 92;
ROTC: Scholarship: 93;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 94;
OCS: 96;
Other[A]: 89;
Total: 93.
Fiscal year and year of service: Year 10;
Academy: 96;
ROTC: Scholarship: 95;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 95;
OCS: 91;
Other[A]: 89;
Total: 94.
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.
[A] This category includes direct commissioned officers in the Air
Force, interservice transfers, returns to active duty, and officers
from unknown sources.
[End of table]
The Air Force is reducing the size of its officer corps through a
planned downsizing. In FY 2006, the Air Force reduced its force by
about 1,700 junior officer positions. By 2011, the Air Force plans to
complete an approximate 13 percent reduction in the number of its
officers, totaling approximately 9,200 officers. The Air Force plans to
accomplish the downsizing through the use of force shaping tools such
as selective early retirement, voluntary separation pay, and other
measures. Despite the need to retain fewer officers, the Air Force
anticipates shortages in three specialties areas--control and recovery
officers who specialize in recovering aircrews who have abandoned their
aircraft during operational flights, physicians, and dentists. Staffing
levels for these three specialties are just below 85 percent.
While All Services Had High Continuation Rates among African American
and Hispanic Officers, Each Service Encountered Challenges Retaining
Female Officers:
While the services did well retaining African Americans and Hispanic
officers, they did not do as well retaining women. The services want to
retain a diverse, experienced officer corps to reflect applicable
groups in the nation's population. For the fiscal years and career
points that we examined, African American and Hispanic officers usually
had higher continuation rates than white and non-Hispanic officers,
respectively; but female officers more often had lower continuation
rates than male officers.
When we compared the continuation rate of African American officers to
that of white officers for a specific fiscal year and career point, our
analyses found that the services were typically retaining African
Americans at an equal or a higher rate than whites (see table 16). At
one extreme, 11 of the 12 comparisons (all except for the FY 2003 3-
year point) for the Army officers showed equal or higher rates for
African American officers. Similarly, 8 of the 12 comparisons for both
the Navy and Marine Corps rates as well as 6 of the 12 Air Force rates
showed a similar pattern.
Table 16: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent for African-
American and White Officers for Selected Fiscal Years:
Race: African American.
Race, by year of service: Year 3;
Army: 2001: 94;
Army: 2003: 93;
Army: 2005: 94;
Navy: 2001: 95;
Navy: 2003: 98;
Navy: 2005: 94;
Marine Corps: 2001: 97;
Marine Corps: 2003: 96;
Marine Corps: 2005: 96;
Air Force: 2001: 84;
Air Force: 2003: 91;
Air Force: 2005: 93.
Race, by year of service: Year 4;
Army: 2001: 88;
Army: 2003: 91;
Army: 2005: 87;
Navy: 2001: 91;
Navy: 2003: 95;
Navy: 2005: 91;
Marine Corps: 2001: 89;
Marine Corps: 2003: 96;
Marine Corps: 2005: 90;
Air Force: 2001: 88;
Air Force: 2003: 91;
Air Force: 2005: 90.
Race, by year of service: Year 5;
Army: 2001: 88;
Army: 2003: 91;
Army: 2005: 88;
Navy: 2001: 89;
Navy: 2003: 93;
Navy: 2005: 93;
Marine Corps: 2001: 88;
Marine Corps: 2003: 97;
Marine Corps: 2005: 89;
Air Force: 2001: 93;
Air Force: 2003: 92;
Air Force: 2005: 88.
Race, by year of service: Year 10;
Army: 2001: 94;
Army: 2003: 96;
Army: 2005: 96;
Navy: 2001: 88;
Navy: 2003: 94;
Navy: 2005: 87;
Marine Corps: 2001: 92;
Marine Corps: 2003: 93;
Marine Corps: 2005: 85;
Air Force: 2001: 93;
Air Force: 2003: 94;
Air Force: 2005: 96.
Race: White.
Race, by year of service: Year 3;
Army: 2001: 91;
Army: 2003: 94;
Army: 2005: 93;
Navy: 2001: 97;
Navy: 2003: 97;
Navy: 2005: 93;
Marine Corps: 2001: 96;
Marine Corps: 2003: 99;
Marine Corps: 2005: 95;
Air Force: 2001: 88;
Air Force: 2003: 92;
Air Force: 2005: 92.
Race, by year of service: Year 4;
Army: 2001: 80;
Army: 2003: 87;
Army: 2005: 81;
Navy: 2001: 92;
Navy: 2003: 92;
Navy: 2005: 91;
Marine Corps: 2001: 88;
Marine Corps: 2003: 93;
Marine Corps: 2005: 84;
Air Force: 2001: 90;
Air Force: 2003: 91;
Air Force: 2005: 91.
Race, by year of service: Year 5;
Army: 2001: 83;
Army: 2003: 89;
Army: 2005: 80;
Navy: 2001: 90;
Navy: 2003: 92;
Navy: 2005: 91;
Marine Corps: 2001: 93;
Marine Corps: 2003: 96;
Marine Corps: 2005: 92;
Air Force: 2001: 91;
Air Force: 2003: 93;
Air Force: 2005: 94.
Race, by year of service: Year 10;
Army: 2001: 93;
Army: 2003: 95;
Army: 2005: 94;
Navy: 2001: 84;
Navy: 2003: 88;
Navy: 2005: 89;
Marine Corps: 2001: 90;
Marine Corps: 2003: 91;
Marine Corps: 2005: 92;
Air Force: 2001: 89;
Air Force: 2003: 92;
Air Force: 2005: 93.
Source: GAO analysis of service-provided data.
[End of table]
Likewise, our analysis showed that the services were typically
retaining Hispanic officers better than non-Hispanic officers (see
table 17). In all 12 comparisons of the two groups of Army officers at
the four career points in the 3 fiscal years, the continuation rates
for Hispanic officers were equal to or higher than those for non-
Hispanic officers. For 9 of the 12 Navy-based comparisons and 5 of the
12 Marine Corps-based comparisons, the same pattern was present. While
the Air Force supplied information on Hispanics and non-Hispanic
continuation rates for only FY 2005, the same pattern occurred for 3 of
the 4 comparisons.[Footnote 29]
Table 17: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent for Hispanic
and Non-Hispanic Officers for Selected Fiscal Years:
Ethnicity: Hispanic.
