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Report to Congress: 

January 2006: 

Mandatory Spending: 

Using Budget Triggers to Constrain Growth: 

GAO-06-276: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-276, a report to Congress: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Prepared as part of GAO’s basic statutory responsibility for monitoring 
the condition of the nation’s finances, the objectives of this report 
were to (1) determine the feasibility of designing and using trigger 
mechanisms to constrain growth in mandatory spending programs and (2) 
provide an analysis of the factors that led to differences between 
estimated and actual outlays in seven mandatory budget accounts during 
fiscal years 2000 through 2004. 

What GAO Found: 

One idea to constrain growth in mandatory programs is to develop 
program-specific triggers that, when tripped, prompt a response. A 
trigger could result in a “hard” or automatic response, unless Congress 
and the President acted to override or alter it. Alternatively, 
reaching a trigger could require a “soft” response, such as a report on 
the causes of the overage, development of a plan to address it, or an 
explicit and formal decision to accept or reject a proposed action or 
increase. By identifying significant increases in the spending path of 
a mandatory program relatively early and acting to constrain it, 
Congress may avert larger financial challenges in the future. However, 
both in establishing triggers and in designing the subsequent 
responses, the integrity of program goals needs to be preserved. In 
addition, tax expenditures operate like mandatory programs but do not 
compete in the annual appropriations process. The analysis GAO applied 
to spending in this report would also be useful in examining tax 
expenditures. 
 
The budget experts GAO consulted had mixed views of triggers. 
Proponents of triggers noted that mandatory spending is currently 
unconstrained and a mechanism that causes decision makers to at least 
periodically reevaluate spending is better than allowing spending to 
rise unchecked. Others, however, expressed considerable skepticism 
about the effectiveness of triggers; many felt they would either be 
circumvented or ignored. While GAO appreciates the views expressed by 
budget experts, in our opinion establishing budget triggers warrants 
consideration in efforts to constrain significant and largely unchecked 
growth in mandatory programs. However, recognizing the natural tension 
in balancing both long-term fiscal challenges and other public policy 
goals, each program needs to be considered individually to ensure that 
any responses triggered strike the appropriate balance between the long-
term fiscal challenge and the program goals. 

To better understand growth in mandatory spending and thus inform GAO’s 
thinking on triggers, for seven case study accounts GAO categorized the 
reasons provided by agencies for differences between estimated and 
actual outlays during a 5-year period as the result of legislative, 
economic, or technical changes. Out of 40 differences, subsequent 
legislation was the primary reason for 19, economic changes for 7, and 
technical changes for 13. In many cases, a combination of these factors 
caused the differences. 

Conceptual Differences between Hard and Soft Responses: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

To promote explicit scrutiny of significant growth in mandatory 
accounts, as mandatory spending programs are created, reexamined, or 
reauthorized, Congress should consider incorporating budget triggers 
that would signal the need for action. Further, it should determine 
whether in some cases it might be appropriate to consider automatically 
causing some action to be taken when the trigger is exceeded. Once a 
trigger is tripped, Congress could either accept or reject all or a 
portion of a proposed response to the spending growth. The Office of 
Management and Budget and agencies responsible for the seven case study 
accounts either did not have comments or provided comments that were 
clarifying and/or technical in nature, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-276. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Susan J. Irving, 202-512-
9142, irvings@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Trigger Mechanisms Could Help Constrain Mandatory Spending but Must Be 
Carefully Designed: 

Reasons for Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays in 
Selected Accounts Varied: 

Conclusions: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Illustrative Examples of Triggers and Responses for Case 
Study Accounts: 

Appendix II: Analysis of Total Outlays, Receipts, and Fiscal Position: 

Aggregate Mandatory Spending Estimates Were Close to Actual Outlays but 
Large Differences Appear at the Account Level: 

Differences between Estimated and Actual Mandatory Outlays Had Limited 
Effect on the Unified Deficit/Surplus: 

Appendix III: Mandatory Budget Accounts: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Reasons for Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays: 

Table 2: Estimated and Actual Corn Outlays, by Fiscal Year: 

Table 3: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual Corn 
Outlays: 

Table 4: Estimated and Actual Crop Disaster Assistance Outlays, by 
Fiscal Year: 

Table 5: Estimated and Actual Direct Student Loan Outlays, by Fiscal 
Year: 

Table 6: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual Direct 
Student Loan Outlays: 

Table 7: Estimated and Actual Medicaid Outlays, by Fiscal Year: 

Table 8: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual 
Medicaid Outlays: 

Table 9: Estimated and Actual HI Outlays, by Fiscal Year: 

Table 10: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual HI 
Outlays: 

Table 11: Estimated and Actual SMI Outlays, by Fiscal Year: 

Table 12: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual SMI 
Outlays: 

Table 13: Estimated and Actual Rail Industry Pension Fund Outlays, by 
Fiscal Year: 

Table 14: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual Rail 
Industry Pension Fund Outlays: 

Table 15: Estimated and Actual Unemployment Trust Fund Outlays, by 
Fiscal Year: 

Table 16: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual 
Unemployment Trust Fund Outlays: 

Table 17: Aggregate Estimated and Actual Outlays and Receipts for 
Fiscal Years 2000-2004: 

Table 18: Revenue Estimates and Actual Results by Source and Fiscal 
Year: 

Table 19: Budget Accounts with Greater than 50 percent Mandatory 
Outlays: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Federal Spending for Mandatory and Discretionary Programs: 

Figure 2: Composition of Spending as a Share of GDP under Baseline 
Extended: 

Figure 3: Composition of Spending as a Share of GDP Assuming 
Discretionary Spending Grows with GDP After 2005 and All Expiring Tax 
Provisions Are Extended: 

Figure 4: Five-Year Average Differences between Estimated and Actual 
Mandatory Outlays, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2005: 

Figure 5: Conceptual Differences between Hard and Soft Responses: 

Figure 6: Balancing Public Policy Goals and Long-term Fiscal 
Challenges: 

Figure 7: Factors Affecting Budget Estimates: 

Figure 8: Percent Change in Unemployment Rate versus Percent Change in 
Actual UTF Outlays: 

Figure 9: Estimated and Actual Total Mandatory Outlays for FYs 2000- 
2004, constant 2004 dollars: 

Figure 10: Estimated and Actual Surplus/Deficit, Fiscal Years 2000- 
2004, constant 2004 dollars: 

Figure 11: Total Estimated and Actual Receipts, Fiscal Years 2000-2004, 
constant 2004 dollars: 

Abbreviations: 

AMT: Alternative Minimum Tax: 

BBRA: Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 
1999: 

BEA: Budget Enforcement Act: 

CBO: Congressional Budget Office: 

CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation: 

CCP: Countercyclical Payments: 

CMS: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: 

CRS: Congressional Research Service: 

ESAA: Employment Security Administration Account: 

EUCA: Extended Unemployment Compensation Account: 

FDLP: Federal Direct Student Loan Program: 

FFELP: Federal Family Education Loan Program: 

FMAP: Federal Medical Assistance Percentage: 

FSA: Farm Service Agency: 

FUA: Federal Unemployment Account: 

FY: Fiscal Year: 

GDP: Gross Domestic Product: 

GRH: Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act: 

HI: Hospital Insurance: 

LDP: Loan Deficiency Payments: 

MMA: Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003: 

MMI: Mutual Mortgage Insurance Program Account: 

NRRIT: National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust: 

OASDI: Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

PAYGO: Pay-As-You-Go: 

PPS: Prospective Payment System: 

QIO: Quality Improvement Organizations: 

RRB: Railroad Retirement Board: 

RUG: Resource Utilization Group: 

SGR: Sustainable Growth Rate: 

SMI: Supplementary Medical Insurance: 

SNF: Skilled Nursing Facility: 

TEUC: Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 2002: 

USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

UTF: Unemployment Trust Fund: 

Letter January 31, 2006: 

The President of the Senate: 
The Speaker of the House of Representatives: 

Over the next few decades as the baby boom generation retires and 
health care costs continue to rise, federal spending on retirement and 
health programs--Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal 
pension, health, and disability programs--will grow dramatically. 
Absent policy changes on the spending and/or revenue sides of the 
budget, a growing imbalance between expected federal spending and tax 
revenues will mean escalating and ultimately unsustainable federal 
deficits and debt that threaten our future economy and national 
security as well as the standard of living for the American 
people.[Footnote 1] 

Given rising deficits, the expiration of the Budget Enforcement Act 
(BEA) of 1990,[Footnote 2] and the long-term fiscal outlook, new budget 
control mechanisms are needed. Accordingly, there have been calls for 
the reintroduction of discretionary spending caps and PAYGO rules. 
Although PAYGO was effective in preventing legislative actions that 
increased the deficit, it did not address increases that occurred 
absent legislative action. Constraining the growth of existing 
mandatory spending programs requires additional action. 

In our 1994 report on capping mandatory spending,[Footnote 3] we noted 
that an alternative method to prompt congressional review of mandatory 
spending trends would be to require Congress to vote periodically on 
whether or not to make program changes when mandatory spending exceeds 
certain targets. One way to do this and potentially achieve greater 
fiscal responsibility would be to create triggers for individual 
mandatory programs--predetermined spending or revenue thresholds--that 
signal the need for some type of action to be taken on the program. 
Once tripped, the trigger could drive either a review or an automatic 
action. It could, for example, trigger a requirement for Congress to 
either review or reaffirm acceptance of the unexpected increase in 
actual program spending or projections. Alternatively, it could trigger 
previously specified changes to the program that automatically take 
effect to reduce spending or increase program revenue. 

Insufficient transparency regarding both the expected and actual cost 
path for spending and revenue decisions hampers the ability of decision 
makers to make informed choices. In previous work, we have called for 
increased disclosure and recognition of long-term costs of proposed 
policies and programs.[Footnote 4] The ability to monitor actual 
spending paths can also play an important role in decisions about both 
the overall fiscal position and the allocation of scarce resources. 
Moreover, as we reported in 1994, a cap on mandatory spending would 
have little if any effect on the longer-term growth trends until and 
unless issues of underlying program eligibility and benefits are 
addressed.[Footnote 5] Thus, efforts to constrain growth in mandatory 
programs need to be focused on and tailored to individual programs. One 
way to assess mandatory spending is to analyze growth by examining the 
estimated and actual outlays for each program. Because budget estimates 
can be linked to achieving fiscal responsibility in the government, 
identifying and understanding recurring patterns between mandatory 
account budget estimates and actual results can facilitate future 
budget decisions. 

This report, prepared as part of our basic statutory responsibility for 
monitoring the condition of the nation's finances, examines issues 
related to using such triggers on mandatory programs. The objectives 
were to (1) determine the feasibility of designing and using trigger 
mechanisms to constrain growth in mandatory spending and (2) provide an 
analysis of the factors that led to differences between estimated and 
actual outlays in seven mandatory budget accounts during fiscal years 
2000 through 2004. 

This report does not deal with the question of projected costs at the 
time decisions are made but instead with the need for responses when 
there is significant growth. Analogous analyses could be applied to the 
revenue side of the budget (e.g., tax expenditures). 

Results in Brief: 

One idea to constrain growth in mandatory programs is to develop 
triggers that, when tripped, prompt a response. A trigger could result 
in a "hard" or automatic response, unless Congress and the President 
acted to override or alter it. Alternatively, reaching a trigger could 
require a "soft" response, such as a report on the causes of the 
overage, development of a plan to address it, or an explicit and formal 
decision to accept or reject a proposed action or increase. By 
identifying significant increases in the spending path of a mandatory 
program relatively early and acting to constrain it, Congress may avert 
larger financial challenges in the future. However, both in 
establishing triggers and in designing the subsequent actions to be 
triggered, the integrity of program goals needs to be preserved. 

The budget experts we consulted had mixed views of triggers. Some 
expressed strong support for budget triggers. These proponents of 
triggers noted that mandatory spending is currently unconstrained and a 
mechanism that causes decision makers to at least periodically 
reevaluate spending is better than allowing spending to rise unchecked. 
Others, however, expressed considerable skepticism about the 
effectiveness of triggers; many felt they would be circumvented or 
ignored. For example, one expert pointed to "accounting tricks" that 
have resulted from triggers with hard responses, such as when Congress 
mandated certain costs not be counted against spending limits so as to 
avoid across-the-board cuts. Others worried that applying budget 
triggers to various mandatory programs diverts attention from what they 
see as the real source of the nation's fiscal woes--health care 
spending. Further, they felt that establishing triggers on such 
programs could mislead the public into thinking that the long-term 
fiscal problem had been addressed, thus delaying efforts to 
appropriately address it. 

Any discussion to create triggered responses and their design must 
recognize that unlike controls on discretionary spending, there is some 
tension between the idea of triggers and the nature of entitlement and 
other mandatory spending programs. These programs--as with tax 
provisions such as tax expenditures--were designed to provide benefits 
based on eligibility formulas or actions as opposed to an annual 
decision regarding spending. This tension makes it more challenging to 
constrain costs and to design both triggers and triggered responses. At 
the same time, with only about one-third of the budget under the 
control of the annual appropriations process, considering ways to 
increase transparency, oversight, and control of mandatory programs 
must be part of addressing the nation's long-term fiscal challenges. 

Ignoring significant growth in mandatory accounts is inconsistent with 
evaluation of programs and their costs. While we appreciate the 
concerns raised by budget experts, we believe that, if carefully 
designed, budget constraint mechanisms such as triggers should be 
considered as existing programs are reexamined or reauthorized and when 
new programs are created. Each program would need to be considered 
individually to ensure that any actions that are triggered preserve 
program goals. The seven mandatory accounts we examined helped inform 
our thinking about budget constraint mechanisms, and we present 
illustrative examples of how growth could be constrained in many of the 
accounts discussed in appendix I. 

For seven case study accounts,[Footnote 6] we categorized the reasons 
provided by agencies for differences between estimated and actual 
outlays during fiscal years 2000 through 2004 as the result of (1) 
legislative changes enacted after original estimates were submitted, 
(2) economic changes such as interest and unemployment rates, or (3) 
technical changes, which is a residual category that represents 
revisions to budget estimates that cannot be attributed to legislative 
or economic factors. Our analysis of the reasons for differences 
between estimated and actual outlays showed that out of 40 differences, 
legislative changes[Footnote 7] were the primary reason for 19, 
economic changes for 7, and technical changes for 13. In one case, it 
was unclear which factors most significantly caused the difference 
between estimated and actual outlays. In many cases, a combination of 
factors caused the differences. 

OMB and agencies responsible for the seven case study accounts either 
did not have comments or provided comments that were clarifying and/or 
technical in nature. These comments were incorporated as appropriate. 

Background: 

BEA[Footnote 8] divided federal spending into two broad categories: 
discretionary and mandatory. Discretionary spending refers to outlays 
from budget authority that is provided in and controlled by 
appropriation acts; it can and has been controlled through annual, 
adjustable dollar limits (spending caps) that permanently lower the 
base for future appropriations. Mandatory spending[Footnote 9] refers 
to outlays resulting from budget authority that is provided in laws 
other than appropriation acts, for example, entitlement programs such 
as Medicare, Food Stamps, and veterans' pensions. Mandatory spending-- 
like tax expenditures--is governed by eligibility rules and benefit 
formulas, which means that funds are spent as required to provide 
benefits to those who are eligible and wish to participate. Therefore, 
unforeseen events such as changes in the economy or additional demands 
for services can translate into unanticipated additional program 
outlays. Congress controls spending for these programs indirectly by 
defining eligibility and setting the benefit or payment rules rather 
than directly through appropriation acts. On an annual basis, however, 
mandatory spending is relatively uncontrollable since Congress and the 
President must change substantive law in order to further increase or 
decrease outlays. This makes it more challenging to constrain costs and 
to design both triggers and triggered responses. 

Over the past 4 decades, we have seen mandatory spending grow as a 
share of the total federal budget. For example, figure 1 shows that 
spending on mandatory programs rose from approximately 42 percent of 
total federal spending in 1984 to about 49 percent in 1994, and to 54 
percent in 2004. This growth is projected to continue with mandatory 
programs claiming about 58 percent of total federal spending in 2010. 

Figure 1: Federal Spending for Mandatory and Discretionary Programs: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The nation's long-term fiscal outlook is daunting under many different 
policy scenarios and assumptions. For instance, under a fiscally 
restrained scenario, if discretionary spending grew only with inflation 
over the next 10 years and all existing tax cuts expire when scheduled 
under current law, spending for Social Security and health care 
programs would grow to consume over three-quarters of federal revenues 
by 2040 (see fig. 2). On the other hand, if discretionary spending grew 
at the same rate as the economy--measured by Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)--in the near term and if all tax cuts were extended, federal 
revenues may just be adequate to pay interest on the growing federal 
debt by 2040 (see fig. 3). Numerous alternative scenarios can be 
developed incorporating different combinations of possible policy 
choices and economic assumptions, but these two scenarios can be viewed 
as "bookends" showing a range of possible outcomes. 

Figure 2: Composition of Spending as a Share of GDP under Baseline 
Extended: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: In addition to the expiration of tax cuts, revenue as a share of 
GDP increases through 2015 due to (1) real bracket creep, (2) more 
taxpayers becoming subject to the alternative minimum tax (AMT), and 
(3) increased revenue from tax-deferred retirement accounts. After 
2015, revenue as a share of GDP is held constant. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: Composition of Spending as a Share of GDP Assuming 
Discretionary Spending Grows with GDP After 2005 and All Expiring Tax 
Provisions Are Extended: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Although expiring tax provisions are extended, revenue as a share 
of GDP increases through 2015 due to (1) real bracket creep, (2) more 
taxpayers becoming subject to the AMT, and (3) increased revenue from 
tax-deferred retirement accounts. After 2015, revenue as a share of GDP 
is held constant. 

[End of figure] 

As both these simulations illustrate, absent policy changes on the 
spending and/or revenue side of the budget, the growth in spending on 
federal retirement and health entitlements will encumber an escalating 
share of the government's resources. Neither slowing the growth in 
discretionary spending nor allowing the tax provisions to expire--nor 
both together--would eliminate the imbalance. Although revenues will be 
part of the debate about our fiscal future, making no changes to Social 
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and other drivers of the long-term fiscal 
gap would require at least a doubling of taxes--and that seems 
implausible. Accordingly, substantive reform of Social Security and our 
major health programs remains critical to recapturing our future fiscal 
flexibility. 

These long-term spending projections can largely be attributed to the 
aging population and increased health care costs. This does not, 
however, mean that the rest of the budget should be exempt from review. 
It is important to periodically look at mandatory accounts in order to 
determine possible ways to constrain spending and ensure a more 
accurate and responsible federal budget process. 

Congressional interest in fiscal discipline and the adoption of budget 
tools to control mandatory spending are not new. The Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, commonly referred to as 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH), established declining deficit targets and 
a sequestration procedure to reduce spending if those targets were 
exceeded. GRH was amended several times, most significantly by BEA in 
1990. One important reason for BEA's success in reducing the deficit 
during the 1990s was that the process enforced a previously reached 
agreement to reduce the deficit. However, recurring surpluses at the 
end of the decade caused a new debate to emerge and undermined the 
acceptance of BEA's spending caps and PAYGO enforcement. BEA rules were 
not extended beyond their scheduled expiration date at the end of 
fiscal year 2002. 

In the past, mandatory spending caps were proposed as a way to control 
the growth of mandatory programs. This idea was discussed in a report 
we issued in 1994.[Footnote 10] Mandatory caps fail to address 
underlying eligibility and benefits formulas--which drive spending. In 
addition, if caps were imposed in the context of a control requiring 
across-the-board spending cuts, they would present agencies with 
difficulties in successfully reducing their program spending to stay 
within limits, and perhaps lead to a cycle of continual sequestrations. 
This difficulty is because in such a regime, any shortfalls in savings 
or growth in spending that occurred despite agency efforts would be 
added to the amount of cuts required in the next year. Moreover, the 
mandatory programs that would be most affected by a cap--because of 
their high and/or volatile growth rates--are also the programs for 
which a cap would be hardest to implement. 

In the mid-1990s, there was a period when the idea of constraining 
greater-than-expected growth through the use of triggers surfaced. 
However, it coincided with a period when actual growth generally was 
less than expected. Recently, with the reappearance of large deficits, 
there has been a resurgence of interest in restoring budget controls 
and containing the growth in both discretionary and mandatory spending. 
For example, in 2005, numerous bills to reinstate fiscal discipline 
were proposed.[Footnote 11] Moreover, in May 2005, OMB issued a memo to 
agencies that required them to propose offsets to any administrative 
action that would increase mandatory spending. 

Budget estimates and actual outlays are determined over a period that 
spans nearly 2 years: from the time the President's budget is 
formulated, about a year before the start of the fiscal year in 
question, to the completion of that fiscal year. Within this 2-year lag 
period between original estimates and actual outlays, legislative, 
economic, and technical factors can affect program outlays. Budget 
estimates are revised part way through the fiscal year and included in 
the budget request for the following fiscal year. These revisions 
reflect updated technical and economic assumptions as well as any 
legislative changes. Also, midsession reviews conducted during the 
summer, usually in July, update budget estimates prior to the 
completion of the fiscal year. In addition, both CBO and OMB estimate 
the cost of bills that affect mandatory spending. 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The objectives of this study were to (1) determine the feasibility of 
designing and using trigger mechanisms to constrain growth in mandatory 
spending and (2) provide an analysis of the factors (legislative, 
economic, and technical) that led to differences between estimated and 
actual outlays in seven mandatory budget accounts during fiscal years 
2000 through 2004. This second objective contributed to our 
understanding of programs, helped us better appreciate the reasons 
behind growth in mandatory accounts that experienced relatively large 
dollar changes, and more fully informed our thinking about triggers. 

To accomplish our first objective, we performed a literature search on 
mechanisms to constrain mandatory spending and had discussions with 
numerous budget experts from OMB, CBO, the Senate Budget Committee 
staff, and various policy research organizations. Based on our 
research, interviews at agencies, and discussions with experts, we then 
considered possible approaches for budgetary constraint within each 
account. 

To accomplish our second objective we extracted from OMB's budget 
database mandatory outlays of accounts where 50 percent or more of the 
outlays were mandatory. We analyzed these data for fiscal years 2000 
through 2004. To determine the estimated and actual outlays for each 
year, we used the original budget estimate and the actual outlays 
reported 2 years later, after the end of the fiscal year. For example, 
when determining the difference between estimated and actual outlays 
for fiscal year 2000, we compared the fiscal year 2000 budget estimates 
published in February 1999 to the actual outlays published in February 
2001. 

From the 534 accounts with outlays at least half mandatory, we selected 
the top 10 accounts that experienced the greatest average dollar change 
between original estimate and actual outlays in absolute value terms 
for 5 fiscal years (2000-2004). The complete list of these accounts is 
included as appendix III. These 10 accounts, which represent 
approximately 50 percent of total average mandatory outlays, include 
(1) Interest on Treasury Debt Securities, (2) Unemployment Trust Fund, 
(3) Commodity Credit Corporation Fund,[Footnote 12] (4) Federal 
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund (Medicare Part B), (5) 
Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (Medicare Part A), (6) Grants to 
States for Medicaid,[Footnote 13] (7) Rail Industry Pension Fund, (8) 
Federal Direct Student Loan Program (FDLP) Account, (9) Payments to 
Health Care Trust Funds, and (10) Mutual Mortgage Insurance Program 
Account (MMI). Because many of the programs we selected are relatively 
big, large dollar increases may represent small percentage increases 
relative to program size. 

After initial analysis, we excluded three of these accounts from 
further analysis: Interest on Treasury Debt Securities, MMI,[Footnote 
14] and Payments to Health Care Trust Funds. We eliminated the U.S. 
Treasury account because interest payments are a function of all other 
funding decisions and thus provide little insight into trigger 
design.[Footnote 15] We excluded the MMI account because the program 
itself is discretionary--only the large mandatory reestimates of its 
credit subsidy required by the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 caused 
it to fall into our original sample. Because decisions about the size 
of this program are annually made in the appropriations process and can 
be informed by the reestimates of previous years' loans, there is no 
need for separate triggers. Finally, we excluded the Payments to Health 
Care Trust Funds account because the payments are classified as 
intragovernmental transfers and therefore do not affect overall budget 
outlay data. Moreover, these transfers are captured within other 
accounts in our sample. 

