This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-1029 
entitled 'Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Nuclear Power 
Plant Safety Has Improved, but Refinements Are Needed' which was 
released on September 27, 2006. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

September 2006: 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

Oversight of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Has Improved, but Refinements 
Are Needed: 

GAO-06-1029: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-1029, a report to congressional requesters 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for overseeing 
the nation’s 103 commercial nuclear power plants to ensure they are 
operated safely. The safety of these plants has always been important, 
since an accident could release harmful radioactive material. NRC’s 
oversight has become even more critical as the potential resurgence of 
nuclear power is considered. NRC implemented a new Reactor Oversight 
Process (ROP) in 2000 to address weaknesses in its oversight of nuclear 
plant safety. 

In this report, GAO reviewed 
(1) how NRC oversees nuclear power plants, (2) the results of the ROP 
over the past several years, and (3) the status of NRC’s efforts to 
improve the ROP. To complete this work, GAO analyzed programwide 
information, inspection results covering 5 years of ROP operations, and 
detailed findings from a nonprobability sample of 11 plants. 

What GAO Found: 

NRC uses various tools and takes a risk-informed and graded approach to 
ensure the safety of nuclear power plants. These tools consist of 
physical inspections of plants and quantitative measures or indicators 
of plant performance. They are risk-informed in that they focus on the 
aspects of operations considered most important to plant safety. On the 
basis of the results of this information, NRC takes a graded approach 
to its oversight, increasing the level of regulatory attention to 
plants where safety is declining. NRC assesses overall plant 
performance and communicates the results to the public, including 
providing detailed results of its oversight process through a Web site 
devoted to the ROP. 

Since 2001, the ROP has resulted in more than 4,000 inspection findings 
concerning plants’ failure to fully comply with safe operating 
procedures, and NRC has subjected more than 75 percent (79) of the 103 
plants to increased oversight for varying periods. Almost all of the 
inspection findings were for actions NRC considered important to 
correct but of low significance to safe plant operations. While the 
majority of plants received some level of increased oversight, only 5 
plants were subjected to NRC’s highest level of oversight. Plants in 
this category were generally subjected to this higher oversight for 
long periods due to the more systemic nature of their performance 
problems. 

NRC has improved its oversight process in various areas, but it has 
been slow to act on needed improvements, particularly in improving the 
agency’s ability to identify and address early indications of declining 
safety performance. NRC is improving its oversight process on the basis 
of feedback from stakeholders, including better focusing inspections on 
areas most important to safety. NRC also is addressing what GAO 
believes has been a significant shortcoming by modifying the ROP to 
improve its ability to address plants’ safety culture—that is, the 
organizational characteristics that ensure issues affecting nuclear 
plant safety receive the attention their significance warrants. GAO and 
others, including some stakeholders, believe these changes could enable 
NRC to better identify safety culture issues and thus provide earlier 
indications of declining plant safety performance. However, some in the 
industry have opposed the changes because they believe the changes 
could introduce undue subjectivity to NRC’s oversight, given the 
difficulty in measuring these often intangible and complex concepts. 
NRC has been reluctant to incorporate safety culture into the ROP 
because it considered this type of activity as a management function, 
and NRC did not believe that it should be directly involved in managing 
licensees’ plants. NRC program officials view the current changes as 
the beginning of an incremental approach and acknowledge that they will 
need to assess their effectiveness at identifying declining safety 
performance at plants before significant safety events occur. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that NRC aggressively monitor; 
evaluate; 
and, if needed, implement additional measures to increase the 
effectiveness of its safety culture changes and make publicly available 
more information on nuclear power plants’ safety culture. In commenting 
on a draft of this report, NRC generally agreed with GAO’s findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1029]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Jim Wells at (202) 512-
3841 or wellsj@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

NRC Uses Various Tools and Takes a Risk-Informed and Graded Approach to 
Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: 

NRC Has Identified Low Risk Problems at Nuclear Power Plants, Resulting 
in Increased Oversight for Varying Periods: 

NRC Is Addressing Weaknesses in Various Areas of Its Oversight Process, 
but More Effort Is Needed: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Key Safety-Related Events at the Salem and Hope Creek 
Nuclear Power Plants from 2000 to 2006: 

Summary of Key Safety-Related Events at Salem and Hope Creek, April 
2000 to June 2006: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Nuclear Power Plant Performance Data on the Basis of the 
Results of NRC's Reactor Oversight Process, 2001 Through 2005: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables Tables: 

Table 1: Key ROP Plant Inspection Areas, or Cornerstones: 

Table 2: NRC Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix: 

Table 3: Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Licensed to Operate in the 
United States: 

Table 4: Total Number of Green Inspection Findings, 2001 Through 2005: 

Table 5: Total Number of Greater-Than-Green Inspection Findings Issued, 
2001 Through 2005: 

Table 6: Type of Substantive Cross-cutting Issue Open At Least Some 
Portion of the Year, 2001 Through 2005: 

Table 7: Total Number of Greater-Than-Green Performance Indicators, 
2001 Through 2005: 

Table 8: Highest NRC Oversight Level Applied during at Least Some 
Portion of the Year, 2001 Through 2005: 

Figures Figures: 

Figure 1: NRC Regions and Operating Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the 
United States: 

Figure 2: NRC's Oversight Process in Determining Plant Placement on the 
Action Matrix: 

Figure 3: Number of Inspection Findings at All Plants, 2001 Through 
2005: 

Figure 4: Number of Inspection Findings and Inspection Findings with 
Cross-Cutting Aspects at All Plants, 2001 Through 2005: 

Figure 5: Number of Plants with Substantive Cross-Cutting Issues, 2001 
Through 2005: 

Abbreviations: 

ACRS: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards: 

ECP: Employee Concerns Program: 

ERB: Executive Review Board: 

INPO: Institute of Nuclear Power Operations: 

NEI: Nuclear Energy Institute: 

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

PRA: Probabilistic Risk Assessment: 

ROP: Reactor Oversight Process: 

RPS: Reactor Program System: 

SALP: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance: 

SCWE: safety-conscious work environment: 

SDP: Significance Determination Process: 

UCS: Union of Concerned Scientists: 

September 27, 2006: 

Congressional Requesters: 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for overseeing 
the safe operation of the nation's 103 operating commercial nuclear 
power plants, which provide about 20 percent of U.S. electricity. The 
safety of these plants, which are located at 65 sites in 31 states, has 
always been important, since an accident could result in the release of 
radioactive material and potentially harm public health and the 
environment. NRC's oversight has become even more critical as the 
Congress and the nation consider the potential resurgence of nuclear 
power in helping to meet the nation's growing energy needs. No new 
orders for plants have been placed since the 1979 accident at the Three 
Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania. However, in the face of concerns 
about energy security, global warming, aging plants, and the ever 
increasing need for energy to fuel the nation's economy, nuclear power 
is resurfacing as a principal option. An accident, even on a relatively 
small scale, could threaten public confidence in nuclear power just as 
it begins to emerge from the shadows of the Three Mile Island accident. 
It is critical that NRC be able to ensure that nuclear power plants are 
operated safely and that public confidence about their safety is high. 

NRC is responsible for issuing regulations, licensing and overseeing 
plants, and requiring necessary actions to protect public health and 
safety, up to and including shutting down a plant, if it is not meeting 
licensing conditions and it poses an undue risk to public health and 
safety. Plant operators are responsible for safely operating their 
plants in accordance with their licenses. Prior to 2000, NRC's 
oversight of plants' compliance, which is a critical part of the 
agency's regulatory program, was criticized because it did not always 
focus on the most important safety issues, and because some activities 
were redundant, inefficient, and overly subjective. While its new 
process--which NRC refers to as the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)--is 
similar to its prior process in that the oversight activities largely 
consist of physical plant inspections, the inspections now focus on 
more important safety issues. NRC's goal is to ensure that its 
oversight of plants' safety performance is objective, predictable, 
understandable, and conducted openly to inform the public and maintain 
confidence about plant safety. The unexpected discovery in March 2002 
of extensive corrosion and a pineapple-size cavity in the reactor 
vessel head--one of the vital barriers preventing a radioactive 
release--at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio led NRC to 
reexamine its safety oversight and other regulatory processes to 
determine how such corrosion could have been missed. On the basis of 
the lessons learned from that event, NRC made several changes to the 
ROP. NRC also has assessed the ROP annually since it was implemented in 
2000 by obtaining feedback from the industry and other stakeholders, 
such as public interest groups. 

In this report, we examined (1) how NRC oversees nuclear power plants 
to ensure that they are operated safely, (2) the results of the ROP 
over the past several years, and (3) the status of NRC's efforts to 
improve the ROP.[Footnote 1] In addition, this report provides details 
on recent safety-related events at the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear 
power plants in New Jersey and on NRC's and the licensee's actions in 
response to these events (see app. I). 

To examine how NRC oversees plants, we reviewed the various tools and 
processes that comprise the ROP. In this regard, we reviewed NRC's 
policies, inspection manuals, and other guidance documents; interviewed 
NRC headquarters and regional program officials and regional and on- 
site inspectors; visited the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear power plants; 
and attended several public meetings covering various nuclear power 
plant oversight topics. To examine the results of the ROP over the past 
several years, we reviewed the number and types of inspection findings 
NRC issued, along with other performance measures or indicators it 
collected from the plants, and the level of oversight it provided as a 
result of its findings. We analyzed NRC data on nuclear plant safety 
for 2001 through 2005, the years since implementation of the ROP for 
which data were available for the full year, and discussed our analysis 
with NRC program officials. We assessed the reliability of these data 
and determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
our report. To examine the status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP, 
we analyzed NRC documents, including annual self-assessment reports; 
interviewed officials from NRC, including a former Commission Chairman 
who is largely credited with leading the development of the ROP, and 
outside stakeholder groups, including the Nuclear Energy Institute 
(NEI), the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), and Greenpeace; 
and attended several key public meetings covering proposed changes to 
oversight procedures. We also reviewed various external evaluations of 
the ROP, including our prior reports and those of the Advisory 
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)[Footnote 2] and the NRC Office 
of the Inspector General. In addition, we selected a nonprobability 
sample of 6 nuclear power sites (totaling 11 plants, including Salem 
and Hope Creek) that spanned each of NRC's four regions and represented 
varying levels of plant performance and NRC oversight since 2000. We 
reviewed relevant inspection reports and assessment documents and 
interviewed NRC and industry officials at each site to examine how NRC 
applies the ROP to identify and correct safety problems. Appendix II 
presents a detailed discussion of our scope and methodology. We 
conducted our work from July 2005 through July 2006 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

NRC uses various tools and takes a risk-informed and graded approach to 
ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. These tools include 
physical inspections of plants' equipment and records and quantitative 
measures or indicators of plant performance, such as the number of 
unplanned reactor shutdowns and the reliability of alert and 
notification system sirens that notify residents living near the plant 
in the event of an accident. NRC uses a risk-informed approach--that 
is, an approach that considers safety significance in selecting the 
equipment or operating procedures to be inspected--to apply these 
tools. NRC inspectors conduct baseline inspections of plant operations 
almost continuously at each nuclear power plant site. When NRC becomes 
aware of a performance problem at a plant, it uses a process to assign 
the inspection finding one of four colors to reflect the finding's risk 
significance, which is set on the basis of measures that reflect the 
potential health effects that could occur from radiological exposure. 
Green inspection findings equate to very low risk significance, while 
white, yellow, and red colors represent increasing levels of risk, 
respectively. In response to greater-than-green (white, yellow, or red) 
inspection findings, NRC conducts supplemental inspections, which 
expand the scope of baseline inspections and review (1) the extent of 
the problem, (2) the sufficiency of the licensee's evaluation of the 
root cause of the problem, and (3) the licensee's proposed corrective 
actions in response to the identified performance problem. NRC conducts 
special inspections to investigate specific safety incidents or events-
-such as reactor shutdowns due to equipment failures--that are of 
particular interest to NRC because of their potential significance to 
safety. Nuclear power plants also self-report on their safety 
performance, using performance measures or indicators in quarterly 
reports that they submit to NRC. The plants' reports are verified by 
NRC's on-site inspectors. On the basis of the number and risk 
significance of inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC 
places each plant into one of five oversight categories on its action 
matrix, which correspond to graded or increasing levels of oversight, 
largely consisting of supplemental inspections that increase in the 
breadth and depth of issues covered as plants move into higher 
oversight categories. NRC provides an overall assessment of each 
plant's performance through assessment letters issued to plants at the 
end of each 6-month period describing their specific performance and 
the level of oversight that will result. In addition, NRC has other 
mechanisms to make available its oversight results, such as an Internet 
Web site devoted to the ROP that provides detailed summaries of each 
plant's performance. 

Since 2001, the ROP has resulted in more than 4,000 inspection findings 
concerning nuclear power plant licensees' failure to fully comply with 
NRC regulations and industry standards for safe plant operation, and 
NRC has subjected more than 75 percent (79) of the 103 operating plants 
to increased oversight for varying periods. (See app. III for 
additional site-specific plant data.) About 97 percent of the 
inspection findings were green, meaning they were for actions or 
failures NRC considered important to correct but of very low 
significance to overall safe plant operations. For example, a finding 
of very low risk significance was issued at one plant after a worker 
failed to wear the proper radiation detector, and at another plant 
because the operator failed to properly evaluate and approve the 
storage of flammable materials in the vicinity of safety-related 
equipment. The other 3 percent (98) of the inspection findings were 
greater-than-green. Most of these findings (86 of the 98) were white, 
meaning they were considered to be of low-to-moderate risk 
significance. The other 12 inspection findings, or less than 1 percent, 
were of the highest levels of significance to safety (yellow and red). 
For example, NRC issued a finding of the highest risk significance 
(red) at one plant after a steam generator tube failed, causing an 
increased risk of the release of radioactive material. In the area of 
performance indicators, there were 156 instances out of more than 
30,000 reports, or less than 1 percent, in which data reported for 
individual indicators were outside of NRC's acceptable performance 
category. On the basis of greater-than-green inspection findings and 
performance indicators, NRC has subjected more than 75 percent (79) of 
the 103 operating plants to oversight beyond the baseline inspections 
for varying periods. Most of these plants received the lowest level of 
increased oversight, consisting of a supplemental inspection to follow 
up on the corrective actions taken for performance problems identified 
through the issuance of 1 or 2 white inspection findings or performance 
indicators. Over the past 5 years, 5 plants have been subjected to the 
highest level of NRC oversight that still allows continued operations. 
Plants in this category were generally subjected to this higher 
oversight for long periods due to the more intensive supplemental 
inspections conducted by NRC and the more systemic nature of the 
plants' performance problems and subsequent corrective actions NRC 
expected the licensees to take. NRC inspectors at the plants we 
reviewed indicated that when plant performance declines, it is often 
the result of ineffective corrective action programs, problems related 
to human performance, or complacent management. In assessing the 
results of the ROP between 2001 and 2005, we found an association 
between poorer performing plants and deficiencies in the plants' human 
performance and problem identification and resolution programs. 