Ethnicity, by year of service: Year 3;
Army: 2001: 92;
Army: 2003: 95;
Army: 2005: 95;
Navy: 2001: 99;
Navy: 2003: 97;
Navy: 2005: 93;
Marine Corps: 2001: 92;
Marine Corps: 2003: 94;
Marine Corps: 2005: 94;
Air Force: 2001: a;
Air Force: 2003: a;
Air Force: 2005: 93.
Ethnicity, by year of service: Year 4;
Army: 2001: 89;
Army: 2003: 94;
Army: 2005: 89;
Navy: 2001: 92;
Navy: 2003: 91;
Navy: 2005: 89;
Marine Corps: 2001: 85;
Marine Corps: 2003: 91;
Marine Corps: 2005: 88;
Air Force: 2001: a;
Air Force: 2003: a;
Air Force: 2005: 95.
Ethnicity, by year of service: Year 5;
Army: 2001: 90;
Army: 2003: 96;
Army: 2005: 88;
Navy: 2001: 90;
Navy: 2003: 93;
Navy: 2005: 87;
Marine Corps: 2001: 95;
Marine Corps: 2003: 96;
Marine Corps: 2005: 87;
Air Force: 2001: a;
Air Force: 2003: a;
Air Force: 2005: 92.
Ethnicity, by year of service: Year 10;
Army: 2001: 95;
Army: 2003: 95;
Army: 2005: 95;
Navy: 2001: 93;
Navy: 2003: 92;
Navy: 2005: 90;
Marine Corps: 2001: 78;
Marine Corps: 2003: 93;
Marine Corps: 2005: 86;
Air Force: 2001: a;
Air Force: 2003: a;
Air Force: 2005: 97.
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic.
Ethnicity, by year of service: Year 3;
Army: 2001: 92;
Army: 2003: 94;
Army: 2005: 93;
Navy: 2001: 96;
Navy: 2003: 97;
Navy: 2005: 93;
Marine Corps: 2001: 96;
Marine Corps: 2003: 99;
Marine Corps: 2005: 94;
Air Force: 2001: a;
Air Force: 2003: a;
Air Force: 2005: 92.
Ethnicity, by year of service: Year 4;
Army: 2001: 81;
Army: 2003: 88;
Army: 2005: 81;
Navy: 2001: 91;
Navy: 2003: 92;
Navy: 2005: 90;
Marine Corps: 2001: 88;
Marine Corps: 2003: 93;
Marine Corps: 2005: 85;
Air Force: 2001: a;
Air Force: 2003: a;
Air Force: 2005: 91.
Ethnicity, by year of service: Year 5;
Army: 2001: 83;
Army: 2003: 89;
Army: 2005: 81;
Navy: 2001: 90;
Navy: 2003: 91;
Navy: 2005: 91;
Marine Corps: 2001: 92;
Marine Corps: 2003: 96;
Marine Corps: 2005: 92;
Air Force: 2001: a;
Air Force: 2003: a;
Air Force: 2005: 93.
Ethnicity, by year of service: Year 10;
Army: 2001: 94;
Army: 2003: 95;
Army: 2005: 94;
Navy: 2001: 84;
Navy: 2003: 88;
Navy: 2005: 89;
Marine Corps: 2001: 90;
Marine Corps: 2003: 91;
Marine Corps: 2005: 92;
Air Force: 2001: a;
Air Force: 2003: a;
Air Force: 2005: 93.
Source: GAO analysis of service-provided rates.
[A] The Air Force did not supply this information because prior to 2003
the Air Force did not collect ethnicity information based on officers
identifying themselves as either Hispanic or non-Hispanic.
[End of table]
In contrast, our analyses showed that all services encountered
challenges retaining female officers. In 11 out of 12 comparisons for
both the Army and Navy, our analysis found that male officers continued
their active duty service at a higher rate than female officers (see
table 18). For 10 of the 12 Air Force-based comparisons and 6 of the 12
Marine Corps-based comparisons, the same pattern was present.
Furthermore, each service generally experienced lower continuation
rates among its female officers compared with male officers at years 3,
4, and 5 of service. For example, overall, the Navy had the greatest
difference in continuation rates between male and female officers who
reached years 4 and 5 of service for all fiscal years studied;
female officers averaged at least a 9 percentage point lower
continuation rate than male officers. Similarly, continuation rates
among female Air Force officers averaged almost 7 percentage points
lower than the rate for male Air Force officers;
among Army female officers, almost 6 percentage points;
and among Marine Corps female officers, almost 4 percentage points.
Table 18: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent by Gender for
Selected Fiscal Years:
Gender: Female.
Gender, by year of service: Year 3;
Army: 2001: 92;
Army: 2003: 92;
Army: 2005: 92;
Navy: 2001: 94;
Navy: 2003: 96;
Navy: 2005: 90;
Marine Corps: 2001: 89;
Marine Corps: 2003: 98;
Marine Corps: 2005: 99;
Air Force: 2001: 83;
Air Force: 2003: 89;
Air Force: 2005: 86.
Gender, by year of service: Year 4;
Army: 2001: 79;
Army: 2003: 82;
Army: 2005: 76;
Navy: 2001: 84;
Navy: 2003: 86;
Navy: 2005: 80;
Marine Corps: 2001: 80;
Marine Corps: 2003: 89;
Marine Corps: 2005: 90;
Air Force: 2001: 85;
Air Force: 2003: 86;
Air Force: 2005: 84.
Gender, by year of service: Year 5;
Army: 2001: 79;
Army: 2003: 84;
Army: 2005: 78;
Navy: 2001: 82;
Navy: 2003: 83;
Navy: 2005: 84;
Marine Corps: 2001: 87;
Marine Corps: 2003: 96;
Marine Corps: 2005: 83;
Air Force: 2001: 88;
Air Force: 2003: 87;
Air Force: 2005: 87.
Gender, by year of service: Year 10;
Army: 2001: 90;
Army: 2003: 93;
Army: 2005: 92;
Navy: 2001: 91;
Navy: 2003: 86;
Navy: 2005: 88;
Marine Corps: 2001: 90;
Marine Corps: 2003: 92;
Marine Corps: 2005: 86;
Air Force: 2001: 90;
Air Force: 2003: 93;
Air Force: 2005: 88.
Gender: Male.
Gender, by year of service: Year 3;
Army: 2001: 91;
Army: 2003: 95;
Army: 2005: 93;
Navy: 2001: 97;
Navy: 2003: 97;
Navy: 2005: 94;
Marine Corps: 2001: 96;
Marine Corps: 2003: 98;
Marine Corps: 2005: 94;
Air Force: 2001: 90;
Air Force: 2003: 92;
Air Force: 2005: 93.