Figure 4 below shows the 5-year average difference between estimated 
and actual mandatory outlays in absolute value terms for the seven 
accounts we reviewed. These differences ranged from $9.4 billion in the 
Unemployment Trust Fund to $2.6 billion in FDLP. 

Figure 4: Five-Year Average Differences between Estimated and Actual 
Mandatory Outlays, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2005: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

To gain more perspective on what factors contributed to the differences 
between estimated and actual outlays in the remaining seven accounts, 
we met with officials from the cognizant agencies to determine if the 
reasons behind the differences were (1) legislative, (2) economic, (3) 
technical, or a combination of the three. We did not independently 
verify the explanations agencies provided for differences. 

Our work was done between May 2005 and January 2006 in Washington, 
D.C., in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

Trigger Mechanisms Could Help Constrain Mandatory Spending but Must Be 
Carefully Designed: 

The purpose of a budget trigger is to either automatically cause some 
action to occur or to prompt decision makers to evaluate and consider 
responding to rising costs. For example, where differences between 
expected and actual growth in a program exceed a specified amount, 
Congress could decide explicitly--by voting--whether to accept the 
slippage or could take action to bring the spending path closer to the 
original goal by recouping some or all of the slippage through changes 
in the program. Our background research, work in case study agencies, 
and discussions with budget experts highlighted several issues to 
consider when designing triggers and their resulting actions, such as 
the extent of agreement among decision makers about underlying fiscal 
goals, measures selected to trip the trigger, and the triggered 
response. 

While a budget process can surface important issues, it is not a 
substitute for substantive debate--no process can force agreement where 
one does not exist. Accordingly, the success of any effort to constrain 
growth depends on whether there is widespread agreement on the 
underlying goals; absent such agreement, any trigger would likely be 
circumvented. For example, underlying the successful budget enforcement 
mechanisms embodied in BEA was the broadly accepted goal of deficit 
reduction and an agreement on a specific set of legislative changes to 
reach that goal. Its triggers were centered around measures that 
Congress could control--discretionary spending caps and changes to 
entitlement and tax laws. However, once the budget moved into surplus 
in the late 1990s and there was no longer agreement on fiscal goals, 
actions were taken to bypass BEA controls. For example, the 
consolidated appropriations acts for both fiscal years 2000 and 2001 
mandated that OMB change the PAYGO scorecard balance to zero. Both OMB 
and CBO estimated that without instructions to change the scorecard, 
sequestrations would have been required in 2001. 

Other countries we have studied have sought to address national 
priorities by developing explicit goals to guide fiscal policy and 
justifying their goals with compelling rationales that often pointed 
out the potential fiscal and economic benefits of budgetary discipline. 
In a 2000 report,[Footnote 16] we noted that having fiscal goals 
anchored by a rationale that is compelling enough to make continued 
restraint acceptable is critical to sustain support for budgetary 
discipline. 

Issues to Consider in Constructing a Trigger: 

One of the reasons for the success of BEA was its link to congressional 
action.[Footnote 17] Discretionary spending caps and PAYGO constrained 
congressional action--BEA held Congress accountable only for things it 
could control and not for the effect of economic or technical factors 
on spending or revenues. This was both the strength and the limitation 
of PAYGO. Triggers seek to go beyond the PAYGO regime by subjecting 
program growth to scrutiny even where that growth is the result of 
economic, population, or other factors outside congressional control. 
Triggers recognize that even the best estimates can turn out to be 
wrong and that decision makers who expected one path might wish to 
consider changes in a program where the path is significantly different 
from what was anticipated. 

In general, there are two types of responses to budget triggers--soft 
and hard--depending on what type of action results when the trigger is 
tripped. A "soft" response prompts special consideration of a program 
or a proposal for action when a certain threshold or target is 
breached. Examples of soft responses that could be triggered include 
requiring the administering agency to prepare a special report 
explaining why the trigger's threshold was breached, or requiring the 
President to submit a proposal for reform. An example of a soft 
response already exists in the Medicare program, which requires the 
President to submit a proposal to Congress for action if the Medicare 
Trustees determine in 2 consecutive years that the general revenue 
share of Medicare spending is projected to exceed 45 percent during a 7-
year period.[Footnote 18] In addition, a few Social Security reform 
proposals have included language requiring presidential and 
congressional action if the Social Security Board of Trustees 
determines that the balance ratio of either of the Social Security 
trust funds will be zero for any calendar year during the succeeding 75 
years.[Footnote 19] 

Soft responses can help in alerting decision makers of potential 
problems but they do not ensure that action to decrease spending or 
increase revenue is taken. With soft responses, the fiscal path 
continues unless Congress and the President take action. In contrast, a 
trigger could lead to "hard" responses requiring a predetermined, 
program-specific action to take place, such as changes in eligibility 
criteria and benefit formulas, automatic revenue increases, or 
automatic spending cuts. With hard responses, spending is automatically 
constrained, revenue is automatically increased, or both, unless 
Congress takes action to override. Figure 5 below illustrates the 
conceptual differences between hard and soft responses of a budget 
trigger. 

Figure 5: Conceptual Differences between Hard and Soft Responses: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In establishing triggers, both near-and long-term perspectives need be 
considered. For some programs it might be appropriate to tie triggers 
to historical data. For example, unexpected spending growth in student 
loans might be measured against past historical spending data. However, 
for other programs that expose the government to long-term commitments-
-such as Medicare or Social Security--it might be more appropriate to 
tie the trigger to projections of future spending. Social Security, 
however, represents a large long-term commitment of future resources. 
Thus, growth for this program might be measured against changes in 
actuarial projections of Social Security's 75-year outlook. Such an 
approach could be used for other programs with long-term commitments, 
such as pension insurance, if good long-term projections become 
available. 

Since all estimates are subject to some uncertainty, the triggering 
mechanism should not be so tight that it is overly sensitive to normal 
variation in budget estimation. One way to address this concern is to 
establish a normal or expected range of budget uncertainty and set a 
trigger level that falls outside this range. For example, if a 
program's actual outlays historically fall within plus or minus 5 
percent of estimated outlays, a trigger set at a level greater than 5 
percent would best signal unexpected growth. This approach resembles 
one CBO uses for certain programs to analyze the budgetary effects of 
legislative proposals.[Footnote 20] Using a probabilistic model, CBO 
estimates the weighted average of the effects associated with all 
possible sets of circumstances, taking into account their respective 
probabilities. Such an approach could be adapted to establish a range 
of uncertainty around a budget estimate. 

Triggers also could be used to ensure that policy changes actually 
achieve intended reductions in spending growth. Such triggers could 
address concerns that some budget constraint mechanisms create the 
false impression that long-term problems have been addressed. 

Although any hard response can be overridden by congressional action, 
it could be important to incorporate a more automatic escape clause 
into budget enforcement mechanisms such as triggers. Effective budget 
enforcement mechanisms need to be able to accommodate changing budget 
policy and political environments in which future outcomes are 
difficult to predict. For example, periods of economic growth may be 
brief or sustained, but inevitably are followed by periods of economic 
downturn that may be shallow or deep. Escape mechanisms, such as 
expiration dates, allow budget policies and procedures to be 
renegotiated later. In addition to expiration dates, House or Senate 
rules can provide flexibility. For example, any Senator may raise a 
point of order against legislation violating PAYGO rules prohibiting 
consideration of revenue or direct spending legislation that is not 
deficit-neutral. However, the point of order may be waived if there is 
broad consensus on the need to do so--that is, if there is an 
affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership. 

Although they provide important flexibility, escape clauses can be 
overused. For example, in fiscal year 2002, the Department of Defense 
and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act[Footnote 21] instructed 
that $130.3 billion in costs be eliminated from the PAYGO scorecard. 
Both OMB and CBO estimated that without instructions to change the 
scorecard, a sequester--across-the-board spending cuts--would have been 
required in 2002. In addition, many programs were exempt from PAYGO's 
sequestration requirement. These exemptions meant that the full brunt 
of any sequester was concentrated in the remaining programs, resulting 
in cuts so draconian that Congress and the President changed the 
targets rather than impose the required cuts. 

Issues to Consider in Designing the Triggered Response: 

Whether a triggered response is soft, hard, or a combination of the 
two, efforts to constrain growth in mandatory programs need to be 
focused at the program level. The experience with GRH highlights the 
importance of individually designed triggers and responses. The deficit-
neutrality targets under GRH triggered a hard response--across- the-
board spending cuts--if they were not met. The deficit targets under 
GRH were not achieved due to the inability of Congress and the 
President to control all of the factors--mainly economic factors--that 
affected whether the trigger would be breached and their unwillingness 
to accept the across-the-board cuts that would have been necessary to 
meet the deficit targets. 

In developing program-specific triggers and responses, proposed changes 
in underlying benefits structure and design of mandatory programs can 
be considered in the context of the factors that drove the growth and 
the goals and objectives of specific programs. For example, certain 
programs such as unemployment insurance and crop assistance are 
designed and intended to have a countercyclical effect on the economy. 
That is, they are aimed at reducing the size and duration of swings in 
economic activity in order to keep economic growth closer to a pace 
consistent with low inflation and high employment. Thus, a triggered 
response in these programs needs to be sensitive to whether growth is 
being driven by automatic budget stabilizers. For example, a rise in 
the unemployment rate would by design increase outlays in federal 
unemployment insurance not only to provide assistance to the unemployed 
but also to stabilize the economy. If a trigger were established that 
resulted in a contractionary response, it could undermine these 
important goals and exacerbate the effects of unemployment on the 
economy. In a January 2002 report,[Footnote 22] the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) suggested one option to avoid procyclical 
triggers would be to delegate to some entity--for instance Congress or 
an executive department--the responsibility for evaluating each year 
whether deteriorating economic conditions would make a trigger 
detrimental. If conditions were found to be deteriorating, decisions 
would need to be made about whether and how to implement any reduction. 
CRS acknowledged, however, that this type of proposal could be 
criticized on the grounds that it is based on a subjective decision and 
thus could be prey to the sort of political pressures that critics fear 
would undermine a trigger. Indeed, one budget expert we met with 
expressed concern that in devising a budget trigger, it would be 
helpful to acknowledge political pressures by considering who would 
judge progress against the trigger and the neutrality of the judging 
entity. 

The programs and agencies we reviewed have objectives and missions that 
contribute to the achievement of public policy goals such as income 
security, feeding the nation, fostering higher education, and providing 
health care. To these ends, these programs are designed to provide 
entitlements--benefits and assistance--to eligible recipients. While 
striving to meet these commitments, our nation is faced with a daunting 
long-term fiscal outlook based on the challenges of an aging 
population, unsustainable deficits, and mounting debt while also 
ensuring truth and transparency. Figure 6 depicts the inherent tension 
in balancing public policy goals and long-term fiscal challenges. 

Figure 6: Balancing Public Policy Goals and Long-term Fiscal 
Challenges: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Addressing this tension invariably entails difficult political choices 
among competing programs that promise benefits to many Americans but 
are collectively unaffordable and unsustainable at current revenue 
levels. In February 2005 we highlighted the size of fiscal imbalances 
looming in the future and the challenge of our policy process to act 
with more foresight to take early action on problems that may not 
constitute an urgent crisis but pose important longer-term threats to 
the nation's fiscal, economic, security, and societal future.[Footnote 
23] Budget triggers are mechanisms that can encourage and facilitate 
such action. 

To help us better consider the implications of establishing triggers, 
we looked at seven mandatory accounts with relatively large differences 
between estimated and actual outlays: Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC), Federal Direct Student Loan Program Account, Grants to States 
for Medicaid, Federal Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund (Medicare Part 
A), Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund (Medicare 
Part B), Rail Industry Pension Fund, and the Unemployment Trust Fund. 
We explored ways in which existing triggers and their corresponding 
actions could be revised, as well as an array of new trigger mechanisms 
that take into consideration the issues just discussed and could be 
adopted to promote better budgeting in light of the nation's long-term 
fiscal outlook. 

It is important to consider the data upon which the trigger will hinge-
-future projections based on historical data, growth as a percent of 
GDP, total growth, or another measure altogether. For example, Congress 
has established a trigger to constrain growth in Medicare spending for 
physicians' services. The sustainable growth rate (SGR) is a 
statutorily set formula that estimates the allowed rate of increase in 
spending for physicians' services; that rate is used to construct the 
spending target for the following calendar year. If actual spending 
exceeds the cumulative SGR targets, fee updates in future years must be 
lowered sufficiently both to offset the accumulated excess spending and 
to slow expected spending for the coming year.[Footnote 24] The 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 
(MMA) established another trigger--the general revenue share of 
Medicare spending. If the Medicare Trustees determine in 2 consecutive 
years that the general revenue share is projected to exceed 45 percent 
during a 7-year projection period, the President must submit a proposal 
to Congress for action. To date, this threshold has not been breached 
and thus no response has been triggered. However, Medicare Trustees are 
expected to determine the first breach in their upcoming 2006 report as 
the trigger is projected to be tripped in 2012, which falls within the 
7-year projection period captured in that report. For unemployment 
insurance, a trigger was established around balances in the 
Unemployment Trust Fund. When funds accumulating in federal 
unemployment accounts reach statutorily set limits, a distribution of 
the "excess" funds from the trust fund to individual states' accounts--
called "Reed Distributions"[Footnote 25]--are automatically triggered 
based on each state's share of covered wages. One way to constrain 
federal spending would be to increase the statutory cap on federal 
unemployment accounts, thus making it more difficult to trigger Reed 
Distributions to states. By making it more difficult to trip the 
trigger, funds could continue to build during economic prosperity and 
be available to states when truly needed to counter rising 
unemployment. 

Our analysis allowed us to develop a list of illustrative examples, 
which analyze the related trade-offs involved in balancing restraint 
with optimization of program goals. These are shown in appendix I, 
along with a brief description of the program and account. Finally, 
where appropriate we present illustrative examples of hard responses 
that could be established to constrain spending. We do not specifically 
advocate any of these approaches--they are presented for illustrative 
purposes only to provide a sense of the types of trigger and resulting 
actions that could be established. Although the illustrative examples 
we developed apply specifically to the seven case study accounts that 
we reviewed, we believe the information can further the larger policy 
conversation about how to increase oversight of the path of mandatory 
spending and advance and encourage budgetary discipline. 

Expert Views on Trigger Mechanisms Are Mixed: 

We interviewed budget experts from OMB, CBO, the Senate Budget 
Committee staff, and various policy research organizations to discuss 
views on using triggers to constrain mandatory spending. Overall, views 
were mixed. While some were more in favor of triggers than others, many 
expressed concern that they would be circumvented or ignored, thereby 
questioning their effectiveness. In addition, many were concerned that 
triggers could jeopardize the underlying intent of mandatory programs. 
Several experts also pointed to the need to ensure that any triggers 
developed be carefully designed to avoid procyclical effects. 

Some of the experts expressed strong support for budget triggers. These 
individuals believed that triggers with hard responses had the 
potential to constrain mandatory spending and that the accountability 
added by triggers would be preferable to the current unconstrained 
environment. For example, one expressed concern about the debt burden 
being permitted to mount for future generations in order to avoid the 
reduction in benefits or increase in taxes needed to finance current 
benefits. Linking revenues and spending with GDP, she argued, would 
help avoid such generational inequities. Another added that under 
current policy, spending grows automatically, by default, faster than 
tax revenues as the population ages and health costs soar. He argued 
that only by changing the budget's autopilot programming can we gain 
the flexibility needed to continually improve government policies and 
services. 

Others, however, said that triggers reduced accountability because they 
enable decision makers to publicly extol budget constraint but quietly 
continue to increase spending. One pointed to "accounting tricks" that 
have resulted from triggers with hard responses, such as when Congress 
mandated certain costs not be counted against spending limits so as to 
avoid across-the-board cuts. However, as discussed previously, triggers 
also could be used to ensure that policy changes actually achieve 
intended reductions in spending growth. Such triggers could address 
concerns that some budget constraint mechanisms create the false 
impression that long-term problems have been addressed. 

Many expressed skepticism that budget constraint mechanisms such as 
triggers would be adhered to; one cited Medicare's SGR as an example. 
The SGR system is designed to apply financial brakes whenever actual 
spending for physicians' services exceeds predefined spending targets. 
It does this by reducing physician fees or limiting their annual 
increase. Because the actual versus target spending comparison is 
cumulative, future fee updates are reduced to lower future actual 
spending below future target spending until total cumulative actual 
spending is the same as total cumulative target spending. However, fee 
declines were averted for 2003, 2004, and 2005 by administrative and 
legislative actions that modified or overrode the SGR system. 

Some experts worried that applying budget triggers to various mandatory 
spending programs would divert attention from the real source of the 
nation's fiscal woes--health care--whose costs continue to rise faster 
than GDP. They pointed to CBO data as evidence that, outside of health 
care and to a lesser extent Social Security, virtually all other 
mandatory programs are decreasing or holding steady as a percent of 
GDP. Accordingly, they expressed concern that establishing triggers on 
such programs could mislead the public into thinking that the long-term 
fiscal problem had been addressed, thus delaying efforts to 
appropriately address it. 

Many of the budget experts raised concerns about triggers jeopardizing 
the important underlying missions and program goals financed by 
mandatory accounts. In particular, concerns were raised about 
undermining countercyclical effects of programs such as unemployment 
insurance, Food Stamps, and the Earned Income Tax Credit. Some noted 
that the desire to preserve program goals is the reason why triggers 
with hard responses have not worked in the past. With respect to the 
SGR, for example, one expert explained that the reason Congress 
overrides the trigger is to ensure doctors do not stop accepting 
Medicare patients. 

Finally, a couple of experts pointed out that triggers need not only 
apply to spending; the revenue side of the budget should also be 
addressed. One noted, for example, that an increase in taxes to cover 
spending growth would increase visibility to the public and thus permit 
the American people to be more aware of how much they are paying for 
services. Applying triggers to tax cuts was an issue considered in 2001 
when the budget was in surplus and tax cuts were proposed. For example, 
Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan at that time expressed his 
preference for a trigger that would make tax cuts contingent on the 
realized net debt level. Comptroller General Walker also raised the 
possibility of using a trigger to return a "surplus dividend" if actual 
surpluses occurred in excess of specific levels. Ultimately, however, 
triggers were not adopted. Instead, tax cuts were enacted through 2010 
even though substantial deficits have reappeared. In addition, as we 
reported in a February 2005 testimony,[Footnote 26] there has been an 
extensive use of tax incentives, rather than direct spending authority, 
to fund social objectives. As we reported in September 2005,[Footnote 
27] the sum of revenue loss estimates associated with tax expenditures-
-such as tax exclusions, credits, and deductions--was nearly $730 
billion in 2004.[Footnote 28] Many tax expenditures operate like 
mandatory spending programs and generally are not subject to 
reauthorization. Such tax expenditures are embedded in the tax system 
and are off the radar screen for the most part. This is a concern from 
a budgetary standpoint because federal dollars committed to fund these 
expenditures do not compete in the annual appropriations process and 
are effectively "fully funded" before any discretionary spending is 
considered. The analysis we applied to spending in this report would 
also be useful in examining tax expenditures. However, challenges in 
defining and measuring tax expenditures, to some extent, would affect 
any effort to curtail revenues foregone through tax expenditures. For 
example, after taxpayers have taken advantage of tax expenditures, the 
federal government still may not know, with much certainty, how much 
tax revenue was foregone, who benefited, and what results were 
achieved.[Footnote 29] 

Reasons for Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays in 
Selected Accounts Varied: 

To better appreciate the reasons behind growth in mandatory accounts 
and thus inform our thinking on triggers, we examined the reasons for 
differences between originally estimated and actual outlays for seven 
mandatory accounts that experienced relatively large dollar 
changes.[Footnote 30] Based on agencies' explanations of differences 
between estimated and actual outlays of the case study accounts we 
examined, we found that legislation enacted after original estimates 
were submitted was the primary driver in 19 out of 40 differences 
during fiscal years 2000 through 2004. Economic factors, such as 
changes in interest and unemployment rates, were primarily responsible 
for 7 differences. Finally, technical factors, which cover a broad 
spectrum, most significantly drove 13 out of 40 differences. In one 
case, it was unclear which factors most significantly caused the 
difference between estimated and actual outlays. In many cases, a 
combination of factors resulted in differences. 

In categorizing agencies' explanations for differences between 
estimated and actual outlays, we applied criteria similar to those that 
CBO uses in its annual budget and economic outlook reports to 
categorize changes as legislative, technical, and economic. However, in 
our report, legislative action was classified in a somewhat different 
manner from the method that CBO applies. Whereas we examined the actual 
budgetary effect that resulted from the legislation, CBO projects the 
anticipated future budgetary effect of legislation.[Footnote 31] Figure 
7 describes the criteria that we applied to categorize agencies' 
explanations into three factors. While this framework is helpful in 
evaluating changes in the federal budget, it is not precise and should 
be viewed as indicative as opposed to determinative. 

Figure 7: Factors Affecting Budget Estimates: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Table 1 summarizes the factors--legislative, economic, and technical-- 
that most significantly resulted in differences between estimated and 
actual outlays by fiscal year and account. The factors that were major 
drivers for differences between estimated and actual outlays are 
denoted with "A." Other factors that affected the difference are 
denoted with "B." In one case, it was unclear which factors most 
significantly caused the difference between estimated and actual 
outlays. In that case, both relevant factors are marked with an "B." 
Detailed explanations supporting this summary are presented in appendix 
I. 

Table 1: Reasons for Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays: 

Account: Commodity Credit Corporation--Corn; 
Fiscal year: 2000; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Economic: B. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Economic: B; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Reason for differences: Economic: A. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Economic: B. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Reason for differences: Economic: A; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Account: Commodity Credit Corporation--Crop Disaster Assistance; 
Fiscal year: 2000; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A. 

Account: Federal Direct Student Loan Program Account; 
Fiscal year: 2000; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Reason for differences: Economic: A; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Reason for differences: Economic: A; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Reason for differences: Economic: A; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Account: Grants to States for Medicaid; 
Fiscal year: 2000; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Account: Medicare Part A--Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund; 
Fiscal year: 2000; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Reason for differences: Economic: B; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Account: Medicare Part B--Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust 
Fund; 
Fiscal year: 2000; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Economic: B; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Account: Rail Industry Pension Fund; 
Fiscal year: 2000; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Reason for differences: Technical: A. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Technical: B. 

Account: Unemployment Trust Fund; 
Fiscal year: 2000; 
Reason for differences: Economic: A. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Reason for differences: Economic: A. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Economic: B. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Economic: B. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: A; 
Reason for differences: Economic: B. 

Account: Total major drivers of differences; 
Reason for differences: Legislative: 19; 
Reason for differences: Economic: 7; 
Reason for differences: Technical: 13. 

Source: GAO analysis of agencies' explanations of differences between 
estimated and actual outlays. 

Note: Factors that were major drivers for the difference between 
estimated and actual outlays are denoted with "A." Other factors that 
affected the difference are denoted with "B." In one case, it was 
unclear which factors most significantly affected the difference. In 
that case, both relevant factors are marked with an "B." 

[End of table] 

Legislation Enacted After Original Estimates Explained Many Differences 
between Estimated and Actual Outlays: 

As seen above in table 1, most of the accounts we reviewed were 
directly affected by legislation that was enacted after original 
estimates were developed and significantly contributed to differences 
between expected and actual outlays in 19 out of 40 instances.[Footnote 
32] For example, the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act 
(TEUC) of 2002 led to the disbursement of greater-than-expected 
unemployment benefits. Supplemental appropriations for crop disaster 
assistance and Agricultural Market Transition Act payments largely 
contributed to additional outlays that were not assumed in original CCC 
budget projections. Similarly, the MMA and the Railroad Retirement and 
Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001, respectively, increased Medicare 
outlays and Rail Industry Pension outlays. 