NRC has improved its oversight process in various areas, but continued 
efforts will be needed to address other shortcomings or opportunities 
for improvement, particularly in improving the agency's ability to 
identify and address early indications of declining plant safety 
performance. NRC has made several improvements, largely in response to 
independent reviews and feedback from stakeholders, including its 
regional and on-site inspectors, usually obtained during NRC's annual 
self-assessment of its oversight process. These improvements include 
better focusing its inspections on those areas most important to 
safety, reducing the time needed to determine the risk significance of 
inspection findings, and modifying the way that some performance 
indicators are measured to improve their quality. NRC also is assessing 
whether it needs to modify its oversight, including developing 
additional inspection procedures, as a result of some problems that 
have surfaced in areas not fully inspected by NRC, such as the recent 
discovery of groundwater contamination from radioactive materials at a 
number of sites. For the most part, NRC considers these efforts to be 
refinements to its oversight process, rather than significant changes. 
One important shortcoming in the ROP that we and others have found is 
that it is not as effective as it could be in identifying and 
addressing early indications of deteriorating safety at nuclear power 
plants before problems develop. In response to this concern, NRC 
recently undertook a major initiative to improve its ability to address 
plants' safety culture--that is, the organizational characteristics 
that ensure issues affecting nuclear plant safety receive the attention 
their significance warrants. NRC and others have long recognized that 
safety culture attributes, such as attention to detail, adherence to 
procedures, and effective corrective and preventative actions, have a 
significant impact on a plant's safety performance, and that the 
lessening of these attributes can indicate a decline in safety 
performance before safety problems occur. However, NRC has been 
somewhat slow to react and only recently modified its oversight process 
by redefining and increasing its focus on cross-cutting safety issues-
-issues that comprise many of the elements of safety culture--and 
developing new requirements under the ROP to more directly assess 
safety culture at poorer performing plants. However, some of NRC's 
changes have been controversial. While some industry officials have 
expressed concern that the changes could introduce undue subjectivity 
to NRC's oversight, given the difficulty in measuring these often 
intangible and complex concepts, other stakeholders believe the changes 
will provide NRC with better tools to identify safety culture issues at 
plants and thus provide earlier indications of declining safety 
performance. NRC has been reluctant to incorporate safety culture into 
the ROP because it considered this type of activity a management 
function, and NRC did not believe that it should be directly involved 
in managing licensees' plants. NRC program officials view these changes 
as the beginning step in an incremental approach and acknowledge that 
they will need to assess the changes they made to the ROP to determine 
their effectiveness in better allowing inspectors to detect 
deteriorating safety conditions at plants before significant safety 
events occur. 

Given the importance of this initiative to the ROP's effectiveness, we 
are recommending that NRC aggressively monitor; evaluate; and, if 
needed, implement additional measures to increase the effectiveness of 
its safety culture changes. In line with NRC's desire to make the ROP 
an open process, we are also recommending that the agency make 
available additional information on plants' safety culture to the 
public and its other stakeholders to provide a more comprehensive 
picture of plant performance. In commenting on a draft of this report, 
NRC generally agreed with our findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations. Appendix IV contains a reproduction of NRC's letter. 

Background: 

NRC is an independent agency of over 3,200 employees established by the 
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to regulate civilian--that is, 
commercial, industrial, academic, and medical--use of nuclear 
materials. NRC is headed by a five-member Commission. The President 
appoints the Commission members, who are confirmed by the Senate, and 
designates one of them to serve as the Chair and official spokesperson. 
The Commission as a whole formulates policies and regulations governing 
nuclear reactor and materials safety, issues orders to licensees, and 
adjudicates legal matters brought before it. NRC's staff work out of 
its headquarters office in Rockville, Maryland; out of its four 
regional offices; and at each of the operating commercial nuclear power 
plant sites (see fig. 1). NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
provides overall direction for the oversight process and the Office of 
Enforcement is responsible for ensuring that appropriate enforcement 
actions are taken when performance issues are identified. NRC's 
regional offices are responsible for implementing the ROP, along with 
the inspectors who work directly at each of the nuclear power plant 
sites. 

Figure 1: NRC Regions and Operating Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the 
United States: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: NRC and Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Nuclear power plant licensees have the primary responsibility for 
safely operating their plants in accordance with their licenses and NRC 
regulations. The plants have many physical structures, systems, and 
components, and licensees have numerous activities under way 24 hours a 
day to ensure that plants operate safely. NRC relies on, among other 
things, its on-site inspectors to assess plant conditions and the 
licensees' quality assurance programs, such as those required for 
maintenance and problem identification and resolution. Given the 
numerous activities going on during complex plant operations, NRC can 
inspect only a relatively small sample of the plants' activities. 
According to NRC, its focus on the more safety-significant activities 
is made possible because safety performance at plants has improved as a 
result of more than 25 years of operating experience, and because 
improvements have been made in the risk assessment tools available to 
NRC inspectors. 

Commercial nuclear power plants are designed according to a "defense- 
in-depth" philosophy revolving around redundant, diverse, and reliable 
safety systems. For example, two or more key safety components are put 
in place so that if one fails, there is another to back it up. Plants 
have numerous built-in sensors to monitor important indicators, such as 
water temperature and pressure. Plants also have physical barriers to 
contain radiation and provide emergency protection. For example, 
nuclear fuel is contained in a ceramic pellet to lock in the 
radioactive byproducts, the fuel pellets are sealed inside rods made of 
special material designed to contain fission products, and the fuel 
rods are placed in reactors housed in containment buildings made of 
several feet of concrete and steel. 

In addition, the nuclear power industry formed an organization, the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), whose mission is to 
"promote the highest levels of safety and reliability, to promote 
excellence, in the operation of nuclear electric generating plants." 
INPO provides a system of personnel training and qualification for all 
key positions at nuclear power plants, and workers undergo both 
periodic training and assessment. INPO also conducts periodic 
evaluations of operating plants, focusing on plant safety and 
reliability, in the areas of operations, maintenance, engineering, 
radiological protection, chemistry, and training. Licensees make the 
results of these evaluations available to NRC for review, and NRC staff 
use the evaluations as a means to determine whether its oversight 
process has missed any performance issues. 

Prior to the ROP, NRC conducted Systematic Assessment of Licensee 
Performance (SALP) evaluations. SALP evaluations were largely based on 
physical plant inspections conducted at each operating plant. Every 12 
to 24 months, NRC provided an overall assessment of plant safety 
performance. As part of the assessment process, NRC's senior management 
met to evaluate plants' performance and develop a "watch list" of those 
plants requiring increased regulatory attention. The SALP process was 
heavily criticized by the industry and other internal and external 
stakeholders, however, for being inconsistently applied among NRC 
regions and for lacking clear and consistent responses once issues were 
identified. In 1997 and 1998, we reported that NRC's oversight needed 
substantial revisions to achieve its purpose as an early-warning tool, 
and that NRC did not consistently apply the SALP across the 
industry.[Footnote 3] We found the inconsistency could be attributed, 
in part, to a lack of specific criteria, the subjective nature of the 
process, and an ineffective process for ensuring that the licensees 
maintain competent management at their plants. 

To address these concerns, NRC undertook a major effort to revise its 
oversight process. NRC held a series of public meetings and workshops 
and formed several task groups to involve its internal and external 
stakeholders, including NEI, UCS, state agencies, and others. In 1999, 
NRC conducted a 6-month pilot program to implement the ROP at various 
sites across the country. On the basis of the input it received from 
its stakeholders and the results from the pilot program, NRC finalized 
its new process and implemented the ROP at all plants in April 2000, 
which was a significant departure from its prior SALP process. 

Soon after the ROP was implemented, NRC faced a number of unanticipated 
events--including the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the discovery 
of the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head degradation in 2002--that 
challenged its ability to complete its baseline inspection activities 
at all plants in 2002 and 2003. Therefore, NRC staff implemented 
"coping strategies," which consisted of increasing the use of overtime 
and scheduling flexibility for its inspectors, reducing the level of 
effort for some of its inspection procedures, reducing some of the 
inspection preparation time, and deferring some inspections, among 
other things. A 2004 audit by the NRC Office of the Inspector General 
found that the resource challenges were largely due to changes in NRC's 
staffing policy, a hiring policy change, an increase in inspection 
activities due to unanticipated events such as Davis-Besse, and a loss 
of qualified inspectors.[Footnote 4] NRC increased its inspection 
resources by 9 percent in 2004, and then by another 5 percent in 2005, 
and reported that it was able to fully implement its baseline 
inspection program at all plants for both years. NRC reports show that 
resources expended in 2005 were almost 20 percent higher than those 
expended in 2002, the lowest level of inspection resources devoted to 
the ROP since its inception in 2000. According to NRC, the additional 
resources expended in 2005 were due, in part, to increased oversight 
that was based on lessons learned from the Davis-Besse incident and on 
the increased focus on security and emergency preparedness. With its 
current resource levels, NRC program officials believe they will be 
able to continue to implement all program requirements without the need 
to employ coping strategies. 

NRC Uses Various Tools and Takes a Risk-Informed and Graded Approach to 
Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: 

NRC's tools to oversee the safe operation of nuclear power plants 
generally consist of physical inspections of the various complex plant 
equipment and operations, reviews of plant records, and quantitative 
measures or indicators of plant performance. These tools are risk- 
informed in that they focus on the aspects of operations considered 
most important to plant safety. NRC bases its oversight process on the 
principle and requirement that licensees have programs in place to 
routinely identify and address performance issues without NRC's direct 
involvement. Thus, an important aspect of NRC's inspection process is 
ensuring the effectiveness of licensee programs designed to identify 
and correct problems. On the basis of the number and risk significance 
of inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC places each 
plant into one of five performance categories on its action matrix, 
which corresponds to graded, or increasing, levels of oversight. NRC 
assesses overall plant performance and communicates the results to 
licensees and the public on a semiannual basis. 

NRC Collects Information about Plant Performance from Physical 
Inspections and Quantitative Measures Reported by the Licensees: 

Physical plant inspections are the main tool NRC uses to oversee plant 
safety performance. NRC defined specific inspection areas by developing 
a list of those elements most critical to meeting the overall agency 
mission of ensuring nuclear power plant safety. These safety elements-
-or key plant inspection areas--are known as cornerstones. Table 1 
summarizes the objectives of each cornerstone. 

Table 1: Key ROP Plant Inspection Areas, or Cornerstones: 

Cornerstone: Initiating events; 
Objective: Limit the frequency of those events that upset plant 
operating stability and challenge critical safety functions. 

Cornerstone: Mitigating systems; 
Objective: Ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of 
systems that mitigate initiating events to prevent reactor accidents. 

Cornerstone: Barrier integrity; 
Objective: Ensure that physical barriers, such as fuel cladding and 
containment structures, protect the public from radioactive releases 
caused by accidents. 

Cornerstone: Emergency preparedness; 
Objective: Ensure that actions taken by the emergency plan would 
provide protection of the public health and safety during a 
radiological emergency. 

Cornerstone: Occupational radiation safety; 
Objective: Ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from 
exposure to radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear 
reactor operation. 

Cornerstone: Public radiation safety; 
Objective: Ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from 
exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain as a 
result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operations. 

Cornerstone: Physical protection[A]; 
Objective: Provide assurance that the physical protection system can 
protect against radiological sabotage. 

Source: NRC. 

[A] The physical protection cornerstone consists of physical security 
issues and, therefore, is outside the scope of this review. 

[End of table] 

During fiscal year 2005, NRC reported that inspectors spent 411,490 
hours (an average of 77 hours per week at each plant) on plant 
inspections, which consist of baseline, supplemental, and special 
inspections. About 73 percent of this time was devoted to baseline 
inspections, which are the minimum level of inspections that all plants 
receive regardless of performance, and are conducted on an almost 
continuous basis. Baseline inspections are conducted by the two or 
three NRC inspectors located at each site and specialists who travel to 
each site from NRC's regional offices. These inspections are designed 
to detect declining safety performance in each of the cornerstones, and 
to review licensee effectiveness at identifying and resolving its 
safety problems. There are more than 30 baseline inspection procedures 
conducted at intervals that range from quarterly to triennially. These 
procedures involve both physical observations of plant activities and 
reviews of plant reports and data. Each of the baseline procedures 
specify a range of sample activities to inspect. Inspectors then select 
the type and number of activities to review on the basis of factors 
such as the sample activities available; their risk significance; the 
amount of time since a particular system or component was last 
inspected; and the inspector's judgment, which is based on information 
such as reviews of the licensee's corrective action program, 
allegations, or plant employee interviews. Risk is factored into the 
baseline inspection procedures in the following four ways: (1) areas of 
inspection are included in the set of baseline procedures, in part, on 
the basis of their risk importance; (2) risk information is used to 
help determine the frequency and scope of inspections; (3) the 
selection of activities to inspect within each procedure is informed 
with plant-specific risk information; and (4) the inspectors are 
trained in the use of risk information in planning their inspections. 
In addition to the more than 30 baseline inspection procedures, 
inspectors spend an average of 750 to 1,100 hours per year (14 to 21 
hours per week), depending on the size of the site, conducting plant 
status reviews. These reviews are to ensure that inspectors are aware 
of plant conditions on a routine basis and include such activities as 
reviewing control room activities and status, attending licensee 
meetings, and conducting walk-downs of various plant areas. 

When NRC inspectors identify a finding they consider to be more than 
minor,[Footnote 5]they use a significance determination process (SDP) 
to assign the finding one of four colors to reflect the finding's risk 
significance. The SDP assesses how an identified inspection finding 
increases the risk that a nuclear accident could occur, or how the 
finding affects the ability of the plant safety systems or personnel to 
prevent such an accident. Risk thresholds for each color were set on 
the basis of measures that reflect the potential health effects that 
could occur from radiological exposure.[Footnote 6] Green inspection 
findings equate to very low risk significance, while white, yellow, and 
red colors represent increasing levels of risk, respectively. For 
greater-than-green (white, yellow, or red) inspection findings, NRC 
issues a preliminary color determination after an initial analysis. It 
then analyzes any readily available information from the licensee 
pertinent to the finding to ensure that the final determination of risk 
significance is made with the best available information. 

When NRC issues one or more greater-than-green inspection findings at a 
plant, it conducts supplemental inspections. Supplemental inspections, 
performed by regional staff, expand the scope beyond baseline 
inspection procedures and focus on diagnosing the cause of the 
performance deficiency. There are three levels of supplemental 
inspections that are increasingly expansive in the breadth and depth of 
their analysis. The level of supplemental inspection to be carried out 
depends on the number and type of performance problem identified. The 
lowest level of supplemental inspection assesses the licensee's 
corrective actions to ensure they were sufficient in both correcting 
the problem and identifying and addressing the root and contributing 
causes to prevent recurrence. The second level of supplemental 
inspection has an increased scope that includes independently assessing 
the extent of the condition for both the specific and any broader 
performance problems. The highest level of supplemental inspection is 
even more comprehensive and includes determining whether the plant can 
continue to operate and whether additional regulatory actions are 
necessary. The highest level of supplemental inspection is usually 
conducted by a multidisciplinary team of NRC inspectors and may take 
place over several months. Also, as a part of this supplemental 
inspection, NRC inspectors assess the adequacy of the licensee's 
overall programs for identifying, evaluating, and correcting its 
performance issues, among other things. 

NRC conducts special inspections at plants when specific events occur 
that are of particular interest to NRC because of their potential 
safety significance at the plant or because of potential generic safety 
concerns important to all plants. Special inspections determine the 
cause of the event and assess the licensee's response to the event. For 
special inspections, a team of experts is often formed and an 
inspection charter issued that describes the scope of the inspection 
efforts. At one plant we reviewed, for example, a special inspection 
was conducted to investigate the circumstances surrounding the 
discovery of leakage from a spent fuel storage pool.[Footnote 7] Among 
the objectives of this inspection were to assess the adequacy of the 
plant licensee's determination of the source and cause of the leak, the 
risk significance of the leakage, and the proposed strategies to 
mitigate leakage that had already occurred and repair the problem to 
prevent additional leakage. 