Gender, by year of service: Year 4;
Army: 2001: 82;
Army: 2003: 90;
Army: 2005: 83;
Navy: 2001: 93;
Navy: 2003: 93;
Navy: 2005: 93;
Marine Corps: 2001: 88;
Marine Corps: 2003: 93;
Marine Corps: 2005: 85;
Air Force: 2001: 91;
Air Force: 2003: 92;
Air Force: 2005: 93.
Gender, by year of service: Year 5;
Army: 2001: 84;
Army: 2003: 91;
Army: 2005: 82;
Navy: 2001: 91;
Navy: 2003: 93;
Navy: 2005: 92;
Marine Corps: 2001: 93;
Marine Corps: 2003: 96;
Marine Corps: 2005: 93;
Air Force: 2001: 92;
Air Force: 2003: 95;
Air Force: 2005: 95.
Gender, by year of service: Year 10;
Army: 2001: 94;
Army: 2003: 95;
Army: 2005: 94;
Navy: 2001: 83;
Navy: 2003: 89;
Navy: 2005: 89;
Marine Corps: 2001: 89;
Marine Corps: 2003: 91;
Marine Corps: 2005: 92;
Air Force: 2001: 90;
Air Force: 2003: 92;
Air Force: 2005: 95.
Source: GAO analysis of service-provided data.
[End of table]
Retaining women may be particularly challenging in certain occupational
specialties. For example, Navy officials explained that some female
surface warfare officers do not view service as a surface warfare
officer as compatible with family life and have much less incentive to
stay in the Navy even when offered a continuation bonus. DOD officials
stated that the behavior of women is different than men because of
family considerations, and they said it is not surprising that women
have different retention patterns and behavior than men. Retaining
female officers at lower rates than male officers in these critical
years may result in negative consequences such as having a less diverse
cadre of leaders. We have previously reported that DOD has responded
positively to most demographic changes by incorporating a number of
family-friendly benefits; however, opportunities exist to improve
current benefits in this area.[Footnote 30]
Steps Are Being Taken to Improve the Foreign Language Proficiency of
Junior Officers, but Many Impediments Could Slow Progress:
DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language
proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome
to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior
officers. For example, to address DOD's foreign language objectives,
the service academies have requested additional funding and teaching
positions to improve foreign language training for officer candidates
at the academies. However, time demands on officer candidates, the
inability to control foreign language curricula at ROTC colleges,
hurdles in providing language training after commissioning, and
problems in maintaining language skills among officers pose challenges
to the services in developing a broader linguistic capacity.
DOD and the Services Are Taking Steps to Improve Junior Officers'
Foreign Language Proficiency:
DOD has issued guidance and the services have developed plans to
achieve greater foreign language capabilities and cultural
understanding among officers. In February 2005, DOD published its
Defense Language Transformation Roadmap which stated, among other
things, that post-September 11, 2001, military operations reinforce the
reality that DOD needs to significantly improve its capability in
emerging strategic languages and dialects. In July 2005, the Principal
Deputy in OUSD (P&R) issued a memorandum that required the services'
assistant secretaries for manpower and reserve affairs and their
deputies to develop plans to achieve 2 of the Roadmap's 43 objectives:
develop a recruiting plan for attracting university students with
foreign language skills and establish a requirement that junior
officers complete added language training by 2013. Specifically, the
OUSD (P&R) memo stated that (1) 80 percent of junior officers (O-1 and
O-2) will have a demonstrated proficiency in a foreign language by
achieving Interagency Language Roundtable Level 1+ proficiency;
and (2) 25 percent of commissioned officers ("non-foreign area
officers") will have a Level 2 proficiency in a strategic language
other than Spanish or French, with related regional knowledge.[Footnote
31] The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review went further,
recommending, among other things, required language training for
service academy and ROTC scholarship students and expanded immersion
programs and semester- abroad study opportunities.
In response to the 2005 OUSD (P&R) memo and the department's language
objectives, the Marine Corps developed a foreign language training plan
that discussed the costs of achieving the two objectives and offered an
alternative proposal for planning, implementing, facilitating, and
maintaining foreign language and cultural skills of Marine officers and
enlisted personnel. Other services are still drafting their responses
to the OUSD (P&R) memo and DOD's other language objectives for
officers.
In addition, the service academies have requested additional funding
and positions to expand the foreign language training offered to their
officer candidates. USMA already requires all its officer candidates to
take two semesters of a language as part of their core curriculum.
Beginning with the class that entered in 2005 and will graduate in
2009, USMA will require its officer candidates who select humanities or
social science majors to add a third, and possibly a fourth, semester
of foreign language study. USMA is also expanding its summer immersion,
exchange, and semester-abroad programs in FY 2007 to give more officer
candidates exposure to foreign languages and cultural programs. Within
the next year, USNA plans to expand the foreign language and cultural
opportunities available to its officer candidates by developing foreign
language and regional studies majors, adding 12 new regional studies
instructors in the political science department, and adding 12 new
language instructors in critical languages such as Arabic and Chinese.
Starting with the class that will enter in 2007 and graduate in 2011,
USAFA will require certain majors to study four semesters of a foreign
language. This change will affect about half of the academy's officer
candidates. The rest--primarily those in technical majors like
engineering and the sciences--will take at least two semesters of
foreign language, though they currently have no foreign language
requirement.
Impediments Could Both Slow the Services' Efforts to Improve Foreign
Language Proficiency for Junior Officers and Lead to Negative
Recruiting Outcomes:
Some service officials, particularly those associated with
commissioning programs, have identified many impediments that could
affect future progress toward the foreign language objectives
identified by DOD. These impediments include the following:
* Time demands on officer candidates. Some academy and ROTC program
officials expressed concerns about adding demands on the officer
candidates' time by requiring more foreign language credits. Each
academy requires its officer candidates to complete at least 137
semester credit hours, in contrast to the approximately 120 semester
hours required to graduate from many other colleges. Reductions in
technical coursework to compensate for increases in language coursework
could jeopardize the accreditation of technical degree programs at the
academies. Similarly, some officer candidates in ROTC programs may
already be required to complete more hours than their nonmilitary
peers. At some colleges, officer candidates may be allowed to count
their ROTC courses as electives only. Academy and ROTC officer
candidates in engineering and other technical majors may find it
difficult to add hours for additional foreign language requirements
since accreditation standards already result in students in civilian
colleges often needing 5 years to complete graduation requirements.