TEUC was enacted to provide up to 13 weeks of federally funded 
unemployment insurance benefits to workers in all states who had 
exhausted their entitlement to regular state unemployment benefits. 
Furthermore, the Act provided up to 13 additional weeks of federally 
funded benefits to workers in states with especially high unemployment 
rates. Congress renewed this extension in April 2003, which allowed 
qualified individuals to file for federal extensions through December 
2003 and collect on those extensions through December 2004. As a 
result, program outlays exceeded estimates by $7.9 billion in 2002, $11 
billion in 2003, and $4.3 billion in 2004. 

Outlays in both CCC programs that we reviewed also were directly 
affected by subsequent legislative action that occurred after original 
budget estimates were formulated. For example, Crop Disaster Assistance 
programs are funded through supplemental appropriations every year 
throughout the 5-year period that we reviewed, which led to an 
additional total of $6 billion in program outlays. According to OMB 
officials, the Administration prefers not to include estimates in the 
budget for relatively unpredictable disaster-related programs such as 
crop disaster assistance. Instead, such funding is typically initiated 
by Congress through supplemental appropriations.[Footnote 33] 
Accordingly, for all 5 years we examined, no estimates were provided 
and all of the outlays were as a result of supplemental appropriations. 

Legislative action that increased market loss assistance payments to 
corn producers largely contributed to the greatest underestimates of 
outlays for that particular commodity--nearly $9 billion in 2000 and 
2001 together. These payments were authorized on an ad hoc basis and, 
in fiscal year 2000, were paid out for both 1999 and 2000. 

The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003 provided 
substantially higher Medicare[Footnote 34] payments to physicians than 
estimated in original budget projections and contributed to the largest 
discrepancy--over $13 billion--between estimated and actual SMI outlays 
throughout the 5 years that we reviewed. Furthermore, both the HI and 
SMI trust funds incurred unanticipated additional outlays as a result 
of MMA. Several of the provisions under MMA were implemented in 2004 
and directly affected that year's outlays; however, officials from the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) said that the largest 
factors that led to additional HI outlays of approximately $4.4 billion 
and additional SMI outlays of nearly $12.3 billion were the 
substantially increased payments to private health plans and rural 
health providers, as well as the increased physician payment update-- 
all of which were provided for under MMA. 

Finally, the Railroad Retirement and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001 
changed a number of benefit and eligibility criteria, which led to a 
sharp rise in retirements. For example, the enactment of this law (1) 
eliminated benefit reductions to early retirees, (2) eliminated the 
maximum threshold on the amount of combined monthly employee and spouse 
benefit payments, (3) lowered the minimum eligibility requirement for 
railroad retirement annuities, and (4) increased benefit payments for 
widow(er)s. Under this legislation, funds in excess of those needed for 
current benefit payments and administrative expenses were transferred 
to the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust. As a result, rail 
industry retirements increased, and pension fund outlays increased by 
almost $20 billion in 2002 and 2003 collectively. 

Economic Factors Were Especially Important in Some Programs' 
Differences: 

Case study agencies cited economic factors as primary reasons for 
differences between estimated and actual outlays for 7 out of 40 
differences. This was especially true for agricultural commodities, 
student loans, and unemployment insurance. For example, market prices 
for commodities affected federal subsidy payments to farmers, changes 
in interest rates affected revenues received from student loan 
borrowers, and unemployment affected outlays of federal unemployment 
insurance. Economic factors also affected the hospital market basket, 
which contributed to greater-than-expected Medicare outlays. 

For CCC's corn program,[Footnote 35] market prices were both 
underestimated and overestimated over the 5-year period. According to a 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) official, corn prices are extremely 
volatile and highly dependent on weather conditions and global food 
production. In addition, the countercyclical design of federal 
commodity subsidies results in outlays that are highly sensitive to 
changes in price. This official explained that a 1 cent change in 
estimated corn prices results in about an $85 million change in federal 
outlays. 

The historically low interest rates that prevailed in recent years were 
below levels previously forecasted, which affected estimated student 
loan subsidy costs. Subsidy cost estimates for FDLP are highly 
sensitive to changes between projected and actual interest rates 
because borrower interest rates are variable. The decline in interest 
rates resulted in lower-than-expected interest payments to the 
government from FDLP borrowers, thus increasing reestimated subsidy 
costs for these loans.[Footnote 36] Concurrently, the volume of student 
consolidation loans, which allow borrowers to lock in fixed interest 
rates, increased as interest rates declined. In consolidating their 
loans, borrowers effectively paid off their underlying loans, thereby 
lowering anticipated interest payments to the government on the loans 
and, in turn, increasing the estimated subsidy costs of the underlying 
loans. 

Discrepancies between estimated and actual unemployment insurance 
outlays are partially attributed to economic factors such as 
unanticipated changes in both the unemployment rate and benefit 
recipiency rates. For example, Department of Labor officials said that 
most of the outlay overestimate in 2000 resulted from a lower-than- 
expected unemployment rate--the ratio of the total number of unemployed 
individuals to the total workforce--which translated into lower-than- 
expected outlays. In subsequent years, the unemployment rate was 
underestimated and thus contributed to greater-than-expected outlays. 
Inaccurate assumptions about the benefit recipiency rates, that is, the 
ratio of the total number of unemployed individuals filing for or 
receiving benefits to the total number of unemployed, further 
contributed to the agency's errors in accurately estimating program 
outlays. According to agency officials, these economic factors tend to 
be key drivers affecting budget estimates, albeit to a somewhat lesser 
degree during the timeframe we reviewed given the significance of the 
temporary extended unemployment compensation legislation that 
substantially increased outlays in 2002 through 2004. 

To a lesser extent, economic factors affected Medicare outlays. In 
2003, a higher-than-expected market basket,[Footnote 37] which is 
basically a price index representing the cost of providing health care 
services to patients, was part of the explanation behind higher-than- 
originally-estimated Medicare outlays, according to CMS officials. This 
increase in the market basket led to greater-than-expected inpatient 
and outpatient hospital expenditures in the HI and SMI funds 
respectively. 

Technical Factors Explained a Broad Spectrum of Differences: 

Technical factors, which encompass a somewhat wide-ranging residual 
category, significantly explained outlay differences in 13 out of 40 
instances. Generally, technical factors account for differences between 
budget estimates and actual outlays that cannot be attributed to 
legislative or economic factors. For example, delayed implementation 
and difficulty in predicting the behavior of providers under new 
payment systems, an increased case mix, and the deferral of adjusting 
payments for skilled nursing facilities utilization led to differences 
between estimated and actual Medicare outlays. Increases in 
administrative costs and revised assumptions of the amount of loan 
defaults and collections caused some of the direct student loan outlays 
to differ from original estimates. Similar to the diversity of the 
programs we reviewed, there was great variability among the technical 
factors that affected account outlays. 

Actual outlays for both Medicare Parts A and B differed from estimates 
primarily due to a number of technical factors, which accounted for 
both some of the largest and some of the smallest discrepancies. For 
example, the largest discrepancy in the HI fund (Medicare Part A) 
occurred in fiscal year 2000 for which outlays were lower-than- 
originally estimated by nearly $16 billion. According to CMS, the 
majority of this inaccuracy is attributed to lower-than-expected 
benefit payments as a result of the agency's difficulty in predicting 
the behavior of providers under newly implemented payment systems for 
skilled nursing facility (SNF) services and home health services. CMS 
officials said that these payment systems were very new at the time 
fiscal year 2000 budget estimates were done and the effect of these new 
systems was unknown. Similarly, SMI outlays were $4.6 billion less- 
than-originally estimated due largely to the delayed implementation of 
and unfamiliarity with a new outpatient hospital prospective payment 
system. Other technical factors CMS cited to explain the differences 
between estimated and actual Medicare outlays included case mixes that 
were more complex than expected and deferred payment refinements for 
SNF utilization. Case mix refers to the average complexity of inpatient 
admissions for Medicare beneficiaries. A change in the mix of cases 
causes the amount of benefit payments to change. The deferral of 
payment adjustments for SNF utilization contributed to greater-than- 
expected outlays in both fiscal years 2003 and 2004. These adjustments 
would have reduced payment rates that had previously been increased on 
a temporary basis under the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced 
Budget Refinement Act of 1999 (BBRA).[Footnote 38] CMS included the 
budgetary effects of these adjustments in their HI estimates for 2003 
and 2004, but later decided not to implement them citing the need for 
additional time to review and analyze the implications of implementing 
hospital case mix refinements. 

Differences between estimated and actual outlays for federal direct 
student loans were most frequently explained by technical factors, 
including revised assumptions in the Department of Education's loan 
subsidy model, increased administrative costs, and Congress's decision 
not to adopt a budget proposal to shift administrative expenses to a 
discretionary account. Moreover, because of the way federal credit 
programs are budgeted, original estimates include a loan subsidy amount 
for one fiscal year but actual outlays include a loan subsidy 
reestimate for all prior fiscal years--in the case of FDLP, up to 8 
years for fiscal year 2004. 

Conclusions: 

Given that unsustainable federal deficits and debt threaten our future 
economy and national security as well as the standard of living for the 
American people, renewed emphasis on increasing fiscal discipline is 
crucial. Mandatory spending represents an increasing percentage of the 
federal budget (e.g., about 54 percent in 2004, up from about 42 
percent in 1984). Unexpected growth in individual programs--especially 
certain very large programs--can significantly change the nation's 
fiscal position. By identifying significant increases in mandatory 
spending relatively early and acting to constrain it, Congress may 
avert even larger fiscal challenges in the future. 

The notion of establishing budget triggers to constrain growth is not 
new and has been used in the past with varying degrees of success. 
Given that spending for mandatory programs is driven by underlying 
benefit and eligibility formulas, serious efforts to constrain spending 
would require substantive changes to current law. Such changes should 
consider program goals and objectives and be enacted as programs are 
created, reexamined, or reauthorized. While budget triggers certainly 
are neither a panacea nor a substitute for deliberate consideration by 
stakeholders and decision makers, they can help to prompt action and 
enhance fiscal responsibility. 

Ignoring significant growth in mandatory accounts is inconsistent with 
evaluation of programs and their costs. While we appreciate the 
concerns raised by budget experts, in our opinion, establishing budget 
triggers warrants serious consideration in order to constrain growth in 
mandatory spending programs. However, it is clear that how the triggers 
are designed must be carefully considered. For example, once widespread 
agreement on underlying public policy goals has been achieved, it needs 
to be decided whether a soft or hard response to a trigger--or a 
combination thereof--would be most appropriate. Also, it is important 
to consider the data upon which the trigger will hinge--future 
projections of historical data, growth as a percent of GDP, total 
growth, or another measure altogether. Moreover, this trigger concept 
might also be useful in examining tax expenditure growth. Calculating a 
normal range of uncertainty for a program could help avoid triggering 
an action prematurely or unnecessarily. In addition, it is important to 
strike an appropriate balance between responses that constrain spending 
or increase revenues. We recognize that automatic responses pose much 
more difficult trade-offs. Ensuring countercyclical effects are not 
undermined is of particular importance. In any case, recognizing the 
natural tension in balancing both long-term fiscal challenges and other 
public policy goals, each program needs to be considered individually 
to ensure that any responses triggered strike the appropriate balance 
between the long-term fiscal challenge and the program goals. 
Considering ways to increase transparency, oversight, and control of 
mandatory spending programs must be part of addressing the nation's 
long-term fiscal challenges. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

To promote explicit scrutiny of significant growth in mandatory 
accounts, as mandatory spending programs are created, reexamined, or 
reauthorized, Congress should consider incorporating budget triggers 
that would signal the need for action. Further, it should determine 
whether in some cases it might be appropriate to consider automatically 
causing some action to be taken when the trigger is exceeded. Once a 
trigger is tripped, Congress could either accept or reject all or a 
portion of the response to the spending growth. 

Agency Comments: 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from OMB; the 
Departments of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, 
Labor; and the Railroad Retirement Board. OMB and the Departments of 
Education and Labor had no comments. The Departments of Agriculture, 
Health and Human Services, and the Railroad Retirement Board provided 
clarifying and/or technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. 

This report was prepared under the direction of Susan J. Irving, 
Director, Federal Budget Analysis, Strategic Issues, who can be reached 
at (202) 512-9142 or [Hyperlink, irvings@gao.gov]. Other key 
contributors are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Illustrative Examples of Triggers and Responses for Case 
Study Accounts: 

Addressing growth in mandatory spending is an important but complicated 
matter that requires looking below the aggregate and into specific 
programs. Mandatory spending is governed by eligibility rules and 
benefit formulas, which means that funds are spent as required to meet 
the needs of all those who are eligible and wish to participate. 
Accordingly, spending in mandatory programs cannot be constrained 
through the application of simple caps/limits. Rather, it requires 
changes in the underlying benefit structure and design of programs. As 
a result, constraints of individual programs that look at the specific 
economic and other factors that drive spending are likely to be most 
effective. 

One idea to constrain growth in mandatory programs is to develop 
triggers that, when tripped, would cause some automatic cost-cutting or 
revenue-increasing response--such as changes in eligibility criteria, 
benefit formulas, or fees--automatically to go into effect unless 
Congress and the President act to make other changes. An alternative 
approach would replace such a "hard" response with a "soft" one such as 
requiring special consideration of a program or a proposal for action 
when the trigger's threshhold is breached. Examples of soft responses 
include raising a point of order, requiring the administering agency to 
prepare a special report explaining why the trigger was breached, or 
submitting a proposal for reform. Soft responses may be helpful in 
alerting decision makers of potential problems but do not ensure that 
such action is taken. 

Especially in designing hard responses, careful consideration must be 
given to avoid counteracting the program's goals and objectives. For 
example, a rise in the unemployment rate would by design increase 
outlays in federal unemployment insurance not only to provide 
assistance to the unemployed but also to stabilize the economy. If a 
trigger were established that resulted in a contractionary response, it 
could undermine these important goals and exacerbate the effects of 
unemployment on the economy. 

We selected seven mandatory budget accounts to examine in order to 
inform our thinking about budget trigger responses and the design 
issues that need to be considered. These seven accounts were selected 
because of their relatively large 5-year average differences between 
estimated and actual outlays. These accounts are the: 

(1) Commodity Credit Corporation[Footnote 39] 

* Corn: 

* Crop Disaster Assistance, 

(2) Federal Direct Student Loan Program Account, 

(3) Grants to States for Medicaid, 

(4) Medicare Part A: Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, 

(5) Medicare Part B: Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust 
Fund, 

(6) Rail Industry Pension Fund, and: 

(7) Unemployment Trust Fund. 

In this appendix, for each case study account we present contextual 
information such as the administering agency, program description, and 
source of funding. Also we provide the agency's explanation of key 
differences between estimated and actual outlays and, as appropriate, 
other relevant information. Finally, where appropriate we present 
illustrative examples of hard responses that could be established to 
constrain spending.[Footnote 40] In some cases these illustrative 
examples involve revising currently existing triggers and their 
corresponding actions. In other cases new triggers and responses are 
presented. We do not specifically advocate any of these approaches as 
Congress would need to balance the program and national objectives 
sought with the long-term fiscal challenges facing our nation. The 
approaches we present are for illustrative purposes only to provide a 
sense of the types of trigger and resulting actions that could be 
established. 

Account Name: 

Commodity Credit Corporation Fund--Corn: 

Administering Organization: 

Primarily the Farm Service Agency (FSA), U.S. Department of 
Agriculture: 

Program Description: 

The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is a government-owned and 
government-operated entity that was created in 1933 to stabilize, 
support, and protect farm income and prices. CCC also helps maintain 
balanced and adequate supplies of agricultural commodities and aids in 
their orderly distribution. 

For fiscal years 2000-2002 (under 1996 Farm Bill provisions), CCC 
provided corn-related subsidies primarily through two types of payments 
available to supplement farmers' incomes: (1) production flexibility 
payments to historical producers of corn and (2) nonrecourse loans, 
which allow farmers to store production and use loan proceeds to meet 
cash flow needs without selling the crop. Ad hoc legislation provided 
additional payments in the form of market loss assistance payments to 
compensate producers for low prices. 

For fiscal years 2003-2004 (under 2002 Farm Bill provisions), CCC 
provided corn-related subsidies through three types of payments 
available to supplement farmers' incomes: (1) direct payments to 
historical producers of corn; (2) countercyclical payments, which 
provide a safety net in the event of low crop prices; and (3) 
nonrecourse loans. 

Funding Source: 

CCC has an authorized capital stock of $100 million held by the United 
States and the authority to have outstanding borrowings of up to $30 
billion at any one time. Funds are borrowed from the U.S. Treasury. 

Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays: 

Based on a 5-year average, estimated outlays for corn differed from 
actual outlays by about $1.9 billion per year, or 63.4 percent, in 
absolute value terms. However, the actual annual differences varied 
between an overestimate of $388 million and an underestimate of $7 
billion. Table 2 presents the estimated and actual outlays associated 
with CCC's corn program, by fiscal year. 

Table 2: Estimated and Actual Corn Outlays, by Fiscal Year: 

Nominal dollars in millions. 

2000; 
Original outlay estimate: $3,087; 
Actual outlays: $10,136; 
Difference: -$7,049. 

2001; 
Original outlay estimate: $4,444; 
Actual outlays: $6,297; 
Difference: -$1,853. 

2002; 
Original outlay estimate: $3,013; 
Actual outlays: $2,959; 
Difference: $54. 

2003; 
Original outlay estimate: $1,803; 
Actual outlays: $1,415; 
Difference: $388. 

2004; 
Original outlay estimate: $2,695; 
Actual outlays: $2,504; 
Difference: $191. 

5-year average dollar difference; 
Difference: -$1,654. 

5-year average difference as a percent of average estimated outlays; 
Difference: -55.5%. 

5-year average dollar difference (absolute value), 5-year percentage 
difference (absolute value); 
Difference: $1,907; 63.4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of FSA budget data. 

[End of table] 

Explanation of Key Differences: 

According to the Farm Service Agency, legislative action and economic 
changes were the primary reasons behind differences between estimated 
and actual outlays for CCC's corn program during fiscal years 2000 
through 2004. In general, weather and natural disasters are the key 
drivers of differences between estimated and actual outlays, which are 
highly sensitive to changes in the price of corn. Outlays increase when 
the corn price decreases. A 1 cent drop in the price of a bushel of 
corn can lead to about $85 million increase in countercyclical 
payments. Participation also affects costs. Farm program costs depend 
on market prices and farm production, which in turn are influenced by 
world weather, the condition of the general economy, the foreign and 
trade policies of the United States and other food-exporting nations, 
the rate of inflation, and the value of the dollar, among other 
variables. Detailed explanations are shown in table 3. 

Table 3: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual Corn 
Outlays: 

Nominal dollars in billions. 

Fiscal year and dollar difference[A]: 2000; -$7.0; 
FSA's explanation of differences: Legislative: Additional $5.1 billion 
fixed payments for producers of grains and cotton were authorized in 
Oct. 1999 (Pub. L. 106-78 § 802); 
FSA's explanation of differences: Economic: Loan deficiency payments 
were underestimated by $1.6 billion due to a sharp drop in prices 
($0.20 and $0.25 per bushel for 1999 and 2000 projections). Remaining 
difference due to lower loan repayments since more loans were repaid at 
lower rates due to weak market conditions, representing marketing loan 
gains for producers. 

Fiscal year and dollar difference[A]: 2001; -$1.9; 
FSA's explanation of differences: Legislative: $2.1 billion Market Loss 
Assistance payments were authorized in Aug. 2001 (Pub. L. 107-25 § 1); 
FSA's explanation of differences: Economic: Underpayment was moderated 
by a small reduction in loan deficiency payments resulting from a 
slight rise in the average market price and a change in the seasonal 
pattern from projections; 
FSA's explanation of differences: Technical: A small drop in net loan 
expenditures, as less corn was placed under loan than projected. 

Fiscal year and dollar difference[A]: 2002; $0.05; 
FSA's explanation of differences: Economic: Three cent per bushel drop 
in the 2001 price of corn, which triggered higher loan deficiency 
payments (LDP). As more producers opted for LDPs, fewer placed corn 
under loan, thus reducing net outlays. 

Fiscal year and dollar difference[A]: 2003; $0.39; 
FSA's explanation of differences: Legislative: Mandated policy change 
saved $1.9 billion by eliminating production flexibility contract 
payments unless requested by producers who are parties to the contract 
(Pub. L. 107-171 § 1107). This was partially offset by $1.4 billion for 
the new direct payment program; 
FSA's explanation of differences: Economic: Increase in net loan 
outlays, reflecting a change in the loan rates. The rate for 2002 and 
2003 corn was assumed at $1.67 per bushel under previous legislation 
but increased to $1.98 under 2002 legislation. Thus, the face value of 
loans made went up. 

Fiscal year and dollar difference[A]: 2004; $0.19; 
FSA's explanation of differences: Economic: An increase in prices 
pushed corn above the countercyclical payment (CCP) trigger level, thus 
reducing CCPs by $397 million. The CCP decline outweighed increases of 
$100 million for LDPs, which reflect a decline in the 2004 crop price, 
raising the LDP rate and quantity; 
FSA's explanation of differences: Technical: The CCP decline outweighed 
increases of $130 million for direct payments, which were due to higher 
base acres than were assumed before the actual sign-up. 

Source: Farm Service Agency. 

Notes: Primary drivers of outlay differences are marked in bold. 

[A] A negative difference means that actual outlays were higher than 
originally estimated. A positive difference means that actual outlays 
were less than originally estimated. 

[End of table] 

Illustrative Triggers and Response: 

The 2002 Farm Bill[Footnote 41] guaranteed historical producers of corn 
and other commodities a minimum price per bushel, known as a target 
price, which they can expect to earn. To constrain spending, one 
possible trigger could be when the target price exceeds the market 
price by some historically average percentage, the legislated target 
price could be reduced. However, to avoid price shocks to the industry 
and possible procyclical effects, the price reduction could be deferred 
to the following year. 

The Farm Bill also established a formula for fixed, direct payments to 
historical producers of corn and other commodities. To limit spending 
on this income-support program, one idea for a trigger could be to link 
direct payments to farm sector production prices. For example, if 
production prices drop by more than 3 percent,[Footnote 42] Congress 
could redefine the formula to be less generous. 

Alternatively, Congress could limit the guarantee of direct payments to 
current producers of corn rather than historical producers. 

Account Name: 

Commodity Credit Corporation Fund--Crop Disaster Assistance: 

Administering Organization: 

Primarily the Farm Service Agency (FSA), U.S. Department of 
Agriculture: 

Program Description: 

CCC is a government-owned and government-operated entity that was 
created in 1933 to stabilize, support, and protect farm income and 
prices. CCC also helps maintain balanced and adequate supplies of 
agricultural commodities and aids in their orderly distribution. 

Crop Disaster Assistance programs reimburse producers for qualifying 
losses to agricultural commodities (other than sugar cane or cotton 
seed) due to damaging weather or related conditions. The damages must 
be in excess of 35 percent of the established price of crops for lost 
production or 20 percent for lost quality. Crop disaster programs cover 
insured, uninsured, and noninsurable crops. The program has no set 
funding limitation, however, payments are limited to $80,000 per 
person, and producers with incomes greater than $2.5 million are 
ineligible. This crop disaster assistance program is not permanently 
authorized. 

Funding Source: 

CCC has an authorized capital stock of $100 million held by the United 
States and the authority to have outstanding borrowings of up to $30 
billion at any one time. Funds are borrowed from the U.S. Treasury. 
Although Crop Disaster Assistance programs are provided through 
appropriations acts,[Footnote 43] the Department of Agriculture 
considers and applies funding for the programs in a manner similar to 
mandatory programs. According to an FSA official, funding is provided 
to all eligible applications for assistance by prorating available 
funding if necessary. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also 
considers crop disaster assistance programs to be mandatory in that all 
eligible applicants may receive benefits. 

Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays: 

Based on a 5-year average, estimated outlays for crop disaster 
assistance differed from actual outlays by about $1.2 billion per year 
in absolute value terms. However, the actual annual differences varied 
between $230 million and $1.9 billion. Table 4 presents the estimated 
and actual outlays associated with CCC's crop disaster assistance 
programs, by fiscal year. 

Table 4: Estimated and Actual Crop Disaster Assistance Outlays, by 
Fiscal Year: 

Nominal dollars in millions. 

2000; 
Original outlay estimate: $0; 
Actual outlays: $1,251; 
Difference: -$1,251. 

2001; 
Original outlay estimate: $0; 
Actual outlays: $1,848; 
Difference: -$1,848. 

2002; 
Original outlay estimate: $0; 
Actual outlays: $230; 
Difference: -$230. 

2003; 
Original outlay estimate: $0; 
Actual outlays: $1,867; 
Difference: -$1,867. 

2004; 
Original outlay estimate: $0; 
Actual outlays: $804; 
Difference: -$804. 

5-year average dollar difference; 
Difference: -$1,200. 

5-year average difference as a percent of average estimated outlays; 
Difference: N/A. 

5-year average dollar difference (absolute value), 5-year percentage 
difference (absolute value); 
Difference: $1,200, N/A. 

Source: GAO analysis of FSA budget data. 

[End of table] 

Explanation of Key Differences: 

According to OMB staff, it is not OMB's policy to include an estimate 
for disaster assistance in the President's budget. Instead, these 
programs are typically funded through subsequent legislation. 

Ideas for Improving the Accuracy of Estimates: 

Although OMB typically does not include an estimate for crop disaster 
assistance in the President's budget, we have reported in the past that 
shifting the budget timing to an up-front recognition of emergency 
costs through reserves may promote a more comprehensive and transparent 
debate over federal budgetary priorities during the regular budget 
process.[Footnote 44] For example, we suggested that federal 
governmentwide emergency reserves could set aside budget authority in 
advance for expected yet unpredictable events as part of the annual 
resource-allocation process. Another approach would be to establish 
agency-specific reserve funds for those agencies that regularly respond 
to federal emergencies. Funds would be appropriated to these agencies 
on a contingent basis, meaning that certain agency-specific criteria 
would have to be met before the funds could be used. While these 
approaches are not of the trigger/response variety that is the subject 
of this report, they would help accomplish a goal of constraining 
spending if the emergency budget authority provided in advance is 
assumed to be within a constrained total budget authority. 

Account Name: 

Federal Direct Student Loan Program Account: 

Administering Organization: 

Office of Federal Student Aid, U.S. Department of Education: 

Program Description: 

The Department of Education (Education) provides financial aid in part 
to increase access to college. Education's first direct loans were made 
in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1994.[Footnote 45] Through its 
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP), students and/or 
their parents borrow money directly from the federal government through 
the vocational, undergraduate, or graduate schools the students attend. 
As is the case under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP), 
or "guaranteed" student loan program, there are four types of direct 
loans.[Footnote 46] 

Stafford Loans--variable rate loans available to students. The federal 
government pays the interest on behalf of borrowers while the student 
is in school, during a 6-month grace period when the student first 
leaves school, and during statutory deferment periods related to 
borrower unemployment and economic hardship. 

Unsubsidized Stafford Loans--variable rate loans to students with the 
same terms as Stafford Loans except that the government does not pay 
interest costs during in-school, grace, and deferment periods. 

PLUS Loans--variable rate loans made to parents. The borrower pays all 
interest costs. 

Consolidation Loans--borrowers may combine multiple federal student 
loans into a single, fixed rate loan. The interest rate is based on the 
weighted average of the interest rates in effect on the loans being 
consolidated or a fixed percentage. 

Funding Source: 

Education finances FDLP through a combination of appropriations and 
borrowing from Treasury. Education receives permanent, indefinite 
budget authority for estimated subsidy costs--the amount expected not 
to be repaid by borrowers--of its loans. These costs are generally 
updated, or reestimated, annually. The portion of direct loans that 
Education predicts will ultimately be repaid by borrowers is financed 
by borrowing from Treasury and is not considered a cost to the 
government because it is expected to be returned to the government in 
future years. 

Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays: 

Based on a 5-year average, estimated outlays for direct student loans 
differed from actual outlays by about $2.6 billion per year, or 702 
percent, in absolute value terms. However, the actual annual 
differences varied between an overestimate of $2.8 billion and an 
underestimate of $5.3 billion. A large component of these differences 
reflects the fact that initial estimates do not include reestimates of 
prior year costs, which are reflected in actual outlays. In addition, 
initial estimates reflect proposed policies, many of which were not 
enacted and so were not reflected in subsequent actual outlays. Table 5 
presents the estimated and actual outlays associated with the federal 
direct student loan program, by fiscal year. 

Table 5: Estimated and Actual Direct Student Loan Outlays, by Fiscal 
Year: 

Nominal dollars in millions. 

2000; 
Original outlay estimate: -$42; 
Actual outlays: -$2,862; 
Difference: $2,820. 

2001; 
Original outlay estimate: $115; 
Actual outlays: $257; 
Difference: -$142. 

2002; 
Original outlay estimate: -$635; 
Actual outlays: $97; 
Difference: -$732. 

2003; 
Original outlay estimate: -$283; 
Actual outlays: $5,055; 
Difference: -$5,338. 

2004; 
Original outlay estimate: -$786; 
Actual outlays: $3,246; 
Difference: -$4,032. 

5-year average dollar difference; 
Difference: -$1,485. 

5-year average difference as a percent of average estimated outlays; 
Difference: $455.2%. 

5-year average dollar difference (absolute value), 5-year percentage 
difference (absolute value); 
Difference: $2,613; 702%. 

Source: GAO analysis of President's budget data. 

Note: A negative outlay amount indicates a positive collection of 
revenue. Also, for credit programs, the term actual is misleading 
because reestimates will continue until all the loans in that cohort 
have been repaid. 

[End of table] 

Explanation of Key Differences: 

Because FDLP is a relatively new program, it has a short history of 
repayment activity and little historical data are available. 
Accordingly, Education initially relied heavily on data from the 
guaranteed student loan program to develop estimates for most key cash 
flow assumptions in its FDLP cash flow model, which is used to estimate 
the subsidy cost of the program. Over the past few years, Education has 
incorporated FDLP data into many cash flow assumptions; as more data 
become available, Education plans to completely phase out the use of 
guaranteed loan data for FDLP assumptions.[Footnote 47] 

Drops in interest rates have been a key driver behind differences in 
estimated versus actual outlays. Not only are loans being paid off at 
lower rates than anticipated but the drop in rates has also led to a 
dramatic increase in consolidations (which are prepayments). Detailed 
explanations are shown in table 6. 

Table 6: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual Direct 
Student Loan Outlays: 

Nominal dollars in billions. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2000; $2.8; 
Education's explanation of differences: Technical: Actual includes 
about $2.4 billion in prior year reestimates of loans made in fiscal 
years (FY) 1994 through 1999. Net downward reestimate of prior cohorts 
primarily due to revised assumptions about a drop in defaults and an 
increase in collections. FY 2000 cohort subsidy decreased $442 million. 
Administrative costs decreased $30 million. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2001; -$0.14; 
Education's explanation of differences: Economic: Changes in interest 
rates resulted in $481 million upward reestimate of prior year cohorts; 
Education's explanation of differences: Technical: Actual includes 
about $481 million in prior year reestimates of loans made in FYs 1994 
through 2000. FY 2001 cohort subsidy decreased $432 million. 
Administrative costs increased $94 million. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2002; -$0.73; 
Education's explanation of differences: Economic: Drop in interest 
rates caused FY 2002 cohort subsidy to increase $694 million due to 
lower projected borrower repayments; 
Education's explanation of differences: Technical: Administrative costs 
increased $42 million. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2003; -$5.3; 
Education's explanation of differences: Economic: Revised assumptions 
on interest rates, prepayments through consolidations, and defaults 
resulted in upward reestimate of prior year cohorts of $4.6 billion. FY 
2003 cohort subsidy increased $250 million; 
Education's explanation of differences: Technical: Actual includes 
about $4.6 billion for 2-years worth of prior-year reestimates of loans 
made in FYs 1994 through 2002. (No reestimate was executed in FY 2002.) 
$15 million policy proposal to shift administrative expenses to a 
discretionary account not enacted by Congress. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2004; -$4.0; 
Education's explanation of differences: Technical: $710 million policy 
proposal to shift administrative expenses to a discretionary account 
not enacted by Congress. About $2.6 billion in upward reestimates of 
prior year cohorts (loans made during FYs 1994 through 2003) reflects 
technical changes to model assumptions, including higher level of 
prepayments, which lower future interest income, and higher defaults 
for borrowers choosing income-contingent loan repayment. 

Source: Department of Education. 

Notes: Primary drivers of outlay differences are marked in bold. 

[A] A negative difference means that actual outlays were higher than 
originally estimated. A positive difference means that actual outlays 
were less than originally estimated. 

[End of table] 

Illustrative Trigger and Response: 

Congress could decrease the subsidy cost to the government by, among 
other things, increasing the amount of fees borrowers must pay to 
obtain a loan or increasing borrowers' interest rate. For example, 
continued differences between estimated and actual outlays could be 
used as a trigger, resulting in higher origination fees or interest 
rates for new FDLP loans. In implementing such a trigger and response, 
Congress would need to consider whether FFELP borrowers should 
similarly be affected. Under current law, loans made to borrowers, 
unless otherwise specified, are to have the same terms, conditions, and 
benefits and be made available in the same amounts under both FDLP and 
FFELP.[Footnote 48] 

Account Name: 

Grants to States for Medicaid: 

Administering Organization: 

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services: 

Program Description: 

Medicaid is a health-financing program for eligible low-income 
individuals and families. Federal statute defines over 50 population 
groups that are potentially eligible for states' programs. In general, 
eligibility is limited to low-income children, pregnant women, parents 
of dependent children, people with disabilities, and the elderly. 
Although Medicaid is one federal program, it consists of 56 distinct 
state-level programs--one for each state, territory, Puerto Rico, and 
the District of Columbia.[Footnote 49] Each of the states has a 
designated Medicaid agency that administers the program. In accordance 
with the Medicaid statute and within broad federal guidelines, each 
state establishes its own eligibility standards; determines the type, 
amount, duration, and scope of covered services; sets payment rates; 
and develops its administrative structure. 

Funding Source: 

The federal government matches state Medicaid spending for medical 
assistance according to a formula that compares each state's average 
per capita income--a proxy reflecting the health of the state's economy 
and its response to economic changes--to the national per capita 
income. Therefore, states with a high per capita income receive less 
federal funds than states with a low per capita income. As economic 
conditions improve or decline in a particular state, so does the amount 
of federal matching funds granted to that state. The federal share, 
known as the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), can range 
from 50 to 83 percent. States are required to describe the nature and 
scope of their programs in comprehensive written plans submitted to 
CMS--with federal funding for state Medicaid services contingent upon 
CMS approval of the plans. This approval hinges on whether CMS 
determines that state plans meet all applicable federal laws and 
regulations. 

Although the source of Medicaid funding is through an annual 
appropriation act, Medicaid is not considered a discretionary spending 
program. Because Medicaid is an entitlement created by the operation of 
law, if Congress fails to appropriate money necessary to fund payments 
and benefits, eligible recipients may seek legal recourse. In such 
case, necessary payments may be made through the indefinite judgment 
fund pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 1304. 

Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays: 

Based on a 5-year average, estimated Medicaid outlays differed from 
actual outlays by about $4.2 billion per year, or 2.9 percent, in 
absolute value terms. Actual annual differences ranged from an 
underestimate of $5.1 billion to an overestimate of $6.3 billion. Table 
7 presents the estimated and actual Medicaid outlays for fiscal years 
2000 through 2004. 

Table 7: Estimated and Actual Medicaid Outlays, by Fiscal Year: 

Nominal dollars in millions. 

2000; 
Original outlay estimate: $114,660; 
Actual outlays: $117,921; 
Difference: -$3,261. 

2001; 
Original outlay estimate: $124,838; 
Actual outlays: $129,374; 
Difference: -$4,536. 

2002; 
Original outlay estimate: $142,423; 
Actual outlays: $147,512; 
Difference: -$5,089. 

2003; 
Original outlay estimate: $158,790; 
Actual outlays: $160,693; 
Difference: -$1,903. 

2004; 
Original outlay estimate: $182,543; 
Actual outlays: $176,231; 
Difference: $6,312. 

5-year average dollar difference; 
Difference: -$1,695. 

5-year average difference as a percent of average estimated outlays; 
Difference: -1.2%. 

5-year average dollar difference (absolute value), 5-year percentage 
difference (absolute value); 
Difference: $4,220; 2.9%. 

Source: GAO analysis of President's budget data. 

[End of table] 

Explanation of Key Differences: 

Both legislative and technical factors led to differences in estimated 
and actual Medicaid outlays. For example, the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003,[Footnote 50] which temporarily 
changed federal matching rates for benefits and provided fiscal relief 
to states, affected estimated Medicaid outlays in both fiscal years 
2003 and 2004. Technical factors included misestimates of medical 
assistance payments, administrative costs, vaccines for children, and 
collections. Also, there were a number of legislative proposals that 
were not adopted. It is not clear if economic factors also contributed 
to the differences, although it is likely so given the economic 
downturn that occurred during this time period. Changing economic 
conditions could have led to differences in the number of individuals 
eligible for and receiving benefits, and therefore total program 
outlays. 

According to CMS officials, Medicaid estimates are based primarily on 
state estimates and may be adjusted by CMS' Office of the Actuary to 
reflect recent trends in how state estimates have changed over time or 
how they have compared with actual expenditures in recent years. Agency 
officials were unable to accurately identify and quantify the effects 
of any of these factors and explained that the difficulty lies with the 
variability of program structure across states. Each state is allowed 
the discretion to structure and modify its program, including the 
establishment of eligibility criteria and payment rates. Similarly, 
state legislative actions and economic conditions vary across the 
country and could have varying effects on program outlays. 
Consequently, aggregating state data into a single Medicaid figure 
would mask estimating inaccuracies and challenges since the negative 
effect in one might be offset by positive effect in another. In the 
event that the difference between estimated and actual spending is very 
large, CMS said it would then investigate and seek explanations from 
the states. Although CMS did not consider the differences evident 
throughout the 5-year period we reviewed to be large enough to prompt 
such an evaluation, they did provide some explanation behind 
misestimates as shown in table 8 below. 

Table 8: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual 
Medicaid Outlays: 

Nominal dollars in billions. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2000; -$3.3; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Underestimated medical 
assistance payments by over $3 billion, administrative costs by $71 
million, and vaccines for children by $2 million. The resulting outlay 
underestimate was further increased by a legislative proposal expected 
to save $161 million that had been included in the original estimate 
but was not accepted. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2001; -$4.6; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Underestimated medical 
assistance payments by $7.1 billion and vaccines for children by $357 
million. These underestimates were partially offset by a $977 million 
overestimate of administrative costs, an underestimate of almost $1.3 
billion in collections, and a legislative proposal expected to cost 
$663 million that had been included in the original estimate but was 
not accepted. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2002; -$5.1; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Underestimated medical 
assistance payments by $5.3 billion. This underestimate was partially 
offset by a $138 million underestimate of collections and overestimates 
of administrative costs and vaccines for children by $722 million and 
$4 million respectively. The resulting outlay underestimate was further 
increased by a legislative proposal expected to save $606 million that 
had been included in the original estimate but was not accepted. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2003; -$1.9; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Legislative: The Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 was enacted in late May 2003, after 
original FY 2003 estimates were made. CMS said this legislation 
accounted for approximately $4 billion in unanticipated outlays; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Underestimated medical 
assistance payments by nearly $3 billion and vaccines for children by 
$241 million. These underestimates were partially offset by a $1.1 
billion overestimate of administrative costs, a $112 million 
underestimate of collections, and a legislative proposal expected to 
cost $98 million that had been included in the original estimate but 
was not accepted. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2004; $6.3; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Legislative: The Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 was enacted in late May 2003, after 
original FY 2004 estimates were made. CMS said this legislation 
accounted for approximately $6 billion in unanticipated outlays; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Outlays were overestimated 
as a result of a legislative proposal expected to cost $5.8 billion, 
which had been included in the original estimate but was not adopted, a 
$1 billion overestimate of administrative costs, and a $168 million 
underestimate of collections. The resulting outlay overestimate was 
partially offset by underestimates of medical assistance payments and 
vaccines for children by $520 million and $133 million respectively. 

Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 

Notes: Primary drivers of outlay differences are marked in bold. 

[A] A negative difference means that actual outlays were higher than 
originally estimated. A positive difference means that actual outlays 
were less than originally estimated. 

[End of table] 

Account Name: 

Federal Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund (Medicare Part A): 

Administering Organization: 

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services: 

Program Description: 

The account funds the Medicare Part A program which partially covers 
the costs of, among other things, home health care, inpatient care in 
hospitals and skilled nursing facilities, and hospice care. Based on 
their work history, most U.S. citizens and permanent residents and 
their spouses are eligible for Medicare Part A if they are 65 years of 
age or older. Also, certain persons under 65 years old who are disabled 
or have end-stage renal disease are eligible for coverage. Enrollees or 
their spouses who have contributed to Medicare through payroll taxes 
for at least 10 years of employment are automatically enrolled at age 
65 and need not pay premiums to receive coverage. Individuals who have 
not met this eligibility requirement may pay a monthly premium to 
purchase Part A coverage.[Footnote 51] 

Funding Source: 

The primary funding source for Medicare Part A comes from payroll 
taxes. Other relevant revenue sources include interest on investments 
in government securities held by the fund,[Footnote 52] income from 
taxation of Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social 
Security) benefits, and premiums collected from voluntary participants. 

Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays: 

Based on a 5-year average, estimated Medicare Part A outlays differed 
from actual outlays by about $5.6 billion per year, or 3.8 percent, in 
absolute value terms. Actual annual differences ranged from an 
underestimate of $4.3 billion to an overestimate of $15.9 billion. 
Table 9 presents the estimated and actual HI outlays for fiscal years 
2000 through 2004. 

Table 9: Estimated and Actual HI Outlays, by Fiscal Year: 

Nominal dollars in millions. 

2000; 
Original outlay estimate: $143,898; 
Actual outlays: $127,973; 
Difference: $15,925. 

2001; 
Original outlay estimate: $143,427; 
Actual outlays: $140,573; 
Difference: $2,854. 

2002; 
Original outlay estimate: $144,674; 
Actual outlays: $145,606; 
Difference: -$932. 

2003; 
Original outlay estimate: $147,295; 
Actual outlays: $151,308; 
Difference: -$4,013. 

2004; 
Original outlay estimate: $159,750; 
Actual outlays: $164,136; 
Difference: -$4,386. 

5-year average dollar difference; 
Difference: $1,890. 

5-year average difference as a percent of average estimated outlays; 
Difference: $1.3%. 

5-year average dollar difference (absolute value), 5-year percentage 
difference (absolute value); 
Difference: $5,622; 3.8%. 

Source: GAO analysis of President's budget data. 

[End of table] 

Explanation of Key Differences: 

Both legislative and technical factors led to differences between 
estimated and actual HI outlays. For example, the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)[Footnote 53] led 
to greater-than-expected outlays in fiscal year 2004. Technical factors 
included difficulty in predicting the behavior of providers under new 
payment systems, misestimates of home health transfers to and from the 
Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund, and misestimates of 
service usage. Economic factors, specifically the hospital market 
basket, also contributed to differences. The hospital market basket is 
an input price index that represents the cost of the mix of goods and 
services that comprise routine, ancillary, and special-care unit 
inpatient hospital services. Detailed explanations of the differences 
are shown in table 10. 

Table 10: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual HI 
Outlays: 

Nominal dollars in billions. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2000; $15.9; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Overestimated benefit 
payments by $10.1 billion, which CMS attributed to its difficulty in 
predicting the behavior of providers under new payment systems for 
skilled nursing facility (SNF) services and home health services. Also, 
a $6.6 billion overestimate of home health transfers to the SMI fund[B] 
further widened the gap between estimated and actual outlays. CMS 
attributed this to discrepancies in implementing the payment system, 
particularly by home health agencies. Specifically, the cap on average 
per- beneficiary home health expenditures was treated as an absolute 
cap, thereby cutting services to patients requiring numerous visits per 
episode of care. This resulted in unexpected additional savings. The 
resulting outlay overestimate was partially offset by a legislative 
proposal expected to save $808 million that had been included in the 
original estimate but was not accepted. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2001; $2.9; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Overestimated benefit 
payments by almost $3.9 billion, which CMS attributed to the 
discrepancy between what they assumed service usage to be and actual 
usage. Overestimates of $242 million in home health transfers to the 
SMI fund and $84 million in quality improvement organizations (QIO)[C] 
further added to the difference. The resulting outlay overestimate was 
partially offset by a $1.2 billion quinquennial adjustment as required 
by lawd and a legislative proposal expected to save $185 million that 
had been included in the original estimate but was not adopted. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2002; -$0.9; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Underestimated benefit 
payments by $2.3 billion, which CMS attributed to the discrepancy 
between what they assumed service usage to be and actual usage. The 
resulting outlay underestimate was partially offset by overestimates of 
$1.3 billion and $77 million in home health transfers to the SMI fund 
and QIOs respectively. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2003; -$4.0; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Economic: Inpatient hospital 
expenditures were higher than expected due to a higher-than-expected 
"market basket" payment update. Market basket refers to the input price 
index based on the cost of a particular type of health provider (e.g., 
hospital, skilled nursing facility, home health agency) to provide 
services to patients. By law these indexes are used to update Medicare 
payments; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Inpatient hospital 
expenditures were higher than expected also because of a hospital case 
mix increase. Case mix refers to the average complexity of inpatient 
admissions for Medicare beneficiaries. Payments are based on the type 
of case, so if the mix of cases changes, payments also change. 
Expenditures were also higher because expected SNF resource utilization 
group (RUG) refinements were not made, which would have reduced 
payments. SNFs received higher payments due to the introduction of a 
new administrative policy to adjust payment updates for past 
differences between actual and estimated market basket increases. The 
$7.3 billion underestimate in benefit payments was further increased by 
an $18 million underestimate of administrative costs, but was partially 
offset by overestimates of $2.8 billion in home health transfers to the 
SMI fund, $43 million in QIOs, and a legislative proposal expected to 
cost $410 million that was included in the original estimate but was 
not adopted. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2004; -$4.4; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Legislative: Underestimated benefit 
payments by $4.3 billion. CMS attributed this to several MMA provisions 
that were enacted and implemented after original estimates were made, 
which led to higher actual expenditures. In particular, payments to 
private health plans contracting with Medicare were increased 
substantially as were payments to rural health providers; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Once again, expected SNF 
RUG refinements were not made, resulting in higher-than-estimated 
expenditures. Hospice expenditures were also higher than estimated. The 
$4.3 billion underestimate in benefit payments was further increased by 
underestimates of $23 million in QIOs and $17 million in administrative 
costs. 

Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 

Notes: Primary drivers of outlay differences are marked in bold. In 
2003 it was unclear which factor most significantly affected the 
difference. In that case, there is no primary driver marked in bold. 

[A] A negative difference means that actual outlays were higher than 
originally estimated. A positive difference means that actual outlays 
were less than originally estimated. 

[B] Home health agency transfers occur between the HI and SMI trust 
funds and total billions of dollars throughout the 5-year period. 
However, the positive variance in one fund is equally offset by the 
negative variance in the other. As a result, when the Medicare trust 
funds are taken together, this intertrust fund activity has no 
cumulative impact on the federal surplus/deficit. 

[C] Quality improvement organizations are groups of practicing doctors 
and other health care experts paid by the federal government to check 
and improve the care given to Medicare patients. 