As part of its inspection process, NRC evaluates all of its findings to 
determine if certain elements of plant performance, referred to as 
cross-cutting aspects, were a contributing cause to the performance 
problem. Cross-cutting aspects represent licensee performance elements 
that extend across all of the cornerstones of safety. There are three 
cross-cutting aspect areas: (1) problem identification and resolution, 
(2) human performance, and (3) a safety-conscious work environment. For 
example, in analyzing the failure of a valve to operate properly at one 
plant, NRC inspectors determined that plant employees had not followed 
the correct maintenance procedures. Thus, NRC concluded that the 
finding was associated with the human performance cross-cutting area. 
Every 6 months, NRC analyzes all findings issued at each plant during a 
12-month assessment period. If more than three findings have similar 
causes within the same cross-cutting area and if NRC is concerned about 
the licensee's progress in addressing these issues, it determines that 
the licensee has a "substantive" cross-cutting issue. NRC notifies the 
licensee that it has opened a substantive cross-cutting issue, and it 
may ask the licensee to respond with the corrective actions it plans to 
take. Also, NRC inspectors said they provide additional focus on any 
substantive cross-cutting issues open through their baseline inspection 
efforts. For example, one regional official said that if a substantive 
cross-cutting issue in the problem identification and resolution area 
is identified, it is the region's practice to increase the frequency of 
certain baseline inspections that focus on the licensee's problem 
identification and resolution processes. 

In addition to its various inspections, NRC also collects plant 
performance information through its performance indicator program, 
which it maintains in cooperation with the nuclear power industry. On a 
quarterly basis, each plant submits data for 15 separate performance 
indicators[Footnote 8]--quantitative measures of plant performance 
related to safety in the different aspects of plant operations. For 
example, one indicator measures the number of unplanned reactor 
shutdowns during the previous four quarters, while another measures the 
capability of alert and notification systems that notify residents 
living near the plant in the event of an accident. Working with the 
nuclear power industry, NRC set thresholds for acceptable performance 
and assigned colors to each of the indicators to reflect increasing 
risk. In contrast to inspection findings, a green indicator does not 
indicate a performance deficiency but instead reflects performance 
within the acceptable range, while white, yellow, and red represent 
decreasing levels of plant performance. NRC inspectors review and 
verify the data submitted for each performance indicator annually 
through their baseline inspections. If questions arise during the 
review and verification process about how to calculate a particular 
indicator or what the correct value should be, there is a formal 
feedback process to resolve the issue. Similar to its process for 
conducting supplemental inspections when greater-than-green inspection 
findings are identified, NRC conducts supplemental inspections in 
response to any greater-than-green performance indicators. 

NRC Uses Its Action Matrix to Categorize Plant Performance and Apply 
Increased Oversight in a Graded Fashion: 

Under the ROP, NRC places each nuclear power plant into one of five 
performance categories on its action matrix, which corresponds to 
graded, or increasing, levels of oversight.[Footnote 9] The action 
matrix is NRC's formal method of determining how much additional 
oversight--mostly in the form of supplemental inspections--is required 
on the basis of the number and risk significance of inspection findings 
and performance indicators. (See fig. 2 for an overview of the process 
that leads to plant placement on the action matrix.) 

Figure 2: NRC's Oversight Process in Determining Plant Placement on the 
Action Matrix: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC guidance. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

The definitions for the categories of the action matrix indicate more 
pervasive and systematic declines in licensee performance as a licensee 
moves from left to right on the action matrix (see table 2). Also, as 
the licensee moves to the right on the action matrix, NRC's response 
and the corrective actions it expects of the licensee become more 
extensive. In determining a plant's placement on the action matrix, 
greater-than-green inspection findings are considered for additional 
oversight for a minimum of four quarters, regardless of whether the 
licensee corrected the problem, to allow sufficient time to identify 
additional findings that may indicate more pervasive performance 
problems. If a licensee fails to correct the performance problem within 
the initial four quarters, the finding may be held open and considered 
for additional oversight. NRC regional officials, with the approval of 
the Executive Director for Operations, can also increase or decrease 
oversight beyond the actions specified by the action matrix through 
deviations to the ROP. Deviations are for rare instances when the 
regulatory actions dictated by the action matrix are not appropriate 
and a more tailored approach is warranted. 

Table 2: NRC Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix: 

Oversight category: Plant performance; 
Lowest level: All green findings and performance indicators; 
Second level: One white finding or performance indicator, or two white 
findings or performance indicators in different cornerstones; 
Third level: Two or more white findings or performance indicators in 
one cornerstone, or one yellow finding or performance indicator, or any 
three white findings or performance indicators; 
Highest level (while allowing continued operations): Two white findings 
or performance indicators or one yellow finding or performance 
indicator in one cornerstone for five or more quarters, or multiple 
yellow or one red finding or performance indicator; 
Unacceptable performance (plant shutdown): Overall unacceptable 
performance due to unacceptable margin of safety. 

Oversight category: NRC oversight actions; 
Lowest level: Baseline inspections only; 
Second level: Baseline inspections and first level, or least intensive, 
supplemental inspection; 
Third level: Baseline inspections and second level, or more intensive, 
supplemental inspection; 
Highest level (while allowing continued operations): Baseline 
inspections and third level, or most intensive, supplemental 
inspection.[A]; 
Unacceptable performance (plant shutdown): Order to modify, suspend, or 
revoke licensed activities. 

Source: NRC. 

Note: In addition to the actions listed in this table, increasingly 
higher levels of NRC management will meet with the licensee as it moves 
to the right on the action matrix. 

[A] For plants at this oversight level, at a minimum, the licensee and 
NRC are to document agreement on the corrective actions the licensee 
will take through a performance improvement plan. NRC may also take 
actions including making a demand to the licensee for information or 
issuing an order up to and including a plant shutdown. 

[End of table] 

Whether NRC takes enforcement actions in response to plant performance 
problems depends on whether there is a violation of a specific 
regulatory requirement.[Footnote 10] Some findings can have risk 
significance without violating a regulatory requirement because the ROP 
is a risk-informed process, while the underlying regulations are not 
all risk-informed. For example, regulatory requirements govern plants' 
safety-related equipment, which licensees define when their licenses 
are granted as equipment that would be employed to mitigate the effects 
of an accident. NRC's risk-informed oversight process considers the 
condition of all of the equipment at a plant, not necessarily just that 
included in its definition of safety-related equipment. As such, 
performance deficiencies could be identified through inspection 
findings that were not associated with safety-related equipment and, 
thus, were not violations of a regulatory requirement. More 
specifically, fire pumps are not typically defined as safety-related 
equipment under the regulations defining safety-related equipment, but 
they could be employed to provide water to cool the reactor in the 
event of an accident. If a licensee specified the use of fire pumps as 
part of its strategy to mitigate the effects of an accident, a 
performance problem associated with the pumps would not necessarily 
violate regulatory requirements, but the problem could be determined to 
be an inspection finding. Even though there is not a regulation 
requiring the licensee to correct such a problem, the finding would be 
considered for additional oversight under the ROP, thus providing an 
incentive for the licensee to correct it. NRC program officials 
acknowledge that applying the risk-informed ROP to regulations that are 
not risk-informed allows for these types of situations. The officials 
said NRC has efforts under way to risk-inform some of its regulations, 
which should reduce the likelihood of these types of situations 
occurring. 

On the basis of the results of its oversight process, NRC provides 
plant licensees and the public with an overall assessment of each 
plant's performance. At the end of each 6-month period, NRC issues an 
assessment letter to each plant to describe what level of oversight the 
plant will receive according to its placement on the action matrix, 
what actions NRC is expecting the plant licensee to take as a result of 
the performance issues identified, any specific enforcement actions NRC 
has taken, and any documented substantive cross-cutting issues. If a 
substantive cross-cutting issue is identified, the letter will describe 
what actions NRC intends to take to monitor the issue and how the 
licensee is expected to respond to NRC with the corrective actions it 
intends to take. NRC also holds an annual public meeting at or near 
each site to review its performance and address questions from members 
of the public and other interested stakeholders. In addition, NRC 
reviews the conclusions of independent plant assessments, such as those 
conducted by INPO. The purpose of this review is to self-assess the NRC 
inspection and assessment process to ensure that NRC is identifying 
similar performance issues. 

NRC communicates the results of much of its oversight process to 
members of the public through an Internet Web site devoted to the ROP. 
This Web site makes available plants' inspection reports and assessment 
letters, and other general materials related to NRC's oversight 
process. NRC also provides a quarterly summary of every plant's 
performance, consisting of its inspection findings, the color of each 
performance indicator, and its placement on the action matrix. NRC also 
provides a short description of each inspection finding issued during 
the quarter. While each description contains information about whether 
the finding was associated with a cross-cutting issue, the Web site 
itself does not provide information on those plants that have open 
substantive cross-cutting issues. This information can only be found on 
the Web site by linking to each plant's individual assessment letters. 
NRC program officials acknowledge that, without having the information 
available in summary form, it is difficult to determine which plants 
have substantive cross-cutting issues open. They said that they may 
look at the possibility of including such information on the Web site, 
although doing so is not part of their current plans. 

In addition to its plant-level assessments, NRC assesses the results of 
its oversight process on an industry-level basis. NRC management holds 
an annual meeting to (1) discuss any significant performance issues 
identified at specific plants and (2) analyze the overall results of 
its inspection and performance indicator programs and compare them with 
other industry- collected and reported performance data. NRC program 
officials said that if they identified any negative trends or 
inconsistencies, they would take action to better understand and 
address the cause. 

NRC Has Identified Low Risk Problems at Nuclear Power Plants, Resulting 
in Increased Oversight for Varying Periods: 

The ROP has identified thousands of performance deficiencies through 
inspection findings at nuclear power plants between 2001 and 2005, but 
most of these findings were considered to be of very low risk to safe 
plant operations. In the performance indicator program, there have been 
very few instances in which performance indicator data were below 
acceptable standards during this period. While the majority of plants 
received some level of increased oversight due to greater-than-green 
inspection findings and performance indicators, only 5 plants were 
subjected to NRC's highest levels of oversight. Plants in this category 
were generally subjected to this higher oversight for long periods due 
to the more intensive supplemental inspections conducted by NRC and to 
the more systemic nature of the plants' performance problems and 
subsequent corrective actions NRC expected the licensees to take. In 
assessing the results of the ROP between 2001 and 2005, we found an 
association between poorer performing plants and deficiencies in the 
cross-cutting areas of human performance and problem identification and 
resolution. 

Of the more than 4,000 inspection findings identified between 2001 and 
2005, 97 percent were green. (See app. III for additional site-specific 
inspection findings data.) The number of green findings ranged from 15 
at one site to 141 at another site, with an overall site average of 59 
for the 5-year period. While green findings are considered to be of 
very low safety significance, they represent a performance deficiency 
on the part of the licensee and it is important that they be corrected. 
Green findings consist of such things as finding that a worker failed 
to wear the proper radiation detector, or finding that a licensee did 
not properly evaluate and approve the storage of flammable materials in 
the vicinity of safety-related equipment. NRC does not follow up on the 
corrective action taken for every green finding; rather, it relies on 
the licensee to address and track the finding's resolution through the 
plant's corrective action program. NRC does, however, periodically 
follow up on some of the actions taken by the licensee to address green 
findings through an inspection specifically designed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action program. NRC program 
officials stated that even though they do not increase oversight as a 
result of green findings, green findings are assessed for the presence 
of cross-cutting aspects and provide useful information on plant 
performance. NRC inspectors told us they use green findings to identify 
performance trends in the various safety areas and these findings help 
inform their selection of future inspection samples. 

The other 3 percent of the inspection findings identified between 2001 
and 2005, or 98 of the more than 4,000, were greater-than-green (see 
app. III). Eighty-six findings were white, meaning they were considered 
to be of low to moderate risk significance. The white findings were 
well-distributed among the sites, with only 11 sites receiving more 
than 2 white findings during the period. Twenty-three sites were not 
issued any white (or greater) findings during this period. White 
findings were issued for such things as (1) a licensee's failing to 
correct a condition in which the auxiliary service water pump could not 
be aligned in sufficient time to mitigate the loss of feedwater during 
a simulated tornado exercise and (2) a licensee's having an improper 
validation process for its licensed operator requalification 
examinations, which compromised the integrity of the exams. Less than 1 
percent of the inspection findings issued since 2001 were of the 
highest risk significance--yellow or red. During this time, NRC issued 
7 yellow findings and 5 red findings. The 7 yellow findings were in the 
mitigating systems and emergency preparedness cornerstones and included 
issues such as the failure to develop and maintain emergency plans at 
one plant, the failure to ensure that safety-related equipment was 
adequately protected from flooding at another plant, and the failure to 
pass an annual licensed operator requalification examination by over 
half of the operator crews at one plant. Of the 5 red findings, 1 was 
issued for the degradation of the reactor vessel head at the Davis- 
Besse plant, 1 was issued for a steam generator tube failure at another 
plant, and the remaining 3 red findings were issued at 2 other plants 
for problems related to their auxiliary feedwater pumps. 

NRC's inspection results have remained relatively consistent from 2001 
to 2005. During this time frame, the number of green findings at all 
plants ranged from 657 to 889 per year, and the number of other 
findings ranged from 10 to 30 per year, with no strong trend (see fig. 
3). 

Figure 3: Number of Inspection Findings at All Plants, 2001 Through 
2005: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Only in the area of inspection findings for which one or more cross- 
cutting aspect was associated, is an increasing trend evident (see fig. 
4). According to NRC, the increase in findings with cross-cutting 
aspects is due, in part, to the recent development of additional 
guidance for inspectors on the identification and documentation of 
cross-cutting aspects. The number of plants where the existence of 
cross-cutting aspects resulted in NRC's opening a substantive cross- 
cutting issue is shown in figure 5. (See app. III for additional data 
on plant-specific, substantive cross-cutting issues.) 

Figure 4: Number of Inspection Findings and Inspection Findings with 
Cross-Cutting Aspects at All Plants, 2001 Through 2005: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Note: Almost all inspection findings with cross-cutting aspects were in 
the areas of human performance and problem identification and 
resolution; only 5 out of 1,890 inspection findings were assigned to 
the safety-conscious work environment cross-cutting area. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Figure 5: Number of Plants with Substantive Cross-Cutting Issues, 2001 
Through 2005: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Note: The totals include those plants that had one or more substantive 
cross-cutting issue open during at least some portion of the year. If a 
plant had more than one substantive cross-cutting issue open, only one 
was counted. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

In the performance indicator program, almost all of the indicator data 
were reported to be within the acceptable levels of performance 
(green). Only 156, or less than 1 percent of over 30,000 indicator 
reports from 2001 to 2005, did not meet the acceptable performance 
threshold. (See app. III for additional plant-specific performance 
indicator data.) Four of the 15 performance indicators have always been 
reported within acceptable performance levels. These 4 indicators 
include 1 that measures the amount of time that the residual heat 
removal safety system is unavailable, 1 that monitors the integrity of 
a radiation barrier, 1 that measures the participation of emergency 
response organizations in emergency drills or exercises, and 1 that 
monitors radiological releases. In addition, 46 plants have never had a 
performance indicator fall outside of the acceptable performance level, 
and no yellow or red indicators were reported during the period. 

On the basis of the greater-than-green inspection findings and 
performance indicators, NRC has subjected more than three quarters (79) 
of the 103 operating plants to at least some level of increased 
oversight for varying periods. (See app. III for additional plant- 
specific oversight level data.)[Footnote 11] Most of these plants 
received the lowest level of increased oversight, consisting of the 
least intensive supplemental inspection, due to the identification of 
one or two white inspection findings or performance indicators. In most 
of these instances, the licensees did not accumulate additional greater-
than-green findings, so oversight did not have to be increased to 
higher levels on the action matrix. For example, at one plant, NRC 
issued a white finding after a degraded valve resulted in the failure 
of a drain line from a moisture separator. After allowing time for the 
licensee to analyze the root cause, NRC completed a supplemental 
inspection to assess the licensee's evaluation and concluded that the 
licensee's actions were adequate. As a result, NRC did not require any 
further actions of the licensee, and NRC inspectors did not conduct 
further inspections beyond the baseline procedures. In some cases, 
however, either the licensee was not able to sufficiently correct the 
performance problem, thus triggering increased oversight, or additional 
greater-than-green inspection findings or performance indicators were 
identified, also triggering increased oversight. For example, a white 
finding was issued at one plant because the licensee's fire response 
procedures were not effective in ensuring a safe shutdown of the 
reactor during a postulated severe fire. Because this finding was 
issued during the same time that one of the plant's performance 
indicators was white, the plant was moved from the second to the third 
highest level of oversight and NRC conducted a second-level, more- 
intensive supplemental inspection. In this case, NRC determined that 
the licensee's corrective actions were sufficient to resolve the 
deficiencies related to both the inspection finding and performance 
indicator and thus reduced its oversight back to baseline inspections 
only. 