* Lack of control over ROTC officer candidates' foreign language
curricula. While one of the objectives outlined by the Principal Deputy
of OUSD(P&R) indicated that 25 percent of commissioned officers (non-
foreign area officers) will have a Level 2 proficiency in a strategic
language other than Spanish or French, ROTC programs do not have
control over the languages offered at the colleges where their officer
candidates attend classes. For example, out of nearly 761 host and
partner Army ROTC colleges, the Army states that only 12 offer Arabic,
44 offer Chinese, and 1 offers Persian Farsi, all languages deemed
critical to U.S. national security. Even if the ROTC programs could
influence the foreign languages offered, additional impediments include
finding qualified instructors and adapting to annual changes to DOD's
list of strategic languages. Moreover, if an officer candidate in ROTC
or one of the academies takes a language in college based on DOD's
needs at that time, the language may no longer be judged strategic
later in the officer's career. For example, DOD operations in the
Caribbean created a need for Haitian Creole speakers in the 1990s;
however, that language may not be as strategic today because of
changing operational needs.
* Language training expensive after commissioning. While language
training after commissioning may appear to be an alternative step to
help the services achieve DOD's foreign language objectives, the Marine
Corps identified significant costs associated with providing language
training after commissioning. Unlike the other services, the Marine
Corps obtains the vast majority of its officers through OCS or other,
nonacademic sources. The Marine Corps estimated that it would need an
end strength increase of 851 officers in order to extend its basic 6-
month school of instruction by another 6 months and achieve Level 1+
foreign language proficiency for 80 percent of its junior officers, a
stated goal in the OUSD (P&R) memo. It also estimated a one-time $150
million cost for military construction plus $115 million annually:
$94.1 million for additional end strength and $21 million for training
costs. The estimates for achieving the 25 percent goal for Level 2
proficiency totaled an additional $163 million, largely because of the
$104 million associated with an end strength increase of 944 officers.
* Maintaining foreign language proficiency throughout an officer's
career. Although DOD offers online tools for language maintenance, our
prior work has shown the difficulties of maintaining foreign language
capabilities.[Footnote 32] We noted that DOD linguists experienced a
decline (of up to 25 percent in some cases) in foreign language
proficiency when they were in technical training to develop their
nonlanguage skills (such as equipment operation and military
procedures). Proficiency could decline if officers do not have an
opportunity to use their language skills between the times when they
complete their training and are assigned to situations where they can
use their skills.
Additional foreign language requirements could also have a negative
effect on recruiting for the officer commissioning programs. Army,
Marine Corps, and Air Force officials expressed concern that the new
foreign language requirement may deter otherwise-qualified individuals
from entering the military because they do not have an interest in or
an aptitude for foreign languages. Service officials also stated that
requiring additional academic credits for language study beyond the
credits required for military science courses could also be
problematic, particularly for nonscholarship ROTC officer candidates
who are not receiving a financial incentive for participating in
officer training. Since at least 63 percent of Army's current ROTC
officer candidates are not on a ROTC scholarship, officials said that
increasing the language requirement could make it more difficult to
reach recruiting and accession goals as well as the objective of having
80 percent of junior officers with a minimal foreign language
proficiency.
At the same time, our recent reports raised concerns about foreign
language proficiency in DOD and other federal agencies such as the
Department of State.[Footnote 33] Service officials recognize the
impediments to foreign language training and are developing plans to
implement DOD's initiatives. Since many of these problem-identification
and action-planning efforts began in the last 2 years, it is still too
early to determine how successful the services will be in implementing
the foreign language and cultural goals outlined in DOD documents such
the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap and the Quadrennial Defense
Review; therefore, we believe that it would be premature to make any
specific recommendations.
Conclusions:
While all of the services are challenged to recruit, access, and retain
certain types of officers, the Army is facing the greatest challenge.
Frequent deployments, an expanding overall force, and a variety of
other factors present Army officials with an environment that has made
accessing and retaining officers difficult using their traditional
management approaches. Moreover, delays in addressing its officer
accession and retention shortages could slow the service's
implementation of planned transformation goals, such as reorganizing
its force into more modular and deployable units, which require more
junior and mid-level officers than in the past. Although the Army has
begun to implement some steps that could help with its long-term
officer needs, accessing and retaining enough officers with the right
specialties are critical issues. Moreover, the limited coordination
among the Army's officer accession programs presents another hurdle in
effectively addressing attrition rates at USMA, student participation
in ROTC, and resource constraints for OCS. Similarly, the Army has not
performed an analysis that would identify and analyze potential risks
of continuing retention problems in the near term in order to determine
priorities for allocating its resources. Without a strategic plan for
addressing its officer shortages, the Army's ability to effectively and
efficiently set goals, analyze risks, and allocate resources could
jeopardize its ability to achieve future mission requirements.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
In order for the Army to maintain sufficient numbers of officers at the
needed ranks and specialties, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a
strategic plan that addresses the Army's current and projected
accession and retention shortfalls. Actions that should be taken in
developing this plan should include:
* developing an overall annual accession goal to supplement specialty-
specific goals in order to facilitate better long-term planning,
* performing an analysis to identify risks associated with accession
and retention shortfalls and develop procedures for managing the risks,
and:
* making decisions on how resources should best be allocated to balance
near-and long-term officer shortfalls.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our recommendation. DOD's comments are included in this report as
appendix II.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop and
implement a strategic plan that addresses the Army's current and
projected officer accession and retention shortfalls. DOD agreed that
the Army does not have a strategic plan dedicated to current and
projected officer accessions and retention. DOD said, however, that the
Army performs analyses, identifies risk, develops procedures to
mitigate risks, and performs other tasks associated with its strategy
and planning process for officer accessions and retention. We recognize
that these are important tasks, however they are not sufficient to
correct the Army's current and future officer accession and retention
problems for the following reasons. First, as noted in our report,
these tasks are fragmented, administered in a decentralized manner
across multiple Army offices, and lack the integrated, long-term
perspective that is needed to deal with the Army's current officer
shortfalls and future challenges. A more strategic, integrated approach
would allow the Army to (1) establish long-term, outcome-related
program goals as well as integrated strategies and approaches to
achieve these goals and (2) effectively and efficiently manage and
allocate the resources needed to achieve these goals. Second, some of
these tasks are not fully developed. For example, the Army's procedures
for mitigating risk did not address important considerations such as
the short-and long-term consequences of not implementing the option and
an analysis of how various options could be integrated to maximize the
Army's efforts. Third, with regard to funding--a key element in
strategic planning, Army officials indicated that they hope to use
supplemental funding to address some of the challenges that we
identified, but they also acknowledged that supplemental funding may be
curtailed. In recent reports,[Footnote 34] we too noted our belief that
supplemental funding is not a reliable means for decision-makers to use
in effectively and efficiently planning for future resource needs,
weighting priorities, and assessing tradeoffs. Considering all of the
limitations that we have identified in the Army's current approach, we
continue to believe that our recommendation has merit and that an
integrated and comprehensive strategic plan is needed.