[D] Section 217(g) of the Social Security Act provides for periodic 
transfers between the general fund of the Treasury and the HI trust 
fund, if needed to adjust prior payments for the costs arising from 
wage credits granted for military service before 1957. 

[End of table] 

Currently Existing Program Trigger and Response: 

MMA established a trigger with a soft response to constrain growth in 
Medicare; it requires the President to submit a proposal to Congress 
for action if the Medicare Trustees determine in 2 consecutive years 
that the general revenue share[Footnote 54] of Medicare is projected to 
exceed 45 percent during a 7-year projection period. To date, this 
threshold has not been breached and thus no response has been 
triggered. According to the 2005 Medicare Trustees' report, the trigger 
is expected to be breached in 2012, which falls within the 7-year 
projection period that will be covered in the 2006 Medicare Trustees' 
report. If the 45 percent threshold is projected to be breached again 
in the next consecutive 7-year projection period, the President will be 
required to propose legislation, within 15 days of submitting the 
fiscal year 2009 budget, to respond to the funding warning. 

Illustrative Trigger and Response: 

Using the trigger of general revenue exceeding 45 percent in 2 
consecutive years during a 7-year period, hard responses could also be 
developed. Possible responses are to adjust taxes, benefit formulas, or 
eligibility criteria. For example, Medicare payroll taxes could 
automatically be increased unless Congress took action to prevent the 
increase. Alternatively, reaching the trigger could cause automatic 
changes to benefit formulas or eligibility criteria, or a combination 
of benefit changes and tax increases. Of course congressional action 
could change the automatic response if it was deemed inappropriate at 
that time. 

Account Name: 

Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) TrustFund (Medicare Part 
B): 

Administering Organization: 

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services: 

Program Description: 

This account, also known as Medicare Part B, partially covers the cost 
of doctors' services, clinical laboratory services, outpatient hospital 
services, some physical and occupational therapy services, and some 
home health care. Eligibility requirements for Medicare Part B are 
similar to those for Part A. However, unlike for Medicare Part A, 
enrollment is voluntary. Enrollees must pay a monthly premium to 
receive Part B coverage. In 2005, premiums were $78.20 per month and 
the deductible was $110. Premium and deductible rates may change every 
year. 

Most Part B services are paid based on a fee schedule. Physicians, the 
largest Part B service type, are paid under the sustainable growth rate 
(SGR) system,[Footnote 55] which determines the increase in payments 
per service for the physician fee schedule for each year based on a 
statutory formula. Under the SGR system, actual physician-related 
spending is compared with target physician-related spending levels. If 
actual spending exceeds target spending, then future physician fee 
schedule updates are reduced. 

Funding Source: 

SMI is financed from general revenues (approximately 75 percent) and 
beneficiary premiums (approximately 25 percent). 

Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays: 

Based on a 5-year average, estimated Medicare Part B outlays differed 
from actual outlays by about $6.4 billion per year, or 6.1 percent, in 
absolute value terms. Actual annual differences ranged from an 
underestimate of $13.4 billion to an overestimate of $4.6 billion. 
Table 11 presents the estimated and actual SMI outlays by fiscal year. 

Table 11: Estimated and Actual SMI Outlays, by Fiscal Year: 

Nominal dollars in billions. 

2000; 
Original outlay estimate: $91,795; 
Actual outlays: $87,216; 
Difference: $4,579. 

2001; 
Original outlay estimate: $96,372; 
Actual outlays: $97,531; 
Difference: -$1,159. 

2002; 
Original outlay estimate: $107,830; 
Actual outlays: $107,113; 
Difference: $717. 

2003; 
Original outlay estimate: $108,416; 
Actual outlays: $121,816; 
Difference: -$13,400. 

2004; 
Original outlay estimate: $119,353; 
Actual outlays: $131,632; 
Difference: -$12,279. 

5-year average dollar difference; 
Difference: -$4,308. 

5-year average difference as a percent of average estimated outlays; 
Difference: -4.1%. 

5-year average dollar difference (absolute value), 5-year percentage 
difference (absolute value); 
Difference: $6,427; 6.1%. 

Source: GAO analysis of President's budget data. 

[End of table] 

Congress has overridden the statutory updates for the 2003, 2004, and 
2005 physician fee schedules. Although the SGR system called for 
negative updates in these years, Congress instead granted increases in 
physician payments per service. For several years the law was changed 
to specify higher spending for physicians after the budget estimates 
were already done. Consequently, this contributed to actual outlays 
that were higher than estimated. 

Explanation of Key Differences: 

Both legislative and technical factors led to differences between 
estimated and actual SMI outlays. For example, the Consolidated 
Appropriations Resolution of 2003 and MMA led to greater-than-expected 
outlays for spending for physicians' services. Technical factors 
included delayed implementation and difficulty in predicting the 
behavior of providers under a new outpatient hospital prospective 
payment system, misestimates of home health transfers to and from the 
HI fund, and misestimates of service usage. Similar to the HI fund, 
changes in the hospital market basket also contributed to differences. 
Detailed explanations of the differences are shown in table 12. 

Table 12: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual SMI 
Outlays: 

Nominal dollars in billions. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2000; $4.6; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Benefit payments were $11.6 
billion lower than expected, which CMS attributed to the delayed 
implementation and difficulty in predicting the behavior of providers 
under a new outpatient hospital prospective payment system. The system 
was being created from scratch and little research had been done on 
what type of system would work best. Original projections had an 
earlier start date, which caused higher expenditures to be estimated. 
This overestimate was further increased by overestimates of $90 million 
and $17 million in transfers to Medicaid and QIOs respectively. The 
resulting overestimate was partially offset by a $6.6 billion 
overestimate of home health transfers received from the HI fund and a 
legislative proposal expected to save $570 million that had been 
included in the original estimate but was not adopted. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2001; -$1.2; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Most of the difference is 
attributed to a legislative proposal expected to save $685 million that 
was not adopted. Benefit payments were $241 million greater than 
expected, which CMS attributed to the discrepancy between what they 
assumed service usage to be and actual usage. In addition, home health 
transfers received from the HI fund were $242 million less than 
expected. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2002; $0.7; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: Most of the difference 
resulted from a $2.1 billion overestimate of benefit payments, which 
CMS attributed to the discrepancy between what they assumed service 
usage to be and actual usage. This overestimate was partially offset by 
a $1.3 billion overestimate of home health transfers received from the 
HI fund and a $42 million underestimate of transfers to Medicaid. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2003; -$13.4; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Legislative: Consolidated 
Appropriations Resolution 2003 was passed after the original budget 
estimates, which caused a substantially higher physician fee update 
than estimated in the projections; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Economic: A higher hospital market 
basket (as mentioned in the Medicare Part A section) also caused higher-
than-expected outpatient hospital expenditures; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: The underestimate of 
benefit payments was further increased by a $112 million underestimate 
of transfers to Medicaid, but was partially offset by a legislative 
proposal expected to cost $70 million that was not adopted and a $16 
million overestimate in QIOs. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2004; -$12.3; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Legislative: As noted in the Medicare 
Part A section, MMA was passed in 2003 and some of its provisions were 
implemented in 2004, causing higher private plan and rural provider 
expenditures. Also, the physician fee update was much higher than had 
been originally estimated due to the MMA legislation that was enacted 
after the 2004 budget estimates were made. Consequently, benefit 
payments were $12.2 billion greater than expected; 
CMS' explanation of differences: Technical: The underestimate of 
benefit payments was further increased by a $168 million underestimate 
of transfers to Medicaid, but was partially offset by a legislative 
proposal expected to cost $55 million that was included in the original 
estimate but not adopted. 

Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 

Notes: Primary drivers of outlay differences are marked in bold. 

[A] A negative difference means that actual outlays were higher than 
originally estimated. A positive difference means that actual outlays 
were less than originally estimated. 

[End of table] 

Currently Existing Program Triggers and Responses: 

Congress has established two triggers with soft and hard responses to 
constrain growth in SMI. First, under the SGR system, if actual 
physician-related spending exceeds target physician-related spending 
then future physician fee schedule updates are reduced. Because the 
actual versus target spending comparison is cumulative, future fee 
updates are reduced to lower future actual spending below future target 
spending until total cumulative actual spending is the same as total 
cumulative target spending. Although the SGR system was designed to 
encourage fiscal discipline, Congress has chosen to modify or override 
this constraint a number of times. We have previously reported on 
concerns about the SGR system and considerations for reform.[Footnote 
56] Second, MMA established a trigger with a soft response; it requires 
the President to submit a proposal to Congress for action if the 
Medicare Trustees determine in 2 consecutive years that the general 
revenue share of Medicare is projected to exceed 45 percent during a 7-
year projection period. To date, this threshold has not been breached 
and thus no response has been triggered. As mentioned in the Medicare 
Part A section of this appendix, the trigger is expected to be breached 
in 2012, which falls within the specified 7-year projection period that 
will be covered in the 2006 Medicare Trustees' report. If the 45 
percent threshold is projected to be breached again in the next 
consecutive 7-year projection period, the President will be required to 
propose legislation, within 15 days of submitting the fiscal year 2009 
budget, to respond to the funding warning. 

Illustrative Trigger and Response: 

Using the trigger of general revenue exceeding 45 percent in 2 
consecutive years during a 7-year period, hard responses could also be 
developed. Possible responses are to adjust premiums,[Footnote 57] 
benefit formulas, or eligibility criteria. For example, Part B premiums 
could automatically be increased unless Congress took action to prevent 
the increase. Alternatively, reaching the trigger could cause automatic 
changes to benefit formulas or eligibility criteria, or a combination 
of benefit changes and premium increases. Of course congressional 
action could change the automatic response if it was deemed 
inappropriate at that time. 

Account Name: 

Rail Industry Pension Fund: 

Administering Organization: 

Railroad Retirement Board (RRB): 

Program Description: 

The RRB administers a Federal retirement-survivor benefit program for 
the nation's railroad workers and their families, under the Railroad 
Retirement Act. In connection with this retirement program, the RRB has 
administrative responsibilities under the Social Security Act for 
certain benefit payments and railroad workers' Medicare coverage. 

Under the Railroad Retirement Act, retirement and disability annuities 
are paid to railroad workers with at least 10 years of service, or 5 
years if performed after 1995. Annuities are also payable to spouses 
and divorced spouses of retired workers and to widow(er)s, surviving 
divorced spouses, remarried widow(er)s, children, and parents of 
deceased railroad workers. Qualified railroad retirement beneficiaries 
are covered by Medicare in the same way as Social Security 
beneficiaries. 

Railroad retirement benefits are calculated under a two-tier formula. 
Tier I is based on combined railroad retirement and Social Security 
credits, using Social Security benefit formulas. Tier II is based on 
railroad service only and is similar to the defined benefit pensions 
paid over-and-above Social Security benefits in other industries. In 
addition, some annuitants may also be qualified for supplemental 
benefits and vested dual benefits. Cost-of-living adjustments on the 
Tier I portion of annuities are paid similarly to those for Social 
Security. However, the adjustment for the Tier II portion is limited to 
32.5 percent of the previous year's increase in the Consumer Price 
Index. Supplemental annuities and vested dual benefits are not subject 
to cost-of-living adjustments. 

Funding Source: 

Payroll taxes paid by railroad employers and their employees are the 
primary source of funding for the railroad retirement benefit program. 
Corresponding to the two-tier benefit structure, railroad retirement 
taxes are levied on a two-tier basis. Railroad retirement Tier I 
payroll taxes are coordinated with Social Security taxes so that 
employees and employers pay Tier I taxes at the same rate as Social 
Security taxes. In addition, both employees and employers pay Tier II 
taxes, which are used to finance railroad retirement benefit payments 
over-and-above Social Security equivalent levels. These Tier II taxes 
are based on the ratio of certain asset balances to the sum of benefit 
payments and administrative expenses. 

While the railroad retirement system has remained separate from the 
Social Security system, the two systems are closely coordinated with 
regard to earnings credits, benefit payments, and taxes. The financing 
of the two systems is linked through a financial interchange under 
which, in effect, the portion of railroad retirement annuities that is 
equivalent to Social Security benefits is coordinated with the Social 
Security system. The purpose of this financial coordination is to place 
the Social Security trust funds in the same position they would be in 
if railroad service were covered by the Social Security program instead 
of the railroad retirement program. 

Starting in fiscal year 2002, revenues in excess of benefit payments 
are invested to provide additional trust fund income. The National 
Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT), established by the 
Railroad Retirement and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001, manages and 
invests railroad retirement assets. The trust is a tax-exempt entity 
independent from the federal government. Railroad retirement funds are 
invested in nongovernmental assets, as well as in governmental 
securities. Prior to the Act, investment of Railroad Retirement Account 
assets was limited to U.S. government securities. 

Additional trust fund income is derived from revenues from federal 
income taxes on railroad retirement benefits, and appropriations from 
general Treasury revenues provided after 1974 as part of a phase-out of 
certain vested dual benefits. 

Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays: 

Based on a 5-year average, estimated outlays from the Rail Industry 
Pension Fund differed from actual outlays by about $4.1 billion per 
year, or 125.7 percent, in absolute value terms. The actual annual 
differences between estimated and actual outlays varied between an 
overestimate of $77 million and an underestimate of about $17.9 
billion. The majority of the underestimate was a result of legislation 
that resulted in funds being transferred out of the account and into a 
nongovernmental investment trust fund. Table 13 presents the estimated 
and actual outlays associated with the Rail Industry Pension Fund, by 
fiscal year. 

Table 13: Estimated and Actual Rail Industry Pension Fund Outlays, by 
Fiscal Year: 

Nominal dollars in millions. 

2000; 
Original outlay estimate: $3,038; 
Actual outlays: $2,961; 
Difference: $77. 

2001; 
Original outlay estimate: $3,044; 
Actual outlays: $2,967; 
Difference: $77. 

2002; 
Original outlay estimate: $3,078; 
Actual outlays: $4,814; 
Difference: -$1,736. 

2003; 
Original outlay estimate: $3,416; 
Actual outlays: $21,326; 
Difference: -$17,910. 

2004; 
Original outlay estimate: $3,639; 
Actual outlays: $4,225; 
Difference: -$586. 

5-year average dollar difference; 
Difference: -$4,016. 

5-year average difference as a percent of average estimated outlays; 
Difference: -123.8%. 

5-year average dollar difference (absolute value), 5-year percentage 
difference (absolute value); 
Difference: $4,077; 125.7%. 

Source: GAO analysis of President's budget data. 

[End of table] 

Explanation of Key Differences: 

The discrepancies between estimated and actual outlays in fiscal years 
2002 through 2004 can be attributed to the enactment of the Railroad 
Retirement and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001, which was signed 
into law on December 21, 2001. This legislation lowered eligibility 
requirements for annuitants and eliminated reductions that previously 
applied to annuities of 30-year employees retiring between ages 60 and 
62. The law also lowered the minimum eligibility requirement to receive 
regular annuities from 10 to 5 years of service after 1995 and 
increased the Tier II amount paid to a widow(er) from 50 percent to 100 
percent. Additionally, the maximum limit on monthly railroad retirement 
benefits was eliminated. The law reduced the Tier II tax rate on rail 
employers in 2002 and 2003, and in 2004 provided automatic Tier II tax 
rate adjustments for both employers and employees. Lastly, funds in 
excess of those needed for current payment of benefits and 
administrative expenses were transferred to the National Railroad 
Retirement Investment Trust. 

Agency officials indicated that the level of employment in the rail 
industry is the most difficult factor to predict when estimating 
revenue because it directly affects payroll tax income. Employment only 
affects estimates in the long term, not short term. When reporting 
budget estimates to OMB, the agency uses middle-range estimates that 
assume employment will decrease gradually over time. Additionally, 
financial interchanges of the estimated allocation of benefits between 
the Railroad Retirement Account and Social Security Equivalent Benefit 
Account make it difficult to estimate exact outlays as they are 
continually changing. A detailed explanation of the differences is 
shown in table 14. 

Table 14: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual Rail 
Industry Pension Fund Outlays: 

Nominal dollars in billions. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2000; $0.08; 
RRB's explanation of differences: Technical: Difference results from 
changes in the estimated allocation of benefits between the Railroad 
Retirement Account and Social Security Equivalent Benefit Account. The 
actual allocation of benefits between these accounts for a given 
calendar year is not known until the financial interchange 
determination is completed some 16 months after the end of a calendar 
year (which implies about 19 months after the end of the fiscal year 
ending in the given calendar year). 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2001; $0.08; 
RRB's explanation of differences: Technical: Difference results from 
changes in the estimated allocation of benefits between the Railroad 
Retirement Account and Social Security Equivalent Benefit Account. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2002; -$1.7; 
RRB's explanation of differences: Legislative: The number of 
retirements increased due to the enactment of the Railroad Retirement 
and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001, which lowered eligibility 
requirements for annuitants and eliminated reductions that previously 
applied to annuities of 30-year employees retiring at age 60. The Act 
also lowered the minimum eligibility requirement to receive regular 
annuities from 10 to 5 years of service after 1995 and increased the 
Tier II amount paid to a widow(er) from 50 percent to 100 percent. 
Additionally, the maximum limit on monthly railroad retirement benefits 
was eliminated. The Act reduced the Tier II tax rate on rail employers 
in 2002 and 2003, and in 2004 provided automatic Tier II tax rate 
adjustments for both employers and employees. Funds in excess of those 
required for current payment of benefits and administrative expenses, 
$1.432 billion, were transferred to the NRRIT; 
RRB's explanation of differences: Technical: The original outlay 
estimates are for benefit payments only. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2003; -$17.9; 
RRB's explanation of differences: Legislative: The number of 
retirements increased due to the enactment of the Railroad Retirement 
and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001. Funds in excess of those 
required for current payment of benefits and administrative expenses, 
$17.75 billion, were transferred to the NRRIT; 
RRB's explanation of differences: Technical: The original outlay 
estimates are for benefit payments only. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2004; -$0.59; 
RRB's explanation of differences: Legislative: Funds in excess of those 
required for current payment of benefits and administrative expenses, 
$586 million, were transferred to the NRRIT; 
RRB's explanation of differences: Technical: The original outlay 
estimates are for benefit payments only. 

Source: Railroad Retirement Board. 

Notes: Primary drivers of outlay differences are marked in bold. 

[A] A negative difference means that actual outlays were higher than 
originally estimated. A positive difference means that actual outlays 
were less than originally estimated. 

[End of table] 

Illustrative Trigger and Response: 

If actual outlays exceeded estimates by more than the historical 
average, Congress could reduce retirement benefits across the board. 
For example, if estimated outlays historically differed from actual 
outlays by a specified percent, increases in outlays above that 
specified percent could automatically result in an across-the-board 
increase in retirement contributions or a cut in retirement benefits. 
To determine an appropriate threshold, rail officials would need to 
look at long-term historical differences to minimize the effects of 
events such as the legislative change in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. 

Account Name: 

Unemployment Trust Fund: 

Administering Organization: 

Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor: 

50 states, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands: 

Program Description: 

Unemployment insurance is designed to serve as a "counter-cyclical" 
remedy to the effects of recessions by putting more dollars in the 
pockets of the labor force, thereby increasing the demand for goods and 
services and stabilizing the U.S. economy. 

The Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) finances unemployment insurance--a 
joint federal-state program that provides temporary cash benefits to 
eligible workers who become unemployed through no fault of their own 
and helps to stabilize the economy in times of economic recession. 
Guided by federal law, unemployed workers must meet certain criteria 
set by their state in order to receive these benefits. Unemployment 
insurance is administered by state employees under state law. 

Extended benefits are paid during periods of high state unemployment. 
Extended benefits are financed one-half by state payroll taxes and one- 
half by the federal unemployment payroll tax. The federal tax also pays 
for the cost of federal and state administration of unemployment 
insurance, labor-market information programs, veterans' employment 
services, and 97 percent of the costs of the employment service. States 
may receive repayable advances from the UTF when their balances in the 
fund are insufficient to pay benefits. 

Federal unemployment payroll taxes accumulate in three accounts: (1) 
the Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA), which covers 
both federal and state administrative costs; (2) the Extended 
Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA), which covers the federal 
share of extended unemployment benefits and has been used to fund 
temporary extended unemployment compensation benefits; and (3) the 
Federal Unemployment Account (FUA), which funds loans to insolvent 
state accounts. There is a statutory ceiling on the size of each of 
these accounts, the amounts of which are calculated each September. The 
ceiling for the ESAA account is 40 percent of the appropriated amounts 
during the fiscal year for which the ceiling is being calculated. For 
the EUCA and FUA accounts, this ceiling is 0.5 percent of the total 
covered wages in the prior calendar year. 

Funding Source: 

The UTF is funded by employer contributions (payroll taxes) and benefit 
reimbursements from nonprofit entities and governmental units that are 
paid in lieu of payroll taxes. The UTF may receive repayable advances 
from the general fund of the Treasury when it has insufficient balances 
to make advances to states or to pay the federal share of extended 
benefits. 

The UTF invests its receipts in U.S. government securities and then 
draws on them when the government needs to pay unemployment benefits 
and/or cover administrative costs. In addition, the Treasury maintains 
a trust fund account for each state that it can use to build up 
reserves in times of economic stability. Forty-nine states have 
triggers that automatically raise state employer taxes when UTF 
balances fall below a specific level. 

States finance the costs of regular unemployment insurance benefits and 
their half of the permanent Extended Benefits Program with employer 
payroll taxes imposed on at least the first $7,000 paid annually to 
each employee. 

Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays: 

Based on a 5-year average, estimated outlays from the UTF differed from 
actual outlays by about $9.4 billion per year, or 29.6 percent, in 
absolute value terms. However, the actual annual differences varied 
between an overestimate of about $5 billion and an underestimate of 
about $22 billion. Table 15 presents the estimated and actual outlays 
associated with the unemployment program by fiscal year. 

Table 15: Estimated and Actual Unemployment Trust Fund Outlays, by 
Fiscal Year: 

Nominal dollars in millions. 

2000; 
Original outlay estimate: $25,773; 
Actual outlays: $20,790; 
Difference: $4,983. 

2001; 
Original outlay estimate: $24,708; 
Actual outlays: $27,989; 
Difference: -$3,281. 

2002; 
Original outlay estimate: $28,443; 
Actual outlays: $50,841; 
Difference: -$22,398. 

2003; 
Original outlay estimate: $40,795; 
Actual outlays: $54,617; 
Difference: -$13,822. 

2004; 
Original outlay estimate: $39,830; 
Actual outlays: $42,525; 
Difference: -$2,695. 

5-year average dollar difference; 
Difference: -$7,443. 

5-year average difference as a percent of average estimated outlays; 
Difference: -23.3%. 

5-year average dollar difference (absolute value), 5-year percentage 
difference (absolute value); 
Difference: $9,436; 29.6%. 

Source: GAO analysis of President's budget data. 

[End of table] 

Explanation of Key Differences: 

Because the overall unemployment rate increased over the 5 fiscal 
years, actual UTF outlays also increased as would be expected. UTF 
outlays are highly sensitive to changes in the unemployment rate. For 
example, between 2000 and 2001 the 17.5 percent increase in the 
unemployment rate was associated with a 34.6 percent increase in actual 
UTF outlays. This relationship is best illustrated by referring to 
figure 8. 

Figure 8: Percent Change in Unemployment Rate versus Percent Change in 
Actual UTF Outlays: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Between 2001 and 2002, UTF outlays increased 81.6 percent in response 
to a 23.4 percent increase in the unemployment rate. In 2002, part of 
the outlay increase was due to legislation extending federally-funded 
unemployment insurance benefits through the Temporary Employment 
Compensation Act of 2002 (TEUC) which resulted in unanticipated UTF 
outlays. The unemployment rate continued to rise during this time as 
130,000 workers were displaced after the events on September 11, 2001, 
and the economic recession persisted. Between 2002 and 2003, TEUC 
benefits were extended and the unemployment rate continued to increase 
but did so at a decreasing rate. The 3.4 percent increase in the 
unemployment rate and the subsequent extension of TEUC led to the 7.4 
percent increase in UTF outlays. Between 2003 and 2004, the 
unemployment rate decreased by 8.3 percent and outlays decreased by 
about 22 percent. Table 16 presents the Department of Labor's (Labor) 
explanation for differences between estimated and actual outlays. 