While more than three quarters of nuclear power plants received some 
level of increased oversight from 2001 through 2005, only 5 plants were 
placed into NRC's highest oversight category on the action matrix that 
still allows continued operations, and no plants were placed into NRC's 
unacceptable performance category.[Footnote 12] Plants subject to the 
highest level of NRC oversight generally remain in this category for 
longer periods of time than the other performance categories on the 
action matrix. It usually takes NRC longer to conduct the more 
intensive supplemental inspections and the licensees longer to 
implement the actions that NRC expects to correct the broader and more 
systemic performance issues that led to their placement in the highest 
oversight category. For example, one plant was subject to NRC's highest 
oversight level for approximately 2 years because of several greater- 
than-green inspection findings and performance indicators, including a 
red inspection finding for the failure of a steam generator tube. In 
this case, NRC conducted its most intensive supplemental inspection 2 
months after the final significance of the red inspection finding was 
determined. NRC inspectors found a number of underlying problems with 
the licensee's programs for design control, human and equipment 
performance, problem identification and resolution, and emergency 
preparedness. The licensee prepared a plan to address its performance 
deficiencies, as is required for all plants placed into this oversight 
category, and determined that a multiyear effort was necessary to 
adequately develop and implement all corrective actions. Once the 
corrective actions were in place, NRC inspectors conducted follow-up 
inspections to examine the adequacy of the licensee's efforts in 
implementing its corrective actions. NRC inspectors at the plants we 
reviewed explained that plants subjected to the highest oversight 
levels typically have underlying problems that can take longer periods 
to resolve. It is important for them to ensure that the corrective 
actions taken by the licensee are effective before oversight is 
reduced. Therefore, inspectors try to allow a sufficient amount of time 
to pass after the licensee has taken a corrective action, to be able to 
examine not only the corrective action itself but also whether it is 
working as intended, which requires it to have been in place for 
awhile. 

NRC inspectors at the plants we reviewed also said that a decline in 
plant performance is often the result of ineffective licensee 
corrective action programs, problems related to human performance, or 
complacent management, which often results in deficiencies in one or 
more of the cross-cutting areas. In assessing the results of the ROP 
data, we found an association between plants that had been subjected to 
increased levels of oversight and the presence of substantive cross- 
cutting issues. For instance, all plants subjected to NRC's highest 
level of oversight also had a human performance and/or problem 
identification and resolution substantive cross-cutting issue open 
either prior to or during the time that they were subjected to 
increased oversight. 

NRC Is Addressing Weaknesses in Various Areas of Its Oversight Process, 
but More Effort Is Needed: 

NRC has taken a proactive approach to constantly improving its 
oversight process over its first 6 years of implementation, but 
additional improvements are needed. NRC has several mechanisms in place 
to incorporate feedback from both external and internal stakeholders, 
and it is currently working on improving several areas of its oversight 
process by, for example, better focusing inspections on areas most 
important to safety, improving the timeliness and quality of 
determining the risk significance of its inspection findings, and 
modifying some of the performance indicators to improve their quality. 
NRC is also assessing whether it needs to modify its oversight, 
including developing additional inspection procedures, as a result of 
some problems that have surfaced in areas not fully inspected by NRC, 
such as the recent discovery of groundwater contamination from 
radioactive releases at a number of sites. In addition, NRC is working 
to address what we believe has been a significant shortcoming by making 
changes to its oversight process to improve its ability to better 
identify and address early indications of deteriorating safety at 
plants before performance problems develop. Some of its changes have 
been controversial, however, and NRC officials acknowledge the need to 
carefully assess the effectiveness of the changes. 

NRC Is Taking Action to Improve Various Areas of Its Oversight Process: 

According to NRC, the ROP was implemented with the understanding that 
it would be an evolving process and improvements would be made as 
lessons were learned. Each year NRC conducts a self-assessment of its 
oversight process to compile feedback from various internal and 
external sources and to outline the changes it intends to make. As a 
part of its self-assessment, NRC developed numerous performance metrics 
for its various oversight components, including its inspections and 
performance indicator program, to provide quantitative insights into 
the timeliness, efficiency, and overall effectiveness of the ROP. The 
metrics are based on program data, such as the number and color of 
inspection findings, and feedback received from external and internal 
stakeholders. Each fall, NRC solicits feedback from external 
stakeholders through a survey published in the Federal Register. In 
2005, NRC received 21 responses from the industry, industry 
organizations, public interest groups, state or local agencies, and 
members of the public. NRC also biannually surveys NRC management, 
program staff, and regional and site inspectors on the effectiveness of 
the ROP. In the most recent survey, which was conducted in 2004, NRC 
received responses from about 50 percent of the surveyed staff. In 
addition, NRC has a formal feedback mechanism whereby NRC staff can 
submit recommendations for improving various oversight components, and 
NRC staff meet with industry officials on a monthly basis--in addition 
to holding various meetings, workshops, and conferences--to discuss the 
ROP. Through NRC's self-assessment process, its staff also incorporates 
direction provided by the NRC commissioners and recommendations from 
independent evaluations, such as from the ACRS, GAO, and the NRC Office 
of the Inspector General. 

According to NRC program officials, the changes made to the ROP since 
its inception in 2000--including those made in response to the Davis- 
Besse incident--have generally refined the existing oversight process, 
rather than significantly changing it. In the case of Davis-Besse, NRC 
formed a task force to review the agency's regulatory processes. The 
task force's report, issued in September 2002, contained more than 50 
recommendations, many associated with its oversight process. Among the 
more significant ROP-related recommendations were those to (1) enhance 
the performance indicator that monitors unidentified leakage; (2) 
develop specific guidance to inspect licensee boric acid control 
programs and vessel head penetration nozzles; (3) modify the inspection 
program, including modifying an inspection procedure to better follow 
up on long-standing plant performance issues; and (4) enhance the 
guidance for managing plants that are shut down as a result of 
significant performance problems. NRC program officials told us that 
the task force's most significant recommendations were in areas outside 
of the ROP, such as improving the agency's operating experience 
program. According to NRC, it has implemented almost all of the task 
force's recommendations. 

Other modifications NRC has recently made or is in the process of 
making include the following: 

* NRC recently revised 7 of its baseline inspection procedures to 
better focus the level and scope of its inspection efforts on those 
areas most important to safety. These revisions resulted from a 
detailed analysis in 2005 of its more than 30 baseline inspection 
procedures. For example, NRC staff analyzed the number of findings 
resulting from each of its inspection procedures to better understand 
the areas where performance deficiencies were occurring, and compared 
the time that inspectors were spending directly observing plant 
activities as opposed to reviewing licensee paperwork to achieve a 
balance between the two. For this effort, NRC held constant the level 
of resources devoted to its baseline inspection effort and did not 
assess whether more or fewer inspection resources overall should be 
applied. NRC is now formalizing this analysis and making it a regular 
part of its yearly assessment so that it can continually refine its 
inspections to direct resources to the most critical performance areas. 

* NRC has efforts under way to improve its SDP. An audit by the NRC 
Office of the Inspector General, a review by a special task group 
formed by NRC, and feedback from other stakeholders such as NEI and UCS 
have pointed to several significant weaknesses with the SDP. Also, 
other internal and external stakeholders, including NRC inspectors and 
plant managers, have raised concerns about the amount of time, level of 
effort, and knowledge and resources required to determine the risk 
significance of some inspection findings. Industry officials commented 
that because most inspection findings are green, one white finding at a 
plant can place it in the "bottom quartile" of plants from a 
performance perspective. Therefore, industry officials explained, 
licensees try to avoid this placement and will expend a great deal of 
effort and resources to provide additional data to NRC to ensure that 
the risk level issued for the finding is appropriate. This can add 
significant time to the process because licensees may use their own 
technical tools, including models, data, and assumptions, to analyze 
the issue. NRC then considers this information in its own analysis. At 
the plants we reviewed, the time it took NRC to determine the final 
significance of risk-significant inspection findings ranged from 24 
days to over 200 days. The delay in assigning a color to a finding 
while the new information is being considered could affect a plant's 
placement on NRC's action matrix, essentially delaying the increased 
oversight called for if the finding is determined to be greater-than- 
green. NRC program officials said that even though there may be a delay 
in determining the final risk significance of the finding, the licensee 
takes immediate action to fix the identified problem. However, 
supplemental inspections are designed to uncover additional associated 
problems, if they exist, and delaying these inspections could delay 
NRC's ability to discover additional performance problems, potentially 
allowing performance to worsen. 

NRC developed a plan in 2002 to improve the timeliness of its decision- 
making process, enhance the quality of its various SDP tools, and track 
its progress in implementing key changes. For example, NRC introduced a 
new process aimed at improving timeliness by engaging decision makers 
earlier to more quickly identify the scope of the evaluation to be used 
to determine the inspection finding's risk significance, the resources 
needed, and the schedule to complete the evaluation. 

As a part of the SDP, NRC uses probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) 
methods, which overall has improved its ability to assess the 
performance and safety of nuclear power plants. PRA is an analytical 
tool for estimating the probability that a potential accident might 
occur by examining how physical structures, systems, and components, 
along with employees, work together to ensure plant safety. Using PRA 
tools, NRC and the plant licensees can estimate the likelihood that 
different accident scenarios at plants will result in reactor core 
damage and a release of radioactive materials. NRC often uses PRA tools 
to help it determine the risk significance of its inspection findings. 
However, we and others have found weaknesses with NRC's use of 
PRA.[Footnote 13] For instance, in our May 2004 report on the Davis- 
Besse reactor vessel head incident, we found that NRC used some 
incomplete and faulty PRA analyses in deciding whether to allow the 
licensee to delay shutdown of the reactor for inspection.[Footnote 14] 
While NRC program officials acknowledge they can improve their current 
PRA tools, they said the tools are adequate for factoring risk into the 
oversight process and do achieve their intended purpose. NRC has 
several initiatives under way to improve its use of PRA in its decision 
making, many of which it plans to complete by June 2007. For example, 
NRC recently revised its models to assess events that occur at plants 
during at-power situations to better capture individual plant 
characteristics, and it is in the process of developing new models to 
assess events that occur at plants during low-power or shutdown 
conditions. NRC is also developing guidance to address broader PRA 
issues, including establishing overall quality requirements for risk 
information; providing specific instructions for documenting the 
decision process and conclusions; and developing improved methods for 
calculating risk, such as its practices for implementing human 
reliability analysis. 

* NRC is working with the nuclear power industry to improve several of 
its performance indicators, including making the definitions of some 
indicators more concise to improve their quality and to reduce the 
number of discrepancies between licensees and NRC inspectors. Because 
NRC inspectors verify indicator data only once a year, a potential 
disagreement with a licensee over these data might not surface for up 
to 1 year after it is reported, and it may take even longer to resolve 
the disagreement. Similar to delays with the SDP, a delay in assigning 
a color while the disagreement is being resolved could affect a plant's 
placement on NRC's action matrix, and delay the increased oversight 
called for if the indicator is determined to be greater-than-green. To 
date, NRC's efforts to improve the performance indicator program have 
largely centered on developing a key indicator to address known 
problems with the indicators that measure the unavailability of safety 
systems. NRC has been working jointly with the nuclear industry since 
2001 to develop the indicator, which is now risk-informed and intended 
to provide a more accurate indication of the risks associated with 
changes in the availability and unreliability of important safety 
systems. This indicator, referred to as the mitigating systems 
performance index, was implemented in April 2006, and the first plant 
reports were submitted in July 2006. NRC is also in the process of 
changing the definition for several other indicators, in addition to 
considering the feasibility of new indicators. 

In addition, NRC program officials said they are taking a broad look at 
the performance indicator program to assess how they might increase its 
overall value to the ROP. The effort is intended, in part, to address 
concerns that performance indicators have not contributed to the early 
identification of poorly performing plants to the degree originally 
envisioned, since all of the indicators are almost always within 
acceptable performance levels (green). When the program was developed, 
thresholds were set using industry performance data such that about 5 
percent of the plants were expected to exceed the green-white 
threshold--that is, be designated either white, yellow, or red--for 
each of the performance indicators. However, from 2000 through 2005, 
less than 1 percent exceeded it. Furthermore, there have been several 
cases where plants reported an acceptable performance indicator and 
performance problems in the area were subsequently identified. For 
example, NRC inspectors at one plant noted that while performance 
indicator data related to its alert and notification system for 
emergency preparedness had always been reported green, the system did 
not always function properly. On the other hand, industry officials 
believe that the high percentage of green indicators is indicative of 
plants' good performance. Several plant managers told us that they 
closely monitor and manage to the acceptable performance thresholds 
established for each indicator, and that they will often take action to 
address performance issues well before the indicator crosses the 
acceptable threshold. To assess issues within the performance indicator 
program, NRC developed a standing working group, with representatives 
from both the industry and NRC, that meets on a monthly basis. This 
group, along with senior NRC and industry management, plans to explore 
overall program improvements to better identify declining plant 
performance. 

In addition to the previously mentioned efforts, NRC is assessing 
whether it needs to modify its oversight, including developing 
additional inspection procedures, as a result of some problems that 
have surfaced in areas not fully inspected by NRC. For example, NRC has 
reported that there have been inadvertent, unmonitored releases of 
radioactive liquids containing tritium at a number of nuclear power 
sites in the past few years.[Footnote 15] To date, NRC reports show 
that the measured levels of tritium discovered were low enough that 
they do not appear to pose a public health hazard. According to NRC, 
the releases were due to equipment failures or structural degradation 
at the plants. At one of the plants we reviewed, for example, elevated 
levels of tritium in the on-site groundwater were discovered during the 
licensee's testing of its monitoring wells. NRC reports suggest that 
this radioactive release was most likely due to leakage from the spent 
fuel pool's support structures. Shortly after the licensee reported the 
contamination, NRC initiated a special inspection to further 
investigate the source and cause of the leakage and the licensee's 
actions for mitigation. On the basis of this and other discoveries of 
contaminated groundwater, in March 2006, NRC formed a lessons-learned 
task force to evaluate NRC's regulatory processes related to the 
radioactive releases and to recommend areas for improvement. For 
example, NRC is reviewing related regulations and guidance, inspection 
program requirements, and its communications with external stakeholders 
and the public. In addition, the nuclear industry recently undertook an 
initiative to improve its groundwater protection, and intends to 
develop site-specific action plans at all plants and improve the 
industry's data collection, reporting, and protocols for sharing 
lessons learned. 

NRC is also taking action to improve its requirements for licensees to 
control and account for their spent nuclear fuel, that is, the used 
fuel periodically removed from reactors in nuclear power plants. NRC 
requires licensees to control and account for all of their spent fuel 
materials because of the hazardous nature of spent nuclear 
fuel.[Footnote 16] However, reviews by both GAO and the NRC Office of 
the Inspector General found weaknesses with NRC's oversight of 
licensees' spent fuel control and tracking programs.[Footnote 17] 
Between 2000 and 2004, several plants experienced instances of missing 
or unaccounted-for spent fuel, and NRC reported weaknesses in the 
material control and accounting programs at various other plants. In 
investigating these issues, we and the NRC Office of the Inspector 
General determined that NRC's inspections did not adequately ensure 
that all licensees properly controlled and accounted for their spent 
nuclear fuel. From the late-1980s through implementation of the ROP, 
NRC did not conduct routine material control and accounting 
inspections; instead it looked at these activities indirectly through 
other inspections, such as those of licensee operations during 
refueling of the reactor. We also found that while NRC requires plants 
to maintain an accurate record of all their spent fuel and its 
location, NRC regulations did not specify how licensees are to conduct 
physical inventories or how they are to control and account for loose 
spent fuel rods and fragments. NRC is currently in the process of 
revising several of its guidance documents and developing inspection 
procedures to better assess the effectiveness of licensee material 
control and accounting programs. NRC reports that most of these efforts 
will be completed by the end of 2007. 