DOD mischaracterized our findings when it indicated our report (1)
asserted that Army officer accessions and retention are down and (2)
implied that recent decreases in accessions or retention have caused
the challenges. On the contrary, our report discussed many factors that
contributed to the Army's officer-related staffing challenges and
provided data that even showed, for example, an increase in accessions
from FY 2001 to FY 2003 and FY 2005. The first table of our report
showed the Army commissioned 6,045 in FY 2005, an increase of 505 from
FY 2001 and an increase of 116 from FY 2003. Also, our report provides
a context for readers to understand that these increases in accessions
would still leave the Army short of officers because of new demands for
more officers. Among other things, a larger officer corps is needed to
lead a larger active duty force and the reorganization of the force
into more modular and deployable units. With regard to retention, our
report does not state that overall retention is down. Instead, we
document retention by commissioning source, occupation, and pay grade,
which revealed shortages that were not readily apparent at the
aggregate level. Our report shows that the Army has experienced
decreased retention among officers early in their careers, particularly
among junior officers who graduated from USMA or received Army ROTC
scholarships. Table 11 of our report makes the point by showing which
types of occupations were over-and underfilled for officers at the rank
of major. We show, for example, that infantry (an occupational group
with a large number of officer positions) were overfilled (107
percent), but positions in numerous other occupational groups such as
military intelligence (73 percent) were underfilled. Moreover, as with
accessions, as the Army grows, it will be required to retain officers
at higher than average percentages in order to fill higher pay grades.
DOD also provided technical comments that we have incorporated in this
report where appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its issue date. At that time we will provide copies of this
report to interested congressional committees and the Secretary of
Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
This report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or other members of the committee have any additional questions
about officer recruiting, retention, or language training issues,
please contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to the report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Derek B. Stewart:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Scope:
We limited the scope of our work to the four active duty Department of
Defense (DOD) services: Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Also,
we examined data for fiscal years 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as
projections for the current year (FY 2006 when we began our work) and
future years. FY 2001 data represented the situations present
immediately before the terrorist events of September 11, 2001; and FY
2005 data represented the most recent fiscal year for which the
services had complete data. FY 2003 data provided information on
interim conditions and allowed us to examine the data for trends.
Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the services are accessing the numbers
and types of commissioned officers required to meet their needs, we
reviewed laws and DOD-wide and service-specific officer-management
guidance, including Title 10 of the U.S. Code, including provisions
originally enacted as part of the Defense Officer Personnel Management
Act (DOPMA), defense authorization acts, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review, and policies and directives. To gain a firm background on the
origin and evolution of the all volunteer force, we studied information
in books[Footnote 35] on the all volunteer force as well as information
published by GAO, DOD, Congressional Research Service, Congressional
Budget Office, and other organizations such as RAND. We reviewed
documents from and obtained the perspectives of officials in Office
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, OUSD (P&R),
services' headquarters, services' personnel and manpower commands,
service academies, Reserve Officer Training Corps commands, and Officer
Candidate Schools and Officer Training School commands (see table 19).
The documents and meetings with officials allowed us to obtain an
integrated understanding of recruitment and accession procedures, the
availability of newly commissioned officers to fill positions in the
military services, and potential causes and effects of any gaps between
the numbers of officers available and the numbers of positions to be
filled. We obtained and analyzed accessions and continuation data from
DOD's Defense Manpower Data Center, but our assessment of the data's
reliability identified incorrect information that was severe enough to
prevent those data from being used for this report.[Footnote 36] As a
result, we subsequently obtained accession and continuation information
from the services. While we did not conduct independent analyses using
the services' databases, we did assess the reliability of their data
through interviews and reviewing relevant documentation on service-
specific databases. Comparisons of service-provided rates with similar
information from other sources--such as information on the number of
officer commissioned from the USMA--suggested that the service-provided
rates were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
Specifically, we examined information showing the numbers of officers
commissioned from the services' officer programs during FY 2001, 2003,
and 2005 for trends and other patterns and compared the numbers of
officers accessed to staffing needs. We performed these comparisons
with consideration for the specialty, race, ethnicity, and gender of
the officers.
Table 19: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary
Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to Officer Accessions:
Organization: DOD;
Installation or office: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
Personnel and Readiness, Arlington, Virginia.
Organization: DOD;
Installation or office: Defense Manpower Data Center, Seaside,
California.
Organization: Army;
Installation or office: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army,
Arlington, Virginia.
Organization: Army;
Installation or office: U.S. Army Accessions Command, Fort Monroe,
Virginia.
Organization: Army;
Installation or office: U.S. Army Cadet Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.
Organization: Army;
Installation or office: U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.
Organization: Army;
Installation or office: Army Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning,
Georgia.
Organization: Army;
Installation or office: Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, West
Point, New York.
Organization: Navy;
Installation or office: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Arlington, Virginia.
Organization: Navy;
Installation or office: Navy Personnel and Reserve Commands, Millington
Naval Air Station, Tennessee.
Organization: Navy;
Installation or office: Navy Recruiting Command, Millington Naval Air
Station, Tennessee.
Organization: Navy;
Installation or office: U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.
Organization: Navy;
Installation or office: Naval Education and Training Command, Pensacola
Naval Air Station, Florida.
Organization: Navy;
Installation or office: Naval Reserve Officer Training Command,
Pensacola Naval Air Station, Florida.
Organization: Navy;
Installation or office: Officer Training Command, Pensacola Naval Air
Station, Florida.
Organization: Marine Corps;
Installation or office: U.S. Marine Corps Manpower Plans & Policy
Division, Quantico, Virginia.
Organization: Air Force;
Installation or office: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
Commissioning Programs Division, Arlington, Virginia.
Organization: Air Force;
Installation or office: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,
Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Arlington, Virginia.