Table 16: Explanation of Differences between Estimated and Actual 
Unemployment Trust Fund Outlays: 

Nominal dollars in billions. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2000; $5.0; 
Labor's explanation of differences: Economic: An overestimate of the 
unemployment rate (5 percent estimated versus 4 percent actual) 
explained $4.7 billion of the difference. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2001; -$3.3; 
Labor's explanation of differences: Economic: An underestimate of the 
recipiency rate[B] (38 percent estimated versus 42 percent actual) 
explained $2.9 billion of the difference. The recipiency rate increased 
from 37 percent the prior year, which is typical for a recession, but 
was unanticipated[C]. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2002; -$22.4; 
Labor's explanation of differences: Legislative: TEUC[D] enactment 
resulted in $7.9 billion of unanticipated outlays; 
Labor's explanation of differences: Economic: A 1.1 percent 
underestimate of the unemployment rate due to recession resulted in a 
$6.6 billion difference. Underestimates of the recipiency rate and the 
average weekly benefit accounted for about $4.8 billion and $2.4 
billion in outlays, respectively.[E]. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2003; -$13.9; 
Labor's explanation of differences: Legislative: TEUC extension 
resulted in $11 billion of unanticipated outlays; 
Labor's explanation of differences: Economic: An underestimate of the 
unemployment rate accounted for an additional $2.9 billion. 

Fiscal year and dollar differences[A]: 2004; -$2.7; 
Labor's explanation of differences: Legislative: TEUC extension 
resulted in $4.3 billion of unanticipated outlays; 
Labor's explanation of differences: Economic: Overestimates of the 
recipiency rate and average weekly benefit partly offset the TEUC 
extension. 

Source: Department of Labor. 

Notes: Primary drivers of outlay differences are marked in bold. 

[A] A negative difference means that actual outlays were higher than 
originally estimated. A positive difference means that actual outlays 
were less than originally estimated. 

[B] The recipiency rate refers to the number of benefit claims and, 
more specifically, is the ratio of the insured unemployed (claimants) 
to the total number of unemployed. The rate tends to vary between 35 
and 45 percent. 

[C] According to the CRS, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
are directly attributed to displacing 130,000 employees. 

[D] The Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act (TEUC), as 
amended, temporarily extended unemployment benefits from March 2002 
through December 2004. 

[E] Department of Labor officials did not include the $8 billion Reed 
Distribution in 2002 as part of the explanation of the difference 
between estimated and actual outlays in fiscal year 2002 because it was 
considered an intragovernmental transfer and was not recorded until the 
states used the money held in the U.S. Treasury. Reed Distributions to 
states' accounts occur when funds accumulating in federal unemployment 
accounts reach statutorily set limits. 

[End of table] 

Illustrative Triggers and Responses: 

Currently, when funds accumulating in federal unemployment accounts 
reach statutorily set limits, a distribution of the "excess" funds from 
the UTF to individual states' accounts in the U.S. Treasury is 
automatically triggered based on each state's share of covered wages. 
These distributions are known as "Reed Distributions."[Footnote 58] 
Congress can also legislatively trigger a special distribution[Footnote 
59] as it did in March 2002, which provided $8 billion in distributions 
to all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands and extended UTF benefits up to an additional 13 weeks longer 
than the maximum 26 weeks previously allowed by most states. 

One potential option to constrain federal spending would be to increase 
the statutory cap on federal unemployment accounts, thus making it more 
difficult to trigger Reed Distributions to states. By making it more 
difficult to trip the trigger, funds could continue to build during 
economic prosperity and be available to states when truly needed to 
counter rising unemployment. 

A different alternative for constraining growth would be to establish a 
trigger using a measure of economic prosperity--such as GDP growth in a 
specified number of consecutive quarters. If this trigger was reached, 
federal unemployment taxes would automatically increase, allowing trust 
fund balances to rise. To avoid procyclical effects, these taxes could 
be automatically reduced again using periods of rising unemployment or 
recession as the trigger for that action. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Analysis of Total Outlays, Receipts, and Fiscal Position: 

While the focus of this report is on budget triggers as they relate to 
selected case study accounts, we have included our analysis of 
aggregate receipts, outlays, and surplus/deficit measures to provide 
broader context. Findings related to our seven case study accounts and 
the reasons for differences between estimated and actual outlays are 
discussed in the body of this report. More detailed summaries of each 
account are included in appendix I. 

Aggregate Mandatory Spending Estimates Were Close to Actual Outlays but 
Large Differences Appear at the Account Level: 

In the aggregate, original estimates of total mandatory spending were 
fairly close to actual results, however large discrepancies were 
evident at the account level. During fiscal years 2000 through 2004, 
estimated total mandatory outlays differed from actuals by no more than 
about 2 percent, or $24 billion. However at the account level, average 
estimated and actual outlays varied greatly. While the largest 
difference was in the Interest on the Public Debt account--a result of 
other changes--other accounts also showed significant changes between 
estimated and actual outlays. Alternatively, there are many mandatory 
accounts with virtually no differences between estimated and actual 
outlays. The variation among individual accounts was not apparent at 
the aggregate level because the combination of positive and negative 
differences offset each other. 

Figure 9 shows that total spending on mandatory programs was expected 
to rise throughout the 5-year period and that resulting outlays were 
just slightly higher than expected. 

Figure 9: Estimated and Actual Total Mandatory Outlays for FYs 2000- 
2004, constant 2004 dollars: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Although aggregate estimates were close to actual estimates, the 
continued actual and forecasted growth in mandatory programs has raised 
concerns about the government's long-term fiscal outlook. Addressing 
growth in mandatory spending is an important but complicated matter 
that requires looking below the aggregate and into specific programs. 

Differences between Estimated and Actual Mandatory Outlays Had Limited 
Effect on the Unified Deficit/Surplus: 

The unified budget deficit/surplus measures federal fiscal position, 
that is, the difference between total annual receipts and outlays. Not 
surprisingly, the relatively small differences between total estimated 
and actual mandatory outlays had a limited effect on the unified budget 
surplus/deficit. In most cases throughout fiscal years 2000 through 
2004, the difference between estimated and actual mandatory outlays 
accounted for approximately 7 percent or less of the difference between 
the estimated and actual fiscal position. Despite the fact that 
mandatory outlays were close to expectations, surplus/deficit measures 
proved difficult to estimate throughout the 5-year period, primarily 
because of misestimates of federal receipts.[Footnote 60] 

During fiscal years 2000 through 2004, deficit/surplus projections were 
generally more optimistic than reality. Figure 10 illustrates the 
estimated and actual fiscal position (surplus/deficit) throughout the 5-
year period. Although increasing surpluses were projected for the first 
three years followed by growing deficits, actual results show that the 
nation's fiscal position in fact declined throughout the 5-year 
timeframe. In addition, projections for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 show 
that the deficit was expected to grow but not to the magnitude that 
ultimately resulted. 

Figure 10: Estimated and Actual Surplus/Deficit, Fiscal Years 2000- 
2004, constant 2004 dollars: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The fiscal position represents the difference between total federal 
revenues and outlays in a given year. Although mandatory spending 
constitutes more than half of total federal spending, misestimates of 
the amount of mandatory spending did not contribute significantly to 
the differences between the predicted and actual fiscal position. 
According to the detailed receipt and outlay data shown in table 17, 
the mandatory outlay difference in most cases accounted for less than 7 
percent of the difference between the estimated and actual fiscal 
position with one exception. In fiscal year 2001, the mandatory outlay 
estimating error had a larger than usual effect--approximately 29 
percent--on the fiscal position estimating error. While this particular 
year stands out in the analysis, it is a reasonable result given that 
the total amount of error in surplus/deficit projections was much 
smaller--approximately 30 percent or $60 billion--compared with any 
other year during the 5-year period. For example, a $242 billion 
surplus was projected for 2002 when in fact the nation's fiscal 
position changed from surplus to deficit, resulting in a $165 billion 
deficit for that year.[Footnote 61] This discrepancy represented a 
misestimate of approximately 168 percent. In both fiscal years 2001 and 
2002, mandatory outlay estimates differed from actual outlays by 
approximately 2 percent. This relatively small difference accounted for 
over one quarter of the resulting error in the surplus projection for 
2001 because the difference between estimated and actual receipts also 
was relatively small. It accounted for less than one-tenth of the total 
error in the fiscal position projection for 2002 because the difference 
between estimated and actual receipts was much larger. Effects similar 
to the latter occurred more frequently throughout the 5-year period, 
indicating that estimation errors in mandatory outlays had a limited 
effect on fiscal position. 

Table 17: Aggregate Estimated and Actual Outlays and Receipts for 
Fiscal Years 2000-2004: 

Constant 2004 dollars in billions. 

Fiscal Year 2000. 

Receipts; 
Original estimate: $2,055.7; 
Actual: $2,210.9; 
Difference: -$155.3; 
Percent of original estimate: -7.6%; 
Percent of difference: 119.7%. 

Outlays; 
Original estimate: $1,927.6; 
Actual: $1,953.1; 
Difference: -$25.5; 
Percent of original estimate: -1.3%; 
Percent of difference: 19.7%. 

Discretionary spending; 
Original estimate: $645.7; 
Actual: $671.2; 
Difference: -$25.4; 
Percent of original estimate: -3.9%; 
Percent of difference: 19.6%. 

Mandatory spending; 
Original estimate: $1,093.7; 
Actual: $1,085.0; 
Difference: $8.6; 
Percent of original estimate: 0.8%; 
Percent of difference: -6.6%. 

Offsetting receipts; 
Original estimate: -$46.8; 
Actual: -$46.5; 
Difference: -$0.3; 
Percent of original estimate: 0.7%; 
Percent of difference: 0.3%. 

Net interest; 
Original estimate: $234.9; 
Actual: $243.3; 
Difference: -$8.4; 
Percent of original estimate: -3.6%; 
Percent of difference: 6.5%. 

Surplus/Deficit; 
Original estimate: $128.1; 
Actual: $257.8; 
Difference: -$129.7; 
Percent of original estimate: -101.3%; 
Percent of difference: 100.0%. 

Fiscal Year 2001. 

Receipts; 
Original estimate: $2,154.1; 
Actual: $2,124.4; 
Difference: $29.7; 
Percent of original estimate: 1.4%; 
Percent of difference: 49.9%. 

Outlays; 
Original estimate: $1,957.8; 
Actual: $1,987.7; 
Difference: -$29.9; 
Percent of original estimate: -1.5%; 
Percent of difference: -50.1%. 

Discretionary spending; 
Original estimate: $676.3; 
Actual: $692.7; 
Difference: -$16.4; 
Percent of original estimate: -2.4%; 
Percent of difference: -27.6%. 

Mandatory spending; 
Original estimate: $1,107.6; 
Actual: $1,125.1; 
Difference: -$17.5; 
Percent of original estimate: -1.6%; 
Percent of difference: -29.4%. 

Offsetting receipts; 
Original estimate: -$48.4; 
Actual: -$50.1; 
Difference: $1.7; 
Percent of original estimate: -3.5%; 
Percent of difference: 2.9%. 

Net interest; 
Original estimate: $222.2; 
Actual: $220.0; 
Difference: $2.2; 
Percent of original estimate: 1.0%; 
Percent of difference: 3.8%. 

Surplus/Deficit; 
Original estimate: $196.3; 
Actual: $136.7; 
Difference: $59.6; 
Percent of original estimate: 30.3%; 
Percent of difference: 100.0%. 

Fiscal Year 2002. 

Receipts; 
Original estimate: $2,296.5; 
Actual: $1,941.7; 
Difference: $354.7; 
Percent of original estimate: 15.4%; 
Percent of difference: 87.0%. 

Outlays; 
Original estimate: $2,054.2; 
Actual: $2,107.1; 
Difference: -$52.8; 
Percent of original estimate: -2.6%; 
Percent of difference: -13.0%. 

Discretionary spending; 
Original estimate: $724.7; 
Actual: $769.4; 
Difference: -$44.6; 
Percent of original estimate: -6.2%; 
Percent of difference: -11.0%. 

Mandatory spending; 
Original estimate: $1,184.1; 
Actual: $1,208.2; 
Difference: -$24.1; 
Percent of original estimate: -2.0%; 
Percent of difference: -5.9%. 

Offsetting receipts; 
Original estimate: -$51.8; 
Actual: -$49.7; 
Difference: -$2.1; 
Percent of original estimate: 4.0%; 
Percent of difference: -0.5%. 

Net interest; 
Original estimate: $197.1; 
Actual: $179.1; 
Difference: $18.0; 
Percent of original estimate: 9.1%; 
Percent of difference: 4.4%. 

Surplus/Deficit; 
Original estimate: $242.2; 
Actual: -$165.3; 
Difference: $407.6; 
Percent of original estimate: 168.3%; 
Percent of difference: 100.0%. 

Fiscal Year 2003. 

Receipts; 
Original estimate: $2,093.5; 
Actual: $1,821.9; 
Difference: $271.6; 
Percent of original estimate: 13.0%; 
Percent of difference: 89.3%. 

Outlays; 
Original estimate: $2,175.4; 
Actual: $2,207.8; 
Difference: -$32.4; 
Percent of original estimate: -1.5%; 
Percent of difference: -10.7%. 

Discretionary spending; 
Original estimate: $806.5; 
Actual: $843.7; 
Difference: -$37.2; 
Percent of original estimate: -4.6%; 
Percent of difference: -12.2%. 

Mandatory spending; 
Original estimate: $1,260.0; 
Actual: $1,263.2; 
Difference: -$3.2; 
Percent of original estimate: -0.3%; 
Percent of difference: -1.0%. 

Offsetting receipts; 
Original estimate: -$75.7; 
Actual: -$55.6; 
Difference: -$20.1; 
Percent of original estimate: 26.6%; 
Percent of difference: -6.6%. 

Net interest; 
Original estimate: $184.7; 
Actual: $156.5; 
Difference: $28.2; 
Percent of original estimate: 15.3%; 
Percent of difference: 9.3%. 

Surplus/Deficit; 
Original estimate: -$81.9; 
Actual: -$386.0; 
Difference: $304.0; 
Percent of original estimate: -371.0%; 
Percent of difference: 100.0%. 

Fiscal Year 2004. 

Receipts; 
Original estimate: $1,922.0; 
Actual: $1,880.1; 
Difference: $42.0; 
Percent of original estimate: 2.2%; 
Percent of difference: 40.1%. 

Outlays; 
Original estimate: $2,229.4; 
Actual: $2,292.2; 
Difference: -$62.8; 
Percent of original estimate: -2.8%; 
Percent of difference: -59.9%. 

Discretionary spending; 
Original estimate: $818.8; 
Actual: $895.4; 
Difference: -$76.6; 
Percent of original estimate: -9.4%; 
Percent of difference: -73.1%. 

Mandatory spending; 
Original estimate: $1,287.9; 
Actual: $1,295.1; 
Difference: -$7.2; 
Percent of original estimate: -0.6%; 
Percent of difference: -6.9%. 

Offsetting receipts; 
Original estimate: -$53.7; 
Actual: -$58.5; 
Difference: $4.8; 
Percent of original estimate: -8.9%; 
Percent of difference: 4.6%. 

Net interest; 
Original estimate: $176.4; 
Actual: $160.2; 
Difference: $16.2; 
Percent of original estimate: 9.2%; 
Percent of difference: 15.5%. 

Surplus/Deficit; 
Original estimate: -$307.4; 
Actual: -$412.1; 
Difference: $104.7; 
Percent of original estimate: -34.1%; 
Percent of difference: 100.0%. 

Source: GAO analysis of President's budget data. 

[End of table] 

In contrast, revenue estimate inaccuracies proved to have a greater 
effect on projections of the nation's fiscal position. Throughout the 5-
year period, total estimated outlays differed from actual outlays by no 
more than 3 percent while total estimated receipts differed from actual 
receipts by up to 15 percent in absolute value terms. This suggests 
that revenue, rather than outlay estimates, led most significantly to 
the discrepancies in surplus/deficit projections. Figure 11 shows the 
total estimated and actual federal receipts in dollar terms for each 
year we reviewed.[Footnote 62] 

Figure 11: Total Estimated and Actual Receipts, Fiscal Years 2000-2004, 
constant 2004 dollars: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

As mentioned earlier in this report, the greatest revenue estimating 
errors occurred in 2000, 2002, and 2003, which correlate with the years 
in which the fiscal position projections were the most inaccurate. For 
example, in fiscal year 2002, an approximate 2.6 percent underestimate 
in total outlays coupled with an approximate 15.4 percent overestimate 
of receipts translated into a large shift in fiscal position from 
surplus to deficit. Similar effects occurred in 2000 and 2003. As shown 
in table 18, the driving source of revenue misestimates in any given 
year varied, but individual and corporate income taxes often proved 
difficult to estimate. 

Table 18: Revenue Estimates and Actual Results by Source and Fiscal 
Year: 

Constant 2004 dollars in millions. 

Fiscal Year 2000. 

Individual income taxes; 
Original estimate: $982,250; 
Actual: $1,096,574; 
Actual minus original: -$114,324; 
Percent of original: -11.6%. 

Corporate income taxes; 
Original estimate: $206,721; 
Actual: $226,298; 
Actual minus original: -$19,578; 
Percent of original: -9.5%. 

Social insurance taxes and contributions; 
Original estimate: $694,901; 
Actual: $712,721; 
Actual minus original: -$17,820; 
Percent of original: -2.6%. 

Excise taxes; 
Original estimate: $76,312; 
Actual: $75,180; 
Actual minus original: $1,132; 
Percent of original: 1.5%. 

Estate and gift taxes; 
Original estimate: $29,445; 
Actual: $31,670; 
Actual minus original: -$2,225; 
Percent of original: -7.6%. 

Customs duties; 
Original estimate: $20,048; 
Actual: $21,740; 
Actual minus original: -$ 1,692; 
Percent of original: -8.4%. 

Miscellaneous receipts; 
Original estimate: $45,991; 
Actual: $46,753; 
Actual minus original: -$762; 
Percent of original: -1.7%. 

Total; 
Original estimate: $2,055,668; 
Actual: $2,210,937; 
Actual minus original: -$ $155,269; 
Percent of original: -7.6%. 

Fiscal Year 2001. 

Individual income taxes; 
Original estimate: $1,037,459; 
Actual: $1,060,855; 
Actual minus original: -$23,396; 
Percent of original: -2.3%. 

Corporate income taxes; 
Original estimate: $207,799; 
Actual: $161,181; 
Actual minus original: $46,618; 
Percent of original: 22.4%. 

Social insurance taxes and contributions; 
Original estimate: $727,707; 
Actual: $740,389; 
Actual minus original: -$12,682; 
Percent of original: -1.7%. 

Excise taxes; 
Original estimate: $81,805; 
Actual: $70,663; 
Actual minus original: $11,143; 
Percent of original: 13.6%. 

Estate and gift taxes; 
Original estimate: $34,465; 
Actual: $30,300; 
Actual minus original: $4,165; 
Percent of original: 12.1%. 

Customs duties; 
Original estimate: $22,267; 
Actual: $20,665; 
Actual minus original: $1,602; 
Percent of original: 7.2%. 

Miscellaneous receipts; 
Original estimate: $42,590; 
Actual: $40,341; 
Actual minus original: $2,249; 
Percent of original: 5.3%. 

Total; 
Original estimate: $2,154,093; 
Actual: $2,124,393; 
Actual minus original: $29,699; 
Percent of original: 1.4%. 

Fiscal Year 2002. 

Individual income taxes; 
Original estimate: $1,130,332; 
Actual: $899,356; 
Actual minus original: $230,977; 
Percent of original: 20.4%. 

Corporate income taxes; 
Original estimate: $229,239; 
Actual: $155,117; 
Actual minus original: $74,122; 
Percent of original: 32.3%. 

Social insurance taxes and contributions; 
Original estimate: $760,476; 
Actual: $734,241; 
Actual minus original: $26,234; 
Percent of original: 3.4%. 

Excise taxes; 
Original estimate: $77,557; 
Actual: $70,190; 
Actual minus original: $7,367; 
Percent of original: 9.5%. 

Estate and gift taxes; 
Original estimate: $30,070; 
Actual: $27,773; 
Actual minus original: $2,297; 
Percent of original: 7.6%. 

Customs duties; 
Original estimate: $23,614; 
Actual: $19,491; 
Actual minus original: $4,123; 
Percent of original: 17.5%. 

Miscellaneous receipts; 
Original estimate: $45,165; 
Actual: $35,547; 
Actual minus original: $9,618; 
Percent of original: 21.3%. 

Total; 
Original estimate: $2,296,452; 
Actual: $1,941,715; 
Actual minus original: $354,737; 
Percent of original: 15.4%. 

Fiscal Year 2003. 

Individual income taxes; 
Original estimate: $1,028,676; 
Actual: $811,304; 
Actual minus original: $217,372; 
Percent of original: 21.1%. 

Corporate income taxes; 
Original estimate: $210,047; 
Actual: $134,701; 
Actual minus original: $75,346; 
Percent of original: 35.9%. 

Social insurance taxes and contributions; 
Original estimate: $765,831; 
Actual: $728,793; 
Actual minus original: $37,038; 
Percent of original: 4.8%. 

Excise taxes; 
Original estimate: $70,552; 
Actual: $69,022; 
Actual minus original: $1,530; 
Percent of original: 2.2%. 

Estate and gift taxes; 
Original estimate: $23,509; 
Actual: $22,446; 
Actual minus original: $1,063; 
Percent of original: 4.5%. 

Customs duties; 
Original estimate: $20,244; 
Actual: $20,303; 
Actual minus original: -$58; 
Percent of original: -0.3%. 

Miscellaneous receipts; 
Original estimate: -$25,371; 
Actual: $35,308; 
Actual minus original: -$60,679; 
Percent of original: 239.2%. 

Total; 
Original estimate: $2,093,489; 
Actual: $1,821,877; 
Actual minus original: $271,612; 
Percent of original: 13.0%. 

Fiscal Year 2004. 

Individual income taxes; 
Original estimate: $849,880; 
Actual: $808,959; 
Actual minus original: $40,921; 
Percent of original: 4.8%. 

Corporate income taxes; 
Original estimate: $169,060; 
Actual: $189,371; 
Actual minus original: -$20,311; 
Percent of original: -12.0%. 

Social insurance taxes and contributions; 
Original estimate: $764,548; 
Actual: $733,407; 
Actual minus original: $31,141; 
Percent of original: 4.1%. 

Excise taxes; 
Original estimate: $70,905; 
Actual: $69,855; 
Actual minus original: $1,050; 
Percent of original: 1.5%. 

Estate and gift taxes; 
Original estimate: $23,379; 
Actual: $24,831; 
Actual minus original: -$1,452; 
Percent of original: -6.2%. 

Customs duties; 
Original estimate: $20,713; 
Actual: $21,083; 
Actual minus original: -$ 370; 
Percent of original: -1.8%. 

Miscellaneous receipts; 
Original estimate: $38,540; 
Actual: $32,565; 
Actual minus original: $5,975; 
Percent of original: 15.5%. 

Total; 
Original estimate: $1,937,025; 
Actual: $1,880,071; 
Actual minus original: $56,954; 
Percent of original: 2.9%. 

Source: GAO analysis of President's budget data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Mandatory Budget Accounts: 

Table 19: Budget Accounts with Greater than 50 percent Mandatory 
Outlays: 

Dollars in millions. 

Obs. #1; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Interest on Treasury debt securities (gross); 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $20,016. 

Obs. #2; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Disability compensation benefits*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $9,977. 

Obs. #3; (Shaded) 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Unemployment trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $9,436. 

Obs. #4; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Compensation*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7,423. 