NRC Is Taking Its First Major Step to Address a Significant ROP 
Weakness in the Area of Safety Culture: 

One significant shortcoming in the ROP that we and others have found is 
that it has not been as effective as it could be in identifying and 
addressing early indications of deteriorating safety performance at 
nuclear power plants before problems develop. NRC and others have long 
recognized that a safety culture--the organizational characteristics 
that ensure that issues affecting nuclear plant safety receive the 
attention their significance warrants--can have a significant impact on 
a plant's safety performance. The identification of a weak safety 
culture--or weaknesses in the attributes that make up a safety culture, 
such as attention to detail, adherence to procedures, and effective 
corrective and preventative actions--can point to early signs of 
deteriorating safety performance before conditions become so serious 
that a safety accident occurs. As early as 1989, NRC recognized the 
importance of developing a safety culture at each nuclear power plant 
that ensures safe plant operations, but NRC's policy stated that it was 
the licensee's duty and obligation to monitor and maintain a strong 
safety culture. 

Despite the recognition of the importance of a safety culture and 
several external groups' recommendations to better incorporate safety 
culture aspects into NRC's oversight process, NRC did not include 
specific measures to comprehensively assess plant safety culture when 
it implemented the ROP in 2000. As its new oversight process was being 
developed, external stakeholders, including the ACRS, concluded that 
additional oversight measures were needed to characterize licensees' 
human performance and safety culture. The 2002 Davis-Besse reactor 
vessel head incident highlighted that this was a significant weakness 
in the ROP. Our May 2004 report concluded that the event occurred, in 
part, because NRC did not have an effective means to identify and 
address early indications of deteriorating safety at plants before 
performance problems develop. 

NRC did not take immediate action, however, contending that direct 
safety culture evaluations would cross the line from a regulatory 
function to a licensee management function. In August 2004, the NRC 
Commission directed the staff to improve the ROP by more fully 
addressing safety culture. In response, NRC staff formed a safety 
culture working group in early 2005 to lead the agency's efforts to 
make changes to the ROP to better incorporate safety culture into its 
oversight process. As a part of this initiative, the working group 
obtained the input of external stakeholders through a series of public 
meetings held in late 2005 and early 2006. The group also incorporated 
lessons learned from events that occurred at the Salem and Hope Creek 
site during this same period. In 2004, NRC confirmed there were 
problems with aspects of the site's safety culture. In addressing the 
problem, NRC concluded that the ROP did not provide adequate tools to 
monitor the situation or the sufficiency of the licensee's corrective 
actions. As a result, NRC deviated from the ROP to increase its 
oversight at the site, which included conducting special inspections 
and forming a team with expertise in the area to review the licensee's 
corrective actions. (See app. I for additional information on the 
events at Salem and Hope Creek.) 

In February 2006, NRC issued proposed changes to some of its inspection 
procedures and guidance documents to incorporate safety culture into 
the ROP, and implemented the changes in July 2006. NRC used the 
following two overall approaches: first, it developed additional 
guidance for identifying and addressing cross-cutting aspects, and, 
second, it developed a structured way to determine the need to evaluate 
plants' safety culture. Several inspection procedures were also 
modified to direct inspectors to be sensitive to and take into 
consideration safety culture components when planning and conducting 
their inspections. Although the three cross-cutting aspects (problem 
identification and resolution, human performance, and a safety 
conscious work environment) did not change, NRC developed new 
definitions for them to more fully encompass safety culture aspects. 
Also, NRC developed additional guidance on the treatment of cross- 
cutting aspects once they have been identified. For example, the 
problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area now has 
several components--a corrective action program, operating experience, 
and self and independent assessments. The human performance cross- 
cutting area is composed of decision making, resources, work control, 
and work practices. NRC inspectors are required to assess every 
inspection finding to determine if it is associated with one or more of 
the components that make up each of the cross-cutting areas. While the 
process for assessing inspection findings for the existence of cross- 
cutting aspects and substantive cross-cutting issues remains largely 
unchanged, now the definitions for the cross-cutting areas are more 
detailed and track more closely with those elements that comprise 
safety culture.[Footnote 18] In addition, under NRC's new guidance, if 
the same substantive cross-cutting issue is identified in three 
consecutive assessment periods, NRC may request that the licensee 
evaluate its safety culture. The intent is to provide an opportunity to 
diagnose a potentially declining safety culture before significant 
safety performance problems occur. NRC program officials said they 
consider the identification and treatment of substantive cross-cutting 
issues the most proactive element of the ROP, because all other 
oversight actions are taken only when more significant performance 
problems have been identified. 

NRC's changes to the ROP now also include a structured way for NRC to 
determine the need for a safety culture evaluation. NRC's new guidance 
calls for the licensees of plants with more than one white finding in 
the same cornerstone or one yellow finding to evaluate whether the 
performance issues were caused by any safety culture components, and 
NRC may request the licensee to independently evaluate its safety 
culture, if the licensee does not identify a safety culture component. 
Any safety culture deficiencies are expected to be entered into the 
licensee's corrective action program. Regional officials would discuss 
the licensee's proposed corrective actions with the licensee, and NRC 
may hold a public meeting to discuss the issues. For plants where more 
significant or multiple findings have been identified, NRC will not 
only independently assess the adequacy of the licensee's independent 
evaluation of safety culture, but may also conduct its own evaluation. 
Following the completion of any evaluations, regional and headquarters 
officials together determine whether additional agency actions are 
warranted, and, at a minimum, the licensee will be required to document 
its plan to make improvements and a public meeting will be held to 
discuss the licensee's performance. According to an NRC official 
familiar with the Salem and Hope Creek situation, had these 
requirements been in place at the time, they would have been adequate 
to address the concerns at Salem and Hope Creek without the need to 
deviate from the ROP. 

NRC's approach to incorporating safety culture into the ROP has been 
controversial, and some stakeholders disagree with certain changes. For 
example, some in the nuclear power industry have expressed concern that 
the changes could introduce undue subjectivity to NRC's oversight, 
given the difficulty in measuring these often intangible and complex 
concepts. Several of the nuclear power plant managers at the sites we 
reviewed said that it is not always clear why a cross-cutting aspect is 
associated with a finding, or what it will take to clear themselves 
once they have been identified as having a substantive cross-cutting 
issue. Some industry officials worry that the changes will further 
increase the number of findings that have cross-cutting aspects 
associated with them, and, if all of the findings have these aspects, 
whether the process will lose its value. Industry officials also warn 
that if the changes are not implemented carefully, resources could be 
diverted away from other important safety issues. Other external 
stakeholders, such as an official from UCS, on the other hand, suggest 
that this effort is an important step toward improving NRC's ability to 
identify performance issues at plants before they result in safety 
problems. Importantly, there are now additional tools in place for NRC 
to use when it identifies potential safety culture concerns. In 
reviewing NRC's proposed approach in April 2006, the ACRS concluded 
that the approach was appropriate and will enhance the agency's ability 
to address safety culture issues; although after gaining some 
experience with the process, it stated that NRC should reassess the 
adequacy of some procedures. 

NRC program officials acknowledged that they will need to assess the 
changes they made to the ROP to determine if they better allow 
inspectors to detect deteriorating safety conditions at plants before 
significant safety events occur. Some at NRC view these changes as the 
beginning step toward an incremental approach. For its current efforts, 
NRC also acknowledged that additional training for its inspectors on 
safety culture is needed. NRC provided computer-based and regional 
training to its inspectors as the changes were being finalized, and it 
is currently working to incorporate aspects of its safety culture 
changes into its more permanent training programs. NRC plans to 
evaluate stakeholder feedback--both through its normal processes, such 
as its monthly meetings, and potentially through specific industry- 
sponsored workshops dedicated to the issue--and make additional changes 
on the basis of the lessons learned as part of its annual self- 
assessment process for 2007. 

Conclusions: 

NRC is devoting considerable effort to overseeing the safe operation of 
the nation's commercial nuclear power plants, and its process for doing 
so appears logical and well-structured. NRC's oversight process is 
finding safety problems and is getting the industry to constantly 
improve. However, weaknesses with its inspection and performance 
indicator programs have been identified--in particular, the timeliness 
of the process used to determine the risk significance of inspection 
findings, and the ability of performance indicators to contribute to 
the early identification of poorly performing plants. Importantly, NRC 
is demonstrating that it is aware of these weaknesses and is actively 
making changes to improve its oversight. NRC's proactive approach is 
demonstrated by the important progress it is making in several key 
areas, including making efforts to improve the timeliness and quality 
of its significance determination process, redefining some of its 
performance indicators, and assessing the need for additional 
inspection procedures based on careful analysis. Its efforts to 
continuously consider the need to improve and obtain feedback from both 
internal and external stakeholders are critical as nuclear power plants 
age and the nation considers building new plants. In this regard, it is 
also important that the ROP continue to be a very open process in which 
NRC provides the public and its other stakeholders with considerable 
information on its oversight activities and findings related to plant 
safety performance. 

Although NRC has been working to improve its oversight in several key 
areas, its efforts to incorporate safety culture into the ROP may be 
its most critical future change. More than 4 years have passed since 
Davis-Besse highlighted that a significant weakness in NRC's oversight 
was its inability to identify deteriorating safety conditions at plants 
before they resulted in performance problems. NRC has been reluctant to 
regulate in the area of safety culture because it did not want to be 
directly involved in managing the licensees' plants. However, NRC is 
now taking concrete actions to begin incorporating safety culture into 
the ROP, although it acknowledges that regulating the often complex and 
intangible aspects of safety culture is challenging, and that its 
recent changes are simply a first step. As a result, it will be 
important to closely monitor this effort to ensure that it is achieving 
the goal of objectively assessing safety culture, while providing an 
early indication of declining safety performance. An additional 
challenge for NRC will be how to provide information to the public and 
other stakeholders on this important but complex area of plant 
performance. Given that it may take some time for NRC to develop 
performance metrics for safety culture, data on substantive cross- 
cutting issues, which provide insight into aspects of plants' safety 
culture, could be useful to the public and other stakeholders as they 
look for assurances that plants are operated safely. Summary-level 
information on plants with substantive cross-cutting issues is not 
currently available to the public through NRC's Web site. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Given its importance to improving NRC's ability to identify declining 
safety performance at nuclear power plants before significant safety 
problems develop, we recommend that the NRC commissioners take the 
following two actions: 

* Aggressively monitor; evaluate; and, if needed, implement additional 
methods or processes to increase the effectiveness of its efforts under 
the ROP to assess safety culture at plants. 

* In addition to periodically evaluating the effectiveness of its 
safety culture efforts, NRC may also be able, through its performance 
indicator program, to develop specific indicators to measure important 
aspects of plants' safety culture. Trends in these performance 
indicators could be useful feedback to NRC on its safety culture 
activities. The indicators could also provide useful information to the 
public and other NRC stakeholders on the safety culture at plants. 

In addition, in the absence of performance indicators or other 
performance metrics for plants' safety culture, we recommend that the 
NRC commissioners make publicly available, through the ROP Web site, 
consolidated and comprehensive data on the plants that have substantive 
cross-cutting issues open. These data would provide a more 
comprehensive picture of plant performance and provide insights into 
aspects of the plants' safety culture that otherwise are not readily 
available on the Web site. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to NRC for its review and comment. 
In a letter from NRC's Executive Director for Operations, NRC generally 
agreed with the report's findings, conclusions, and recommendations 
(see app. IV). NRC also commented that the report is comprehensive, 
fair, and balanced. In addition, NRC provided minor, technical 
comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. 

We are also sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees, the Chairman of NRC, and other interested parties. We also 
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the 
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or wellsj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Jim Wells: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable James M. Inhofe: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Environment and Public Works: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety: 
Committee on Environment and Public Works: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ed Whitfield: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: 
Committee on Energy and Commerce: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tom Carper: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Michael N. Castle: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Edward J. Markey: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Key Safety-Related Events at the Salem and Hope Creek 
Nuclear Power Plants from 2000 to 2006: 

This appendix summarizes key safety-related events at the Salem and 
Hope Creek nuclear power plants and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 
(NRC) and licensee's actions to follow up on and correct them. This 
information is presented to enhance the public's understanding of the 
events and timing of NRC's actions. We did not conduct an independent 
audit or assessment of the events, other than to help illustrate how 
NRC is using its oversight process to ensure plant safety. 

The Salem and Hope Creek plants are located at one site in Hancocks 
Bridge, New Jersey, 18 miles southeast of Wilmington, Delaware, on the 
Delaware River. The two Salem plants (Salem 1 and Salem 2) consist of 
two pressurized water reactors, and the Hope Creek plant is a boiling 
water reactor. The three plants produce a combined 3,237 megawatts of 
electricity. Salem 1 began operating in the late-1970s and Salem 2 and 
Hope Creek began operating in the 1980s. PSEG Nuclear LLC is licensed 
to operate all three plants, with their current licenses expiring 
roughly 40 years after the start of their operations. In January 2005, 
PSEG entered into a nuclear operating services contract with Exelon, 
the first step of a planned merger between the two companies. Under the 
terms of this contract, Exelon manages operations at Salem and Hope 
Creek. 

From 2000 through 2006, there were several safety-related events at the 
site that affected the plants' performance. As a result, NRC increased 
its oversight to include supplemental and special inspections, and 
required the licensee to take specific actions to address its 
performance issues. NRC also deviated from its normal oversight process 
from August 2004 through 2006 to increase its oversight and address 
problems with the licensee's ability to provide an adequate safety- 
conscious work environment (SCWE). A SCWE is defined by NRC as an 
environment in which employees feel free to raise safety concerns, both 
to their management and to NRC, without fear of retaliation. During 
this period, NRC and the licensee held several public meetings to 
discuss performance issues related to the site's safety work 
environment, or the SCWE, and the actions the licensee was taking to 
improve it. 

The following summary provides details on the key safety-related events 
at Salem and Hope Creek, along with NRC's and the licensee's responses 
to the events, from the initial implementation of NRC's reactor 
oversight process in April 2000 to June 2006. 

Summary of Key Safety-Related Events at Salem and Hope Creek, April 
2000 to June 2006: 

White Performance Indicator for Unplanned Scrams: 

During the fourth quarter of 2000, Salem 1 reported a white color for 
the unplanned scrams performance indicator, an indicator that monitors 
the number of unplanned scrams--reactor shutdowns--that occurred during 
the previous four quarters. During 2000, Salem 1 had four scrams, which 
is one more than the acceptable performance level. NRC conducted a 
supplemental inspection in March 2001 to follow up on why such a high 
number of scrams occurred and on the corrective actions the licensee 
was taking to address the problem. In conducting its inspection, NRC 
determined that the licensee had performed a comprehensive common cause 
analysis of the associated performance deficiencies, which identified 
human performance, equipment failure, and procedure and preventive 
maintenance program issues as root causes of the performance problems. 
The licensee documented these issues in its corrective action program 
and developed a plan to outline the actions it would take to address 
them. NRC concluded this effort was sufficient and did not require the 
licensee to take any additional corrective actions beyond what it had 
outlined in its plan. 