Organization: Air Force;
Installation or office: U.S. Air Force, Medical Recruiting, Arlington,
Virginia.
Organization: Air Force;
Installation or office: U.S. Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph Air
Force Base, Texas.
Organization: Air Force;
Installation or office: U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs,
Colorado.
Organization: Air Force;
Installation or office: Air Force Officer Accession and Training
Schools, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
Organization: Air Force;
Installation or office: Air Force Officer Training School, Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama.
Organization: Air Force;
Installation or office: Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To assess the extent to which the services are retaining the numbers
and types of officers they need, we reviewed laws and DOD-wide and
service-specific policies and directives to gain a comprehensive
understanding of officer retention. To gain a firm background on
officer retention, we examined reports and studies by GAO, DOD,
Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Office, and other
organizations such as RAND. Additionally, we met with a number of DOD
officials located at the services' personnel directorates to obtain an
understanding of officer retention missions, goals, historical trends,
and projected forecasts for each service. We worked with DOD and
service officials to identify differences in the metrics that each
service uses to assess retention success, and to review proposed
initiatives for enhancing officer retention and to address downsizing
efforts. We analyzed documents from and obtained the perspectives of
officials in the services' headquarters, services' personnel and
manpower commands, service academies, ROTC commands, and OCS/OTS
commands to obtain an understanding of retention, specifically whether
the services are retaining the total numbers they needed as well as the
number of officers needed in specific ranks and specialties (see table
20). We obtained and analyzed data provided by service headquarters on
officer continuation rates at critical years in an officer's service.
In our calculation of continuation rates, officers were considered as
having continued in a year if they were on the rolls on the first day
of the fiscal year and the last day. We, in consultation with retention
experts from the four services, chose to examine four key points in an
officer's career: years 3, 4, 5, and 10. Years 3, 4, and 5 reflect the
minimum active duty service obligation for the major accession
programs, that is, the first year an officer could leave the active
duty service through resignation. For example, the minimum active duty
service obligation is 3 years for OCS graduates and officers who were
commissioned by ROTC but did not receive scholarship. Officers who
received an ROTC scholarship have an obligation to serve 4 years, and
academy graduates must serve at least 5 years. Additionally, some
officers who receive specialized training, such as pilots, may be
obligated to serve at least a 10-year obligation or 8 years from the
completion of pilot training. We also analyzed continuation rates for
subgroup differences broken out by occupation, race, ethnicity, and
gender. Once we identified particular issues of concern to the service,
such as the shortages for mid-level officers in the Army, we explored
these issues in further detail. We relied on rates provided by service
headquarters because of our previously cited concerns about the Defense
Manpower Data Center data. Using the data reliability-assessment
procedures discussed for our accessions work, we determined that the
data were sufficiently reliability for the purposes of our report.
Table 20: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary
Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to Officer Retention:
Organization: DOD;
Installation or office: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
Personnel and Readiness, Arlington, Virginia.
Organization: DOD;
Installation or office: Defense Manpower Data Center, Seaside,
California.
Organization: Army;
Installation or office: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army,
Arlington, Virginia.
Organization: Navy;
Installation or office: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Arlington, Virginia.
Organization: Navy;
Installation or office: Navy Personnel and Reserve Commands, Millington
Naval Air Station, Tennessee.
Organization: Marine Corps;
Installation or office: U.S. Marine Corps Manpower Plans & Policy
Division.
Organization: Air Force;
Installation or office: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
Force Management Branch, Officer Management Policy, Arlington,
Virginia.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Finally, to assess the steps taken and impediments confronting the
services in their attempts to increase foreign language proficiency
among junior officers, we reviewed policy materials such as the
Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD policies and directives on officer
candidate training, curricula for the academies, DOD and service
memoranda, reports by GAO and others, and other materials related to
language acquisition and maintenance by military personnel and federal
employees. We obtained additional perspectives about foreign language
issues in meetings with DOD and service officials located in OUSD
(P&R), the services' personnel directorates, service academies, ROTC
commands, OCS/OTS commands, and the Defense Language Office. In each
instance, we discussed the training programs for officer candidates,
the ongoing and proposed steps to increase language proficiency among
junior officers, and the challenges these programs face in providing
officer candidates with the foreign language and training they need to
serve as officers. We conducted our review from September 2005 through
November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
Personnel And Readiness:
Dec 21 2006:
Mr. Derek B. Stewart:
Director, Defense Capabilities Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street N. W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stewart:
This letter constitutes the Department of Defense (DoD) response to GAO
draft report, "Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address
Army's Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges, (GAO-07-
224)," dated November 22, 2006.
We partially concur with the recommendation in the subject draft
report. We agree that the Army does not have a published strategic plan
dedicated exclusively to current and future recruiting and retention.
We note, however, that they do perform analysis and identify risk,
develop procedures to mitigate risk, set objectives, decide on courses
of action, and other tasks associated with the strategy and planning
processes for recruiting and retention. The products from these tasks
guide both policy-makers and implementers.
Further, we disagree with the draft report's assertions that Army
officer accessions and retention are down-which form the bedrock for
the recommendation. From fiscal years 2002 to 2006, the Army has
accessed an average of 4,500 Army Competitive Category lieutenants; up
from an average of 4,000 from fiscal years 1996 to 2001. Similarly,
fiscal year 2006 company grade loss rates were 7.9 percent, below the
8.4 percent 10-year historical average and well below the pre-9/11
rates of over 9 percent (9.7 percent in FY99; 9.7 percent in FY00; and
9.1 percent in FY01). The mid-grade officer challenges the Army faces
are primarily due to structure growth. Although recruiting and
retention are key parts of the plan to address these challenges, it is
misleading to imply that recent decreases in recruiting or retention
have caused the challenges.
Attached to this letter are the Department's detailed responses to the
GAO recommendation and technical comments, which will provide further
detail. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the
draft report. The DoD point of contact is Lt Col Chuck Armentrout,
ODUSD (MPP)/OEPM, 703-693-3939, e-mail charles.armentrout@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
William J. Carr:
Acting Deputy Under Secretary (Military Personnel Policy):
Attachments:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated November 22, 2006:
GAO Code 350735/GAO-07-224:
"Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging
Officer Accession and Retention Challenges"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendation:
Recommendation: The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommends
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to
develop and implement a strategic plan that addresses the Army's
current and projected accessions and retention shortfalls. Actions that
should be taken should include in developing this plan should include:
* developing an overall annual accession goal to supplement specialty-
specific goals in order to facilitate better long-term planning;
* performing an analysis to identify risk associated with accession and
retention shortfalls and develop procedures for managing the risks;
and:
* making decisions on how resources should best be allocated to balance
near-and long-term officer shortfalls.