Obs. #5; (Shaded) 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Commodity Credit Corporation fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $6,944. 

Obs. #6; (Shaded) 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Federal supplementary medical insurance trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $6,427. 

Obs. #7; (Shaded) 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Federal hospital insurance trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5,622. 

Obs. #8; 
Agency: Office of Personnel Management; 
Account: Employees health benefits fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5,065. 

Obs. #9; (Shaded) 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Grants to States for Medicaid; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4,220. 

Obs. #10; (Shaded) 
Agency: Railroad Retirement Board; 
Account: Rail industry pension fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4,077. 

Obs. #11; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Payments to health care trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3,800. 

Obs. #12; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: FHA--mutual mortgage insurance program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2,892. 

Obs. #13; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Pensions benefits*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2,528. 

Obs. #14; (Shaded) 
Agency: Education; 
Account: Federal direct student loan program account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2,370. 

Obs. #15; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Immediate helping hand prescription drug plan*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2,240. 

Obs. #16; 
Agency: Postal Service; 
Account: Postal Service fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2,129. 

Obs. #17; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: FHA--mutual mortgage and cooperative housing insurance funds 
liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2,067. 

Obs. #18; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Food stamp program; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2,058. 

Obs. #19; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Temporary State fiscal assistance fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2,000. 

Obs. #20; 
Agency: Social Security Administration; 
Account: Federal old-age and survivors insurance trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,979. 

Obs. #21; 
Agency: Office of Personnel Management; 
Account: Payment to civil service retirement and disability fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,862. 

Obs. #22; 
Agency: Allowances; 
Account: Bipartisan economic security plan*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,600. 

Obs. #23; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Payment where child credit exceeds liability for tax; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,582. 

Obs. #24; 
Agency: Education; 
Account: Federal family education loan program account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,573. 

Obs. #25; 
Agency: Federal Communications Commission; 
Account: Universal service fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,539. 

Obs. #26; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Temporary assistance for needy families; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,322. 

Obs. #27; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Allowance for Medicare modernization*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,200. 

Obs. #28; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: September 11th victim compensation (general fund)*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,192. 

Obs. #29; 
Agency: Social Security Administration; 
Account: Payments to social security trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,168. 

Obs. #30; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Advances to the Unemployment trust fund and other* funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,154. 

Obs. #31; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Refunding internal revenue collections, interest; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,153. 

Obs. #32; 
Agency: Office of Personnel Management; 
Account: Government payment for annuitants, employees health benefits; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,081. 

Obs. #33; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Payment where earned income credit exceeds liability for tax; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1,004. 

Obs. #34; 
Agency: Office of Personnel Management; 
Account: Civil service retirement and disability fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $988. 

Obs. #35; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Black lung disability trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $987. 

Obs. #36; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: FHA--general and special risk insurance funds liquidating 
account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $964. 

Obs. #37; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: State children's health insurance fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $922. 

Obs. #38; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Compensation for air carriers*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $910. 

Obs. #39; 
Agency: Social Security Administration; 
Account: Federal disability insurance trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $865. 

Obs. #40; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Foreign military sales trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $850. 

Obs. #41; 
Agency: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 
Account: Bank insurance fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $844. 

Obs. #42; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Payment to the Resolution Funding Corporation; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $799. 

Obs. #43; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: United States quota, International Monetary Fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $793. 

Obs. #44; 
Agency: Federal Communications Commission; 
Account: Spectrum auction program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $785. 

Obs. #45; 
Agency: Education; 
Account: Federal family education loan liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $778. 

Obs. #46; 
Agency: Office of Personnel Management; 
Account: Employees and retired employees health benefits funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $775. 

Obs. #47; 
Agency: Social Security Administration; 
Account: Supplemental security income program; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $759. 

Obs. #48; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural electrification and telecommunications liquidating 
account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $681. 

Obs. #49; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Immigration support*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $652. 

Obs. #50; 
Agency: Small Business Administration; 
Account: Business loan program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $625. 

Obs. #51; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Interest paid to credit financing accounts; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $625. 

Obs. #52; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Crime victims fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $609. 

Obs. #53; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Housing program account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $594. 

Obs. #54; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Pension benefit guaranty corporation fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $581. 

Obs. #55; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Claims, judgments, and relief acts; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $569. 

Obs. #56; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Commodity Credit Corporation export loans program account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $553. 

Obs. #57; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: FHA--mutual mortgage insurance capital reserve account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $543. 

Obs. #58; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: FHA-general and special risk program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $536. 

Obs. #59; 
Agency: Export-Import Bank of the United States; 
Account: Export-Import Bank loans program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $516. 

Obs. #60; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Child care entitlement to States; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $499. 

Obs. #61; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Federal Financing Bank; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $488. 

Obs. #62; 
Agency: Homeland Security; 
Account: Citizenship and Immigration Services*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $471. 

Obs. #63; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Agricultural credit insurance fund program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $467. 

Obs. #64; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Exchange stabilization fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $440. 

Obs. #65; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Immigration services*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $418. 

Obs. #66; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Reemployment accounts*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $400. 

Obs. #67; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Payments to States for foster care and adoption assistance; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $392. 

Obs. #68; 
Agency: Other Defense Civil Programs; 
Account: Payment to Department of Defense Medicare-eligible retiree 
health care fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $390. 

Obs. #69; 
Agency: Other Defense Civil Programs; 
Account: Payment to military retirement fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $376. 

Obs. #70; 
Agency: Railroad Retirement Board; 
Account: National railroad retirement investment trust*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $367. 

Obs. #71; 
Agency: Railroad Retirement Board; 
Account: Railroad social security equivalent benefit account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $363. 

Obs. #72; 
Agency: Other Defense Civil Programs; 
Account: Department of Defense Medicare-Eligible retiree health care 
fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $361. 

Obs. #73; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Welfare to work jobs; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $353. 

Obs. #74; 
Agency: Homeland Security; 
Account: Retired Pay*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $352. 

Obs. #75; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Allied contributions and cooperation account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $346. 

Obs. #76; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Education benefits; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $324. 

Obs. #77; 
Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority; 
Account: Tennessee Valley Authority fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $323. 

Obs. #78; 
Agency: Small Business Administration; 
Account: Disaster loans program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $319. 

Obs. #79; 
Agency: Energy; 
Account: Bonneville Power Administration fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $317. 

Obs. #80; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Pentagon reservation maintenance revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $317. 

Obs. #81; 
Agency: Other Defense Civil Programs; 
Account: Military retirement fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $312. 

Obs. #82; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Iraq relief and reconstruction fund, Army*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $310. 

Obs. #83; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Federal crop insurance corporation fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $310. 

Obs. #84; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Payments to the Unemployment trust fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $305. 

Obs. #85; 
Agency: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 
Account: Savings association insurance fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $295. 

Obs. #86; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Payments to States for child support enforcement and family 
support programs; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $284. 

Obs. #87; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Mineral leasing and associated payments; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $279. 

Obs. #88; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Air transportation stabilization program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $273. 

Obs. #89; 
Agency: Homeland Security; 
Account: National Flood Insurance Fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $269. 

Obs. #90; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Interior Franchise Fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $260. 

Obs. #91; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Farm security and rural investment programs*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $254. 

Obs. #92; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Funds for strengthening markets, income, and supply (section 
32); 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $241. 

Obs. #93; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Allowance for transitional Medicare low-income drug 
assistance*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $240. 

Obs. #94; 
Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
Account: National flood insurance fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $227. 

Obs. #95; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Guarantees of mortgage-backed securities liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $223. 

Obs. #96; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Vocational rehabilitation and employment benefits*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $202. 

Obs. #97; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: National defense stockpile transaction fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $197. 

Obs. #98; 
Agency: National Credit Union Administration; 
Account: Credit union share insurance fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $195. 

Obs. #99; 
Agency: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 
Account: FSLIC resolution fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $189. 

Obs. #100; 
Agency: Export-Import Bank of the United States; 
Account: Export-Import Bank of the United States liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $188. 

Obs. #101; 
Agency: Office of Personnel Management; 
Account: Employees life insurance fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $187. 

Obs. #102; 
Agency: Education; 
Account: Federal student loan reserve fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $182. 

Obs. #103; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural electrification and telecommunications loans program 
account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $180. 

Obs. #104; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Coast Guard military retirement fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $178. 

Obs. #105; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Child nutrition programs; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $177. 

Obs. #106; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Social services block grant; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $177. 

Obs. #107; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Payment where health care credit exceeds liability for tax*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $177. 

Obs. #108; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Retired pay*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $174. 

Obs. #109; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural development insurance fund liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $174. 

Obs. #110; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Energy employees occupational illness compensation fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $160. 

Obs. #111; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Federal unemployment benefits and allowances; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $159. 

Obs. #112; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Supply fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $159. 

Obs. #113; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Ricky Ray hemophilia relief fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $150. 

Obs. #114; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Payment to Coast Guard military retirement fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $147. 

Obs. #115; 
Agency: Social Security Administration; 
Account: Payment to social security trust funds post-1956 military 
service wage credits*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $146. 

Obs. #116; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Forest Service trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $139. 

Obs. #117; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural housing insurance fund liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $131. 

Obs. #118; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Restitution of forgone interest*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $129. 

Obs. #119; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Economic assistance loans liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $127. 

Obs. #120; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Agricultural credit insurance fund liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $125. 

Obs. #121; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Tribal special fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $123. 

Obs. #122; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Working capital fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $118. 

Obs. #123; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Housing for the elderly or handicapped fund liquidating 
account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $118. 

Obs. #124; 
Agency: District of Columbia; 
Account: Federal payment to the District of Columbia pension fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $117. 

Obs. #125; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Forest Service permanent appropriations; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $116. 

Obs. #126; 
Agency: Small Business Administration; 
Account: Disaster loan fund liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $116. 

Obs. #127; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Payment to the Ricky Ray hemophilia relief fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $116. 

Obs. #128; 
Agency: Farm Credit System Financial Assistance Corporation; 
Account: Financial Assistance Corporation assistance fund liquidating 
account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $116. 

Obs. #129; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Ocean freight differential; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $115. 

Obs. #130; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Payments to copyright owners; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $113. 

Obs. #131; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Housing liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $104. 

Obs. #132; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Contribution for annuity benefits*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $103. 

Obs. #133; 
Agency: Social Security Administration; 
Account: Special benefits for disabled coal miners*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $95. 

Obs. #134; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Special benefits for disabled coal miners*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $94. 

Obs. #135; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Foreign military loan liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $93. 

Obs. #136; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Treasury forfeiture fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $88. 

Obs. #137; 
Agency: Small Business Administration; 
Account: Business loan fund liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $87. 

Obs. #138; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Special benefits; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $86. 

Obs. #139; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Overseas Private Investment Corporation program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $86. 

Obs. #140; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Miscellaneous permanent payment accounts; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $82. 

Obs. #141; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Commodity Credit Corporation guaranteed loans liquidating 
account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $81. 

Obs. #142; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Payment of anti- terrorism judgments*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $80. 

Obs. #143; 
Agency: Judicial Branch; 
Account: Judiciary filing fees; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $80. 

Obs. #144; 
Agency: Education; 
Account: Rehabilitation services and disability research; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $79. 

Obs. #145; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Payment where alternative to failing school credit exceeds 
liability for tax*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $76. 

Obs. #146; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Foreign military financing loan program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $70. 

Obs. #147; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: National service life insurance fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $70. 

Obs. #148; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Internal revenue collections for Puerto Rico; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $68. 

Obs. #149; 
Agency: Corps of Engineers--Civil Works; 
Account: Rivers and harbors contributed funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $67. 

Obs. #150; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Retirement pay and medical benefits for commissioned officers; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $67. 

Obs. #151; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $65. 

Obs. #152; 
Agency: United Mine Workers of America Benefit Funds; 
Account: United Mine Workers of America combined benefit fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $63. 

Obs. #153; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Healthy investments in rural environments*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $63. 

Obs. #154; 
Agency: Railroad Retirement Board; 
Account: Federal payments to the railroad retirement accounts; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $61. 

Obs. #155; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Maritime guaranteed loan (Title XI) program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $60. 

Obs. #156; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural telephone bank liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $60. 

Obs. #157; 
Agency: General Services Administration; 
Account: General supply fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $60. 

Obs. #158; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Burial benefits*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $59. 

Obs. #159; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Continued dumping and subsidy offset*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $56. 

Obs. #160; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Aviation insurance revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $56. 

Obs. #161; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Fund for rural America; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $55. 

Obs. #162; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Payments to states stabilization*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $54. 

Obs. #163; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Program management*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $52. 

Obs. #164; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Burial benefits and miscellaneous assistance*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $51. 

Obs. #165; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Refunds, transfers, and expenses of operation, Puerto Rico*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $51. 

Obs. #166; 
Agency: Federal Communications Commission; 
Account: Pioneer's preference settlement*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $50. 

Obs. #167; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Restoration of lost interest, Medicare trust funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $49. 

Obs. #168; 
Agency: Corps of Engineers--Civil Works; 
Account: Revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $48. 

Obs. #169; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Expenses, Public Law 480, foreign assistance programs, 
Agriculture liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $48. 

Obs. #170; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Expenses and refunds, inspection and grading of farm 
products*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $48. 

Obs. #171; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Working capital fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $48. 

Obs. #172; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Army conventional ammunition working capital fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $48. 

Obs. #173; 
Agency: United States Enrichment Corporation Fund; 
Account: United States Enrichment Corporation Fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $47. 

Obs. #174; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Public Health Service Commissioned Corps retirement fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $47. 

Obs. #175; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Surcharge collections, sales of commissary stores, Defense*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $46. 

Obs. #176; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Recreation fee permanent appropriations; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $45. 

Obs. #177; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Working capital fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $44. 

Obs. #178; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Transitional drug assistance, Federal supplementary medical 
insurance trust fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $43. 

Obs. #179; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Confiscated and vested Iraqi property and assets*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $42. 

Obs. #180; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Administrative expenses, Energy employees occupational illness 
compensation fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $40. 

Obs. #181; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Lower Colorado River Basin development fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $40. 

Obs. #182; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Federal Reserve Bank reimbursement fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $38. 

Obs. #183; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Government Printing Office revolving fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $38. 

Obs. #184; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Public safety officers' benefits*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $37. 

Obs. #185; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Permanent operating funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $37. 

Obs. #186; 
Agency: Department of State; 
Account: Working capital fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $36. 

Obs. #187; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Financial agent services*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $36. 

Obs. #188; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Census working capital fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $36. 

Obs. #189; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Federal Prison Industries, Incorporated*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $36. 

Obs. #190; 
Agency: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 
Account: Federal deposit insurance fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $36. 

Obs. #191; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Upper Colorado River Basin fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $35. 

Obs. #192; 
Agency: Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation; 
Account: Farm credit system insurance fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $35. 

Obs. #193; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Payment to health care trust funds for post-1956 military 
service wage credits*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $35. 

Obs. #194; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Assets forfeiture fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $35. 

Obs. #195; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Health care fraud and abuse control account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $34. 

Obs. #196; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Health education assistance loans program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $33. 

Obs. #197; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Housing and other credit guaranty programs liquidating 
account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $33. 

Obs. #198; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Initiative for future agriculture and food systems*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $33. 

Obs. #199; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Radiation exposure compensation trust fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $32. 

Obs. #200; 
Agency: Homeland Security; 
Account: Boat Safety*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $30. 

Obs. #201; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Payments to States, northern spotted owl guarantee, Forest 
Service*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $29. 

Obs. #202; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Working capital fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $29. 

Obs. #203; 
Agency: Corps of Engineers--Civil Works; 
Account: Coastal wetlands restoration trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $29. 

Obs. #204; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Boat safety*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $28. 

Obs. #205; 
Agency: Other Defense Civil Programs; 
Account: Contributions*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $28. 

Obs. #206; 
Agency: Homeland Security; 
Account: Oil Spill Recovery*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $28. 

Obs. #207; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Oil spill recovery*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $28. 

Obs. #208; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Tribal trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $27. 

Obs. #209; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Compact of free association; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $27. 

Obs. #210; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Promote and develop fishery products and research pertaining 
to American fisheries; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $26. 

Obs. #211; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Payment to Public Health Service Commissioned Corps retirement 
system*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $26. 

Obs. #212; 
Agency: Central Intelligence Agency; 
Account: Payment to Central Intelligence Agency retirement and 
disability system fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $26. 

Obs. #213; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Low-rent public housing--loans and other expenses; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $25. 

Obs. #214; 
Agency: Environmental Protection Agency; 
Account: Re-registration and expedited processing revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $24. 

Obs. #215; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: HHS service and supply fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $23. 

Obs. #216; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Abandoned mine reclamation fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $23. 

Obs. #217; 
Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
Account: Disaster assistance direct loan program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $23. 

Obs. #218; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Fees and expenses of witnesses; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $23. 

Obs. #219; 
Agency: Judicial Branch; 
Account: Judiciary information technology fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $22. 

Obs. #220; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Vaccine injury compensation program trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $22. 

Obs. #221; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Natural resource damage assessment fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $22. 

Obs. #222; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $21. 

Obs. #223; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Promoting safe and stable families; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $21. 

Obs. #224; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Payments to the United States territories, fiscal assistance; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $21. 

Obs. #225; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: McGovern-Dole international food for education and child 
nutrition program*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $20. 

Obs. #226; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Assessment funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $20. 

Obs. #227; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Essential air service and rural airport improvement fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $20. 

Obs. #228; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Revolving fund (liquidating programs)*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $18. 

Obs. #229; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $18. 

Obs. #230; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Urban and environmental credit program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $18. 

Obs. #231; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Commissary funds, Federal prisons (trust revolving fund)*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $18. 

Obs. #232; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Veterans special life insurance fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $18. 

Obs. #233; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Working capital fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $17. 

Obs. #234; 
Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
Account: Flood map modernization fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $17. 

Obs. #235; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Trade adjustment assistance for farmers*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $16. 

Obs. #236; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Federal aid in wildlife restoration; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $16. 

Obs. #237; 
Agency: Homeland Security; 
Account: Refunds, transfers, and expenses of operation, Puerto Rico*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $16. 

Obs. #238; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Milk market orders assessment fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $16. 

Obs. #239; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Health education assistance loans liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $15. 

Obs. #240; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Right-of-way revolving fund liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $15. 

Obs. #241; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Payment to radiation exposure compensation trust fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $15. 

Obs. #242; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Working capital fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $15. 

Obs. #243; 
Agency: Railroad Retirement Board; 
Account: Railroad unemployment insurance trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $15. 

Obs. #244; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Other DOD trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $14. 

Obs. #245; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Franchise fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $14. 

Obs. #246; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Office of Thrift Supervision*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $14. 

Obs. #247; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Diversion control fee account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $14. 

Obs. #248; 
Agency: General Services Administration; 
Account: Panama Canal revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $14. 

Obs. #249; 
Agency: National Science Foundation; 
Account: Donations; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $13. 

Obs. #250; 
Agency: Farm Credit System Financial Assistance Corporation; 
Account: Financial assistance corporation trust fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $13. 

Obs. #251; 
Agency: District of Columbia; 
Account: District of Columbia Federal pension liability trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $12. 

Obs. #252; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Colorado River dam fund, Boulder Canyon project; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $12. 

Obs. #253; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Sport fish restoration; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $12. 

Obs. #254; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Presidential election campaign fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $12. 

Obs. #255; 
Agency: United Mine Workers of America Benefit Funds; 
Account: United Mine Workers of America 1992 benefit plan; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $12. 

Obs. #256; 
Agency: Department of State; 
Account: Payment to Foreign Service retirement and disability fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $12. 

Obs. #257; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $11. 

Obs. #258; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Emergency steel guaranteed loan program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $11. 

Obs. #259; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: State grants and demonstrations*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $11. 

Obs. #260; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Children's research and technical assistance; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $10. 

Obs. #261; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural strategic investment program grants*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $10. 

Obs. #262; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Contingency fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $10. 

Obs. #263; 
Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
Account: National flood mitigation fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $10. 

Obs. #264; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural economic development grants; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $10. 

Obs. #265; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Everglades watershed protection*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $10. 

Obs. #266; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Other permanent appropriations; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $10. 

Obs. #267; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Vaccine injury compensation*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $9. 

Obs. #268; 
Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
Account: Disaster assistance direct loan liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $9. 

Obs. #269; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Interior Franchise Fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $9. 

Obs. #270; 
Agency: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 
Account: Office of Inspector General; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $9. 

Obs. #271; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Post- Vietnam era veterans education account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $9. 

Obs. #272; 
Agency: Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board; 
Account: Program expenses; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $9. 

Obs. #273; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Assistance to territories*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $9. 

Obs. #274; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Working capital fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $8. 

Obs. #275; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Buildings maintenance fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $8. 

Obs. #276; 
Agency: Department of State; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $8. 

Obs. #277; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Helium fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $8. 

Obs. #278; 
Agency: Other Defense Civil Programs; 
Account: Education benefits fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $8. 

Obs. #279; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Independent counsel; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $8. 

Obs. #280; 
Agency: Corps of Engineers--Civil Works; 
Account: Washington aqueduct*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $8. 

Obs. #281; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Reclamation trust funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $8. 

Obs. #282; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural cooperative development grants*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $8. 

Obs. #283; 
Agency: Energy; 
Account: Emergency fund, Western Area Power Administration*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $8. 

Obs. #284; 
Agency: United Mine Workers of America Benefit Funds; 
Account: Federal payment to United Mine Workers of America combined 
benefit fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $8. 

Obs. #285; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural business investment program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #286; 
Agency: Education; 
Account: College housing and academic facilities loans liquidating 
account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #287; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #288; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Service- disabled veterans insurance fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #289; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Gift and trust fund accounts; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #290; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Local television loan guarantee program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #291; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Community development loan guarantees liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #292; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Working Capital Fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #293; 
Agency: Department of State; 
Account: Foreign Service retirement and disability fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #294; 
Agency: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; 
Account: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #295; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #296; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Foreign national employees separation pay; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #297; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Federal ship financing fund liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $7. 

Obs. #298; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Cooperative fund (Papago)*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $6. 

Obs. #299; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Coastal zone management fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $6. 

Obs. #300; 
Agency: Energy; 
Account: Continuing fund, Southeastern Power Administration*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $6. 

Obs. #301; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Overseas Private Investment Corporation liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $6. 

Obs. #302; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Rental housing assistance fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $6. 

Obs. #303; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $6. 

Obs. #304; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Federal interest liabilities to States; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $6. 

Obs. #305; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Voluntary separation incentive fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #306; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Special workers' compensation expenses; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #307; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: State grants and demonstrations*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #308; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Community development loan guarantees program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #309; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Miscellaneous permanent appropriations; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #310; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Contribution for annuity benefits*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #311; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Job opportunities and basic skills training program*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #312; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Miscellaneous veterans housing loans program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #313; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Miscellaneous contributed funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #314; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Economic development revolving fund liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #315; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Environmental improvement and restoration fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #316; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Veterans reopened insurance fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $5. 

Obs. #317; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Conservation reserve program*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #318; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Canteen service revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #319; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: U.S. Capitol Preservation Commission*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #320; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Federal ship financing fund fishing vessels liquidating 
account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #321; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Payments for trust accounting deficiencies*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #322; 
Agency: National Credit Union Administration; 
Account: Operating fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #323; 
Agency: Railroad Retirement Board; 
Account: Supplemental annuity pension fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #324; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: National Sheep Industry Improvement Center*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #325; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Road and trail fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #326; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Payments to NOAA commissioned officer corps retirement fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #327; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Administering the public debt*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #328; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Loan guarantees to Israel program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #329; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Renewable energy program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #330; 
Agency: District of Columbia; 
Account: Federal payment for water and sewer services*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #331; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Host nation support fund for relocation; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #332; 
Agency: Standard Setting Body; 
Account: Payment to standard setting body*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $4. 