White Performance Indicator for Unplanned Changes in Reactor Power: 

During the first quarter of 2002, Salem 1 reported a white color for 
the performance indicator that monitors unplanned changes in reactor 
power that could have challenged safety functions during the previous 
four quarters. Salem reported a total of seven power changes, which 
exceeded the acceptable performance threshold by one. NRC conducted a 
supplemental inspection in October 2002 and concluded that the 
licensee's implementation of several programs to address the underlying 
causes of the unplanned power changes, such as the replacement of 
certain pieces of equipment, sufficiently addressed the performance 
problem. NRC did not require the licensee to take any additional 
corrective actions. 

Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue in Problem Identification and 
Resolution: 

In March 2003, NRC opened a substantive cross-cutting issue in the 
problem identification and resolution area at all three plants on the 
basis of the identification of a number of green inspection findings 
that documented ineffective problem evaluations and untimely, 
ineffective corrective actions by plant employees, including recurring 
equipment failures. Upon opening this substantive cross-cutting issue, 
NRC stated that it would closely monitor the licensee's performance in 
this area. This substantive cross-cutting issue remained open until 
March 2006, when NRC concluded that the licensee's efforts to improve 
its ability to identify and resolve performance problems were 
sufficient. 

White Inspection Finding for Failure of a Part on an Emergency Diesel 
Generator: 

In May 2003, NRC determined that the failure of a part on an emergency 
diesel generator at the Salem 1 plant that occurred in September 2002 
would result in a white inspection finding. NRC conducted a 
supplemental inspection in October 2003 and concluded that although the 
licensee had adequately fixed the emergency diesel generator, it would 
need to take additional action to address broader performance problems. 
Specifically, NRC had concerns with the licensee's ability to ensure 
that the controls and procedural requirements determined to be 
necessary on the basis of evaluations of equipment failures, were 
reliably tracked and implemented. The licensee implemented procedural 
changes to more effectively track its corrective actions to prevent 
recurrence. NRC conducted a second, follow-up supplemental inspection 
in September 2004 and, on the basis of this inspection, concluded that 
the licensee's corrective actions were sufficient. 

White Inspection Finding for the Failure of a Rotating Screen That Is 
Part of the Station Service Water System at Hope Creek: 

In May 2004, NRC determined that the failure in July 2003 of a rotating 
screen that is part of the station service water system at Hope Creek 
would result in a white inspection finding. NRC determined that the 
failure resulted from the licensee's inadequate maintenance procedures 
and its failure to adhere to procedural instructions. In September 
2004, NRC conducted a supplemental inspection to follow up on the 
corrective actions that licensee had taken. It determined that the 
licensee's corrective actions, which included revising relevant 
maintenance procedures, were sufficient and did not require additional 
actions from the licensee. 

White Inspection Finding for the Failure of a Drain Line in the 
Moisture Separator System at Hope Creek: 

In February 2005, NRC determined that the licensee's failure to 
properly evaluate and correct a degraded valve, which resulted in the 
failure of a drain system at Hope Creek in October 2004, would result 
in a white inspection finding. NRC conducted a supplemental inspection 
in June 2005 to follow up on the licensee's corrective actions, which 
included the development of new guidance; revisions to relevant plant 
operating procedures; inspections of pipe hangers, one of which was 
determined to be the initiator of the degraded valve; and the 
development of a new procedure for additional monitoring of degraded 
equipment. NRC determined that these actions were sufficient and did 
not require additional actions from the licensee. 

Increased Oversight to Address Safety-Conscious Work Environment 
Problems: 

In late 2003, NRC initiated a special review of the site's SCWE on the 
basis of allegations concerning its SCWE, plant events and inspection 
findings that indicated problems with its SCWE, insights from NRC 
interactions with the licensee, observations made by NRC inspectors, 
and the presence of a substantive cross-cutting issue in problem 
identification and resolution. NRC's special review consisted of (1) in-
depth interviews by NRC experts of more than 60 current and former 
plant employees, (2) an analysis of the site's inspection and 
assessment record over the previous several years, and (3) information 
from plant employees' allegations related to the SCWE. NRC provided the 
interim results of its review to the licensee in January 2004. Although 
NRC did not identify any serious safety violations, the information led 
to concerns about the site's SCWE, particularly as it related to the 
handling of emergent equipment issues and associated operational 
decision making. The review accumulated information about a number of 
events that, to varying degrees, called into question the openness of 
management to concerns and alternative views, strength of 
communications, and effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action 
and feedback processes. There were several differences of opinion among 
operators and senior managers on plant operating decisions, 
particularly as they might impact continuing plant operation and outage 
schedules. On the basis of these interim results, NRC requested that 
the licensee conduct an in-depth assessment of its SCWE. 

NRC issued the final results of its special review in July 2004, 
confirming many of the concerns it identified through its interim 
review. In its final results, NRC concluded that there were weaknesses 
in the licensee's leadership and management approaches, leading to a 
perception among some staff and mangers that the company emphasized 
production over safety. NRC also determined that licensee management 
was not consistent in its support of staff identifying concerns and 
providing alternate views, and cited examples of unresolved conflicts 
and poor communication between management and staff. 

In May 2004, the licensee submitted an independent assessment of its 
SCWE. The assessment included interviews of employees, and reviews of 
the licensee's inspection record and employee concerns program, among 
other things. Among the findings of the assessment were that (1) some 
plant employees were hesitant to raise issues; (2) management was not 
receptive to or effective at addressing some employee concerns, such as 
those surrounding long-standing equipment problems; (3) a significant 
number of employees did not view the employee concerns program as a 
viable means to raise concerns; and (4) management was not effective at 
understanding or addressing the potential for a "chilling" effect--that 
is, an environment that discourages workers from raising safety 
concerns--in response to highly visible employee concerns and actions 
associated with operational events. 

As a result of the assessment, the licensee submitted to NRC in June 
2004 an action plan to improve its overall safety work environment. The 
plan addressed the licensee's corrective action program, work 
management program, and safety-conscious work environment. For example, 
to improve the licensee's corrective action program, the plan 
identified actions to improve monitoring, such as developing and 
implementing an integrated corrective action training program and 
developing performance indicators. The plan also included a number of 
actions to improve the licensee's management alignment, prioritization, 
support for and awareness of the workweek schedule, and communication 
and training strategies to support work management improvements. In 
addition, the plan included actions to improve the willingness of plant 
employees to raise concerns, improve the effectiveness of policies and 
procedures for resolution of issues, enhance key elements of the 
employee concerns program, and improve management effectiveness in 
detecting and preventing retaliation or a chilled environment. The 
licensee's action plan included 17 metrics designed to measure safety 
work environment improvements. The licensee provided the results of 
these metrics to NRC on a quarterly basis. 

In August 2004, NRC regional officials received approval from 
headquarters to deviate from the normal oversight process to increase 
oversight at the site to monitor the licensee's actions to improve its 
safety work environment. NRC's increased oversight consisted of (1) 
reviewing the results of the specific actions the licensee took as a 
part of its action plan, (2) creating an NRC team with expertise in the 
area to assist with coordinating and focusing these review efforts, and 
(3) conducting additional special inspections and enhancing existing 
inspections by adjusting their focus and scope. NRC determined that it 
could reduce its oversight to baseline levels once the licensee 
completed a self-assessment of its SCWE that concluded that it had made 
substantial, sustainable progress, and NRC confirmed the licensee's 
conclusion. 

NRC also opened a substantive cross-cutting issue in the SCWE area at 
all three plants in August 2004, on the basis of the results of its 
special review of the site's SCWE completed that July. Upon opening 
this substantive cross-cutting issue, NRC requested that the licensee 
discuss its progress in improving its SCWE and the effectiveness of its 
corrective action program in a public meeting planned for late 2004. 
This substantive cross-cutting issue remained open in the 2005 annual 
assessment letter, issued in March 2006. NRC will consider closing this 
substantive cross-cutting issue after the licensee provides the results 
of an assessment that concludes that it has made substantial, 
sustainable progress, and NRC has completed a review that confirms 
these results. 

In June 2005, NRC issued the results of an inspection of the licensee's 
employee concerns program (ECP) conducted as a part of its increased 
oversight to monitor the site's safety work environment. NRC inspectors 
did not identify any findings of safety significance and concluded that 
the ECP provided a framework for investigating concerns, maintaining 
the confidentiality of personnel who use the program, and protecting 
employees who use the program against retaliation. They also concluded, 
however, that it was too early to fully assess the effectiveness of 
recent program improvements and initiatives. The inspectors observed 
that a statistically significant portion of the personnel interviewed 
indicated that they would not use the ECP due to a perception that the 
process did not take adequate measures to protect users' 
confidentiality. NRC inspectors cited a section of the ECP that 
appeared to affirm this perception. The licensee emphasized that it was 
making efforts to protect confidentiality, and acknowledged that the 
ECP should reflect these efforts. 

NRC also provided the preliminary results of its review of the 
licensee's executive review board (ERB) process in June 2005. The ERB 
was established to improve the site's safety work environment and 
management's effectiveness in detecting and preventing retaliation and 
a chilled work environment. NRC inspectors determined that lapses in 
the licensee's use of the ERB process constituted a green inspection 
finding, although it did not represent a violation of regulatory 
requirements. NRC requested that the licensee reassess the review of 
the ERB in the broader context of the work environment, identify 
additional actions planned or taken to address negative worker 
perceptions, and provide a written response to NRC within 30 days. The 
licensee responded with planned corrective actions, including 
developing and implementing continuing training on the SCWE, and 
developing and implementing a plan to improve its corrective action 
program. 

In July 2005, NRC headquarters extended regional officials' permission 
to deviate from the normal oversight process and provide increased 
oversight at Salem and Hope Creek. The extension was necessary because 
the licensee had not yet met the criteria to move back to normal, or 
baseline levels of oversight. Increased oversight included (1) 
continued management meetings and site visits to review the 
implementation of the licensee's corrective actions; (2) increased 
efforts, including using more inspectors and samples than what would 
typically be used, to conduct a baseline inspection of the site's 
effectiveness at identifying and resolving problems; and (3) an 
additional inspection to monitor the licensee's progress in resolving 
the substantive cross-cutting issue in the SCWE. 

In November 2005, NRC issued the results of the special inspection on 
the site's SCWE. The inspection included assessing the licensee's 
progress and plans for making improvements to its SCWE, its metrics to 
monitor the effectiveness of the improvements made, and effectiveness 
of the licensee's corrective actions and self assessment initiatives. 
NRC inspectors did not identify any findings of safety significance and 
determined that the licensee had made progress in improving its SCWE. 
For example, NRC inspectors concluded that workers' willingness to 
raise safety concerns had increased. In addition, the licensee had 
taken a significant number of actions to improve the corrective action 
and work management programs and had implemented several corrective 
actions for the employee concerns program. They also concluded that the 
licensee had made progress in preventing and detecting retaliation. 
However, NRC inspectors also observed that some issues required 
additional action and focused attention, such as the need for the 
licensee to fully evaluate and address negative perceptions about its 
work environment in certain work groups. The licensee initiated actions 
to address these observations. 

In May 2006, the licensee submitted to NRC an independent peer 
assessment that concluded that it had made substantial improvements to 
its SCWE, and a solid foundation existed to sustain them. The 
assessment included interviews with site personnel; observations of 
station activities and meetings; and reviews of the licensee's 
programs, procedures, policies, and other relevant information. Among 
the assessment's conclusions were that personnel throughout the 
organization exhibited a willingness to engage in open-and-candid 
discussions and raise safety and quality issues, the corrective action 
and work management programs had improved, management had been 
effective at detecting and preventing retaliation and addressing 
chilling effects in response to the raising of safety concerns, and 
management provided high-visibility and strong and continuous 
reinforcement of good work environment principles. In response, NRC 
began a review of the effectiveness of the licensee's actions to 
improve its safety work environment. The results of this review will be 
a key input into NRC's midcycle assessment of the site's overall safety 
performance to be completed in August 2006; through the midcycle 
assessment NRC will determine any changes in the level of oversight for 
Salem and Hope Creek. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

To examine how NRC oversees plants, we reviewed the various tools and 
processes that comprise the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). In this 
regard, we analyzed NRC's documentation of its oversight process, 
conducted interviews with NRC program staff and other officials, 
visited one NRC regional office, and visited one nuclear power plant 
site that was of specific interest to our requesters. In particular, we 
reviewed NRC's policies, inspection manuals, and other guidance 
documents outlining its various oversight process components-- 
including reports discussing the ROP design basis; inspection and 
reporting requirements; performance indicator program guidance; and 
other requirements, such as those related to its enforcement and 
assessment processes. We interviewed NRC headquarters and regional 
officials and regional and on-site inspectors responsible for 
implementation of the ROP and visited the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear 
power plants to observe firsthand how the ROP is implemented by the 
resident inspectors located at each power plant. To learn more about 
how ROP results are communicated to the public, we attended the annual 
public meeting held at the Indian Point nuclear power plant. We also 
reviewed the information NRC makes available to the public on a Web 
site devoted to ROP topics, which includes both detailed plant-specific 
information and general program information and guidance. In addition, 
we interviewed external stakeholder individuals and groups about their 
experiences with the ROP, including the NRC Commission Chairman from 
1995 to 1999, who is largely credited with leading the development of 
the ROP; officials from the NRC Office of the Inspector General, the 
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the Union of Concerned Scientists 
(UCS), and Greenpeace; and nuclear power plant managers at six sites. 

To examine the results of the ROP over the past several years, we 
reviewed the number and types of inspection findings NRC issued, the 
performance indicators reported by the plants, and the level of 
oversight NRC provided to the plants. Specifically, we obtained and 
analyzed NRC data on its inspection findings for 2001 through 2005, the 
years since implementation of the ROP for which the data were available 
for the full year, and discussed our analysis with NRC program 
officials. We obtained inspection findings data from the NRC Reactor 
Program System (RPS) database and assessed the reliability of the RPS 
data by (1) performing electronic and manual testing of required data 
elements; (2) reviewing existing information about the data and the 
system that produced them; (3) reviewing an audit of the RPS database 
performed by the NRC Office of the Inspector General in 2005, and 
documents related to NRC's implementation of the audit's 
recommendations; and (4) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable 
about these data. We determined that these data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. Data elements included a 
breakout of inspection findings identified at each nuclear power plant, 
including information on their risk significance, or color; 
cornerstone; date; cross-cutting aspects; a brief description of the 
problem identified; and other related information. We also obtained and 
analyzed ROP data provided on NRC's Web site, including a list of 
performance indicator data broken out by plant and by quarter and a 
list of the plants in each column of the action matrix by quarter since 
inception of the ROP in 2000. We assessed the reliability of these data 
by interviewing the appropriate agency officials about how these data 
are reported on the Web site and compared the data with source 
information contained in inspection reports and assessment letters for 
sample plants. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable 
for the purposes of this report. In addition, we reviewed every 
assessment letter issued to each of the 103 plants since the inception 
of the ROP to document the plants that had one or more substantive 
cross-cutting issue open and the length of time that the issue was held 
open. We discussed the results of our data analysis with NRC 
headquarters program officials and compared the results of the ROP with 
other industry-collected and reported performance data, including data 
collected through NRC's industry trends program, to identify any 
inconsistencies in trends or industry safety performance indicators. 