DOD Response: We partially concur with the recommendation. We concur
that the Army has no strategic plan that specifically integrates
current and projected accession and retention needs; however, we note
that the Army does perform the tasks associated with the strategy and
planning processes for recruiting and retention. We disagree with the
implications that the Army has not developed an overall annual
accession goal and that the Army has not performed analysis to identify
risk associated with accession and retention shortfalls and developed
procedures for managing the risks.
1. The Army has a strategic plan analyzing risks and prioritizing
competing requirements. Representatives from the G8, G3, and the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and
Compensation [ASA(FMC)] analyze risks and determine requirements from
these analyses. Options are vetted at the 3-star level by the G8, G3,
and ASA(FMC). These are, in turn, briefed and approved by the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the
Secretary of the Army.
a. Current (base) funding supports a 482,400 Active Army force.
However, the current program, which is the strategic plan, requires a
much larger force. Funding for the difference is included in the
supplemental funding requests. Global War On Terrorism (GWOT)
supplemental funding is allowed for OIF/OEF plus 2 years. The strategic
plan has contingency options for a force reduction should supplemental
funding be curtailed.
b. The Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP) is the Army's plan
to grow the Active Army strength. It is based on the Congressional end
strength of 512,400. The AAMMP encompasses all of the retention,
reenlistment, accession, and promotion goals and missions necessary to
attain the projected strength.
2. The Army employs several processes to inform and receive direction
from the Army staff and leadership on the plan and its execution. Every
month representatives of the G1 brief the Active Army Military Manpower
Program at the Program Update Briefing (PUB) to representatives across
the Army Staff (ARSTAF), including Human Resources Command (HRC), G3,
G8, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
(ASA(MRA)), and ASA(FMC). This brief updates current and projected
strength. The Monthly Military Personnel Review (M2PR), focusing on
financial execution and the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
strategy is briefed to the same participants monthly. The Point
Estimate Brief is a third, but less formal, briefing held monthly.
Shortly after end of month data is received, Plans and Resources,
Strength and Forecasting Division (PRS) briefs Army G1 leadership on
current strength and projected end strength.
3. GAO's contention that there is no strategic plan without programmed
funding implies that there was an Army budget/(FYDP) analysis portion
of this study. It is unfortunate that Army did not understand this and
appropriate personnel in Army G3/5/7, G8, and ASA(FMC) were not
contacted to contribute input to this study.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Derek B. Stewart, (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director;
Kurt A. Burgeson, Laura G. Czohara; Alissa H. Czyz; Barbara A. Gannon;
Cynthia L. Grant; Julia C. Matta; Jean L. McSween; Bethann E. Ritter;
Angela D. Thomas; and Adam J. Yu made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Military Personnel: Reporting Additional Servicemember Demographics
Could Enhance Congressional Oversight. GAO-05-952. Washington, D.C.:
September 22, 2005.
Military Education: Student and Faculty Perceptions of Student Life at
the Military Academies. GAO-03-1001. Washington, D.C.: September 12,
2003.
Military Education: DOD Needs to Enhance Performance Goals and Measures
to Improve Oversight of the Military Academies. GAO-03-1000.
Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2003.
DOD Service Academies: Problems Limit Feasibility of Graduates Directly
Entering the Reserves. GAO/NSIAD-97-89. Washington, D.C.: March 24,
1997.
DOD Service Academies: Comparison of Honor and Conduct Adjudicatory
Processes. GAO/NSIAD-95-49. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 1995.
DOD Service Academies: Academic Review Processes. GAO/NSIAD-95-57.
Washington, D.C.: April 5, 1995.
DOD Service Academies: Update on Extent of Sexual Harassment. GAO/
NSIAD-95-58. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 1995.
Coast Guard: Cost for the Naval Academy Preparatory School and Profile
of Minority Enrollment. GAO/RCED-94-131. Washington, D.C.: April 12,
1994.
Military Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-94-95.
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1994.
DOD Service Academies: Further Efforts Needed to Eradicate Sexual
Harassment. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-111. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 1994.
DOD Service Academies: More Actions Needed to Eliminate Sexual
Harassment. GAO/NSIAD-94-6. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1994.
Academy Preparatory Schools. GAO/NSIAD-94-56R. Washington, D.C.:
October 5, 1993.
Air Force Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-93-244.
Washington, D.C.: September 24, 1993.
Military Education: Information on Service Academies and Schools. GAO/
NSIAD-93-264BR. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 1993.
Naval Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-93-54.
Washington, D.C.: April 30, 1993.
DOD Service Academies: More Changes Needed to Eliminate Hazing. GAO/
NSIAD-93-36. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 1992.
DOD Service Academies: Status Report on Reviews of Student Treatment.
GAO/T-NSIAD-92-41. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 1992.
Service Academies: Historical Proportion of New Officers During
Benchmark Periods. GAO/NSIAD-92-90. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 1992.
DOD Service Academies: Academy Preparatory Schools Need a Clearer
Mission and Better Oversight. GAO/NSIAD-92-57. Washington, D.C.: March
13, 1992.
Naval Academy: Low Grades in Electrical Engineering Courses Surface
Broader Issues. GAO/NSIAD-91-187. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 1991.
DOD Service Academies: Improved Cost and Performance Monitoring Needed.
GAO/NSIAD-91-79. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 1991.
Review of the Cost and Operations of DOD's Service Academies. GAO/T-
NSIAD-90-28. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 1990.
FOOTNOTES
[1] USNA provides both Navy and Marine Corps officers.
[2] Pub. L. No. 96-513 (1980), codified as amended in various sections
of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
[3] H. R. No. 96-1462, at 6345 (1980).
[4] Continuation rates represent the number of officers who remained in
the military for an entire fiscal year divided by the number of
officers who were also present at the beginning of the year.
[5] GAO, Military Personnel: Reporting Additional Servicemember
Demographics Could Enhance Congressional Oversight, GAO-05-952
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2005); and GAO, Military Personnel: DOD
Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel Recruitment and
Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005).