Obs. #333; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Miscellaneous contributed funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #334; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Bureau of Reclamation loan liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #335; 
Agency: General Services Administration; 
Account: Disposal of surplus real and related personal property; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #336; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Gifts and donations; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #337; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned 
Officer Corps retirement*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #338; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Informant payments*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #339; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Judiciary office building development and operations fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #340; 
Agency: Department of State; 
Account: Foreign Service national separation liability trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #341; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Refunds, transfers and expenses, Unclaimed and abandoned 
goods*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #342; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Wetlands reserve program; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #343; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Expenses and refunds, inspection and grading of farm products; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #344; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Operations and maintenance (Harbor services fee collections)*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #345; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: General post fund, national homes; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #346; 
Agency: Judicial Branch; 
Account: Judicial officers' retirement fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #347; 
Agency: National Archives and Records Administration; 
Account: National archives gift fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #348; 
Agency: Office of Personnel Management; 
Account: Government payment for annuitants, employee life insurance; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #349; 
Agency: Vietnam Education Foundation; 
Account: Vietnam debt repayment fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $3. 

Obs. #350; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Miscellaneous contributed funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #351; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Damage assessment and restoration revolving fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #352; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Manufactured home inspection and monitoring*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #353; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Migratory bird conservation account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #354; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Indian direct loan program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #355; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Operations and maintenance*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #356; 
Agency: General Services Administration; 
Account: Expenses of transportation audit contracts and contract 
administration; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #357; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds, AID*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #358; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Fisheries finance program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #359; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Other DOD trust revolving funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #360; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Medical facilities guarantee and loan fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #361; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Service members' group life insurance fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #362; 
Agency: Farm Credit Administration; 
Account: Revolving fund for administrative expenses*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #363; 
Agency: Federal Housing Finance Board; 
Account: Federal housing finance board*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #364; 
Agency: Judicial Branch; 
Account: Registry Administration; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #365; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Compensation of members and related administrative expenses; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #366; 
Agency: Small Business Administration; 
Account: Pollution control equipment fund liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #367; 
Agency: Corps of Engineers--Civil Works; 
Account: Permanent appropriations; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #368; 
Agency: Corps of Engineers--Civil Works; 
Account: Payment to South Dakota terrestrial wildlife habitat 
restoration trust fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #369; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Limited access system administration fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #370; 
Agency: Homeland Security; 
Account: US Customs Refunds, Transfers and Expenses, Unclaimed and 
Abandoned Goods*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #371; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Wildlife habitat incentives program; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #372; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Insurance benefits; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #373; 
Agency: District of Columbia; 
Account: Federal payment to the District of Columbia judicial 
retirement and survivors annuity fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #374; 
Agency: Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National 
Environmental Policy Foundation; 
Account: Environmental dispute resolution fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #375; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Farm storage facility loans program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #376; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Miscellaneous special funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #377; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Elderly vouchers*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #378; 
Agency: Department of State; 
Account: International litigation fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #379; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: National Indian Gaming Commission, Gaming activity fees; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #380; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Interest on uninvested funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #381; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Railroad rehabilitation and improvement liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #382; 
Agency: Environmental Protection Agency; 
Account: Abatement, control, and compliance direct loan liquidating 
account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #383; 
Agency: Panama Canal Commission; 
Account: Panama Canal Commission dissolution fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $2. 

Obs. #384; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: White Earth settlement fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #385; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Indian loan guaranty and insurance fund liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #386; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Emergency preparedness grants; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #387; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Congressional use of foreign currency, House of 
Representatives; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #388; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural communication development fund liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #389; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Franchise fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #390; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: United States trustee system fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #391; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Revolving fund for loans liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #392; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: National forests fund, Payment to States; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #393; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Recreational fee program; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #394; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #395; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Federal tax lien revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #396; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Microenterprise and small enterprise development program 
account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #397; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Contributed funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #398; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Miscellaneous permanent appropriations; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #399; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Check forgery insurance fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #400; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Payment to terrestrial wildlife habitat restoration trust 
fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #401; 
Agency: District of Columbia; 
Account: District of Columbia judicial retirement and survivors annuity 
fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #402; 
Agency: Environmental Protection Agency; 
Account: Abatement, control, and compliance loan program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #403; 
Agency: Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation; 
Account: Harry S. Truman memorial scholarship trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #404; 
Agency: James Madison Memorial Fellowship Foundation; 
Account: James Madison Memorial Fellowship trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #405; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: John C. Stennis Center for Public Service Training and 
Development trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #406; 
Agency: National Archives and Records Administration; 
Account: National archives trust fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #407; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Agricultural resource conservation demonstration program 
account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #408; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural economic development loans program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #409; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Manufactured housing fees trust fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #410; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Panama Canal Commission compensation fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #411; 
Agency: Department of State; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds, information and exchange programs*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #412; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Operation and maintenance of quarters; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #413; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Special therapeutic and rehabilitation activities fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #414; 
Agency: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; 
Account: EEOC education, technical assistance, and training revolving 
fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #415; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Peace Corps miscellaneous trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #416; 
Agency: Judicial Branch; 
Account: Judicial survivors' annuities fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #417; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Congressional use of foreign currency, Senate; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #418; 
Agency: Social Security Administration; 
Account: Special benefits for certain World War II veterans*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #419; 
Agency: Appalachian Regional Commission; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #420; 
Agency: Broadcasting Board of Governors; 
Account: Foreign Service national separation liability trust fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #421; 
Agency: Christopher Columbus Fellowship Foundation; 
Account: Christopher Columbus Fellowship Foundation*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #422; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Limitation on inspection and weighing services expenses*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #423; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural development loan fund liquidating account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #424; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Biomass research and development*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #425; 
Agency: Energy; 
Account: Payments to States under Federal Power Act; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #426; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Revolving fund for certification and other services*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #427; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Working capital fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #428; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Range improvements; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #429; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Cooperative endangered species conservation fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #430; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Everglades restoration account; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #431; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Leases of lands acquired for flood control, navigation, and 
allied purposes; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #432; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Contributed funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #433; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Payment of Government losses in shipment*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #434; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Terrorism insurance program*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #435; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Amtrak corridor improvement loans liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #436; 
Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
Account: National insurance development fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #437; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Property management fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #438; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Foreign Service national separation liability trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #439; 
Agency: Judicial Branch; 
Account: Gifts and donations, Federal Judicial Center Foundation; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #440; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Senate revolving funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #441; 
Agency: Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National 
Environmental Policy Foundation; 
Account: Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National 
Environmental Policy Foundation*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #442; 
Agency: Other Defense Civil Programs; 
Account: White House commission on the national moment of remembrance*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #443; 
Agency: Telecommunications Development Fund; 
Account: Telecommunications development fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $1. 

Obs. #444; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Distance learning, telemedicine, and broadband program*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #445; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural economic development loans liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #446; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Facilities acquisition and enhancement fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #447; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Homeownership assistance fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #448; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Consolidated fee fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #449; 
Agency: Department of State; 
Account: International Center, Washington, D.C.*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #450; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Donations and contributed funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #451; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Collection Contractor Support*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #452; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: United States Government life insurance fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #453; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Medical facilities revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #454; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Veterans extended care revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #455; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Kuwait civil reconstruction trust fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #456; 
Agency: Judicial Branch; 
Account: United States Court of Federal Claims Judges' retirement fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #457; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Compensation of members, Senate; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #458; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Tax Court judges survivors annuity fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #459; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Emergency boll weevil loan program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #460; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Gifts and bequests; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #461; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Apple loans program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #462; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Rural community fire protection grants*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #463; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: National sheep industry improvement center revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #464; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: Land acquisition reinvestment fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #465; 
Agency: Energy; 
Account: Continuing fund, Southwestern Power Administration*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #466; 
Agency: Energy; 
Account: Advances for cooperative work*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #467; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Interstate land sales*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #468; 
Agency: Department of State; 
Account: Foreign service national defined contributions retirement 
fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #469; 
Agency: Department of State; 
Account: USIA Foreign Service national separation liability trust 
fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #470; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Dutch John community assistance*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #471; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #472; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Minority business resource center program*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #473; 
Agency: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Appraisal 
Subcommittee; 
Account: Registry fees; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #474; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Private sector revolving fund liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #475; 
Agency: Japan-United States Friendship Commission; 
Account: Japan-United States Friendship trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #476; 
Agency: National Credit Union Administration; 
Account: Community development credit union revolving loan fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #477; 
Agency: Other Defense Civil Programs; 
Account: Wildlife conservation; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #478; 
Agency: Other Defense Civil Programs; 
Account: Soldiers' and airmen's home revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #479; 
Agency: Other Defense Civil Programs; 
Account: White House commission on the national moment of remembrance*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #480; 
Agency: Allowances; 
Account: Contingent offset for the refundable portion of the health 
care tax credit*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #481; 
Agency: Barry Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education 
Foundation; 
Account: Barry Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education 
Foundation; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #482; 
Agency: Agriculture; 
Account: P.L. 480 title I food for progress credits, program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #483; 
Agency: Commerce; 
Account: Gifts and bequests; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #484; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Concurrent receipt accrual payments to the Military Retirement 
Fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #485; 
Agency: Department of Defense--Military; 
Account: Restoration of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #486; 
Agency: Education; 
Account: Reading excellence*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #487; 
Agency: Education; 
Account: School construction*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #488; 
Agency: Education; 
Account: Class size reduction and teacher financing*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #489; 
Agency: Education; 
Account: Perkins loan revolving fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #490; 
Agency: Education; 
Account: Federal family education loan insurance fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #491; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: State legalization impact assistance grants*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #492; 
Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Account: Health maintenance organization loan and loan guarantee fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #493; 
Agency: Homeland Security; 
Account: Disaster assistance direct loan program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #494; 
Agency: Housing and Urban Development; 
Account: Empowerment zones/enterprise communities*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #495; 
Agency: Justice; 
Account: Civil liberties public education fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #496; 
Agency: Labor; 
Account: Foreign labor certification processing*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #497; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Bureau of Reclamation loan program account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #498; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Miscellaneous permanent appropriations*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #499; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Payment to tribe, Lower Brule Sioux Trust Fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #500; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Miscellaneous Indian trust payments*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #501; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Operation and maintenance of quarters*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #502; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Operation and maintenance of quarters*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #503; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Fee collection support, national park system*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #504; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: National park renewal fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #505; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Concessions improvement accounts*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #506; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Park concessions franchise fees*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #507; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: African elephant conservation fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #508; 
Agency: Interior; 
Account: Miscellaneous permanent appropriations*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #509; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Payment to Justice, FIRREA related claims*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #510; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Payments to the farm credit system financial assistance 
corporation liquidating account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #511; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Miscellaneous activities to be authorized in tobacco 
legislation*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #512; 
Agency: Treasury; 
Account: Miscellaneous permanent appropriations*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #513; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Railroad rehabilitation and improvement program*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #514; 
Agency: Transportation; 
Account: Aviation user fees; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #515; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Veterans housing benefit program fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #516; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Reinstated entitlement program for survivors under P.L. 97-
377*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #517; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Miscellaneous veterans housing loans guaranteed loan financing 
account*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #518; 
Agency: Veterans Affairs; 
Account: Medical care cost recovery fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #519; 
Agency: District of Columbia; 
Account: District of Columbia Federal pension fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #520; 
Agency: District of Columbia; 
Account: Federal payment for water and sewer services*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #521; 
Agency: Environmental Protection Agency; 
Account: Revolving fund for certification and other services*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #522; 
Agency: General Services Administration; 
Account: Working capital fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #523; 
Agency: General Services Administration; 
Account: Acquisition workforce training fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #524; 
Agency: General Services Administration; 
Account: Pennsylvania Avenue activities*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #525; 
Agency: General Services Administration; 
Account: Land acquisition and development fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #526; 
Agency: International Assistance Programs; 
Account: Payment to the Foreign Service retirement and disability fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #527; 
Agency: Judicial Branch; 
Account: Payment to judiciary trust funds; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #528; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: Gifts and donations*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #529; 
Agency: Legislative Branch; 
Account: United States Capitol Police memorial fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #530; 
Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
Account: National Space Grant Program*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #531; 
Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
Account: Science, space, and technology education trust fund; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #532; 
Agency: Other Independent Agencies; 
Account: Foreign service national separation liability trust fund*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #533; 
Agency: Other Independent Agencies; 
Account: Miscellaneous trust funds*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Obs. #534; 
Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority; 
Account: Tennessee Valley Authority Office of the Inspector General*; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $0. 

Total; 
5-year avg. dollar change (absolute value): $162,987. 

Source: GAO analysis of President's budget data. 

Note: The shaded rows indicate the 7 case study accounts discussed in 
appendix I. Accounts with fewer than 5 years of data are denoted with 
an "*." 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Susan J. Irving, (202) 512-9142, [Hyperlink, irvings@gao.gov]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Christine Bonham, Assistant 
Director, as well as Carol Henn, Richard Krashevski, Leah Nash, Sheila 
Rajabiun, Paul Posner, and Stephanie Wade made key contributions to 
this report. 

(450410): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] For more information, see GAO, 21ST Century Challenges: Reexamining 
the Base of the Federal Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: 
February 2005). 

[2] BEA established pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rules to ensure that 
legislation affecting direct, or mandatory, spending and revenues was 
budget-neutral over each session of Congress. In addition, annual 
discretionary spending limits were established. The sequestration 
procedure enforced PAYGO rules and discretionary spending caps. See 
Pub. L. No. 101-508, title XIII, § 13204, 104 Stat. 1388, Nov. 5, 1990. 

[3] GAO, Budget Policy: Issues in Capping Mandatory Spending, GAO/AIMD- 
94-155 (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 1994). 

[4] GAO, Fiscal Exposures: Improving the Budgetary Focus on Long-Term 
Costs and Uncertainties, GAO-03-213 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 2003). 

[5] GAO/AIMD-94-155. 

[6] These seven accounts listed in the Objectives, Scope and 
Methodology section were selected because of the relatively large 5-
year average differences between their estimated and actual outlays. 

[7] Both the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) estimate the cost of bills that affect 
mandatory spending. 

[8] BEA amended the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
of 1985, sometimes referred to as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. In 
this report, the amended Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
Act of 1985 is referred to as the Budget Enforcement Act, or BEA. 

[9] BEA defined mandatory spending (referred to as "direct spending" in 
BEA) as spending for entitlement authority, the Food Stamp program, and 
budget authority provided in laws other than appropriations acts. 
Mandatory programs include familiar benefits and services--among them 
Social Security, Food Stamps, and Medicare--as well as other lesser- 
known activities, such as revolving funds and certain activities of the 
National Park Service, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, and 
the federal judiciary. 

[10] GAO/AIMD-94-155. 

[11] Examples of these 2005 bills include S. 19, S. 568, H.R. 523, H.R. 
903, and H.R. 2290. 

[12] Given the size and breadth of programs covered by the Commodity 
Credit Corporation, we selected two programs within the large account: 
corn and crop disaster assistance. 

[13] Although the source of Medicaid funding is through an annual 
appropriation act, Medicaid is not considered a discretionary spending 
program. Because Medicaid is an entitlement created by the operation of 
law, if Congress fails to appropriate money necessary to fund payments 
and benefits, eligible recipients may seek legal recourse. In such 
case, necessary payments may be made through the indefinite judgment 
fund pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 1304. 

[14] For more information on MMI, see GAO, Mortgage Financing: FHA's $7 
Billion Reestimate Reflects Higher Claims and Changing Loan Performance 
Estimates, GAO-05-875 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2, 2005). 

[15] In addition, these interest payments must be made in order to 
avoid a default on the federal government's debt obligations. 

[16] GAO, Budget Surpluses: Experiences of Other Nations and 
Implications for the United States, GAO/AIMD-00-23 (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 2, 1999). 

[17] As discussed earlier, BEA established pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rules 
to ensure that legislation affecting direct spending and revenues was 
budget-neutral in each session of Congress. In addition, annual 
discretionary spending limits were established. 

[18] For the purpose of the Medicare trigger, general revenue is 
defined as the difference between Medicare program outlays and 
dedicated Medicare financing sources. Dedicated Medicare financing 
sources are HI payroll taxes, the HI share of income taxes on Social 
Security benefits, state transfers for Part D prescription drug 
benefits, premiums paid under Parts A, B, and D, and any gifts received 
by the trust funds. 

[19] Recently, this provision was included in the Bipartisan Retirement 
Security Act of 2005, H.R. 440, 109TH Cong. § 14 (2005). 

[20] CBO uses probabilistic modeling when the possible cost of a 
legislative proposal is not distributed symmetrically around a single, 
most likely outcome. For example, under marketing loan programs, low 
crop prices yield large costs to the government with farmers paying 
back loans at the lower market price rather than the higher loan rate. 
However, high crop prices provide no offsetting gains because farmers 
may simply repay their loans at the original loan rate. For more 
information, see CBO, Estimating the Costs of One-Sided Bets: How CBO 
Analyzes Proposals with Asymmetric Uncertainties (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 1999). 

[21] Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United 
States, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, Div. C, § 102, Jan. 10, 2002. 

[22] CRS, Fashioning a Tax Cut Trigger: Economic Issues, Order Code 
RL30948 (Washington, D.C.: Updated Jan. 29, 2002). 

[23] GAO-05-325SP. 

[24] Although the SGR was designed to encourage fiscal discipline, 
administrative and legislative actions modified or overrode the SGR 
system, resulting in fee increases for 2003, 2004, and 2005. For more 
information on this, see GAO, Medicare Physician Payments: Concerns 
about Spending Target System Prompt Interest in Considering Reform, GAO-
05-85 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004). 

[25] States may keep Reed Distributions in their trust funds or 
appropriate the money for administrative costs. Because state funds are 
held by the U.S. Treasury, they are not recorded as an outlay until the 
states distribute the funds. 

[26] GAO, Long-Term Fiscal Issues: Increasing Transparency and 
Reexamining the Base of the Federal Budget, GAO-05-317T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 8, 2005). 

[27] GAO, Government Performance and Accountability: Tax Expenditures 
Represent a Substantial Federal Commitment and Need to Be Reexamined, 
GAO-05-690 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2005). 

[28] Summing tax expenditure estimates does not take into account 
interactions between individual provisions. 

[29] For additional details, see GAO, Tax Policy: Tax Expenditures 
Deserve More Scrutiny, GAO/GGD/AIMD-94-122 (Washington, D.C.: June 3, 
1994). 

[30] Given this report's focus on constraining growth in mandatory 
spending, our analysis focused more on underestimates than 
overestimates of actual outlays. 

[31] If a new law has effects that differ from those reflected in CBO's 
initial estimate, the differences will appear as technical 
"reestimates" in later revisions to the baseline. 

[32] In all cases, CBO had prepared scoring estimates of the 
legislation. 

[33] Although Crop Disaster Assistance programs are generally funded 
through supplemental appropriations acts, the Department of Agriculture 
considers and applies funding in a manner similar to mandatory 
programs. According to a Farm Service Agency official, funding is 
provided to all eligible applications for assistance by prorating 
available funding if necessary. OMB also considers Crop Disaster 
Assistance programs to be mandatory in that all eligible applicants may 
receive benefits. 

[34] The HI Trust Fund finances Medicare Part A while the SMI Trust 
Fund finances Medicare Part B. 

[35] Federal commodity subsidies essentially consist of three types of 
payments available to supplement farmers' income: direct payments to 
historical producers of the commodity, countercyclical payments, which 
provide a safety net in the event of low crop prices, and nonrecourse 
loans, which allow farmers to store production and use loan proceeds to 
meet cash flow needs without selling the crop. 

[36] Direct loan subsidy cost is the estimated long-term cost to the 
government of a direct loan excluding administrative costs. It is the 
net present value of estimated loan disbursements, repayments of 
principal, payments of interest, and other payments by or to the 
government over the life of the loan. 

[37] The market basket refers to an input price index that reflects the 
cost of a particular type of health care provider (e.g., hospital, 
skilled nursing facility, home health agency) to provide services to 
patients. This index is used to update the payments to providers from 
one year to the next. 

[38] Section 101(a) of BBRA provided for a temporary, 20 percent 
increase in per diem adjusted payment rates for 15 specified resource 
utilization groups. Under section 101(c) of the Act, this increase was 
to be effective for SNF services furnished on or after April 1, 2000, 
and would continue until the later of: (1) October 1, 2000, or (2) 
implementation of a refined case-mix classification system that would 
better account for medically-complex patients. 

[39] The Commodity Credit Corporation budget account encompasses many 
programs that are influenced by different factors. Accordingly, to gain 
an appreciation for the factors that should be considered in designing 
budget triggers, we focused on two programs--corn and crop disaster 
assistance. These two programs experienced the greatest average 5-year 
differences between estimated and actual outlays. 

[40] Given the nature of soft triggers, that is, requiring special 
consideration or reporting, to avoid redundancy we do not present soft 
triggered actions for each of the case study accounts. 

[41] Farm Security Act and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-171 (May 13, 2002). 

[42] According to USDA's Economic Research Service, the average change 
in annual U.S. farm sector production expenses between 2001 and 2005 
was about 2.5 percent. 

[43] For example, see Military Construction Appropriation and Emergency 
Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-324, 
118 Stat. 1220, 1232-37, Oct. 13, 2005. 

[44] GAO, Budgeting for Emergencies: State Practices and Federal 
Implications, GAO/AIMD-99-250 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 1999). 

[45] Under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP), private 
lenders fund the loans and the government guarantees them a minimum 
yield and repayment if borrowers default. FFELP is a larger program 
than is FDLP in terms of both annual and outstanding loan volume. 

[46] Loans made in each fiscal year are called a cohort. 

[47] While using guaranteed loan data is appropriate for the interim, 
guaranteed loans may perform differently than FDLP loans. Accordingly, 
Education plans to phase out the use of guaranteed loan data as FDLP 
data become available. 

[48] Higher Education Act of 1965 (Public Law 89-329), as amended, 
Section 455 (a)(1). 

[49] Hereafter, all will be referred to as states. 

[50] Pub. L. No. 108-27, §401, 117 Stat. 752, 764 (May 28, 2003). 

[51] The premium for Part A was $375 per month in 2005. Medicare 
premiums can change each year. 

[52] The portion of the HI trust fund that is not needed to cover 
current expenditures for administration and benefits is invested on a 
daily basis in interest-bearing obligations of the federal government. 

[53] Public Law 108-173. In this report, the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 is referred to as the 
Medicare Modernization Act (MMA). 

[54] For the purpose of the Medicare trigger, general revenue is 
defined as the difference between Medicare program outlays and 
dedicated Medicare financing sources. Dedicated Medicare financing 
sources are HI payroll taxes, the HI share of income taxes on Social 
Security benefits, state transfers for Part D prescription drug 
benefits, premiums paid under Parts A, B, and D, and any gifts received 
by the trust funds. 

[55] Physician spending was about 40 percent of total Part B benefits 
in fiscal year 2004. 

[56] GAO, Medicare Physician Payments: Considerations for Reforming the 
Sustainable Growth Rate System, GAO-05-326T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 
2005) and Medicare Physician Payments: Concerns about Spending Target 
System Prompt Interest in Considering Reforms, GAO-05-85 (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004). 

[57] Part B premiums have seen double-digit increases in the past 3 
years, and are expected to continue in the future if Congress again 
decides to override the SGR. 

[58] Reed Distributions occur when excess funds build up in federal 
accounts. States can keep the money in their trust funds or appropriate 
the money for administrative costs. Because these state funds are held 
by the U.S. Treasury, they are not recorded as an outlay until the 
states distribute the funds. 

[59] Special Reed Distributions occur when Congress mandates a 
distribution to state UTF accounts but do not follow all the Reed Act 
provisions. 

[60] Differences between estimated and actual discretionary outlays 
were much greater than for mandatory outlays. However, on the whole, 
differences in receipts outweighed differences in outlays. 

[61] Budget figures discussed here are in constant 2004 dollars. 

[62] A comparable figure showing total estimated and actual mandatory 
outlays for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 is included as figure 9. 

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