To examine the status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP, we reviewed 
specific components of the ROP where weaknesses had been identified and 
recent and current staffs' efforts to improve them. We analyzed NRC 
documents, including all annual self-assessment reports issued by NRC 
since 2001; interviewed officials from NRC headquarters, regional, and 
site offices and outside stakeholder groups, including NEI and UCS; and 
attended two public meetings covering proposed changes to incorporate 
safety culture into its oversight process. In reviewing the annual self-
assessment reports, we analyzed comments submitted by both internal and 
external stakeholders that were collected during recent surveys. We 
analyzed responses submitted by internal staff, including management, 
program staff, and regional and site inspectors, and responses from 
external stakeholders, including industry, industry organizations, 
public interest groups, state and local agencies, and members of the 
public. We examined all proposed and final documents related to NRC's 
safety culture changes, including inspection manuals, training 
documents, and other guidance documents. We also reviewed public 
comments submitted to NRC on its safety culture changes, such as those 
submitted by NEI, UCS, and meetings held on the topic by the Advisory 
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). In addition, we assessed 
various external reports and evaluations related to the ROP or specific 
aspects relevant to NRC's oversight, such as issues surrounding safety 
culture, including our prior reports, those of the NRC Office of the 
Inspector General and of the ACRS. We met with NRC program officials 
responsible for assessing and implementing changes to the ROP to obtain 
a clear understanding of the actions they were taking and the status of 
their efforts. 

Additionally, we selected a nonprobability sample[Footnote 19] of 6 
nuclear power sites (totaling 11 of the 103 operating plants)[Footnote 
20] that provided coverage of each of NRC's four regional offices and 
varying levels of plant performance and NRC oversight since 2000. The 
following nuclear power sites were included in our review: Cooper (1 
plant) located near Nebraska City, Nebraska; Indian Point 2 (1 plant) 
located near New York, New York; Oconee (3 plants) located near 
Greenville, South Carolina; Perry (1 plant) located near Painesville, 
Ohio; Salem and Hope Creek (3 plants) located near Lower Alloways 
Creek, New Jersey; and Surry (2 plants) located near Newport News, 
Virginia. Our selection criteria was designed to represent geographic 
diversity, a variety of safety problems in which inspection findings or 
performance indicators of higher risk significance (white, yellow, and 
red) were issued, trends reflecting both improving and declining safety 
performance, and plants that have been subjected to at least some level 
of increased oversight since the ROP was implemented. The purpose of 
our review was to understand how performance problems were identified 
by NRC's oversight process, what caused them, actions taken by NRC and 
the licensee in response to the problems, and how NRC documented their 
resolution. We analyzed all publicly available inspection reports and 
assessment documents covering years 2000 through 2005 for each site to 
examine how NRC applied the ROP to identify and correct safety 
problems.[Footnote 21] We analyzed each green and greater-than-green 
inspection finding documented through the inspection reports and 
collected data associated with each finding, including how it was 
identified, which cornerstone it was assigned to, whether the finding 
was associated with a violation of regulatory requirements, and whether 
there were any cross-cutting elements associated with the finding. For 
the greater-than-green inspection findings, we collected additional 
information to determine the length of time it took the licensee to 
correct the performance problem, the length of time and level of effort 
NRC inspectors took to follow up on the issue, and the actions it 
required the licensee to take. Additionally, for each of the sites, we 
reviewed NRC reports and documentation showing that all baseline 
inspection procedures were completed (for 2004 and 2005), and that 
inspectors verified the licensees' reporting of the performance 
indicator data (for 2000 through 2005). We also interviewed NRC branch 
chiefs and resident inspectors and industry management officials at 
each site to learn more about NRC's implementation of the ROP at the 
site. We conducted our work from July 2005 through July 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Nuclear Power Plant Performance Data on the Basis of the 
Results of NRC's Reactor Oversight Process, 2001 Through 2005: 

Table 3: Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Licensed to Operate in the 
United States: 

Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 1; 
City: Russellville; 
State: AR; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 2; 
City: Russellville; 
State: AR; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 1; 
City: McCandless; 
State: PA; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 2; 
City: McCandless; 
State: PA; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 1; 
City: Joilet; 
State: IL; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 2; 
City: Joilet; 
State: IL; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 1; 
City: Decatur; 
State: AL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 2; 
City: Decatur; 
State: AL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 3; 
City: Decatur; 
State: AL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 1; 
City: Southport; 
State: NC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 2; 
City: Southport; 
State: NC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Byron 1; 
City: Rockford; 
State: IL; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Byron 2; 
City: Rockford; 
State: IL; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Callaway; 
City: Fulton; 
State: MO; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 1; 
City: Annapolis; 
State: MD; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 2; 
City: Annapolis; 
State: MD; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Catawba 1; 
City: Rock Hill; 
State: SC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Catawba 2; 
City: Rock Hill; 
State: SC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Clinton; 
City: Clinton; 
State: IL; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Columbia Generating Station; 
City: Richland; 
State: WA; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 1; 
City: Glen Rose; 
State: TX; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 2; 
City: Glen Rose; 
State: TX; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Cooper; 
City: Nebraska City; 
State: NE; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Crystal River 3; 
City: Crystal River; 
State: FL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 1; 
City: Benton Harbor; 
State: MI; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 2; 
City: Benton Harbor; 
State: MI; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Davis-Besse; 
City: Toledo; 
State: OH; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 1; 
City: San Luis Obispo; 
State: CA; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 2; 
City: San Luis Obispo; 
State: CA; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Dresden 2; 
City: Morris; 
State: IL; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Dresden 3; 
City: Morris; 
State: IL; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Duane Arnold; 
City: Cedar Rapids; 
State: IA; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Edwin I. Hatch 1; 
City: Baxley; 
State: GA; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Edwin I. Hatch 2; 
City: Baxley; 
State: GA; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Fermi 2; 
City: Toledo; 
State: MI; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Fort Calhoun; 
City: Omaha; 
State: NE; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Ginna; 
City: Rochester; 
State: NY; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Grand Gulf 1; 
City: Vicksburg; 
State: MS; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: H.B. Robinson 2; 
City: Florence; 
State: SC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Hope Creek 1; 
City: Lower Alloways Creek; 
State: NJ; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 2; 
City: New York; 
State: NY; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 3; 
City: New York; 
State: NY; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: James A. FitzPatrick; 
City: Oswego; 
State: NY; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Joseph M. Farley 1; 
City: Dothan; 
State: AL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Joseph M. Farley 2; 
City: Dothan; 
State: AL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Kewaunee; 
City: Green Bay; 
State: WI; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: La Salle 1; 
City: Ottawa; 
State: IL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: La Salle 2; 
City: Ottawa; 
State: IL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Limerick 1; 
City: Philadelphia; 
State: PA; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Limerick 2; 
City: Philadelphia; 
State: PA; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: McGuire 1; 
City: Charlotte; 
State: NC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: McGuire 2; 
City: Charlotte; 
State: NC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Millstone 2; 
City: New London; 
State: CT; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Millstone 3; 
City: New London; 
State: CT; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Monticello; 
City: Minneapolis; 
State: MN; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 1; 
City: Oswego; 
State: NY; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 2; 
City: Oswego; 
State: NY; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: North Anna 1; 
City: Richmond; 
State: VA; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: North Anna 2; 
City: Richmond; 
State: VA; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 1; 
City: Greenville; 
State: SC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 2; 
City: Greenville; 
State: SC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 3; 
City: Greenville; 
State: SC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Oyster Creek; 
City: Toms River; 
State: NJ; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Palisades; 
City: South Haven; 
State: MI; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 1; 
City: Phoenix; 
State: AZ; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 2; 
City: Phoenix; 
State: AZ; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 3; 
City: Phoenix; 
State: AZ; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 2; 
City: Lancaster; 
State: PA; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 3; 
City: Lancaster; 
State: PA; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Perry 1; 
City: Painesville; 
State: OH; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Pilgrim 1; 
City: Plymouth; 
State: MA; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 1; 
City: Manitowoc; 
State: WI; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 2; 
City: Manitowoc; 
State: WI; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Prairie Island 1; 
City: Minneapolis; 
State: MN; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Prairie Island 2; 
City: Minneapolis; 
State: MN; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 1; 
City: Moline; 
State: IL; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 2; 
City: Moline; 
State: IL; 
NRC region: III. 

Nuclear power plant: River Bend 1; 
City: Baton Rouge; 
State: LA; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Salem 1; 
City: Lower Alloways Creek; 
State: NJ; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Salem 2; 
City: Lower Alloways Creek; 
State: NJ; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 2; 
City: San Clemente; 
State: CA; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 3; 
City: San Clemente; 
State: CA; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Seabrook 1; 
City: Portsmouth; 
State: NH; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Seqouyah 1; 
City: Chattanooga; 
State: TN; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Seqouyah 2; 
City: Chattanooga; 
State: TN; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Shearon Harris 1; 
City: Raleigh; 
State: NC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: South Texas Project 1; 
City: Bay City; 
State: TX; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: South Texas Project 2; 
City: Bay City; 
State: TX; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: St. Lucie 1; 
City: Ft. Pierce; 
State: FL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: St. Lucie 2; 
City: Ft. Pierce; 
State: FL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Summer; 
City: Columbia; 
State: SC; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Surry 1; 
City: Newport News; 
State: VA; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Surry 2; 
City: Newport News; 
State: VA; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 1; 
City: Berwick; 
State: PA; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 2; 
City: Berwick; 
State: PA; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Three Mile Island 1; 
City: Harrisburg; 
State: PA; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 3; 
City: Miami; 
State: FL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 4; 
City: Miami; 
State: FL; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Vermont Yankee; 
City: Battleboro; 
State: VT; 
NRC region: I. 

Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 1; 
City: Augusta; 
State: GA; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 2; 
City: Augusta; 
State: GA; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Waterford 3; 
City: New Orleans; 
State: LA; 
NRC region: IV. 

Nuclear power plant: Watts Bar 1; 
City: Spring City; 
State: TN; 
NRC region: II. 

Nuclear power plant: Wolf Creek 1; 
City: Burlington; 
State: KS; 
NRC region: IV. 

Source: NRC. 

[End of table] 

Table 4: Total Number of Green Inspection Findings, 2001 Through 2005: 

Nuclear power site[A]: Arkansas Nuclear; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 12; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 23; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 23; 
Total: 82. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Beaver Valley; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9; 
Total: 51. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Braidwood; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 12; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 7; 
Total: 40. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Browns Ferry; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8; 
Total: 32. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Brunswick; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 3; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9; 
Total: 26. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Byron; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 16; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 19; 
Total: 71. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Callaway; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 17; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 17; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 17; 
Total: 77. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Calvert Cliffs; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 18; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 19; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 6; 
Total: 53. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Catawba; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8; 
Total: 36. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Clinton; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 16; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8; 
Total: 47. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Columbia Generating Station; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 21; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 17; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 10; 
Total: 64. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Comanche Peak; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 12; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 3; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 11; 
Total: 41. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Cooper; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 32; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 23; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 29; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 23; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 34; 
Total: 141. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Crystal River; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 5; 
Total: 24. 

Nuclear power site[A]: D.C. Cook; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 27; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 24; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 16; 
Total: 88. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Davis-Besse; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 16; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 24; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 46; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 12; 
Total: 102. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Diablo Canyon; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 22; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 25; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 23; 
Total: 95. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Dresden; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 20; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 19; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 22; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 26; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 13; 
Total: 100. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Duane Arnold; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 1; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 22; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 12; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 19; 
Total: 61. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Farley; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 11; 
Total: 33. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Fermi; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 18; 
Total: 55. 

Nuclear power site[A]: FitzPatrick; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 12; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8; 
Total: 40. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Fort Callhoun; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 18; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 15; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 21; 
Total: 72. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Ginna; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 10; 
Total: 48. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Grand Gulf; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 11; 
Total: 49. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Harris; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 6; 
Total: 26. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Hatch; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 2; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 4; 
Total: 29. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Hope Creek; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 18; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 24; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 19; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 25; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 16; 
Total: 102. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Indian Point 2; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 44; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 21; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 20; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 25; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 13; 
Total: 123. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Indian Point 3; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 3; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8; 
Total: 44. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Kewaunee; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 12; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 24; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 20; 
Total: 79. 

Nuclear power site[A]: La Salle; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 20; 
Total: 60. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Limerick; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 15; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 4; 
Total: 51. 

Nuclear power site[A]: McGuire; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9; 
Total: 45. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Millstone; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 20; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 12; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 17; 
Total: 70. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Monticello; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 17; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 12; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9; 
Total: 59. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Nine Mile Point; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 16; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 19; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8; 
Total: 67. 

Nuclear power site[A]: North Anna; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 12; 
Total: 34. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Oconee; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 16; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 19; 
Total: 70. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Oyster Creek; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 12; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 15; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 12; 
Total: 57. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Palisades; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 23; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8; 
Total: 67. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Palo Verde; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 16; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 3; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 46; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 29; 
Total: 98. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Peach Bottom; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 18; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9; 
Total: 61. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Perry; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 18; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 16; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 59; 
Total: 110. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Pilgrim; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 7; 
Total: 34. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Point Beach; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 15; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 28; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 24; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 23; 
Total: 100. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Prarie Island; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 16; 
Total: 41. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Quad Cities; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 21; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 11; 
Total: 67. 

Nuclear power site[A]: River Bend; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 19; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 17; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 18; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 7; 
Total: 67. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Robinson; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 1; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 3; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 3; 
Total: 15. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Saint Lucie; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9; 
Total: 45. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Salem; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 17; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 26; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 24; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 25; 
Total: 106. 

Nuclear power site[A]: San Onofre; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 16; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 13; 
Total: 51. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Seabrook; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8; 
Total: 43. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Sequoyah; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 16; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 4; 
Total: 47. 

Nuclear power site[A]: South Texas; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 12; 
Total: 61. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Summer; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9; 
Total: 51. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Surry; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 3; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 7; 
Total: 28. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Susquehanna; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 17; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 7; 
Total: 59. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Three Mile Island; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 19; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 12; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 12; 
Total: 58. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Turkey Point; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 2; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9; 
Total: 39. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Vermont Yankee; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 3; 
Total: 46. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Vogtle; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 6; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 3; 
Total: 29. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Waterford; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 14; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 17; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 15; 
Total: 66. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Watts Bar; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 8; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8; 
Total: 43. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Wolf Creek; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 3; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 9; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 6; 
Total: 30. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Total; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 751; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 657; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 774; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 889; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 835; 
Total: 3,906. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Site average; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 10; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 12; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 13; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 13; 
Total: 59. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Range (for each column); 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 1-44; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 1-27; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 3-29; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 2-46; 
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 3-59; 
Total: 15-141. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

[A] NRC reports these data by nuclear power site as opposed to by 
individual plant. Oftentimes, there are 2 or 3 plants located at each 
site. Therefore, data for all 103 plants are included here, but at the 
site level. 

[End of table] 

Table 5: Total Number of Greater-Than-Green Inspection Findings Issued, 
2001 Through 2005: 

Nuclear power site[A]: Arkansas Nuclear; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Beaver Valley; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Braidwood; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Browns Ferry; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Brunswick; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Byron; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Callaway; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Calvert Cliffs; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Catawba; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Clinton; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Columbia Generating Station; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Comanche Peak; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Cooper; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 5; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Crystal River; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: D.C. Cook; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Davis-Besse; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 4; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: 1. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Diablo Canyon; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Dresden; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Duane Arnold; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Farley; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Fermi; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: FitzPatrick; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Fort Callhoun; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Ginna; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Grand Gulf; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Harris; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Hatch; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Hope Creek; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Indian Point 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: 1. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Indian Point 3; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Kewaunee; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 4; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: La Salle; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Limerick; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: McGuire; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Millstone; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Monticello; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Nine Mile Point; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: North Anna; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Oconee; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 7; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Oyster Creek; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Palisades; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Palo Verde; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Peach Bottom; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Perry; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 5; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Pilgrim; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Point Beach; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: 3. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Prarie Island; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Quad Cities; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: River Bend; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Robinson; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Saint Lucie; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Salem; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: San Onofre; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Seabrook; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Sequoyah; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: South Texas; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Summer; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Surry; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Susquehanna; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Three Mile Island; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Turkey Point; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Vermont Yankee; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Vogtle; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Waterford; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Watts Bar; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Wolf Creek; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty]; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power site[A]: Total; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 86; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 7; 
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: 5. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

[A] NRC reports these data by nuclear power site as opposed to by 
individual plant. Oftentimes, there are 2 or 3 plants located at each 
site. Therefore, data for all 103 plants are included here, but at the 
site level. 