[6] Our assessment of the numbers of officers accessed from the various
officer commissioning programs revealed major data reliability concerns
for the information that we obtained from the Defense Manpower Data
Center. The services subsequently supplied us with information that
showed under-and overcounts for the numbers of officers commissioned
into each service. At the extreme, the Center's results showed that the
Marine Corps commissioned 17 officers in FY 2005; whereas the service
indicated that it had actually commissioned 160. We, therefore, used
only service-provided data in this report. We are developing a report
that further documents these data problems and recommends corrective
action.
[7] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
[8] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November
1999).
[9] Our confirmations of the services' overall ability to meet their
newly commissioned officer needs were based on our analyses of the data
and other documents that the services provided to substantiate how well
they had filled the positions designated for junior officers in the
various occupational groups.
[10] Pub. L. No.109-364, §§ 536, 538, 612, and 617 (2006).
[11] GAO, Military Personnel: Military Departments Need to Ensure That
Full Cost of Converting Military Health Care Positions to Civilian
Positions Are Reported to Congress, GAO-06-642 (Washington, D.C.: May
1, 2006).
[12] Although women constitute around one-half of the U.S. population,
they constitute a smaller part of the services' officer accessions. For
example, in FY 2005, women constituted 20 percent of the officer
accessions for the Army and Navy, 6 percent for the Marine Corps, and
25 percent for the Air Force. The National Defense Authorization Acts
for Fiscal Years 1992, 1993, and 1994 authorized DOD to permanently
assign women to combat aircraft and combatant ships. Since 1994, DOD
policy has allowed women to be assigned to any unit except those below
brigade whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the
ground. A listing of the occupational specialties that exclude women is
available in app. IV in GAO-05-952.
[13] GAO-05-952.
[14] GAO, Military Education: DOD Needs to Align Academy Preparatory
Schools' Mission Statements with Overall Guidance and Establish
Performance Goals, GAO-03-1017 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2003).
[15] Hispanic employment in the civilian federal workforce is similarly
affected by the educational levels and citizenship status of this
group. See GAO, The Federal Work Force: Additional Insights Could
Enhance Agency Efforts Related to Hispanic Representation, GAO-06-832
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2006).
[16] GAO, Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More
Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation
Plans, GAO-06-745 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[17] The service academies may graduate more students than they
commission into the armed services of the United States because they
include foreign students who return home to their own military
services.
[18] While the Army, Navy, and Air Force do not have a single command
and control structure for their officer commissioning programs,
Headquarters Air Force created a USAFA and Commissioning Programs
Division in 2004 to consolidate all USAFA issues and officer
commissioning functions under one headquarters division. This division
serves as a single point of contact for policy issues, provides a
standardized direction across officer accession sources, and provides
USAFA support and oversight.
[19] Army Cadet Command manages the Army ROTC program.
[20] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
[21] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
[22] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid
Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 10, 2004).
[23] The services use different terms when discussing specialties. For
example, the Army uses branch to refer to general specialty areas, and
these areas include infantry, armor, and transportation. In contrast,
the Navy uses the term community to refer to its general specialty
areas, which include surface warfare, submarine, and aviation.
[24] Our confirmation of the services' overall ability to meet their
retention needs was based on our analyses of the data and other
documents that the services provided to substantiate their needs or
positions to fill, the numbers of officers available in specific
subgroups, and continuation rates for officers by accession source, as
well as occupational and demographic subgroups.
[25] The stop-loss policy temporarily prevents personnel from leaving
the military even when an obligation is finished. As a result, it may
artificially inflate continuation rates for the period when the policy
is in effect and artificially deflate continuation rates for the months
after it is rescinded.
[26] The Congressional Research Service noted that the shortfall in
line officers includes infantry, armor, air defense, aviation, field
artillery, engineer, military intelligence, military police, chemical,
ordnance, quartermaster, signal, transportation, adjutant general, and
finance. See Congressional Research Service, Army Officer Shortages:
Background and Issues for Congress, RL33518 (Washington, D.C.: July 5,
2006).
[27] GAO-05-952.
[28] Marine Corps retention is comprised of three categories: releases,
resignations, and retirements. Specifically, the Marine Corps
experienced an increase in resignations, thus contributing to lower
than normal retention rates among officer communities as listed above.
[29] In September 2005, we recommended that the services gather data on
racial and ethnic subgroup membership in a manner that is consistent
with the required procedures set forth by the Office of Management and
Budget in 1997. We further noted that in addition to requiring that
recruits provide their racial and ethnic subgroup membership using
revised categories and procedures, DOD should also determine procedures
that could be used for updating the information on servicemembers who
previously provided their racial and ethnic subgroup membership with
different subgroup categories and questions. For more information see,
GAO-05-952.
[30] GAO, Military Personnel: Active Duty Benefits Reflect Changing
Demographics, but Opportunities Exist to Improve, GAO-02-935
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2002).
[31] DOD assesses language capability based on a scale established by
the federal Interagency Language Roundtable. The scale has six levels-
-0 to 5--with 5 being the most proficient. The Roundtable describes
speaking level 1 as "elementary proficiency," in that the individual
has a sufficient capability to satisfy basic survival needs and minimum
courtesy and travel requirements. The Roundtable describes speaking
level 2 capability as "limited working proficiency," in that an
individual has a sufficient capability to meet routine social demands
and limited job requirements. A plus is assigned when proficiency
substantially exceeds one skill level but does not fully meet the
criteria for the next level capability.
[32] GAO, DOD Training: Many DOD Linguists Do Not Meet Minimum
Proficiency Standards, GAO/NSIAD-94-191 (Washington, D.C.: July 12,
1994).
[33] GAO, State Department: Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies
Overseas Being Met, but Gaps Remain in Hard-to-Learn Languages, GAO-04-
139 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003); and GAO, Department of State:
Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to
Address Gaps, GAO-06-894 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4, 2006).
[34] GAO has previously reported on DOD's over reliance on supplemental
appropriations. See GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq:
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 9, 2007) and GAO, Global War on Terrorism: Observations on
Funding, Costs, and Future Commitments, GAO-06-885T (Washington, D.C.:
July 18, 2006).
[35] For example, Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and John T.
Warner, eds., The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service (Dulles,
Va.: Brassey's, Inc., 2004).
[36] Our assessment of the numbers of officers commissioned from the
various training programs revealed major data reliability concerns for
the information that we obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center.
The services subsequently supplied us with information that showed
under-and overcounts for the officers commissioned in each service. At
the extreme, the Center's results showed that the Marine Corps
commissioned 17 officers in FY 2005; whereas the service indicated that
it had actually commissioned 160. We, therefore, used only services-
provided data in this report.
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