[End of table] 

Table 6: Type of Substantive Cross-cutting Issue Open At Least Some 
Portion of the Year, 2001 Through 2005: 

Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 1; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR. 

Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 2; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR. 

Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 1; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 2; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 2; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 3; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Byron 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Byron 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Callaway; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 1; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 2; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Catawba 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Catawba 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Clinton; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Columbia Generating Station; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 1; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 2; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Cooper; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR,HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Crystal River 3; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Davis-Besse; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 1; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 2; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Dresden 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Dresden 3; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Duane Arnold; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Farley 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Farley 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Fermi 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP. 

Nuclear power plant: FitzPatrick; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Fort Callhoun; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Ginna; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Grand Gulf 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Harris 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Hatch 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Hatch 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Hope Creek 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, 
SCWE; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR,SCWE. 

Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 2; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR. 

Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 3; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Kewaunee; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR. 

Nuclear power plant: La Salle 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP. 

Nuclear power plant: La Salle 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Limerick 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Limerick 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: McGuire 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: McGuire 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Millstone 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Millstone 3; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Monticello; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 1; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 2; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: North Anna 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: North Anna 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 3; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Oyster Creek; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR. 

Nuclear power plant: Palisades; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 3; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 2; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 3; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Perry 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR,HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Pilgrim 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Prairie Island 1; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Prairie Island 2; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: River Bend 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Robinson 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Salem 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,SCWE; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR,SCWE. 

Nuclear power plant: Salem 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,SCWE; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR,SCWE. 

Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 3; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Seabrook 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: South Texas 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: South Texas 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Summer; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Surry 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Surry 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR, HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Three Mile Island 1; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 3; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 4; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Vermont Yankee; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 2; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Waterford 3; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Watts Bar 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP. 

Nuclear power plant: Wolf Creek 1; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty]; 
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty]. 

Legend: 

HP = human performance 
PIR = problem identification and resolution 
SCWE = safety-conscious work environment: 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

[End of table] 

Table 7: Total Number of Greater-Than-Green Performance Indicators, 
2001 Through 2005: 

Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 1; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
1; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
2; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
3; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 7. 

Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 3; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
1; 
Total: 1. 

Nuclear power plant: Byron 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Byron 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Callaway; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
2; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 2. 

Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
4; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
3; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 7. 

Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Catawba 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Catawba 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Clinton; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Columbia Generating Station; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
5; 
Total: 5. 

Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Cooper; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 1. 

Nuclear power plant: Crystal River 3; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
1; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 1. 

Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
1; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 1. 

Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
4; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
5; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
2; 
Total: 11. 

Nuclear power plant: Davis-Besse; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
1; 
Total: 2. 

Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
1; 
Total: 1. 

Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
1; 
Total: 1. 

Nuclear power plant: Dresden 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 1. 

Nuclear power plant: Dresden 3; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
4; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
2; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 7. 

Nuclear power plant: Duane Arnold; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Farley 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Farley 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Fermi 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
4; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
4; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
1; 
Total: 10. 

Nuclear power plant: FitzPatrick; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
2; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 2. 

Nuclear power plant: Fort Callhoun; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
2; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
2; 
Total: 5. 

Nuclear power plant: Ginna; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Grand Gulf 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Harris 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
3; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 5. 

Nuclear power plant: Hatch 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Hatch 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Hope Creek 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 3; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
3; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 3. 

Nuclear power plant: Kewaunee; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: La Salle 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: La Salle 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
2; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
1; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 3. 

Nuclear power plant: Limerick 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Limerick 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: McGuire 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: McGuire 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Millstone 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
2; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
3; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 5. 

Nuclear power plant: Millstone 3; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Monticello; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
4; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
2; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 6. 

Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 3. 

Nuclear power plant: North Anna 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: North Anna 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
1; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 1. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
2; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 2. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 3; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Oyster Creek; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Palisades; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 3; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
3; 
Total: 5. 

Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 3; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Perry 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
3; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 4. 

Nuclear power plant: Pilgrim 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
4; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 5. 

Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
2; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 2. 

Nuclear power plant: Prarie Island 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Prarie Island 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: River Bend 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
2; 
Total: 2. 

Nuclear power plant: Robinson 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 1. 

Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 2. 

Nuclear power plant: Salem 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
2; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 2. 

Nuclear power plant: Salem 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
3; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
1; 
Total: 5. 

Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 3; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Seabrook 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 1. 

Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
2; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 3. 

Nuclear power plant: South Texas 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: South Texas 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 2. 

Nuclear power plant: Summer; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
3; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 3. 

Nuclear power plant: Surry 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
3; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
6; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
3; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 12. 

Nuclear power plant: Surry 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
2; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
4; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
4; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
1; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: 11. 

Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Three Mile Island 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 3; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
1; 
Total: 1. 

Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 4; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
2; 
Total: 2. 

Nuclear power plant: Vermont Yankee; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 2; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Waterford 3; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Watts Bar 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Wolf Creek 1; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
[Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Total; 
[Empty]; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001: 
34; 
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002: 
25; 
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003: 
41; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004: 
33; 
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005: 
23; 
Total: 156. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Note: Plant licensees report their performance indicator data on a 
quarterly basis for 15 different indicators (excluding 3 physical 
security indicators). Yearly totals include a summary for all 15 
indicators and the four quarters. Thus, if the same indicator was white 
for two quarters during the year, it would count twice in the yearly 
total. 

[A] All of the greater-than-green indicators were white during this 
period, no yellow or red indicators were reported. 

[End of table] 

Table 8: Highest NRC Oversight Level Applied during at Least Some 
Portion of the Year, 2001 Through 2005: 

Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 3; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Byron 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Byron 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Callaway; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Catawba 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Catawba 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Clinton; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Columbia Generating Station; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Cooper; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: H; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: H; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: H; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Crystal River 3; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Davis-Besse; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [B]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [B]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [B]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [B]. 

Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Dresden 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Dresden 3; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Duane Arnold; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Farley 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Farley 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Fermi 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: FitzPatrick; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Fort Callhoun; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Ginna; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Grand Gulf 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Harris 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Hatch 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Hatch 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Hope Creek 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: H; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: H; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 3; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Kewaunee; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: M. 

Nuclear power plant: La Salle 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: La Salle 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Limerick 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Limerick 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: McGuire 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: McGuire 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Millstone 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Millstone 3; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Monticello; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: North Anna 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: North Anna 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Oconee 3; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Oyster Creek; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Palisades; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: M. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: M. 

Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 3; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: M. 

Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 3; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Perry 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: H; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: H. 

Nuclear power plant: Pilgrim 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: H; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: H; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: H. 

Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: H; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: H; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: H. 

Nuclear power plant: Prarie Island 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Prarie Island 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: River Bend 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Robinson 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Salem 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Salem 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 3; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Seabrook 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: South Texas 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: South Texas 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Summer; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Surry 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Surry 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Three Mile Island 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 3; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 4; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Vermont Yankee; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: M; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 2; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Waterford 3; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: L; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Nuclear power plant: Watts Bar 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: L. 

Nuclear power plant: Wolf Creek 1; 
[Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2001: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2002: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2003: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2004: [Empty]; 
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the 
year[A]: 2005: [Empty]. 

Legend: 

L = 1ST or lowest level of increased oversight beyond the baseline 
M = 2ND level of increased oversight beyond the baseline 
H = 3RD and highest level of oversight that still allows continued 
plant operations: 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

[A] All plants receive a baseline level of oversight, regardless of 
their safety performance. Plants are also placed into performance 
categories on NRC's action matrix on a quarterly basis, which 
corresponds to the level of oversight NRC will provide based on the 
plant's safety performance. The level of oversight reported here 
corresponds to the highest oversight level the plant received during 
the year, even if it was only for a portion of the year. Thus, if a 
plant was placed into a different category each quarter, the highest 
category in which it was placed is reported here. 

[B] Davis-Besse was under a separate oversight category not considered 
part of the ROP due to the reactor vessel head incident that occurred 
in 2002. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001: 

September 6, 2006: 

Mr. James E. Wells, Jr. 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Wells: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and submit comments on the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, "Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission Oversight of Nuclear Power Plant Safety has 
Improved but Refinements are Needed" (GAO-06-1029). The U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) appreciates the time and effort you and 
your staff have invested to review the NRC oversight program for 
commercial nuclear power plants. We also appreciate the willingness of 
your staff to maintain a continuing dialogue with the NRC to ensure 
that your report is accurate. 

Overall, the NRC considers the draft report to be comprehensive, fair, 
and balanced. The report is well written and provides an accurate 
reflection of the review. The NRC generally agrees with the findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations. We have no substantive comments on 
the draft report. 

The enclosure provides some minor comments for your consideration. 
Should you have questions about these comments, please contact Ms. 
Melinda Malloy at (301) 415-1785 or Mr. James Andersen at (301) 415- 
3565. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Luis A. Reyes: 
Executive Dire for Operations: 

Enclosure: 
Minor Comments on Draft Report: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Jim Wells, (202) 512-3841 or w [Hyperlink, wellsj@gao.gov] 
ellsj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Raymond H. Smith, Jr. 
(Assistant Director), Alyssa M. Hundrup, and Dave Stikkers made key 
contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were 
Cindy Gilbert, Carol Kolarik, Alison O'Neill, Ilene Pollack, Keith A. 
Rhodes, and Barbara Timmerman. 

(360585): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Physical security, which is also covered by the ROP, is not 
included in this review. For information on NRC's physical security, 
see GAO, Nuclear Power Plants: Efforts Made to Upgrade Security, but 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Design Basis Threat Process Should 
Be Improved, GAO-06-388 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006). 

[2] The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards is an independent 
committee, mandated by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which 
provides advice on nuclear facility safety-related topics, among other 
topics. The ACRS is currently composed of 11 individuals with a wide 
variety of engineering and technical expertise, including nuclear 
engineering; risk assessment; chemistry; and mechanical, civil, and 
electrical engineering, as well as many others. The ACRS is structured 
to provide a forum where these experts can provide independent advice 
that can then be factored into NRC's decision-making process. Each 
year, the ACRS produces several reports, many of them related to the 
ROP. 

[3] GAO, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Preventing Problem Plants 
Requires More Effective Action by NRC, GAO-T-RCED-98-252 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 30, 1998); 
and Nuclear Regulation: Preventing Problem Plants Requires More 
Effective NRC Action, GAO/RCED-97-145 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 1997). 

[4] NRC, Office of the Inspector General, US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission: Audit of NRC's Baseline Inspection Program, OIG-05-A-06 
(Dec. 22, 2004). 

[5] "Minor issues" are defined by NRC as those that have little actual 
safety consequences, little or no potential to impact safety, little 
impact on the regulatory process, and no willfulness. For example, if a 
licensee missed providing an hourly update to a state agency during a 
declared unusual event that resulted in no actual safety consequences, 
it would be considered minor if it did not detract significantly from 
the state agency's ability to function during the emergency. Also, if a 
licensee failed to record one section of a surveillance test, but the 
test was performed and the last completed surveillance test revealed 
that the equipment adequately performed its safety function, the 
finding would be considered minor. 

[6] The measures used for the characterization of risk are core damage 
frequency and large early release frequency. In some situations, risk 
calculations cannot be made using these measures, such as in the case 
of measuring the risk for emergency preparedness inspection findings. 
In these cases, thresholds were determined by panels of experts on the 
basis of operating experience and a determination of what the 
appropriate response would be. 

[7] Spent fuel storage pools are typically 40-foot deep, steel-lined, 
concrete vaults filled with water to store spent fuel rods no longer 
capable of being used for nuclear power generation. The water is to 
provide shielding from radiation that is left in the rods. 

[8] There also are 3 performance indicators in the area of physical 
security, and, therefore, they are outside the scope of this review. 

[9] While NRC formally places plants into performance categories on its 
action matrix on a quarterly basis, NRC assesses plant performance on a 
continuous basis and takes actions in accordance with the action matrix 
as performance issues are identified. 

[10] In some cases, a violation of regulatory requirements can occur 
that results in an inspection finding, but the finding is not assigned 
a color because the issue associated with the violation is not amenable 
to a risk calculation. For these types of findings, a severity level is 
assigned to reflect the significance of the finding, ranging from I for 
the most significant, to IV for the least significant. In assigning a 
severity level to the finding, NRC assesses the following: (1) the 
actual safety consequences; (2) the potential safety consequences; (3) 
the potential for impacting NRC's ability to perform its regulatory 
function (e.g., failure to provide complete and accurate information); 
and (4) any willful aspects of the violation. Severity levels I and II 
violations generally involve actual or high-potential consequences to 
public health and safety. Severity level III violations are cause for 
significant concern, and severity level IV violations are less serious 
but are of more than minor concern. 

[11] During this period, NRC also requested and received approval to 
deviate from its oversight process at 6 plants, with 1 of the plants 
subjected to increased oversight from a deviation on two separate 
occasions. At 4 of the plants, the deviation resulted in increased 
oversight, while at 2 plants it resulted in decreased oversight. 

[12] While it was not placed into NRC's unacceptable performance 
category on the action matrix, the Davis-Besse plant was subjected to a 
special oversight process due to its significant performance problems 
related to the reactor-vessel head degradation that occurred in 2002. 
On the basis of this event, NRC placed the plant, which was already in 
a shutdown condition, into an oversight process outside of the ROP and 
conducted by a special oversight panel consisting of region and 
headquarters NRC officials. 

[13] Currently, the NRC Office of the Inspector General is also 
completing a review, through a contract with technical experts, to 
assess NRC's use of PRA in its regulation of licensees given the 
current state of the art in the technology. 

[14] GAO, Nuclear Regulation: NRC Needs to More Aggressively and 
Comprehensively Resolve Issues Related to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 
Plant's Shutdown, GAO-04-415 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004). 

[15] Tritium is a mildly radioactive type of hydrogen that occurs both 
naturally and during the operation of nuclear power plants. Water 
containing tritium and other radioactive substances is normally 
released from nuclear plants under controlled, monitored conditions 
that NRC mandates to protect public health and safety. 

[16] While spent nuclear fuel is too inefficient to power a nuclear 
reaction, it is still intensely radioactive and continues to generate 
heat for thousands of years. Thus, the potential health and safety 
implications make the control of spent nuclear fuel of great 
importance. 

[17] GAO, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: NRC Needs to Do More to Ensure 
that Power Plants Are Effectively Controlling Spent Nuclear Fuel, GAO- 
05-339 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005); and NRC, Office of the 
Inspector General, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Audit of NRC's 
Regulatory Oversight of Special Nuclear Materials, OIG-03-A-15 (May 23, 
2003). 

[18] NRC also defined four additional components--accountability, 
continuous learning environment, organizational change management, and 
safety policies--that are not associated with the cross-cutting issues, 
but when combined with them, comprise all components that make up 
safety culture. While these additional components are not considered in 
relation to baseline inspection findings, they would be considered 
during the conduct of supplemental inspections. 

[19] Because these plants represent a nonprobability sample, results 
cannot be used to make inferences about the population, or nuclear 
power industry as a whole. This is because in a nonprobability sample, 
some elements of the population being studied have no chance or an 
unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample. 

[20] The 6 sites are out of a total possible of 65. Oftentimes, there 
are 2 or 3 operating plants located at each nuclear power site, often 
operated and licensed by the same company, and therefore combined for 
NRC oversight purposes. 

[21] Physical security inspection reports were not included in our 
analysis because physical security issues were not within the scope of 
this review. 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of 
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to 
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 
integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 
graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its 
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order 
GAO Products" heading. 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 

Voice: (202) 512-6000: 

TDD: (202) 512-2537: 

Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov 

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Public Affairs: 

Jeff Nelligan, managing director, 

NelliganJ@gao.gov 

(202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 

441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548: